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The accused was previously shot by the brother of the victim.

cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking the victim, the accused
was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire
to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he
was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a
running feud between them. (People vs. Toring, G.R. No. 56358, Oct.
26, 1990, 191 SCRA 38, 47)
The deceased hit the first cousin of the accused with the
butt of a shotgun. The deceased also pointed the shotgun at the
first cousin, took a bullet from his jacket pocket, showed it to
him and asked him, "Do you like this, Dong?" to which the latter
replied, "No, Noy, I do not like that." The deceased then placed
the bullet in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at the first
cousin when the accused came from behind the deceased and
stabbed him. There was unlawful aggression on the part of the
deceased and there was no provocation on the part of the accused.
However, because of a running feud between the deceased and
his brother on one side and the accused and his brother on the
other side, the accused could not have been impelled by pure
compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the
immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. He was motivated by
revenge, resentment or evil motive. He is only entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of
relative. (People vs. Toring, G.R. No. 56358, Oct. 26, 1990, 191
SCRA 38, 45-48)

Andal vs Sandiganbayan

- Andal appealed to the Court upon being charged for the crime of Homicide. He alleges that
Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his self-defense plea, since the unlawful agression was initiated
by the deceased (victim) He also contends that the cause of death of the deceased was through
accidental gunshots as he was trying to disarm the deceased.
- The antecedent of the crime was that Andal called out the deceased, Pfc Maximo Macaraig, for
failure to report to police headquarters for briefing but the latter just disrespected and told Andal
that he did not need to report as he already had Andal’s orders.
- At 11:00 PM, the deceased furiously approached Andal, asking why Andal embarrassed him in
front of so many people. Andal denied the deceased accusation and told him to put it all behind.
But the deceased refused to stop and challenged Andal to a gunfight that lead to both of them
grappling for the possession of the gun.
- The court finds Andal’s petition having no merit because the witnesses testified that the
deceased was more or less 2 meters from Andal when the gunshots were heard and that Andal
was seen holding the gun stretched downward and that he and the deceased were not grappling
for the possession of the gun when the gunshots were fired.

Whether or not Andal can use self-defense as a defense against his criminal liability of homicide.

- No, as it is essential that the attack upon defendant be simultaneous with the killing, or
preceded the latter without an appreciable interval of time. Also, before the decased and Andal
grappled for the possession of the gun and before the gunshots were fired, the deceased first
attacked Andal. The said initial unlawful aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he was
disarmed by accused. Lastly, the primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And
for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. In the
instant case, there was no imminent and real danger to the life or limb of the petitioner when he
shot the deceased, since the latter had already been disarmed.

The exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments

under Section 23 of P.D. 957 is a valid defense against the
purported violations of B.P. Big. 22 that petitioner is charged with.
Petitioner's exercise of the right of a buyer under Article 23 of P.D.
No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges against him. (Sycip vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000)

Accused-appellant shot the

victim in the left forearm. While he and the victim were
grappling for the gun, his co-accused who has remained at
large, stabbed the victim in the chest. The victim died and
it was established that the cause of death was hemorrhage,
secondary to stab wound. Held: Accused-appellant
was found guilty of homicide there being no qualifying
circumstance to make the killing murder. The fact that
he did not inflict the mortal wound is of no moment, since
the existence of conspiracy was satisfactorily shown by the evidence.

People vs Andal

He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were on their way to Mayor Asis house in
Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other persons talking to one
another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When he turned to look, he noticed that smoke was
coming out of appellants gun and that empty shells were dropping from it as appellant continued to fire
at the victim. Appellants rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the ground. He heard seven
(7) gunshots. Appellants companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not
fired because he did not notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take
cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim, appellant together with
his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis coffee plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim,
whom they found already dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victims wife

A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force must
prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence.i[25] He must show that the irresistible force
reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will.ii[26]
The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough.iii[27] A speculative, fanciful or remote
fear,iv[28] even fear of future injury,v[29] is insufficient.

In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that
the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any
attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not follow
them. No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the
Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a
real and imminent threat on his life or limb sufficient to overcome his free will.

People of the Philippines vs Gerardo Sazon, alias INSIK

GR. No. 89684 September 18, 1990


Ernesto Romualdez was confronted by Sazon for circulating a rumor that Sazon and his
companions were engaged in stealing, upon confrontation however, Romualdez boxed Sazon and
threatened to kill him. 2 days later, Sazon and his cousin followed Romualdez after seeing the
latter pass by. Sazon again confronted Romualdez, and Romualdez allegedly provoked Sazon to
just shoot. To which Sazon shot Romualdez dead.

Issue: WON Sazon was justified in killing Romualdez because there was provocation

Held: No. The alleged provocation of Romualdez was insufficient to justify Sazon's actions.
Furthermore, there was evident premeditation when Sazon and his cousin followed the
victim in an attempt to overpower himfatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of premeditated killing.
To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 22

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident of September 15, 1983, warning
the victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already
decided to kill the victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly
announced. It was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.

G.R. No. L-39630 November 13, 1933


LEONCIO ROXAS, defendant-appellant.

Counsel for the appellant maintains that the accused was a minor below eighteen when the
offense was committed and asked that this be considered as an additional mitigating
circumstance under the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Article
13, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of the
minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article 80.

Exhibit A, offered by the prosecution, states that the age of the accused at the time of the
commission of the offense was seventeen years and eight months. We accept this as the best
evidence in the record as to the true age of the accused. It is necessary, therefore, to reform the
judgment of the court below and to enter one in conformity with article 80 of the Revised Penal
Code. We accept and affirm the findings of fact of the court below as to the guilt of the
defendant. We further find the presence of the following extenuating circumstances and direct
that they be applied when final sentenced may be pronounced, namely: First, the age of the
accused being under eighteen (article 13, paragraph 2); second, provocation on the part of the
deceased (article 13, paragraph 4); third, obfuscation (article 13, paragraph 6); fourth, voluntary
surrender (article 13, paragraph 7). That part of the judgment which sentences the defendant to
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P1,000 is hereby revoked and it is ordered that the defendant-appellant be placed in the
Philippine Training School for Boys at Welfareville in the custody of the care of the
Commissioner of Public Welfare until the said defendant shall have attained his majority, subject
however, to the provisions and conditions of said article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.

But a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression. Two persons

met in the street. One slapped the face of the other and the latter
repelled it by clubbing him and inflicting upon him less serious
physical injury. Held: The act of slapping another constituted the
use of force qualifying an unlawful aggression. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of January 20, 1904; People vs. Roxas, 58
Phil. 733)

When the deceased who had attacked Alconga ran away, there
was no necessity for Alconga to pursue and kill the deceased. (People
vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366)

People vs. Alconga, et al.

(78 Phil. 366)
Facts: The deceased was the banker in a game of black jack.
The accused posted himself behind the deceased acting as a spotter
of the latter's cards and communicating by signs to his partner. Upon
discovering the trick, the deceased and the accused almost came
to blows. Subsequently, while the accused was seated on a bench
the deceased came and forthwith gave a blow with a "pingahan,"
but the accused avoided the blow by crawling under the bench. The
deceased continued with second and third blows, and the accused
in a crawling position fired with his revolver. A hand to hand fight
ensued, the deceased with his dagger and the accused using his bolo.
Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away, but was
followed by the accused and another fight took place, during which
a mortal blow was delivered by the accused, slashing the cranium
of the deceased.

Held: There were two stages in the fight between the accused and
the deceased. During the first stage of the fight, the accused in inflicting
several wounds upon the deceased acted in self-defense, because then
the deceased, who had attacked the accused with repeated blows, was
the unlawful aggressor. But when the deceased after receiving several
wounds, ran away, from that moment there was no longer any danger
to the life of the accused who, being virtually unscathed, could have
chosen to remain where he was and when he pursued the deceased,
fatally wounding him upon overtaking him, Alconga was no longer
acting in self-defense, because the aggression begun by the deceased
ceased from the moment he took to his heels.

enjamin, when they fell from the "papag", according to Macario Pascua.

Again, Benjamin's version is that, after this accidental injury on the back of Piol, the latter
succeeded in rolling over and being on top of him (Benjamin); that Piol then struck him on the
face with a stone; that, after fending off another attempt of Piol to similarly hit him again, he
(Benjamin) picked up another stone and, in turn, struck him with it on the head; that, as
Benjamin squeezed him by the neck, he let the stone loose and, pulling Piol down with his
(Benjamin's) right hand, he (Benjamin) stabbed Piol on the back — on which, according to
Benjamin, Piol was lying — by thrusting the dagger with his left hand; and that, at this juncture,
the Chief of Police came and took the weapon from him.

This story is manifestly artificious and unworthy of credence. It should be noted that, according
to Benjamin, he held the dagger, even before they fell from the "papag"; that the dagger was still
in his hand when Piol allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he (Benjamin), in turn, took
another piece of stone, and hit Piol with it. This would have been impossible, however, unless
Benjamin first released the dagger, which he then held; but, We cannot believe that he, or
anybody for that matter, would have done so under the circumstances.

Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin, the latter threw the stone away and
picked up the dagger once more. He would thus have Us believe that, in order to get the stone
with which he claimed to have hit Piol on the head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from
which, at the opportune moment, he got it back to inflict the second stab wound. The context of
Benjamin's story does not convey the idea that he had such a control of the situation as to be able
to choose the place where he would put the dagger and the time he would retrieve it.

But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach, for, by this time, he was again lying
down on his back — according to the defense — with Benjamin on top of him, he (Benjamin)
thrust the dagger, with his left hand, into the back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound
almost at right angle with his body, like the first. Just why, being in the precarious condition he
depicted himself, Benjamin chose to stab Piol in such an awkward, inconvenient and
unbelievable manner, the defense has not even tried to explain. Regardless of the foregoing, an
injury inflicted in this fashion on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed against the ground,
would have necessarily been much more slanting than the first, instead of being almost
perpendicular to the body. The fact of the matter — and this has been established by the
testimony of the Chief of Police, whose impartiality and veracity are not contested — is that Piol
was then lying down, not on his back, but on his stomach with Benjamin on top of him. This
explains why and how he (Benjamin) managed to stab Piol on the back. It, likewise, shows that
Piol could not have struck Benjamin on the face with a stone, much less squeezed his neck. .
It is clear, from the foregoing, that Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming
him.1 Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling
uncomplimentary remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol;2 that such remarks
led to an altercation with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him
on the head; that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which could have rendered him
groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to fight by
drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting from this act, by "rushing" to
his encounter and grappling with him; and that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the
benefit of either complete or incomplete self-defense.3 Although Piol was stabbed from
behind, Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of their
struggle, which had begun with both contenders facing each other, each prepared for the
fight that ensued.4

In this case, four members of the police force went after him
as soon as the detention prisoner had escaped. When the escaping
detainee saw one of the policemen, he lunged at the latter, hitting
him with a stone on the right cheek, as a consequence of which he
fell down, and while in that position on the ground, he was again
struck with a stone by the escaping detainee; thereafter, the latter
ran away pursued by the policeman and his companions; in the course
of the pursuit, the policeman fired a warning shot into the air, and as
the escaping detainee paid no heed to this, the policeman fired into
the air four times more and kept on pursuing him; as the latter was
apparently widening the distance between them, and fearing that
he might finally be able to elude arrest, the policeman fired directly
at him while he was in the act of jumping again into another part of
the creek, the shot having hit him on the back. (Valcorza vs. People,
30 SCRA 148-150)

When the accused surrendered to the policemen, he declined to

give any statement, which is the natural course of things he would
have done if he had acted merely to defend himself. A protestation
of innocence or justification is the logical and spontaneous reaction
of a man who finds himself in such an inculpatory predicament as
that in which the policemen came upon him still clutching the death
weapon and his victim dying before him. (People vs. Manansala, No.
L-23514, Feb. 17, 1970, 31 SCRA 401, 404)

There is no showing that the attack was agreed upon

between the two accused beforehand. No motive for it was
shown other than the provocation given by the deceased;
and such motive was true only insofar as the other accused
was concerned. The circumstances indicate that if the accused
embraced the deceased and rendered him helpless,
it was to stop him from further hitting the other accused
with his fists. However, even after the first knife thrust
had been delivered, he did not try to stop the other accused,
either by word or overt act. Instead, the accused continued
to hold the deceased, even forced him down on the bamboo
bed with the other accused still pressing the attack. If the
initial intent of the accused was free from guilt, it became
tainted after he saw the first knife thrust delivered. (People
vs. Manansala, No. L-23514, Feb. 17,1970, 31 SCRA 401,

In People vs. Aquino (No. L-32390, Dec. 28, 1973, 54 SCRA

409), the plea of self-defense was sustained. There were conflicting
versions as to how the victim was shot but the Supreme Court
sustained the version of the accused as being in accord with the
physical evidence. The prosecution tried to prove that the victim
was standing about two or three meters away from the truck where
the accused was seated as driver and that the accused, without any
exchange of words, shot the victim. The accused, on the other hand,
claimed that the victim went up the running board of the truck,
after pulling out a "balisong," and held on to the windshield frame.
When the victim lunged with his knife, the accused leaned far right,
at the same time parrying the hand of the victim who switched to
a stabbing position and, at that moment, the accused, who was
already leaning almost prone on the driver's seat, got his gun from
the tool box and shot the victim. The Court considered the physical
objective facts as not only consistent with, but confirming strongly,
the plea of self-defense. The direction and trajectory of the bullets would have been different had the victim
been standing upright two or three meters to the left of the truck.

"Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply

material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration
of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct,
more than reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness
thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury." (People vs. Encomienda,
No. L-26750, Aug. 18, 1972

People vs. Jaurigue

(76 Phil. 174)
Facts: The deceased was courting the accused in vain. One day,
the deceased approached her, spoke to her of his love which she flatly
refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her on account
of which the accused gave him fist blows and kicked him. Thereafter,
she armed herself with a fan knife, whenever she went out. One week
after the incident, the deceased entered a chapel, went to sit by the
side of the accused, and placed his hand on the upper part of her right
thigh. Accused pulled out her fan knife and with it stabbed the deceased
at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting a mortal wound.
Held: The means employed by the accused in the defense of her
honor was evidently excessive. The chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several
people, including her father and
the barrio lieutenant, inside the chapel. Under the circumstances, there
was and there could be no possibility of her being raped.

The Supreme Court apparently considered in this case the

existence of unlawful aggression consisting in the deceased's placing
his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh. The accused was
not given the benefit of complete self-defense, because the means
employed was not reasonable. If the accused only gave the deceased
fist blows or kicked him, to prevent him from going further in his
attempt to commit an outrage upon her honor, she would have been
completely justified in doing so.

People vs. Apolinar

(C.A., 38 O.G. 2870)

Facts: The accused, armed with a shotgun, was looking over his
land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing
that the man had stolen his palay, the accused shouted for him to stop,
and as he did not, the accused fired in the air and then at him, causing
his death.
Held: Defense of property is not of such importance as right to
life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance
only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property.
Had the accused, who wanted to stop the thief then approaching
him, been attacked, say with a bolo, by that thief, he would have
been justified in shooting him, if the shotgun was the only available
weapon for his defense.
In such case, there would be unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased, which is required even in defense of one's property. It
will be noted that in paragraph 1 of Article 11, the opening clause,
which is followed by the enumeration of the three requisites, states:
"anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights." The word
"rights" includes right to property. Hence, all the three requisites of
self-defense, particularly unlawful aggression, must also concur in
defense of property.

When one hurls insults or imputes to another the utterance

of vulgar language, as when the accused and his brothers
imputed to the deceased, the utterance of vulgar language
against them, which imputation provoked the deceased to
attack them. (People vs. Sotelo, 55 Phil. 403)

The Court of Appeals applied paragraph 4 of Art. 11 in a case

of slander by deed, a crime against honor, where the accused (a
woman) who was about to be married to the offended party eloped
with another man, after the offended partly had made preparations
for the wedding, the Court holding that there was a necessity on the
part of the accused of avoiding a loveless marriage with the offended
party, and that her refusal to marry him and her eloping with the
man whom she loved were justified and did not amount to the crime of
slander by deed. (People vs. Norma Hernandez, C.A., 55 O.G. 8465)

People vs. Beronilla

(96 Phil. 566)
Facts: The accused was a military major of La Paz, Abra, in 1944.
He received an order from the regional commander of an infantry,
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to prosecute Arsenio
Borjal for treason and to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury found
Borjal guilty of the charge and the recommendation of the jury was
approved by the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the execution
of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted for murder.
The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned
out to be illegal. As a military subordinate, he could not question the
orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the orders in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence
on his part.
Held: Criminal intent was not established. To constitute a
crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference
to duty or to consequences, as in law, is equivalent to criminal intent.
(U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507) The accused was acquitted.

Negligence, on the
other hand, is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand without which such other person
suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory;
one cannot exist with the other.

As to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the commission of the

crime, this Court already ruled in G.R. No. L-34497, that treachery (alevosia) qualified
the killing of Chua to murder. Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged when
he was stabbed twice with an ice-pick. Chua was defenseless and helpless enabling the
accused to commit the crimes," without risk to them. The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery because in this crimes,"
treachery arose from the defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while
nighttime was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate immunity in the commission
of the crime. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado) is also
present, due to the deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio Makatipo
Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim. Abuse of confidence
cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance present in the crime, because it
does not appear that the victim Chua ever reposed confidence on Ong. Chua knew that
he was far stronger in money and influence than Ong. The fact that Henry Chua invited
Ong night clubbing on that fatal evening and accommodated the latter in his car did not
show that Chua had confidence in Ong.

The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes,"
can be considered present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the
victim's car and to facilitate the commission of the crimes," and the escape of the

Cruelty (ensañamiento) cannot be considered because there is no evidence that the

victim Chua was by while still alive to make him suffer.

Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused
meditated, planned, and tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.

Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one
analogous to passion and obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened Ong for
non-payment of debt arising from gambling, causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34
Title: People v. Jaime Jose, G.R. No. L-28232

Subject Matter: Conspiracy


On June 26, 1967, four principal-accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo Aquino and
Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and
there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena
“Maggie” dela Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the
incident, where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the element of conspiracy, the trial court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape and sentences each of them to the
death penalty.


Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element of


No, the trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of conspiracy was
present, where the act of one is the act of all, each of the accused is also liable for the crime
committed by each of the other persons who conspired to commit the crime. The SC modified
the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and each and every one of them is
likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape.


he elements of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance are: (a) when it facilitated the

commission of the crime; or (b) when especially sought by the offender to insure the
commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity, or (c) when the offender took
advantage thereof also for purposes of impunity. 1[33] There are two tests for nocturnity
as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test,
under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender.2[34] These two tests should be applied in the alternative.3[35] In this case, the
subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that SALVADOR purposely
sought the cover of nighttime. The mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime
with nothing more does not make nocturnity in this particular case an aggravating

As to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, it is essential to show that

confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal, such as would give
the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. 4[36]
The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit
taking advantage of the offended parties' belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence.5[37] In this case, the bare allegation that the victim's mother asked
SALVADOR to fetch her children from Antipolo to Marikina does not prove that she
reposed such confidence in SALVADOR that he could have used to his advantage in
committing the crime.


The alternative circumstance of relationship is taken into consideration when, as in this case, the victim
is the descendant of the offender [Art. 15, Revised Penal Code]. In crimes against chastity, relationship is
Evident premeditation was attendant where the accused
apprehended the victims about 10 o'clock in the evening
and the crime was consummated at about 1 o'clock early
the following morning. The accused had sufficient time
to meditate and reflect on the consequences of their act.
(People vs. Berdida, No. L-20183, June 30,1966,17 SCRA
520, 530)

Rank was aggravating in the following cases: the

killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal; the killing of
the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil
Service Commission by a clerk therein; the murder by a
pupil of his teacher; the murder of a municipal mayor; the
murder of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret
service division; assault upon a 66-year-old CFI (now RTC)
judge by a justice of the peace (now municipal judge); the
killing of a consul by a mere chancellor; and the killing of
an army general. (People vs. Rodil,

"Rank" refers to a high social position or standing as

a grade in the armed forces; or to a graded official standing
or social position or station; or to the order or place in which
said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to
others; or to the designation or title of distinction conferred
upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in refer ence to other officers in matters of privileges,
and sometimes of command or by which to determine his
pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers;
or to a grade or official standing, relative position in civil
or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade,
including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a
position. (People vs. Rodil, supra, at 330)