Sovereignty

Authority and Artificial

Person in Hobbes
PO: 541- Early Modern Political Thought, (non-credit)
Himanshu Misra, Registration No. 79683

By accepting the will of sovereign – the artificial person of their representative –
as their own, the subject themselves become an artificial person: the state.
Critically elaborate on Skinner’s interpretation of Hobbes’ views on sovereignty
and authority.

Skinner provides insights into the Hobbes’ conception of nature of state. This
article explores that why does he start as an individualist and eventually lands
into the realm of absolute sovereignty. Firstly, as Skinner writes that the
sovereign and the state are two different entities. The state is also known as
commonwealth, leviathan or seat of power. However the sovereign is mere
representation of state. Therefore both the state and sovereign are of artificial
nature.

Skinner formulates this argument after successfully establishing various
components of this theory. The fundamental component of entire theory is the
author.1 He considers God to be supreme author as God gives natural rights to
individual. It can also be said, being author means to have rationality,
reasonableness and capacity to authorize any other person on his behalf.
Author refers to that person who authorizes the representation or personation
of himself in any other agent. This author has also been defined as the person
whose words or actions are of his own, or who represents the words or action of
other man, or of any other thing. Therefore, as definition implies, this person can
be of two types; firstly as a natural person who is independent and is not under
the sway of any one. Secondly as an artificial person who is distinct form natural
person and such artificial person is representing other person or thing:

A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as
representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom
they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when
they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a
Feigned or Artificiall person. 2

Therefore this implies that the natural person is capable of representing him or
herself and is an autonomous chooser of rules in life.3 Further, they also have
capacity of becoming an artificial person when they are commissioned or
licensed to act behalf of any other person.4 Skinner writes that the churches,

1 Hobbes (1996) p.1992
2 Hobbes 1996, p. 111.

3Quentin Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artifcial Person of the State” 1999, The Journal of Political
Philosophy: Volume 7, Number 1, pp. 1±29, p.13.

4 Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person,” 9.

bridges and hospitals are artificial persons.5 The artificial persons authorized by
the author represent them. In this case such person who holds the ownership or
dominion over the artificial persons can only do the authorization. Therefore it
implies that a person can be concomitantly artificial as well as natural person. A
priest being representative of idol is an artificial person and by having distinct
choices of social life; he is also a natural person. Now, the question comes that
how does one represent himself6? In other words, how can one attribute his
actions to other?


As the natural person is author and therefore he is in capacity to attribute his
actions to someone else. Therefore, in Hobbes, there is a concept of person that is
autonomous as well as dependent carrying other person’s identity. The one who
is autonomous is natural and the other is the artificial person. For Hobbes, as
Skinner writes, an agent can attribute his actions to another agent by claiming
that he is authorizing the other person to act on his behalf.7 This action can also
be attributed to a multitude and that multitude may attribute its action to a
particular entity.8 For the simplification of language this can be explained with
the help of tortious liability9 in the civil law. In the case of principal and agent or
master or servant relationship the master or principal may attribute their
actions to servant and agent, thereby authorizing them to perform some acts.
The result of such authorization would be that the master or principal should be
liable for the acts done by servant or agent. Here the responsibility of master or
principal would be up to such extent where the acts of servant or agent has been
authorized by the master or principal.

Therefore by combining the above mention fact we can conclude that the natural
person may authorize and be represented by other artificial person. If someone
has any authority over a particular artificial person then again an artificial
person may be appointed on its behalf. The multitude is resemblance of
establishment of authority tantamount to the constructed bridge of church. Now
again an artificial entity is required for its representation; that would be
sovereign. Therefore the persons attribute the action to the multitude and such
multitude acts as the one person:

“One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with
another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the
strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and

5 Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person,” 16.
6 As Hobbes considers only men to be capable of representing therefore it doesn’t imply ‘herself’.
7 Skinner,“Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person,” 12.
8 Skinner,“Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person,” 23.
9 Vicarious liability
 10
Common Defence”.

Further as the person owns the multitude they may appoint another artificial
person on its behalf. By this way a multitude or commonwealth of seat of
sovereign is formed and thereafter the sovereign represents the commonwealth.

Further as the persons have authorized the state by attributing their acts to it
they are bound by the will of sovereign. Therefore as the actors enter into
covenant as if the authors themselves have done it, they are bound by the
covenant. As they have appointed the person of state, they are under obligation
of not only to take the responsibility of his acts but also they cannot interfere in
it. This implies that the authors have completely transferred their liberty to the
actors thereby forming the state and representing the sovereign, and therefore
they become subject of this artificial person of state, reason their being that they
themselves have rendered their liberty to the person of state.

Contextualizing the artificial person

For Hobbes, the state of nature has been pervasion of sense of irrationality
where everyone was enemy of the other one. He coined human nature as
solitary, nasty, brutish and short. The protection of life and property brings the
idea and expectation of peace in the state of nature and people decided to ponder
upon the ways for saving human life and property. For him the establishment of
peace will allow people to fulfill their desire and they will make every attempt to
remove pain in their life. For Hobbes, it can only be achieved by entering into
covenant. Therefore, consent becomes essential for the formation of political
unity.11 He writes that the only source from which the authorities of the state can
validly flows is ‘ the consent of every one of subjects’.12 The justification of
sovereigns acting as representative of people must therefore be, ‘derived from
the consent of the every one of those that are to be governed’.13 By arguing this
Hobbes is challenging the parliamentarians as well as the proponents of divine
right. The divinity of authority has been countered by the fact that natural
person is an autonomous being and the God stands to be the supreme author and
giver of rights. Whereas, the parliamentarian’s contention that the sovereignty
lies in the people and the king remains to be ‘less than the whole of
universality’14 is responded, primarily, by the two conditions imposed on the

10 Hobbes 1996p. 121.

11 Skinner, “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person,” 23.

12 Hobbes 1996, p. 219; cf. pp. 114, 150.

13 Hobbes 1996, p. 395; cf. p. 121.

14 Parker 1642, pp. 167, 210

people that they have to be responsible for the act of sovereign and must not
interfere as they themselves have constituted such authority. And secondarily,
by giving justification for authorized representation. Therefore the sovereign
emerges from individual autonomous people but eventually bounds them by its
will. Here, the artificiality emerges at two level, one as the person of state and the
other as sovereign itself.

The nature of sovereignty and the artificial

The nature of sovereignty in the Hobbes’ leviathan is in the form of ‘status’. The
collectivized consent of people gives form to the person of state thereby it
authority being given to the sovereign. For Hobbes the person of state is
represented by the sovereign, here the kind of authority and legitimacy given to
the sovereign to work on behalf of it is of ‘status’.15 This status is an artificial
entity, which makes the power to be allocated in the virtual form. Such virtual
authority gives many qualities to this kind of power. This makes the power to be
located at one place perpetually. By this way, it becomes consistent and
indestructible. The two conditions imposed on the people correspond to it and
contributes in the fulfillment of these object. Unlike Rousseau, who argues about
the rendering of general will, Hobbes emphasizes on the consent. It appears, as if,
the sovereign asked the people that whether they want to be governed by him or
not. The moment people said yes, they became subject of sovereign and the two
conditions were concomitantly imposed on them to make them bound by the will
of sovereign perpetually. It can also be argued that the sovereign is legitimizing
is power in discursive way and telling its people, “look you have appointed me
now you cannot do anything but obey”.

Further it has also been argued the sovereignty has been attributed to the
person represented by the commonwealth or person of state. As the people
cannot revoke form the covenant and thereby it becomes permanent, eventually
all the power comes into the hands of sovereign. He becomes the supreme
fountainhead of the power. It can be argued that the person of state becomes the
assemblage of authority and the person represented by it hold and executes
sovereignty. Here, skinner argues that there cannot be fail of identity between
person of state and the sovereign. However, there are some situations where

15 Christine
Chwaszcza , “The Seat of Sovereignty: Hobbes on the Artificial Person of the
Commonwealth or State”, Hobbes Studies 25 (2012) 123–142.

such fail may occur.16 The most important fail may occur when the sovereign is
not able to protect the natural laws of people i.e. right to property and life. As the
natural law is will of god and the person of state is formed for protection for such
right, then, if they shall not be properly protected then the identity between the
both may fail. It can be said that the sovereign ha also responsibility to take care
of its people. The natural law of the state of nature takes form of civil law in the
state.

Conclusion

Skinner’s observation of the person of the state and sovereign not only explains
the reasons behind foundation of individualism and edifice of absolute authority
in Hobbes’s works but also questions the relevance of the ‘artificial’ in the
contemporary world. Many times the political is enmeshed in the various
artificial entities and thereby asserts its brute power. The multiple identities are
created to perpetuity in order shift the locus of power. The observations made by
Skinner further compel us to ponder upon the nature of power asserted in the
contemporary times and its relationship with the obedience. Hobbes,
undoubtedly, at that time, defended the absolute authority on the basis of
individualism, but later on the rupture can be seen, where the authority again
got vested in the people by the democratic constitutionalism.

16 Trainor, Brian (2001). Hobbes, Skinner and the Person of the state. Hobbes Studies 14
(1):59-70.
References

1. Hobbes, Thomas. 1996. Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a
Common-wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
2. Skinner, Q. (2002). Hobbes and the purely artificial person of the state.
In Visions of Politics (pp. 177-208). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511613784.009
3. Chwaszcza, Christine. (2012). The Seat of Sovereignty: Hobbes on the
Artificial Person of the Commonwealth or State. Hobbes Studies. 25. 123-
142. 10.1163/18750257-02502001.
4. Trainor, Brian (2001). Hobbes, Skinner and the Person of the
state. Hobbes Studies 14 (1):59-70.