Fleming, Jenny y George Lafferty (2001) Police Unions, Industrial Strategies and Political

Influence: Some Recent History. International Journal of Employment Studies, volumen

9, número 2 (octubre de 2001). Bakery Hill, Victoria, Australia. International Employment
Relations Association. Páginas 131 a 140. 131

RESEARCH NOTE

Police Unions, Industrial Strategies

and Political Influence: Some Recent
History

Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

Griffith University

This article examines an area of Australian industrial relations that has

received little attention in the academic literature on employment –
police unionism. The article addresses two main issues. Firstly, it
provides an examination of the changing nature of police work and
management practices. Secondly, it evaluates the distinctive character
of strategies developed by police unions and the legitimacy of their
political role. The overview concludes that in an environment where the
majority of unions are struggling to maintain membership and develop
strategies that deal effectively with increasingly strict legislative
constraints, police unions have been remarkably successful.

INTRODUCTION

The situation of police as employees has received scant attention from

industrial relations scholars in Australia. This is despite high levels of
industrial organisation of police in Australia, with virtually 100 per cent
union membership nationally and a recently formed police federation
committed to the introduction of national industrial standards (Fleming
and Lafferty, 2000). This article seeks to explore contemporary changes in
the nature of police management and work, particularly as they relate to
police unionism within the broader context of Australian industrial
relations.

International Journal of Employment Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, October 2001

International Employment Relations Association
Bakery Hill, Victoria, Australia
132 Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

The legislative strictures prescribed in the Workplace Relations Act

1996 (Cth) and most State legislation have meant that the possibilities
for industrial action open to all unions have been constrained. Firstly,
there has been a redefinition of almost all forms of industrial action as
being equivalent to strike action. Secondly, there are stricter controls on
when and how unions may legally engage in industrial action. Since
police unions have long been legally prohibited from taking strike
action, many of the strategies they have developed over decades equip
them well to operate in this new political-industrial regime. The
following sections of the article will discuss these strategies.

POLICE UNIONISM AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: A

QUEENSLAND CASE STUDY

Police in Australia have not been passive instruments of the state.

Through their unions and associations they have played a very active
role in the pursuit of better wages and conditions, and in the broader
processes of police administration and law reform. The legal
prohibition on striking has compelled police organisations to use other
forms of strategy to achieve industrial power. These strategies have
included advertising campaigns, leaflet distribution, picketing activity
and work-to-rule campaigns.
The first police union formed in Australia was in South Australia
(1911), followed by Western Australia (1912), Queensland (1915),
Victoria (1917), New South Wales (1920), Tasmania (1923), Australian
Capital Territory (1933) and the Northern Territory (1945). The Police
Federation of Australia and New Zealand was also formed in 1945
(Swanton, 1983: 207-220). In 1998, despite considerable opposition from
governments and Australian police services, a national organisation,
the Police Federation of Australia, was formed (Fleming and Lafferty,
2000).
In this note, the Queensland Police Union of Employees (QPUE)
provides the main focus for an examination of the capacities of police
unions to organise both industrially and politically. Since its formation,
the QPUE has been able to exert considerable influence on
governmental decision-making and organisational processes (Fleming,
1995). For example, in achieving the resignations of several police
commissioners and ministers, effecting law reform and bringing about
 Police Unions, Industrial Strategies And Political Influence: Some Recent History 133

changes in recruitment, promotion and disciplinary procedures

(Swanton, 1983: 23-36; Fitzgerald, 1989: 280; Fleming, 1997).
A combination of negotiation and industrial representation, either
through the Commissioner or the responsible Minister, has been the
most characteristic way in which the QPUE has pursued its aims.
Negotiation has been particularly successful when the union has taken
advantage of favourable political, economic and social circumstances to
enhance its case. The union has rarely failed to make the most of such
circumstances.
While industrial action has been rare, the QPUE has, on numerous
occasions, demonstrated its ability to mount campaigns to highlight any
sense of grievance it may have. Significant instances include an
unofficial go-slow in Brisbane during 1976 when only two traffic notices
were issued in two days, indicating the capacity of police unions to cut
off at short notice substantial sources of government revenue (Swanton,
1983: 33). Letter-drops, media comment and direct appeals to the
public have been other successful strategies adopted by the QPUE. The
union has been most effective when governments have been especially
vulnerable to public and media pressure on ‘law and order’ issues. The
rhetoric of the ‘thin blue line’ standing between community order and
chaos has proved very persuasive over many years.

The Mundingburra Controversy

The QPUE’s paradigmatic campaign occurred during the 1996 by-

election in the marginal Australian Labor Party (ALP) seat of
Mundingburra in North Queensland. The by-election provided the
union with an opportunity to mount a public campaign against the
Goss ALP government, including local television advertisements and
the ostentatious tactic of driving a billboard around the electorate
asking people to vote for ‘more police’. The Liberals narrowly won the
seat from Labor, allowing the Coalition, dominated by the National
Party, to take government. While the QPUE insisted that its campaign
was ‘non-political’, considerable outrage accompanied the subsequent
revelation in a union newsletter that the QPUE had signed a
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MOU) with the Opposition Leader
and Shadow Minister for Police prior to the by-election. The MOU
outlined a list of QPUE demands with respect to discipline, senior
134 Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

officer appointments, promotion and the activities of the Criminal

Justice Commission (CJC) – an external, independent body established
in 1989, with a responsibility to review complaints against police.
QPUE concerns about the CJC’s operations were reflected in initiatives
that would have effectively reduced it to a ‘token police accountability
body’ (Lewis, 1999: 160-162; CJC 1996).
An inquiry, with very wide terms of reference, was established to
investigate the creation and execution of the MOU, which concluded
that the Opposition had deliberately sought to use the union’s ‘political
muscle’ in the by-election and that the element of secrecy between the
Opposition, the union and certain members of the Mundingburra
community was unacceptable. The Coalition, though, refused to wait
for his report and established its own enquiry, which produced a
substantially diluted report recommending that the police officers
involved in the campaign and the MOU be charged (CJC, 1996). The
CJC handed over the responsibility for such discipline to the
Queensland Police Service (QPS). No further action was taken (Lewis,
1998: 166-178).
Despite some misgivings, following the Mundingburra campaign,
there was general agreement amongst union members and
departmental personnel today that the QPUE’s campaign in the by-
election achieved very positive outcomes for the union. The publicity
generated during the campaign and the subsequent political fallout
from the public disclosure of the MOU appears to have served as an
unspoken lesson to Queensland’s political parties. Phone calls from the
union to the Minister, relevant institutions and media usually evoke the
required response. Union issues are considered political problems to be
dealt with promptly (QPUE/QPS, 1999). Few union leaders can boast
of such access to organisational heads.
Following what the union perceived as the success of
Mundingburra, the QPUE executive believed there is little need to
engage in further public campaigns (Wilkinson, 1999). This is perhaps
just as well, as the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) has redefined the
concept of strike activity. For the police union, specific references to
‘expressed or implied’ understandings (DETIR, 1999: 504) may well
curtail their industrial strategic options further. Nevertheless with 100
per cent membership and a demonstrated ability to achieve its
objectives, the QPUE appears to have earned a grudging respect for its
organisation, resources and preparedness to use them.
 Police Unions, Industrial Strategies And Political Influence: Some Recent History 135

POLICE UNIONS AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: INTERSTATE

AND INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES

Such strategies are not unique to the QPUE but have been used in
varying degrees by other Australian police organisations. As in
Queensland, the concerns of these organisations have been addressed
mainly through negotiation and/or through the relevant industrial
channels. Since the 1970s, there has been less emphasis on wages and
other routine conditions of service in the context of ‘police grievances’.
The ongoing emphasis on efficiency and productivity has increased the
pressure on police ‘to justify their budgets and to demonstrate that their
resources are bring used efficiently’ (James, 1989: 8). Some of the more
dramatic examples in recent decades of political action by police unions
and associations in other Australian states and territories are
highlighted below.

Tasmania

In the twelve months up to Tasmania’s 1992 state election, the Police

Association of Tasmania (PAT) overtly supported the Liberal Opposition
and its law and order campaign slogan, ‘Tackling Crime Together’, in
anticipation of promised pay parity with the mainland and other benefits.
The PAT ran full-page advertisements, asserting ‘Labor’s a crook vote!’
and also direct-mailed voters in Tasmania, claiming crime rates had risen
steadily under the ALP state government. The ALP was decimated in the
state election, losing nineteen seats, including the Police Minister’s.
However, when the Liberal administration failed to deliver the pay rise or
to consider alleviating staff shortages, the PAT went on the offensive
again, taking industrial action. Work bans were called, courts were
picketed and one branch, comprising approximately 200 members,
marched on Parliament House with placards. The industrial action was
called off after a month when the government agreed to negotiations
(PAT, 1997).

New South Wales

The New South Wales Police Association (NSWPA) has often used the
public arena to air its grievances and elicit public support, thereby
136 Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

putting community pressure on the government of the day to address

its complaints. For example, during 1982 the NSWPA engaged in a
widespread media campaign behind the slogan, ‘Make the Police a Real
Force again!’ Newspaper reports and articles were supplemented by
extensive advertising. Strong support was offered by sections of the
community and in some rural areas, newspapers offered to run
advertisements for free (Brien, 1997: 160-161). Again in 1985, the
Association committed $150 000 to an advertising campaign on the state
ALP government’s position on staff levels. The campaign included a
series of television commercials that depicted futuristic scenes of
families wearing armour and using savage guard dogs as part of their
everyday life. The campaign was halted when, following a change of
Premier, the government acceded to the Association’s claims and
promised 2 000 extra police for NSW. In the same year a series of work-
to-rule bans ensured the introduction of a thirty-eight hour week,
another 523 police recruits and an additional twelve days annual leave
(Brien, 1997: 179-180).
Poor relations between the NSWPA and the government throughout
1990 and prior to the 1991 state election saw the government seize the
initiative and launch a series of emotive television commercials praising
the NSW police. The campaign cost the government one million
dollars. Following the government’s re-election, the NSWPA launched
its own television commercial campaign to highlight the perceived
injustices to which police were subjected as part of departmental
inquiries, and the huge financial and emotional costs of these matters.
In The Entrance by-election in January 1992, the NSWPA circulated
leaflets claiming that police have lost confidence in the Premier and his
Ministers. The Liberal candidate lost his seat (White and Richards,
1992; Brien, 1997).

Victoria

Other than the ultimately unsuccessful police strike of 1923, the activities
of Victoria’s Police Association were relatively low-key until the 1970s,
when a series of protracted disputes between the Victorian Police
Association (VPA), the Police Minister and the Commissioner laid the
foundations for more serious conflict in the ensuing years (Swanton,
1983). During the 1980s, senior police officers and the VPA had sought
amendments to police powers, an issue that was given enormous media
 Police Unions, Industrial Strategies And Political Influence: Some Recent History 137

attention. During the 1988 state election, the VPA intensified its campaign
for additional powers, lending its support to the Liberal Opposition’s law
and order platform, and actively canvassing public support in sixteen
marginal electorates. To overcome legislation prohibiting serving police
officers from direct political campaigning, the VPA used retired police
officers to deliver its pamphlets. While the union’s campaign was
generally seen to be unsuccessful, as the government was returned albeit
with a reduced majority and few marginal seats changed hands, it ‘clearly
signified the commitment of a police union to take explicit part in the
processes of electoral and political decision-making’ (James, 1989: 7).

Western Australia

In 1974, prior to a state election, the parliamentary Opposition

proposed a traffic patrol independent of the Police Force to deal with
concerns relating to the road toll. The Western Australia Police Union
(WAPU) objected to these measures and published an open letter to the
public outlining its objections. Three weeks before the election, another
letter was published and issued ‘in the interests of public safety’. The
letter openly discouraged the traffic control proposal, implying that
taxpayers should vote against Opposition candidates. Despite these
efforts, the Opposition won government and went about creating its
own highway patrol. However, a strong campaign by WAPU
prevented the complete excision of traffic control functions from police
(Swanton, 1983). The WAPU engaged in a very public campaign to
pressure the government to increase police numbers and resources on
‘the thinning blue line’, under the slogan, ‘More Police + Political Will =
Less Crime + Safer Communities’ (WAPU, 2000).
These instances of political action by Australian police unions have
equivalent examples overseas. For example, in the late 1970s, the Police
Federation of Great Britain (PF), responding to what it saw as
excessively liberal law reforms, conducted its own law and order
campaign. The campaign’s stated goals, despite the union’s claim to be
‘strictly non-political’, coincided almost exactly with the policies of the
incoming Thatcher administration. The PF also campaigned
aggressively, on a largely pro-Tory basis, in subsequent election
campaigns. In 1993, it mobilised, with considerable success, against the
Sheehy Report that had recommended substantial changes to police pay
138 Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

and conditions. This particular campaign included the expenditure of

over £1 000 000 and the hiring of Wembley Stadium for one protest
meeting. The PF’s activity succeeded in having the Home Secretary
reject several parts of the Report and promise to work with the Force to
achieve an acceptable compromise (Judge, 1994; Reiner, 1996).
In another example of police union politicking, the New Zealand
Police Association (NZPA), following a breakdown of negotiations on
early retirement with the National Party government, campaigned in
the lead-up to the 1984 election, expressing a position broadly
consistent with the Labour Party’s. The Association, stating that it had
to be involved in the politics of police issues, regardless of which party
was in power, delivered a draft policy on early retirement to Labour’s
Shadow Minister for Police. Labour was elected on 16th July 1984 and
by February 1985, the new government had delivered the early
retirement package plus benefits to the Association. However, the
NZPA consistently campaigned against various police-related policies
of the Labour Government during the late 1980s and early 1990s. When
in 1990, prior to the general election, the government introduced
‘radical change’ to police superannuation, the NZPA took the
unprecedented step of marching on Parliament House as part of its
campaign. The Labour Party lost office (McGill, 1992: 171-185).
Both in Australia and internationally, police unions have been able
to take advantage of their political importance to both governments and
opposition parties to exert considerable influence over decision-making,
as well as to achieve gains on pay and conditions. They have
consistently sought to implement two critical strategies: the fostering of
community support, combined with the creation and exploitation of
favourable political circumstances. In doing so, they have been
prepared to form temporary, informal alliances with either governing
or opposition parties in order to have their own goals realised. Police
unions, therefore, have been prepared to be clearly ‘political’.
Such strategies, though, contravene the arguments of exponents of
‘new managerialism’ in the police context, for whom police unions
should exercise no such political influence. This view was articulated
most notably in the Queensland Commission of Inquiry into Possible
Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (1989) which
criticised the disproportionate role the police union had played in
Queensland’s political affairs (Fitzgerald, 1989: 280, 287).
 Police Unions, Industrial Strategies And Political Influence: Some Recent History 139

CONCLUSION

Over decades, police have adopted alternative strategies in the face of

legislative constraints on industrial action. The 1996 Workplace Relations
Act has drastically restricted the range of industrial action legally open
to all unions and workers in Australia. Yet the political mobilisation
strategies pursued by police unions have been remarkably successful in
an anti-union context. Such activitism has included extensive media
campaigns, short-term tactical alliances with political parties, the active
canvassing of community support for such goals as more police
numbers, and the preparedness to take strong action to achieve their
demands. Readers may wish to reflect on the relevance of these
strategies for other unions.

REFERENCES

Brien, S. (1996), Serving the Force, Focus Publishing, Edgecliffe.

Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) (1996), Report on an Investigation into a

Memorandum of Understanding between the Coalition and QPUE and an
Investigation into an Alleged Deal between the ALP and the SSAA,
Criminal Justice Commission, Government Printer, Brisbane.

Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations (DETIR) (1999),

Industrial Relations Act (Queensland), Government Printer, Brisbane

Fitzgerald, T. (1989), Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities

and Associated Police Misconduct, Report of a Commission of Inquiry
Pursuant to Orders in Council, Government Printer, Brisbane.

Fleming, J. (1995), ‘Shifting the Emphasis: The Impact of Police Unionism in

Queensland, 1915-1925’, Labour History, No. 68, May, 98-114.

Fleming, J. (1997), ‘Power and Persuasion: Police Unionism and Law Reform in
Queensland’, Queensland Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, October, 59-74.

Fleming, J. and Lafferty, G. (2000), ‘New Management Techniques and

Restructuring in Police Organisations’, Policing: An International Journal
of Police Strategy and Management, Vol. 23, No. 2, June.
140 Jenny Fleming and George Lafferty

James, S. (1989), ‘Police Unions and Police Powers - A Recent Australian

Experience’, seminar paper presented at Conference of the Society for the
Reform of the Criminal Law, Sydney, unpublished.

Judge, T. (1994), The Force of Persuasion, Police Federation, Surrey.

Lewis, C. (1999), Complaints against Police: The Politics of Reform, Hawkins

Press, Leichhardt.

McGill, D. (1992), No Right to Strike, Silver Owl Press, Wellington.

Police Association of Tasmania (PAT) (1997), Association News, Journal of the

Police Association of Tasmania, December.

QPUE/QPS, (1999), Interviews conducted with union officials from Queensland

Police Union of Employees and personnel from the Industrial Relations
Department of the Queensland Police Service, 23 September; 28 November;
30 November.

Reiner, R. (1996), ‘Fuzzy Thoughts: The Police and Law-and-Order Politics’ in

R. Reiner (ed), Policing Volume II, Controlling the Controllers: Police
Discretion and Accountability, Dartmouth, Aldershot.

Swanton, B. (1983), Protecting the Protectors, Australian Institute of

Criminology, Canberra.

Western Australian Police Union of Workers (WAPU) (2000), Policing 2000

Challenge: Solving the Crime Equation, WAPU, Perth.

White, R. and Richards C. (1992), ‘Police Unions and Police Powers’, Current
Issues in Criminal Justice, Vol. 4, No. 2, November, 157-174.

Wilkinson, G. (1999), Personal interview with Gary Wilkinson, President,

Queensland Police Union of Employees, 8 October.