Atp-Mtp 57.1 (A)

STANDARDS RELATED DOCUMENT
ATP/MTP-57.1
THE SUBMARINE SEARCH AND
RESCUE MANUAL
BACKGROUND SUPPLEMENT
Edition A Version 1
MAY 2013
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED/MULTINATIONAL TACTICAL PUBLICATION
Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
© NATO/OTAN
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
16 May 2013
1. The enclosed Allied/Multinational Tactical Publication, ATP/MTP-57 .1 (A) - THE

SUBMARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL - BACKGROUND SUPPLEMENT,
has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Maritime Standardization
Board and is promulgated herewith. This Standards Related Document is agreed by the
Nations in conjunction with ATP/MTP-57(C) (STANAG 1390).
2. ATP/MTP-57.1 (A) is effective upon receipt.
3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used

commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the
publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member
nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and bodies.
4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.
Dr.~Civ
Director, NATO standardization Agency
INTENTIONALLY BLANK
ATP/MTP-57.1
RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION
Edition (C) Version (1)

I
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

II
ATP/MTP-57.1
RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of By Whom Entered

NATO Effective
Change, Reg No. (if Date Entered (Signature; Rank, Grade or
Date
Any), and Date Rate; Name of Command)

III
ATP/MTP-57.1
RECORD OF CHANGES
Identification of By Whom Entered

NATO Effective
Change, Reg No. (if Date Entered (Signature; Rank, Grade or
Date
Any), and Date Rate; Name of Command)

IV
ATP/MTP-57.1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... XV
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... XVII
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1-1

1.1. GENERAL....................................................................................................... 1-1
1.2. POLICY AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS .................................................. 1-1
1.3. ALERT ............................................................................................................ 1-2
1.4. SEARCH, ASSEMBLY OF RESCUE FORCE AND MOBILISATION .............. 1-2
1.5. ESCAPE ......................................................................................................... 1-2
1.6. SURFACE ABANDONMENT .......................................................................... 1-3
1.7. INTERVENTION ............................................................................................. 1-3
1.8. RESCUE OF DISSUB PERSONNEL .............................................................. 1-3
1.9. VESSEL OF OPPORTUNITY (VOO) .............................................................. 1-3
1.9.1. SUITABILITY.................................................................................................. 1-3
1.9.2. AVAILABILITY ................................................................................................ 1-4
1.9.3. VOO TO MOSHIP SELECTION ..................................................................... 1-4
1.9.4. SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATION .............................................................. 1-4
1.10. MEDIA ............................................................................................................1-4
1.11. COMMAND AND CONTROL .......................................................................... 1-4
1.12. THE CRF AND REC ....................................................................................... 1-4
CHAPTER 2 - EQUIPMENT USED IN SMER .............................................................. 2-1

2.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2-1
2.2. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 2-1
2.3. OVERVIEW OF ESCAPE AND RESCUE ASSETS ON BOARD A SUBMARINE.
.......................................................................................................................2-1
2.3.1. ESCAPE ASSETS.......................................................................................... 2-1
2.3.1.1. Escape towers/trunks. (Hereafter referred to as ‘towers’) .............................. 2-1
2.3.1.2. Submarine Escape and Surface Survival Personnel Equipment (SESSPE). . 2-2
2.3.1.3. Maintaining on-board air conditions............................................................... 2-2
2.3.1.4. Back up Battery and Emergency Lighting. .................................................... 2-2
2.3.1.5. Food Water and Hygiene .............................................................................. 2-2
2.3.2. RESCUE ASSETS ......................................................................................... 2-2
2.4. OVERVIEW OF ASSETS THAT WOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO AN
ESCAPE AND FACILITATE RESCUE ............................................................ 2-3

V
ATP/MTP-57.1
2.4.1. INTERVENTION ELEMENTS......................................................................... 2-3
2.4.1.1. DIVERS ........................................................................................................ 2-3
2.4.1.2. ADS (Atmospheric Diving System) ................................................................ 2-3
2.4.1.3. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV).............................................................. 2-4
2.4.1.4. RESCUE VEHICLES AND BELLS ................................................................ 2-4
2.4.1.5. Ventilation ..................................................................................................... 2-6
2.4.2. SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUP (SPAG) ......................... 2-6
2.4.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE MOSHIP/VOO ......................................................... 2-6
2.5. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESCUE SYSTEMS ............................................... 2-6
2.5.1. INITIAL PHASE .............................................................................................. 2-6
2.5.2. PROCEEDINGS ............................................................................................. 2-6
2.6. DISCUSSION ON THE PROCUREMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
DEPLOYMENT OF ALL MENTIONED ASSETS. ............................................ 2-7
2.6.1. PROCUREMENT AND MANUFACTURE ....................................................... 2-7
2.6.2. MAINTENANCE ............................................................................................. 2-7
2.6.3. OWNERSHIP AND COOPERATION OF RESCUE ASSETS. ........................ 2-7
CHAPTER 3 - COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................ 3-1

3.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 3-1
3.2. ONBOARD C3 ................................................................................................ 3-1
3.3. COMMUNICATIONS WITH DISSUB .............................................................. 3-1
3.4. RELEASE OF INFORMATION........................................................................ 3-1
3.5. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT................................................................. 3-1
3.6. USE OF ISMERLO ......................................................................................... 3-1
CHAPTER 4 - INTRODUCTIONS TO THE ESCAPE .................................................. 4-1

4.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 4-1
4.2. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DISSUB ...................................................... 4-1
4.3. ESCAPE COMPARTMENTS .......................................................................... 4-1
4.4. METHODS OF INDICATING POSITION ......................................................... 4-1
4.4.1. INDICATOR BUOYS ...................................................................................... 4-1
4.4.2. SMOKE CANDLES AND GRENADES ........................................................... 4-1
4.4.3. EMERGENCY UNDERWATER TELEPHONE................................................ 4-2
4.5. METHODS OF ESCAPE................................................................................. 4-2
4.5.1. TOWER ESCAPE. ......................................................................................... 4-2
4.5.2. RUSH ESCAPE.............................................................................................. 4-2
4.5.3. DECOMPRESSION ILLNESS (DCI)............................................................... 4-2
4.5.4. SUBMARINE ESCAPE IMMERSION EQUIPMENT (SEIE) ............................ 4-2
4.6. CONDITIONS ON BOARD THE DISSUB ....................................................... 4-2

VI
ATP/MTP-57.1
4.7. DETAILS OF SUBMARINES........................................................................... 4-3
4.8. INITIATING THE ESCAPE PROCESS ........................................................... 4-3
4.9. NUCLEAR REACTOR IMPLICATIONS .......................................................... 4-3
4.10. DISSUB - RADIATION RISKS ........................................................................ 4-3
4.11. MEDICAL ORGANISATION ............................................................................ 4-4
4.12. CASUALTY REPORTING ............................................................................... 4-4
4.13. SURFACE ABANDONMENT .......................................................................... 4-4
CHAPTER 5 - SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUPS (SPAG)

CAPABILITIES ................................................................................. 5-1
5.1. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 5-1
5.2. SPAG EQUIPMENT ........................................................................................ 5-1
5.3. SPAG DEPLOYMENT .................................................................................... 5-2
5.4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ................................................................ 5-2
CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVENTION CONCEPT ...................... 6-1

6.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 6-1
6.2. INTERVENTION ELEMENTS ......................................................................... 6-1
6.3. INTERVENTION COMMAND AND CONTROL ............................................... 6-2
6.4. INTERVENTION ELEMENT DEPLOYMENT .................................................. 6-2
6.5. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DISSUB ...................................................... 6-3
6.6. INTERVENTION SORTIES AND PLANNING ................................................. 6-3
6.6.1. LOCALISATION ............................................................................................. 6-3
6.6.2. SURVEY ........................................................................................................ 6-3
6.6.3. TRANSPONDER FIELD PREPARATION....................................................... 6-3
6.6.4. DEBRIS CLEARANCE ................................................................................... 6-3
6.6.5. ELSS RESUPPLY .......................................................................................... 6-4
6.6.6. CURRENT AND STREAM MONITORING...................................................... 6-4
6.6.7. MINI-POD OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 6-4
6.7. INFORMATION PROMULGATION AND BRIEFING ....................................... 6-4
6.8. TRAINING....................................................................................................... 6-4
CHAPTER 7 - ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM (ADS) CONDUCT OF ADS

INTERVENTION OPERATION ......................................................... 7-1
7.1. INTRODUCTION. ........................................................................................... 7-1
7.2. PROCEDURE ................................................................................................. 7-2
7.2.1. DISSUB SAR OPERATIONS ......................................................................... 7-2
7.2.1.1. Hull Inspection. ............................................................................................. 7-2
7.2.1.2. Ventilation Hose Connection. ........................................................................ 7-2
VII
ATP/MTP-57.1
7.2.1.3. Submarine Rescue Chamber (SRC) Downhaul Line Connection. ................. 7-2
7.2.2. GENERAL TASKS. ........................................................................................ 7-2
7.2.2.1. Ocean Salvage. ............................................................................................ 7-2
7.2.2.2. Deep Diving Back-up .................................................................................... 7-2
7.2.2.3. Cutting and Welding...................................................................................... 7-2
7.2.2.4. Miscellaneous ............................................................................................... 7-3
7.3. ADS ASSET .................................................................................................... 7-3
7.3.1. BASIC CONFIGURATION. ............................................................................. 7-3
7.3.2. ADS ASSET CONFIGURATION. ................................................................... 7-3
7.3.3. ADS ASSET MOBILIZATION/SUITABLE VESSEL OF OPPORTUNITY. ....... 7-3
7.3.3.1. REQUIRED ITEMS ON AIRPORT ................................................................ 7-4
7.3.3.2. REQUIRED ITEMS IN SEAPORT ................................................................. 7-4
7.3.3.3. VOO REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 7-4
7.4. LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEM (LARS). ............................................... 7-4
7.5. EMERGENCY SUPPORT. .............................................................................. 7-4
7.6. PERSONNEL TRAINING. ............................................................................... 7-5
7.6.1. QUALIFICATIONS ......................................................................................... 7-5
7.6.2. SWIMMING POOL ......................................................................................... 7-5
7.6.3. MOCK UPS .................................................................................................... 7-5
7.7. MAINTENANCE. ............................................................................................. 7-5
7.8. AT SEA OPERATION ..................................................................................... 7-5
CHAPTER 8 - CONDUCT OF POD POSTING ............................................................ 8-1

8.1. EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT STORES – POD POSTING .......................... 8-1
8.2. WET TRANSFER............................................................................................ 8-2
CHAPTER 9 - CONDUCT OF VENTILATION AND BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE

DEPRESSURISATION CONCEPT .................................................. 9-1
9.1. INTRODUCTION. ........................................................................................... 9-1
9.2. PROCEDURE ................................................................................................. 9-1
9.3. THE VENTILATION SYSTEM ......................................................................... 9-1
9.4. STANAG 1450 SMER ..................................................................................... 9-2
9.5. AT SEA OPERATION ..................................................................................... 9-2
9.6. DEPRESSURIZATION CONCEPT ................................................................. 9-3
CHAPTER 10 - INTRODUCTION TO THE RESCUE OPERATION CONCEPT ........ 10-1

10.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 10-1
10.2. RESCUE OPERATIONS............................................................................... 10-1
VIII
ATP/MTP-57.1
10.2.1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE RESCUE PHASE ............................................ 10-2
10.2.2. DETAILS OF RESCUE OPERATIONS ........................................................ 10-2
CHAPTER 11 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRV – DESCRIPTION

OF SUBMARINE AND VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS ..................... 11-1
11.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 11-1
11.2. SUBMARINE RESCUE SEATS .................................................................... 11-1
11.3. CERTIFICATION OF SUBMARINE RESCUE SEATS .................................. 11-2
11.4. SRV DESCRIPTIONS ................................................................................... 11-2
11.5. SRV SKIRTS ................................................................................................ 11-2
11.6. NATO SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (NSRS) ......................................... 11-3
11.6.1. THE NSRS RESCUE VEHICLE ................................................................... 11-4
11.7. SUBMARINE RESCUE DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (SRDRS) ........... 11-10
11.7.1. SRDRS SYSTEM OVERVIEW ................................................................... 11-10
11.7.2. A. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (SRS) ................................................ 11-11
11.7.2.1. SUBMARINE DECOMPRESSION SYSTEM (SDS) .................................. 11-11
11.7.2.2. PRESSURIZED RESCUE MODULE SYSTEM (PRMS)............................ 11-11
11.7.3. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (SRS) DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATIONS
................................................................................................................... 11-11
11.7.4. SRDRS RESCUE MISSION OVERVIEW ................................................... 11-13
11.7.4.1. TRANSPORTATION AND MOBILIZATION............................................... 11-14
11.7.4.2. SRDRS MISSION OPERATIONS SEQUENCE ........................................ 11-14
11.7.5. RESCUE MISSION OVERVIEW ................................................................ 11-15
11.7.6. SRS VOO MOBILIZATION TIMELINE ........................................................ 11-16
11.7.7. SRDRS SYSTEM AUWS ........................................................................... 11-16
11.7.7.1. ASSESSMENT / UNDERWATER WORK SYSTEM (AUWS) .................... 11-16
11.7.7.2. ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM (ADS) ................................................ 11-17
11.7.7.3. LIGHT WEIGHT MOORING SYSTEM (LWMS) ........................................ 11-17
11.7.7.4. SIDE LOOKING SONAR (SILOS) SEARCH SYSTEM .............................. 11-17
11.7.7.5. ASSESSMENT / UNDERWATER WORK SYSTEM MISSION SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT (AUWS-MSE) ................................................................................................. 11-17
11.7.8. AUWS MISSION ........................................................................................ 11-18
11.7.9. AUWS VOO MOBILIZATION TIMELINE .................................................... 11-20
11.8. ROYAL SWEDISH SUBMARINE RESCUE VEHICLE, URF ....................... 11-21
11.8.1. GENERAL .................................................................................................. 11-21
11.8.2. COMPARTMENTS ..................................................................................... 11-21
11.8.3. HATCHES .................................................................................................. 11-22
11.8.4. MAIN FEATURES ...................................................................................... 11-23
11.8.5. OPERATING CONDITIONS ....................................................................... 11-24
11.9. SRV 300/ITS ANTEO .................................................................................. 11-28
IX
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.9.1. SRV 300 ..................................................................................................... 11-28
11.9.2. ITALIAN NAVY RESCUE SHIP .................................................................. 11-32
CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRC – DESCRIPTION

OF SUBMARINE AND SUPPORT SHIP REQUIREMENTS .......... 12-1
12.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 12-1
12.2. SRC SYSTEM: TECHNICAL OVERVIEW..................................................... 12-1
12.2.1. EXTERIOR FEATURE. ................................................................................ 12-1
12.2.2. UPPER COMPARTMENT. ........................................................................... 12-1
12.2.3. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT. ............................................................... 12-2
12.2.4. LOWER COMPARTMENT. .......................................................................... 12-2
12.2.5. BALLAST TANK. .......................................................................................... 12-2
12.2.6. HOSES/UMBILICAL. .................................................................................... 12-2
12.2.7. BACKHAUL LINE. ........................................................................................ 12-2
12.2.8. LIFTING PENDANT...................................................................................... 12-2
12.3. AT SEA OPERATION PROCEDURE ............................................................ 12-2
12.4. SUPPORT SHIP REQUIREMENTS .............................................................. 12-3
12.5. SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................... 12-4
12.6. SOURCES: ................................................................................................... 12-4
CHAPTER 13 - TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT GUIDE FOR THE CRF/REC ........ 13-1
13.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 13-1
13.2. THE CRF ...................................................................................................... 13-1
13.3. CRF AND OSC ............................................................................................. 13-2
13.4. CO-ORDINATION ......................................................................................... 13-2
13.5. EXERCISES ................................................................................................. 13-3
13.6. TRAINING..................................................................................................... 13-3
ANNEX 13.A. CRF TRAINING PLAN ................................................................................. 13.A-1
13.A.1. Prior Reading and Preparation ............................................................. 13.A-1
13.A.2. Equipment ............................................................................................ 13.A-1
13.A.3. Personnel and responsibilities .............................................................. 13.A-1
13.A.4. Medical ................................................................................................. 13.A-1
13.A.5. Radiological.......................................................................................... 13.A-1
13.A.6. Operations............................................................................................ 13.A-1
13.A.7. Exercises.............................................................................................. 13.A-2
13.A.8. Miscellaneous ...................................................................................... 13.A-2
CHAPTER 14 - SSRA GUIDANCE ............................................................................ 14-1

14.1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 14-1
X
ATP/MTP-57.1
14.2. SUBMARINE RESCUE OPERATIONS......................................................... 14-1
14.3. INITIATION ................................................................................................... 14-2
14.4. CHOP FROM OTHER SUBOPAUTH TO NATIONAL AUTHORITY .............. 14-2
14.5. BEST SUITED SSRA .................................................................................... 14-2
14.6. CHOP FROM NATO SUBOPAUTH TO NATIONAL AUTHORITY ................ 14-2
14.7. SEARCH AND FORCE ASSEMBLY PHASE ................................................ 14-2
14.8. FLOW OF THE RESCUE OPERATION ........................................................ 14-3
14.8.1. INTERVENTION........................................................................................... 14-3
14.8.2. RESCUE OF DISSUB PERSONNEL ........................................................... 14-3
14.9. THE RETURN PHASE .................................................................................. 14-3
14.10. MEDIA .......................................................................................................... 14-4
CHAPTER 15 - MEDICAL SUPPLEMENT ................................................................ 15-1

15.1. TOXIC ATMOSPHERE CONTROL ............................................................... 15-1
15.2. CARBON DIOXIDE LEVEL CONTROL ......................................................... 15-1
15.3. OXYGEN LEVEL CONTROL ........................................................................ 15-2
15.3.1. OXYGEN CONSUMPTION RATES.............................................................. 15-2
15.3.2. OXYGEN MEASUREMENT AND LIMITS..................................................... 15-3
15.3.3. EFFECTS OF HIGH OXYGEN CONCENTRATION ..................................... 15-3
15.3.4. OXYGEN SOURCES ................................................................................... 15-4
15.4. ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONSIDERATIONS ...................................... 15-5
15.4.1. GENERAL .................................................................................................... 15-5
15.4.2. EFFECTS OF INCREASED ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE .......................... 15-5
15.4.3. PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS AND LIMITS .............................................. 15-5
15.4.4. SOURCES OF INCREASED COMPARTMENT PRESSURE ....................... 15-5
15.5. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 15-6
15.6. THE TEAM.................................................................................................... 15-6
15.7. THE INSERTION .......................................................................................... 15-6
15.8. THE TREATMENT OF ESCAPEES .............................................................. 15-6
15.9. HYPOTHERMIA............................................................................................ 15-7
15.9.1. DEFINITION ................................................................................................. 15-7
15.9.2. EFFECTS OF HYPOTHERMIA .................................................................... 15-7
15.9.3. PREVENTION OF HYPOTHERMIA ............................................................. 15-7
15.9.4. RECOGNITION ............................................................................................ 15-7
15.9.5. GUIDELINES FOR CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION AS FOLLOWS
..................................................................................................................... 15-8
15.9.6. MANAGEMENT OF HYPOTHERMIA ........................................................... 15-8
15.9.6.1. All hypothermic casualties........................................................................... 15-8
15.9.6.2. Hypothermic casualties able to assist themselves....................................... 15-9
15.9.6.3. Hypothermic casualties unable to assist themselves ................................... 15-9
XI
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.10. COLD INJURIES......................................................................................... 15-10
15.10.1. FREEZING COLD INJURY (FROSTBITE) ................................................. 15-10
15.10.2. NON-FREEZING COLD INJURY................................................................ 15-10
15.11. HYPERTHERMIA ....................................................................................... 15-11
15.11.1. EFFECTS OF HYPERTHERMIA ................................................................ 15-11
15.11.2. PREVENTION OF HYPERTHERMIA ......................................................... 15-11
15.12. HEAT INJURIES ......................................................................................... 15-11
15.12.1. THERMAL STRESS ABOARD THE DISSUB ............................................. 15-11
15.12.2. OVERHEATING IN TROPICAL CONDITIONS ........................................... 15-11
15.12.3. HEAT SYNCOPE ....................................................................................... 15-12
15.12.4. WATER DEPLETION HEAT EXHAUSTION ............................................... 15-12
15.12.5. TREATMENT ............................................................................................. 15-12
15.12.5.1. Heat stroke ............................................................................................... 15-12
15.13. RADIATION INJURIES ............................................................................... 15-13
15.13.1. GENERAL .................................................................................................. 15-13
15.13.2. IRRADIATED CASUALTIES....................................................................... 15-14
15.13.3. CONTAMINATED CASUALTIES................................................................ 15-14
15.14. US NAVY OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE ON ACCELERATED OXYGEN
DECOMPRESSION .................................................................................... 15-15
15.15. BASIC PROCEDURE ................................................................................. 15-15
15.16. MODIFICATIONS TO THE BASIC PROCEDURE ...................................... 15-17
15.16.1. AIR BREAKS DURING PRE-BREATHING AND DECOMPRESSION ........ 15-17
15.16.2. OXYGEN PRE-BREATHING IN DISSUB OR DURING TRANSIT .............. 15-18
15.16.3. SHORTENED DECOMPRESSION ............................................................ 15-19
15.17. DECOMPRESSION OF SYSTEM OPERATORS AND TENDERS ............. 15-19
15.18. TREATMENT OF DECOMPRESSION SICKNESS AND ARTERIAL GAS
EMBOLISM IN SUBMARINE RESCUE OPERATIONS............................... 15-20
15.18.1. GENERAL .................................................................................................. 15-20
15.18.2. PROCEDURE ............................................................................................ 15-21
15.19. REFERENCE .............................................................................................. 15-22
15.20. UK ACCELERATED DECOMPRESSION SCHEDULES ............................. 15-22
15.21. PROCEDURES........................................................................................... 15-24
15.22. EQUIVALENT AIR DEPTH PRINCIPLE ...................................................... 15-24
15.23. DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES - SURVIVORS .................................. 15-25
15.24. DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES - RECOMPRESSION CHAMBER
OPERATORS ............................................................................................. 15-29
15.25. OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................... 15-30
15.26. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................... 15-32
15.26.1. REFERENCE ............................................................................................. 15-32

XII
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.27. REFERENCE: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED BELOW IS DRAWN FROM
‘PROCEDURES FOR SATURATION.......................................................... 15-33
15.28. PROCEDURE CHARACTERISTICS........................................................... 15-33
NSRS TABLE 1 ................................................................................................................. 15-33
NSRS TABLE 2 ................................................................................................................. 15-33
NSRS TABLE 3 15-33
NSRS TABLE 4 15-33
SUMMARY – NSRS PROCEDURES ................................................................................... 15-33
15.29. SAFETY ...................................................................................................... 15-34
15.30. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 15-34
15.31. DETAILED NSRS DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES ............................. 15-34
NSRS TABLE 1 15-34
NSRS TABLE 2 15-35
NSRS TABLE 3 15-36
15.32. REFERENCE .............................................................................................. 15-38
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES................................................................................. LEP-1

XIII
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

XIV
ATP/MTP-57.1
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 11-1 NSRS skirt volumes ............................................................................................ 11-3

Figure 11-2 SRV Main features .............................................................................................. 11-4
Figure 11-3 SRV being prepared for embarkation .................................................................. 11-8
Figure 11-4 NSRS – The full system at sea on Norwegian Coastguard Vessel HARSTAD ... 11-9
Figure 11-5 SRDRS Subsystems ......................................................................................... 11-10
Figure 11-6 PRMS and SDS Systems and Elements........................................................... 11-11
Figure 11-7 On-Deck Spread for the SRS-RCS Configuration .............................................. 11-12
Figure 11-8 On-Deck Spread for the SRS-TUP Configuration .............................................. 11-13
Figure 11-9 SRS Mission Operations Sequence................................................................... 11-15
Figure 11-10 SRS Representative Rescue Mission Timelines .............................................. 11-16
Figure 11-11 AUWS Systems and Elements ........................................................................ 11-17
Figure 11-12 AUWS Mission Operation Sequence .............................................................. 11-19
Figure 11-13 AUWS VOO Mobilization Timeline................................................................... 11-20
Figure 11-14 External cut through URF. .............................................................................. 11-21
Figure 11-15 Internal look through of the separate compartments ....................................... 11-22
Figure 11-16 Main Dimensions of the SRV Rescue Skirt ...................................................... 11-26
Figure 11-17 URF in the HMS Belos LARS .......................................................................... 11-27
Figure 11-18 Main Features of the SRV 300 ........................................................................ 11-28
Figure 11-19 SRV-300 bring launched from its anteo ........................................................... 11-30
Figure 11-20 ITS ANTEO and SRV-300 being launched ...................................................... 11-32
Figure 12-1 SRC ................................................................................................................... 12-3
Figure 13-1 Command Relationships ..................................................................................... 13-2

XV
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

XVI
ATP/MTP-57.1
LIST OF TABLES
Table 15-1 Effects of High Carbon Dioxide Concentrations .................................................... 15-2

Table 15-2 Effects of Low Oxygen Concentration. .................................................................. 15-3
Table 15-3 Submarine Rescue Oxygen Decompression Table............................................. 15-16
Table 15-4 System Operator/Tender Oxygen Breathing Times (minutes) ............................. 15-20
Table 15-5 Required Oxygen Time ....................................................................................... 15-21
Table 15-6 ACCELERATED DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES ....................................... 15-28
Table 15-7 PROCEDURES FOR MANAGEMENT OF LR5 RECOMPRESSION CHAMBER
OPERATORS ............................................................................................................... 15-30
Table 15-8 TABLE 66, 66 Mod I & Mod II OXYGEN REQUIRMENTS .................................. 15-31

XVII
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

XVIII
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1. GENERAL
The aim of ATP/MTP-57.1 is to provide the operator without a robust background, with the
necessary information to approach and gather knowledge on how Submarine Rescue
Operations or exercises are conducted. It should be read in conjunction with ATP/MTP-57 and
may be read in conjunction with the International Aeronautical and Maritime SAR (IAMSAR)
Manual Volumes 1 and 2, to understand overall search and rescue concepts. Information held in
the mentioned documents is referred to here, but not duplicated.
The ATP/MTP-57 philosophies for submarine rescue are to provide a reasonable level of
insurance for the more likely accident situations and some, at least, for the less likely. While
rescue is the preferred method of saving life after a submarine accident, escape is just as likely
even though it presents greater risks to the individual. Salvage of the whole submarine is not
considered here as a means of saving lives, as it would invariably take far too long to
accomplish even in favourable circumstances. Some salvage related activities may, however,
contribute towards escape or rescue.
Indications on other relevant reference documentation can be found at ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 1.
1.2. POLICY AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

As described in ATP/MTP-57, the main SUBSAR phases are the:
• Search and Localisation of the DISSUB
• Escape and Rescue
SUBSAR operations, in reality, are the sum of a certain number of distinct “sub-phases” where a
few of them can, in certain cases, be combined. A typical sub-phases set can be identified as
follows:
a. Alert (Initiation)
b. Search
1. Search
2. Assembly of Rescue Forces and Mobilisation.
c. Escape
d. Rescue
1. Surface Abandonment
2. Intervention
3. Rescue
Normally the Search and Rescue Force Assembly and Mobilization phases are conducted
concurrently. If an Escape took place, it will probably be relatively soon after the accident,
whereas an Intervention or Rescue phase may last for several days. Whenever the
circumstances in the DISSUB offer a choice, survivors should be rescued in preference to being
advised to make escapes. No two situations will be the same. It is possible that lives will be
saved by both Escape and Rescue from the same DISSUB. The Escape and Rescue phases

1-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
may therefore take place in any order or even concurrently, thus posing water and asset
management problems for the CRF.
1.3. ALERT
Indication of a submarine being in distress may come from a variety of sources, ranging from
merchant ships observing an untoward incident, through warships operating with the submarine,
to the SUBOPAUTH realising that the submarine has failed to report as detailed in her orders, or
any unit receiving distress signals of one sort of another from the submarine. Once the decision
has been made that a submarine is in distress, the SSRA will alert other NATO Nations through
the formal signal system and by activating an Alert on the ISMERLO web-site. In this last case
the Alert will be received by all Nations which have registered into the ISMERLO Alert System.
During this phase and depending on the National Authority formal Request for Assistance, the
Nation owning a designated system will authorise mobilisation, gaining higher authority approval
if necessary. Note that on the ISMERLO web-site all coordination and clarification activities do
normally take place that reduces and compresses the TTFI and TTFR. Above all, it is to be
remarked that the Request for Assistance has anyway to be formally forwarded by the
requesting National Authority through the formal channels. While this/these system/s is/are
underway, the SSRA will co-ordinate with relevant authorities the call-out of the Recovery and
Rescue Forces. All response is determined by the circumstances, and there are related check-
off lists in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3.
1.4. SEARCH, ASSEMBLY OF RESCUE FORCE AND MOBILISATION

Once the alarm (Alert) has been initiated, the SSRA/SMC, which is the Naval Authority
designated by the National Authority (OPCOM) responsible for the planning and conduct of
Submarine search, escape and rescue operations, will plan and conduct the operation in
coordination with the relevant RCC. The degree of urgency and anxiety related to the operation
will determine the designation given to the operation as it progresses. A GMDSS indicator buoy
or a SEPIRB/EPIRB signal will remove much of the need for search operations, but not all
submarines are fitted with such buoys.
Concurrent to the Search phase, the (Intervention, Recovery and) Rescue forces will be
assembled. This is a logistics led process, developing an initial rescue plan based on the
MOSHIP/Airport/Seaport Combination (MASC), which may be different for Intervention and
Rescue, and indeed different for different systems responding to the emergency. Provisions of
Surface transport, airlift and MOSHIP charter are key activities in this phase, which is covered in
ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3.
1.5. ESCAPE
Once the DISSUB has been located, life saving operations can start. Rescue is the preferred
method but escape is also possible, should changing conditions onboard the DISSUB force the
crew (or part thereof) to escape, or abandon at the surface. In such cases the Search Force
may come upon escapees already on the surface and in need of treatment before the arrival of
any specialist advice or equipment.
In this phase escapees may be recovered from the sea and taken to a suitable On Scene Unit
where a senior underwater medical adviser may carry out triage to allocate the treatment
facilities at his disposal to those most in need. See also Chapters 4 and 5.

1-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
1.6. SURFACE ABANDONMENT
If the DISSUB has surfaced and is able to remain on the surface for a sufficiently long time,
some or indeed all of its personnel may have abandoned the submarine. In such a situation they
should have dressed in SEIE or survival suits and made their way into the sea without the
trauma of escape and pressurisation, but with the trauma coming from the incident that caused
the abandonment in the first place. They will endeavour to remain together on the surface and
present a relatively straightforward recovery problem, unless they have been awaiting recovery
in extreme conditions for a considerable time. SPAG or a SAR aircraft may have delivered life
rafts, which should extend their survival time considerably. Some submarine classes also have
their own life-raft.
1.7. INTERVENTION
Intervention is the use of external resources to increase survivability. This can be surface or
subsurface, and is likely to involve ROVs/ADS/Divers for survey, debris clearance and
transponder field preparation around the DISSUB. During the waiting time between localisation
and rescue, it may be necessary to maintain conditions on the DISSUB by ELSS resupply, either
“wet” re-supply using pressure tight pods posted into the escape tower 1 by ROV (or by ADS or
Divers).
In addition during the rescue phase the Rescue Vehicle can deliver ELSS, known as “dry”
transfer
Some classes of submarine can accept an air supply connection and maintain a breathable
atmosphere thereby. This operation (ventilation) can be performed by a suitable support ship
(air-provider) connected to the DISSUB via ROV, ADS or divers.
Chapter 6 deals with Intervention.
1.8. RESCUE OF DISSUB PERSONNEL

If conditions aboard the DISSUB are within limits, the personnel should wait to be rescued. This
operation may last for several days, and is covered in Chapter 10, 11 and 12. Medical aspects of
a Rescue operation are covered in Chapter 15 and in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 6.
1.9. VESSEL OF OPPORTUNITY (VOO)

Air portable Rescue and Intervention Systems rely upon Vessels of Opportunity (VOO) to act as
MOSHIPs during rescue operations and exercises. There is a wide variety of suitable vessels,
and the precise vessel specifications are kept by the rescue systems, which are responsible for
chartering such vessels when required. These specifications can also be viewed on the
ISMERLO website. Briefly put, a VOO must satisfy both suitability and availability criteria to be
selected as a MOSHIP.
1.9.1. SUITABILITY
Most VOOs act primarily in support of offshore exploration, either as Construction
vessels,Supply Vessels or Anchor Handling Tugs, although there are some military and
1
Some classes can accept Pods through torpedo tubes, or “Minipods” through the SSE
1-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
Coastguard vessels which are also suitable. The basic requirement is for a clear deck area of a
known strength that is big enough to accommodate the Rescue System, and then for the vessel
to be able to transit and operate safely with the system embarked in the conditions likely to be
encountered. There are numerous other detailed requirements that vary from system to system,
but an illustrative universal specification is at the Annex.
1.9.2. AVAILABILITY
A suitable ship also needs to be available, and availability can be sub-divided into location and
employment. The datum for any submarine accident cannot be predicted in advance, but the
distribution of suitable shipping can be predicted on a relatively long term basis as it is tied so
closely to the offshore industry. Submarine operating nations should be aware of rescue system
coverage and availability to support rescue. When relying on air portable systems the likely VOO
distribution near to their operating areas will be critical. If a suitable VOO is in the vicinity, its
current state must then be established before a selection can be made, and this is best done by
direct contact with the owner or operator.
1.9.3. VOO TO MOSHIP SELECTION

These decisions, for both Intervention and Rescue, must be made as part of the initial rescue
plan, and include the logistical train in support of the operation. These initial decisions, made by
the system operators in conjunction with National and other Local Authorities, establish the
MOSHIP/Airport/Seaport Combinations (MASC) which will be fundamental in minimising Time to
First Intervention (TTFI) and Time to First Rescue (TTFR).
1.9.4. SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATION

The surface support ship is used in the event the VOO requires logistic or operational support.
Examples of the surface support ship utility include:
• Deployment/Recovery of a four-point moor,
• Additional berthing support,
• Intervention support ship,
• Medical support ship,
• Any other service that could support the overall mission of the VOO
1.10. MEDIA
Although the priority of the organisation is to save life, the situation will generate enormous
pressure from the media and from anxious families and friends. A pre-arranged media strategy
is essential. It is the DISSUB Nation that needs to have a plan for how to handle the media. All
published information needs to be approved by them before it is released.
1.11. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Effective Command, Control and Communications are vital to the success of the mission. The
procedures to be put in place are covered in Chapter 3.
1.12. THE CRF AND REC

The CRF and REC are key players in any SUBSAR response, and they must be trained and
experienced in the discharge of their duties. CRF and REC responsibilities and training
requirements are covered in Chapter 13.

1-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 2 - EQUIPMENT USED IN SMER
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a general overview of all equipment that would be typically deployed in
cases of a confirmed SUBSUNK. Coordination and deployment of equipment, is facilitated
through ISMERLO. The chapter provides
• an overview of escape and rescue assets on board a submarine;
• an overview of assets that would provide assistance to an escape and facilitate in a rescue,
• information on the deployment of rescue systems;
• Part four provides a discussion on the procurement, maintenance and operation of assets.
2.2. BACKGROUND
In the unlikely event of a submarine incident, the dilemma is whether to escape or wait for
rescue. This raises the question: to what extent is the DISSUB equipped to successfully execute
an escape and/or await the rescue effort? Not all submarine operating nations have a submarine
rescue capability, but all submarine operating nations should have the capability to guarantee a
minimum period of onboard life support. This chapter aims to provide information to answer the
question.
2.3. OVERVIEW OF ESCAPE AND RESCUE ASSETS ON BOARD A SUBMARINE.

It is assumed that it will take some time before an escape or even longer for a rescue to be
successfully executed. The purpose of equipment on board should be to overcome the
preparation time to escape, enhance survivability and to facilitate rescue, therefore saving the
maximum amount of life.
2.3.1. ESCAPE ASSETS

Should escape be necessary the following equipment is required:
2.3.1.1. ESCAPE TOWERS/TRUNKS. (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS ‘TOWERS’)

The tower acts as a transfer lock between inboard and outboard conditions. It is either capable
of holding one or more crewmembers, dressed in escape-suits and provides vital respiration
facilities whilst exiting the tower. Further to this, a mechanical system should be in place to
overcome the pressure difference between inboard an outboard conditions. The escape tower
and supporting systems should be capable of facilitating the escape of all crewmembers.
The escape tower is part of the pressure hull. It contains two independently and remotely
operated hatches, upper and lower lid, providing differentially controlled breathing air to the
escapees. It is able to equalize the outboard pressure and can be filled with and drained of
seawater.
Note: Single towers are usually designed with a manhole style lower cover which is purely
mechanical in nature. Numerous submarine classes have this style of tower.
In order to operate the escape tower successfully, submarine crews will be familiar with them
using laid down procedures in National Guard Books/Cards. It will typically made available
through the DISSUB Liaison Team (DLT).

2-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
The crew should be able to determine when an escape must be executed. Lastly, escape towers
will be subjected to a regular National maintenance and inspection regime.
2.3.1.2. SUBMARINE ESCAPE AND SURFACE SURVIVIAL PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT

(SESSPE).
The SESSPE suit aids an escapee to utilize the escape tower during an escape and protects
against water temperature and, once surfaced, weather conditions. On the surface the suits
function is to increase chances of swift detection and rescue and facilitate endurance at the
surface for some time. The suits are often operated in combination with life rafts and personal
locator beacon, lights and audio signal equipment. The number of suits on board, as well as their
dispersal on board, is subject to National policy.
Details of the suits can be found in ATP/MTP-57.2 - National data.
2.3.1.3. MAINTAINING ON-BOARD AIR CONDITIONS.

To maintain a habitable atmosphere on board the atmospheric conditions should be monitored
and maintained using emergency survivability stores at all times. Escape compartments should
therefore be equipped with (redundant) air and pressure monitoring equipment as well as
Oxygen supply and CO2 scrubber equipment and supplies. The quantities of air conditions’
maintaining supplies are subject to National policy. However it is advocated to cater for supplies
for at least seven days.
Details of the atmospheric conditioning equipment can be found in ATP/MTP-57.2 - National
data.
2.3.1.4. BACK UP BATTERY AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING.

Submarine emergency lighting should support the entire survivability period. Many Navies
provide additional emergency portable lighting to support the survivability period or the period
while conducting escape
2.3.1.5. FOOD WATER AND HYGIENE

Food, drinks and personal hygiene products should be stored in each escape compartment to
support the survivability period.
Note: The above points 2.3.1.3 to 2.3.1.5 will be “required” not only for Escape but also for
Rescue.
2.3.2. RESCUE ASSETS

Rescue shall always be considered the primary method of leaving the DISSUB. Rescue differs
from escape to the extent that the submarine is depending on third party support or supply. First
of all the submarine must make sure, in advance, that she is able to receive third party supplies
or rescue assets. Standardization is imperative.
Standardization fields are:
• Rescue Seats (STANAG 1297)
• Padeyes (downhaul cables)
• Seats dimensions
• Seats indicators

2-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
• STANAG 1390
• STANAG 1301
• STANAG 1450
• STANAG 1391
• HP air hose connectors (outboard)
• Homing Devices
• Medical
‘Buying Time’
All rescue systems require (geographical and weather situations permitting) some days to be
fully deployed. According to ATP/MTP-57, arrangements should be made and maintained to be
able to sustain a period of about seven days before a Transfer Under Pressure (TUP) rescue
can successfully be deployed. Most of the equipment for escape should sustain this period.
2.4. OVERVIEW OF ASSETS THAT WOULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO AN ESCAPE AND

FACILITATE RESCUE
Third party assistance may consist of:
2.4.1. INTERVENTION ELEMENTS
2.4.1.1. DIVERS
Divers provide reconnaissance of the stricken submarine with the aim to supply the boat with
communication, Emergency Life Support Stores (ELSS) (Pod posting) or Hp air (for buoyancy or
ventilation). Maximum depths are governed by National policies.
Inherent data can be found in ADivP-1.
They operate from a support ships.
2.4.1.2. ADS (ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM)

The ADS may be operated to depths of several hundred meters and are mostly owned by Off-
Shore related civilian companies. However, the Navies of France, Turkey, Italy, Russia and USA
operate ADS without having to rely on third parties.
ADS are normally operated by a support ship, able to handle them overboard through a launch
and recovery system and are connected to the mother ship (Moship) through an umbilical.
Detailed information is contained in Chapter 7.
Nation Nr Max Depth Location MAIN TASK
(m/ft)
FRA 1 300/1000 Toulon Ventilation, POD Posting, UW
Inspection
ITA 1 300/1000 La Spezia- Ventilation, POD Posting,
ashore McCann Bell line attachment, UW

2-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
Nation Nr Max Depth Location MAIN TASK
(m/ft)
2 300/1000 La Spezia- Inspection
aboard
TUR 1 350/1200 Istanbul Rescue Ops
USA 4 600/2000 San Diego Inspection, Hatch clearing,
DSDS, Line attachment, (in future
Pod Posting)
Detailed matrix can be found at ADIVP-1 Table E-1
2.4.1.3. REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLES (ROV)

ROV’s are widely used by the offshore community for a wide range of tasks, and as a result
come in a multitude of shapes, sizes and capabilities. Many vehicles are useful to Intervention,
and several rescue systems use dedicated ROVs in this role.
The smallest ROVs are almost suitcase portable, and would only be capable of basic inspection
operations at limited depths. As the size increases so does the capability, with the “Work –
Class” ROV being the most suitable balance between size and capability. Such vehicles can
perform the full range of Intervention tasks, down to the full depth requirement, especially if fitted
with dedicated tooling sets, which all of the system specific ones are.
Commercial ship fitted ROVs may be able to be on the scene of any accident before any other
rescue forces, depending on the precise conditions and circumstances. If commercial units are
available, it may be possible to supplement them with bespoke tooling and sensors, along with
expert personnel, to enhance their utility within any operation.
Details of dedicated Intervention ROVs can be found in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 1.
2.4.1.4. RESCUE VEHICLES AND BELLS

There are (semi) autonomous Rescue Vehicle Systems, some of which can perform a personnel
transfer under pressure.
They are listed in the matrix below together with their capabilities:
Nation System Air Moship Max Rescuees TUP Note
Portable depth capable
AUS LR5 Yes VOO 450 m 16 Yes 5 bar
CHI LR-7 500 m 18
FR/UK NSRS Yes VOO 610 m 15 Yes, 6 bar
/NO
ITA SRV 300 No ITS Anteo 300 m 12 Yes 5 bar (1)

2-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
Nation System Air Moship Max Rescuees TUP Note
Portable depth capable
JAP DSRV No Chiyoda/Chi 610 m 12 Yes
haya
KOR DSAR5 Cheonghaej 450 m 16
in
Chung Hae 16
KOR DSAR-5 No 500 m Yes, 5 bar
Jin
RUS AS Kind Various 1000 m
Moships
SIN DSAR-6 No Swift 500 m 17 Yes, 5 bar
Rescue
SWE URF Yes HSwMS 450 m 35 Yes/with (2)
Belos/VOO Belos
USA SRDRS Yes VOO 610 m 16 Yes from (3)
2015
Notes:
(1) The vehicle itself is TUP capable – There are currently no lock transfer capabilities aboard
ITS ANTEO.
(2) URF is air portable and can be towed up to 100 nautical miles for a single cycle rescue.
(3) SRDRS TUP capabilities: decompression up to 5 BAR / treatment up to 6 BAR.

p.s. TUP capabilities will be available in 2015.
Additionally, a few nations operate a traditional Bell system which is launched by a MOSHIP.
The Bell runs along a cable which is connected between the MOSHIP and the DISSUB, and
mates with the DISSUB in the same way other vehicles do.
Below matrix lists nations operating that system:
System Nation Air Portable Max depth TUP capable
Mc Cann Bell BGR No 120 m No
Rescue Bell CHI 200 m
Rescue Bell IND No 200 m Yes
Rescue Bell Russia
Mc Cann Bell ITA No 120 m No
Mc Cann Bell TUR No 207 m No

2-5
ATP/MTP-57.1
System Nation Air Portable Max depth TUP capable
Rescue Bell BRA No 300 m No
Rescue Bell USA Yes 259 m (850 ft) No
Above data to be confirmed and/or integrated by nations during annual SMERWG.

Both Rescue vehicles and Bells typically operate from MOSHIPs. Details can be found in
ATP/MTP-57.2 national sections.
2.4.1.5. VENTILATION
Ventilation is a procedure by which an auxiliary/rescue ship provides fresh air to a distressed
submarine laying on the seabed and, at the same time, removes excess air in order to avoid the
pressure increase aboard the submarine.
The whole concept is properly developed at Chapter 9.
2.4.2. SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUP (SPAG)

Details can be found in Chapter 5.
2.4.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE MOSHIP/VOO

All rescue systems are deployed from MOSHIPS/VOO. The Swedish, Italian, Bulgarian,
Japanese, Turkish and Russian Federation Systems utilize dedicated MOSHIPs. All other
systems are able to be mounted on and launched from any other civilian ships that meet certain
requirements. Once civilian ships have been categorized as such, they qualify as Vessels of
Opportunity (VOO). Whilst a submarine rescue attempt is mounted, the equipment for launching
the rescue vehicle and the TUP equipment is dispatched to the VOO, mounted, tested and
deployed to the nearest possible Airport/Seaport combination near the submarine datum.
Although NSRS and SRDRS are fully containerized, the amount of materiel is large and provides
a significant logistical challenge. Nations should bear in mind that 90% of the equipment
deployed is owned, transported and deployed by civilian organizations.
2.5. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESCUE SYSTEMS
2.5.1. INITIAL PHASE

It should be noted that rescue systems respond to a demand from a National Authority. Once the
demand has been raised, ISMERLO will assist in coordinating the mounting of the rescue effort
and will identify the most suitable systems that are available the fastest. Once those systems
have been identified, this information will be passed to the Nation that owns the DISSUB
(National Authority) and to the SSRA.
2.5.2. PROCEEDINGS
The rescue effort will be mounted and conducted according to procedures described in
ATP/MTP-57. Nations owning the DISSUB will provide a DISSUB Liaison Team (DLT) to the
Country that operates the Rescue System. The DLT will advise the CRF on technical detail of
their submarine. Some Rescue systems are Government owned and operated, some others are
Government owned and contractor operated. It is expected that pilots of SRVs will preserve the
2-6
ATP/MTP-57.1
right to decide whether to mate with the DISSUB ensuring safety of the SRV and the SRV crew.
The contractor cannot be held liable for the failure of any rescue attempt.
2.6. DISCUSSION ON THE PROCUREMENT, MAINTENANCE AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL

MENTIONED ASSETS.
2.6.1. PROCUREMENT AND MANUFACTURE

Mating by a rescue system such as NSRS and SRDRS requires the initial certification of the
submarine rescue seat (see STANAG 1297) and subsequent recertification on a routine basis.
Many products have been developed, utilizing discussion and contacts, with submarine
operators. ISMERLO and SMERWG promulgate the exchange of information and maintenance
of standardization in ATPs, STANAGs and numerous other publications. Regular major
submarine escape and/or rescue exercises are conducted worldwide. Participating nations will
be joined by worldwide invited submarine operating nations to witness procedures, equipment
and standardization techniques during the exercises.
2.6.2. MAINTENANCE
NSRS and SRDRS require certification of submarine rescue seats (see STANAG 1297).
Furthermore the maintenance of escape and rescue equipment is subject to National
Regulations.
2.6.3. OWNERSHIP AND COOPERATION OF RESCUE ASSETS.

The ownership of rescue assets is extremely expensive. Some nations have cooperated to build
and operate jointly owned systems; some nations operate systems independently. Rescue asset
operating nations are open to MOU/LOA type of agreements to support other submarine
operating nations’ rescue requirements.

2-7
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

2-8
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 3 - COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Effective Command, Control and Communications (C3) are fundamental to the success of any
military operation. The Assembled Force will operate under standard NATO C3 procedures as
laid down in ATP-10 and in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 5. The following sections deal with areas of
detail that are Rescue Elements specific.
3.2. ONBOARD C3
External C3 is well catered for in the standard publications, whereas a typical onboard C3 can
be identified as follows:
• Ships Master – Responsible for safety of his vessel at all times.
• CRF – Responsible for the planning and conduct of operations.
• REC - In charge of the relevant Rescue Element.
• Rescue Manager (if applicable/present) – In charge of the contractor personnel, responsible
for discharging the Rescue Plan.
• SMO - Responsible for all medical planning and treatment.
• Senior Diver Officer – Responsible to the CRF (through a REC, if not REC himself) for
utilizing all diving assets.
3.3. COMMUNICATIONS WITH DISSUB

It is important that all communication with the DISSUB is logged so that information is not lost. It
is equally important to disseminate information early, so that effective planning can take place,
but equally important that sensitive information not be put into the public domain.
3.4. RELEASE OF INFORMATION

During a rescue operation there is likely to be a considerable amount of sensitive information,
particularly dealing with survivors and casualties, and release of such information must be very
closely handled (see Introduction – Media). Sensitive information will be forwarded to the SSRA
and DISSUB National Authority only, and it is for them to agree its dissemination. Timing of
release will depend on progress of informing next-of-kin.
In addition to the generic and consolidated different circuits between CRF/SSRA/REC etc., there
is likely to be a separate medical information channel controlled by the SMO, especially to the
DMTT, to other MOSHIP Medical Triage teams and to ships with chambers embarked.
3.5. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Intervention and Rescue MOSHIPs should be at least equipped with HF, UHF and VHF
equipment. Availability of Secure and Satellite Communication devices are welcome but not
imperative. See ATP/MTP-57.2 national sections for available Comms aboard.
3.6. USE OF ISMERLO

The ISMERLO website (Alert Page) www.ismerlo.org will be very useful during the mobilization
phase, as it will be the prime method of displaying and de-conflicting requirements. During the
Intervention and Rescue phases sanitized information regarding the progress of the operation
will be displayed on ISMERLO. The CRF/REC will post such information on the Main Chat
pages.
3-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
Password protected access to the ISMERLO web-site should be sought in advance by all
Authorities likely to be involved in a SUBSAR Operation. Follow links on the web-site.

3-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 4 - INTRODUCTIONS TO THE ESCAPE
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The Escape Phase will start once the crew determines that escape is the best/only option. It is to
be hoped that Recovery Forces will reach the datum before the DISSUB personnel have been
forced to escape and such Units must be ready to treat escapees by the time they arrive on the
scene.
4.2. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DISSUB

It is important to gain as much information as possible of the conditions in the DISSUB so that
the Escape and Rescue specialists with the Recovery Force can advise both the men in the
DISSUB and the CRF/REC. The information contained in the Check-off List India should be
obtained from the DISSUB as soon as possible
The 3-letter code for UWT communications is held in ATP/MTP-57, Chapter 5.
It is imperative that all information from the DISSUB is accurately logged and collated so that the
OSC staff and SSRA/CRF can develop as complete a picture as possible.
The flow of information from the surface to the DISSUB must be maintained, as this will play a
major part in the maintenance of morale. The ship designated to maintain UWT Link with the
DISSUB should call her at regular intervals not exceeding 15 minutes. Be aware however, that
the battery capacity of the DISSUB UWT may be kept for important messages, so a long reply
will not always be given.
The following section gives information on the DISSUB, and the escape process and supporting
equipments.
4.3. ESCAPE COMPARTMENTS

Details of each nation’s submarines, their escape compartments and capabilities can be found in
4.4. METHODS OF INDICATING POSITION

The methods with which a DISSUB may use to indicate its position are listed below. Certain of
the equipments used for the purpose are described below.
4.4.1. INDICATOR BUOYS

Many submarines are fitted with indicator buoys which can be tethered or not. They can be
released from the escape compartments or from compartments adjacent to them. Particular
details of transmission types can be found in National Annexes, as can details of Emergency
Communications Buoys and SEPIRBs.
In addition some submarines are fitted with a tethered life-raft. The life-raft will give a visual
indication and may also be equipped with an EPIRB. The life-raft can be released down to their
maximum design depth.
4.4.2. SMOKE CANDLES AND GRENADES

Smoke candles and grenades are fired from SSE's, and a variety is carried onboard.
Submarines are ordered to fire red grenades in emergency but if none is available all types of

4-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
grenades may be fired as an alternative. This will also help the recovery Forces to establish the
position where escapees will break the surface.
4.4.3. EMERGENCY UNDERWATER TELEPHONE

An emergency UWT is provided in each escape compartment. Details can be found in
4.5. METHODS OF ESCAPE

Escape can be made either from an escape tower (Tower Escape) or from a compartment fitted
with an escape hatch (Rush Escape). If an escape tower is available and prevailing conditions
permit it will be used. The escape tower has been used for live escapes down to 186 m. Brief
descriptions of each system follow.
4.5.1. TOWER ESCAPE.

Details of escape towers and their locations can be found in National Sections. Logistic
Embarkation Tower (LETs) modified to act as escape towers are fitted in some submarines and
can allow two men to escape on each cycle (typically, deeper than a certain depth, determined
by the Tower specifications, only a one man escape may be performed). The tower has to be
drained down before it can be used again and the whole cycle time is dependent on the
submarine class and depth of water. Data is available in ATP/MTP-57.2 national sections.
Therefore escapees may be expected to reach the surface, either singly or in pairs, with an
interval of approximately five to 15 minutes between each cycle. A quantity of air will be vented
from the submarine during each cycle of escape from the tower.
4.5.2. RUSH ESCAPE.

Crew escaping from compartments make a collective escape and leave the submarine in rapid
succession. They may therefore be expected to arrive on the surface with intervals of
approximately five seconds between each person. Rush escape will be limited by the depth and
by the submarine design.
4.5.3. DECOMPRESSION ILLNESS (DCI).

It is highly likely that any survivors will have some form of DCI, the ones leaving last being the
most severely affected. It is also likely that not all of the original survivors of the DISSUB
incident will survive to escape.
4.5.4. SUBMARINE ESCAPE IMMERSION EQUIPMENT (SEIE)

Escapees will be wearing day glow red/orange suits, some types fitted with life rafts, whistles
and white indicator lights with an endurance of about 48hrs. The single man life-raft, when
inflated and boarded, keeps the occupant in a seated position. The risk of hypothermia, or over
heating, may be a significant factor for survival dependent on locations of the DISSUB and
environmental conditions.
4.6. CONDITIONS ON BOARD THE DISSUB

It can be safely assumed that it is virtually impossible for most submarines to bring itself to the
surface should any one of her main compartments be flooded. In the "worst" case all those who
have survived the accident will be in one of the escape compartments and the compartment may
be partially flooded and/or may have an internal pressure above 1.0 bar (absolute). Each of

4-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
these possibilities will present different problems to the DISSUB personnel and to the recovery
and rescue forces.
The decision on how and when to escape is the sole responsibility of the "Senior Survivor”,
although as much advice as possible should be provided by surface forces. Ideally escape
should take place after search and recovery forces have located the DISSUB and are standing
by on the surface to provide assistance. However, conditions in the DISSUB may force the
Senior Survivor to start the escape before the arrival of surface forces that may arrive at the
datum to find men in the water. The definition of the Senior Survivor may be different from nation
to nation but, in each case, he/she will be the person best suited to make the onboard decisions.
Factors affecting the time to escape will include O2 depletion, CO2 and pressure buildup,
conditions of current and tidal stream, light, weather, and the proximity of surface forces as well
as the pressure and atmosphere condition in the DISSUB. Escape will not normally be delayed
beyond the limits of pressure or atmosphere in order to await rescue by submersible unless the
Senior Survivor considers that circumstances justify such a delay, or the depth of the DISSUB is
such that successful escape is clearly out of the question. A partial escape to lower the burden
on remaining atmosphere control equipment is also possible.
4.7. DETAILS OF SUBMARINES

Full details of all submarine classes and the emergency equipment carried can be found in the
4.8. INITIATING THE ESCAPE PROCESS

Although the Senior Survivor has the responsibility of deciding when to start the escape from the
DISSUB, he should be given as much advice as possible to help him with this decision. He
should be given details of the ability of recovery forces to treat escapees, and of the weather
conditions. Communication codes at ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 5 are to be referred to.
It must be remembered that a large number of escapees may need recompression. The signal
should not necessarily be made as soon as the first compression chamber reaches the datum. If
communications with the DISSUB are good, the three-letter group 'SSS' can be passed on UWT.
4.9. NUCLEAR REACTOR IMPLICATIONS

If a nuclear submarine is involved, it is advisable to ascertain if the accident has caused
increased radiation levels around the submarine. This is best achieved by carrying out a survey
of the hull with an ROV/ADS fitted with specialist survey equipment. Some Rescue Vehicles also
carries monitoring equipment to enable the pilot to keep clear of areas of high radiation. Divers
and ADS should only be used after consultation with the embarked Senior Medical Officer to the
Dissub Liaison Team.
4.10. DISSUB - RADIATION RISKS

In the unlikely event that there has been a reactor accident in the DISSUB, personnel aboard
may be at risk from gamma or alpha radiation emanating from the reactor compartment;
DISSUB personnel will measure the dose received from this source with the instrumentation
provided in the escape compartment. The accumulation of a high dose from gamma or alpha
radiation may force survivors to make an early escape.

4-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
In addition to gamma radiation, DISSUB personnel could be at risk from airborne radioactive
fission products if these have leaked into the DISSUB atmosphere from within the primary
containment. This will produce a hazard from both direct alpha/gamma radiation from the
airborne material and internal radiation via inhalation/ingestion. The internal risk may be reduced
by taking Potassium Iodate Tablets (PITs) and by wearing respiratory protection.
Escapees and rescuees may be externally contaminated if fission products have leaked within
the DISSUB. To reduce this risk, personnel will be decontaminated on the surface.
4.11. MEDICAL ORGANISATION

The SMO will be responsible to the OSC and CRF for implementing the on-scene medical
organisation. This will reflect established procedures for dealing with the number of casualties
expected. SMO will be responsible for the deployment and management of all available medical
personnel, following the guidance given in the ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 6.
4.12. CASUALTY REPORTING

Timely and accurate information about the personnel involved (including known fatalities) will be
required ashore in accordance with National procedures. The OSC and CRF will be provided
with a crew list, and the Medical Admin staffs are responsible for tracking all escapees from
arrival on board until final onward movement.
The CRF will forward names of all escapees to the SSRA/National Authority as soon as the
personnel are received on board the relevant vessel.
4.13. SURFACE ABANDONMENT

If Surface Abandonment does occur, it is likely to be at the start of the operation, and efforts
should be made to move the personnel to a place of greater safety as soon as possible. This is
likely to be either a liferaft or passing vessel, and both MPA and SPAG may well have a role in
assisting DISSUB personnel. Many countries provide surface abandonment suits/equipment
which will support enhanced survival of personnel conducting a surface abandonment.

4-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 5 - SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUPS
(SPAG) CAPABILITIES
5.1. BACKGROUND
Several nations currently have the capability or are in the process of forming SPAGs, whose
utility is to primarily offer guidance to the crew of a DISSUB and then to give support to that crew
should they be required to escape from either a surface or sub-surface situation; they may also
have a function within a rescue operation.
Even if the first ship at the location of the DISSUB is a NATO warship it may not possess the
means to communicate with the DISSUB and will almost certainly not have submarine qualified
personnel onboard or the correct Guard Book to enable effective communication to take place.
There will therefore be an urgent need to provide a portable Underwater Telephone and a
qualified operator to the scene to gain the correct information about the conditions onboard the
DISSUB and relay those facts to the Rescue Authorities.
Depending on the circumstances, it is possible that escape may commence prior to the arrival of
any military support ships, compression chambers, medical specialists and other medical stores.
It is also possible that commercial shipping may arrive at the scene with no Naval personnel
onboard, and both types of vessel will require clear, concise guidance to ensure the safety of
escaping personnel. A key requirement of the SPAG is to assume command and control of the
immediate area around the site prior to the arrival of the OSC for the Rescue Forces, and then
effectively hand that control over as appropriate.
Personnel escaping from DISSUBs are likely to be in single man life rafts, and the SPAG can
provide multi-occupancy life rafts to maximise the survival prospects; these are anchored and
rafted together in order to allow mutual support and effective control.
As personnel escape from either a surface or sub-surface DISSUB, there are likely to be various
injuries ranging from pressure-related problems to basic trauma. SPAG teams should all be
qualified to recognise and carry out triage to personnel, and would normally contain a diving-
specialist doctor. The medical stores carried by the SPAG teams will vary depending on the
method of deployment, but should contain basic intervention equipment as well as sufficient
therapeutic oxygen to treat the likely number of casualties; effectively, this is as much as the
aircraft type can feasibly carry. SPAG can be deployed to the area by either fixed or rotary wing
aircraft dependent on the likely range required and the quantity of equipment needed, although it
is usual for each nation to use only one type to minimise the quantity of equipment required. This
chapter will deal with general information and considerations; each nation’s particular
capabilities can be found in national documentation.
5.2. SPAG EQUIPMENT

SPAG equipment varies between national teams and is usually based on the worst case
scenario involving a DISSUB with the largest crew. Most SPAGs are formed on the basis that
they may need to operate independently and be unsupported for up to 72 hours. The team and
personal equipment will reflect this with reliable boats, high quality immersion suits, long range
communication equipment and sufficient rations for the determined time-scale. The stores must
also include all surface support to the DISSUB crew, both prior to their escape and immediately
following it.
Due to the nature of the equipment, it may prove to be extremely problematical to fully deploy
5-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
the SPAG by Commercial Air for long range operations, but thought should be given to
deploying elements of the team to give on-scene guidance, taking the essential communications
devices with them and utilising other local facilities as required.
It is not practical to deploy a SPAG team unless the location of the DISSUB has been localised
to within the range of the underwater communications equipment, but it is possible to deploy the
team to a closer airfield to enable a faster response time when the DISSUB has been located.
5.3. SPAG DEPLOYMENT

Before taking the decision to deploy a SPAG, there are limitations that must be taken into
account. As an example, the following are the limitations for the UK SPAG.:
• Location of DISSUB fixed to within 1000m of the support vessel
• Surface wind speeds up to 30 knots for both types of parachute/canopy
• Sea state up to sea state 4
• Minimum Cloud Base:
- SLS (Square) Parachutes - 1200 ft
- SSL (Round) Parachutes - 800 ft
• All limits overridden at the discretion of OC SPAG
The following factors should also be taken into account:
• The period that the SPAG team are able to operate independently; although UK SPAG have
sufficient supplies for 72 hours, their effectiveness will be reduced after 24 hours if they
remain unsupported.
• If the team are able to deploy at night; UK SPAG have a low-light capability and would
parachute at night if personnel are escaping, but it may be prudent to insert limited personnel
to establish communications with the DISSUB and deploy the remainder during daylight
hours.
Depending on their availability, SPAG may be enhanced or supplemented by members of Diving
or Special Forces units to broaden the skills available on site, although this should be in the form
of a second wave to supplement the Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP)
team and not to replace them.
Once SPAG have completed their initial tasking they should remain on scene to be available for
further employment as required, especially if they possess medical and recompression skills.
Such employment may also be in the Intervention MOSHIP, dealing with ELSS Pods and
resupply. If not delivered by parachute insertion, SPAG members are likely to arrive at the scene
by helicopter transfer or by boat transfer.
5.4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

For a period of several years, the UK and Italian SPAG teams have been developing closer
working relations, sharing information about their operating procedures and equipment, and
taking part in limited numbers in exercises with each other, resulting in both mutual confidence
and respect for each others capabilities, and could also result in valuable support for each other
during a DISSUB situation. It is recommended that other SPAGs follow this lead to work
together, at both individual and multi-lateral exercises

5-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVENTION CONCEPT
The answer is – “It Depends”
6.1. INTRODUCTION
Intervention is defined as the use of external means to improve survivability.
The purpose of Intervention Operations is to improve survivability of DISSUB personnel and to
prepare the DISSUB and site for rescue operations.
The Intervention Phase will usually follow localisation, and will probably be followed by Rescue,
although for large submarines it is feasible to consider rescue and ELSS resupply happening at
the same time.
It is likely that Intervention elements will be the first specialist units to arrive on scene, especially
if a SPAG is deployed. SPAG operations are covered separately in Chapter 5.
Intervention operations may include any combination of the following subsets:
• Establishing communications,
• Establishing exact position and material status of the DISSUB,
• Offering medical and technical advice to DISSUB
• Conducting hull and radiation surveys,
• Marking site with tracking transponders,
• Removing debris and clearing hatches,
• ELSS re-supply (Pod Posting),
• Mini-Pod Posting
• Ventilation and depressurisation,
• Recording environmental conditions,
• Sending detailed briefing to the Rescue MOSHIP to plan rescue mission,
• Providing the outline Rescue Plan to the DISSUB,
• Briefing SSRA/National Authority
6.2. INTERVENTION ELEMENTS

A wide variety of equipments, military and civil, dedicated or available, can be used to assist in
Intervention operations, depending on the requirements of the emergency and the level of
assistance required.
Civil/opportunity elements are likely to be less capable of undertaking the full range of operations
than dedicated military systems, but as seen during the KURSK operation they may be able to
provide all that is needed.

6-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
Intervention elements can be broadly grouped into three main subsets, namely:
• Divers
• Remotely Operated Vehicles
• Atmospheric Diving Systems
Each has advantages and disadvantages particular to their capabilities, and these are briefly
covered now
a. Divers are operated by most navies, and tend to be experienced in underwater engineering
tasks. They tend to be readily available and easy to move, but have differing depth
limitations, most of which are relatively shallow, and their payload capability is limited. They
are best suited to inshore and shallow water operations, often in support of other more
capable intervention elements.
b. Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) come in a wide range of shapes, sizes and capabilities,
from very small and suitcase portable “eyeballs” through to “Work Class” vehicles complete
with a wide range of tooling, which are about the biggest applicable to Intervention. The
offshore industry uses ROVs extensively, and thus there is a large pool of vehicles, and
experienced operators available to call upon.
c. Military ROVs tend to be specialised for intervention tasks, with dedicated tooling sets and
well practised procedures. They are well suited to the full range of intervention operations,
but their greater size and in-water deployment equipment make them less portable and a
more complicated logistic task.
Details of Atmospheric Diving Systems are covered in Chapter 7.
6.3. INTERVENTION COMMAND AND CONTROL

Each Intervention element will be under the control of the Rescue Element Commander
(Intervention) or REC(I). When more than one element is deployed, the SSRA will nominate one
of the REC(I)s (or another commander) to act as CRF, and other RECs will report to him.
The SSRA or DISSUB owning nation (N.A.) will provide a DISSUB Liaison Team (DLT) to
provide technical and translation support to the REC as required. This team may relocate to the
Rescue MOSHIP when it arrives on the scene.
All media operations and queries will be dealt with by the SSRA/N.A..
6.4. INTERVENTION ELEMENT DEPLOYMENT

Intervention Elements will be called for by the SSRA after formal request/s to the System owning
Nation/s has/have been issued by the N.A. The Logistical requirements will differ between
systems; ATP/MTP-57 and the ISMERLO website show these in outline.
The smallest airlift requirement could be as low as a single military aircraft, with the largest likely
to be in the order of 2 x C-17 or a single AN-124/C-5. Road transport requirement will vary
between one small van and up to 4 x 40 ft trailers, and handling will depend upon the aircraft
type and road transport used.
It would be wise to plan upon the need for a K-loader at the airport, forklift trucks and dockside
crane.
Operating teams tend to be relatively small, averaging between 8 – 12 people. Such a team may
be supplemented by others, particularly a DLT, Nuclear Monitoring specialists and others if
required.
6-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
Intervention elements can usually be embarked onto relatively small and simple ships, with
Dynamic Positioning as a valuable capability.
Prior planning is the key to rapid response, and nations are encouraged to develop dormant
plans through exercises or tabletops
6.5. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DISSUB

Most Intervention elements have either a fixed or portable underwater telephone with which to
establish communications with the DISSUB. If that is not the case the explosive/tap signals code
from ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 5 can be used.
It is important to gain as much information as possible on the conditions in the DISSUB so that
the specialists embarked with the Intervention Elements can advise both the crew in the DISSUB
and the supporting authorities. Information to be obtained by the DISSUB as soon as possible
are reported at paragraph 4.2.
6.6. INTERVENTION SORTIES AND PLANNING

After assessing all available data, the REC (I) will develop the Intervention plan. This will depend
entirely on the conditions and circumstances encountered, as well as the assets available, but
are likely to include the following types of sortie:
6.6.1. LOCALISATION
Use of Intervention elements to conduct a visual and sonar area search if the DISSUB position is
still in some doubt, or to confirm or discard bottom contacts identified by other search units.
Once localised the DISSUB position will be marked and promulgated (DATUM).
6.6.2. SURVEY
Visual survey of the DISSUB will provide vital information for Rescue Forces as well as feeding
back to shore authorities. Images from Intervention Elements are recorded and can be
transmitted to authorities that need them.
In addition for Nuclear Powered DISSUBs, a comprehensive radiological survey will be required
so that it can be determined whether a reactor is critical or shut down, and if there has been a
nuclear accident. A radiological survey will determine any approach restrictions for the ADS,
Divers and SRV.
6.6.3. TRANSPONDER FIELD PREPARATION

Some Intervention systems use a transponder field tied to a tracking system. For such systems
the position of the DISSUB will be marked using transponders provided as part of their deployed
equipment. Transponders will be positioned by intervention elements close to each escape
hatch so as to ease repeat runs for intervention and rescue vehicles.
Using such transponders enables the display of the detailed in-water picture for the Command,
using ship fitted or portable tracking equipment, enabling assets to be tracked and conned if
necessary from the surface.
6.6.4. DEBRIS CLEARANCE

Many Intervention elements are fitted with dedicated rope and wire cutting equipment that can
deal with ropes and cables of considerable size. Other available tooling includes water jets for
clearance of mud and silt., manipulators and grabs. Solid objects weighing up to several
6-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
hundred kilograms can be dragged or pushed clear, depending on the capability of the element
being used.
6.6.5. ELSS RESUPPLY

This is covered in Chapter 8.
6.6.6. CURRENT AND STREAM MONITORING

The determination of current, tidal stream and visibility in the close vicinity of the DISSUB will be
extremely useful for Rescue sortie planning. Such information should be promulgated to Rescue
elements and supporting authorities as soon as possible.
6.6.7. MINI-POD OPERATIONS

Norway holds a small number of mini-pods, which permit the posting of small items through
SSEs, using the “Mama” scripts from ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 5.
The ability of a DISSUB to take mini-pods is contained within the ATP/MTP-57.2 national
sections.
Mini-pods are best suited to the transfer of digital media, information, and small medical
supplies, and can be posted by IROV, ADS or Divers.
6.7. INFORMATION PROMULGATION AND BRIEFING

As mentioned above, it is imperative that all information received about the DISSUB, personnel,
requirements and environmental conditions are recorded and collated for onward transmission to
the CRF and National Authority. Such information is essential for the planning and execution of
rescue sorties, which is the essential action that follows Intervention operations.
6.8. TRAINING
Dedicated SMEREX examples are contained in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 7.

6-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 7 - ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM (ADS)
CONDUCT OF ADS INTERVENTION OPERATION
Reference/Source: ADiv-P 1
7.1. INTRODUCTION.
The 18th Century saw the start of numerous efforts to create armoured diving suits to allow man
to go deep under water without hydrostatic pressure problems. Unfortunately these suits were
very complicated and neither safe nor really useful.
It was only in the 1930s that suits of various shapes began to have effective operational
capabilities without decompression problems at depths of 300 m. However, the severe
limitations in these armoured suits' arm movement range of motion and effort to move (which
increased with depth) and the limited mobility in the water column or on the bottom, led to these
atmospheric diving suits being used in limited applications. As of the early 1970s Remotely
Operated Vehicles (ROVs) began to demonstrate the ability to operate effectively and ADS
applications became even more limited.
More recent technology has solved the arms movement and effort constraints by creating joints,
which are not affected by hydrostatic pressure or limited in range of motion. The effort required
by the internal operator (pilot) to move their arms is minimal, whether working at 1 or 609 m
depth. Further, the addition of thrusters to add range and mobility (similar to the ROV),
integrated handling and control systems and overall better design, led to what is now commonly
known as the ADS. With its operational capability and versatility falling between that of a diver
and an ROV, great potential exists for the ADS in both commercial and military applications.
The ADS is an underwater intervention system, connected to the surface by an umbilical. The
pilot breathes self-contained air at atmospheric pressure. The maximum operating depth of the
most common version is 300m, although the newest version can dive to 360m and a special
version that can operate to 609m has been delivered. The basic configuration consists of a suit
with all ancillary systems to support the pilot, power and communication umbilical and a surface
control system.
The suit is composed by various sections made in special aluminum (A356-T6) and treated with
special paint, two-piece body (upper and lower torso), arms with interchangeable manipulators
and legs.
The suit is equipped with a special thruster pack that clips on to the back of the upper torso to
provide propulsion. The thrusters are specially designed propellers with electrical motors that
can be controlled by the pilot using special foot pedals for changing propeller pitch for full
maneuverability. The electrical motors are switched on and off from the surface control console.
The computerised life support system is installed inside the suit and the data is repeated on the
surface control system through the umbilical, including communications, videos and sonar.
It is possible to cut the umbilical and release weights to gain positive buoyancy in emergency
situations. The breathing system consists of two independent oxygen circuits (external bottles,
internal valves, flow meters and by-pass) plus an internal CO2 scrubber. The average
endurance is eight working hours plus a certain number of emergency hours dependent on the

7-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
system. Electrical power is supplied from the surface, while battery power is available only for
CO2 scrubber and communication for emergencies.
7.2. PROCEDURE
The ADS was not designed to replace other intervention systems, but rather to add another tool
in the tool bag for underwater operations. Different scenarios call out different abilities. In the
operations listed below and with the appropriate procedures, the ADS is a safer, quicker and
more economic way to work when compared to conventional diving (especially deep dive
procedures).
7.2.1. DISSUB SAR OPERATIONS
7.2.1.1. HULL INSPECTION.

DISSUB hull survey is conducted to gain all essential information in order to plan the rescue
operation. The sonar and video data is essential to allow the surface team to make real time
evaluations, or reassess as required. The thrusters are also essential for rapid and controlled
movements around the DISSUB.
7.2.1.2. VENTILATION HOSE CONNECTION.

Connection and disconnection of air hoses from the surface vessel to the submarine air intakes
and outlets for the exhaust, to provide fresh air ventilation. In this case special fast-locking
connectors are recommended to make handling easier and ensure faster connection. However,
very skilled operators have also managed to screw and unscrew normal connectors.
7.2.1.3. SUBMARINE RESCUE CHAMBER (SRC) DOWNHAUL LINE CONNECTION.

The connection and disconnection of the SRC downhaul cable to the submarine seat allows safe
Rescue Chamber mating. This application requires a modified hook to perform attachment to the
shackle fitted on the submarine. Newly designed spring cocked screw bolts have been tested
with extremely satisfactory results.
7.2.2. GENERAL TASKS.

Although these tasks are not strictly exclusive military applications, they can be encountered
during military operations.
7.2.2.1. OCEAN SALVAGE.

Location and light salvage of items lost within its operating depth capability. The sonar and
video are used in tandem to localize the object and provide site survey information to personnel
on the surface. The manipulators can be used to retrieve small items or attach rigging gear for
heavy lifts.
7.2.2.2. DEEP DIVING BACK-UP

ADS can be used for emergency back-up during saturation or bounce diving operations. The
video fit is essential to gain useful information about the underwater scenario.
7.2.2.3. CUTTING AND WELDING

Commercial underwater cutting and welding equipment can be modified to be used with ADS
manipulators and hand pod tool adapters. Cutting must be limited to controlled conditions and
scenarios. Protocols have been developed for this in commercial and military operations.
Significant operator skill, job planning and safety review is required for these applications. The
7-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
ADS has been used for cutting and has the dexterity for welding. The effects of the welding
process may cause degradation of suit components as a result of electrolysis. A detailed safety
assessment must be conducted before any welding is planned.
7.2.2.4. MISCELLANEOUS
Standard diver type pneumatic and hydraulic tools such as jackhammers, hydraulic saws, impact
wrenches etc have been adapted with simple handles and buoyancy for use with ADS. Due to
the deep depth of operation, the hydraulic tools require an underwater, electric drive Hydraulic
Power Unit (HPU) to eliminate the handling problems associated with long hose lengths. The
preferred configuration for the HPU is to locate it on the Tether Management System (TMS)
portion of the Launch and Recovery System (LARS). This simplifies deployment, retrieval and
underwater control.
7.3. ADS ASSET
7.3.1. BASIC CONFIGURATION.

The basic configuration allows training operations in a pool and offshore operations/exercise in
reasonably shallow water under calm/low current conditions. The basic configuration includes:
ADS suit; a support stand; a power supply (from the vessel or a generator); Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) and junction box; communications module (hardwire digital and acoustic underwater
telephone); video and sonar monitoring equipment; the Atmospheric Monitoring System (AMS)
module and umbilical. A complete tools set, spares and dive consumables are provided. When
used in this simple surface tended mode, the surface platform requires a crane (rated for approx.
1000 kg) to lower and hoist the suit, room for the generator and a sheltered control room that
houses the surface control panels. The control room can be computerized for rapid deployment
if there is adequate deck space. The ADS should have a few kilograms of negative buoyancy to
facilitate the descent. The umbilical is also used as the safety line for emergency recovery of the
suit. When at the surface the suit is connected to a crane to lift the suit in and out of the water.
In an emergency the umbilical can be used for lifting the suit from the water. Typically the suits
are operated in pairs (diver, standby diver). Independent units handle the control panels for each
suit. For most operations, oxygen-refilling facilities (or a sufficient number of pre-filled bottles)
must be available. Equipment is provided in the tool kits for re-charging scrubber units and
emergency batteries. Consumables such as carbon dioxide absorbent must be deployed to
match mission endurance.
7.3.2. ADS ASSET CONFIGURATION.

When ADS is mobilized as an Intervention System, capable of diving to the maximum
operational depth, the total spread must compose two complete systems with all ancillaries,
consumables and power supplies.
7.3.3. ADS ASSET MOBILIZATION/SUITABLE VESSEL OF OPPORTUNITY.

In general the ADS is a flexible and capable underwater intervention system, rapid to deploy and
manageable from a suitable Vessel of Opportunity. Logistics depend mainly on the scenario and
consequent suit configuration. The mobilization procedures are a national responsibility (see
Annex A). As an example the Italian Navy tested the deployment of the ADS asset by Truck and
by Helicopter (EH101 ASH). The paragraph below indicates the requirements for a typical ADS
during mobilization and minimum standards for the VOO.

7-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
7.3.3.1. REQUIRED ITEMS ON AIRPORT
• 1 Standard ISO 40” Flat bed semi-trailer (12m x 2,4m)
Truck with the same characteristics
• 1 K-loader (2000 Kg)
• 1 Bus (at least 10 seats for the ADS team)
7.3.3.2. REQUIRED ITEMS IN SEAPORT

• 2 Forklift (2000 Kg)
• 1 Crane (2000 Kg) for embark operation
7.3.3.3. VOO REQUIREMENTS

• Deck space available Minimum 15 square metres/Optimum 30 square metres
• Mooring system DP IMO class 2 (minimum) or class 3/Mooring system by anchors
• Launch and recover Crane up to 1000 Kg (10 KN) at 5 meters from ship side
• Assistance rubber inflatable boat with outboard motor (minimum 3.6 metres)
• Electric power supply (if available 20 kW at 440 volt and 3 kW at 220 volt both at 50 Hz)
7.4. LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEM (LARS)

A LARS consists of a main skid, A-frame, umbilical winch, secondary recovery winch and Tether
Management System (TMS). The TMS is used to protect the suit during launch and recovery
and consists of a cage like structure, sub-sea tether winch, suit latch and secondary support.
The protection provided to the suit by the TMS cage, combined with dual support at the head
and crotch, allows the suit to be safely launched in adverse weather conditions (sea state 3 to
4). Once at depth, the ADS pilot exits the TMS and travels to the work site. The weight of the
TMS and the armoured umbilical counteract the effects of heave and current and allows the ADS
to operate more effectively in elevated currents (up to 1.5 knots). The TMS also protects and
supports the suit both on deck and at the air/water interface, thus reducing the risk of suit
damage or personnel injury. A further advantage is that the LARS provides a convenient
platform for a sub-sea tool basket and hydraulic power source. A Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU)
and Power Distribution Unit (PDU) provide the energy necessary to operate up to two LARS.
LARS can be permanently installed on board a purpose-built ship or transported via standard
means. The dimensions of deployable LARS are consistent with ISO standard containers.
7.5. EMERGENCY SUPPORT

Emergency support requirements vary according to National regulations. The ADS has
numerous emergency capabilities installed to meet international certification regulations
(including thrusters release, umbilical cutter and release, lung powered secondary scrubber,
battery back-up main scrubber, dual life support supply and control, redundant life support
monitoring and display, acoustic underwater telephone, pressure activated strobe, VHF radio
direction finder (surface), food/fluids supply etc). Entanglement of the umbilical is a potential risk
that in most cases can be cleared by the pilot manoeuvring appropriately. However, it is normal,
and often required by regulation, to have a back-up or stand-by system available. This back-up
can be provided by a diver, an ROV or a second ADS as long as the back-up has the same
depth and operational capability as the ADS.

7-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
7.6. PERSONNEL TRAINING.
As with any other diving system, highly trained personnel are vital for safe use of the ADS. This
is applicable not only to the pilots but also to the surface support teams. The standard ADS team
is composed of Supervisor, 2 Pilots and 3 Technicians specifically trained with electronic,
electrical and mechanical backgrounds.
7.6.1. QUALIFICATIONS
Those who qualify as ADS pilots typically come from a qualified diving background. Experience
has shown that this type of operator has a better overall understanding of underwater operations
and safety. Key traits held by divers include knowledge of underwater works, inherent in-water
comfort level and proven ability to perform lengthy confined space operations. Supervisors must
have a comprehensive understanding and extensive experience in offshore operations.
7.6.2. SWIMMING POOL

Since underwater pressure does not affect the new generation ADS movement capabilities, a
shallow swimming pool can be used for effective training. It has the advantage of permitting
direct instructor supervision and filming.
7.6.3. MOCK UPS

Different mock-ups may be used in the swimming pool or at sea to reproduce real case
scenarios (distressed submarine decks, SRC bell hook, etc.)
7.7. MAINTENANCE.
Although an ADS is relatively easy to dive once the basic skills are mastered, it is still a
complicated apparatus. Many of the ADS systems are designed for repair and maintenance in
the field. The concept of Lowest Replaceable Unit (LRU) is applied to most field repairs and
utilizes complete assembly or subassembly replacement rather than component repair. This
process expedites repair time, minimizes on site spares and maximizes operator safety. Spare
parts and replacement procedures are provided accordingly. A number of systems such as the
patented joints can have routine preventative maintenance performed in the field but must be
returned to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for overhaul and factory service. Other
factory service includes overhaul and refurbishment.
7.8. AT SEA OPERATION

At sea operations are carried out under national procedures in accordance with National safety
standard regulations.
The first step of the operation is the positioning of the VOO (by mooring system or DP system) in
order to maintain position above the DISSUB or in the working area required.
When pre-dive checks are completed (check list) the observation dome is installed and the dive
time starts. From this moment the pilot starts to use his own oxygen and therefore the
endurance time starts. When the suit is launched, diving operations start with the ADS moving
autonomously to the working depth or position required. The procedures to launch ADS without
LARS are more complicated because a diver and a small boat are required to remove the crane
hook from the top of the suit.
During the dive, communications between the pilot and the surface control room (supervisor) are
constant and all data can be monitored by both the supervisor and the pilot. The sonar image
7-5
ATP/MTP-57.1
can only be seen by the supervisor who directs the ADS to the target.
At the end of the operation the reverse procedures are used to recover the ADS to the MOSHIP.
When a LARS is available the ADS returns to the cage and then the cage is recovered on board.
In the case of a free dive, ADS follows the umbilical back to the surface autonomously, and a
diver will connect the crane hook for recovery on board.

7-6
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 8 - CONDUCT OF POD POSTING
8.1. EMERGENCY LIFE SUPPORT STORES – POD POSTING

Prior to execution of the rescue effort, it may be necessary to assist the DISSUB in maintaining
conditions onboard by intervention. One useful method of intervention is the POD-posting of
Emergency Life Support Stores (ELSS) using pressure tight pods.
For submarines which can only receive Pods via transfer through the escape tower, the decision
to transfer ELSS to the DISSUB has potentially serious implications to the crew’s ability to
conduct an Escape. All efforts must be taken to avoid causing any damage which would
preclude the use of the escape tower and must therefore only be undertaken with the informed
concurrence of the Senior Survivor onboard the submarine. This is of primary importance and
must be fully understood by the OSC.
The preferred method of recovery from a DISSUB will always be rescue, escape being the
option of last resort. To that end, the DISSUB crew will take every step to reduce their
consumption of oxygen (O2) and production of carbon dioxide (CO2) in order to prolong their
survival time aboard while awaiting the arrival of the designated rescue system.
The DISSUB crew may be exposed to several hazards that limit survivability and directly affect
the stay-time prior to escape and/or rescue. The most critical factors are:
a. uncontrolled flooding resulting from damage to the pressure hull or systems which penetrate
the pressure hull;
b. an increase in internal pressure within the DISSUB resulting from water ingress or damage
to pressurized systems within the submarine;
c. the development of a toxic atmosphere within the submarine resulting from fire, battery
contamination, increased pressure or other damage;
d. a rise or decrease in internal temperature within the DISSUB which renders the compartment
uninhabitable; and
e. loss of life support capability such as O2 production and CO2 absorption.
Where such catastrophic factors do not apply, the stay-time until surface support arrives for
escape or rescue will depend on previously mentioned conditions. It can be presumed that
morale onboard will be low, and, as a result, every effort must be made by surface forces to
keep spirits on board the DISSUB high, by keeping them well informed of the efforts being made
on their behalf and making every attempt to assist them to remain in the submarine for as long
as possible. The posting of ELSS would therefore serve to further increase the waiting time
available to the crew.
The intent of Pod Posting is to provide personnel in the DISSUB with essential stores which will
allow them to maintain a suitable environment within the submarine, allowing them to remain
onboard until such time as the designated rescue system arrives on scene. Pods may be loaded
with a variety of useful stores. These can include food, water, O2 generation capability, CO2
absorption materials and medical supplies. Consideration should also be given, in consultation
with the Senior Survivor, to include reading material and other items which would assist in the
maintenance of morale among the survivors.
The On Scene Commander (OSC) must be fully advised and made aware that the decision on
whether, how and when to escape remains the sole responsibility of the Senior Survivor,
8-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
although as much advice as possible should be provided by surface forces. Escape will not
normally be delayed beyond the limits of pressure or atmosphere sustainability unless the Senior
Survivor considers that circumstances justify such a delay, or the depth of the DISSUB is such
that successful escape is clearly out of the question. A partial escape to lower the burden on
remaining atmosphere control equipment may also be considered.
The re-supply of ELSS to a DISSUB can be achieved by the “dry” or “wet” method as follows:
a. “Wet Method”: Carried out by a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), Submarine Rescue
Vehicle (SRV), Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) or divers. Pods will be transferred to the
DISSUB via the escape tower, torpedo tubes or other designated Pod reception location
dependent upon the design of submarine involved.
b. “Dry Method”: Carried out by the rescue vehicle during one of it’s rescue cycles. This is not
strictly POD-Posting and will not be further covered in this chapter.
8.2. WET TRANSFER

As indicated in paragraph 1.7, the wet transfer of ELSS can be conducted using a ROV, SRV,
ADS or divers. The choice of delivery system will be made taking into consideration all assets
available to the CRF and the state of the DISSUB. Debris clearance may be necessary and must
be taken into consideration when determining the delivery system to be used.
Communication scripts to be used during Pod Posting can be found in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 5
(Pod Posting Script). The method chosen to communicate with the DISSUB using these scripts
will be determined by the equipment fitted in the Intervention MOSHIP, on scene Units and the
DISSUB.
Some submarines carry equipment which will allow them to prepare the escape tower or other
suitable compartment for the reception of a POD. These can include a “pod posting bag” or a
cloth/metal receiving device. Details of these devices can be found in the ATP/MTP-57.2
national sections and will also be available from the DLT. In the case of submarines which carry
such devices, once the decision is made by the Senior Survivor to proceed with the wet transfer
of ELSS, adequate time will be required to allow the DISSUB personnel to rig this equipment.
The time required will vary dependant upon the condition of the personnel and the current
conditions within the submarine.
In some cases, where the DISSUB does not carry such equipment, it may be necessary for the
Intervention/Rescue Forces to deliver equipment within the designated compartment to allow for
Pod Posting.
When loading Pods, careful consideration must be given to their weight and buoyancy. A heavily
loaded pod may be difficult for the personnel within the DISSUB to handle. As the size, shape
and materiel composition of pods in use by various nations differs, close liaison with national
authorities and the DLT will assist greatly in determining the amount and type of stores that can
be transferred in each pod. Details of different Pods can be found in STANAG 1391.
Regardless of the delivery method chosen, it is important that each pod be slightly negatively
buoyant to allow it to be easily manoeuvred while under water. A positively buoyant pod will be
difficult to manoeuvre and may, if released, present a danger to divers and other rescue
personnel equipment by rising rapidly to the surface uncontrolled. A slightly negatively buoyant
pod will, if released, slowly settle to the bottom where it may be easily recovered. Ideally, the
pod should be weighted to achieve 2-3 kg negative buoyancy. If a torpedo tube is used as the
8-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
receiving location, the POD should be very close to neutral buoyancy. In addition a rod to push
the POD inside the tube will be required.
Care should be taken to ensure that heavier items are loaded in the bottom of the pod. This is
important as weight will help balance the pod, making it easier to handle during pod posting. In
order to prevent the shifting of any delicate stores, consideration should be given to using light
packing material to fill any void spaces.
It must be noted that the decision to proceed with or discontinue Pod Posting remains, at all
times, with the Senior Survivor. He/She alone has an accurate appreciation of the conditions
within the submarine, and the condition of surviving personnel.
At no time shall the decisions of the Intervention forces impinge on the ability of the DISSUB
personnel to effect an escape should it become necessary.

8-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

8-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 9 - CONDUCT OF VENTILATION AND BRIEF INTRODUCTION
TO THE DEPRESSURISATION CONCEPT
9.1. INTRODUCTION.
Ventilation is a procedure by which an auxiliary/rescue ship provides fresh air to a distressed
submarine laying on the seabed and, at the same time, removes excess air in order to avoid the
pressure increase aboard the submarine.
This procedure permits the restoration and ability to maintain the minimum standard aboard, in
terms of microclimate during the rescue operation or during the waiting time before rescue
operation starts.
The same air provided to the DISSUB can also be used to refill the air bottles aboard. This is
achievable only if the submarine is fitted with a proper connecting system. There are two
different air systems one dedicated for escape (dive quality air) and one for ballast tank blows.
With fully charged air storage on board, the DISSUB can carry out buoyant ascent or blow main
ballast tanks if not damaged.
9.2. PROCEDURE
Ventilation allows circulation of fresh air within the DISSUB through the employment of air-
inlet/outlet hoses in order to restore the adequate level of the O2/CO2 aboard avoiding the
increase of pressure.
Depth limitations are imposed and depend on the structure of the hoses and on the capabilities
of the system in use. Taking into account 30 liters per minute as the minimum air-flow rate for
each survivor, it means that a crew of 50 people will need about 90 cubic meters air-flow per
hour.
The length of the hoses and the amount of air-flow (m3/min) are directly connected to the
ventilation effect due to turbulence and resistance inside the hoses. In other words when
increasing the length of the hoses, the air-flow pressure must be increased in order to reach the
same effect.
The following procedures have been developed by the Italian Navy confronting different results
from numerous tests carried out on a bottomed submarine.
9.3. THE VENTILATION SYSTEM

It is defined as the whole complex (compressors, hoses, interfaces, and ancillary equipment)
able to provide fresh air and remove exhaust air to/from a DISSUB.
The system must be embarked on board a dedicated or suitable VOO equipped with a mooring
system or a DP system able to maintain the ship above the DISSUB.
The system is usually built in or embarked on a diving support vessel or on a vessel equipped
with its own Intervention Assets (ADS, ROV, Ancillary equipment, etc.).
The main parts which compose the system are:
• Production, storage and management of the high-pressure fresh air,
• Ventilation hoses (inlet and outlet),
• Ventilation interface with the submarine normally called “ventilation connectors” (inlet and
outlet connectors).
9-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
Following is a brief description of components:
a. Compressors produce high-pressure fresh air. Compressors are designed so that the air is
protected against contamination. They are equipped with all accessories and tools
necessary for effective operations. They are designed in accordance with the required
pressure and delivery rate and they have to comply with ADivP-1(A) with reference to the
content of air contaminants (i.e. Italy: 50 mg of water, 500 ppm CO2, 10 ppm CO, 2 mg oil
per Nm3).
b. The gas storage plant is a system of bottles which stores air at high pressure. It is connected
to the compressors by a high-pressure pipe line. The air distribution system manages the
low-pressure air, provided with a pressure relief valve, used for ventilation.
c. The Air distribution system consists of all components and piping necessary for distribution
of air at the correct rate and pressure. The system includes instruments for monitoring the
rate and pressure of the fresh air sent to the DISSUB and the rate of the exhaust air coming
from it. This system also includes gas monitoring equipment to analyze the exhaust gas in
order to verify and monitor the air quality on board.
d. Ventilation hoses connect the air distribution system on board the surface ship to the
DISSUB.
- Inlet Hose: The inlet hose provides the low-pressure air from ship to submarine and is
built for low-pressure working range (up to 30 atm). It is usually a common low-pressure
hose.
- Outlet Hose: The outlet hose is specially designed and built. The internal diameter must
be at least 50 mm in order to permit an easy air-flow, with very low resistance for air-flow.
The hose structure must also be non-collapsible at maximum working depth (300m for
Italian Navy).
e. The Ventilation connectors are special interfaces that connect to the hoses and to the
submarine ventilation valves. There are different kinds of ventilation valves on board
submarines depending on their class and nationality. The inlet and outlet ventilation valves
on the submarine may also be different in size, therefore a NATO Standard interface
connector has been developed as covered in STANAG 1450.
9.4. STANAG 1450 SMER

STANAG 1450 “Common interfaces, to be used for ventilating a Distressed Submarine
(DISSUB)” is an agreement by which Nations owning the DISSUB will provide the Intervention
Asset with NATO standard connectors to be mounted on the submarine ventilation valves.
9.5. AT SEA OPERATION

When the MOSHIP arrives on scene it will position itself in order to maintain the required
position on the top of the DISSUB. When ready, diving operations start by launching appropriate
asset (Divers, ROV or ADS) which will connect the hoses.
If no UWT communication can be achieved, the standard tap codes will be used. The ventilation
hoses are then lowered to the DISSUB and connected.
During an exercise the water inside the hoses is discharged externally using an open ended T
valve.
During a real scenario the water in the hoses will be discharged to the DISSUB.
When ready to commence ventilation the MOSHIP will instruct the DISSUB to open the required
valves. If communication is not possible the valves will be opened from outside if the DISSUB
has that capability. At this point the MOSHIP will start ventilating and monitoring air-flow regime,
quality of air and internal pressure.

9-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
The ventilation will be fully effective when inlet and outlet values reach normal atmospheric
value.
9.6. DEPRESSURIZATION CONCEPT

The pressure inside the DISSUB must be accurately known to allow the proper conduct of
ventilation or depressurization. If the internal pressure is not known the CRF should take no
action until he has sufficient data to work on.
The depressurization process is very complicated. There is limited information concerning tests
and exercises in the SMER community.
The rate of depressurization must be under a decompression curve in order to avoid
decompression sickness.

9-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

9-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 10 - INTRODUCTION TO THE RESCUE OPERATION
CONCEPT
10.1. INTRODUCTION
Rescue Operations are defined as the recovery of DISSUB personnel from the DISSUB to the
surface, using a Rescue Element of some description. There are now a wide variety of Rescue
Elements around the world, with differing methods of providing rescue. Some are free
swimming; others are tethered or use a downhaul cable. Some have dedicated MOSHIPS, some
use Vessels of Opportunity (VOO), and some can make use of Support Submarines (SUPSUB)
if these are available within the theatre of operations. Their capacities and capabilities are as
varied as the vehicles themselves, and are laid out in ATP/MTP-57.2 Chapter 1.
This chapter will not examine individual systems in detail, but will deal with aspects of operations
that are common to all vehicles.
The Rescue Phase starts with the arrival of the Rescue MOSHIP and the deployment of the
rescue Element. This phase may follow any Recovery or Escape Phase or take place at the
same time. Prior to the rescue phase there is detailed preparatory work to be done, and it is
likely that this may take place during embarkation onto the Rescue MOSHIP or whilst on transit.
Rescue operations are deemed to be complete when DISSUB personnel are released from the
Element – this might be into a Transfer under Pressure facility or straight to deck – but onward
personnel movements are not covered here.
Each rescue system will be controlled by a Rescue Element Commander (REC) who will be a
system expert from the owning authority. It is vital that each REC is fully briefed prior to
operation on scene so that time is not wasted. A suggested briefing format is contained in
Annex A of Chapter 13. Based on the outcome of such a briefing, a rescue and sortie plan will
be developed, particular to the circumstances of the operation.
The aim of a rescue operation is to recover the surviving crew of the DISSUB. To achieve this, a
rescue asset will be launched from its MOSHIP, transit to the DISSUB and achieve a mate.
Once the pressure has been equalized, the hatches will be opened, and personnel transferred. If
personnel are fit and able, the transfer will be relatively quick – depending on the number of
incapacitated rescuees and the severity of their injuries, the rate of transfer will slow down. Once
transfer is complete, hatches will be shut and the vehicle will transit back to the surface for
recovery to deck. Rescuees will then be transferred for medical treatment, either hyper or
normobaric.
10.2. RESCUE OPERATIONS

As stated above, the nature of the rescue operations will be determined by the circumstances of
the emergency. The composition of the Rescue Force will vary from incident to incident
depending on the availability of units and the location of the accident. A rescue may either be a
single system evolution, or a joint one involving more than one system.
The CRF and REC need to be able to concentrate entirely on the saving of life by recovery
and/or rescue, without other operational distractions. Accordingly once the OSC has delegated
responsibility for all recovery and rescue assets at the scene to the CRF, the OSC is to remain

10-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
to assist with area control tasks such as perimeter patrol, communications guard and helicopter
and personnel transfer coordination.
10.2.1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE RESCUE PHASE

Sound preparation is one of the key enablers of success. Development of a detailed mission
plan, covering all aspects of the rescue, is a vital activity that will require input from all key
players before arrival at the DISSUB location. The CRF will co-ordinate this activity, assisted by
the RECs, SMO, Senior Diving Officer, NRC, Operating teams and national specialists (DLT) if
required/available. Items to be considered include:
a. Intervention Information – gathering the latest data from the Intervention operations, and any
communications from the DISSUB;
b. Other Information – All source searches for DISSUB information, from DISSUB Flyaway
pack, national sources, operating information, Crew list etc;
c. Available manpower – Numbers onboard the Rescue MOSHIP, watch-bills, transfers,
accommodation and domestic routines;
d. Ships in the force – Capabilities and resources available from other vessels on the scene-
including Submarines to act as Support Submarines (SUPSUB);
e. Availability of other Rescue Elements – Capabilities of other systems, including TUP. ETA on
scene, deconfliction and combined rescue plan;
f. Weather and Forecast ;
g. MOSHIP Characteristics and Ship handling/mooring requirements – Liaison between Ships
crew and Rescue Team, Launch and Recovery plan specific to ship and weather/sea
conditions;
h. Decompression treatment to be used – will affect rescue cycle;
i. Casualty Handling arrangements – will be ship specific.
All these variables and perhaps others specific to the precise nature of the emergency will be
considered and applied in the formation of a sortie plan.
Once this process is complete, it should be briefed to the entire team. (Check off list I from
ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3 may assist in the compilation of this brief).
The CRF should ensure that all his assets receive adequate and timely briefing. The arrival brief
should include all known DISSUB information and intentions. Every effort must be made to
comply with the DISSUB's requests for stores and to obtain specialist advice on what might be
required, using personnel on the scene and experts ashore. CRF will have to rely on information
supplied from the DLT. Co-ordination of rescue assets and MOSHIPs is vital both for water
space management and achievement of the aim. Waterspace management plans for combined
rescue will be required if co-ordinated operations are being conducted.
10.2.2. DETAILS OF RESCUE OPERATIONS

Each rescue cycle will consist of stationing, launch, approach, mating, transfer, demating,
recovery, withdrawal from the DISSUB, TUP interface (if relevant) and SRV servicing. All of
these are procedurally controlled, and the precise details of how each is achieved will vary from
system to system.
Launch and recovery operations will depend on the weather forecast, MOSHIP ship-handling or
mooring and whether swimmer-assisted or swimmer-free launch and recovery is being

10-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
conducted It is valuable for the CRF/REC and operating teams, in conjunction with the MOSHIP
Master, to practice launch and recovery ship-handling before rescue operations, so long as it
does not significantly increase the TTFR.
If a SUPSUB is available, rescuees may be transferred to it under certain circumstances,
particularly rough weather, although it will usually be preferable to return them to the MOSHIP.
This will be dependant on the internal pressure of the DISSUB.
When deciding on the order in which to take people off the DISSUB, it is worth remembering that
maximum numbers of fit people off first will maximize the number of rescuees in the short term,
but that onboard casualties will need considerable assistance to enter the SRV. Depending on
the conditions it is probably worth taking a balance of fit and injured off.
Rescue is essentially an act of presenting rescuees to medical care, and the medical aspects
are well covered in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 6. The opinion of the SMO should be sought as part of
the routine planning and management process.
Where systems have a TUP capability and pressurized rescue operations are being conducted,
TUP operations, and selection of decompression treatment against time available, become
operational decisions which will be taken by the REC after consultation with all interested parties
as part of the routine planning and management process.
Onward (possible MEDEVAC) personnel movement, once cleared from initial medical care, will
depend greatly on the circumstances at the scene, particularly location and the standard and
availability of treatment ashore.

10-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

10-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 11 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRV –
DESCRIPTION OF SUBMARINE AND VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS
11.1. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter looks at the various fittings and equipments required to enable SRVs to mate with
Submarines. It also gives details of Rescue Systems.
In order to allow rescue operations, Submarines must be fitted with an interface that allows
Rescue Elements to mate. The key to this is the Rescue Seat, the precise details of which are
mandated in STANAG 1297, from which much of this Section is condensed.
11.2. SUBMARINE RESCUE SEATS

The submarine must have a flat mating surface large enough and of sufficient strength to accept
a rescue asset with its attendant loading. There must be no obstructions that would interfere with
mating. The hatch must be of such a configuration as not to interfere with the rescue asset, and
it must permit exit from the submarine into the rescue asset when the two are mated.
The rescue mating seat must be a reinforced metal area around the submarine hatch opening
and extending over the area intended for mating. The strengthened area of the rescue seat must
have a minimum outside diameter of 167 cm (66 inches) and a maximum inside diameter of
114.3 cm (45 inches), centered on the submarine rescue seat vertical centerline. The strength
required of the rescue seat is a function of the depth at which the mating is performed and the
current the rescue asset is subjected to. The precise details of these loads are given in STANAG
1297, Annex C.
The rescue asset lands as close as possible to the center of a rescue seat but the seat structure
must be designed to support up to a 7.62 cm (3 inches) radial misalignment.
The mating seat flatness shall not deviate from a true plane by more than 3.2 mm (0.125
inches).
The submarine mating seat must not be coated with abrasive or anti-skid treatment to avoid
abrading the seal (gasket) and preventing subsequent sealing.
Any mating seat surface defects shall not be greater than 1.6 mm (0.0625 inches) in depth or
height.
Projections and obstructions above the hull of the DISSUB in the vicinity of the rescue seat
present hazards to a rescue asset when it is maneuvering during the mating operation. Any
obstruction could interfere with the rescue asset skirt or keel and damage caused by impacting
the obstructions could prevent mating. For unrestricted landing orientation of the rescue asset, a
footprint encompassing a 5.59 meter (220 inches) diameter circle centered on the rescue seat
should be clear of obstructions and projections above the DISSUB hull. The only exception to
this clear footprint requirement is the hold down devices used during DISSUB and rescue asset
mating. Any hold down devices and obstructions within and adjacent to this area (including
within the circumference of the rescue seat) must be documented and available for briefing the
rescue asset operators. They must be included in ATP/MTP-57.2 national sections.
Rescue operations are limited by conditions such as current magnitude, DISSUB depth, list
and/or trim angles, internal pressure, and rescue asset trim and/or heel angles.
11-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
Rescue assets must be able to depressurize and drain the mating skirt and flange area when
mated to the DISSUB rescue seat. Submarines may have hatch cavity drain systems to drain
the remaining water below the mating flange of the rescue seat and above the submarine hatch
into the submarine.
11.3. CERTIFICATION OF SUBMARINE RESCUE SEATS

Safety of the rescue vehicle and its operators as well as the DISSUB is of a high priority. If the
hull of the DISSUB collapses while mated to the rescue asset, it's likely the rescue asset and the
crew will not survive. Lack of certification of the submarine rescue seat may preclude rescue.
The certification process is necessary to avoid further damage to the DISSUB during rescue
operations or damage to the rescue asset. Certification requirements include verifying the design
of the candidate submarine’s mating seat and supporting structure. This ensures it will accept
the initial impact loads when the rescue asset sets down on the submarine and the subsequent
combined forces of sea pressure applied at collapse depth along with current forces after full
contact has been achieved and a full seal of the personnel transfer skirt has been completed.
Requirements for a common rescue seat is available in STANAG 1297.
11.4. SRV DESCRIPTIONS

The following section gives information on and descriptions of Submarine Rescue Systems.
The subsections are as follows:
• NATO Submarine Rescue System (NSRS)
• Submarine Rescue Depressurization System (SRDRS)
• Royal Swedish Submarine Rescue Vehicle, URF
• SRV 300/ITS ANTEO
• AUS SRS
• RUSSIA
• CHINA
• SINGAPORE
• S. KOREA
• JAPAN
11.5. SRV SKIRTS

SRVs are fitted with a transfer skirt that enables them to achieve a mate and seal with the
DISSUB, and then to transfer personnel. This skirt has dimensions to match the seat
requirements of STANAG 1297.
The key dimension for the skirt is the swept volume, which indicates that skirt’s ability to
accommodate hatch fairings of various sizes as they are opened into the skirt. Swept volume
may be indicated by a table or graphic.

11-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.6. NATO SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (NSRS)
The Swept Volume of the NSRS Mating Skirt is as follows:
Figure 11-1 NSRS skirt volumes

11-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.6.1. THE NSRS RESCUE VEHICLE
Figure 11-2 SRV Main features

The SRV is an all-steel, two-compartment submersible vehicle containing a command module
(CM) and a rescue chamber (RC) (see 0). The RC accommodates the pilot and co-pilot in a
forward-facing, tandem seat configuration, with both being provided with ergonomic seating and
appropriate safety harnesses. The CM contains all necessary control and instrumentation
requirements for controlling propulsion, ballast and trim, life support, communications and
navigation, lighting, cameras and external tooling, skirt de-watering and emergency recovery.
The controls for these systems are contained in panels mounted on the port and starboard
bulkheads of the cm. An additional panel (the consolette) is located at the deck head to allow
the SRV pilot to undertake surface manoeuvres when observing through the conning tower
viewports.
The CM will remain at atmospheric pressure at all times including periods when tup is being
conducted. This will allow the free movement of CM personnel to effect crew changeovers and
access for maintainers without imposing further risk on CM occupants.
The RC is located immediately aft of the CM and is designed to accommodate up to fifteen
rescuees. A single attendant will manage activities in the RC including the replacement of
carbon dioxide (CO2) absorbent in the independent breathing system (IBS), opening and closure
of the hatches and the provision of support to the rescuees. The co-pilot, located in the CM, will
generally manage and monitor this compartment’s life support systems. The RC will operate to
a maximum internal pressure of 6 bar (abs) in order to effect rescues from dissubs where the
internal pressure is above surface ambient.
There are a total of five hatches located in the SRV:
1. Hatch No.1 is located in the bottom of the RC at the forward end. The outer coaming is
provided with a bolted flange on to which locates the Dry Mating Skirt (DMS). The inner

11-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
coaming provides a seat which seals against a corresponding face of an inward opening
hatch. The faces are brought together to create a watertight seal using a hydraulically
powered ‘C’clamp arrangement. An acrylic viewport is provided in this hatch to provide a
vertical view inside the DMS and into the DISSUB Escape Tower
2. Hatch No.2 is located at the aft end of the SRV. This provides the interface with the Flexible
Transfer Trunking Assembly provided as part of the TUP facility.
3. Hatch No.3 is located in the RC bulkhead and forms the pressure tight boundary with the
CM. It opens in towards the RC and can be fitted with a small medical lock. The design of
No.3 Hatch and the dividing bulkhead allows for the full range of pressure differentials likely
to be encountered during pressurised operations.
4. Hatch No.4 is located in the CM at the top of the conning tower to allow access to the SRV.
No.4 Hatch can be used for emergency egress of the crew and rescuees when on the deck
of the MOSHIP and when on the surface, depending on sea conditions.
5. Hatch No.5 is located at the aft end of the RC to form an inner pressure boundary.
The DMS forms the structural link between the SRV and the DISSUB and therefore forms part of
the pressure tight boundary during all DISSUB transfer evolutions. A 20° angled wedge is
provided (fitted to the SRV whilst on the MOSHIP) to allow the SRV to undertake extreme
angled DISSUB mating. Using a combination of trim and buoyancy adjustment, Pilot control and
the Wedge, a maximum angled mate of 60° can be achieved.
The SRV is provided with a Main Lift Point at the top of the pressure hull, at the approximate
amidships position. The Main Lifting Point provides the interface between the SRV and the
PLARS, when operating in the unassisted mode (high sea state launch and recovery) or
assisted mode (using swimmer assistance).
Two sets of ZEBRA™ batteries, each housed in cylindrical pressure-tight pods with
hemispherical end caps, provide power for the SRV. ZEBRA™ batteries are an advanced
sodium-based technology already in widespread commercial use in the automotive industry.
ZEBRA™ battery technology has been applied to the SRV to provide a high power and long
endurance source of power. The pods are secured to the underside of the pressure hull on
outriggers. Single-point capture and release mechanisms secure each pod in position with each
being capable of being jettisoned in the event of an emergency situation developing that requires
the SRV to gain positive buoyancy, when other methods are unavailable or when a rapid
recovery to the surface is required.
Main propulsion is provided by two electrically driven, aft-mounted side thrusters - each rated at
23kW, driving 600 mm diameter ducted propellers. Each thruster is independently controlled
thus allowing the propulsion system to provide steering control as well as fore and aft
movement. Hydraulically operated hydroplanes located at the forward end of the SRV provide
pitch control. In all but the most arduous conditions, the main propulsion and hydroplanes alone
are sufficient to undertake the majority of most rescue mission profiles.
Four hydraulically powered thruster units provide auxiliary propulsion and control. Two are
mounted at the amidships position to provide vertical control, but can also be rotated 90º to
provide additional fore and aft control. The other two thrusters are located at each end of the
vehicle and provide yaw control only.
A water ballast system internal to the SRV is used to compensate for the changing buoyancy
conditions under various payloads.

11-5
ATP/MTP-57.1
Two 300kg trim weights, each mounted on a lead screw (one port and one starboard) are moved
fore and aft by the main hydraulic system to control the SRV pitch. The trim weights also act as
drop weights in the event of an emergency.
As well as manual control, the SRV is provided with an auto pilot facility in order to reduce crew
workload during critical operations. The auto pilot provides auto-heading and auto-depth
functions.
The principal overall dimensions of the SRV are:
• Length 8.76 metres
• Beam 3.45 metres
• Height 3.55 metres to include the Transfer (Mating) Skirt
• The nominal weight of the SRV is quoted with the vehicle neutrally buoyant in seawater of
Specific Gravity (SG) 1.025:
• Vehicle in diving & surfaced condition 29,700kg
(NB. MBT contents treated as lost buoyancy rather than added mass)
• Lightship condition 27,000kg
Air is stored in gas bottles outside the SRV pressure hull at 240 bar. The storage system
consists of a main storage system and a reserve storage system. The main storage system
comprises a single 487 litre (minimum water capacity) storage bottle. The reserve system also
comprises of a 487 litre (minimum water capacity) bottle. Each system enters the pressure hull,
into the CM, through separate hull penetrations on opposite sides of the pressure hull.
The Life Support System is designed to provide a breathable atmosphere in both the CM
(containing 2 crew) and the RC (containing an attendant and up to 15 rescuees). The SRV has a
capability to provide life support for a full complement of crew and rescuees for up to 1200 man
hours of operation. The CM will always be at approximately 1 atmosphere internal pressure
whilst the RC may be at any pressure from 0.84 to 6 bar, depending on the pressure in the
DISSUB when equalised with the RC. A CO2 scrubbing system using Soda Lime (SodaSorb™)
is used to absorb exhaled carbon dioxide, with reserve supplies carried in the CM and in the RC.
Oxygen is stored in four pressurised bottles mounted outside the pressure hull with two bottles
connected as main supply and two bottles in reserve. The oxygen also supplies the IBS.
Oxygen monitoring and control is provided to maintain oxygen levels around 22%. If levels drop
or rise then the system will alert the crew.
In the RC, normal Life Support is achieved via the Independent Breathing System (IBS)
operated in Open Circuit mode. Both the Oxygen supply and the CO2 scrubbers are
incorporated into the IBS. In the event of the RC atmosphere becoming unbreathable, eg in the
event of a fire, the IBS can be operated in Closed Circuit mode. The IBS is ‘sided’ within the RC
with each side supporting eight persons using a combination of full-face masks (7) or oral nasal
masks and goggles (1). In the event of the CM atmosphere becoming unbreathable, the SRV
pilot/co-pilot can don rebreather life support equipment or utilise small (1 litre water capacity) air
bottles and mask.
The SRV is able to operate under the following conditions:
11-6
ATP/MTP-57.1
Maximum operating depth 610 metres water
Maximum forward speed 3.5 kts
Maximum Pitch ± 30 deg static excursion
± 40 deg dynamic excursion
Maximum Roll ± 20 deg static excursion
± 40 deg dynamic excursion
Additional offset for mating 20 deg wedge to offset DMS
The SRV will also operate within the following conditions, when considering the DISSUB:
Maximum DISSUB angle 60 deg to the horizontal plane at any azimuth;
Maximum Internal pressure 6 bar (absolute);
Minimum Internal pressure 0.8 bar (absolute).
In Service Life is intended to be 25 years based on the following usage profile:
• 20 pressure tests to 854msw
• 100 dives 610msw and
• 3000 dives 125msw
The SRV is designed to be capable of operating within the limits of the following environmental
parameters:
Wind speed Operational - up to and including 30 kts
Survival - up to 100 kts
Atmospheric Pressure 860mb and 1084mb
Maximum significant wave height Operational - up to and including 5m
Survival - up to and including 10m
Air Temperature; Operational -15 to +45 deg C
Survival - -40 to +66 deg C
Humidity; up to and including 100%
Sea water Temperature -4 to +33 deg C
Sea water Specific Gravity 1.005 to 1.038
Maximum Ambient current profile
0 to 3 knots from 0 to 250 metres deep
0 to 2.3 knots from 250 to 500 metres deep
0 to 2 knots from 500 to 610 metres deep

11-7
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-3 SRV being prepared for embarkation

11-8
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-4 NSRS – The full system at sea on Norwegian Coastguard Vessel HARSTAD
Full details of the NSRS System can be found in the NSRS Supplement to ATP/MTP-57,
available for download from the ISMERLO website.

11-9
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.7. SUBMARINE RESCUE DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM (SRDRS)
11.7.1. SRDRS SYSTEM OVERVIEW

The SRDRS provides a quick response, worldwide capability to rescue the crew of a Distressed
Submarine (DISSUB). The Submarine Decompression System (SDS) portion of the SRDRS
provides controlled decompression, recompression, and/or treatment of DISSUB rescuees from
a pressurized submarine. The design of the SRDRS will support submarine rescue from a
bottomed submarine, with an intact personnel compartment, to depths up to 609 meters/2000
feet sea water (fsw) for all U. S. Navy, and international submarines that have mating seats
certified to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreement (STANAG)
1297 standards. The SRDRS shall provide capability to rescue personnel from a DISSUB
pressurized to 5 atmospheres absolute (ata) or less. Hyperbaric treatment of decompression
illness (decompression sickness and / or arterial gas embolism) shall be provided up to 6 ata.
The Submarine Rescue System (SRS) is not intended for search and localization of a DISSUB.
The search and location requirement will be met by other existing systems, including Submarine
Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacons (SEPIRB) and a variety of acoustic and non-
acoustic search systems to be used for search and localization of the DISSUB. The Assessment
/Underwater Work System (AUWS) will provide capability for DISSUB localization, rapid
assessment of DISSUB conditions, and hatch mating seat clearance.
The SRDRS is composed of two distinct systems: Assessment / Underwater Work System
(AUWS covered in para 11.7.7.) and the Submarine Rescue System (SRS). SRS is composed
of two subsystems, the Pressurized Rescue Module System (PRMS) and the Submarine
Decompression System (SDS) (see Figure 11-5 SRDRS Subsystems).
Figure 11-5 SRDRS Subsystems

11-10
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.7.2. A. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (SRS)
The Submarine Rescue System (SRS) is composed of two distinct subsystems; the SDS and
the PRMS (see Figure 11-6.)
11.7.2.1. SUBMARINE DECOMPRESSION SYSTEM (SDS)

The Submarine Decompression System (SDS) is composed of two large Submarine
Decompression Chambers (SDCs) and SDS Mission Support Equipment (MSE). SDS Mission
Support Equipment includes the Deck Transfer Lock (DTL), Modified Transfer Locks (MTLs),
Pressurized Flexible Manway Systems (PFMS) and associated SDS-MSE Auxiliary Equipment
(AE). The SDS provides controlled decompression, recompression and/or treatment of DISSUB
rescuees.
11.7.2.2. PRESSURIZED RESCUE MODULE SYSTEM (PRMS)

The Pressurized Rescue Module System (PRMS) includes the Pressurized Rescue Module
(PRM) with remote control equipment elements and the PRMS-MSE. The PRMS is a tethered,
remotely operated vehicle (ROV) manned system that is designed to rescue up to 16 personnel
per sortie from a DISSUB up and onto a surface support Vessel of Opportunity (VOO). The PRM
is launched and recovered from a range of different VOOs by employing a transportable Launch
and Recovery System (LARS). The PRM is commanded and controlled remotely from a Control
Van on the VOO. The design of the system enables the PRM to navigate, ascend, descend,
maneuver to, mate underwater with a bottomed, pressurized DISSUB, and mate with the SDS
(surface) to transfer rescuees under pressure.
Figure 11-6 PRMS and SDS Systems and Elements
11.7.3. SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM (SRS) DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATIONS

The SRS will deliver in two distinct configurations, SRS Rescue Capable System (SRS-RCS)
and SRS Transfer Under Pressure (SRS-TUP).

11-11
ATP/MTP-57.1
The first configuration, SRS-RCS, will provide a capability similar to the Deep Submergence
Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) for unpressurized rescue. Unpressurized rescue for the purposes of
this document is defined as air saturation at pressures equal to or less than 1.6 ata (20 fsw).
Rescuees saturated at pressures equal to or less than 1.6 ata (20 fsw) do not require controlled
(staged) decompression (see Figure 11-7 On-Deck Spread for the SRS-RCS Configuration).
Umbilical Winch
PRMS GR
Logistics Van
Control Van
LARS
Generator Van
Spares Van
HPU
PRM
LARS Base SITS
Figure 11-7 On-Deck Spread for the SRS-RCS Configuration
The second configuration, SRS-TUP, will allow full-up capabilities of rescue and controlled
decompression of pressurized personnel at pressures greater than 1.6 ata (20 fsw) and up to 5
ata (132 fsw). Pressurized rescue for this document is defined as air saturation at pressures
greater than 1.6 ata (20 fsw) and rescuees requiring decompression. In addition, SRS-TUP shall
provide for hyperbaric treatment of decompression illness up to 6 ata (165 fsw) (see Figure 11-8,
the On-Deck Spread for the SRS-TUP Configuration).

11-12
ATP/MTP-57.1
PRMS GR
Gen VAN
Umbilical Winch
SDC-1
MTL 1
Control VAN
DTL
LARS
SDS GR
Aux Van
SDC-2
Spares Van
MTL 2
PFM
HPU
PRM
LARS Base SITS
Figure 11-8 On-Deck Spread for the SRS-TUP Configuration
11.7.4. SRDRS RESCUE MISSION OVERVIEW

Mission activation begins with the receipt of a SUBMISS/SUBSUNK message. The AUWS is
rapidly transported to the port closest to the emergency (also known as the Rescue Port) and
mobilized on a VOO. In a nominal rescue mission, the AUWS elements of the SRDRS are the
first assets deployed to the DISSUB site. The ADS asset is used to localize and survey the
DISSUB. The survey includes DISSUB localization, performing a damage assessment with
debris identification, and determination of DISSUB and bottom conditions. The AUWS places an
acoustic marker pinger adjacent to the escape hatch or at some other known reference position
on the DISSUB. If required, ADS is used to clear away wreckage and debris from the escape
hatch and mating seat. A surface buoy may have been set on the DISSUB location as a marker
over the DISSUB for VOO mooring or Dynamic Positioning (DP) to be established.
The SRS, composed of the PRMS and SDS, is also rapidly mobilized to the port closest to the
emergency and installed on a separate VOO. SRS performs rescue operations as well as
receives, decompresses DISSUB personnel and provides recompression treatment using
subsystems as required. The PRMS is capable of mating to a DISSUB, and transporting up to
16 rescuees to the surface per sortie. The SDS has the capacity for providing controlled
decompression of up to 62 rescuees simultaneously. The SDCs are modular and arranged on
the deck of a VOO. A DTL is used to transfer personnel from the PRM to the SDC. Each SDC
will have a maximum seating capacity of 33 personnel (rescuees, PRM Attendants (PRMA),
SDC Tenders (SDCT) and SRDRS assets are based at the Deep Submergence Unit (DSU),

11-13
ATP/MTP-57.1
Naval Base Coronado (NBC), San Diego, California. The facility supports recurring
maintenance, training, storage, and deployment requirements. Both AUWS and SRS are
maintained under a Government Owned Contractor Operated/Contractor Maintained (GOCO /
CM) strategy. In order to permit rapid load-out and deployment, the AUWS and SRS equipment
shipping modules are maintained in a Rescue Ready condition.
11.7.4.1. TRANSPORTATION AND MOBILIZATION

A mobilization / installation methodology allows rapid installation on as wide a range of VOOs as
possible is documented in the SRS-RCS Command Checklist for Mobilization/VOO Installation.
A Ship Interface Template Set (SITS) incorporates the use of International Standards
Organization (ISO) container interfaces as much as practical. This speeds installation by
allowing welding to begin prior to all large equipment arriving on site and by minimizing welding.
Each SRDRS element’s configuration is optimized for size, weight, and modularity to meet
international transport requirements. Optimal transportability will be accomplished by utilizing
ISO-compatible shipping module sizes and interface standards whenever possible using ISO-
sized vans and flat-racks. Loose equipment is packaged within special ISO vans or onto ISO
flat-rack shipping pallets. All of the SRDRS transportable elements’ shipping modules are
provided with Air Transport Pallets (ATP) to simplify and expedite cargo aircraft load-out and
restraint. Standard interfaces and equipment enable the elements to be transported using
military and commercial assets without the need for special accommodations or waivers.
The SRDRS is intended to operate from two separate VOOs, one for the AUWS and one for the
SRS. Rapid independent mobilization of the AUWS on a separately deployed VOO allows the
AUWS to be the first rescue asset on scene.
VOO and rescue port surveys enable selecting acceptable rescue ports and VOOs, both military
and commercial, for installation of the SRDRS around the world. Surveys are documented in
SRDRS VOO Survey Database for rescue ports, VOOs that meet requirements and VOOs that
require modification to meet requirements. VOO evaluation criteria include stability, deck loading
area, deck loading capacity and position-keeping ability per the SRDRS VOO Specification.
11.7.4.2. SRDRS MISSION OPERATIONS SEQUENCE

The SRS equipment is specifically designed to provide the capability to rescue up to 155
personnel from a DISSUB during a single continuous rescue mission. SRS equipment
accomplishes this capability by performing repetitive submerged sorties until all rescuees have
been recovered from the DISSUB. As mandated in the SRDRS Operational Requirements
Document (ORD), the equipment must work and survive under a wide range of environmental
and marine sea state conditions from those typically encountered in the non-ice covered
Northern Atlantic climates to the heat extremes experienced in the equatorial tropics.

11-14
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-9 SRS Mission Operations Sequence
11.7.5. RESCUE MISSION OVERVIEW

Due to increasing atmospheric pressure and partial pressure of carbon dioxide and the limited
amount of oxygen to support life, time is critical in the rescue of DISSUB occupants. Life support
aboard the DISSUB is a finite supply. The time to locate, stabilize and rescue DISSUB
occupants is based on many parameters, including, but not limited to:
• location of DISSUB (or last known location)
• time to mobilize search, intervention, stabilization and rescue assets
• time to transit assets and VOOs from the rescue port to the DISSUB site and back
• VOO and aircraft transport availability
Procedures are in place to address all required actions for a submarine rescue, which is initially
triggered by a SUBMIS and/or SUBSUNK event message. A Rescue Port is selected based on
the location of the DISSUB. A VOO is identified for the deployment of each subsystem (AUWS
and SRS) and ordered to transit to the Rescue Port. Timeline requirements, as shown in Figure
1107A-6 dictate SRS Time to First Rescue (TTFR) of 72 hours. To support the timeline,
equipment is deployed in two distinct groups by subsystem.
The first group of equipment includes the AUWS and SRS-SITS. AUWS will deploy on the first
VOO, to localize, survey and stabilize the DISSUB, using the localization sonar and ADS as
necessary. Once the DISSUB position is established, the LWMS is used to establish a moor
over the DISSUB unless a DP capable vessel is employed.
SRS-SITS will be installed on the second VOO in preparation for receipt of second equipment
group, the SRS. SRS-SITS installation will begin upon arrival of second VOO and is scheduled
11-15
ATP/MTP-57.1
to be completed prior to arrival of SRS equipment. Multiple aircraft sorties are required for both
groups of equipment and deployment depends on the size of assigned aircraft.
The second equipment group deployed is the SRS and consists of the PRMS and SDS. The
second equipment group loads on the next round of available aircraft and is transported to the
Rescue Port. The SRS is loaded on the second VOO and transits to the DISSUB location. Upon
arrival at the DISSUB location the AUWS VOO will break out of the LWMS moor and the SRS
VOO will take up the moor. The PRM will be launched and the required number of rescue sorties
will begin.
11.7.6. SRS VOO MOBILIZATION TIMELINE
Figure 11-10 SRS Representative Rescue Mission Timelines
11.7.7. SRDRS SYSTEM AUWS

The SRDRS is composed of two distinct systems: Assessment / Underwater Work System
(AUWS) and the Submarine Rescue System (SRS). SRS is composed of two subsystems, the
Pressurized Rescue Module System (PRMS) and the Submarine Decompression System (SDS)
(shown in 11.7.1 SRDRS System Overview) (see Figure 11-5 SRDRS Subsystems).
11.7.7.1. ASSESSMENT / UNDERWATER WORK SYSTEM (AUWS)

As the Submarine Rescue Intervention System (SRIS), the Assessment Underwater Work
System (AUWS) is the first SRDRS system mobilized in response to a SUBMISS / SUBSUNK
event. The AUWS is composed of three mission equipment elements and their related sub-
elements, the Atmospheric Diving System (ADS), Side Looking Sonar (SILOS) Search System,
and Light Weight Mooring System (LWMS) (see Figure 11-11 AUWS Systems and Elements).

11-16
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-11 AUWS Systems and Elements
11.7.7.2. ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM (ADS)

The Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) consists of a 2000 fsw one-atmosphere diving suit
equipped with a set of tools, video camera, and sonar system. ADS may be operated in hand-
tended mode to 950 fsw or supported by a LARS for deep diving to 2000 fsw. The LARS is used
to lower a Tether Management System (TMS) cage and ADS near the bottom. A Control Van
(CV), Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU), and Power Distribution Unit (PDU) and other Mission Support
Equipment (MSE) support the ADS. The ADS LARS is configured for transportation in a 20-foot
ISO container envelope.
11.7.7.3. LIGHT WEIGHT MOORING SYSTEM (LWMS)

The Light Weight Mooring System (LWMS) consists of light weight mooring lines and an
associated anchoring system to allow anchoring of the VOO in a 4 point moor over the DISSUB
at depths up to 2000 fsw. The system contains Plasma mooring line, Bruce 3400 kilogram (kg)
anchors, deck release mechanisms, deck jewelry and shots of chain. The holding force of the
light weight mooring system varies with bottom type and sea state. Adjustment of the VOO over
the DISSUB is accomplished by portable deck winches.
11.7.7.4. SIDE LOOKING SONAR (SILOS) SEARCH SYSTEM

The Side Looking Sonar (SILOS) Search System, a towed side scan sonar system, is used for
localization. SILOS has a dual frequency capability; a 100 kHz transducer for long-range
detection of objects and a 500 kHz transducer for high resolution passes over contacts. The
SILOS System consists of the following elements: towfish, handling system, tow winch / spool
and topside display/processing/control unit. SILOS is launched and recovered using a LARS and
towed by its cable.
11.7.7.5. ASSESSMENT / UNDERWATER WORK SYSTEM MISSION SUPPORT EQUIPMENT

(AUWS-MSE)
Assessment/Underwater Work System - Mission Support Equipment (AUWS-MSE) includes
generators, a rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB), air transport pallets, and miscellaneous tools and
containers. Generators provide backup power, the RHIB supports the ADS in the water and
personnel transfers if required, air transport pallets facilitate loading and off loading with aircraft,
and miscellaneous tools and containers support all AUWS operations.

11-17
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.7.8. AUWS MISSION
The AUWS is rapidly transported to the port closest to the emergency (also known as the
Rescue Port), mobilized on a Vessel of Opportunity (VOO) and are the first assets deployed to
the DISSUB site. The AUWS VOO will establish a moor with the LWMS or, if so equipped,
stabilize over the datum in DP mode of operation. While some, or all, of the information may be
available through voice communication with the DISSUB (underwater telephone), a bottom site
inspection and survey should be performed at the DISSUB location using the ADS prior to the
first rescue sortie. The purpose of the dive is to orient and familiarize the rescue unit with the
DISSUB site, inspect the DISSUB’s condition and damage, locate potential hazards in the area,
debris clearance of the hatches if required, placement of acoustic pingers at known locations on
the DISSUB or upon bottom obstructions in the vicinity of the DISSUB, emergency life support
systems (ELSS) POD delivery and entanglement assistance as needed. Information such as
DISSUB depth, pitch angle, roll angle, stability and true heading are crucial to rescue units as
well as speed and direction of ocean current.
While awaiting arrival of a rescue asset, escape trunk and hatch / mating seat clearance is a
priority. All means of evacuation require egress from the DISSUB through escape trunks and
hatches, which are single-lock pressure chambers integrated into the pressure hull of the
submarine. Projections and obstructions above the hull of a DISSUB in the vicinity of the escape
trunks and hatches present a hazard to stabilization and rescue operations. Projections and
obstructions can interfere with maneuvering of rescue equipment and are a potential source of
fouling and entrapment for rescue assets. Obstructions can interfere with the PRM Transfer Skirt
(TS) and prevent docking and mating to establish a pressure-proof seal. The ADS is capable of
assessing the DISSUB hatch area and maneuvering debris away with manipulators. Clearing the
hatch area may require the use of special tools and other equipment such as hydraulic cable
cutters and chain-falls to assist with the clearance and cleaning of the rescue mating seat
surface. The ADS can also be used for any additional site clearance following the initial DISSUB
site survey and evaluation.
The AUWS will be the first SRDRS subsystem mobilized (see Figure 11-12 AUWS Mission
Operation Sequence). AUWS Mission Operations Sequence provides an overview of the AUWS
VOO mobilization sequence. The SRDRS is intended to operate from two separate VOOs, one
for the AUWS and one for the SRS. Rapid independent mobilization of the AUWS on a
separately deployed VOO allows the AUWS to be the first rescue asset on scene. A mobilization
/installation methodology allows rapid installation on as wide a range of VOOs as possible. Each
SRDRS element’s configuration is optimized for size, weight, and modularity to meet
international transport requirements. Optimal transportability will be accomplished by utilizing
ISO-compatible shipping module sizes and interface standards whenever possible using ISO-
sized vans and flat-racks. Loose equipment is packaged within special ISO vans or onto ISO
flat-rack shipping pallets. All of the SRDRS transportable elements’ shipping modules are
provided with Air Transport Pallets (ATP) to simplify and expedite cargo aircraft load-out and
restraint. Standard interfaces and equipment enable the elements to be transported using
military and commercial assets without the need for special accommodations or waivers.

11-18
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-12 AUWS Mission Operation Sequence

11-19
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.7.9. AUWS VOO MOBILIZATION TIMELINE
Figure 11-13 AUWS VOO Mobilization Timeline

11-20
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.8. ROYAL SWEDISH SUBMARINE RESCUE VEHICLE, URF
11.8.1. GENERAL
The design and building of the URF was a joint venture between the submarine builder Kockums
in Sweden and (by the time) one of the leading diving companies Comex in France. The SRV
was commissioned in 1979.
The SRV was originally equipped with a saturation diving system, in the aft sphere. The diving
system system was removed during 1986 due to poor endurance for the divers and at the same
time the two external main propulsion thrusters were replaced by a single propeller. The SRV
was originally only intended to be towed to the place of the DISSUB but in 1997 a Launch And
Recovery System was installed on the MOSHIP HMS Belos and a single lifting point was
subsequently installed on the SRV back. Over the years a normal upgrade has been performed
on the sonar systems.
The SRV is an all-steel three-compartment submersible vehicle containing a Command Module
(PR), a Rescue Chamber (RR) and an Engine Room (MR) (see picture Figure 11-14 External
cut through URF). The pressure hull is surrounded by a The PR accommodates a pilot and a co-
pilot in a forward-facing and looking position. The PR contains all necessary control and
instrumentation for controlling propulsion, positioning communication and navigation. Ballast,
trim and roll, lighting cameras and ordinary manoeuvring of the rescue door are also controlled
from the PR. The PR has three viewports for ocular control during manoeuvring and mating as a
redundant method for using cameras. For the pilot to undertake surface manoeuvres there is a
camera mounted on the fin.
Rescue Engine room Ballast tanks Divers lockout

compartment
sphere
Pilot sphere
Rescue skirt Battery pods Gas storage

Compensation
weights
Figure 11-15 External cut through URF
11.8.2. COMPARTMENTS
The PR will remain at atmospheric pressure at all time including periods when TUP is being
conducted. The PR also contains it own ordinary and emergency life support systems/stores.
11-21
ATP/MTP-57.1
The RR (Rescue Chamber) is located immediately aft of the PR and is designed to
accommodate up to 35 rescues. A single attendant will manage activities in the RR including
guiding the pilot during the final approach (in parallel or instead of the camera system). He also
activates the suction and dewatering of the rescue skirt. The RR will operate to a maximum
internal pressure of 6 bar (abs) in order to effect rescues from DISSUBs where the internal
pressure is above the surface ambient. The RR contains its own CO2 absorbent but the O2
make up, control and monitoring of the atmosphere is conducted in the MR (Engine Room).
The MR (Engine Room) contains all electric and hydraulic systems.
Many of the main systems are placed outside of the MR between the pressure hull and the
superstructure. The main battery s contained in wet (oil filled) containers at sea water pressure.
Figure 11-16 Internal look through of the separate compartments

From left to right: Pilot sphere, Rescue Room, Engine Room and (no longer in use) Diver Lock
Out sphere.
11.8.3. HATCHES
There are a total number of eight hatches located on and inside the SRV:
Hatch No.1 is located at the bottom of the RR at the forward end. The hatch, outer coaming and
the Dry Mating Skirt (DMS) is a complete unit that is bolted to the Pressure hull/Rescue Room.
The inner coaming provides a seat which seals against a corresponding face on the inward
opening hatch. The faces are brought together to using a hydraulically manoeuvred bayonet
ring. Two acrylic viewports are arranged in the hatch to provide both a fish eye view and a
normal view inside the DMS and down onto the DISSUB rescue platform.
Hatch No1. and the DMS also acts as the mating flange to the TUP Transfer Trunk included in
HMS Belos Recompression Chamber System.
Hatch No.2 is located on top of the PR providing access to for the pilots without affecting the
pressure in the Rescue Chamber (RR). The hatch can, in calm weather, be used for emergency
egress of the crew.
Hatch No.3 is located on top of the RR providing access for a Personnel Transport Chamber
(PTK). The function of the PTK is to provide TUP capability from the SRV to an other Chamber

11-22
ATP/MTP-57.1
without using the DMS and the Belos Recompression Chamber System. The hatch can also, in
calm weather, be used for emergency egress of the crew.
Hatch No.4 is situated just beneath Hatch No.3 and provides the pressure tight seal against the
internal pressure in the RR.
Hatch No.5 is placed on top of the aft part of the MR.
Hatch No.6 is placed in the lower aft part of the MR. The hatch was originally used for diver lock
out when the SRV was equipped with a diving system. Today it only purpose is for ventilation
and access during maintenance.
Hatch No.7 Is placed in the RR forward bulkhead and forms a pressure tight boundary with the
PR. It also acts as the “door” between the PR and the RR. The Hatch has an acrylic window for
visual contact between PR an RR.
Hatch No.8 is placed in the forms a pressure tight boundary with the MR. The hatch has an
acrylic window for visual contact between RR and MR.
A small Medical Lock is installed in the bulkhead between RR and MR.
11.8.4. MAIN FEATURES

The DMS forms the structural link between the SRV and the DISSUB and therefore forms part of
the pressure tight boundary during all DISSUB transfer evolutions. Since the DMS is a structural
part of the Pressure hull the SRV has to use a roll and trim system to adapt to the DISSUB
position on the bottom. By using these systems the SRV can mate up to an angle of 45° roll and
30° trim.
The SRV is provided with a Main Lift Point at the top of the pressure hull, at the approximate
amidships position. The Main Lifting Point provides the interface between the SRV and the HMS
Belos LARS. The operation is swimmer operated both at launch and recovery and is operated
up to Sea State four.
The main battery is placed outside of the pressure hull but within the protective shell of the
“hydrodynamic” superstructure. It is placed in oil filled containers and therefore inflicted by the
sea pressure. The battery is lead acid type consists of 64 standard cells (2,3 V/Cell).
Inside the MR is a small 24 V emergency battery.
Main propulsion is provided by a single propeller hydraulically driven from a pump coupled to the
main rotating transformer via a clutch. The Propeller made of GRP and consists of four separate
blades mounted on a central hub. The capacity of the propeller motor is 15 kW.
For manoeuvring the SRV has electric thrusters coupled in pairs. Two vertically and two
horizontally. The thrusters can either be used together working in the same direction or against
each others depending on what is desired by the SRV pilot.
A water ballast system externally is used to compensate for the changing of the buoyancy
conditions and variations in payload.
A compensation system for the change of internal load represented by rescues consists of steel
balls that can be mechanically jettisoned by the pilots (total weight of 2000 kg). There are also a
number of lead bars that can be removed from the RR for of weight compensation.

11-23
ATP/MTP-57.1
As trim weights a mercury systems is used were two tanks are connected (forward and aft) are
connected by a pipe. Two hydraulic cylinders at each end provide the power to move the
mercury.
For rolling the SRV there are two hydraulically operated arms on each side of the vehicle. These
weigh 800 kg each and can be jettisoned in an emergency.
As a complement to the manual control, the SRV is provided with an Auto Pilot (auto-heading)
facility in order to reduce crew workload.
Principle overall dimensions of the SRV are:
Length 13,9 m
Beam 3,2 m
Height 4,1 m (including the rescue skirt)
Distance from bottom of rescue skirt to bottom of SRV is 0,6 m
Draft 3,1 m
Displacement 52 tons
Air is stored in gas bottles inside the RR and outside of the pressure hull with a system pressure
of 200 bars. The storage is divided in ordinary, emergency and BIBS systems. Total numbers of
bottles are 10 with a total volume of 197 litres.
Oxygen is stored outside of the pressure hull in two separate systems with a system pressure of
200 bars. There are three bottles and the total volume is 100 litres.
The life support system is designed to provide a breathable atmosphere during exercise for six
days (eight people) or a crew of four with 35 rescues for 24 hours.
The RR has CO2 scrubbing system using Soda Lime as absorbent. The system in the RR is
under normal conditions driven by electric fans but can in an emergency be used with face
masks.
Oxygen is stored outside and is monitored and controlled from the MR.
During normal exercise mode there is a BIBS system in all compartments (2+8+1). Mouthpiece
in the RR, full masks in the PR and MR. There are also non electric EBS in the PR and MR.
The SRV endurance is calculated to the following phases:
Towing 10 hours (to the DISSUB)
Operating 10 hours (Mating operation)
Towing 10 hours (Return to port)
Margin 10 hours (Just In case)
11.8.5. OPERATING CONDITIONS

Maximum operating depth 460 metres of sea water
Minimum mating depth 20 m (differential pressure to within the DISSUB. Shallower
matings can be performed by using clamps to the rescue seat).

11-24
ATP/MTP-57.1
Maximum forward speed 3 knots
Maximum speed towing (surface) 6 knots
Maximum speed towing (submerged) 10 knots
Maximum pitch +/- 30 degrees
Maximum roll +/- 45 degrees
Maximum internal air pressure inside RR 6 bar (absolute)
Maximum internal gas pressure inside RR 10 bar (absolute)
Maximum significant wave height Sea State 4 (LARS HMS Belos)

11-25
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-17 Main Dimensions of the SRV Rescue Skirt

11-26
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-18 URF in the HMS Belos LARS

11-27
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.9. SRV 300/ITS ANTEO
11.9.1. SRV 300

The SRV 300 is an all-steel, two-compartments submersible vehicle containing a command
module (CM) and a rescue chamber (RC). The CM accommodates the pilot and co-pilot in a
forward-facing, tandem seat configuration. The CM contains all necessary control and
instrumentation requirements for controlling propulsion, ballast and trim, life support,
communications and navigation, lighting, cameras and external tooling, skirt de-watering and
emergency recovery. The controls for these systems are contained in panels mounted on the
port and starboard bulkheads of the cm. The propulsion control panel is moveable one in order
to allow the SRV pilot to undertake surface manoeuvres when observing through the conning
tower viewports.
Conning Tower
Main Lifting (Hatch No. 4)
Main Propulsion
Point
Thruster
Rescue Chamber
Command
Module
Forward
Viewport
Battery pod
High Manipulator
pressure air and griper
storage
Mating Skirt
Figure 11-19 Main Features of the SRV 300

The CM will remain at atmospheric pressure at all times including periods when tup is being
conducted.
The RC is located immediately aft of the CM and is designed to accommodate up to twelve
rescuees. A single attendant will manage activities in the RC including opening and closure of
the hatches and the provision of support to the rescuees. The co-pilot, located in the cm, will
generally manage and monitor this compartment’s life support systems including the
replacement of carbon dioxide (co2) absorbent. The RC will operate to a maximum internal
pressure of 5 bar (abs) in order to effect rescues from dissubs where the internal pressure is

11-28
ATP/MTP-57.1
above surface ambient.
There are a total of four hatches located in the SRV 300, each hatch is fitted with a centrally
mounted acrylic view-port. The hatches are numbered as follows:
1. Hatch No.1 is located inside the rescue skirt and it seals the lower trunking from the external
pressure. Opening and closing is hydraulically operated from the pilot compartment.
2. Hatch No.2 is located inside the rescue compartment and it seals the lower trunking from the
internal pressure of the rescue compartment (during the surfacing operation it is normally
closed to allow the rescues pressurization). It is hydraulically operated.
3. Hatch No.3 is located in the RC bulkhead and forms the pressure tight boundary with the
CM. It opens in towards the RC. The design of No.3 Hatch and the dividing bulkhead allows
for the full range of pressure differentials likely to be encountered during pressurised
operations.
4. Hatch No.4 is located in the CM at the top of the conning tower to allow access to the SRV
300. No.4 Hatch can be used for emergency egress of the crew and rescuees when on the
deck of the MOSHIP and when on the surface, depending on sea conditions.
5. Medical lock: is located in the RC and provided to achieve equipment transfer (into and out)
when the compartment is pressurized and it is on board of the mother ship.
The DMS forms the structural link between the SRV 300 and the DISSUB and therefore forms
part of the pressure tight boundary during all DISSUB transfer evolutions. A 30° angled wedge is
provided (fitted to the SRV whilst on the MOSHIP) to allow the SRV to undertake extreme
angled DISSUB mating. Using a combination of trim and buoyancy adjustment, Pilot control and
the Wedge, a maximum angled mate of 45° can be achieved.
The SRV 300 is provided with a Main Lift Point at the top of the pressure hull, at the approximate
amidships position. The Main Lifting Point provides the interface between the SRV and the
LARS.
Two sets of batteries, each housed in cylindrical pressure-tight pods with hemispherical end
caps, provide power for the SRV 300. The pods are secured to the underside of the pressure
hull on outriggers.
Main propulsion is provided by one hydraulically driven 1520 mm diameter ducted 4 blade
propeller, aft-mounted on SRV centre line. The total hydraulic power available to the thrusters is
20 kW, and can be divided according to pilot’s control.
Four hydraulically powered thrusters units provide auxiliary propulsion and control. Two are
mounted at the amidships position to provide vertical control. The other two thrusters are located
at each end of the vehicle and provide yaw control only. The thrusters are fitted with four blades
propellers of 320 mm diameter. In emergency situations (loss of main propeller) one vertical
thrusters can be turned hydraulically of 90° in order to give to SRV a limited speed forward.
A water ballast system is used to compensate for the changing buoyancy conditions under
various payloads.

11-29
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 11-20 SRV-300 bring launched from ITS ANTEO

The battery can be hydraulically moved fore and aft, inside the battery pods, by the main
hydraulic system to control the SRV pitch.
As well as manual control, the SRV is provided with an auto pilot facility in order to reduce crew
workload during critical operations. The auto pilot provides auto-depth functions.
The principal overall dimensions of the SRV are:
- Length 8.30 metres.
- Beam 3.10 metres.
- Height 4.20 metres to include the Transfer (Mating) Skirt
The nominal weight of the SRV 300 is quoted with the vehicle neutrally buoyant in seawater of
Specific Gravity (SG) 1.030 and in in diving & surfaced condition: 27,000kg
Air is stored in gas bottles outside the SRV pressure hull at 300 bars. The storage system is
divided into two systems, main storage and a reserve storage system. The total amount of air is
150000 lt. Each system enters the pressure hull, into the CM, through separate hull
penetrations.
The Life Support System is designed to provide a breathable atmosphere in both the CM
(containing 2 crew) and the RC (containing an attendant and up to 12 rescuees). The SRV has a
capability to provide life support for a full complement of crew and rescuees for up to 480 man
hours of operation. A CO2 scrubbing system using Soda Lime (SodaSorb™) is used to absorb
exhaled carbon dioxide, with reserve supplies carried in the CM and in the RC. Oxygen is stored
in four pressurised bottles, for a total amount of 22000 lt, mounted outside the pressure hull with
two bottles connected as main supply and two bottles in reserve. Oxygen monitoring and control
11-30
ATP/MTP-57.1
is provided to maintain oxygen levels around 21%. If levels drop or rise then the system will alert
the crew.
In the event of the RC atmosphere becoming unbreathable, i.e. in the event of a fire, the EBS
can assist the rescuees during the surface procedure. In the event of the CM atmosphere
becoming unbreathable, the SRV pilot/co-pilot can use the EBS with a mask.
The SRV is able to operate under the following conditions:
Maximum operating depth 300 metres water
Maximum forward speed 3 kts
Maximum Pitch ± 30 deg static excursion (wedge to offset DMS)
± 15 deg dynamic excursion (by battery moving)
Maximum Roll ± 30 deg static excursion
The SRV will also operate within the following conditions, when considering the DISSUB:
Maximum DISSUB angle 45 deg to the horizontal plane at any azimuth;
Maximum Internal pressure 5 bar (absolute);
The SRV is designed to be capable of operating within the limits of the following environmental
parameters:
Wind speed Operational - up to and including 30 kts
Maximum significant wave height Operational - up to and including sea state 3 (1,25m);
Towing - up to and including sea state 4 (2,5m)
Air Temperature; Operational -10 to +40 deg C;
Humidity; up to and including 100%;
Sea water Temperature 0 to +30 deg C;
Sea water Specific Gravity 1.030;
Maximum Ambient current profile 0 to 3 knots from 0 to 300 metres deep;
Above details integrate data contained in ATP/MTP-57.2 Chapter 1.

11-31
ATP/MTP-57.1
11.9.2. ITALIAN NAVY RESCUE SHIP
Figure 11-21 ITS ANTEO and SRV-300 being launched

ARS ANTEO is the Italian Navy dedicated MOSHIP to deploy the rescue assets. Built in 1980 in
the Marghera Shipyard (Venice), commissioned in 1981 has been deeply refitted and upgraded
in 2002.
ANTEO is based in La Spezia (North Italy). Anteo is the name of a Giant in the Greek
mythology, son of Nettuno (Poseidon God of the sea) and of the Earth.
Main Vessel Data
- Length o.a. 98,40m
-B 15,80m
- Draft 5,10m
- Displacement 3500 t
- Propulsion 3 Diesel Generators GMT A230-12
1 Propulsion electric motor Magneti Marelli 1 shaft
2 thrusters
Total Power abt. 4,5 MW
- Speed 18 kts
- Range abt 4000 NM @ 14 kts
- 4 points mooring system by anchors and steel wires

11-32
ATP/MTP-57.1
Typical mission
- Support and rescue for damaged vessel
- Support and rescue for submarines (bottomed and surfaced)
- Cooperation with other naval units fore fire fighting operations
- Support underwater operation up to 300 metres and sea state 3
- Locate underwater target with hall mounted multi beam sonar Konsberg EM 1002S.
Underwater Intervention capability

- Diving system capable of bounce diving up to 150m
- Diving system capable of saturation diving up to 300m for maximum 6 divers (2 team of
three) at different depth
- Submarine Rescue Chamber (SRC) up to 120m (6 escapee each time)
- Submarine Rescue Vehicle (SRV 300) up to 300m (12 escapee each time)
- Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) up to 300m
- Ventilation System up to 300m
- ROV FALCON up to 300m.

11-33
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

11-34
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRC –
DESCRIPTION OF SUBMARINE AND SUPPORT SHIP REQUIREMENTS
12.1. INTRODUCTION
The SRC design is based on the McCann chamber. The SRC is a cylindrical steel structure with
an elliptical head (see Figure 12-1 SRC). The SRC measures about 3.9 meters high and weighs
approximately 9.5 metric tons. The outside diameter near the top measures 2.3 meters and
tapers to 1.5 meters at the bottom.
The SRC is divided into three sections: an upper compartment, a lower compartment, and a
ballast tank. The upper compartment houses all operating equipment and controls, the
operators, and rescued personnel. The lower compartment is open to ambient sea pressure
except when seated on and sealed over a submarine rescue/escape hatch. On the bottom of the
lower compartment is the SRC–to–disabled submarine (DISSUB) mating surface, which consists
of a strengthened seating surface that has a machined dovetailed groove for a rubber sealing
gasket. This rubber gasket is held in place by a stainless steel retaining ring. In the Italian Navy
SRC an adaptor is welded to the mating surface in order to allow the escape hatch of the Sauro
class submarine to open.
The SRC is supported by a surface ship during all operations. Air, electrical power, and
communications are provided to the SRC through an umbilical between the support ship and the
SRC.
The US Navy SRC rated depth is 259 meters (850 feet) with a test depth (no personnel on
board) of 387 meters; the Turkish Navy SRC rated depth is 207 meters with a test depth (no
personnel on board) of 311 meters and the Italian Navy SRC (built in Italy in the late sixties
modified at the end of seventies) rated depth is 120 metres with a test (no personnel on board)
of 225 metres.
12.2. SRC SYSTEM: TECHNICAL OVERVIEW

The following sections briefly discuss some of the various features and systems of the SRC.
12.2.1. EXTERIOR FEATURE

On the outside and top of the SRC are hull penetrations with watertight fittings for an air supply
hose, an air exhaust hose, a communications cable, and an electrical power cable. A 25–inch,
hand wheel–operated, hinged, three–dog access hatch surrounded by a raised coaming permits
entrance from the top of the SRC into the upper compartment. An oval–shaped, proof pressure,
boiler–type manhole cover held in place with a strong back separates the upper and lower
compartments.
12.2.2. UPPER COMPARTMENT

The upper compartment contains all the equipment and controls needed to operate the SRC.
The compartment has room for two operators and six rescued personnel. During rescue
operations, this compartment can be maintained at atmospheric pressure by periodic manual
venting to the surface, or the upper compartment can be pressurized. Various support tools and
equipment are also stored in the upper compartment.

12-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
12.2.3. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
There are three ways to communicate with the SRC: the divers’ speaker system, a sound–
powered telephone, and an underwater telephone system. The underwater telephone is the
primary means of communication between the SRC and the DISSUB.
12.2.4. LOWER COMPARTMENT

The lower compartment contains the downhaul equipment and two pressure proof lights. It also
provides access to the DISSUB. The downhaul equipment is used to winch the SRC down to the
DISSUB and to control the ascent back to the surface. The equipment consists of an air motor
and drive train assembly located in the upper compartment; a downhaul mechanism made up of
a gearbox, cable drum, spooling device, and a fairlead assembly. The downhaul cable is a
galvanized steel wire rope 11 millimeters (7/16 inch) in diameter.
12.2.5. BALLAST TANK

The ballast tank surrounds the lower compartment and can change the buoyancy of the SRC by
approximately 1360 kilograms (3000 pounds). It is usually dry and kept at atmospheric pressure
except when a seal is being made with a submarine.
12.2.6. HOSES/UMBILICAL
Air is supplied to the SRC from the support ship through a wire–reinforced air supply hose. Air is
vented to the surface through a wire–reinforced exhaust hose. The hoses come in 15–meter
lengths and are coupled together to form assemblies umbilical with a communication cable.
12.2.7. BACKHAUL LINE

The backhaul line is a synthetic fiber rope. The backhaul line is attached to a lifting eye welded
to the top of the SRC. The backhaul line is used to tend the SRC from the surface and for
emergency recovery; it is not used to lift the SRC from or onto the deck of the support ship.
During SRC descent and ascent, the backhaul line stays slack to avoid overstressing the
downhaul cable.
12.2.8. LIFTING PENDANT

The lifting pendant is used to handle the SRC during transfer from and to the support ship. The
length of the pendant used depends on the requirements of the support ship.
12.3. AT SEA OPERATION PROCEDURE

The following section provides a general outline of the sequence of events that occurs when the
SRC is used to perform a rescue.
Before starting the rescue, the DISSUB crew should notify the rescue forces by UWT the
bottomed submarine condition (trim and negative buoyancy).
Refer to the approved national procedure to be followed by the submarine crew and the SRC
operators during rescue operations. All communication will be IAW the ATP/MTP-57 (C).
a. After locating the DISSUB, the support ship establishes a four–point mooring with the centre
as near as possible over the DISSUB.
b. A downhaul cable is connected to the shackle on the upper access hatch of the
rescue/escape trunk designated to be use during the rescue operation (Stermer Strap). One
end is secured to and wound around the cable reel. The other end has a swivel end fitting
and a safety hook. During rescue operations, the safety hook is coupled to a shackle located
12-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
near the centre of the submarine’s rescue/escape trunk upper access hatch. The downhaul
cable is attached by air or mixed gas divers (for shallow depths), saturation divers (for
shallow depths), a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) with a manipulator arm or an
Atmospheric Diving System (ADS) for deeper depths.
c. The umbilical (air supply hose, air exhaust hose and communication/power cable) and
backhaul line are connected on the support ship and to the proper fitting on the SRC. To
allow the SRC to operate freely, the umbilical is hand tended during the descent and ascent.
d. After all service connections from the support ship the SRC is lowered over the side of the
support ship and when the SRC is ready for the descent. After the upper hatch is closed and
the lower compartment is flooded, the SRC descends to the DISSUB.
e. When the SRC is on the DISSUB hatch the SRC operators carry out a hard seal procedure
IAW the approved procedure. Once ready the SRC lower hatch is opened and personnel
transfer starts. The SRC is intended for use in rescue operations in which the pressure within
the DISSUB is at, or near, atmospheric pressure.
f. Submarine personnel are brought aboard the SRC. The variable ballast on board of SRC is
adjusted and the submarine crew is directed to close the upper hatch.
g. Once unmated from the DISSUB the SRC returns to the surface. The operation continues
until all rescuees are evacuated.
Figure 12-1 SRC
12.4. SUPPORT SHIP REQUIREMENTS

Support ships’ general requirements for rescue operations with SRC are listed below:
• Four point mooring system up to maximum SRC operating depth or suitable DP system (DP
IMO class 2 minimum or class 3).
12-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
• Adequate deck space available for handling the system, and for adequate ancillary systems
for air production and storage.
• Suitable crane for SRC launch and recovery.
12.5. SUBMARINE REQUIREMENTS

The submarine must have a flat mating surface large enough and of sufficient strength to accept
a SRC or other rescue asset. The emergency escape hatch must permit the exit from the
submarine into the rescue asset when the two are mated.
The dimensions, strength and technical data of the rescue seat are in STANAG 1297.
The dimensions of non NATO standard submarine rescue seats do not guarantee mating and
hatch opening but these may be possible and must be assessed.
The ability of the submarine to drain the water trapped in the mating skirt is not mandatory but is
a useful function.
12.6. SOURCES:
USN S9086–T9–STM–010/CH–594 NAVAL SHIPS’ TECHNICAL MANUAL SALVAGE –
SUBMARINE SAFETY ESCAPE AND RESCUE DEVICES - CHAPTER 594 FIRST REVISION.
IT NAVY SRC Manual and Technical Supplement.
STANAG 1297 “Requirements for a NATO common rescue seat” (Edition 5).

12-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 13 - TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT GUIDE FOR THE
CRF/REC
13.1. INTRODUCTION
The CRF is defined in ATP/MTP-57 as “The Officer with responsibility for coordinating and
controlling the recovery of escapees and/or the rescue of the crew from the DISSUB. Normally
the most appropriate person will be nominated as CRF by the SSRA”.
He will report to the SSRA and OSC as required by them, and will be supported by Rescue
Element Commanders (RECs) and operating personnel. This is a NATO wide definition.
RECs are in charge of a specific Element, either in the fields of Intervention or Rescue, and this
could be a diving team, Intervention Element such as ROV/ADS, or a full Rescue System. The
RECs will usually be experienced members of the submarine rescue community with detailed
overall knowledge of their system’s rescue procedures and capabilities.
13.2. THE CRF

The CRF will be in overall charge of the Rescue Operations. He may embark in one of the
Rescue MOSHIPs or another vessel as designated by the SSRA. He is responsible for
determining the actual conduct of the rescue sequence, delegating detailed tasking to the RECs
who are on scene with their Rescue Elements. This could include preparation of equipment and
the DISSUB site to the extraction of rescuees from the DISSUB to the decompression treatment
of rescuees while they remain in the vicinity of the accident, as well as their preparation for
onward movement. It is important that the CRF be allowed to concentrate on these duties
without interruption from the wider range of activities going on around the force.
The Rescue Element Commanders will normally be under the tactical control of the CRF, to
whom they should report about their rescue capabilities status, and actions completed/aborted.
The CRF needs to be able to concentrate entirely on the saving of life by recovery and/or
rescue, without other operational distractions. Accordingly, once he has handed over these
responsibilities to the CRF, the OSC, who remains in overall command of the operation, will
continue to provide assistance with other tasks such as perimeter patrol, communications guard
and helicopter co-ordinator.
Command and Control arrangements are covered in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3, but a simple
pictorial example is shown in the following diagram:

13-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
Figure 13-1 Command Relationships
13.3. CRF AND OSC

On arrival at the Datum area, the CRF, on behalf of the OSC, will take tactical control of those
units having Rescue and Intervention Assets in order to prepare and conduct the recovery and
the rescue operations. A checkoff list of required information is at Annex A to this Chapter.
The relationship between the CRF and OSC is pivotal to the success of the intervention and
rescue effort. In general terms and in accordance with military chain of command the OSC must
control all the non SMERAS activities in order to allow the CRF the freedom of action to perform
a speedy intervention and rescue.
13.4. CO-ORDINATION
Due to the special circumstances of a DISSUB operation, where the OSC, SSRA and the rest of
the Authorities could belong to different nations than the DISSUB’s, the CRF may have a direct
relationship (reporting) with the designated SSRA and/or DISSUB’s NA, mainly focused on
avoiding any publicity of sensitive issues. This reporting relationship is recorded by the dotted
lines represented in the above figure. The CRF may or may not copy the reports to the OSC,
depending on the sensitivity of the issues and in accordance with particular directions received
from the National Authorities for the operation.
Coordination of the different SMERAS assets is vital both for water space management and
achievement of the aim. The CRF should ensure that all his Rescue Elements receive adequate
13-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
and timely briefing. The arrival brief should include the DISSUB's position, heading, depth, heel,
trim and which indicator buoys have been released if applicable and DISSUB internal condition.
In addition details of water conditions observed so far must be briefed. These include; currents
and how they change with depth and time, the density profile and water clarity.
13.5. EXERCISES
For exercises as opposed to real operations, the CRF will have to have a detailed knowledge of
submarine exercise requirements as laid down in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 7.
13.6. TRAINING
CRFs and RECs must be suitably trained and experienced if they are to properly discharge their
responsibilities. Suggested areas of knowledge are given at Annex B to this Chapter.
Certain Authorities provide CRF and REC Training courses which allow personnel to be trained
as detailed in ANNEX 13.A below.

13-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
INTENTIONALLY BLANK

13-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
ANNEX 13.A. CRF TRAINING PLAN
CRFs should be proficient in the following areas in order to properly discharge their function
within a rescue operation. It is worthy of note that this training will be very similar to that for REC
and indeed qualification may be progressive – i.e. a trainee may first qualify as a REC or Deputy
CRF before qualifying as a CRF, with on job experience being a fundamental requirement to
progress.
13.A.1. PRIOR READING AND PREPARATION
- ATP/MTP-57
- Any National Supplement
- ATP-10
- AXP-1/MXP-1
- National CONOPS
- National Callout procedures
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- ISMERLO Website.
13.A.2. EQUIPMENT
CRF and REC must be fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of all equipment allocated
under his control.
13.A.3. PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES
- DISSUB Liaison Team (DLT)
- Rescue/Intervention teams
- Senior Medical Officer (SMO) and Medical Team
- Senior Diving Officer and Diving Teams
- MOSHIP personnel, onboard battle rhythm
- Ancillary personnel.
13.A.4. MEDICAL
Briefed on the medical and survival aspects including:
- DISSUB atmosphere monitoring and control
- survival in the DISSUB
- use of the DISSUB Entry Team (DET) and/or DISSUB Medical Triage Team (DMTT)
- medical constraints on rescue
- triage, medical treatment and decompression of rescuees
- casualty flow, handling and reporting procedures
- medical and decompression risks to rescue personnel.
13.A.5. RADIOLOGICAL
Radiological aspects and implications of a nuclear powered or armed DISSUB should be briefed
by specialist teams.
13.A.6. OPERATIONS
- Command and Control
- Communications and reports, including ISMERLO
13.A-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
- Readiness, Callout and Alertment
- Deployment
- Intervention operations
- Rescue operations
- TUP operations
- MOSHIP operations.
13.A.7. EXERCISES
- Exercise planning
- Safety and relaxations
- Exercise requirements
- SMEREX/CASEX signals
- RV/Diving/Bottoming/Surfacing procedures
- WSM and PMI
- Single/coordinated operations (exercises)
- Operational Analysis.
13.A.8. MISCELLANEOUS
- Media and Media handling
- Next of Kin and casualties.

13.A-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 14 - SSRA GUIDANCE
14.1. INTRODUCTION
Submarine Rescue Operations are unique within naval operations, but share a large number of
common aspects with other areas of SUBOPAUTH activity. The key to a successful response is
to have a valid and representative plan (also called Dormant or Contingency plan) in place which
allows the various authorities involved to concentrate on their specialist areas.
It is difficult to predict the precise nature of any emergency – submarine disasters have
thankfully become rare, and there are a large number of variables all of which will have a degree
of potential outcome on the end result.
These brief notes are primarily aimed at the SSRA who does not possess either an indigenous
Submarine Rescue Capability or a large pool of Submarine Rescue expertise. There are
considerably more submarine operating nations than submarine rescue systems. As mentioned
above this guidance must be to an extent general rather than specific, as specific guidance can
only be given when the precise details of any accident are known.
Excellent advice is readily available, both through this publication, which simply must be required
reading for all SUBOPAUTH staff, and through the ISMERLO website (www.ismerlo.org) which
again must be familiar to all watch keepers, all of whom should have arranged current password
access and be competent in its use. The publication offer invaluable advice in considerably more
details which integrate the content of this chapter.
Details of Submarine Rescue Capabilities are available through ISMERLO, and are the meat
and drink of the NATO Standardisation Agency sponsored Submarine Escape and Rescue
Working Group (SMERWG) and its 3 specialist panels, namely Operations (OPS)(deals also
with Doctrine and Technical aspects), Submarine Escape Equipment (SEE) and Medical (MED).
These meetings, details of which are carried on the ISMERLO and NATO NSA websites are
open to all submarine operating nations, not just NATO, and attendance by SUBOPAUTHs and
supporting staffs is strongly recommended, particularly at the Operations Panel.
ISMERLO hosts regular web-based exercises in which various scenarios are exposed and
solutions developed. Participation is recommended for all SUBOPAUTHs, even if it is just to
monitor activity and gain knowledge or further experience. Regular (or even constant) monitoring
of the ISMERLO website is thoroughly recommended so that suitable training opportunities are
not missed.
The prime function of the SSRA is to maximise the number of DISSUB personnel who are safely
recovered from the scene of the accident through a consistent mobilization of both Search and
Rescue/Intervention Forces, and through a detailed coordination of all those support and logistic
elements such as the provisional of medical stores, the availability of medical infrastructure
ashore and aboard, the mobilization of expert pool to support the CRF and the REC on the
scene.
14.2. SUBMARINE RESCUE OPERATIONS

A (generic) rescue operation can be sub-divided into several phases after the alarm has been
raised, and these phases may occur sequentially or in parallel. Details of phases can be found at
ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3.

14-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
14.3. INITIATION
Initiation is the realisation that a submarine has, or may have sunk. There will always be a
reluctance to come to this conclusion, but time will always be a major factor in any response,
and it is probably better to accept a few false alarms rather than delay reaction to the real event,
due to the criticality of the survivability. Once the decision has been made, put your own
procedures (Dormant or Contingency plan) into force as soon as possible, and balance the time
needed to inform local authorities and families with the time needed to raise the alarm and start
the mobilisation of search and rescue forces. This is not a decision particular to SMER, but
similar to the response to any major emergency.
Detailed Check-off List for SSRA is available at ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 3.
14.4. CHOP FROM OTHER SUBOPAUTH TO NATIONAL AUTHORITY

When the DISSUB is operating under NATO or other Operational Control (OPCON),
consideration must be given to when to chop OPCON back to the NA .The organization with
OPCON at the time of the incident should retain OPCON until a change makes sense and is
convenient to both parties. Consideration should be given to communications coverage,
available assets, public affairs and knowledge of the area.
14.5. BEST SUITED SSRA

The choice of SSRA is down to the National Authority. The best suited is likely to be either the
NA’s own SSRA, the NATO Subopauth for whom the submarine was operating at the time of the
accident or the one who has the responsibility of local RCC, and who will therefore be best
placed to organise and co-ordinate the Search operation, and have best local knowledge of
logistic and communication requirements.
Prior agreement may be seek between the NA and the best suited Subopauth prior deploying a
submarine outside of metropolitan waters.
14.6. CHOP FROM NATO SUBOPAUTH TO NATIONAL AUTHORITY

When the DISSUB was operating under NATO Operational Control (OPCON), it is important not
to rush the process of chopping OPCON back to the NA even though there may be significant
pressure to do so. The organization with OPCON at the time of the incident should retain
OPCON until a change makes sense and is convenient to both parties. Consideration should be
given to communications coverage, available assets and knowledge of the area.
14.7. SEARCH AND FORCE ASSEMBLY PHASE

The Search and Assembly phases will probably be conducted concurrently. If a Recovery phase
is required it will probably be relatively soon after the accident and could involve either personnel
having escaped and/or personnel having conducted a surface abandonment. Assembly and
deployment of search forces is routine SSRA business, often in conjunction with an appropriate
Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC).
Depending on the method of alert (SEPIRB, overdue signal receipt, etc.), and the area of
uncertainty initial Search and Localization for a DISSUB is typically conducted with ASW and
MCM capable forces.
The tables at Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4 give guidance on the selection of available Submarine
Rescue Elements.

14-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
If and when requested, the Intervention and Rescue forces will be assembled. This is a logistics
led process, developing an initial Mobilization plan based on the MOSHIP/Airport/Seaport
combination (MASC), which may use alternatives for Intervention and Rescue, and indeed
different if multiple Elements respond to the emergency. The initial logistic planning will be
undertaken by the owners of the Rescue Elements, but be prepared to offer assistance where
appropriate, particularly in dealing with bureaucratic impediments (Customs, Immigration etc),
with liaison and interpreter services, and assistance to the nominated Port Agent(s).
Early nomination of a preferred MASC for reception of Rescue Elements will make the logistical
planning easier, and local knowledge of potential MOSHIPs will always be welcomed –
contribute via ISMERLO.
14.8. FLOW OF THE RESCUE OPERATION

A typical flow of the Rescue Operation can be found at ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 4.
14.8.1. INTERVENTION
Intervention is the use of external resources to increase survivability. This can be surface or
subsurface, and is likely to involve ROV/ADS/Divers for survey, debris clearance and
transponder field preparation close to the DISSUB. During the waiting time between localisation
and rescue, it may be necessary to maintain conditions on the DISSUB by ELSS resupply,
commonly known as “Pod-Posting”. Intervention forces are likely to arrive in advance of Rescue
Forces, and tend to have a lesser logistical burden. They are likely to be entirely self sufficient
once on scene, but logistical assistance will always be welcomed. A DISSUB Liaison Team
(DLT) should be mobilised to provide specialist advice.
14.8.2. RESCUE OF DISSUB PERSONNEL

Once Rescue Elements arrive on scene they will conduct operations in accordance with their
own procedures. Again a DLT should be provided, with particular emphasis on interpreters (if
required). Medical aspects of a rescue operation are well covered in ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 6. Be
prepared to support any emergent requirements from the RECs via the CRF. Their aim will be to
return DISSUB personnel to surface, and prepare them for onward movement.
14.9. THE RETURN PHASE

The return phase covers the time from completion of final SRV rescue mission to re-
establishment of operational availability at the SSRA. As with all other phases it will require
planning, and like the mobilization it is likely to demand a considerable logistic package. Items to
be considered include the final state of the DISSUB, rescuees and TUP, return port, Media,
Families, Demobilisation, and Operational Analysis.
Once all rescuees and the DMTT have been recovered, the final state of the DISSUB needs to
be known in order to inform salvage authorities. A Check off list should be developed and used
as a template for the required information, augmented by known internal conditions and external
photography. Such information is also likely to be wanted by any Board of Enquiry that is likely to
be sitting by this time.
Depending on the size of the DISSUB, pressure experienced and distance from scene to
demobilisation port, it is possible that there may still be personnel receiving treatment in TUP as
the MOSHIP/VOO returns alongside. Demobilisation activity is not to start until TUP is clear.

14-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
This decision is likely to be made by National Authorities. From the SSRA point of view it is best
to demobilize from the same Airport/Seaport combination that was used for mobilisation. The
force will have grown in the time since mobilisation, and the return plan will have to deal with
several vessels.
The demobilization is a procedurally controlled activity, and once more will be subject to detailed
planning. Similar services and support will be required as for mobilisation, although there is less
urgency. There is likely to be a large amount of waste of various kinds, and this should be
disposed of in accordance with local procedures, and the agent will be able to assist here.
The National Authority will make arrangements for the onward movement of dead bodies. Local
legislation, (Coroners etc) will have to be complied with, and Embassy/Consular staff should be
consulted for advice.
The main purpose of the return phase is the re-establishment of Operational Availability. The
aim is to get all equipment and personnel back to a known state, defect free in as reasonably
short a time as is practicable.
Operational Analysis will be conducted after each deployment (and often for exercises). The
purpose is to improve future capability by analysing current performance. The precise
composition of an analysis team will be undertaken by National Authorities post operation. It is
likely that all PN’s will be represented on the team.
14.10. MEDIA
Experience has shown that a DISSUB is likely to lead news reports around the world. Have a
plan to deploy suitable people to deal with the media at suitable locations. The SSRA and OSC
are probably better prepared to deal with Media than the Intervention and Rescue MOSHIPs.
Media considerations will be dealt with by National Authority.

14-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
CHAPTER 15 - MEDICAL SUPPLEMENT
This supplement contains information which can be used to assist in the medical response laid
out ATP/MTP-57 Chapter 6. It contains information which may be of assistance in providing
guidance to the DISSUB or in the assessment and treatment of specific illness or injuries likely
to be found during a SMERAS scenario.
SECTION I - SUBMARINE CONDITIONS
15.1. TOXIC ATMOSPHERE CONTROL

Atmosphere Contaminants. Multiple types of atmosphere contaminants are possible in a
DISSUB. A catastrophe which results in a DISSUB is likely to produce supplementary casualties
and damage such as fires, flooding, and system ruptures or leaks. It is imperative that additional
casualties and damage are quickly contained to minimize toxic atmosphere levels and the
subsequent need for the survivors to use EABs.
Toxic Contaminants. Careful checks of all accessible systems containing toxic materials must be
made as soon as is practical in a DISSUB scenario. Slow leaks must be identified and stopped
before they produce toxic conditions. The following toxic contaminant sources should be
checked for leaks periodically.
- Gas bottles (e.g., nitrogen, hydrogen, and acetylene)
- Toxic chemical stowage areas, including reactor plant addition chemicals
- All refrigeration and air conditioning systems
- Battery well; chlorine gas is produced when seawater leaks into battery cells
- Weapons that contain liquid propellants or other liquids that could constitute a source of
atmospheric contaminants.
Monitoring. Portable atmospheric monitoring should begin as soon as possible after stabilizing
any casualties resulting from the initial DISSUB casualty. Values should be recorded to evaluate
current levels and used as a baseline to identify trends. A sampling plan should be developed
after conducting an inventory of life support and atmosphere monitoring assets. Some toxic
gases, like halocarbons (Refrigerant and fire-suppressant gases), are heavier than air and will
concentrate in the lowest spaces.
Avoiding Emergency Air Breathing systems (EABs). The use of EABs should be avoided unless
absolutely necessary. Using EABs significantly decreases the DISSUB crew’s survival time.
Extending exposure limits and accepting higher levels of contaminants before donning EABs is
appropriate and may be necessary, depending on the individual DISSUB situation and chance of
rescue.
15.2. CARBON DIOXIDE LEVEL CONTROL

Physiological Effects. Normal carbon dioxide levels in a submarine are 0.5 to 0.8%. Carbon
dioxide production by each survivor at rest in a DISSUB is estimated to be 23 litres per man per
hour at STP, however this can vary depending on activity levels. Elevated levels of carbon
dioxide cause progressive performance impairment beginning at 2.5%. Unconsciousness
occurs, rapidly followed by death, when carbon dioxide is at about 10%, regardless of the

15-1
ATP/MTP-57.1
oxygen level. Critical planning and actions must take place before impairment occurs. Escape
should be considered when the CO2 level reaches 5% and is increasing. Table 15-1 describes
the physiological effects of high carbon dioxide concentrations.
Carbon Dioxide Measurement and Limits. The practical limit for carbon dioxide in a DISSUB
scenario is 5-6.0%. Carbon dioxide measurements in hyperbaric conditions should be converted
to surface equivalent values (SE).
Carbon Dioxide Clinical Effect

Volume in % (SE) (Physiologic)
0.03 None
1.0 24% increase in breathing volume. No
symptoms during rest.
2.0 50% increase in breathing volume. Headaches
and air hunger on mild exertion.
3.0 Air hunger at rest, diffuse sweating.
4.0 - 4.5 Incapable of strenuous exercise, nausea.
Breathing volume increased 150-200%.
5.0 - 6.0 Degradation in performing precision tasks.
Dizziness and tremors.
6.0 and increasing Consider escape.
7.0 - 8.0 Tolerance limit. Burning eyes, increased pulse
rate, significant shortness of breath.
10.0 Restlessness, confusion. Unconsciousness
within 0.5-2.0 hours, rapidly followed by death.
Table 15-1 Effects of High Carbon Dioxide Concentrations

Carbon Dioxide Removal. Carbon dioxide removal is vital in DISSUB conditions since in most
scenarios the carbon dioxide level is the most critical for survival. If power is available, normal
carbon dioxide scrubbing should be performed. Without power, passive carbon dioxide
scrubbing by non-regenerative chemical or other means will be required for survival. To assess
the rates of CO2 removal reference should be made to the DISSUB Nation’s technical
specifications or Guard-Book.
15.3. OXYGEN LEVEL CONTROL
15.3.1. OXYGEN CONSUMPTION RATES

Oxygen consumption rates depend on the activity level of the individual. In a DISSUB scenario,
oxygen consumption rates must be kept as low as possible by minimizing the activities of the
survivors. For DISSUB oxygen consumption calculations, a nominal consumption rate of 27
litres/man/hour may be used. Actual resting oxygen consumption rates can be as much as 30%
or even higher in a DISSUB due to hypothermia, stress, and damage control or escape efforts.

15-2
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.3.2. OXYGEN MEASUREMENT AND LIMITS
Oxygen concentration is measured using portable oxygen monitors or sampling tubes. Oxygen
levels are ideally maintained between 18-21%.
Effects of Low Oxygen Concentration. Decreasing atmospheric oxygen below 16% SE (0.16
ATA) will result in impaired performance. Impairment increases until unconsciousness and death
occur as the oxygen concentration approaches 9% SE. In a DISSUB with sources available to
provide oxygen, oxygen supplies should be regulated to maintain oxygen between 17% and
20% SE. Oxygen levels decreasing uncontrollably below 16% SE should mandate escape
actions unless rescue is imminent. Below 13% SE, the crew loses ability to function and carry
out rescue or escape procedures. High levels produce an increased risk of fire and oxygen
toxicity. Error! Reference source not found. lists the effects of low oxygen concentration.
Oxygen
Effect
concentration
(in ATA) Acute Chronic
0.21 No significant effects No significant effects

0.17 No significant effects No significant effects
Increased respiratory rate;
0.15 No significant effects
headaches in 25% of personnel
Initial impairment to thinking Acclimation to effect on thinking;
0.13 (judgment) and motor 50% develop respiratory and brain
performance effects
Difficulty concentrating, impaired Almost all will show problems,
0.11 judgment, heavy breathing, and including nausea, vomiting, and
severe headaches confusion
Loss of consciousness in less
0.09 Death
than 10 minutes
Table 15-2 Effects of Low Oxygen Concentration
15.3.3. EFFECTS OF HIGH OXYGEN CONCENTRATION

An increased partial pressure of oxygen may be caused by internal DISSUB pressurization,
improper use of oxygen candles, or leaks from oxygen banks. However, simple pressurization
of the submarine itself may be sufficient to cause a medically significant rise in the partial
pressure of oxygen. A 1 ATA atmosphere with a normal oxygen partial pressure, when
compressed to 5 ATA, yields an oxygen partial pressure of 1 ATA. Exposure to oxygen at high
inspired partial pressures can be toxic to both the pulmonary and central nervous systems.
Pulmonary oxygen toxicity can occur after a 24-hour exposure to an oxygen partial pressure of
as little as 0.5 ATA. The first symptom is mild retro-sternal pain or discomfort at the end of deep
inspiration. Higher levels may lead to a burning sensation on inspiration and progress to frank
pain. Pulmonary function will decrease and permanent lung damage may result. Pulmonary

15-3
ATP/MTP-57.1
oxygen toxicity, if present, may make the treatment of decompression sickness significantly
more difficult.
Acute central nervous system toxicity may occur at oxygen partial pressures of 1.6 ATA or
greater. Symptoms of CNS toxicity can develop in minutes to hours and may present as mild
sensory symptoms or as a grand mal seizure. High carbon dioxide levels may increase the
likelihood of CNS oxygen toxicity. Convulsions are the most important deleterious effect of
oxygen poisoning and may occur suddenly without warning. These convulsions will normally be
self-limiting provided that further exposure to oxygen is reduced. Warning signs that may
precede convulsions are as follows:
• Muscle twitching: usually appears first in the lips or the face. It may affect any muscle.
• Nausea: this may be intermittent.
• Abnormalities of vision or hearing: tunnel vision or tinnitus may occur.
• Difficulty in breathing.
• Anxiety and confusion.
• Unusual fatigue.
• Loss of coordination.
The partial pressure of oxygen in the DISSUB may be reduced by simply allowing survivor to
"breathe down" the oxygen level. Otherwise, there is no specific internal means by which the
oxygen partial pressure can be reduced.
15.3.4. OXYGEN SOURCES

Oxygen can be provided by the combustion of Oxygen candles, supply from oxygen banks or by
bleeding air into the submarine from air banks.
Bleeding air banks is a last option as it adds only limited amounts of Oxygen for a significant
pressure increase due the residual Nitrogen.
Oxygen Candles: Oxygen candles (usually Chlorate based) can be burned in candle furnaces
(oxygen generator) or stand-alone cases to provide oxygen. As candles produce a fixed volume
of oxygen the number burned and the frequency of initiation need to be tailored to monitoring
results.
Oxygen Banks: Bleeding oxygen from oxygen banks can be tailored to provide a balanced
replacement for oxygen used. When the oxygen bleed rate equals the rate oxygen is
metabolized by the survivors, and CO2 is removed, compartment internal pressure will not
increase. Compartment pressurization can occur if the bleed rate exceeds the metabolic rate.
Compartment pressurization must be avoided. Compartment pressure and oxygen levels should
be monitored frequently and adjusted to maintain a constant oxygen bleed rate and levels.
Air Banks: Bleeding air banks to replenish oxygen should be used only as a last resort, prior to
donning EABs for low oxygen levels. Bleeding air banks provide only limited supplies of oxygen.
Since 79% of the air bank is nitrogen, bleeding the air banks will significantly increase the
pressure in the DISSUB and the risk of decompression illness during escape or rescue. If the air
bank must be used to provide oxygen, bleeding the air bank into the compartment produces a
longer survival time than donning EABs. EABs pressurize the compartment more rapidly than
using air banks to raise the partial pressure of oxygen.

15-4
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.4. ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONSIDERATIONS
15.4.1. GENERAL
Past experience of submarine accidents has shown that a DISSUB is invariably pressurized to
some extent. Survival for up to one week at a pressure of about 5 ATA is considered possible.
However, it should be noted that this has never been proven scientifically. Above this level the
crew would be unlikely to survive for long due to the toxic effects of raised partial pressures of
carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and oxygen.
15.4.2. EFFECTS OF INCREASED ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE

Increased atmospheric pressure raises the amount of nitrogen dissolved in the body tissues.
When the body is later depressurized, the dissolved nitrogen can come out of solution,
producing bubbles in the joints, blood vessels, or brain. This, in turn, can result in pain, paralysis,
or death. This effect is known as decompression illness (DCI) or “the bends”.
The magnitude of the effect differs between individuals and is directly related to the amount of
pressure and the length of time spent under increased pressure. The higher the pressure that
the casualty is exposed to and the longer the time under pressure (up to 24 hours), the greater
the severity of decompression illness and risk of injury or death.
Nitrogen at higher pressures can also cause nitrogen narcosis. This effect usually begins at
pressures up to 3 to 5 ATA, with symptoms such as overconfidence, heightened sense of well-
being, anxiety, or errors of reasoning. These symptoms worsen as pressure increases and may
develop into confusion, euphoria, hallucinations, and unconsciousness.
15.4.3. PRESSURE MEASUREMENTS AND LIMITS

Standard diver’s depth gauges are a convenient means to measure DISSUB atmospheric
pressure directly and accurately. Other devices may also be used to determine pressure in the
boat. Depending upon keel depth an internal DISSUB pressure of 1.7 ATA is considered the
upper physiological limit for safe submarine escape. The risk of decompression illness to
survivors of a pressurized DISSUB is the same for rescue as it is for escape unless TUP
facilities are available.
15.4.4. SOURCES OF INCREASED COMPARTMENT PRESSURE

Most DISSUB scenarios involve some internal compartment pressure increase. Some
compartment pressurization will occur as a result of flooding. The pressure increase is directly
related to the size of the space and amount flooded. Bleeding or rupture of high pressure air
system would increase the pressure of the compartment. Use of EABs causes a rapid increase
in DISSUB internal pressure, significantly increasing the risk of decompression illness upon
escape or rescue. Some pressurization will occur during escape from venting of air and draining
of water from the escape trunk. Incremental pressurization is most significant when performing
many escape cycles from small compartment volumes.

15-5
ATP/MTP-57.1
SECTION II - SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUP
15.5. INTRODUCTION
Several countries have developed a Submarine Parachute Assistance Group (SPAG) to assist
submariners who may need to escape from a DISSUB prior to rescue. SMERAT personnel
require to know what the capabilities of individual SPAG teams are and how to interact with
them. There is inter-country variability between the SPAG teams, however they are generally
made up of an Officer in Charge, a Medical Officer, medic and several personnel who undertake
casualty recovery, boat driving and man life-rafts. Teams may be up to 10 strong.
15.6. THE TEAM

SPAG teams are on a nationally determined notice to move (UK 6 hours to flight departure).
However there are restrictions on their deployment. The parachute limitations include wind
speed of 30kts, sea state 4 cloud base of 1700ft (560m) for square parachutes and 1300 ft
(425m) for round chutes including 500ft (160m) above the minimum drop height. Night jumps are
not possible and there is a distance restriction of approximately 8 hours flying in a C130 or
equivalent.
15.7. THE INSERTION

The deployed teams are usually capable of insertion by surface vessel, helicopter or parachute
and are capable of operating with minimal air support for a period of up to 24 hours. In addition
to the personnel the teams can deliver boats, life-rafts and equipment. The UK team can deliver
a maximum of 8 x 25 man life-rafts, 2 medium inflatable boats (MIB) with 25hp outboard motors,
78,00 litres of Oxygen, underwater telephone, GPS, hand held VHF RADIO, sabre, satellite
phone, radiation monitoring equipment and rations (hot and cold).
The insertion commences with the dropping of 2 SPAG personnel followed by a MIB. Once in
the water the personnel rig the MIB and contact the aircraft to call in the next team. They will
also attempt to contact the DISSUB on the UWT. Once the second team are inserted and both
boats are rigged then the life-rafts are dropped. The MIBs will collect the rafts and link them
together and the remaining personnel will be collected and transferred to the rafts to form the
medical and command cells.
15.8. THE TREATMENT OF ESCAPEES

The SPAG MO will stay within the life-raft to triage the survivors and administer first-aid. Once
on scene the SMO SMERAT should establish radio contact with the SPAG MO to establish how
many casualties of which priority are in the life-rafts. This will allow decisions to be made on the
precedence and methods for collecting the casualties and return them to the EGS for
subsequent treatment. The SMO(S) should also ensure that the EGS casualty figures are
reconciled with those held by SPAG.
SPAG personnel should also be recovered to the EGS. They should be triaged because they
could suffer from hypothermia, sea-sickness dehydration or exhaustion from their period in the
sea. After an appropriate rest period SPAG personnel may be redeployed to other roles within
the escape or rescue response organisation.

15-6
ATP/MTP-57.1
SECTION III - SPECIFIC MEDICAL CONDITIONS.
15.9. HYPOTHERMIA
15.9.1. DEFINITION
Hypothermia is associated with a succession of symptoms ultimately leading to life threatening
cardiac arrhythmias. Involuntary shivering may progress to the point that it interferes with an
individual's ability to care for himself. This begins when the body's core temperature falls to
about 35.5° C (96° F). When the core temperature reaches 35 - 32° C (95 - 90° F), sluggish
thinking, irrational reasoning, and a false feeling of warmth may occur. Core temperatures of 32 -
30° C (90 - 86° F) and below result in muscle rigidity, unconsciousness, and barely detectable
signs of life. If core temperature falls below 25° C (77° F), death is almost certain.
15.9.2. EFFECTS OF HYPOTHERMIA

Hypothermia reduces the individual’s ability to physically and mentally function and can
eventually kill. Even mild cases of hypothermia affect survival time. Shivering (mild hypothermia)
consumes more oxygen and produces more carbon dioxide.
15.9.3. PREVENTION OF HYPOTHERMIA

In the event of boat cooling, avoid allowing body temperatures to fall to the point of shivering.
The following steps should be undertaken as soon as possible:
a. If the compartment is partially flooded, move survivors to locations where they are not
immersed in water. Water conducts heat away from the body 20 to 30 times faster than air.
Immersion in apparently warm water will still cause hypothermia.
b. Remove wet clothing. Wet clothing will accelerate heat loss (evaporation effect).
c. Keep heads covered. Don watch caps, ball caps, towels, etc. Approximately 50% of body
heat loss occurs from the head and neck.
d. Wrap survivors in layers of clothing and blankets. Huddle together to decrease heat loss.
e. If the compartment is partially flooded, move survivors to locations where they are not
immersed in water. Water conducts heat away from the body 20 to 30 times faster than air.
Immersion in apparently warm water will still cause hypothermia.
f. Remove wet clothing. Wet clothing will accelerate heat loss (evaporation effect).
g. Keep heads covered. Don watch caps, ball caps, towels, etc. Approximately 50% of body
heat loss occurs from the head and neck.
h. Wrap survivors in layers of clothing and blankets. Huddle together to decrease heat loss.
15.9.4. RECOGNITION
There is a great individual variation in susceptibility to hypothermia and ability to survive. When a
DISSUB loses heating capability following an accident in cold water, a significant portion of the
crew may even be affected prior to surface survival phase. This is especially true if some degree
of flooding has occurred. Hypothermia can occur even in relatively warm waters if the exposure
time is long enough.
The diagnosis of hypothermia should not present a problem in the conscious survivor who will
probably be shivering violently and complain of cold. His degree of shivering will quickly draw
attention to the possibility of hypothermia, which can be confirmed by measuring rectal

15-7
ATP/MTP-57.1
temperature with a low reading thermometer. Conscious, shivering patients can be assumed to
have a core temperature of equal or greater than 30C (86 F).
Core temperature may not be so easy to estimate in the deeply unconscious or apparently dead
patient. A rectal temperature is essential if possible and practical to obtain.
At core temperatures below 27-28C (80.6-82.4F), the muscles are flaccid, pupils are dilated and
fixed, peripheral pulses are not palpable, BP is un-recordable, heart sounds are inaudible,
respiration is undetectable and, to all intents and purpose, the individual seems dead.
Note: It is imperative to differentiate between a near drowning, where cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) may be essential, and the purely hypothermic patient where CPR may not
be indicated.
A rectal temperature gives information to help make this distinction as does the condition of
other survivors, a general assessment of conditions, the likely time of exposure, and whether or
not the casualty remained dry inside his survival suit. Unconsciousness usually supervenes at a
core temperature at or below about 30C (86F).
15.9.5. GUIDELINES FOR CARDIOPULMONARY RESUSCITATION AS FOLLOWS

a. If the casualty is apnoeic, standard ventilator support should be instituted (mouth-to-mouth,
bag-valve-mask, etc.)
b. Chest compression should be started only if all the following conditions are met:
- A pulse was present initially, but disappears
- There is no palpable carotid pulse detectable after palpating for one minute
- There is reasonable expectation that effective CPR can be provided continuously until the
casualty can be transported to a hospital site where advanced life support can be
provided. In practice, this means being within approximately 2 hours travel time to a
suitable hospital. Initiating CPR that cannot be maintained effectively will only serve to
exhaust the rescuers and deplete personnel resources.
15.9.6. MANAGEMENT OF HYPOTHERMIA

Treatment of hypothermic casualties can be done concomitantly with treatment of
decompression injuries. The re-warming of seriously affected case can begin immediately after
triage. General guidelines regarding management are firstly provided for all hypothermic
casualties and then more specifically for casualties who are able to assist themselves, then
casualties who are not able to assist themselves.
15.9.6.1. ALL HYPOTHERMIC CASUALTIES

• If possible, providing this does not delay recovery, ensure that all cold casualties are
removed from the water in a horizontal position to avoid inducing shock in those survivors.
• Lie casualties flat, give essential first aid for any injury, and undertake resuscitation if
indicated (see guidance below).
• Prevent further heat loss by enclosing the casualties in a casualty bag or sleeping bag, or
cover with any available material such as blankets, including cover for the head. Insulate
from the ground and provide water- and wind-proof protection. Any disturbance of this
protective cocoon risks further heat loss.
• Move the casualties, lying flat, to a warmer and protected environment such as the ship’s
hangar to reduce further heat loss.

15-8
ATP/MTP-57.1
• Proceed with passive rewarming, with rewarming heat from the body core rather than the
surface. Even in a warmer environment, the casualty should be wrapped in blankets or a
sleeping bag to insulate from external heat loss. There is a danger that rewarming may occur
too rapidly from the body surface inwards, resulting in a potentially catastrophic fall in blood
pressure ('rewarming shock').
• Provide airway insulation with a loose scarf over the nose and mouth to trap heat from
exhaled breath, provided that the airway is not compromised. Medical oxygen cylinders
should be kept as warm as possible before use in order to minimise respiratory heat loss to
the cold gas.
• Maintain close observation of overall status, including pulse and respiration, and provide any
supportive treatment indicated within the limits of available resources.
15.9.6.2. HYPOTHERMIC CASUALTIES ABLE TO ASSIST THEMSELVES

In general, conscious and shivering survivors will not require any intensive medical treatment
provided they have sufficient energy reserves to maintain shivering. These survivors can be
assumed to have a core temperature of at or above 30C (86F). Once in a sheltered
environment, if the casualty's clothing is dry he should be kept in blankets or a sleeping bag with
cover over his head and allowed to rewarm slowly. Any wet clothing should be removed with
assistance and replaced with dry.
Warm, sweetened drinks may be given, if the casualty is able to swallow easily and is sufficiently
responsive. No alcohol should be given. Warmed intravenous fluids (up to 40C - 104F) may be
administered if indicated, remembering that hypothermic patients are vasoconstricted with a
reduced vascular volume - they may be fluid overloaded with less volume replacement. There is
the possibility that with vasodilation as core temperature increases, survivors could go into
hypovolaemic shock.
Active, immersion rewarming may be considered as an option to rapidly treat some of the less
severe casualties if sufficient facilities and support staff are available.
If this treatment is pursued, the casualty may be immersed to the neck (supine) in a hot bath,
with bath temperature not to exceed 40C (104F). Constant stirring and addition of hot water as
necessary should be undertaken to maintain the temperature of the bath. Cessation of shivering
will occur almost immediately after immersion, but this should not be interpreted as an indication
for removing him from the bath. When the casualty becomes comfortably warm, help him out of
the bath, cover him with blankets, and keep him supine until he is warm to the touch. Do not
leave him in the bath if he complains of feeling hot or begins sweating. If a warm shower is
used, casualties should be kept in a recumbent or sitting position. All casualties being rewarmed
must be carefully observed throughout and following this treatment.
15.9.6.3. HYPOTHERMIC CASUALTIES UNABLE TO ASSIST THEMSELVES

The profoundly hypothermic casualty should be regarded as being in a critical condition, and too
cold to actively rewarm safely in a shipboard mass casualty situation. The major objective of
management is the prevention of further heat loss to enable passive rewarming to occur.
Movement of the casualty should be minimised as it may precipitate ventricular fibrillation
Once in a protected environment, the casualty should be carefully wrapped in blankets or a
sleeping bag, removing wet clothing with minimum movement. Cut clothing off as necessary.

15-9
ATP/MTP-57.1
Carefully place the casualty in a position to protect his airway from possible aspiration until he
regains consciousness, and then keep him lying supine until he is warm subjectively and to the
touch.
These casualties should have a high priority for medical evacuation, since active rewarming of
profoundly hypothermic patients aboard the EGS cannot be accomplished easily or safely under
mass casualty conditions.
15.10. COLD INJURIES

Prolonged exposure to a cold environment may occur aboard the DISSUB, or on the surface
after escaping. The areas most susceptible to cold injury are the face, hands, and feet. The
likelihood of cold injury is higher at ambient air temperatures below 5C (41F) and sea
temperatures below 20C (68F), especially when associated with wind. Non-freezing cold injury
(NFCI) is most likely but freezing cold injury (frostbite) may occur in areas of exposed skin with
low temperatures and/or even moderate wind speeds.
15.10.1. FREEZING COLD INJURY (FROSTBITE)

In the case of survivors wearing SEIE, freezing cold injury is most likely to occur on the face and
may be recognised by a pale waxy appearance of the affected area. The area may feel
indurated and sensation will be absent. Treatment consists of rapidly rewarming the affected
area with hot (41C, 105.8F) poultices, or by skin to skin rewarming. Analgesics will be required
during the thawing process. If the skin is broken, antibiotics and sterile dressings will be
necessary.
15.10.2. NON-FREEZING COLD INJURY

This condition can affect any part of the body. Cold damage to vasomotor nerves occurs. It is
usually seen in the hands and/or feet and is often associated with general hypothermia. When
the feet are affected it is usually called “immersion foot”. It is characterised by redness, swelling
and some paraesthesia. Blotchy discolouration and ischaemic changes appear and a wet
gangrene may develop. Treatment is to warm the remainder of the body but not the affected
part.
The affected part should be gently cleaned with a lukewarm cleansing agent (such as Cetavlon),
gently patted dry, slightly elevated and left exposed to room temperature. If there is any abrasion
of the skin, broad spectrum antibiotic cover is required. Great care should be taken not to heat or
abrade the skin.
Failure to treat correctly may result in months of hospitalisation or even amputation. Every
survivor who has been exposed to prolonged low temperatures aboard the DISSUB or has spent
some time in very cold water must be carefully examined for this condition. Pain is a common
early and delayed consequence of non-freezing cold injury: the only effective treatment for this is
Amitriptyline, starting with a single 50 mg dose given in the evening, increasing as necessary to
a maximum of 150 mg in the single dose. Early treatment of pain is important in the avoidance of
chronic pain, which can be refractory to treatment.

15-10
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.11. HYPERTHERMIA
15.11.1. EFFECTS OF HYPERTHERMIA

Hull insulation, heat production of survivors, removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
using exothermic chemical methods, and burning of oxygen candles all contribute to heat build
up in the DISSUB environment.
Engineering spaces are especially susceptible to temperature increase after ventilation ceases.
Humidity in DISSUB conditions can also rise over time, causing discomfort and adding to the risk
of dehydration and heat related illness. Survivors should be assumed to be non-heat acclimated.
15.11.2. PREVENTION OF HYPERTHERMIA

If heat stress conditions develop or appear imminent, the following steps should be undertaken
as soon as possible:
a. Lower levels or spaces lacking insulation can be expected to be cooler. Survivors should be
permitted to move to cooler areas if conditions permit.
b. Survivors should initiate a buddy system and pair up. Buddies should check each other
hourly when awake for signs of dehydration such as light-headedness on standing or greater
than 1 pound per day of weight loss. If possible, all survivors should be weighed daily prior to
eating and monitored for weight loss.
c. Adequate fluid replacement is essential to avoid dehydration in the presence of heat stress.
Fluids should be encouraged at quantities depending on body size, temperature and
humidity. Several quarts a day may be needed. Food intake should supply adequate salt
replacement. Decreased urination or dark urine is a sign of dehydration.
d. Body cooling is an effective way of preventing core body temperature increase and heat
stress injury. This can be achieved by immersing the forearms and hands and/or feet and
legs in pans or buckets of cool or even tepid water periodically for 10 minutes or more.
Likewise, immersion in floodwater or a coldwater shower from the escape trunk drain can be
effective.
15.12. HEAT INJURIES
15.12.1. THERMAL STRESS ABOARD THE DISSUB

With loss of normal ventilation and air conditioning, the thermal environment of a submarine in
tropical waters may deteriorate and heat casualties may occur. Exertion will exacerbate the
situation. The rate at which such deterioration occurs will depend upon the type of submarine, its
contained volume, the number of survivors and the circumstances of the accident.
15.12.2. OVERHEATING IN TROPICAL CONDITIONS

If survivors are forced to escape before rescue vessels arrive they will be faced with the problem
of surviving in tropical conditions on the surface whilst wearing survival gear and without access
to drinking water. In seawater temperatures of around 27-32C (80-90F) and ambient air
temperatures of 32-49C (90-120F) the survival length has yet to be determined. It is clear those
survivors will be subjected to considerable thermal stress if the survival suit is worn fully sealed,
since it is impermeable to water and unventilated. It is recommended that survivors in warm
waters employing the free-floating survival suit deflate the outer portion of the suit and float
vertically supported by the stole portion, with hood and gloves removed.

15-11
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.12.3. HEAT SYNCOPE
Heat Syncope is the most common heat disorder seen in standard medical practice. This
generally occurs in unacclimatised personnel and is associated with a moderately raised rectal
temperature and symptoms similar to the well-known vaso-vagal "faint". In the submarine
escape situation, the recumbent posture will minimise the risk of syncope. It is most likely to
occur when a survivor is taken aboard the rescue vessel and resumes physical activity. When
rescuing escapers, they should be transferred to the rescue vessel via stretcher or small boat lift
in a supine or recumbent position to avoid this problem. Treatment is to rest the patient, cool
them, and administer fluids. All forms of alcohol are contra-indicated.
15.12.4. WATER DEPLETION HEAT EXHAUSTION

This condition may occur in submarine survivors exposed to tropical heat for more than a few
hours. They may have no means of obtaining water and may sweat a great deal even though the
sweat produced cannot evaporate. A loss of body salt will occur but because sweat is hypotonic,
plasma sodium will be high. Symptoms of water depletion include intense thirst, which may
become obsessive to the point where seawater is drunk with disastrous results. Other symptoms
commonly seen are giddiness, faintness, diminished urinary output and pyrexia; delirium follows
and then death. Severe salt deficiency may cause excruciatingly painful spasms of voluntary
muscles. With an unconscious patient, the diagnostic difficulty is to determine whether the
primary condition is water or salt deficiency.
15.12.5. TREATMENT
In submarine escape conditions, water depletion is the primary danger and treatment is directed
towards replacement of fluids. Start an IV of 5% glucose in water. Isotonic saline can be used if
there is any doubt as to whether salt deficiency or severe hypovolaemia is a contributory factor.
Keep the patient in the shade in a cool environment; reduce pyrexia by spraying with tepid water
and keep careful fluid intake and output charts. Body weights may be used to help guide fluid
replacement. Recovery is usually rapid and, when consciousness returns, fluids can be
administered by mouth. Diet should begin with liquids and be gradually increased to a normal
diet. Heavily salted fluids are not usually required but it is advisable to test the urine for chloride
to ensure that a salt deficiency does not supervene following the replacement of water losses.
15.12.5.1. HEAT STROKE

Complete failure of the thermoregulatory mechanism of the body results in heat-stroke. It is often
fatal and death is inevitable unless immediate treatment is given. Classically, the disorder is
associated with a rectal temperature of 40.6C (105F) or more, generalised anhydrosis and
disturbances of the central nervous system, which may result in headaches, fits, convulsions or
coma. In some patients however, sweating may be present or they may be perfectly rational. If a
rectal temperature of 40.6C (105F) or higher is found, immediate and energetic treatment for
heat stroke must be given. A delay in treatment of more than four hours indicates a poor
prognosis.
Treatment consists of rapid cooling to drop rectal temperature to 38.9C (102F) within an hour.
This may be achieved by the following measures:
a. Undress the casualties
b. Give fully conscious patients cool liquids to drink

15-12
ATP/MTP-57.1
c. Spray a mist of 25-30C (77-86F) water over exposed skin and fan to enhance
evaporation
d. Immerse extremities (at least forearms) in cool or chilled water
e. In the case of unconscious or unresponsive patients, consider central cooling with chilled
saline gastric or rectal lavage as an additional measure.
(1) If immersed in cool water or sprayed with mist and fanned, discontinue this treatment
when the patient's rectal temperature falls below 39C (102F). Very cold water (below 10 C) or
ice should not be used to cool the skin, since it causes vasoconstriction which decreases blood
flow to the skin and actually slows the process of lowering core temperature. Hypotension
should be treated by an initial infusion of 300-500 cc normal saline, and this may need to be
followed by sustained infusion at a rate of 1000 cc per hour or more, according to blood pressure
and clinical responses.
(2) There is a risk of pulmonary oedema in heat-stroke, especially after vasoconstriction
which occurs in the cooling phase. When body temperature is near normal, hypotension and
dehydration may be treated with standard amounts of intravenous fluids. The airway must be
protected in all patients with a decreased level of consciousness. Many patients with heat stroke
vomit, therefore all stuporous or comatose patients must be placed in the recovery position to
protect their airway, or have an endotracheal airway placed to avoid aspiration. All cases of
moderate to severe cases of heat stroke must be evacuated to a hospital care facility as soon as
possible in order to avoid irreversible brain or renal injury, or disseminated intra-vascular
coagulation and multi-organ failure.
15.13. RADIATION INJURIES
15.13.1. GENERAL
France, Russia, China, the US and the UK operate nuclear powered submarines. In the event of
a SUBSUNK, specialist medical advice will be made available to deal with any radiation hazards.
Further details of Radiation Injury are also available in NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects
of NBC Defensive Operations AMed P-6C Volume 1 - Nuclear.
The overriding principle that applies in the management of casualties from any incidents that
may or may not involve radioactivity is that standard lifesaving emergency medical care must
take priority over any radiological concerns.
Casualties from a nuclear powered DISSUB with a damaged reactor may have been irradiated,
contaminated, or both. Purely irradiated casualties pose no radiation hazard to the crew of a
rescue vessel. Casualties who have external contamination with radioactive fission products can
pose a hazard if these fission products are allowed to spread. However simple procedures
including the undressing of casualties can contain this hazard so that the risk to the rescue
vessel crew and carers becomes negligible.
Radiation monitoring equipment can assist in the management of survivors by confirming and
identifying areas of contamination. However survivors can be safely and effectively managed
whilst waiting for these resources to arrive by making an assumption that they are contaminated
and following simple decontamination and containment procedures.

15-13
ATP/MTP-57.1
15.13.2. IRRADIATED CASUALTIES
Survivors will report the dose of ionising radiation (penetrating gamma radiation) in units called
Grays (Gy) or Sieverts (Sv) ( in the DISSUB scenario assume that 1 Gy is exactly the same as 1
Sv). Above 1 Gy (1 Sv) the survivors will begin to develop the effects of the Acute Radiation
Sickness (ARS). The initial symptoms (Prodromal Symptoms) of nausea, vomiting, lethargy and
perhaps diarrhoea will begin within several hours but then wear off after perhaps 24 hours.
Affected personnel will recover somewhat over the next few days (the Latent Period) but the
symptoms will return in due course - within days for severe doses (> 3 Grays) but perhaps taking
longer - several weeks for lesser doses (the Manifest Illness Phase). There should be no deaths
form ARS for doses below 1 Gy. 2 Gy equates to a 5% mortality from ARS. The LD50/60
(Lethal Dose for death in a 60 day period following exposure for 50% of those exposed,
assuming no treatment) is around 4.5 Gy.
The Acute Radiation Syndrome should not interfere with the provision of prompt emergency
medical care. Trauma, hypothermia, DCI etc. must be treated as soon as possible and then the
ARS can be dealt with by prompt CASEVAC to an appropriate shore based establishment. The
combination of ARS and other injury such as trauma or DCI will result in 'the combined injury
syndrome' and markedly increase the potential mortality and morbidly.
15.13.3. CONTAMINATED CASUALTIES

The decontamination of casualties with radiological contamination is laid out in ATP/MTP-57
Chapter 6, Section IX. The urgent stabilisation and treatment of casualties must not be delayed
because of contamination or the potential for it.
Fission products that have been deposited on the skin and clothing of survivors may cause
severe radiation burns to the skin (similar to conventional thermal burns) due to the intense
radiation (mainly beta particles) emitted by the deposited radioactive material. Beta particles can
penetrate clothing so skin damage will not be confined to exposed areas such as the hands and
face.
An internally contaminated survivor is not a hazard to treatment teams and there is little that can
be done for this problem at this stage apart from giving stable iodine (if this has not already been
done on the DISSUB) to protect the thyroid gland from Iodine131. It would also be beneficial to
collect and hold all urine, stool and vomit if this is reasonably practicable. In the later stages of
care these samples will help assess the extent of internal contamination and thereby direct the
need for other forms of medical intervention.

15-14
ATP/MTP-57.1
SECTION IV - TABLES FOR DECOMPRESSION OF RESCUEES
The tables outlined below have been proposed for use in the decompression of rescuees from a
DISSUB. They are fully outlined in the reports referenced with each set of tables. These reports
include the background information on how the tables were defined, their safety limitations and
how the Authors intended the tables to be used. Readers are advised to acquire and review the
reports before considering using the tables.
Of the tables reproduced below only the USN Accelerated O2 decompression tables have been
subject to trails, including manned trails. There is intention to undertake animal based validation
of the NSRS tables but no date has yet been set for this. This supplement will be updated once
this validation is complete.
The guidance on selecting a decompression table is laid out in Chapter 6 Annex G. This is
generic and should be modified by each rescue system as appropriate to their decompression
facility, available gas supplies and the ability to transfer casualties under pressure between the
SRV and the decompression system.
15.14. US NAVY OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE ON ACCELERATED OXYGEN

DECOMPRESSION
Reference: This information is reproduced from Appendix A of the US Navy Experimental Diving
Unit report NEDU TR 11-00 entitled “Accelerated Decompression Using Oxygen For Submarine
Rescue – Summary Report And Operational Guidance”.
Limitations: The full US Navy report includes the following advice: “The procedure which follows
in Appendix A is our best estimate of the minimum safe decompression, based on experience
gained in these experiments. We do not regard these recommendations as definitive, and
caution that the status of the subjects and the quality of the oxygen delivery system must be
taken into consideration. If operationally feasible, we recommend extending the time for
decompression on oxygen beyond these minimal times.”
These decompression procedures are designed to be used in the Deep Submergence Rescue
Vehicle (DSRV) fitted with Field Change 665, the Onboard Decompression System; however,
they may be adapted for use in any rescue system, such as the planned Submarine Diving and
Recompression System (SRDRS), with the capacity to provide safe delivery of oxygen for
breathing during a controlled decompression. The maximum depth to which these tables have
been trailed is 60 feet of sea-water and decompression from depths greater than this are not
addressed.
In systems without on-board decompression in the rescue vehicle, or transfer under pressure
capability, it will probably be necessary to bring rescuees to surface pressure in order to transfer
from the rescue vehicle to the recompression chamber. Limit the surface interval to 15 minutes
or less whenever possible. Recompress the rescuees back to the DISSUB internal pressure and
then begin the procedure described below.
15.15. BASIC PROCEDURE

Table 15-3 gives the decompression times on oxygen needed to safely return pressurized
rescuees to normal atmospheric pressure. These times do not include air breaks (discussed
below) which may increase the total time required by as much as 25%.

15-15
ATP/MTP-57.1
O2 Time
EAD at Depth Total O2
Decompression Stop Depth (fsw)
(fsw) (O2 Pre- Time (min)
breathe)(min)
45 40 35 30 25 20
20 0 0
Oxygen Breathing Times at Depth (min)
25 70 70
30 140 140
35 120 40 40 200
40 120 10 85 40 255
45 120 20 105 115 50 410
50 120 85 105 115 50 475
55 120 55 95 105 115 50 540
60 120 30 85 95 105 115 50 600
Table 15-3 Submarine Rescue Oxygen Decompression Table
Notes:
1. Oxygen Breathing Times are given in minutes.
2. If air breaks are used, the time for each decompression stop may increase (see below)
3. The time required to purge the closed-circuit breathing loop of nitrogen is included in the
decompression stop time and does not need to be accounted for separately.
To use Table 15-3, follow these six steps:

1. First calculate the rescuee's Equivalent Air Depth (EAD). This is necessary because the
pressurized atmosphere of the DISSUB will likely have different partial pressures of oxygen
and nitrogen than standard air. Decompression requirements are determined by the partial
pressure of nitrogen in the tissues, and the use of the EAD is a convenient method of
expressing the amount of nitrogen in the pressurized atmosphere. The EAD may be
calculated from the following formula:
(Dsub + 33) (1 - FO2)

EAD = ------------------------------- - 33
0.79
where: EAD = Equivalent Air Depth (fsw)

15-16
ATP/MTP-57.1
Dsub = DISSUB internal pressure or depth (fsw)
FO2 = Fractional concentration of oxygen in DISSUB
atmosphere
If the information is available, use the highest Dsub and the lowest FO2 recorded in the last 24
hours when making the EAD calculation.
2. Enter Table 15-3 at the depth which is exactly equal or next greater than the calculated EAD.
Begin the procedure by placing the rescuees on the oxygen breathing system. Breathe
oxygen for the time indicated in the second column, "O2 Time at Depth". Time is given in
minutes. This oxygen period is termed "pre-breathing" because it takes place before
decompression begins.
3. When the pre-breathing period is complete, decompress at 1-5 fsw/min to the first
decompression stop indicated in the table.
4. Breathe oxygen at each decompression stop for the time indicated in the table. Oxygen
breathing times are given in minutes.
5. Ascend between decompression stops at 1-5 fsw/min. Ascent time between stops is
included in the subsequent stop time.
6. Upon completion of the last oxygen breathing period, remove the oxygen mask and
decompress to atmospheric pressure at 1-5 fsw/min.
15.16. MODIFICATIONS TO THE BASIC PROCEDURE

In emergency situations, it is highly likely that many factors could result in the need to vary or
modify these procedures, and the on-scene Undersea (Diving) Medical Officer should be
allowed to do so if necessary to accommodate priorities. The following recommendations should
be followed whenever possible.
15.16.1. AIR BREAKS DURING PRE-BREATHING AND DECOMPRESSION

Periodic interruption of 100% oxygen breathing during pre-breathing and decompression is
highly desirable to reduce the injurious effects of oxygen on the central nervous system and
lung. Interruption of oxygen breathing may also be necessary to change CO2 canisters in the
closed-circuit breathing loop. Unexpected interruption of oxygen breathing may also occur
because of rescuee illness or injury.
When at a pressure greater than 45 fsw (actual pressure, not EAD), interrupt oxygen breathing
every 30 minutes with at least five minutes on air to minimize the risk of central nervous system
oxygen toxicity (in this section, the term "air" refers to any approximately normoxic breathing
mixture, or ambient cabin atmosphere).
When 45 fsw and shallower, interrupt oxygen breathing every two hours with at least 10 minutes
on air. If the rescue timeline permits, interrupt oxygen breathing every 60 minutes with 15
minutes on air when 45 fsw and shallower. This pattern of 60 minutes on oxygen, 15 minutes on
air is optimal for minimizing lung injury.
Once oxygen breathing is begun, consider any time spent on air to be "dead time," that is, not to
count toward meeting the oxygen decompression requirement. Lengthen the time at each stop,
and the total decompression time, correspondingly so that all the required time on oxygen during
pre-breathing and at each stop is completed.

15-17
ATP/MTP-57.1
Optimally, rescuees should be on oxygen for at least 15 minutes prior to decompression to the
first stop and should continue to breathe oxygen during decompression to the stop. This,
however, is not a requirement. Ascent to the first decompression stop may be made on air or
cabin atmosphere if necessary.
There is no contraindication to ascending between decompression stops while on air or cabin
atmosphere. Ascent time, however, should not be included in the subsequent stop time since the
rescuee is not on oxygen.
During oxygen pre-breathing, the time on air or cabin atmosphere should not exceed 15 minutes
for each hour of oxygen breathed. Otherwise, some of the beneficial effects of oxygen pre-
breathing will be lost. If the time on air exceeds 15 minutes per hour, add two minutes to the pre-
breathing time for each minute spent on air beyond the 15 minute allowance.
15.16.2. OXYGEN PRE-BREATHING IN DISSUB OR DURING TRANSIT

Oxygen pre-breathing in the Distressed Submarine (DISSUB), or in the rescue vehicle during
transit, could be used to shorten the time required for decompression at the final destination.
The decision to employ oxygen pre-breathing in the DISSUB or rescue vehicle during transit
would depend on the availability of suitable equipment to supply oxygen, the risk of fire in the
rescue vehicle cabin, the extent to which rescuees are already suffering from pulmonary oxygen
toxicity or other pulmonary injury, and the anticipated risk of central nervous system oxygen
toxicity. 100 % oxygen should not be breathed at an actual pressure greater than 60 fsw due to
the risk of CNS oxygen toxicity.
Reduce the oxygen time in Table A1 by one minute for each minute spent pre-breathing oxygen
in the DISSUB or during transit. Subtract oxygen time from the pre-breathing time in Table 15-6
first, then from the decompression stops, beginning with the shallowest decompression stop first.
Example: A rescuee on the 45 fsw EAD schedule breathes oxygen for 180 minutes during
transit. The 120 minute pre-breathe requirement has already been satisfied, so direct ascent to
the first stop is allowed. The remaining 60 minutes is subtracted first from the 20 fsw stop (50
minutes), then from the 25 fsw stop (10 minutes). The rescuee may surface after completing 105
minutes on oxygen at 25 fsw.
Use the effective pre-breathing time, not the actual pre-breathing time in the DISSUB or during
transit, to determine how much decompression time to subtract from Table A1. The effective pre-
breathing time is the actual pre-breathing time minus two minutes for each minute spent on
DISSUB or DSRV atmosphere beyond the 15 minute allowance per hour of oxygen.
Example: A rescuee prebreathes oxygen in the DISSUB for two 60 minute periods separated by
a 15 minute air break, then breathes air for 60 minutes in the DSRV during transit from the
DISSUB to the MOSUB. How much decompression time should be subtracted from Table 15-6.
Solution: Thirty minutes on air is allowed for the two hours of oxygen breathed. The rescuee,
however, has spent a total of 75 minutes on air (the 15 minute air break + the 60 minute transit
in the DSRV). The excess air time is 45 minutes (75-30). The effective oxygen pre-breathing
time therefore is 120 - (2 x 45) = 30 minutes. Subtract 30 minutes from the oxygen
decompression time in Table A1.

15-18
ATP/MTP-57.1
For DISSUB pressures up to an EAD of 40 fsw, all of the oxygen decompression time required
by Table A1 can generally be completed by pre-breathing without a significant risk of pulmonary
or CNS oxygen toxicity.
For DISSUB pressures greater than an EAD of 40 fsw, the allowable pre-breathing time will be
governed primarily by the extent to which pulmonary symptoms are already present and by the
actual DISSUB pressure, which governs the inspired oxygen partial pressure during the pre-
breathing period. The actual DISSUB pressure may be significantly less than the equivalent air
depth due to oxygen consumption in the DISSUB. This lower actual pressure allows for a greater
use of oxygen pre-breathing. As a general rule, limit oxygen pre-breathing to 240 minutes at an
actual DISSUB pressure up to 40 fsw and to 120 minutes at an actual pressure of 41-60 fsw.
100 % oxygen should not be breathed at an actual pressure greater than 60 fsw due to the risk
of CNS oxygen toxicity.
15.16.3. SHORTENED DECOMPRESSION

Operational circumstances may force shortening of the prescribed decompression. Shortening
decompression is expected to increase both the incidence and severity of decompression
sickness, but the exact risks are difficult to predict because the data are extremely limited and
current decompression risk models do not describe saturation decompression on oxygen very
well. Moderate shortening is expected to produce neurological and cardiovascular
decompression sickness while extreme shortening such as direct ascent to the surface from 50-
60 fsw EAD, may produce death in individuals left untreated. Shortened decompression may
also put operators at a significant risk for decompression sickness. Decompression should not
be shortened unless other operational factors outweigh this significant risk.
15.17. DECOMPRESSION OF SYSTEM OPERATORS AND TENDERS

In many cases, system constraints will force system operators and inside medical tenders to
decompress at the same time as the rescuees. To achieve safe decompression, operators and
tenders must breathe oxygen during the decompression for the times indicated in Table A2.
Oxygen breathing may be synchronized with rescuee breathing cycles and follow the same
pattern of time on oxygen and time on air. Oxygen breathing by operators and tenders should be
timed so that the last minute of oxygen breathing is completed when the rescuees are ready to
make the final decompression to the surface.
In Table 15-4, Operator Exposure Time is defined as the elapsed time from initial pressurization
of the rescue vehicle until the rescuees begin oxygen pre-breathing after mating to the MOSUB
or SRDRS chamber. Enter the table at the Operator Exposure Time that is exactly equal to or
next greater than the actual exposure time. Read down to the EAD schedule being used by the
rescuees. Find the oxygen breathing time in minutes.
During the pre-breathing period, operators and tenders will be exposed to an additional period of
time at the DISSUB depth beyond that already included in the Operator Exposure Time. This
additional time has been incorporated into the calculation of the decompression requirement in
Table 15-4 and need not be accounted for separately.
If the rescuees breathe oxygen during transit, some decompression schedules may be
shortened to the point where the oxygen breathing requirement of the operators and tenders
exceeds the remaining decompression time. This is especially true of shallow schedules with
long operator exposure times. In these cases, the operators should begin oxygen breathing
15-19
ATP/MTP-57.1
during transit along with the rescuees so that they have an opportunity to complete all the
required oxygen time prior to decompression to the surface. Use the operator's effective pre-
breathing time (see calculation above) when computing his remaining oxygen decompression
time.
EAD (fsw)
1
Operator Exposure Time (minutes)2
Schedule
03 120 240 360 480 600 720
25 0 0 0 20 40 60 70
30 0 10 40 70 100 120 140
35 0 30 80 110 140 160 180
40 15 70 120 150 180 210 230
45 70 120 160 190 220 250 270
50 100 150 190 230 260 280 300
55 130 180 220 260 280 300 320
60 160 210 250 280 310 330 350
Table 15-4 System Operator/Tender Oxygen Breathing Times (minutes)

Notes:
1. Use the same decompression schedule as the rescuees, based on the EAD, and breathe
oxygen for the times indicated.
2. Operator Exposure Time is the elapsed time from initial pressurization of the rescue vehicle
until the rescuees begin breathing oxygen after mating to the MOSUB or SRDRS chamber or
decanting to a deck recompression chamber.
3. Use the zero column for a tender who locks into the recompression chamber at the
beginning of the oxygen pre-breathing period and remains in the chamber throughout the
remaining decompression.
15.18. TREATMENT OF DECOMPRESSION SICKNESS AND ARTERIAL GAS EMBOLISM

IN SUBMARINE RESCUE OPERATIONS
15.18.1. GENERAL
Decompression sickness or arterial gas embolism (AGE) could occur in any DISSUB scenario,
either after use of the schedules in the previous section, or in the likely event that conditions
could not allow use of the procedures due to time or equipment constraints. Therefore, treatment
of a DISSUB casualty must take into account not only the fact that the rescuee has
decompression sickness or arterial gas embolism, but also that he may have omitted a
significant amount of saturation decompression.
Standard treatments may resolve the immediate clinical problem, but not satisfy the patient's
saturation decompression obligation. Failure to take this omitted decompression time into
account may result in inadequate treatment with subsequent recurrence of symptoms. The

15-20
ATP/MTP-57.1
following procedures are designed to provide both recompression therapy and the total oxygen
time needed to resolve the patient's remaining decompression obligation.
15.18.2. PROCEDURE
a. Allocate patients for recompression treatment following the appropriate DISSUB triage
algorithm.
b. Compress to 60 fsw and begin treatment with oxygen according to U.S. Navy Treatment
Table 6. Recompression deeper than 60 fsw should not be undertaken unless it is certain
that chamber resources can be devoted exclusively to that patient, for example, at a shore-
based referral site.
c. Follow Treatment Table 6 to the completion of the 30 fsw stop using allowed extensions at
60 and 30 fsw to resolve symptoms, as needed.
d. Add the time spent on oxygen during the current treatment to any time spent on oxygen
during saturation decompression or prior recompression treatments to calculate the patient's
total oxygen time to that point.
e. Determine the oxygen time required for safe decompression from the DISSUB depth using
Table 15-5 below. Subtract the patient's total oxygen time from the required oxygen time to
determine the patient's remaining omitted oxygen decompression time.
DISSUB Equivalent Required Oxygen
Air Depth (fsw) Time (min)
20 0
25 70
30 140
35 200
40 255
45 410
50 475
55 540
60 600
Table 15-5 Required Oxygen Time

f. If no omitted oxygen decompression time remains, complete Table 6 by surfacing from 30
fsw on oxygen at 1 fsw/min. If less than 170 minutes of omitted oxygen decompression time
remain, ascend to 15 fsw at 1 fsw/min on oxygen, complete the remaining oxygen time at 15
fsw, then ascend to the surface on oxygen at 1 fsw/min. If more than 170 minutes of omitted
decompression time remain, complete any time in excess of 170 minutes at 30 fsw, then
ascend to 15 fsw at 1 fsw/min on oxygen, complete 170 minutes on oxygen at 15 fsw, then
ascend to the surface on oxygen at 1 fsw/min. Oxygen breathing during the additional time
at 30 and 15 fsw should be interrupted every 60 minutes with a 15 minute air break
continuing the pattern of oxygen exposure begun at 30 fsw on Table 6.
g. If necessary, surface asymptomatic or nearly asymptomatic patients before completion of
treatment to make room in the chamber for more emergent cases. Reduce the patient's
omitted oxygen decompression time by the amount of oxygen time completed during the
15-21
ATP/MTP-57.1
treatment. If omitted oxygen decompression time remains, additional oxygen recompression
treatment should be administered when feasible. In the interim, these patients should
breathe surface oxygen and remain at rest in the supine position.
h. Once treatment is initiated, complete one Treatment Table 6 at a minimum even if the
omitted oxygen decompression time is zero (i.e., the calculated amount of necessary oxygen
decompression was given prior to onset of DCS). Interrupt treatment only if premature
surfacing is required to accommodate a more emergent case.
i. Allocate patients with recurrence of symptoms or new symptoms post treatment to
recompression according to the triage rules. Once all the omitted oxygen decompression
time has been completed, these patients may be managed as per the USN Diving Manual.
Asymptomatic rescuees with omitted oxygen decompression time are at significant risk for
decompression sickness. These individuals should be recompressed and treated as above
when circumstances permit. While awaiting recompression, these individuals should breathe
surface oxygen and remain at rest in the supine position. Surface oxygen should be
continued for a period not less than three times the omitted oxygen decompression time.
j. The on-scene Undersea Medical Officer should have the discretion to vary these procedures
due to other needs of the patient, allocation of resources, or other considerations.
15.19. REFERENCE
Naval Sea Systems, U.S. Navy Diving Manual, Vol. #5, Rev. 4., Naval Sea Systems Command,
NAVSEA SS521-AG-PRO-010 (Arlington, VA: U.S. Navy, 1999), Chapter 21.
15.20. UK ACCELERATED DECOMPRESSION SCHEDULES

Reference: The information for this section is drawn from INM Report No. R2002.004 –
‘Accelerated Decompression Following Rescue from a Pressurised Submarine - Interim
Procedures’ by Surgeon Commander P J Benton, Royal Navy, March 2002.
Limitations: These tables were designed using available information from manned and animal
trials available in 2000. They are based on a maximum of a 5 minute window between surfacing
in the SRV and being back at depth within the decompression facility. These tables have not
been validated by trials.
ROYAL NAVY TABLE 66, TABLE 66 MOD I AND TABLE 66 MOD II

a. ROYAL NAVY TABLE 66
Gauge Depth Stops/Ascent Elapsed time Rate of Ascent

(metres) (minutes) (hours and mins) (metres/minute)
14 30 (O2) 00:00 - 00:30

14 5 (Air) 00:30 - 00:35
14 30 (O2) 00:35 - 01:05
14 5 (Air) 01:05 - 01:10
14 20 (O2) 01:10 - 01:30
14 -0 10 (O2) 01:30 - 01:40 1.4 m in 1 min
Surface 01:40

15-22
ATP/MTP-57.1
Attendants oxygen breathing requirements, RN Table 66
The attendant must breath oxygen for the last 20 minutes of the table including the 10 minute
ascent from 14 metres to the surface
b. ROYAL NAVY TABLE 66 MOD I
Gauge Depth Stops/Ascent Elapsed time Rate of ascent

(metres) (minutes) (hours and (metres/minute)
minutes)
14 30 (O2) 00:00 - 00:30

14 5 (Air) 00:30 - 00:35
14 30 (O2) 00:35 - 01:05
14 5 (Air) 01:05 - 01:10
14 30 (O2) 01:10 - 01:40
14 5 (Air) 01:40 - 01:45
14 30 (O2) 01:45 - 02:15
14 5 (Air) 02:15 - 02:20
14 30 (O2) 02:20 - 02:50
14 5 (Air) 02:50 - 02:55
14 30 (O2) 02:55 - 03:25
14 - 0 10 (O2) 03:25 - 03:35 1.4 m in 1 min
Surface 03:35
Attendants oxygen breathing requirements, RN Table 66 Mod I
The attendant for a Table 66 Mod I must breath oxygen for the final 30 minute oxygen period at
14 metres and throughout the 10 minute ascent to the surface.

15-23
ATP/MTP-57.1
c. ROYAL NAVY TABLE 66 MOD II
Gauge Depth Stops/Ascent Elapsed time Rate of ascent

(metres) (minutes) (hours and (metres/minute)
minutes)
14 30 (O2) 00:00 - 00:30

14 5 (Air) 00:30 - 00:35
14 30 (O2) 00:35 - 01:05
14 5 (Air) 01:05 - 01:10
14 30 (O2) 01:10 - 01:40
14 5 (Air) 01:40 - 01:45
14 30 (O2) 01:45 - 02:15
14 5 (Air) 02:15 - 02:20
14 30 (O2) 02:20 - 02:50
14 5 (Air) 02:50 - 02:55
14 30 (O2) 02:55 - 03:25
14 5 (Air) 03:25 - 03:30
14 30 (O2) 03:30 - 04:00
14 5 (Air) 04:00 - 04:05
14 30 (O2) 04:05 - 04:35
14 - 0 10 (O2) 04:35 - 04:45 1.4 m in 1 min
Surface 04:45
Attendants oxygen breathing requirements, RN Table 66 Mod II

The attendant for a Table 66 Mod II must breath oxygen for the last two 30 minute oxygen
periods at 14 metres and throughout the 10 minute ascent to the surface.
15.21. PROCEDURES
15.22. EQUIVALENT AIR DEPTH PRINCIPLE

The Equivalent Air Depth (EAD) principle is a method by which a decompression table
developed for use by divers breathing air can be adapted for use when the atmosphere breathed
is composed of varying fractions of nitrogen (fN2) and oxygen (fO2). This is of importance as the
decompression obligation is determined by the partial pressure of nitrogen in the air breathed
and not simply the depth at which the air is breathed. Because the escape compartment air is
unlikely to contain 21% oxygen the EAD, calculated from the compartment pressure and fraction
of oxygen (fO2), is the simplest method of determining decompression obligation as diving

15-24
ATP/MTP-57.1
tables list decompression procedures for given depths and not fN2. Within a stricken submarine
the fO2 will slowly fall with a corresponding increase in fN2. Thus, the EAD may be in excess of
the measured depth (pressure) of the compartment. Assuming that the maximum compartment
pressure to be 5 bar (0.5mPa) and survival possible down to an pO2 of 0.12 bar (12kPa), the
pO2 will have dropped slowly over time so permitting a degree of acclimatisation, the EAD could
be as great as 51.7 metres. Below is the equation for calculation of EAD:
EAD = fN2 (D + 10) - 10

79
Where: EAD = Equivalent Air Depth in metres.
fN2 = Fraction of nitrogen in 'air' breathed.
(calculated from compartment pressure in (P) and pO2, all pressures in bar)
fN2 = (P - pO2) x 100
P
D = Depth in metres (calculated from compartment pressure) D = (P x 10) – 10
15.23. DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES - SURVIVORS

Saturation EADs less than 7 metres. Research has shown that the incidence of decompression
illness (DCI) amongst subjects, who have remained at a pressure of 1.65 bar (0.165mPa) for
sufficient time for their tissues to become saturated with nitrogen, and then decompressed to 1
bar (0.1 mPa) over a minute is extremely low. Thus survivors recovered from a compartment
with an EAD of 7 metres or less will have a very low probability of developing decompression
illness. Although the probability of DCI would be low, if adequate supplies of oxygen are
available it is recommended that following decompression within LR5 the survivors be given
100% oxygen at 1 bar (0.1mPa) for 60 minutes as a precautionary measure.
However, if the EAD is in excess of 7 metres (0.17mPa) the incidence of DCI will increase as the
EAD increases, making it essential that survivors are recompressed as soon as possible after
leaving LR5. Survivors rescued from a submarine compartment can also be expected to have
had restricted fluid and calorie intake for many days as well as being mildly, or markedly,
hypothermic. Individuals in such a condition will be not dissimilar to some of the critical care
patients managed at the Hyperbaric Medicine Unit at the Royal Hospital Haslar who have shown
an increased tendency to develop oxygen seizures when exposed to therapeutic levels of
oxygen (pO2 of 2.8 bar (0.28mPa)). Because of the difficulties of managing a convulsing
individual within the cramped conditions of a recompression chamber containing up to 14
individuals it is considered advisable to restrict the pO2 to a slightly lower level. Royal Navy
Table 66 is a 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) therapeutic table that can be easily modified to provide an
accelerated decompression schedule. Experience has shown that the incidence of oxygen
seizures amongst critical care patients treated with this table is very low and as such it is
considered unlikely that oxygen seizures will occur amongst survivors rescued from a stricken
submarine.
Royal Navy Table 66 is only of 100 minutes duration and as such would be of inadequate
duration for the management of survivors rescued from a pressurised compartment with a
significantly increased EAD. However, by the simple inclusion of additional 30 minute oxygen
breathing periods at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa), separated by 5 minute air breaks, the table can be
15-25
ATP/MTP-57.1
easily adapted to provide an accelerated decompression schedule. By holding the survivors at
2.4 bar (0.24mPa) for the full duration of the decompression schedule with only a 10 minute
decompression from maximum chamber depth (2.4 bar, 0.24mPa) to the surface (1 bar,
0.1mPa) maximum benefit can be obtained from breathing hyperbaric oxygen. This approach
differs from standard decompression procedures for in water diving and also from the approach
adopted by the US Navy in their accelerated decompression tables which both utilise a stepped
decompression. However, it should be noted that the US Navy accelerated decompression
tables do utilise oxygen breathing at depths down to 60 fsw (approximately 2.8 bar, 0.28mPa)
whilst survivors are being transported within the rescue submersible. The decision as to how
many additional oxygen breathing periods should be included is based upon a combination of
data from existing decompression tables and results from the US Navy accelerated
decompression table trials.
Saturation EADs in excess of 7 metres but not exceeding 18 metres. For dives to 15 metres with
duration in excess of 450 minutes RN Table 11-Mod requires 80 minutes of decompression
stops with the deepest decompression stop at 6 metres. For a dive to 18 metres for duration in
excess of 495 minutes RN Table 11-Mod requires a total of 125 minutes of decompression with
the deepest decompression stop at 9 metres. In both examples the diver breathes air during all
decompression stops. Although these profiles are extreme exposures significantly below the
Limiting Line in an emergency situation the risk of DCI would be considered acceptable
especially if recompression facilities were available on site. RN Table 66 provides 80 minutes of
oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) with an additional 10 minutes oxygen breathing during
the ascent to 1 bar (0.1mPa). The duration of the RN Table 66 is thus in excess of the
decompression required for a 15 metre dive of maximum duration and only some 25 minutes
shorter than the decompression time required for an 18 metre dive of maximum duration.
However, RN Table 66 utilises oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) whereas RN Table 11-
Mod uses air. Oxygen breathing markedly increases inert gas removal from tissues and as such
it can be expected that even with the shorter decompression time for the 18 metre exposure the
RN Table 66 will have a lower risk of DCI than the RN Table 11-Mod. Based upon this argument
individuals rescued from an EAD in excess of 7 metres but not exceeding 18 metres should be
recompressed and treated using RN Table 66. RN Table 66 is equivalent to 264 UPTDs.
For saturation EADs in excess of 18 metres but not exceeding 30 metres. Little data is available
for decompressions from such shallow saturation exposures although some guidance can be
obtained from experience gained by the construction industry in their use of compressed air for
both tunnel and caisson work. Recent studies investigated the use of oxygen decompression
following a 4 hour working shift at 2.85bar (0.285mPa). The decompression profile (Blackpool
Tables) for such an exposure currently requires 110 minutes of decompression breathing air, 45
minutes of which are at 1.6 bar (0.16mPa). During the trial oxygen was breathed for 35 minutes
of the 45 minute decompression stop at 1.6 bar (0.16mPa). Doppler scoring using the Kisman
Masurel system revealed a median score at rest of 3 for the controls who breathed compressed
air during decompression and a median score of 0 for the subjects who breathed oxygen.
Following movement the median scores were 4 for the control group (air decompression) and 1
for the subject group (oxygen decompression). Thus it would appear that even with a relatively
short duration of oxygen breathing at only 1.6 bar (0.16mPa) a significant reduction in inert gas
burden, and hence decompression stress and Doppler score can be achieved. Based upon this
information RN Table 66 was extended by 3 full 30 minute oxygen periods at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa)
15-26
ATP/MTP-57.1
giving a total of 180 minutes oxygen breathing before decompression to the surface. This
extended Table is known as RN Table 66 Mod I and should be used for survivors who have
been saturated at EADs in excess of 18 metres but not exceeding 30 metres. RN Table 66 Mod I
is equivalent to 568 UPTDs.
For saturation EADs in excess of 30 metres. Survivors rescued from compartments at such a
high EAD will have a considerable inert gas burden that ideally should be treated using a
saturation decompression schedule such as RN Table 64. However, where this is not possible
RN Table 66 can be extended to include 240 minutes of oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa).
This extended table is known as RN Table 66 Mod II. The probability of DCI following such a
relatively short decompression table is unknown but probably quite high. However, the severity
of DCI can be expected to be relatively minor with sufficient time between surfacing and onset of
symptoms that the individual will ideally already have been evacuated shore side to a hyperbaric
facility for observation and additional treatment if required. RN Table 66 Mod II should only be
used in circumstances, such as when there is only a single recompression chamber on the
MOSHIP, when it is essential to free that chamber for use by the next group of survivors to arrive
onboard the MOSHIP. RN Table 66 Mod II is equivalent to 750 UPTSs.
Tables 66, Table 66 Mod I and Table 66 Mod II are at para 15.20. A summary of the
recompression tables to be used is at Table 15-6. It must be emphasised that these
decompression procedures have not been formally evaluated in this role. The procedures should
be considered as being a ‘best guess’ based upon a combination of incomplete scientific data,
the clinical experience of the author and the facilities and equipment that can be expected to be
available onboard an LR5 MOSHIP.
Equivalent Probability of Probable type Time to onset Action

Air Depth DCI untreated and severity of of DCI if
(EAD) DCI if untreated untreated
metres
<7 Very low Limb pain. Not 90 minutes + 100% surface oxygen
life threatening for 60 minutes if
available.
> 7 to 18 Increases with Majority limb 5 to 90 a. Immediate transfer

increasing pain but minutes to recompression
depth. Possibly neurological chamber,
30-50% symptoms with
incidence at 18 b. RN Table 66.
increasing depth
msw c. If no chamber within
5 minutes 100%
oxygen and urgent
transfer to chamber

15-27
ATP/MTP-57.1
Equivalent Probability of Probable type Time to onset Action
Air Depth DCI untreated and severity of of DCI if
(EAD) DCI if untreated untreated
metres
> 18 to 30 Increases with ALL will have 3 to 15 a. RAPID

increasing depth limb pain. minutes. recompression. Limit
from approx. number of personnel
MOST will have
30% at 18 msw rescued per run to
serious
to 100% at 30 ensure transfer from
neurological
msw. LR5 to deck chamber
symptoms.
achievable within 7
SOME will have minutes maximum.
pulmonary
b. RN Table 66 Mod I.
symptoms
(chokes)LIFE c. If small numbers of
THREATENING survivors and sufficient
recompression
chambers consider
Royal Navy Table 64
> 30 to 50 100% ALL will have 3 to 15 a. RAPID

limb pain. minutes recompression. Limit
number of personnel
MOST will have
rescued per run to
serious
ensure transfer from
neurological
LR5 to deck chamber
symptoms.
achievable within 7
SOME will have minutes maximum.
pulmonary
b. RN Table 66 Mod II
symptoms
(chokes)LIFE c. If small numbers of
THREATENING survivors and sufficient
recompression
chambers consider
Royal Navy Table 64
Table 15-6 Accelerated Decompression Procedures
Work has been completed by the US Navy to develop accelerated decompression tables which
are of longer duration than the Table 66 Mod I and II. However, the US Navy tables do not utilise
such lengthy periods of oxygen breathing at 2.4 bar (0.24 mPa) choosing instead to use a longer
stepped decompression following, when possible, a period of oxygen pre breathing at escape
compartment pressure. Although such a stepped decompression follows standard
decompression practice for in water dive decompression tables in the case of an emergency
accelerated decompression table it is considered that this may not be appropriate. The aim of
any decompression table is to remove inert gas as rapidly and safely as possible so permitting

15-28
ATP/MTP-57.1
the diver to return to the surface. With in water decompression the depth at which oxygen
breathing can commence is restricted to relatively shallow depths. This is due to a combination
of facts. These are the increased sensitivity of the immersed individual to raised partial
pressures of oxygen compared to the individual within a dry chamber plus the fact that the
consequences, often death, of an in water oxygen convulsion are far more severe than the
consequences of convulsion within a dry chamber. There is also the problem of pulmonary
oxygen toxicity. Therapeutic hyperbaric oxygen tables differ from decompression tables in that
they provide the subject/patient with the maximum safe ‘dose’ of oxygen accepting that the
therapeutic benefit from treatment outweigh the risk of oxygen toxicity. It is suggested that an
emergency accelerated decompression table should be thought of in the same way as a
therapeutic table with the benefits, in the form of reduced decompression time, made possible by
remaining at a relatively high pO2 outweighing the problems of minor pulmonary oxygen toxicity.
Pulmonary oxygen toxicity is unlikely to be a significant problem as even RN Table 66 Mod II
only has an oxygen exposure of 750 UPTDs which is comparable to the exposure (759 UPTDs)
associated with an RN Table 62 with 2 extensions at 2.8 bar (0.28mPa). As has been already
discussed clinical experience suggests that even with dehydrated and physically exhausted
subjects the probability of oxygen convulsions at 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) is low.
The proposed accelerated decompression tables also differ from the US Navy tables in that the
primary aim is to prevent severe life threatening DCI, such as acute pulmonary DCI (the
chokes), and to markedly reduce the probability of DCI developing post treatment. This is in
contrast to the US Navy accelerated decompression tables that have been designed to provide a
complete decompression from saturation. Although it is hoped that the use of Table 66 and
Table 66 Mod I and II would provide a complete decompression it is accepted that symptoms of
DCI may develop after completion of these tables. However, any such cases could be expected
to present with relatively minor non-life threatening symptoms such as limb pain. Survivors
presenting with such symptoms could be treated with 100% surface oxygen whilst awaiting
availability of a suitable recompression chamber. Indeed, as such symptoms would probably not
present for a number of hours after completion of the decompression table it is probably that the
survivor would already have been evacuated ashore to the vicinity of a hyperbaric unit. During
both the evaluation trials for the US Navy accelerated decompression tables (8) and recent
simulated submarine escapes following saturation carried out at QinetiQ Alverstoke there has
been a minimum period of 2 hours post decompression before the onset of symptoms of DCI.
15.24. DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES - RECOMPRESSION CHAMBER OPERATORS

During a rescue from a pressurised submarine compartment the recompression chamber
operators (RCOs) within the rescue chamber of the LR5 would also be exposed to increased
pressure. Provided that the pressure was below 1.9 bar (0.19mPa), which equates to a depth of
9 metres, there would be no decompression obligation. For pressures in excess of 1.9 bar
(0.19mPa) but less than 4.3 bar (0.43mPa), which equates to a depth of 33 metres, Royal Navy
Table 14-Mod (an air surface decompression table) can be used. For pressures exceeding 4.3
bar (0.43mPa) but less than 5 bar (0.5mPa), which equates to a depth of 40 metres, Royal Navy
Table 15-Mod (an oxygen surface decompression table) can be used.
Even for pressures exceeding 1.9 bar (0.19mPa) with careful use of Royal Navy Table 11-Mod it
may be possible to limit the RCOs exposure to the no-stop time for a given depth. All of these
decompression tables are detailed within the Royal Navy Diving Manual, BR2806. As the RCOs

15-29
ATP/MTP-57.1
would be breathing air either from the LR5 breathing systems or from self-contained air
breathing apparatus if entry to the submarine was required fO2 of the escape compartment
would not be a factor in determining the RCOs decompression obligation.
Chamber Pressure Depth (msw) Decompression Table

(bar)
1 to 1.9 9 Royal Navy Table 11-Mod
>1.9 to 4.3 >9 to 33 Royal Navy Table 14-Mod
>4.3 to 5.0 >33 to 40 Royal Navy Table 15-Mod
Table 15-7 Procedures for management of LR5 recompression chamber operators

Because any survivors rescued from a pressurised submarine will have a very different
decompression obligation to that of the LR5 RCOs whenever possible at least 2 recompression
chambers should be deployed onboard the MOSHIP. One chamber should be available to
provide treatment for survivors with the second dedicated to the surface decompression of the
LR5 chamber operators. Unfortunately even when the MOSHIP is a large vessel space
constraints may permit only one multiplace recompression chamber to be deployed. In such
circumstances surface decompression can either be performed within small monoplace
chambers such as the HYPERLITEor by treating both the LR5 RCOs and survivors within the
same chamber.
If the RCOs are to be treated within the same recompression chamber as the survivors then
there are 2 options. These are:
a. For the RCOs to act as attendants to the survivors and complete the same decompression
schedule (RN Table 66 or RN Table 66 Mod I or II) as required by the survivors.
b. For the RCOs to spend the total decompression time, irrespective of depth of
decompression stop, required according to RN Table 14-Mod or Table 15-Mod (whichever
appropriate) breathing oxygen at 14 metres. On completion the RCOs would transfer to the
man lock of the recompression chamber and be decompressed to the surface over 10
minutes whilst continuing to breath oxygen. Oxygen breathing periods at 14 metres would
be of 30 minutes on oxygen, 5 minutes on air. Only time spent breathing oxygen would be
counted towards the decompression time, time spent breathing chamber air being “dead
time”.
The decision as to which of the above procedures to complete will depend upon factors such as
manpower availability as well as pressure time exposure of the RCOs.
15.25. OXYGEN REQUIREMENTS

Accelerated decompression tables will almost without exception utilise oxygen. Consideration
must therefore be given to the provision of adequate supplies of oxygen onboard the MOSHIP
as well as to methods of supplying the oxygen to the survivors within the recompression
chambers. The following calculations are based upon a respiratory minute volume of 15 litres
per minute surface equivalent representative of the gas usage of an individual at rest.

15-30
ATP/MTP-57.1
Decompression Table Oxygen requirement* (litres surface equivalent)
Survivor Attendant
Table 66 3135 615
Table 66 Mod I 6735 1335
Table 66 Mod II 8895 2415
Table 15-8 TABLE 66, 66 Mod I & Mod II Oxygen Requirments

* Assumes at rest and respiratory minute volume of 15 litres per minute surface equivalent
Tables 66 and 66 Mod I & II are based on 30 minute duration oxygen breathing periods at 2.4
bar (0.24mPa) with a final 10 minute period breathing oxygen during which the pressure is
reduced from 2.4 bar (0.24mPa) to 1.0 bar (0.1mPa). Thus for each 30 minute period at 2.4 bar
(0.24mPa) the oxygen usage per person is 30 x 2.4 x 15 = 1080 litres. Oxygen usage during the
10 minute bleed to surface can be calculated by averaging the pressure over the 10 minute
period. Thus, oxygen usage per person during the 10 minute bleed to the surface is (10 x 1.7 x
15) = 255 litres. Table 66 is slightly different in so far as the final 30 minute oxygen period
includes the 10 minute bleed to the surface. Oxygen usage per person during the final 30
minutes of a standard Table 66 is thus (20 x 2.4 x 15) + (10 x 1.7 x 15) = 975 litres. Based upon
these calculations Table 15-8 provides details of oxygen requirement per survivor for each
decompression table. Details are also provided of the oxygen requirement for chamber
attendants.
The volumes of oxygen required are considerable. If a worst case scenario of 100 personnel
rescued from a submarine compartment with an EAD above 30 metres, and hence requirement
for use of Table 66 Mod II, is considered a total volume of 889,500 litres of oxygen would be
required for the survivors alone. Assuming a ratio of 10 survivors per attendant an additional
24,150 litres would be needed. Thus a total of 913,650 litres of oxygen would be required. Even
assuming 100% utilisation this would require over 215 standard 150 cubic foot oxygen cylinders
or 7 commercial ‘quads’ (each contain 140,000 litres of oxygen at 200 bar and weigh in excess
of 500kg). Because of the large volumes and problems inherent in transporting between 4 and 5
tonnes of oxygen cylinders it is essential that alternate means of supplying oxygen, other than
the use of oxygen cylinders is required. Alternatives include the use of closed circuit rebreathers
which would reduce the quantity of oxygen required to that of metabolic need plus the possible
use of oxygen concentrators or cryogenic systems.
The use of an oxygen rebreathing system would reduce the oxygen requirements to
approximately 1.5 litres per man per minute, a ten fold decrease in the volume required to supply
an open circuit system. As well as oxygen a rebreather also requires quantities of a CO2
absorbent material such as soda lime. The quantity of absorbent depends on both the metabolic
rate of the subject and also the design of the absorbent canister. The Clearance Diving
Breathing Apparatus (CDBA) used by the Royal Navy contains 3kg of soda lime which is
sufficient to maintain efficient removal of CO2 for a 4 hour period. Unlike the diver who can be
expected to be working hard during a 4 hour dive the survivor rescued from a submarine
undergoing recompression will be at rest during an accelerated decompression procedure and
as such have a much reduced metabolic rate and hence CO2 output. Provided the absorbent

15-31
ATP/MTP-57.1
canister is of efficient design it is estimated that approximately 1.5kg of soda lime would
probably be sufficient to maintain acceptable inspired CO2 levels during the nearly 5 hour
duration of a Table 66 Mod II. Based upon 100 survivors a total of 150 kg of soda lime would be
required in addition to some 22 standard 150 cubic foot oxygen cylinders or a single commercial
‘quad’ of oxygen.
The adoption of an oxygen rebreathing system, as well as reducing the volume and mass of
consumables to be transported and stored upon the MOSHIP, has the added advantage of
minimal impact upon the internal pressure of the recompression chamber in which oxygen is to
be administered. In the case of a deck mounted recompression facility this is not a major
problem as standard practice is to ‘dump’ the exhaled oxygen overboard from the chamber.
However, this is not possible within a rescue submersible such as LR5 where use of an open
circuit oxygen system would result in a rapid increase of both compartment pressure and oxygen
content, both of which would be unacceptable. Adoption of an oxygen rebreather might make
possible the commencement of oxygen breathing within LR5 during its transition make to the
MOSHIP. The ability to pre breathe oxygen prior to the decompression to 1 bar would almost
certainly reduce the probability of DCI occurring during the surface interval. This would be of
especial benefit following rescues from high compartment pressures.
15.26. CONCLUSIONS
Survivors rescued from a pressurised submarine compartment by a rescue submersible such as
LR5 will in the absence of a TUP facility be at considerable risk of developing DCI. In the case of
rescue from a compartment with an EAD above 20 metres fatalities can be expected. By
adoption of a surface decompression in which the time between commencing decompression
within the rescue submersible to arriving at pressure within a surface recompression chamber is
minimised it is hoped that DCI can be prevented. The procedures described should only be
considered as a temporary solution pending procurement of a TUP facility or for use in
circumstances in which a TUP facility is not available.
15.26.1. REFERENCE
INM Report No. R2002.004 –
‘Accelerated Decompression Following Rescue from a Pressurised Submarine - Interim
Procedures’ by Surgeon Commander P J Benton, Royal Navy, March 2002.

15-32
ATP/MTP-57.1
SECTION V - PROPOSED NATO SUBMARINE RESCUE SYSTEM TUP DECOMPRESSION
SCHEDULES FROM 5 BAR
15.27. REFERENCE: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED BELOW IS DRAWN FROM

PROCEDURES FOR SATURATION
Decompression Of Submariners Rescued From A DISSUB - A Review Of Published Procedures
And Recommendation Of Interim NSRS Decompression Procedures (3rd Edition)’ by Surgeon
Commander Senior Grade Jan Risberg, Head Of Submarine and Diving Medicine RNON.
Limitations: These tables have been extrapolated theoretically from decompression procedures
reviewed by Surg Cdr Risberg. These include air decompression tables for shallow saturation
which have maximum depths of up to 60msw for NITROX or 30msw for air. The tables are
designed around compressed air as the chamber gas and air or oxygen as the breathing gas.
Where the breathing gas is oxygen then 30 minutes of O2 should be followed by a 10 minute air
break.
An air decompression table from 5 bars has been tested on humans by France
(ALFAN/CEPHISMER). If validated, they will be publicised in appropriate documents.
15.28. PROCEDURE CHARACTERISTICS

NSRS TABLE 1
An air-only decompression procedure. Targeted to give a K=1.5 msw/h/Bar at depth and 1,0 at
shallow depth Considered the optimal and safest choice when there is no constraint on
decompression time.
NSRS TABLE 2
Air breathing to 12 msw, oxygen (and air breaks) from 12 msw to surface. Targeted to give
K=1.5 msw/h/Bar at depth at K=0.8 msw/h/Bar from 12 msw to surface. Considered an
acceptable compromise if decompression time is constrained and a moderate exposure to
hyperoxia acceptable.
NSRS TABLE 3
Air breathing to 18 msw, oxygen breathing (with air breaks) from 18 msw to surface. This is the
procedure of choice if there is severe constraints on decompression time and the submariners
are expected to tolerate severe hyperoxia. The oxygen burden using this procedure is so high,
that severe symptoms of pulmonary toxicity (chest discomfort, chest pain, coughing) should be
expected.
NSRS TABLE 4
Nitrox 40 breathing (40% Oxygen in balance Nitrogen) from 50 to 18 msw. Compressed air
breathing (chamber gas) from 18 msw to surface. This is the procedure of choice if there is a
vast number of survivors pressurized at a high ambient pressure, and there is a need for rapid
turnover in the chamber complex. This procedure will cause a significant hyperoxic burden, but
will allow the submariners to decompress from 50 to 18 msw in 14h 20min (from 40 msw in 10h
50 min and from 30 msw in 5h 50min). A pressure equivalent to 18 msw is targeted as this will
allow transfer to other pressure chambers of opportunities in immediate vicinity (considering 18
msw as the deepest 100% Oxygen should be breathed).
SUMMARY – NSRS PROCEDURES
15-33
ATP/MTP-57.1
Below are listed summary performance parameters for the suggested NSRS decompression
procedures:
NSRS 1 NSRS 2 NSRS 3 NSRS 4
Gas Deep Air Air Air Nitrox 40
Shallow Air Oxygen Oxygen Air
Depth of gas switch

(msw) NA 12 18 18
K-value Deep 1.47 1.43 1.46 1.31

(msw/h/Bar) Shallow1,06 0.71 0,68 1.14
Ascent time to surface

from:
50 msw 2d 20h 10min 2d 2h 45min 1d 23h 20min 2d 9h 30min
20 msw 1d 20h 20min 1d 2h 55min 23h 30min 1d19h 50min
10 msw 1d 4h 30min 14h 40min 14h 30min 1d 4h 30min
OTU to surface from:

50 msw 1145 2819 4207 3190
40 msw 591 2265 3653 1940
30 msw 254 1928 3316 766
20 msw 34 1708 3096 81
10 msw 0 1069 1109 0
15.29. SAFETY
The k-values and other safety considerations, such as pulmonary oxygen toxicity, for the
proposed NSRS tables are discussed in the report.
15.30. CONCLUSION
NSRS 1 is recommended for decompressing submariners saturated with air at a pressure not
exceeding 6 Bar (50 msw), NSRS 2-4 could be considered if time is critical and hyperoxic
exposure acceptable.
15.31. DETAILED NSRS DECOMPRESSION PROCEDURES

NSRS TABLE 1
CHAMBER GAS
To contain FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen, pCO2<1 kPa (preferably <0,05 kPa), Chamber
temperature comfortable (18-23 ºC), RH 50-70%.
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air throughout (chamber gas).

15-34
ATP/MTP-57.1
INITIAL HOLD TIME
No requirement for an initial hold time.
DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression optimally to be performed in linear bleed, alternatively pressure drop of 0.5 or
1.0 meter depending on operational experience/opinion/routine. No night stop. The table below
present ascent rate depending on depth and should be interpreted as “hold time” per meter for
the depth range given. (E.g. “21-15 msw” column with an ascent rate of 70 min/msw: Pressure
should be held for 70 min when the chamber reaches 21 m, a pressure drop to 20 msw is then
allowed. After 70 min at 20 m the pressure could be decreased to 19 msw a.s.o. When the
pressure reaches 14 msw the pressure should be held for 120 min (row below).)
Depth range (msw) Ascent rate (min/msw)
50-31 40
30-21 60
21-15 70
14-10 120
9-7 150
6-4 180
3-0 240
If there is a problem maintain pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at
shallow depths, the chamber may alternatively be held at 3 msw for the full extension of the
remaining decompression time (i.e. the time scheduled for 3 msw to surface).
REPLACEMENT OF BREATHING GAS

No provision is given change in breathing gas in this procedure. If a faster decompression
schedule is needed, attention is drawn to the NSRS 2, NSRS 3 or NSRS 4 procedure.
NSRS TABLE 2
CHAMBER GAS
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air (chamber gas) from 50 msw to 13 msw, and 100% Oxygen from 12 msw.
INITIAL HOLD TIME

DECOMPRESSION RATE
Decompression Ascent rate (min/msw) Breathing gas
ti ll t b
50-31 40 Air
30-21 60 Air
21-15 70 Air
14-13 120 Air
12 30 Oxygen
11-8 40 Oxygen
7 150 Air
6-0 50 Oxygen
15-35
ATP/MTP-57.1
NB: Air breaks are not included in the ascent rates given above. It is suggested that the
submariners are allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Oxygen breathing.

If the submariner has to abandon oxygen BIBS breathing for a certain period, e.g. of practical
reasons, symptoms of oxygen toxicity (acute or pulmonary) or other reasons, the breathing gas
should be replaced with compressed air (chamber gas). In that case every 10 min of oxygen
breathing should be replaced with 40 min of compressed air breathing.
NSRS TABLE 3
CHAMBER GAS
BREATHING GAS
Compressed air (chamber gas) from 50 to 19 msw and 100% Oxygen from 18 msw.
INITIAL HOLD TIME

No requirement for an initial hold time.DECOMPRESSION RATE
Depth range (msw) Ascent rate (min/msw) Breathing gas
50-31 40 Air
NB: Air 30-21 60 Air breaks are
20-19 70 Air
not included in
18-15 30 Oxygen
the ascent 14 40 Oxygen rates given
above. It is 13 120 Air suggested
that the 12 30 Oxygen
11-8 40 Oxygen
7 150 Air
6-0 50 Oxygen
submariners are allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Oxygen breathing.

15-36
ATP/MTP-57.1

If the submariner has to abandon oxygen BIBS breathing for a certain period, e.g. of practical
should be replaced with compressed air (chamber gas). In that case every 10 min of oxygen
breathing should be replaced with 30 min of compressed air breathing at 18-16 msw, while 10
min of Oxygen breathing should be replaced with 40 min of compressed air breathing at 15-0
msw.
NSRS TABLE 4
CHAMBER GAS
There are two options: Either compressed air (FO2= 21 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen) or a proper
Nitrox mix (FO2= 40 % ± 1%, balance Nitrogen). In the first case, Nitrox 40 must be available on
BIBS, in the latter case compressed air should be available on BIBS.Chamber temperature
comfortable (18-23 ºC), RH 50-70%.
BREATHING GAS
Nitrox 40 from 50 to 19 msw, Compressed air from 18 msw.
INITIAL HOLD TIME

DECOMPRESSION RATE
Depth range (msw) Ascent rate (min/msw) Breathing gas

50-41 20 Nitrox 40
40-21 30 Nitrox 40
20-19 40 Nitrox 40
18-15 70 Air
14-10 120 Air
9-7 150 Air
6-4 180 Air
3-0 240 Air

15-37
ATP/MTP-57.1
NB: Air breaks are not included in the ascent rates given above. It is suggested that the
submariners are allowed an additional 10 min of airbreak for every 30 min of Nitrox breathing.
If there is a problem maintaining pressure seal or working dumps (toilet, gray water, BIBS) at

If the submariner has to abandon Nitrox BIBS breathing for a certain period, e.g. of practical
should be replaced with compressed air (chamber gas). In that case every 10 min of Nitrox
breathing should be replaced with 20 min breathing of compressed air.
Optionally, the breathing gas may be changed to Nitrox 50 from 30 to 19 msw. In that case,
decompression rate may be increased to 30 min/msw from 30 to 19 msw. This will, however,
increase the risk for symptoms of (pulmonary) oxygen toxicity.
15.32. REFERENCE
‘Procedures For Saturation Decompression Of Submariners Rescued From A DISSUB - A
Review Of Published Procedures And Recommendation Of Interim NSRS Decompression
Procedures (3rd Edition) by Surgeon Commander Senior Grade Jan Risberg, Head Of
Submarine and Diving Medicine RNON.

15-38
ATP/MTP-57.1
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Effective Pages Page Number
Version 1 I thru XVIII

Version 1 1-1 thru 1-4
Version 1 3-1, 3-2
Version 1 5-1, 5-2
Version 1 13.A-1, 13.A-2
Version 1 LEP-1

LEP-1

Atp-Mtp 57.1 (A)

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Atp-Mtp 57.1 (A)

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

STANDARDS RELATED DOCUMENT

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. The enclosed Allied/Multinational Tactical Publication, ATP/MTP-57 .1 (A) - THE

2. ATP/MTP-57.1 (A) is effective upon receipt.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

Edition (C) Version (1)

Edition (C) Version (1)

Identification of By Whom Entered

Edition (C) Version (1)

Identification of By Whom Entered

Edition (C) Version (1)

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................... XV

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... XVII

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 1-1

CHAPTER 2 - EQUIPMENT USED IN SMER .............................................................. 2-1

Edition (C) Version (1)

CHAPTER 3 - COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................ 3-1

CHAPTER 4 - INTRODUCTIONS TO THE ESCAPE .................................................. 4-1

Edition (C) Version (1)

CHAPTER 5 - SUBMARINE PARACHUTE ASSISTANCE GROUPS (SPAG)

CHAPTER 6 - INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVENTION CONCEPT ...................... 6-1

CHAPTER 7 - ATMOSPHERIC DIVING SYSTEM (ADS) CONDUCT OF ADS

CHAPTER 8 - CONDUCT OF POD POSTING ............................................................ 8-1

CHAPTER 9 - CONDUCT OF VENTILATION AND BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE

CHAPTER 10 - INTRODUCTION TO THE RESCUE OPERATION CONCEPT ........ 10-1

CHAPTER 11 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRV – DESCRIPTION

CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF MATING OPERATIONS WITH SRC – DESCRIPTION

CHAPTER 14 - SSRA GUIDANCE ............................................................................ 14-1

CHAPTER 15 - MEDICAL SUPPLEMENT ................................................................ 15-1

Edition (C) Version (1)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES................................................................................. LEP-1

Edition (C) Version (1)

Edition (C) Version (1)

Figure 11-1 NSRS skirt volumes ............................................................................................ 11-3

Edition (C) Version (1)

Edition (C) Version (1)

Table 15-1 Effects of High Carbon Dioxide Concentrations .................................................... 15-2

Edition (C) Version (1)

Edition (C) Version (1)

1.2. POLICY AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Edition (C) Version (1)

1.4. SEARCH, ASSEMBLY OF RESCUE FORCE AND MOBILISATION

Edition (C) Version (1)

1.8. RESCUE OF DISSUB PERSONNEL

1.9. VESSEL OF OPPORTUNITY (VOO)

1.9.3. VOO TO MOSHIP SELECTION

1.9.4. SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATION

1.11. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1.12. THE CRF AND REC

Edition (C) Version (1)

2.3. OVERVIEW OF ESCAPE AND RESCUE ASSETS ON BOARD A SUBMARINE.

2.3.1. ESCAPE ASSETS

2.3.1.1. ESCAPE TOWERS/TRUNKS. (HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS ‘TOWERS’)

Edition (C) Version (1)

2.3.1.2. SUBMARINE ESCAPE AND SURFACE SURVIVIAL PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT

2.3.1.3. MAINTAINING ON-BOARD AIR CONDITIONS.

2.3.1.4. BACK UP BATTERY AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING.

2.3.1.5. FOOD WATER AND HYGIENE

2.3.2. RESCUE ASSETS