Signature

EMMANUEL LEVINAS
Edited by Adrian Peperzak

' .
EDITOR'S PREFACE

In the following text' Emmanuel Levinas gives a concentrated overviewof his

life and works. The density of the text makes appropriate an elucidation of its
allusions and dsfjiculties by means of a number of explanatory notes. All such
notes have been added by the editor.
I want to thank Emmanuel Levinas jor the many conversations by which he
helped me to understand his thinking, and Mary Fllen Petrisko who did the
translation of text and notes.

Adrian Peperzak

The Hebraic bible from the earliest years in Lithuania, Pushkin and Tolstoy,
the Russian revolution of 1917 at 11 years of age in Ukrainia. From 1923on, the
University of Strasbourg, where Charles Blondel, Halbwachs, Pradines,
' The firstversionof this text waswrittenby Levinasfor a panoramaof contemporary
Frenchphilosophyin whicha numberof Frenchphilosopherspresenttheir thoughts:Les
philosophesfrancais d'aujourd'huipar eux-msmes.Autobiographiede la philosophie
franpaisecontemporaine,Paris, 1963,pp. 'i25-328.Under the title of "Signature,"the
text was included in Ihfficile Liberté. Essau sur le judarsme, A. Michel, 1963, pp.
323-327.Levinaswrote a secondversionfor a Dutch selectionfrom his articles,Het
meruelijkegelaat(The HumanVisage),Bilthoven,Ambo,1969', 1975',whichbesidesan
introductionalsoincludesa completebibliographyof Levina'swritingsup to 1975,and
approximately60 pagesof explanatorynotes.A third versionof "Signature"appearedin
the secondeditionof DifficileLibertO,Paris1976,pp. 373-379.(It is the paginationof this
secondeditionof DifficileLibertéwhichwill be usedin all notesfollowing).

175
Carteron and, later, Gu6roult taught. Friendship with Maurice Blanchot2 and,
through the teachers who were adolescents at the time of the Dreyfus affair, a vie
son - dazzing for a newcomer -of a people who equal humanity and of a nation
to which one can attach himself by spirit and heart as strongly as by origins.' A
stay in 1928/1929 in Freiburg, and apprenticeship in phenomenology begun a
year earlier with Jean Hering.4 The Sorbonne, L6on Brunschvicq. The
philosophical avant-garde at the Saturday soirées of Gabriel Marcel,.' The in-
tellectual-and anti-intellectualist-refinement of Jean Wahl' and his
I Severalstudieson Blanchot'sworkattestto thisfriendshipand to Levinas'admiration
for Blanchot.Cf. "MauriceBlanchotet le regard du potltc"in MondeNouveau,n. 96
(March, 1956),pp. 6-19; "La servanteet son maitre; propos de L'attente l'oubli de
MauriceBlanchot)in Critique,n. 229(June, 1966),pp. 514-522;"EntretiensavecAndrt
Dalmasin La QuiruaireeLittéraire,n. 115(1971),and "Exercicessur Lafolic du jour"in
Change, n. 22 (1975). Levinashas collectedthese studiesunder the title Sur Maurice
Blanchot,s.d. [1976],84 pp. and has had thempublishedby Fata Morgana(BrunoRoy,
Montpellier).
' This nation is France.
4 In his dissertation,La th6oriede intuition dansla phinombtologiede Husserl,Paris
1930 (see note 12), Levinasrefers (p. 5-6) to this universitycompanion,author of
Phénoménologie et philosophiereligieuse,Paris 1925 -the firstbookpublishedin France
on "the wholeof phenomenological thought."
6 The philosophyof Brunschvicqhas not had a great influenceon Levinas'thought.
The high estimationof him as a personhas been expressedby Levinasin "L'agendade
L6on Brunschvicq",1949,includedin DifficileLiberté (see note 1), p. 61-68.See also
"Etre occidental",ibid., p. 69-73.
' Concerningthe relationship(at a distance)withGabrielMarcel,compareTotalitéet
Infrni.E-uai su r 1ex t &iorit Hague, Nijhoff1961,196JZ;1968';1971.;X VIII+ 284
TheL',
pp., pp. 40-41 (Englishtranslation: Totality and Infinity; An Essay on Exteriority,
by AlphonsoLingis,DuquesneUniversityPress,Pittsburgh,1969);and "Transcendance
et Hauteur", in Bulletinde la Sociiiffranpzisede Phs7osophie, 56 (1962),p. 99.
' The friendshipwithJean Wahl has left its traces in severalcontributionsto books
whichWahl collectedand edited(Cf."Le tempset fautre,"in J. Wahlet. al., Le choix -
le monde - 1existence.,Grenoble-Paris,1947,pp. 125-196:J. Wahl, Petite histoirede
l'eristentia.lisme,Paris, 1947,pp. 81-89,reprintedin J. Wahl,Fsquiuepour une histoire
de 1'existentislisme, Paris, 1949,pp. 90-100),in a numberof references(amongothers,in
"Transcendanceet Hauteur (seenote 6) and commentsin Kierkegaardvivant(colloquy
organisedby UNESCO,Paris, April21-23,1964,Paris, 1966,pp. 2S3-234:246;286-288)
and in an articleconcerning"JeanWahlet le sentiment"in Cahiersdu Sud, n. 33(1955),
pp. 453-459,which Levinascollectedtogether with articleson Agnon, Buber, Celan,
Delhomme,Derrida, Jabts, Kierkegaard,Lacroix, Laporte, Picard, Proust and Van
Breda in NomsPropres, Montpellier,Fata Morgana,1976,196 pp.) Totalitéet Infini.
Essaisur 1ext&ioritLi (seenote 6) is dedicatedto Marcelkand JeanWahLAfter the death
of Jean Wahl in 1974, Levinasgave a conferenceon him which,under the title 'Jears
Wahlsans avoiTni - ", waspublishedin E. Levinas,X. Tilliette,P. Ricoeur, JeanWahl
et GabrielMarcel, Paris. Beauchesne.1976,pp. 13-31.

176
 benevolent friendship, regained after a long captivity in Germany; regular con-
ferences since 1947 at the College Philosophique which Wahl founded and
which he animated.' Direction of the century-old ?cole Normale Israelite OTien-
tale, preparing teachers of French for the schools of the Alliance Israelite
Universelledu Bassin Méd£terranéen. Daily communication with Dr. Henri Ner-
son, frequent visits to M. Chouchani, the prestigious-and merciless-teacher
of exegesisand of Talmud. Annual conferences, since 1957, on Talmudic texts'
at colloquys of the Jewish Intellectuals of France. Thesis for the Doctor of Let-
ters degree in 1961." Professorshipat the Universityof Poitiers, from 1967 at the
Universityof Paris-Nanterre, and since 1973 at the Sorbonne. This disparate in-
ventory is a biography.
It is dominated by the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror." i

Husserl is to have brought a method to philosophy. 12This method consists in

' Fourof theseconferencesappearedunder the title "Le tempset 1'autre."(seenote 7).
' Cf. "Temps messianiqueset temps historiquesdans le chapitre XI du 'Trait£
Sanh?drin'" in La Coniciencejuive.Donnéeset dibats,'Paris,1963,pp. 268-285and "Le
Messianisme d'aprts un texte talmudique"(Conferenceat the 4th Colloquyof French-
speakingJewishIntellectual) in La Conscience juive (II): Face 1'histoire: Le Pardon,
, Paris, 1965.pp. 103-117,whichare includedas "TextesMessianiques" in DifficileLiberty
(seenote 1), pp. 83-129;Quatre lecturestalmuds'ques,Paris, Minuit, 1968;two"Lesons
talmudiques"in Jeunesse et réuolutiondansla conscience juive, Paris,1972,pp. 59-80and
pp. 279.292;"Legontalmudique.D6sacralisadon et d6sensorcellement" in L'Autredans
la consciencejuive. Le sacréet le couple,Paris, 1973,pp. 55-74;"Legontalmudique.Et
Dieu cria la femme" in L'Autre dans la consciencejuive. La sacré et le couple, pp.
173-186.
'° Fora statedoctorate,twothesesmustbe presented.The principalthesis,on the basis .
of whichLevinasat oncemadea namefor himselfas an extremelyoriginaland important
philosopher,was Totalité et Infini. Esscu'sur 1'extErioritE (see note 6). The collected
philosophicalpublicationsbefore Totalité et Infirti functionedas the complementary
thesis.At the dissertationdefensetherewasdiscussionoverDe 1'existence d 1'existentfrom
the collectionExercisede la pe7u6e,n. 2, Paris,Fontaine,1947(nowdistributedby Vrin),
175pp. and overthe firsteditionof Endécouvrant1existenceavecHusserlet Heidegger,
Paris,Vrin, 1949,109p. (The second,augmentededitionof this workwaspublishedby
Vrin 1967).
" The horrors which are summarizedin this short sentence are the ever-present
backgroundof Levinas'meditationsand writings.They find direct expressionin the
followingshort pieces:"Aimerla Thora plus que Dieu," in DtfftcileLiberté(seenote 1),
pp. 189-193;"Honneursans drapeau," in Les NouveauxCahiers,n. 6, 1966,pp. 1-3,
under the title "SansNom"in Nomspropres(seenote 7), pp. 175-182;"De la mont6edu
nihilismeau Juifcharnel,"in DAuschudtz Israel, Paris,Centerof contemporaryJewish
documentation,1968,pp. 244-249,includedin 1?tfficile Liberti, pp. 285-291;"Nomd'un
chienou le droit naturel," in DifficikLiberti, pp. 199-202.
'= Levinas'continuouscontact with Husserl'swork is documentedby the following
publications:
a) La thiforiede 1'intuitiondans la phénoménologie de Husserl(seenote 4), the disserta-
tion withwhichLevinasendedhis studiesin Strasbourg,and whichwaslaudedby the
177
 seriously considering the intentions which animate the psychical and the
modalities of the appearing which conform to these intentions, modalities which -
characterize the diverse beings apprehended by experience. It consists in
discovering the unsuspected hmizons within which the real is situated, ap-
prehended by representative thought but also apprehended by concrete, pre-
predicative life," beginning with the body (innocently), beginning with culture
(perhaps less innocently). To hold out one's hands, to turn one's head, to speak a
language, to be the "sedimentation" of a historyl'-all of this transcendentally
conditions contemplation and the contemplated." In showing that con-

AcademicdesSciencesMoraleset Politiques.The first editionwaspublishedbyAlcan,

Paris,1930.It wasrepublishedbyVrin(1963', 1970').An Englishtranslationhas been
done by Andri Orianne: The theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology,
Evanston,NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1973,163pp.
b) The translationinto French (together with G. Pfeiffer)of Husserl'sCartesiam'sche
Meditatioreere: M6ditatio?ns Cafl*iennes:Introductiond la phénoménologie par Ed-
moaedHusserl.Paris,Colin193 1,VII + 136pp. ;Vrin 1947zand 1953'.(The firstfor-
ty pagesare translatedby Ms. Peiffer,the last 80 by Levinas.)
e) A long seriesof articleson aspectsof Husserl'sphilosophy:
(i) "Sur les 'Ideen' de M.E. Husserl,"a review of E. Husserl,Ideen zu einerreinen
. Ph4nomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie,L Buch (Jahrbuchfar
Philosophieund Phttnomenologische forschung,Halle, 1913,323,pp.) in Revue
Philosophiquede la France et de I'Etranger107(1929),p. 230-265.
(ii) "L'oeuvre d'Edmond Husxrl" in Revue Philosophique de la France et
lEtranger, 124(1940),includedin En découurant... (seenote 10), pp. 7-52.
(iii) "Rtflexionssur la 'technique'phénoIIiénologique,"in Husserl(Cahiersde Royau-
mont, Philosophieno III), Paris 1959,pp. 95-107,includedin the secondand
third editionsof En découvrant... pp. 111-124.
(iv) "La ruine de la representation," in Edmund Husserl 1859-1959
(PhaenomenologicaIV), The Hague, 1959, pp. 73-85, included in En
ddcouvrant ... , pp. 125-135.
. (v) "Intentionalit6et métaphysique,"in Revue Philosophiquede la France et de
l'Etranger, 149 (1959), pp. 471-479, included in En découurant..., pp.
137-144.
(vi) "Le permanentet I'humainchezHusserl,"in L'AgeNouveau,n. 110(1960),pp.
51-56.
(vii) "Intentionalit6et sensation,"in RevueInternationalede Philosophie,19 (1965),
pp. 34-54,includedin En dicouvrant... , pp. 144-162.
(viii) "De la consciencea la veille.A partir de Husserl,"in Bijdragerc,35 (1974),pp.
235-249.
is Referencesto Husserl'stheoryof the Horixonand the -.
14Through intentionalanalysis,one can differentiatevariouscultural levelsin the
Lebensmelt,which then appears to be a layered whole composedof many sediments
(precipitates,deposits).Cf. En découvrant... (seenote 10), p. 34.
's Cf. Husserl'stheoryof transcendentalconstitution.

178
sciousnessand represented Being emerge from a non-representative "context,""
Husserl is to have contested that the place of the Truth is in Representation. 17
The "scaffoldings" which require scientific constructions never become useless,
if one is careful about the sense of these edifices.18Ideas transcending con-
sciousness do not separate themselves from their genesis in the fundamentally
temporal consciousness." In spite of his intellectualism and his certitude with,
respect to the excellence of the West," Husserl has thus brought into question
the Platonic privilege, until then uncontested, of a continent which believes
itself possessedof the right to colonize the world.21
The phenomenological method was used by Heidegger==to turn, beyond ob-

16This "context"refersagain to the horizonand the Lebenmieltwithinwhichbeings

presentthemselvesand from whichone cannotseparatethem.
" The primacyof theoryand the "egology"whichare boundup withthe centralroleof
representation(Vorstellung,repr?sentation)are characteristic,accordingto Levinas,of
westernphilosophy.The critique of representationtakes up a large part alreadyin his
dissertation.Cf.La thioriede 1'tntuitivndanslephénoménologie deHusserl(note12),pp.
86-142and p. 223;furthersee"L'oeuvred'EdmondHusserl"(seenote 12),pp. 23-25;"La
ruine de la representadon"(seenote 12), Totalitéet Infini (seenote 6), pp. 94 ff. See also
note 51.
" Phenomenology showsalongwhichwayscienceconstructsits fundamentalconcepts,
structuresand lawsvia abstractions,choices,and stylizations from the concreteexperience
of the Lebenswelt,whichis and remainsprimary.With referenceto thesescientificcon-
structions,all the other elementsof concreteexperienceappear as scaffolding.In that
sense,phenomenologyis an attempt to keep and to "reconstruct"the scaffolding.
1' The "temporalizing"of consciousness,such as it is describedbyHu33Cri and Heideg-
ger, impliesthat the Platonic"eternal"ideascannotbe separatedfrom the concreteex-
periencein whichthey arise. ,
20Cf. amongother worksE. Husserl,Die Krisrsder EuropaischmWissenschaften und
die transzendentalePhltreomenologie, The Hague1954.
" Due to the fact that ideas,accordingto Husserl,are not independentof the concrete
experienceof the Lebensweltfromout of whichtheycome,it followsalsothat theycannot
be separatedfrom the culturein whichtheyare born. Accordingto Plato, however,they
are valid-as ideas whichare eternal and independentof their materializationin ex-
perience-not only for this or that culture, but for everyhuman being, in so far as he
thinks.Husserl'stemporalizingof the ideas(via their reductionto concreteexperience)
thus underminesthe demand for absolutenessand the imperialismof the Platonicideas
whichfollowsthis demand. Elsewhere,however,LevinasdefendsPlato againsta current
anti-Platonism.Cf. the third section of "La significationet le sens," in Revue de
MétaPhysiqueet de Morale, 69 (1964),pp. 125-156,includedin Humanismede l'autre
homme,Montpellier,Fata Morgana,1972,111pp.
" MartinHeideggeris for Levinasthe mostoutstandingfigurecontinuingand renew-
ing the westernphilosophywhichbeganwith Parmenidesand found its highestcomple-
tion in Hegel'sthought; preciselyfor this reasonHeideggeris also the thinker against
whom Levinas almost continuallypolemizes.In La throne de l'intuition dam la
phénoménologie de Husserl(seeunder 12),Heidegger's s influence
is alreadynoticeable(cf.
179
 jectively known and technically approached entities, toward a situation which
would condition all others: that of the apprehension of the Being of these en- -
tities-that of ontology. The Being of these entities is not another entity; it is
neutral, but it illuminates, guides and orders thought. It calls to man and nearly
brings him forth."
Is the Being of the being which is not another being phosphorescence, as
Heidegger would have it?24

especiallypp. 14-15and p. 218).Forexplicitstudieson Heidegger's philosophy,see"Mar-

tin Heideggeret l'ontologie,""L'ontologiedans le temporel,"and "De la descriptionà
1'existence"in En d6couvrant...,
. (see note 10), pp. 53-107;"L'ontologieest-ellefun-
damentale ?"in Revuede M6taphysiqueet de Morale,56 (1951),pp. 88-98,reprintedin
H. Birault et. al., Phénoménologie-bistence, Paris, 1953, pp. 193-203;"Heidegger,
Gagarineet nous"in Injormation Juive,1961,includedin DifficileZs'bertE(seenote 1),
pp. 299-303.An implicitpolemicwithHeideggeris found in the polemicallyentitledDe
1'exr'stence
d 1'existant(seenote 10)and in Totalittfet Infini (seenote 10).
_' The precedingsketchesthe situationin whichLevinas'own thought had its begin-
ning. The followingindicatesthe way-beginning from Husserland Heidegger-which
he has passed along. On this way, which includeda criticismof phenomenology,he
retakesin a mostoriginalwaythemesfrom the philosophiesof Plato (whosepresenceis to
be found in Totalité et Infini (see note 6) and many other publications),Plotinus,
Descartes(most obviouslypresentin the article "La philosophieet l'idéede fInfini" in
Revuede Mélaphysiqueet de Morale62 (1957),pp. 241-253,includedin the secondedi-
tion of En découvrant... (seenote 10), pp. 165-178,Karat(on whomLevinaswrotean
article, "Het primaat van de zuiverepraktischerede" (The primacyof pure practical
reason) for a Dutch review, WijsgerigPerspectief,11 (1970-71)n. 3, p. 178-186,
Kierkegaard(cf. Existenceet Ethique and "A proposde Kierkegaardvivant"in Noms
Propres(seenote 7), p. 97-115,Bergson,Husserl,Heidegger,Rosenzmeig(about whom
Levinaswrotea "spiritualbiography"under the title "Entre deux mondes"in La Cons-
cience Juive;Donnieset débats, Paris, 1963,pp. 121-137and a characterisation,Franz
Rosenzweig:Une peruEejuive moderne in Rernsede Theblogieet de Philosophie,98
(1965),pp. 208-221.In TotaU'téet Infsiri(seenote 6), p. xviit is saidof Rosenzweig's
Stern
der Erlosungthat it is "presentin thisbooktoooftento be cited"),Buber, and Marcel(In
TotalitE et Infini, p. 40, Levinas indicates his relationship with the latter two
philosophers.With regard to Buber he has written a seriesof respectfulbut critical
studies: Martin Buber und die Erkenntnistheorie" in Philosophen des 20.
Jahrhusulerts-Martzn Euber (ed. P.A. Schilpp), Stuttgart 1963, pp. 119-134.(The
Frenchversioncan be foundin NomsPropres,pp. 27-50);"DialogueavecMartinBuber," "
ibid., pp. 51-55;"Martin Buber"in L'Arche,n. 102(July,1965),pp. 10-11:"La pens6e
de Martin Buber et le judaisme contemporain,"in Martin Buber. L'homme et le
philosophe,Brussels,1968, pp. 43-58.Accordingto a verbal communication,Levinas
considersthe fivegreatestphilosophersof the westto be Plato(withthe wholelineof those
followingin his tracks,beginningwithAristotle,via the Scholastics,Descartes,Malebran-
che and Spinoza,up to and includingHusserl),Kant, Hegel(in particularwith reference
to hisPhltnomenologie des Geistes)Bergson(la duréel),and Heidegger(of Seinund Zeit).
14An allusionto "die LichtungdesSeins"fromthe later Heidegger;cf.
e.g., Ueberden
Humanismus,pp. 15-20,24, 26, 35-37.

180
 The followingis the path taken by the author of this book [Difficile Liberty.
An analysis which feigns the disappearance of every existence-and even of the -
cogito which thinks it-is overrun by the chaotic rumbling of an anonymous "to
exist", which is an existence without existants and which no negation manages to
overcome. There is - impersonally- like it u raining or it is night_Z5No generosi-
ty which the German term "es gibt" is said to express showed itself between 1933
and 1945.**This must be said] Illumination and sense dawn only with the ex-
isting beings' rising up and establishing themselvesin this horrible neutrality of
the there is. They are on the way which leads from existence to the existant2l and
from the existant to the Other (Autrui) - thc way which delineates time itself.
Time must not be seen as "image" and approximation" of an immobile ,
eternity," as a deficient mode of ontological fullness. It articulates a mode of ex-
istence in which everything is always revocable, in which nothing is final but is
yet to come-in which even the present is not a simple coincidence with itself,
but is alwaysan imminence. This is the situation of consciousness.To have con-
sciousnessis to have time; it is to precede nature-in a certain sense, not yet to
have been born.'° Such a tearing away is not a lesser-being, but is the manner or
the subject. This manner is the power of separation, the refusal of neutral and
impersonal principles, the refusal of Hegelian totality and of politics, the refusal
of art's bewitching rhythms." It is the faculty of speech, freedom of speech- a
faculty which is not invalidated by a sociology'sor a psychoanalysis'establishing
11For the descriptionand analysisof thisanonymousand presubjectivebeing-thereor
il ya, see"DeI'evasion"in Recherches Philosophiques, V( 1 935-'36) pp., 37 3- 392 De; 1ex-
istenced 1existant(seenote 10), pp. 93-105.
21An exampleof the band whichbindsthe ideastogetherwith the temporalityof con-
crete life (seenote 19); the Nazi period is a manifestationof the "there is" (il y a) in ita
mosthorribleaspects.Seenote 11.
" The title of the bookDe 1'exutenced l'existant(seenote10), whichradicallyreverses
the orderofHeidegger's thought processwhichgoesfrombeing(Seiendes,existant)to Be-
ing(Seing,existence),can be seento be reflectedin thisstatement.The bookwaswritten
during the SecondWorld War.
" Cf. the analysesof timein "Le tempset 1'Autre"(seenote 7), pp. 125-196;Totahii et
Infini (seenote 6) throughoutand especiallypp. 195-219;En découvrant... (seenote
10). pp. 118-120.
"' Cf. Plato'sTimaeus37c-38band the wholetraditionup to and includingHegel.
'° A playon wordsbetween"nature" (fromnasei-natus-natura)and "nE' (Frenchfor
natus = born).
" Cf. De 1'existerece
d 1'existant(seenote 10),pp. 83-92;"La réalitéet son ombre"in
TempsModernes,n. 38 (1948),pp. 771-789;"JeanWahl et le sentiment,"in NomsPro-
frres(seenote 7), pp. 163-173.

181
 itself behind the spoken word, seeking the place of this word in a system of rela-
tions and thus reducing it to something which it did not intend. Whence comes w
the power to judge history instead of awaiting its impersonal verdict.32
But time, language and subjectivity do not only assume a being which tears
itself away from totality; they also assume one which does not encompass it.
Time, language, and subjectivity delineate a pluralism and consequently, in the
strongest sense of this term, an experience: one being's reception of an absolute-
ly other being. In the place of ontology-of the Heideggerian comprehension of
the Being of the being3' - is substituted as primordial the relation of a being to a
being,34which is, however, not equivalent to a rapport between subject and ob-
ject,'6 but rather to a proximity, to a relation with the Other (Autruz).S8
The fundamental experience which objective experience itself presumes is the

n The propheticand untimelythoughtthat historyisjudged by morality(and not the

other wayaround)constantlyre-emerges-ofcenpolemically-in the essayswhichare col-
lected in DoricileLibert,4(seenote 1). A more technicallyphilosophicaldevelopmentis
givento this thoughtin, amongother works,the eighthsectionof "La significationet le
sens"in Humanomede l'autre homme(seenote 21). pp. 54-56..
aa Cf. M. Heidegger,Seinund Zes'tsections1-4.
14This isalreadythe thesisof De 1existenced 1existant(1947)(seenote 10).
15This is the constant theme of all of Levinas writings. One can follow the
philosophicalworkingout of this theme-each time takenup anew-in a seriesof articles
whichculminatein TotalitéetInjini (1961)(seenote 6), whichis the closingoff of a com-
plete phase. Cf. "L'Autredans Proust"in Deucalion2 (1947),pp. 117-123,alsoincluded
in NomsPropres(seenote 7), pp. 149-156;"Ethiqueet esprit"in Evidences, n. 27 (1952),
pp. 1 -4,includedin DifficileLiberté (seenote 1), pp. 15-24;"L'ontologieest-ellefon-
damentale ?"in Revuede Mitaphysiqueet de Morale, 56 (1951),pp. 88-98;"Libertdet .
commandement"in Revuede M.Otaph3wique et de Morale, 58 (1953),pp. 264-272;"Le
moi et la totalite' in Revue de Métaphysiquede Morale, 59 (1954),pp. 353-373;"La
philosophicet l'id6ede 1'Infini"in Revuede M?taphysiqueet de Morale,62 (1957),pp.
241-253,includedin the secondeditionofEn découvrant... (seenote 10),pp. 16S-178.
After Totaliti et Infini the central themestill remainsthe other and otherness,but the
perspectivechanges.Seethe last sectionof the presenttext.
31See,for example,Totalitéet Infini(seenote 6), pp. 52-54,161-225and ''Langageet
prtlximit6,"in the secondeditionof En découvrant... (seenote 10), pp. 218-236.The
being that standsfacingme is not an object,for an objectdoesnot reallystand opposite
me, but is part of the I, whoassimilatesand envelopesthis objectby possession,work,or
thought.The being that is trulyother than I, the pre-eminentiyother is the otherperson:
autrui. We have translated this as "the Other", written with a capital letter due to
Levinas'owncapitalizationof the word. A particulardifficultyariseshere howeverwith
, the term "fAutre", whichhas alsobeen translated.as"the Other" (seenote 43). To make
the differencebetween"l'Autre" and "Autrui" clear, "l'Autre" has been put in paren-
thesesin each placewhere"the Other" refersto this term. It may thus be assumedafter
this point that all mentionsof "the Other"whichdo not indicatethe Frenchterm refer to
"Autrui." .

182
 experience of the Other-experience par excellence. As the idea of the Infinite
goes beyond Cartesian thought, so is the other out of proportion with the power
and freedom of the I." The disproportion between the other and the I is precise-
ly moral consciousness. saMoral consciousnessis not an experience of values, but
an access to exterior Being: exterior being par excellence is the Other. Moral
consciousnessis thus not a modality of psychologicalconsciousness, but its con-
- dition. At first sight it is even its inversion, since the freedom which lives through
consciousnessis inhibited before the Other when I really stare, with a straight-
forwardness without artifice or evasion, into his unguarded, absolutely un-
protected eyes. Moral consciousnessis precisely this straight-forwardness." The
face of the Other brings into question my happy spontaneity, this joyousforce,
. which moves.40In a "sentiment of humanity stretched to the extreme," the
crowd in War and Peace to which Count Rostropchin delivered Vereshchagin
hesitates to do violence before his face, which reddens and turns pale; the people
remain silent at the end of "Boris Goudonov" in face of the crimes committed by
those in power.41

" Thinking(Cogito),such as Descartesdescribesit, thinksfrom its verybeginningthe

idea of the Infinite("l'id6ede 1'Infini").This idea, however,is toogreat for this cogito;it
runs, as it were,overthe edgesof the Cogito("elledbbordela pens6e").In the sameway,
the Other is toogreat for the freeI; I cannotencompassthe Other whofacesme-neither
by myactionnor by my thought.When I neverthelesstry to encompassthe other, I com-
mit violenceand annihilatehim as Other.
" We would prefer alwaysto
translate"consciencemorale" as "conscience"(cf. En
découvrant... (seenote 10),p. 72, where"consciencemorale"is Levinas'translationof
Heidegger's s Geur?ssen), but in doing that, the associationwith and oppositionto the
theoreticalconsciousness ("conscienceth6oretique"or simply"conscience")-whichis so
fundamentalfor modernphilosophysinceDescartes,and preciselyagainstwhichLevinas
polemizes-wouldbe lost. Philosophy's fundamentum absolutumet inconcussumis not,
accordingto Levinas, the sovereignconsciousness (Bewuutsein)which "takes in" all
othernessin "den BauchdesDenkens",but the moralconsciousness or conscience,which
is the experienceof the Other as higher than I, and in that sensean experienceof a
disproportionin the relationbetweenthe Other and myself.Cf. note 48.
" The word"droiture"whichLevinasoftenuses,indicatesthe "straightness"and im-
mediacyof the goodrelationto the other, foundedin the glanceor wordwhichreflectsthe
. consciousness. It alsoindicatesthe righteousness of this relation.In thissense"droiture"is -
opposedto the mediacyof mediationand reflection(cf. "Transcendanceet hauteur"(see
note 6), p. 105)."Droiture"containsat the sametime a nuance of justice.
4' In VictorHugo'sHernani, CharlesV saysof himself,"Jesuisune force va"(Ver-
qui
bal communicationof the author). Levinasquotesthis text more than once;cf. Difficile
LibertL' (Seenote 1), p. 21;En decouvrant -.. (seenote 10).p. 176;Totalit?etInfini (see
note 6), p. 146;"Transcendanceet hauteur"(seenote 6), p. 100.
" Russianis the languagein whichLevinas,originallyLithuanian,grewup. He knows
Tolstoiand Pushkinthus from the originaltexts.Seebeginningof this article.

183
 In Totality and Infinity42 an attempt was made to systematize these ex-
periences by opposing them to a philosophical thought which reduces the Other -
(I'Autre) to the Same and the multiple to the totality, making of autonomy its
supreme principle."
But the adaption of the Other (1'Autre) to the measure of the Same in the
totality is not attained without violence; War, or Bureaucracy"-which alienate
the Same itself. Philosophy as love of truth aspires to the Other (l'Autre) as such,
to a being distinct from its reflection in the I-it searches for its Law, it is
heteronomy itself, it is metaphysical. According to Descartes, the I who thinks
possessesthe idea of the infinite: the otherness of the Infinite is not deadened in
the idea, as is the otherness of finite ideas of which, according to Descartes, I can
give an account through myself.'3 The idea of the Infinite consists in thinking
more than one thinks.
This negative description assumes a positive sense which is no longer literally

" Cf. note 10.

43 The oppositionof Le Mêmeand ftlutre goesback to the Platonicpair of concepts,
tauton and to heteron(or thateron):The Sameand the Other (seeSophist254c-256b;cf.
Timaeus35a-band Theaetetus185c).Thisoppositionishoweveroftenmixedwiththe op-
positionbetweenthe Self(k Sot)of the sovereignI (IeMoi)and the otherwhostandsfac-
ing this I (cf. note 36). Le MAnehas then a doublemeaning:it refersto the same(that
whichis identicalwith itself)opposedto all the other (whichis other than, whichdiffers
fromthe same)as wellas to the (my)"Self' whowantsto swallowup all whichisother, but
whothroughthe Other(s)is calledto obeythe orderof the conscience.Thus leMine coin-
cideswithSartre'spour soi (pourMoi)and with freedom.(cf. "Transcendanceet hauteur"
(see note 6), p. 92). "L'Autre," translatedas "the Other" (see note 36), is used in the
generaland abstractsenseof Plato; "I'Autre"can howeveralsorefer to a realitywhichis
abovethe other man (Autrus)and is onlyknowableby its traces.Cf. for examplethe arti-
cle"La trace de I'Autre,"in Tijdschriftvoor Filosofie,
25 (1963),pp. 605-623,includedin
the secondeditionof Endécouvrant... (seenote 10),pp. 187-202;"La significationet le
sens(seenote 21) and "Enigmeet phénomène,"in Esprit 33 (1965),pp. 1128-1142,in-
cludedin the secondeditionof En découvrant... , pp. 144-162.
" Guerreou Administration:twowaysin whichviolenceis actualizedin the contem-
porary world. "Administration"(bureaucracy)points to the hierarchicalcivil-service
structure,through whichthe State alienatesthe I from itself.The dialecticalmediation,
which-accordingto Hegeland Marxand their FrenchinterpretersAlexandreKoj6veand
EricWeil-reconcilesthe I with itselfby includingit as a memberof a politicalsystem,re-
mainsa structureof violence.To thisstructureof violence,Levinasopposesthe ethicalin-
dividualism("quelquepeu anarchique")of the I, whoknowshimselfto be responsiblefor
"the secrettears"of the Other, whichare not seenby the State. This individualismcomes
forth out of another tradition than the Greek-dialecticaltradition of the rational
Order-namely, from Jerusalem. Cf. "Libert6et Commandement"(see note 35) and
"Transcendanceet hauteur" (seenote 6), p. 94 and pp. 102-103.
" An oft-recurringreferenceto the M?ditationsof Descartes;cf. especiallythe third
meditation,edition of Adam-Tannery,IX, pp. 27-35.

184
Cartesian: a thought which thinks more than it thinks-what is this, if not
Desire? It is a desire which distinguishes itself from the privation of need. The
Desired does not fill it, but deepens it.41, ,
The phenomenology of the relation with the other suggests this structure of
Desire analyzed as an idea of the Infinite." While the object is integrated into
the identity of the Same, the Other manifests himself by the absolute resistance
of his defenselesseyes. The solipsisticanxiety of consciousness,seeing itself in all
its fortunes captivated by itself, ends here. The privilege of the Other in relation
to the I - or the moral consciousness- is the very opening to exteriority, which is
also an opening to highness."
The epiphany of that which can present itself directly, outwardly and
eminently-is visage. The expressing helps the expression here, brings help to
itself, signifies, Speaks." The revelation of the face is language. The Other is the
first intelligible. 50But the infinite in the face does not appear as a representa-
tion.51It brings into question my freedom, which is discovered to be murderous
and encroaching. But this discovery is not a derivation of self-knowledgelt; it is

" For the fundamentalmeaningof desire(D6ir is Levinas'interpretationof Plato's

eros) and the radical differencebetweendesire and need (besoin),see especiallyEn
découvrant... (seenote 10), pp. 174-178and Totalitéet Injisei(seenote 6). pp. 3-18.
4' On the relationto the Other coincidingwithDesireand the idea of the Infinite,cf.
"La philosophieet l'idéeet 1'Infini"in Endécouvrant... (seenote 10),pp. 165-178,and
TotaUtL4 et ¡nfini (seenote 6), pp. 18-23.
" Consideringthe fact that I experiencethe other from out of myself,not as an
"object"whichis equal to me, but as someonewhocommandinglycomestowardsme, he
stands higher than I; he comesfrom out of the height. The Hauteur whichtypifiesthe
Other is thus at the same time Heightand Highness.
" Levinasalludeshere, and in many other places in his works,to
ao expressionof
Plato. In the passageof the Phaedruswhichconcernsthe excellenceof the spokenword
overthat of the writtenargument(274b-277a),the later is characterizedas a logosthat
cannot help or defend itself (oux aAgpbtTOaL oure Oo7l67 ^facit
8uvaros 275c;
aduvarcavaJTo1s ÀÓ'yú> ?orl6eiv:276c), whereas the spoken word, as "living and
animated"logos,can do both of thesethings(buvarosEirlu"vao. Eaurc?:276a;ecsuroisT§re
?ureuravr??So?9em txavoL:276e).For the workingout of this thoughtin Levinas'inter-
pretation,see Toialiteet Infini (seenote 6), pp. 45, 69, 71.
to The primumintelligible(a term out of the Aristoteliantradition)isthe realityout of
whichthoughtcan understandthe rest of reality.In the westerntradition,this waseither
the "objects"of experience,or consciousnessitself.Levinasis revolutionaryin hisshowing
that the foundationof all understandingconsistsin havingan "understanding"for the
other human being. His visagespeaksto me, and bringsme to think. _
6 This criticismof représentationgivesa resumeof the extendedanalyses
quoted in
note 17.
St Westernphilosophy,in particular the modern philosophyof consciousness from
Descartesup to and includingHusserl,can be consideredas a paraphraseof Socrates'

185
 heteronomy through and through. 58In front of the face, I always demand more
of myself; the more I respond to it, the more the demands grow. This movement
is more fundamental than the freedom of self-representation.6' Ethical con-
sciousness is not, in effect, a "particularly commendable" variety of con-
sciousness, but is the contraction, the retreat into oneself, the systole of con-
sciousnesswithout qualification.
The orientation to the highness of the Other (l'Autre)55thus described-is like
a grading in Being itself. The above does not indicate a nullifying (n&ntisation)
but a "more than being"," better than the happiness of the social relation. Its

device,borrowedfrom Apollo'ssanctuary,"Knowthyself'. The wholeworld of truth,

whichis the resultof philosophicalreflection,wouldbe an unfoldingof the germwhich
alreadylayenclosedin the consciousness of the philosopher.In oppositionto this concep-
tion of philosopyas an unfoldingof the consciousness by that same consciousness (via
Socrates'midwiferyor Hegel'sand Huserl'stranscendentaldeductions),Levinasadvances
the idea that it, in any case,doesnot do the other human beingjustice,consideringthe
fact that he comesat the thinkerfrom the outside,and cannot be swallowedup by any
part of self-realisingthinking.
iii That thoughtwhichis indicatedin the previousnote is autonomous,due to the fact
that it drawsits wholetruth fromitself.By includingall whichis other in the Same(the
. unity of the thinkingSelf,whicheffectuatesthe indifferenceof everything),the thinker
makes of himself(auton) the law (nomos)of all reality. At the same time, however,
autonomyalsomeansfreedom,in the senseof independence,self-regulatingmastery,self-
determination.If the "first" truth, however,consistsin the revelationof the Other,
thought can only be true when it pays attention to the surprisingsummonswhichthe
Other directsto the thinker. For this reason,philosophyis essentiallyheteronomous.Cf.
"Libertt et commandement"(see note 35) and Ln dEcourrra».t ...(see note 10), pp.
38-39.
H "La representationde soi" is synonomoushere with the self-consciousness ("cons-
cience de soi", "autoconscience") indicated in the previousnotes, which realizesitself
autonomouslyas a thinkingfreedom.
IiliFor the meaning of l'Autre, see note 43. Here. fAutre seemsto summarizethe
preceding;it namesat the sametime the Other(than I) in a universaland abstractsense
and the Other (human being)whois the concretefigurein whichthe other (than I) turns
his visagetowardsme and speaksto me. Perhapsa third meaningof the word-going out
beyondthat of the other humanbeing-is indicatedat the sametime in thiscontext.See
alsonote 63.
if The height (or the "above")doesnot destroythe I, but summonsit to a goodness
(bontt) whichgoesbeyondmere"being."The wordn?a»tisationrefersto Sartres'Being
and Nothingness,in whichinterpersonalrelationsare describedas mutual negations:cf.
especiallythe third sectionof that work.The Other transcends"being"(and the inten-
tionalitycorrespondingto being). Cf. "Transcendanceet hauteur" (see note 6), p. 98:
un à l'intentionnalite'(The Other conveysa
' "L'Autre... comporte surcrou,inad6quat
surplusincommensuratewith intentionality).

186
"production"" would be impossible without separation," which can not be
reduced to a dialectical counterpart of the Relation with the Other, since to
bring into play the dialectic of separation and union already pre-supposes the idea
of a totality." The principle of separation is provided not by the misery of
solitude already turned toward others, but by the happiness of enjoyment. Thus
it becomes possible to sustain a pluralism which is not reduced to a totality.so

6' The terms"production"and "seproduire"are used by Levinaspreferablyin a dou-

blesense.Theyindicatetwothingsat the sametime: 1) that a realitycomesinto being,is
produced,or happens,and 2) that it manifestsitself,that it appears.Cf. Totalitéet Infini
(seenote 6), p. XIV "Le terme de productionindiqueet feffectuationde I'fte (1'6v6ne-
ment'se produit,' une automobile'seproduit')et sa miseen lumibreou sonexposition(un
argument'se produit', un aaeur 'x produit')".
s° The keyword"siparation"is opposedto "participation".Levinaspolemizesagainst
everyconceptionof man (the Otherand Myself)as a part or memberabsorbedby a totali-
ty or communityin whichhe merelyparticipates.A clearexampleof suchparticipationis
the primitivecommunityaccordingto the interpretationof L6vy-Bruhl (cf. "L6vy-Bruhl
et la philosophiecontemporaine"in RevuePhilosophiquede la France et de l'Etranger,
147(1957),pp. 556-569.Againstthis totalitarianism,whichfalls short of an adequate
presentationof man as an autonomousand independentbeing, Levinasshowsthat man
stands apart from everythingelse:"un ere s6pari."He is evenseparatedfrom God: his
freedomdoesnot mergewith God. In that xnx, Levinascan saythat man is essentially
atheistic:"un fte Cf. in this connectionthe followingtext fromDifficileLibert4f
(seenote 1), p. 31: "C'estune grandegloirepour le Criateur que d'avoirmissur pied un
etre qui I'affirmeaprts I'avoircontest6et ni6 dans les prestigesdu mythe et de fen- -
thousiasme;c'estune grandegloirepour Dieuque d'avoircreeun etrecapablede le cher-
cher ou de fencendrede loin, i partir de la separation, partir de I'athtisme"(It is a great
gloryfor the Creator to havemade a beingwhoaffirmshim, after havingcontestedand
deniedhim in the fascinationsof myth and of enthusiasm;it is a great gloryfor God to
havecreateda beingcapableof searchingfor him or of hearinghim fromafar, beginning
from separation,beginningfrom atheism).The atheismwhichLevinasspeaksof here is
the liberationfrom all godsand fromthe captivityby mythicalpowers.This modernver-
sionof the struggleagainstfalseidolsis explainedphilosophically in numerousplacesin
Totalitéet Infini (seenote 6). Human freedomand its relation to God presupposesan
atheism,not with relationto the creator,but in relationto all primitiveand Greekgods
who are not creator enough to leave their creature, man, free, and not do him any
violence.Cf. Totalitéet Infini, pp. 23-31,49-50,66 and 121 :"Etre moi, ath6e,chezsoi,
s6pari, heureux, créé-voilå des synonymes" (To be myself,atheist, at home, separate,
happy, created-thex are synonymous).
11If the Other and I stooddialecticallyoppositeone another, wewouldmakeup two
momentsof one totalitywhich containsus both. I wouldhave a summaryconceptof
myselfand the Other. The Otherwouldthen, however,no longerbe other, due to the fact
that my understandingwouldhaveswallowed him. The sameis validfor a dialecticalcon-
ceptionof the relationbetweenthe separation(the apartnessand alonenessof the free I)
and the relationwhichconnectsthe I to the philosophyof the Same;if onewantsto take
the other seriously,a pluralityis indicated.
" Cf. Totalitéet
Infini (seenote 6), pp. 120-125.

187
 The other, revealing himself by his visage, is the first intelligible, before
culture and its alluvions and allusions. This is to affirm the independence of
ethics in relation to history. By showing that the first meaning arises in
moraliry-in the quasi-abstract epiphany of the face, which is laid bare and
stripped of every quality- absolute - absolvings' itself of cultures, one draws out
a limit to the comprehension of the Real by history and rediscovers Platonism.62
It has become possible to present, after Totality and Injinity, this relation
with the Infinite and irreducible to "thematisation." The Infinite always re-
' mains "third peison"-"He"6' in spite of the "You" (Thou, "Tu") whose face
concerns me. The Infinite affects the I without the I's being able to dominate it,
without the I's being able to "assume" through the arche of the Logos'.

" An oft-recurringplayon wordsbetween"absolu"(also"ab-solu")in the senseof ab-

soluteand of "ibsoudre""s'absolvant"(absolve,absolving).The bare visageof the Other
is the absolutein a doublesense:1)it disengagesitself("s'absout",absolvesitself)fromthe
Same/Selfthat I am; it is separatefromme (s6part),exterior:2) it is absolutedue to the
fact that it comesfromthe height,as the concreteepiphanyof the infinite.Cf. abovenote
48. See also Totatitdet InfiN (seenote 6), p. 21 and "Le Nom de Dieud'aprèsquclques
textestalmudiques,"in L analysedu languagethéologique.Le Nomde Dieu, Paris,1969,
pp. 155-167.
81Againsta current tendencyto makehistorythe highestreality,Levinas
fights for the
possibilityand the duty to judge the historicalin functionof the conscience(the ethical).
In thissensehe rediscovers the Platonicideaswhichextendout overtime, and are thusab-
solute.See alsonotes 19, 21 and 32.
The infiniteOther (l'Autre)speaksto me throughthe face of the Other (Autrus);he
is howeverhimselfneitherThou nor You(Tu or Yous)but "He"(In. Levinasalsousesthe
neologism"illEatE", whichis derivedfrom the Latin "ille"and includes"Il" withinit. The
word"il16t£"appearedfirst in "La trace de l'Autre"(1963);see the secondeditionof En
decouvrant... (seenote 10), pp. 199-202.Seealso"La significationet le sens"(1964)in
Humanismede l'autre homme(seenote 21), pp. 59-63;"Enigmeet ph6nom6ne"(ibid.),
pp. 212-216and "Le Nomde Dieud'apr&squelquestextestalmudiques"(seenote 61),pp.
166.
" Greek-western philosophyis the logos(thought)whichunderstandsbeingas a reality
unfolding itself from out of its arche (source, ground). This "archeology"is the
philosophicalworkingout of a freesovereignegoism.In oppositionto this, Levinasstates
the casefor a certainkind of "an-archy".Cf. note 44, but in particular"Humanismeet
An-archie"(Rernieinternationalede Philosophie,85-86(1968),pp. 324-337,includedin
Humanismede I'autre homme(see note 21), pp. 65-82,and "La Substitution"(Revue
Philosophiquede Louraain,66 (1968),pp. 487-508.The latter in a somewhatalteredform
is the coreof the bookin whichthe developmentof Levinas'thoughtsinceTotahtLi et In-
fini (1961)culminates:Autrementqu'etre ou au-deldde l'essence,The Hague, Martinus
Nijhoff,1973,233pp.

188
 the unboundness of the Infinite thus anarchically affecting the I, imprinting
itself as a trace66in the absolute passivity-prior to all freedom-showing itself
as a "Responsibility-for-the-Other" which this affection gives rise to. The
ultimate sense of such a responsibility consists in thinking the I in the absolute
passivity of the Self-like the very act of substituting oneself for the other
66
(l'Autre), of being his hostage, and in this substitution not only being other-
wise, but, as freed of the conatus essendi, otherwise than being.67 The on-
tological language which Totality and Infinity maintains in order to exclude the
purely psychologicalsignificance of the proposed analyses is hereafter avoided.
And the analysesthemselvesrefer not to the experience in which a subject always
thematises what he himself equals, but to the transcendence in which he is
responsible for that which his intentions do not encompass.68

" Cf. the first three articlescited in note 63 (En découvrant... , pp. 197-202;
211-215;and Human£mede l'autre homme,pp. 57-63)and Autrementqu'etre ou au-
deldde 1'essence (seenote 64), pp. 14-15,118-120.The bestsummaryof Levinas'reflec-
tionon God(insofaras "summary"and "reflectionon" do not contradictthe ideaof God),
is his study"Dieuet la philosophie,"publishedin Le NouveauCommerce,Cahier30-31
(Paris, 1975),pp. 97-128.
" The term "otage"(hostage)appearstogetherwith"obsession","assignation"(assign-
ment) and "substitution"in "Langageet proximite'in En d6couvrant... (seenote 36),
pp. 228-234.In spite of the fact that it doesnot occur so often, it sumsup the central
thoughtwhich,in."La substitution"and Autrementqu ',Stre ... especially,is thoroughly
thought through and workedout. Transcendenceas a transcendingmovementof the
humansubject(mot)towardthe radically(infinite)Other existsin the beingof the one for
the other, bywhichthe self(Ie doesnot belongto itselfand livefor itself,but physical-
ly bearsand enduresthe other human being-as a substitute,a mother,one persecuted,
or a victim.
" Etre autrement" (being in another way, being otherwise)does not conveyone
. "above" being or "beyond"being, but constitutesa pseudo-cranscendence which is
swallowed up in a dialecticaltotalityof being.This affirmsitselfbyencompassing and rul-
ing over a multitude of modes of being. Genuinetranscendence,however,demands
somethingother than being.This is the problematicfrom whichA utrementqu'etre ...
(seenote 64)proceeds(pp. 3ff).
·' Experienceis essentiallyconnectedwith the Husserlianintentionality,in which
noesisand noemacorrespondexactlyto each other, and withbeingas an activepresence
or "essance."A philosophyof transcendencepresupposesanotherwayof speakingthan
that characteristicallywesternphenomenological and ontologicalwaywhichplacesknow-
ing abovethe inspirationof prophecy.True philosophyis "sagessede l'amourau service
de 1'amour"(love'swisdomin the serviceof love).Cf. Autrementqu'?tre... (seenote
64), p. 207; an analysisof inspirationis given on pp. 195-207.Cf. also "Dieu et la
philosophic"(see note 65), pp. 118-128.Cf. also, for an overviewand interpretationof
Autrementqu'estre... , the reviewincludedin thisissueofResearchin Phereomenology.

189