Exploring The Grounding Objection To Mol

Philosophy of Religion (2018)
johnlimanto@gmail.com
JOHN ANTHONY LIMANTO
Exploring the Grounding Objection to Molinism:

From Garrigou-Lagrange to Hasker
JOHN ANTHONY LIMANTO1
16 August 2018
Abstract: Hasker’s latest paper on the grounding objection marks—to use Flint’s word—“the final
incarnation”2 of his version of the grounding objection. Let alone its formulation, the debate on
the grounding objection, has brought with it, numerous history, spanning from Fr. Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange that culminates to Adams and Hasker. I hope to be able to provide a sketch of
the development of the arguments and to provide an analysis to each form of the argument.
Written for The Art of Rigor
Preliminaries
Molinism, as minimally defined, is the thesis that God possesses a knowledge (called ‘middle
knowledge’) of what every creature would freely do under different circumstances. Therefore,
within Molinism, God can order the world as he sees fit without violating the free will of the
creatures. Further, Molinism distinguishes between two different types of knowledge in God:
natural and free knowledge. Natural knowledge is God’s knowledge of all necessary and possible
facts about the world. Free knowledge, on the other hand, is God’s knowledge of all facts about
the actual world based on his creative decree. Middle knowledge stands midway as the contingent
knowledge that God possesses that are neither determined by God’s volitions or the creatures’.
This is the main point of contention that anti-Molinists have attacked.
1
John A. Limanto is a student at Pelita Harapan (SPH) and an aspiring Christian apologist in his local community.
After living for 7 years in Borneo, he now resides with his family in Jakarta, Indonesia where he is pursuing his
research on Molinism and free will.
2
Flint, Thomas P. 2011. "Whence and Whither the Molinist Debate: A Reply to Hasker." In Molinism: The
Contemporary Debate, 37-49. New York: Oxford University Press. 39.
Exploring the Grounding Objection to Molinism Jakarta, Indonesia. 2
Middle knowledge is expressed in counterfactuals (in the form of ‘subjunctive

conditionals’) of what creatures would freely do in different circumstances (also known as
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom or ‘CCF’). Thereby, the following is an example of a CCF:
(CCF) If Jones had been born in Namibia, he would have been a sailor.
Remember, however, that the properties of the CCF are that it is eternally true, contingent, and
pre-volitionally known by God. First, for the CCF to be eternally true, it must be the case that it
has been true even prior to the creature’s existence. This has the implication that the creature is
not the cause of the truths of CCFs. Second, for CCFs to be contingent means that CCFs do not
necessitate what the creatures would do in such-and-such circumstance. If CCFs are necessary,
then creaturely freedom would be destroyed because when the CCFs are exemplified (when, say,
Jones became a sailor when he had been born in Namibia), then the agent has done the action in
question out of necessity. Third, for CCFs to be pre-volitionally known by God means that CCFs
are known logically prior to any act of will from God. Therefore, God did not determine the truths
of these CCFs.
Grounding Objection
Given the three characteristics of CCFs given previously, the grounding objection (‘GO’)
is the objection that there “are no true counterfactuals concerning what creatures would freely do
under certain specified circumstances–the propositions expressed by such counterfactual sentences
are said either to have no truth value or to be uniformly false, since there is nothing to make these
counterfactuals true.”3 The statement “there is ‘nothing’ to make these counterfactuals true” is the
core of the objection. Readers, hearing the objection for the first time, may be taken aback by the
ambiguity. However, the ambiguous generalization of the grounding objection should not take
away its merit. GO remains as the principal objection that hinders philosophers from being
Molinists. How one may clarify the statement that there is nothing to “make” the CCFs true should
determine whether one falls to either of two major camps of GOs.
As Jensen has rightly noted, the anti-Molinists are divided into two camps: the truthmaker-
style GO (TGO) or the causal-style GO (CGO).4 Although TGO predates CGO, the TGO remains
paralyzed in the corners of Molinist history ever since its first publication in 1977. 5 CGO, on the
other hand, has been advanced for nearly two decades by its foremost champion—William
Hasker.6 The former relies on the principle, derived from the “Truth Supervenes on Being” thesis,
that CCFs are the type of propositions that require “truthmakers” for them to be true. On the other
hand, the latter stipulates for agents to be able to “bring about” the truth of the CCFs in some way.
3
Craig, William Lane. 2001. "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers, and the "Grounding Objection." Faith and
Philosophy 18 (3): 337-352. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/divine-
omniscience/middle-knowledge-truth-makers-and-the-grounding-objection/. 337-338.
4
Jensen, Jennifer Lynn. 2008. The Grounding Objection to Molinism. PhD Thesis, Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame.
5
See Adams, Robert. 1977. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly 109-
117.
6
The amount of print sources from Hasker on this is remarkable. See (Hasker 1989, 39-52), (Hasker 1995), and
(Hasker 2011)
The latter claims that if the “bring about” thesis cannot be fulfilled, then the middle knowledge is
detrimental to LFW.
Defining Stalnaker-Lewisian Semantics of Comparative Similarity
Comparative similarity, first gaining eminence from Robert Stalnaker’s Theory of
Conditionals,7 is a system of determining the truth-values of counterfactuals based on their
relations to different possible worlds. In explaining how similarity works, take a concentric circle
with the actual world in the middle and different strata of similar worlds that permit the same
antecedents. As the circle closes in on the actual world, the worlds become more similar to the
actual world. Now, take the stratum closest to the center—which is the actual world. Is the same
counterfactual true within that stratum? If it can be found that the antecedent-permitting worlds
within the concentric stratum closest to the actual world bear the same truth-value as the actual
world, then the counterfactual is a would counterfactual that is true. If only some of them are true
in those worlds, then it is might counterfactual. If none of them are true in that stratum, then it is
a false counterfactual.
Of course, the notion that is ambiguous in this system is “similarity.” After all, what
constitutes the fact that one world is more similar than another—is it possible to make such a
distinction? Stalnaker was not himself able to posit this. However, he does propose for
philosophers to include in any variable in his function, the s-function:
s-function: ∫(𝐴, 𝑎)
Stalnaker writes:
I shall use the following terminology for talking about the arguments and values of s-
functions: where ∫(𝐴, 𝑎) = ß is the antecedent, a is the base world, and (3 is the selected
world.
(1) For all antecedents A and base worlds a, A must be true in ∫(𝐴, 𝑎)
(2) For all antecedents A and base worlds a, ∫(𝐴, 𝑎) = λ only if there is no world possible
with respect to a in which A is true. 8
What Stalnaker here is positing is that a is the base world—meaning that it is the world used as a
referent point (whether it be the actual world or else, some other world). A, on the other hand, is
the antecedent described within the similarity function. Any variable we put as ß indicates that it
is the measure of similarity. As we will be discussing later in this essay, Plantinga has offered
shared counterfactuals to be included as ß.
7
Stalnaker, Robert. 1968. "A Theory of Conditionals." American Philosophical Quarterly 98-112.
8 Ibid. 104.
Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964) was a French Catholic neo-Banezian. Domingo Banez
(1528-1604) and Tomas de Lemos (1555-1629) had earlier been the staunch Thomists who
criticized Molina for repudiating Thomist understanding of premotion. Premotion is the doctrine
that God directly moves secondary causes (i.e. the agents) towards good deeds. Whereas evil
actions are times where God refrains from exerting his grace such that the agents themselves
commit the evil actions. For the Banezians who lured the Dominicans to their camps, the Molinists
denigrate God’s sovereignty by denying the Thomist doctrine of divine concurrence, the
Aristotelian doctrine of actus purus/pure actuality, and imposes on God knowledge that he does
not have causal powers over.9
Garrigou-Lagrange emerges in the 20th century as the modern defender of neo-
Banezianism. Having labelled Molinism as “semipelagianism,” 10 He argues that
Before the divine decree, there is no object for the scientia media [middle knowledge],
because the conditionally free act of the future is not determined either in itself or in another,
as we stated…The medium of the Scientia media does not precede the divine decree because
there is no cause in which this conditioned future is determined; for it is not determined in
the divine cause or in human liberty or in the circumstances11
In short, Garrigou-Lagrange argues that there is no “source” from which God can know his middle
knowledge given that it is not determined by his divine determination (as it is known pre-
volitionally). Further, he argues that it is also not determined by the human liberty or the
circumstances. Clearly enough, if the content of middle knowledge is determined by the
circumstances, then it would end in “determinism of circumstances.” 12 Therefore, Garrigou-
Lagrange concludes, “scientia media, which is devised to save created liberty, would destroy it.” 13
At first glance, Garrigou-Lagrange seems to be giving a sketch of what the later anti-
Molinists formulate as the TGO—especially that of Robert M. Adams. This primitive formulation,
however, insists that there is no “object” to which middle knowledge to be known. However,
Garrigou-Lagrange is far from pellucid on what this means. Perhaps, the closest that we can sketch
from Garrigou-Lagrange’s thought is that there must be a cause behind the knowledge that God
possesses or God does not possess the knowledge. This corresponds well to his own repeated
insistent dichotomy that “Either God is the first determining being, or else He is determined by
another; there is no other alternative”14 Thereby, Garrigou-Lagrange insists that given the
contingency of middle knowledge, God himself must be the source of his own knowledge.
9
MacGregor, Kirk R. 2015. Luis de Molina, The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge. Grand
Rapids: Zondervan. 114-115.
10
“This theory seems to savor somewhat of Semipelagianism, which holds that the beginning of salvation is from
ourselves, and not from God’s grace” Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. 2016. The One God. London: Aeterna Press.
419.
11
Ibid. 417-418.
12
Ibid. 418.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
Evaluation: Garrigou-Lagrange
Although Garrigou-Lagrange had been a bold harbinger of an upcoming, even bolder
objections of Adams, Garrigou-Lagrange seems to have posited a radical statement that nullifies
Christian orthodoxy itself. Notice that the claim here is the following:
(1) Every contingent proposition must have a cause for its truth
What (1) stipulates fails on two fronts. First, it seems that Christianity necessitates for there to be
uncaused, contingent propositions. Thereby, statement such as the following seems to be
indubitably uncaused contingency:
(2) God desires to create
Desires precedes its action. Therefore, if God desires to create, then it would be futile to claim that
God causes his desires. For him to cause his desires, he must also have other desires to cause his
desires and the desires to cause the desires of his desires and so on. Therefore, ultimately, God’s
desires to create and to perform other free, contingent, supererogatory actions must be uncaused,
contingent events.
Second, (1) may also not sustain if one believes in LFW—not just of God, but also of men.
LFW entails BCCF and BCCF would not exist given (1). BCCF is the conjunction of all contingent
facts about the world. Therefore, the fact that I am writing this paper and that you are reading this
paper are both contingent facts of the world. Yet, for all of these facts to be contingent, there needs
to be uncaused factors in the world. It is, thus, a logically fallacy to claim:
Let "x c-> y" mean "x causes y" and let "O(x, y)" mean "x is outside y". Then, for any CCF c and
any human person p:
(3) For all x, ~[O(x, p) & (x c-> c)]
(4) Therefore, p c-> c.
If it is false that not-P causes C does not mean that P causes C. Rather, it may be the case that C
is true as an uncaused, contingent factor of the world.
Robert M. Adams (1977)
Robert M. Adams’ first appearance in the debate is important. His paper, entitled Middle
Knowledge and the Problem of Evil, informs Plantinga of the roots of his views back to the Jesuit
theologian Luis de Molina (1535-1600). To understand Adams’ insistence, we must understand
what Plantinga had earlier proposed. In his even earlier work, God, Freedom, and Evil, Plantinga
proposed the free will defence against the problem of evil as brought about by J. I Mackie.15 In
defending Theism, Plantinga proposes that humans’ freedom may make it infeasible for God to be
able actualize a world in which creatures do not do moral evil. To summarize, Plantinga writes:
15
Mackie, J. L. 1955. "Evil and Omnipotence." Mind 200-21
To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of
moral evil; and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same
time prevent them from doing so. As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures
God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom; this is the source of moral evil. 16
To further advance his argument, Plantinga proposes the following thought experiment. Suppose
that a maximal state of affairs S’ includes Paul being free to accept an offer or not to accept an
offer. There are, thus, two distinct conditionals that are mutually exclusive:
(5) If the state of affairs S’ had obtained, Paul would have accepted the offer
(6) If the state of affairs S’ had obtained, Paul would not have accepted the offer
However, Plantinga proposes that given the mutually exclusive nature of these two propositions,
only one may be the actual thing that corresponds to what Paul would have done given S’. Through
this thought experiment, inadvertently, Plantinga has reformulated the doctrine of Scientia media
that has been buried in the debris of ideological schism between the Jesuits and the Dominicans
from 1588.
In response, having informed Plantinga of the fact that his contention is not original, he
confesses: “I do not understand what it would be for any of [CCFs] to be true, given that the actions
in question would have been free”17 First, in elaborating his objection, he proposes the following
to be the “grounds”18 of CCFs: correspondence to a future event, logical necessity, causal
necessity and intentions.
First, he elaborates that the “ground” cannot be correspondence to a future event. Take,
Adams’ example, of 1 Samuel 23:1-14. In this chapter, Saul pursues after David until David takes
refuge in the city of Keilah. At Keilah, David asks to God through the Ephod: would the men of
Keilah hand him over to Saul if he stays? would Saul besiege the city if he stays? The Ephod
answers ‘yes’ to both question, which prompts David to escape out of the city. The following
episode in the Bible illustrates that there are, at least, two different propositions that may be true:
(7) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would not besiege the city
(8) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would not
surrender David to Saul.19
Neither (7) nor (8) can be ascribed to a correspondence to future event because these events do not
actually happen as David fled from Keilah.
Second, the “ground” also cannot be either logical necessity or causal necessity. If (7) or
(8) had been true by logical necessity, then (7) and (8) would be true in every possible world. This
16
Plantinga, Alvin. 1977. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 30.
17
Adams, Robert. 1977. "Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil." American Philosophical Quarterly 109-117.
110
18
Adams explicitly uses the word “ground” himself. See ibid.
19
The following propositions are taken directly from ibid. 110.
means that there is no possibility for David to have been able to do differently. Thereby, David
would not be free in the libertarian sense. Similarly, if (7) or (8) had been true of causal necessity,
then determinism would be true and LFW would also not be achievable through this model.
Third, the “ground” also cannot be the intentions of the agents. This is because intentions
are non-causal to the actions of the agents. Therefore, given that (7) and (8) involves a free action,
in order for the action to be fully free, it must be the case that (7) and (8) are not necessitated by
even the intentions of Saul or the men of Keilah. In fact, Adams rebuts this notion by providing
two propositions that would be true if (7) or (8) had been grounded in the intentions of Saul or the
men of Keilah:
(9) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would probably besiege the city
(10) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would probably
surrender David to Saul.
In fact, Adams posits that (9) and (10), if proven to be true, are rebutting defeaters of (7) and (8).
Given (7) and (8), the opposite of them are (9) and (10).
Evaluation: Robert M. Adams (1977)
The difficulty in tracing Adams’ notion of “grounding” is that it is unclear what he
stipulates. It seems to be either (or all) of the following:
(1) Every contingent proposition must have a cause for its truth
(11) Every contingent proposition must have a truthmaker
(12) Every contingent proposition must have an explanation for its truth
I will attempt to show that no matter which stipulation is given, the Molinism still stands to be the
more plausible answer. First, (1) is Adams’ speculation that CCFs may be grounded (albeit
destroying LFW) in causal necessity. However, we have already established that it may be the case
that CCFs are true apart from any causal constraints—thereby, CCFs would be true as a brute fact.
(1) is closely related to (12) in the sense that Adams may be stipulating that any contingent
proposition must have an explanation in the form of causal necessity or logical necessity. However,
this falls flat when one considers BCCF and the doctrines of Christianity that have been brought
up earlier in support of brute, contingent facts. To stipulate that any contingent proposition to have
explanations in the form of either causal necessity or logical necessity seems to deflate BCCF to
necessity likewise (as they may only be true either by being cause by other contingent beings that
must be logically necessary or logically necessary itself).
Therefore, we are left with (11). (11) is the stipulation that there must be “an entity that
acts as the truth’s ‘ontological ground’: it is some worldly thing whose mere existence necessitates
the proposition’s truth.”20 For example, the truthmakers for the proposition “cars exist” are the
20
Beebee, Helen and Julian Dodd, Truthmaker: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford University Press,
2005. 2
entities known as “cars” that necessitate the truth of the proposition. If this is indeed the route that
Adams is taking, then the question goes: what is the truthmaker for CCFs?
First, it must be noted that the existence of an “entity” as stipulated in the truthmaker theory
in no way implies that it must be a concrete object. For an object to be concrete, it must only
exhibit causal powers and material features. The notion of causality is central to when an object
exhibits concretism or not. However, we can easily demonstrate that truthmakers may be non-
causal states of affairs. For example, the truthmaker of the proposition (supposing that it is true)
“I will do X in 2020” may be the state of affairs that I will do X in 2020. The state of affairs of me-
doing-X-in-2020 is in no way a concrete object. Secondly, the truthmaker theory does not posit
that all propositions require grounding in this way. This can be argued in three different ways.
First, take the proposition:
(13) This sentence has no truthmaker
Any truthmaker posited in support of the truth of the statement will yield a contradiction. Suppose
that the truthmaker is the state of affairs of the nonexistence of truthmakers. This would mean that
the proposition becomes a contradictory proposition. Second, necessary propositions are true apart
from the existence of some entity. Therefore, the proposition one plus one equals two does not
seem to require any concrete object to which it corresponds to. Surely enough, we would intuitively
say that the necessary nature of numbers are enough to account for its truth-value. Third, most
importantly, negative existential propositions do not have truthmakers. Thus, the statement:
(14) Dinosaurs do not exist
Proposition (3) does not have a truthmaker as it is about the nonexistence of something. Of course,
the nonexistence of something cannot be conflated to an existence of something.
As we have established the two desiderata of the truthmaker theory, we can already
construct a rebuttal to circumvent the objection. First, given the second principle we have brought
up, it is not implausible for the Molinists to doubt that CCFs require grounding in this way. After
all, if we can allow for negative existential propositions to not have a truthmaker, why cannot it be
insisted that CCFs also do not require truthmakers in the same vein? Second, given the first
principle we have brought up, it is also possible for Molinists to posit a truthmaker for CCFs. After
all, if truthmaking does not require grounding in the existence of a concrete object, then the
Molinists can easily sway the objection by claiming that the state of affairs of its being the case
that person P would do X in C just is the truthmaker of the CCF.21 This is the same truthmaker that
is utilized in justifying the truth of future-oriented propositions.
Therefore, as we have established, none of the alternative that Adams brings may force a
Molinist out of their position. On the contrary, Adams’ insistence, if amalgamated, may result in
the implausible notion that neither the past or the future oriented propositions may have
21
This is the same answer that is brought up by Craig in Craig, William Lane. "Middle Knowledge, Truth–Makers,
and the "Grounding Objection"." Faith and Philosophy 18.3 (2001): 337-352.
<https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/divine-omniscience/middle-knowledge-truth-makers-
and-the-grounding-objection/>.
truthmakers. This means that they become neither true or false. I grant that this may be a legitimate
strategy that an anti-Molinist may adopt. However, it should be insisted that taking this position
resorts to highly counter-intuitive position. Very little reflection is required for us to ascertain that
there is such a thing as the past or that propositions about the future may be true or false. The
burden of proof is for the objector here to insist by what motivation should we adopt this radical
position eschewing any truth about what the future or the past are.
William Hasker (1989)
The progenitor of the extremely complex causal-style grounding objection is William
Hasker. Albeit the discussion has gone on for over two decades, its earliest formulation of the
notion of “bringing about” originates from his phenomenal book, God, Time and Knowledge.22
Hasker asks us to construe the cause of the truth of the CCF through a notion in counterfactual
logic called “centering.”23 Centering is the idea that whenever an antecedent and a consequent of
the counterfactual is realized, the counterfactual automatically becomes true. Thus, the fact that I
am writing this paper given the circumstances that I was born in makes true the counterfactual:
(17) If I had been born where I was, then I would have ended up writing this paper
This seems, prima facie, to be the notion that Hasker endorses. Hasker writes:
The answer to this question that is in fact given by the friends of middle knowledge is that it
is the agent named in the counterfactual who brings it about that the counterfactual is true.24
Hasker concludes, at the end of his paper, that the agent is not responsible in any way for the CCFs
coming to be true. Hasker’s argument may be summed up in the following:
(18) If E brings it about that “Q” is true, then E is a token of an event-type T such that [(some
token of T occurs) → Q] and [¬(some token of T occurs) → ¬Q], and E is the first token of
T which occurs.
(19) Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are more fundamental features of the world than
are particular facts. (Hence, worlds that differ from the actual world with regard to factual
content are closer than those that differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom.)
(20) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and “P” entails “Q” and “Q” is false, then
it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q [power entailment principle (PEP)].
(21) If S freely does A in situation B, then it was in S’s power to bring it about that (¬A &
B).25
22
Hasker, William. 1989. God, Time, and Knowledge. New York: Cornell University Press.
23
Ibid. 40-41. This is also the same point brought up by Trenton Merricks in Merricks, Trenton. 2011. "Truth and
Molinism." In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, 50-72. New York: Oxford University Press.
24
Hasker, William. 1989. God, Time, and Knowledge. New York: Cornell University Press. 40.
25
Flint, Thomas. 1998. Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. New York: Cornell University Press. 139.
(22) Given that CCFs are more fundamental features of the world than are particular facts,
there will always be a world in which B is false that is closer to the actual world than a world
in which S freely does A in situation B (from (19))
(23) S’s freely doing A in B is not a token of his CCF such that [(S’s freely doing A in B) →
Q] and [¬(S’s freely doing A in B) → ¬Q], and S’s freely doing A in B is the first token of
the CCF which occurs (from (18), (19), and (22))
(24) Therefore, it is not in S’s power to bring it about that (¬A & B) (from (23) and (21))
(25) Therefore, it is not in S’s power to bring it about that A ((from (24) and (20))
Hasker here is contending that given Stalnaker-Lewisian semantics, it follows that the PEP will
never be satisfied. That way, (21) can never be true. Given the Stalnaker-Lewisian semantics and
(19), it follows that there will always be a world in which B is false that is much closer to the actual
world than are worlds in which (22) is false. Therefore, (22)’s truth does not rely on the occurrence
of P doing A in B or P refraining from A in B.
To further discuss the relations of each premise to one another, the first premise
((18))indicates that if E brings about that “Q” is true, then E is a subgroup of T such that T → Q
and ¬ T → Q. The first premise is meant to illustrate the relation between the agent and his
corresponding CCF. T is meant to be an allegory for CCFs and E is a free action manifested in an
event that the agent brings about. (18) is supposed to describe a kind of centering whereby given
an event E, then T (the CCF) follows, which entails that Q (the consequent of the CCF) is true.
Second, given (18), then there must be some way to ground the idea that CCFs are not based on
our actions. Therefore, (19) is imposed to prove that there will always be possible worlds closest
to our world in which the CCF is true, but the antecedent is false. This is because shared
counterfactuals act as a weightier count of similarity than are particular facts. The implication of
this is that these counterfactuals become true apart from the particular facts that the closest possible
world exhibit. Recall that previously, we establish (in the preliminaries) that in the Stalnaker-
Lewisian semantics, a counterfactual is true by virtue of the similarities between possible worlds.
Therefore, if it can be established that a CCF is true apart from particular facts, then it can be
established that it is non-reliant to those particular facts.
However, what warrant may we have for (19)? In justifying (19), Hasker brings an analogy.
Suppose that I have been making a poster at work with an ink bottle next to me. Just as the poster
is nearly completed, I knock over the ink bottle, spilling ink on the poster. At this point, there are
two possible scenarios in which I don’t spill the ink bottle which may be more similar to the actual
world in which I spill ink on the poster (the actual world): First, it may have been that a world in
which I did not knock over my ink bottle or second, it may have been the world in which I knock
over the ink bottle but no ink spilled. Hasker claims that Plantinga would hold the former to be
closer to the actual world than the latter. This is because the former is a world in which more
counterfactuals are identical (such as the laws of nature in this case). Therefore, counterfactuals
are weightier than are particular facts. In fact, Plantinga, once writes:
[S]uppose there had been no material objects. It might nonetheless have been true that if
there had been some, they would have conformed to Newton’s Law of Gravitation. So let W
be a world in which there are no material objects, but the counterfactual in question
nevertheless holds. Then a world W in which there are material objects that conform to
Newton’s Laws is, so far forth, more like W than is a world in which there are objects that
do not thus conform.26
Given Plantinga’s own retort, Hasker takes it to be the case that (19) is well justified even in
Molinist conceptions. The consequence of this, it seems, that a world in (22) is true is more similar
to the actual world than a world in which B occurs. Thereby, B needs not occur and person P need
not act in such a way described by his CCF to be true. This means that (20) can never be satisfied
and Molinism suffers from internal inconsistency.
Evaluation: William Hasker (1989)
As complicated as Hasker’s argument may be, it is worth noting that Molinists may well
reject ‘centering’ as a premise of Molinism. 27 With that, (18) is rejected in favour of a kind of
brutism. Brutism is the notion that we have elaborated upon: namely that CCFs are true apart from
centering, but true by virtue of brute facts. We can argue for this position based on that ‘centering’
cannot account for negative existential counterfactuals. For example, take the following CCF:
(23) If Jones had not been in Namibia, he would not have become a sailor.
Suppose, for a second, that Jones does not exist and will not exist (given that God has actualized
a world in which Jones does not exist). It follows from this that the CCF would not be true given
that Jones will not exist. However, Molinism posits that God knows CCFs of even non-existent
persons that could have existed were God to actualize such a world. Therefore, there is a possibility
for (23) to be true and if it is, then God must know such CCF.
It has to be clarified, at this point, that when Molinists say that CCFs are true by brute fact,
we are not saying that there is no candidate for truthmakers of the CCFs. As we have established,
we may posit a truthmaker for the CCFs by constructing a state of affairs out of the CCF. What
we mean, on the other hand, is that nothing outside of the agent causes the CCF to be true.
Therefore, when we claim that CCFs are true as a brute fact is in terms of its causal relation. We
reject that the agent, in question, may likewise cause their CCFs to be true through centering. By
insisting on this point, Molinists do not shy away from (18). Rather, we deny (23) given that (18)
is inapplicable to the case of CCFs.
26
Plantinga, Alvin. 1985. "A Response to Adams' Argument." In Alvin Plantinga, 373-379. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
378
27
For a Molinist who defends a kind of centering in their defense against Haskerian grounding objection, see
Merricks, Trenton. 2011. "Truth and Molinism." In Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, 50-72. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Is (19) true?
Molinists such as Flint agrees that if (18) – (21) are sound, then Molinists would be forced
to abandon their position.28 However, as I have contended we may also deny (23) and resort to
deny the applicability of the relation between (18) and the CCFs with the agents. However, let us
focus on (19). To what extent is it true that Molinists are committed to (19)? Prima facie, there
seems to be no connection between either middle knowledge or LFW to what Pickavance calls as
“hypotheticalism.”29 The view, as stated by Hasker here, comes to be known as hypotheticalism
as it posits that counterfactual conditionals exist uncaused, ex nihilo entities that are not reducible
to other propositions. Typically, this view—accompanied by Haskerian influence—posits that
CCFs weigh more as a similarity function that are “particular facts.” Yet, Flint has pointed out
rightly that this is not the case if one exegetes Plantinga rightly. What Plantinga proposed earlier
is that “given the context of Plantinga’s discussion, he might be committed to the claim that , in
deciding the comparative similarities of possible worlds, counterfactuals outweigh the differences
in matters of facts that obtain after the time specified by the antecedent of the counterfactual.”30
On the other hand, Plantinga proposes (in his short section of counterfactuals in the book
Nature and Necessity) the thesis—instigated by David Lewis himself—called the “asymmetry
thesis.”31 Thus, Plantinga gives the thought experiment of Royal Robbins. 32 For Plantinga,
supposing that Robbins had climbed to safety over ledges in the actual world, we may still
construct the following counterfactual:
(24) If Robbins had slipped and fallen at thanksgiving ledge, he would have been killed
Now, consider another world, W’, in which Robbins had slipped at t. Yet, at t+1, he reappears on
the ledge and keeps climbing to safety. In such a world, everything else goes on as it does in the
actual world. However, Plantinga contends, world W’ is far less similar to the actual world than
another possible world in which Robbins had slipped and fallen—in which case the other events
in that possible world would have turned out much differently than in the actual world. The point
is, Plantinga is saying all concrete events after the time specified in the antecedent of a
counterfactual is frivolous in deciding similarity between worlds. Yet, where Hasker differs is that
he considers all other contingent facts to be subservient in deciding comparative similarities
between possible worlds to CCFs—which, in no way, is Plantinga’s original point.
If, on the other hand, we reject Hasker’s thesis that CCFs weigh more in similarity than are
all particular facts, we may still propose that worlds in which P does A given that B occurs weighs
more than are worlds in which B is not even true. This does not, at all, violate the asymmetry thesis
28
Flint, Thomas P. 1998. Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. New York: Cornell University Press. 140
29
Koons, Robert C., and Timothy Pickavance. 2017. The Atlas of Reality: A Comprehensive Guide to Metaphysics.
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 84-86.
30
Flint, Thomas P. 1998. Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. New York: Cornell University Press. 140.
31
The “asymmetry thesis” is the thesis that events that happen after the event stated in the counterfactual does not
matter in comparing the similarities of possible worlds. See Menzies, Peter. 2014. "Counterfactual Theories of
Causation." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . February 10. Accessed July 13, 2018.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/#TemAsyCauDep.
32
Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 201-203
given that P doing A given B is still part of the time described in the counterfactual. Thereby, by
repudiating (19), we have rendered the argument toothless.
Other ways to tackle Hasker’s objection
Surely enough, one can construct the same argument without relying on (19). Perhaps, one
will contend that (19) is an unnecessary premise of Hasker’s argument. For these proponents,
perhaps (20) is the more important premise. A quick reformulation will produce the following
argument:
(25) The following CCF is false:
(CCF) If C, then P would do X
(26) If it is in P’s power to bring it about that (CCF) is true, then it is in P’s power to bring
it about that X and P’s doing X entails (CCF) and if (CCF) is false, then it is in P’s power to
bring it about that (CCF) is true
(27) If (CCF) is false, then P does not bring it about that X
(28) Therefore, it is not in P’s power to bring it about that (CCF)
Perhaps, for the proponents of this argument, (27) may be justified by resorting to the fact that
(CCF) is true without the causal control of the agent. Thereby, whether or not (25) is true or false
relies not on the occurrence of the action. This would mean that (27) would not just be true, but
necessarily true. Our interests in this maverick argument is not just for the sake of broadening the
discussion, but also in the interest of refuting Hasker’s original argument. If, somehow, (20) can
be repudiated, then it follows logically that Hasker’s original argument would not proceed even if
we concede with (19).
It should be contended here that the moot premise is premise (27). This mirrors the previous
premise (24). However, a key terminology that the detractor must clarify here is with regards to
the phrase “bringing about.” For example, what can Hasker here mean when he says that “it is not
in S’s power to bring it about that (¬A & B) (from (23) and (21))”? Or to use verbatim quote from
him, “If E brings it about that “Q” is true”? For example, Flint offers the following definition of
what “brings about” is:
(BA) S brings it about that Y is true =df. For some X, S causes it to be the case that X and
(X→Y).33
Clearly, however, such a reading would lead to implausible implications. (BA) is a direct example
of centering. Yet, this, once again, leads to the same problems that centering has encountered that
33
Flint, Thomas P. 1998. Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. New York: Cornell University Press. 150.
counterfactual logicians have faced. For example, through (BA), it would mean that I can “bring
about” anything that my action implies. For example, Flint raises the following case:
By raising my arm today, I bring it about, in the sense delineated by [(BA)], that the sun rises
tomorrow morning for I cause it to be the case that my arm rises—and assuming that the sun
does rise tomorrow morning, and assuming that the inference from (X & Y) to (X → Y) is
legitimate—my arm rises today implies the sun rises tomorrow morning34
Therefore, this possible formulation of (BA) that endorses material implication between the
agent’s action and his CCFs fail because it allows for us to “bring about,” in its proper sense, the
rising of the sun, the tiding of the wave, and all the like. What about a conception of (BA) that
relies on direct causality between the agent and the CCF?
(BA2) S brings it about that Y is true = df. For some Y, S causes Y
Yet, recall that this is precisely the refuted point of Garrigou-Lagrange. History repeats itself in a
way favourable for the Molinists as Molinists may deem (BA2) implausible given that it excludes
future and past propositions about free actions. In that case, nobody brings it about that any of his
future or past actions—which is all the more radical!
Robert Adams (1991)
As it has been noted previously, Hasker’s objection is too complex and is highly revisable
to a simpler model. The first occurrence of this simplification was attempted by Adams in 1991. 35
Although Adams remains resolute in his previous conclusion, he goes on to argue that Hasker’s
PEP may be advanced through the understanding of “explanatory priority” 36/’prius ratione’ (prior
in reason). It seems that Adams had earlier meant for explanatory priority to be equivalent to
logical priority. This is evidenced by his insistence that this priority occurs timelessly and
segregates between God’s pre-volitional knowledge and decrees.37 Therefore, Adams makes the
same distinction that Molinist make between different logical steps of God’s knowledge.
Adams’ two-part argument may be summarized in the following:
First part:
(29) According to Molinism, the truth of all true counterfactuals of freedom about us is
explanatorily prior to God’s decision to create us.
(30) God’s decision to create us is explanatorily prior to our existence.
34
Ibid.
35
Adams, Robert. 1991. "An Anti-Molinist Argument." Edited by James E. Tomberlin. Philosophical Perspectives
(5): 343-353. 347
36
This notion of explanatory priority is similar between the distinction of logical and temporal priority.
37
“Like the Scholastics, I do mean to distinguish this sort of priority from temporal priority. Even if there was no
time before God decided to create us, or if God is timeless, God’s knowing is various things can be explanatorily
prior to God’s deciding to create us.” Adams, Robert. 1991. "An Anti-Molinist Argument." Edited by James E.
Tomberlin. Philosophical Perspectives (5): 343-353. 347
(31) Our existence is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions.
(32) The relation of explanatory priority is transitive.
(33) Therefore, it follows from Molinism (by 1-4) that the truth of all true counterfactuals of
freedom is explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions.
(34) The relation of explanatory priority is asymmetrical.
(35) Therefore, it follows from Molinism (by 5-6) that none of our choices and actions is
explanatorily prior to the truth of any true counterfactual of freedom about us.
(36) whatever we bring about is something to which some choice or action of ours is
explanatorily prior.
(37) Therefore it follows from Molinism (by 7-8) that we do not bring about the truth of any
counterfactual of freedom about us.
Adams contends that the most tendentious premise of his is premise (34). Accordingly, to
him, he admits that two decisions made by the same person at the same time can help to explain
each other. However, Adams rejects that this same notion can be applied to CCFs or divine
foreknowledge.
Second Part:
(PEP) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that P, and “P” entails “Q” and “Q” is false,
then it is in A’s power to bring it about that Q
(38) It follows also from Molinism that I freely do action A in circumstances C, then there
is a true counterfactual of freedom F*, which says that if I were in C, then I would (freely)
do A.
(39) Therefore it follows from Molinism that if I freely do A in C, the truth of F* is
explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C.
(40) If I freely do A in C, no truth that is strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in
C is explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C.
(41) The truth of F* (which says that if I were in C, then I would do A) is strictly
inconsistent with my refraining from A in C.
(42) If Molinism is true, then if I freely do A in C, F* both is (by 39) and is not (by 40-41)
explanatorily prior to my choosing and acting as I do in C.
(43) Therefore (by 42) if Molinism is true, then I do not freely do A in C.
The first fold argues that logical priority may be transitive. An example of another transitive
relation is in terms of causality. In causality, a cause precedes its effect logically and the effect
may not have any efficacy on its cause so as to prompt a backwards causation. In the same way, I
take it that Adams is arguing that in the same light, logical priority also cannot be non-transitive.
The first part also argues that given the transitivity of logical priority, CCFs are likewise
explanatorily prior to our actions.
The second fold, on the other hand, argues that given the PEP principle, it follows that if there
is some CCF F*, F* is explanatorily prior to me acting as I do. Thereby, if Molinism is true, then
PEP canwnot be satisfied in the case of CCFs and free actions.
Evaluation: Robert Adams (1991)
The main Achilles heels of this argument, as it is presented, has been posited by Craig. 38
The difficulty in presenting this argument is that it presents an equivocal understanding of
explanatory priority. For example, in the first step, premise (30) distinguishes our existence to be
explanatorily prior to all of our choices and actions. Yet, in what sense is our existence to be
“explanatorily prior” to all of our choices and actions is unclear. If, as we have been assuming,
Adams is presenting logical priority, then it seems erroneous to claim that our existence logically
precedes all of our actions. In fact, in what sense such a statement may be construed seems to be
a helpless mystery. Nonetheless, it is apparent that, on multiple counts, Adams conflates between
a kind of logical priority and temporal priority.
This Achilles heels becomes even revealing in (39). Adams wants to say that CCFs are
logically prior to our actions and choices, but CCFs are only prior to our actions and choices in
the sense of temporal priority and not logical priority. It is not clear, in what sense, as Adams is
insisting for CCFs to be logically prior to our actions and choices. If Adams is insisting that our
actions and choices are dependent for its truth on the CCFs that become true temporally prior to
the action stated, then it seems to be a notion that Molinists can easily sway away. CCFs do not
have a causal relation to its corresponding future actions neither do free actions have its
truthmakers in their CCFs.
Craig gives a counter syllogism to further prove the absurdity of this argument. Take, for
example, that we want to start a family and on the basis of a Scripture like Proverbs 22:6 we believe
that:
(44) If children were born to us, they would come to love God
(45) truth of (A*) is explanatorily prior to our decision to have children
(46) Our decision to have children is explanatorily prior to the existence of our children
(47) our children’s existence is explanatorily prior to their coming to love God
(48) The relation of explanatorily priority is transitive
(49) The truth of (A*) is explanatorily prior to our children’s coming to love God 39
38
Craig, William Lane. 1994. "Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument." Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 857-861.
39
Ibid.859-860.
Given this syllogism, it seems to arrive to the conclusion that the children’s coming to love God
will not be their free actions! Once again, the problem is that there is a conflation between
chronological priority to logical priority.
Adams-Haskerian Aliance?
A more formulated defence of this argument comes from Hasker. 40 Hasker posits the
following analysis of explanatory priority in support of Adams’ argument:
(EP) p is explanatorily prior to q iff p must be included in a complete explanation of why q
obtains.
Therefore, in this sense, p plays a role in bringing it about that q obtains. However, this is not an
original point. If Hasker is insisting that the explanatory priority is in terms of a complete
explanation, it seems highly implausible that a complete explanation may, in itself, be able to
exclude LFW given CCFs.
The Achilles heels of this argument is when we consider what counts as a “complete
explanation” to our actions given CCFs. I suspect that Hasker misunderstands that our future
actions, given that the antecedent and the consequent of the CCFs are achieved, is not grounded in
the CCFs themselves. Therefore, it is not true to claim that our future actions are grounded in CCFs
as per (EP). (EP), on the other hand, may be a useful tool in describing the relationship between
CCF and counterfactual states of affairs, but it is in no way a description of CCFs and the future
actions that exemplifies the CCFs. Take a future action:
(50) I will do X in 2020 given circumstances C
Proposition (50), before 2020, is grounded not in the following CCF:
(51) If I had been in C, then I would do X.
On the other hand, (50) is grounded in the state of affairs of its being the case that I will do X in
2020. This, in no way, is the CCF. Thus, there is a disconnection between the CCF and the
proposition about my future action that exemplifies the CCF—the former is grounded in
counterfactual state of affairs while the latter is grounded in tenseless state of affairs.
The point is that it is futile to argue that CCFs prevent anyone from being able to refrain to
do otherwise. On the other hand, our actions do not, in any way, rely on its truth to an even more
fundamental CCFs. Even this CCFs conform to state of affairs of what the agent would do in
different circumstances. The state of affairs that the CCF is grounded in would then be the more
fundamental, non-necessitating existent feature of reality.
40
Hasker, William. 1997. "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal: A Reply to William Lane Craig."
Philosophy and Phenomenological research 389-393.
William Hasker (1995-2011)

Haskerian objections further spanwn in, at least, two more places: first, in his essay, Middle
Knowledge: A Refutation Visited (1995)41 and second, in his The (Non-)Existence of Molinist
Counterfactuals42 (2011), The thrust of the argument in both cases are hugely similar and
therefore, the focus of this section is to discuss the notion of “bringing about” that Hasker has
conceded to.
To begin with Hasker (1995), it is helpful to split the section into three different sections:
the first section defending his notion of hypotheticalism, the second section defending Adams’
objections, and the third section is to advance a possible refurbishing of his old “bringing about”
argument.
Recall Hasker’s previous premise:
(19) Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are more fundamental features of the world than
are particular facts. (Hence, worlds that differ from the actual world with regard to factual
content are closer than those that differ from it with regard to counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom.)
As we have argued, this argument centres around either (19) or (23). Hasker begins re-arguing for
(19) to assert his defence of (24) and (25).
To begin with, he defends another argument in support that might/would-probably
counterfactuals (which comprises laws of nature) weigh less in comparison to would
counterfactuals. Through this, he contends that (19) is true. Take our previous counterfactual:
(CCF) If Jones had been born in Namibia, he would have been a sailor (we may frame this
as ‘P → Q’)
As we have been elaborating earlier, (CCF) is true by virtue that in the closest possible worlds to
the actual world, the same counterfactual is true. However, Hasker points to a crucial stipulation
by Lewis. For based on the Stalnaker-Lewisian semantics, “If it is a counterfactual of freedom, we
cannot have “P” true and “Q” false in the actual world or any of the set of possible worlds that are
“closest to” the actual world. But with a would-probably conditional, we can have “P” true and
“Q” false in the actual world, and also in possible worlds as close as you please to the actual
world.”43
Evaluation: Do CCFs Weigh More Than do Particular Facts?
Take a law of nature L such that L entails a condition C. Therefore, we have,
(52) L → C
41
Hasker, William. 1995. "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited." Faith and Philosophy 223-236.
42
Hasker, William. 2011. "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals." In Molinism: The Contemporary
Debate, 25-36. New York: Oxford University Press.
43
Hasker, William. 1995. "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited." Faith and Philosophy 223-236. 225.
It may be the case that (52) is false in half of the world that are closest to the actual world and yet,
(52) may still be a true counterfactual. This is because (52) is a might counterfactual/probabilistic
law. Thereby, Hasker reasons, it must be the case that would counterfactuals weigh more as a
similarity because it stipulates not some worlds to be a world in which the same counterfactual is
true, but that all worlds (closest to the actual world) are worlds in which the same counterfactual
is true.
This reasoning is valid, but it still fails to account his previous statement. In order for (19)
to be valid, it has to be the case that (19) applies to all particular facts and not only laws of nature.
This means that (19) should also apply to non-probabilistic fact. Thereby, this is a valid attempt to
prove that some contingent facts are probabilistic and weigh less, but it does not answer whether
CCFs weigh more than all contingent facts.
To put this into example, (52) cannot account for the following proposition
(P) At t2, it is the case that person p does a.
Take time t3 after the occurrence of the event stated in (P). This would mean that such an event,
(P) is true and unalterable. If that is the case, then (P) no longer remains a probabilistic event (not
even in Hasker’s conception), but it can rightly be said to be a fixed event. Therefore, it follows
that what Hasker has to prove is that all propositions of the contingent nature of (P) weighs less
than any CCF.
Perhaps, at this point, Hasker resorts into the temporal asymmetry that he has earlier
brought up. However, this strategy does not work because as we are talking about timeframe t3, it
means that (P) has became part of the antecedents necessary for some counterfactuals. Thereby, it
seems that at any point in time after the occurrence of the event, the event becomes likewise
incorporated into the counterfactual. Moreover, take, for example, the proposition (that Flint
himself has brought up): God became man.44 It seems that such a proposition may be more
fundamental by virtue of its being more explanatory to a possible world than another. It would
seem intuitively true that a world in which God becomes a man is closer to the actual world rather
than not and may even be a measure of similarity itself. In fact, it may be argued that whatever any
divine intervention whatsoever in any world may be a further weigh of similarity than just other
contingent particular facts.
The New ‘Bringing About’: Adams-Haskerian Rapprochement?
As we have stipulated earlier, the notion of “bringing about” that Hasker has earlier posited,
fails to be able to account for the problems that ‘centering’ faces in counterfactual logic. Having
solidified himself thoroughly in Adams’ arguments, Hasker presents a much simpler argument in
Hasker (2011):45
44
Flint, Thomas P. 1998. Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. New York: Cornell University Press. 142
45
Hasker, William. 2011. "The (Non-)Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals." In Molinism: The Contemporary
Debate, 25-36. New York: Oxford University Press. 31-34.
(53) Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘ C □→ Z’ is true of her,

and she freely chooses to do z.
(54) A is in c, and it is in A’s power to refrain from doing z.
(55) (A is in c and refrains from doing z) → (C □→ ¬Z)
(56) If it is in A’s power to bring it about that A is in c and refrains from doing z, and ‘(C
□→ ¬Z)’ is false, then it is in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ¬Z).
(BA3) A brings it about that Y iff: For some X, A causes it to be the case that X and (X &
H) → Y, and ¬ (H → Y), where ‘H’ represents the history of the world prior to its coming
to be the case that X (where ‘→’ represents strict (broadly logical, or metaphysical)
necessitation.
(57) It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom
about her (from (56) and (BA3)).
(58) it is not in A’s power to bring it about that (C □→ ¬Z).
The crux of this argument lies solely in (BA3). No Molinist, to my knowledge, expresses a
disavowal towards (PEP). (BA3) expresses the new kind of ‘bringing about’ that is much needed
for Molinists to be able to say that agents bring about their actions.
A point of debate here is whether or not ‘history’ as implied in (BA3) involves all facts that
a world has. For example, if it can be established that ‘H’ involves all facts that a world has, then
it follows that CCFs would, thereby, be included in the same category. The proponents of this
argument claims that this would prove detrimental to the Molinists as it would be true that (H →
Y). Therefore, according to Hasker’s criteria alone, it can be concluded that as A does not bring
about that Y, then it follows that A does not have the power to bring about X either.
The new (BA3) circumvents the problem of ‘centering’ we have been elaborating. For
given (BA3), we are no longer able to say that A’s doing X alone can imply that the sun rises this
morning or the history of the world. Rather, the new condition stipulates that it is the history up
until that point of the action and the agent combined that entails Y. This would mean that without
one or the other, Y would not have resulted and that neither the agent nor H, by themselves, could
imply the other when put alone. Thus, it would be impossible, given agent A to imply the truth of
H when H is not present.
Evaluation: The New ‘Bringing About’ Argument
It seems that Hasker has succeeded in being able to posit a stipulation for (BA) that
repudiates the claim that agents “bring about” their CCFs. However, a fatal flaw within this
argument results when he posits the leap between:
(BA*) A does not bring about Y
(57) It is not in an agent’s power to bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom
about her (from (56) and (BA3)).
Although (BA*) was not in the formulation of the argument, it suffices to say that (BA*) is also
implicit in Hasker’s reasoning in order to derive the truth to from (56) – (57). As Flint himself has
pointed out, the following premise is necessary for the argument to proceed:
(a) If it is not possible that A brings it about that X, then it is not possible that A has the
power to bring it about that X
For A to possess the power to “bring it about” that X is to say that A has an inherent ability to act
in such a way that even given the history of the world up until a point in time, it may be the case
that A can cause X such that (X & H) → Y, and ¬ (H → Y). This is to assume that “history”
includes all facts that were true from eternity past. Thereby. Even given Hasker’s insistence for
“history” to include all the facts a world consists of, the facts themselves remain contingent, non-
causal, and non-necessitating. If that is so, then we know that (57) is a non-sequitur from the
previous premises.
The implication of this is that even given that agents do not bring about the truth of CCFs
about him, it does not follow that the agents do not have the power to bring about the actions
specified in the CCFs. The former does not logically entail the latter. A parallel analogy of this, of
course, is in terms of future or past actions. It may be argued that in a similar vein, agents do not
bring about future or past actions in the present. Yet, we can claim that the agents do have the
power to bring about those actions given that the agent may have the ability to cause the actions.
Yet, at present, it is not possible for the agents to bring it about that his past actions are false.
Conclusion
In brief summary, the causal-style GO insists that the agent has no power over his own
actions given that he did not “bring about” the truth-values of his own CCFs. On the other hand,
the truthmaker-style GO insists that there is no existing entity by virtue of which that CCFs are
true. The latter seems to be implausible given that Molinists may posit counterfactual state of
affairs as a truthmaker. In answering the former, the notion of “bringing about” that Hasker posits
is innocuous even if Molinists concede to that there is no possibility for the agent to bring about
the truth of CCFs about him. This means, further, that Molinism has been able to withstand even
its strongest critic—the grounding objection.
Jakarta, Indonesia
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Exploring The Grounding Objection To Mol

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Philosophy of Religion (2018)

Exploring the Grounding Objection to Molinism:

JOHN ANTHONY LIMANTO1

Written for The Art of Rigor

Middle knowledge is expressed in counterfactuals (in the form of ‘subjunctive

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange

William Hasker (1995-2011)

(53) Agent A is in circumstances c, the counterfactual of freedom ‘ C □→ Z’ is true of her,

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