ARUTA, KATRIN ANN A.

CASE TITLE I. ISSUES II. CHARACTER III. DOCTRINE

EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION
DAR v. Apex Whether a -owns several lots located at Barangay Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
Investment and petition for covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Financing certiorari and -the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Dasmariñas initiated
prohibition may lie compulsory acquisition proceedings over those lots pursuant to Republic
given that Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
respondent failed Law of 1988
to exhaust all -It was only on February 15, 1999, or more than one year after
administrative respondent filed its protest, that the PARO forwarded to petitioner DAR
remedies. the said protest together with the records of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings
-respondent came to know that TCT No. T-868471 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. CLOA-2473 was issued in the name of Angel M.
Umali, a farmer-beneficiary allegedly occupying the land. This prompted
respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that the compulsory acquisition proceedings over its
landholdings be declared void and that TCT No. CLOA-2473 issued to
Angel Umali be cancelled
Maglalang v. PAGCOR Was the CA -teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which
correct in was operated by PAGCOR
outrightly - in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his
dismissing the functions as teller, a lady customer approached him in his booth and
petition for handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed
certiorari filed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were 45 P1,000.00 and ten P500.00
before it on the bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure,
ground of non- petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously
exhaustion of spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth
administrative P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each
remedies cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia.
Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out
P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested
petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than
the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster
contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and
rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him
by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of
-The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case,
(a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently
illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Records show that the PARO did not take immediate action
on respondent's Protest filed on January 12, 1998. It was only
on February 15, 1999, or after more than one year, that it
forwarded the same to petitioner DAR. Since then, what
petitioner has done was to require respondent every now
and then to submit copies of supporting documents which
were already attached to its Protest. In the meantime,
respondent found that the PARO had caused the cancellation
of its title and that a new one was issued to an alleged
farmer-beneficiary.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the
issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part
of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of
a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly
 trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her
of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued
to berate and curse him. As a result, the two of them were invited to the
casino's Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides.
Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he
submitted on the same day of the incident.
-petitioner was charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and
directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the
memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed to which he
heeded
-the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy
towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for
this first offense.
-petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
-petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
>>no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of
guilt against him
>>grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to
the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to
observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in
imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension.
-petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day
suspension which is not within the CSC's appellate jurisdiction. He also
claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified
as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand
Pagara, et al v. CA Whether or not -private respondents acquired from Santiago Ceniza parcels of land,
the RTC has each with an average area of five (5) hectares, in Taguitic, Aurora,
jurisdiction over Zamboanga del Sur, evidenced by transfer certificates of title. Originally,
the complaint. the parcels were part of a large tract of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-9515. The property was later subdivided into
twenty-four (24) sub-lots under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-187203 which,
on 10 September 1973, was approved by the Land Registration
Commission.
On 22 December 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through a
certain Honorio Tequero, sent a telegram to private respondent Jorge C.
Paderanga informing him that the several parcels had been placed under
prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative
review is provided by law;(13) where the rule of qualified
political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.
-In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law
declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or
fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But
there is a clear policy reason for declaring these decisions
final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are
numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by
government officials and employees. To allow their multiple
level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial
machinery of our administrative system and defeat the
expectation of fast and efficient action from these
administrative agencies
-there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's
allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of
the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and
should therefore be set aside
-Petitioners assail, nevertheless, the exercise of jurisdiction
by the court a quo on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and for failure to secure a referral
from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 12
of P.D. 946. The court, however, has correctly pointed out
that —
"The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where
the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an
 the Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program of the
government. In February 1974, a parcellary map was prepared by the
Department of Agrarian Reform in collaboration with the Bureau of Lands.
Forthwith, the parcels were adjudicated to private petitioners and
corresponding OLT certificates were issued to them.
-Private respondents thereupon filed their complaint with the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Pagadian City and Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, vehemently contesting the issuance of the OLT
certificates. On 23 October 1978, after the local agency had failed to act
on the protest, private respondents elevated their case to the Minister
of Agrarian Reform. The matter remained pending with the agency.
On 03 September 1986, private respondents finally decided to file a
complaint against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City to regain possession of the parcels of land, as well as for the
annulment and/or cancellation of the OLT certificates, and for recovery of
damages. Private respondents averred that private petitioners were mere
"opportunist and/or squatters" who took advantage of the government's
operation land transfer program; that private petitioners were not
qualified under the program with each of them already owning over four
(4) hectares of agricultural land; that, not being tenanted, the land was
not covered by the land reform program and thus beyond the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform; and that, even assuming that private
petitioners were tenants, the property should still be deemed excluded
from the program since the parcels of land averaged less than five (5)
hectares each.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint due allegedly to the
failure of private respondents "to (first) refer the matter to the
Department of Agrarian Reform."
Judicial Review / Appeal
Arboleda v. NLRC Whether review Petitioner, an employee for 25 years of respondent Meralco, was
by the Court be dismissed for misappropriating or withholding company funds. He was
made. found to have received without official receipt the amount of P1,200 as
payment for Antonio Sy's Found Connection (FC) bills. Sy had been found
twice to have illegal connections. Sy's meter was thereafter installed
without the go signal from Meralco. This irregularity was discovered by
Marcelo Umali, branch manager of Meralco, who recommended
alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed
approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him,
or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention
-Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, when there is
no due process observed, or where the protestant has no
other recourse.
"The foregoing jurisprudence when applied to the case at bar
will point out that exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable. First, the issue of tenancy involves legal
questions as 'tenancy is not purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenants does upon the land,
but it is also a legal relationship' (Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals,
118 SCRA 484). Second, one of the principal respondents
herein is the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who acts as the
alter ego of the President, and whose act of issuing land
transfer certificate is the subject matter of this case. Third,
plaintiffs' claims of denial of due process in the issuance of
the land transfer certificates finds merit in this case for it was
only after the certificates were issued that they were able to
protest. Finally, there is an exhaustive presentation of
evidence that plaintiffs availed of the administrative
processes, (testimonies of Attys. Jorge and Goering
Paderanga and exhibits 'J,' 'K,' 'L,' 'L-1' to 'L-3' and 'L-4' to 'L-
11' that fourteen (14) years had already elapsed and
Department Secretary had not yet resolved plaintiffs' protest
leaving plaintiffs with no other recourse but to seek the relief
of this Court as there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law."
The principle that factual findings of administrative bodies
are binding upon this Court may be sustained only when no
issue of credibility is raised. But when the findings of fact of
the NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, this
Court must of necessity review the records to determine
which findings should be preferred as more conformable to
the evidentiary facts.
 petitioner's investigation. Petitioner, notified of the charge against him,
denied the charge. However, Sy identified petitioner as the one who
received P1,200 payment of his FC bills, but did not issue a receipt.
Petitioner was thereafter terminated. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter who rendered
judgment in his favor. The NLRC, on appeal, reversed the Labor Arbiter.
Hence, this recourse.
- On appeal by MERALCO the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that there was no proof of instigation on the part of Umali; Sy's
testimony was credible; and, Anonuevo's exculpating evidence in favor of
Arboleda was a ruse.

IV. EXTRA CASES:

 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC (see digest attached)

The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when
the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself
made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable.”

 PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO.,INC.

FACTS: Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum, respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO),grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to certain municipalities
of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430, seeking the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. After due notice and hearing, the ERB granted the petition. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and, therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory. The
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

To implement the decision in ERB Case No. 89-430, CEPALCO advised Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC) of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NAPOCOR,
disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC is an entity operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate. The Estate is managed and operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial
Authority (PIA). To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not injunction will lie in the case at bar.

RULING: In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts
and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier
narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for,
the movant must show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. In
the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any clear legal right which would be violated if the power supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO. If it were true
that PSC has the exclusive right to operate and maintain electric light within the municipalities of Tagoloan and Villanueva pursuant to its charter (PD 538), then this Court would have made
such pronouncement in National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the
government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee. 29 More importantly, the Constitution prohibits monopoly of franchise. 30
Another significant fact which militates against the claim of PIA is that it previously allowed CEPALCO to distribute electric power to industries operating within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate.
This, to our mind, sufficiently indicates PIA's recognition of CEPALCO's franchise. Indeed, it is unimaginable that an implementation of a long-standing government policy which had been
sustained by this Court 31 can be stalled by an injunctive writ.

 ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL V. COMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

FACTS: The petitioner Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar for export, the sugar so produced being placed in containers known as jute bags. In
1957 it made two importations of jute bags declared entered free of customs duties and special import tax upon the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bonds,
conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of importation: first shipment entry 48 - 44,800 jute bags and second shipment entry 243 - 75,200 jute bags.
Total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year
period but within three years from their importation.

The petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond giving the following as the reasons for its failure to export the
remaining jute bags within the period of one year: (a) typhoons and severe floods; (b) picketing of the Central railroad line by certain union elements in the employ of the Philippine Railway
Company, which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the arrival of the vessel aboard which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then ready for loading. This request was
denied by the Commissioner. Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance the Collector of Customs of Iloilo, required it to pay the amount of P28,629.42
representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which amount the petitioner paid under protest.

The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on the ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute
bags within the required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad line which was denied by the
Collector of Customs.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Customs is vested, under the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, the then applicable law, with discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section
23 of the Act.

RULING: No. Customs Administrative Order 66 dated August 25, 1948 was issued, prescribing rules and regulations governing the importation, exportation and identification thereof under
section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909. Said administrative order provides: "That importation of jute bags intended for use as containers of Philippine products for exportation to foreign
countries shall be declared in a regular import entry supported by a surety bond in an amount equal to double the estimated duties, conditioned for the exportation or payment of the
corresponding duties thereon within one year from the date of importation."

It will be noted that section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers
therein mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. It was surely by reason of this silence that the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders
389 and 66, already adverted to, to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year
period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
Considering that the statutory provisions in question have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative
construction," would, initially, be in order. "Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to
construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the
executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded
appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings
of the statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency."

The administrative orders in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year, without
extension, from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have amended section 23 of the
latter law so as to overrule the long- standing view of the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not extendible.

"Implied legislative approval by failure to change a long- standing administrative construction is not essential to judicial respect for the construction but is an element which greatly increases the
weight given such construction. The correctness of the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with administering its provision is indicated where it appears that Congress, with full
knowledge of the agency's interpretation, has made significant additions to the statute without amending it to depart from the agency's view."

Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be
given controlling weight.

"In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies
charged with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency
is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity
and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the statute; . . ."

In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered view that the one-year period prescribed in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 is non-extendible and compliance therewith is
mandatory.

SUGGESTION:

 Matanglawin
 Recitation