CUSTOMARY LAW

THE EXCHANGE V. MCFADDON

The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it deriving validity from an external source would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which
could impose such restriction.

All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.

This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties
of construction, but if understood, not less obligatory.

The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual
benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates
and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar
circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.

This consent may in some instances be tested by common usage and by common opinion, growing out of that usage.

A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might not be expressly plighted, which should
suddenly and without previous notice exercise its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received
obligations of the civilized world.

This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction, being alike the attribute of every sovereign and being incapable of conferring
extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One
sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to
degrade the dignity of his nation by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to
his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to
him.

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every
sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction which has been
stated to be the attribute of every nation.

1st. One of these is admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign
territory.

If he enters that territory with the knowledge and license of its sovereign, that license, although containing no stipulation
exempting his person from arrest, is universally understood to imply such stipulation.

Why has the whole civilized world concurred in this construction? The answer cannot be mistaken. A foreign sovereign is
not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his nation,
and it is to avoid this subjection that the license has been obtained. The character to whom it is given and the object for
which it is granted equally require that it should be construed to impart full security to the person who has obtained it. This
security, however, need not be expressed; it is implied from the circumstances of the case.

Should one sovereign enter the territory of another without the consent of that other, expressed or implied, it would
present a question which does not appear to be perfectly settled -- a decision of which is not necessary to any conclusion
to which the Court may come in the cause under consideration. If he did not thereby expose himself to the territorial
jurisdiction of the sovereign whose dominions he had entered, it would seem to be because all sovereigns impliedly
engage not to avail themselves of a power over their equal which a romantic confidence in their magnanimity has placed
in their hands.
2d. A second case, standing on the same principles with the first, is the immunity which all civilized nations allow to
foreign ministers.

Whatever may be the principle on which this immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the
sovereign he represents or by a political fiction suppose him to be extraterritorial, and therefore in point of law not within
the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court he resides, still the immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the
nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction of exterritoriality could not be erected and supported against the will of
the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to assent to it.

This consent is not expressed. It is true that in some countries, and in this among others, a special law is enacted for the
case. But the law obviously proceeds on the idea of prescribing the punishment of an act previously unlawful, not of
granting to a foreign minister a privilege which he would not otherwise possess.

The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which are admitted
to attach to foreign ministers is implied from the considerations that without such exemption, every sovereign would
hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad. His minister would owe temporary and local allegiance to a
foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects of his mission. A sovereign committing the interests of his
nation with a foreign power to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose cannot intend to subject his
minister in any degree to that power, and therefore a consent to receive him implies a consent that he shall possess those
privileges which his principal intended he should retain -- privileges which are essential to the dignity of his sovereign and
to the duties he is bound to perform.

In what cases a minister, by infracting the laws of the country in which he resides, may subject himself to other
punishment than will be inflicted by his own sovereign is an inquiry foreign to the present purpose. If his crimes be such as
to render him amenable to the local jurisdiction, it must be because they forfeit the privileges annexed to his character,
and the minister, by violating the conditions under which he was received as the representative of a foreign sovereign, has
surrendered the immunities granted on those conditions, or, according to the true meaning of the original assent, has
ceased to be entitled to them.

3d. A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction is where he allows the
troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.

In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has been
granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising
it, the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated and a portion of the military force of a foreign
independent nation would be diverted from those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be
withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining the
exclusive command and disposition of this force. The grant of a free passage therefore implies a waiver of all jurisdiction
over the troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those
punishments which the government of his army may require.

But if, without such express permit, an army should be led through the territories of a foreign prince, might the jurisdiction
of the territory be rightfully exercised over the individuals composing this army?

Without doubt, a military force can never gain immunities of any other description than those which war gives by entering
a foreign territory against the will of its sovereign. But if his consent, instead of being expressed by a particular license, be
expressed by a general declaration that foreign troops may pass through a specified tract of country, a distinction between
such general permit and a particular license is not perceived. It would seem reasonable that every immunity which would
be conferred by a special license would be in like manner conferred by such general permit.

We have seen that a license to pass through a territory implies immunities not expressed, and it is material to inquire why
the license itself may not be presumed.

It is obvious that the passage of an army through a foreign territory will probably be at all times inconvenient and injurious,
and would often be imminently dangerous to the sovereign through whose dominion it passed. Such a practice would
break down some of the most decisive distinctions between peace and war, and would reduce a nation to the necessity of
resisting by war an act not absolutely hostile in its character, or of exposing itself to the stratagems and frauds of a power
whose integrity might be doubted, and who might enter the country under deceitful pretexts. It is for reasons like these
that the general license to foreigners to enter the dominions of a friendly power is never understood to extend to a military
force, and an army marching into the dominions of another sovereign may justly be considered as committing an act of
hostility, and if not opposed by force, acquires no privilege by its irregular and improper conduct. It may, however, well be
questioned whether any other than the sovereign power of the state be capable of deciding that such military commander
is without a license.

But the rule which is applicable to armies does not appear to be equally applicable to ships of war entering the parts of a
friendly power. The injury inseparable from the march of an army through an inhabited country, and the dangers often --
indeed generally -- attending it do not ensue from admitting a ship of war without special license into a friendly port. A
different rule, therefore, with respect to this species of military force has been generally adopted. If, for reasons of state,
the ports of a nation generally or any particular ports be closed against vessels of war generally, or the vessels of any
particular nation, notice is usually given of such determination. If there be no prohibition, the ports of a friendly nation are
considered as open to the public ships of all powers with whom it is at peace, and they are supposed to enter such ports
and to remain in them while allowed to remain, under the protection of the government of the place.

In almost every instance, the treaties between civilized nations contain a stipulation to this effect in favor of vessels driven
in by stress of weather or other urgent necessity. In such cases, the sovereign is bound by compact to authorize foreign
vessels to enter his ports. The treaty binds him to allow vessels in distress to find refuge and asylum in his ports, and this
is a license which he is not at liberty to retract. It would be difficult to assign a reason for withholding from a license thus
granted any immunity from local jurisdiction which would be implied in a special license.

If there be no treaty applicable to the case, and the sovereign, from motives deemed adequate by himself, permits his
ports to remain open to the public ships of foreign friendly powers, the conclusion seems irresistible that they enter by his
assent. And if they enter by his assent necessarily implied, no just reason is perceived by the Court for distinguishing their
case from that of vessels which enter by express assent. In all the cases of exemption which have been reviewed, much
has been implied, but the obligation of what was implied has been found equal to the obligation of that which was
expressed. Are there reasons for denying the application of this principle to ships of war?

In this part of the subject a difficulty is to be encountered the seriousness of which is acknowledged, but which the Court
will not attempt to evade.

Those treaties which provide for the admission and safe departure of public vessels entering a port from stress of weather
or other urgent cause provide in like manner for the private vessels of the nation, and where public vessels enter a port
under the general license which is implied merely from the absence of a prohibition, they are, it may be urged, in the same
condition with merchant vessels entering the same port for the purposes of trade who cannot thereby claim any exemption
from the jurisdiction of the country. It may be contended, certainly with much plausibility if not correctness, that the same
rule and same principle are applicable to public and private ships, and since it is admitted that private ships entering
without special license become subject to the local jurisdiction, it is demanded on what authority an exception is made in
favor of ships of war.

It is by no means conceded that a private vessel really availing herself of an asylum provided by treaty, and not attempting
to trade, would become amenable to the local jurisdiction unless she committed some act forfeiting the protection she
claims under compact. On the contrary, motives may be assigned for stipulating and according immunities to vessels in
cases of distress which would not be demanded for or allowed to those which enter voluntarily and for ordinary purposes.
On this part of the subject, however, the Court does not mean to indicate any opinion. The case itself may possibly occur,
and ought not to be prejudged.

Without deciding how far such stipulations in favor of distressed vessels, as are usual in treaties, may exempt private
ships from the jurisdiction of the place, it may safely be asserted that the whole reasoning upon which such exemption
has been implied in other cases applies with full force to the exemption of ships of war in this.

"It is impossible to conceive," says Vattel,

"that a prince who sends an ambassador or any other minister can have any intention of subjecting him to the authority of
a foreign power, and this consideration furnishes an additional argument, which completely establishes the independency
of a public minister. If it cannot be reasonably presumed that his sovereign means to subject him to the authority of the
prince to whom he is sent, the latter, in receiving the minister, consents to admit him on the footing of independency, and
thus there exists between the two princes a tacit convention which gives a new force to the natural obligation."

Equally impossible is it to conceive, whatever may be the construction as to private ships, that a prince who stipulates a
passage for his troops or an asylum for his ships of war in distress should mean to subject his army or his navy to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. And if this cannot be presumed, the sovereign of the port must be considered as having
conceded the privilege to the extent in which it must have been understood to be asked.

To the Court it appears that where, without treaty, the ports of a nation are open to the private and public ships of a
friendly power, whose subjects have also liberty without special license to enter the country for business or amusement, a
clear distinction is to be drawn between the rights accorded to private individuals or private trading vessels and those
accorded to public armed ships which constitute a part of the military force of the nation.

The preceding reasoning has maintained the propositions that all exemptions from territorial jurisdiction must be derived
from the consent of the sovereign of the territory, that this consent may be implied or expressed, and that when implied,
its extent must be regulated by the nature of the case and the views under which the parties requiring and conceding it
must be supposed to act.

When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling
indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government
to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus
passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently there are
powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found,
and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter can never be construed to grant
such exemption.

But in all respects different is the situation of a public armed ship. She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation;
acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. He has many and
powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference
cannot take place without affecting his power and his dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such vessel
enters a friendly port may reasonably be construed, and it seems to the Court ought to be construed, as containing an
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality.

Upon these principles, by the unanimous consent of nations, a foreigner is amenable to the laws of the place; but certainly
in practice, nations have not yet asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sovereign entering a
port open for their reception.

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)

By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago and gradually ripening into a rule of international
law, coast fishing vessels pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish have been recognized as exempt,
with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.

This doctrine, however, has been earnestly contested at the bar, and no complete collection of the instances illustrating it
is to be found, so far as we are aware, in a single published work, although many are referred to and discussed by the
writers on international law. It is therefore worth the while to trace the history of the rule from the earliest accessible
sources through the increasing recognition of it, with occasional setbacks, to what we may now justly consider as its final
establishment in our own country and generally throughout the civilized world.

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by
years of labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.

Wheaton places among the principal sources international law "text writers of authority, showing what is the approved
usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual conduct, with the definitions and modifications introduced
by general consent."

As to these, he forcibly observes:

"Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers or to substitute, in any case, their authority for the
principles of reason, it may be affirmed that they are generally impartial in their judgment. They are witnesses of the
sentiments and usages of civilized nations, and the weight of their testimony increases every time that their authority is
invoked by statesmen, and every year that passes without the rules laid down in their works being impugned by the
avowal of contrary principles."

This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that, at the present
day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public
act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of
men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies,
cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are
exempt from capture as prize of war.

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed for a warlike purpose, or in such
a way as to give aid or information to the enemy, nor when military or naval operations create a necessity to which all
private interests must give way.

Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking whales or seals or cod or
other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured and made a regular article of
commerce.

This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take judicial notice of,
and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter.

Calvo, in a passage already quoted, distinctly affirms that the exemption of coast fishing vessels from capture is perfectly
justiciable, or, in other words, of judicial jurisdiction or cognizance. Calvo § 2368. Nor are judicial precedents wanting in
support of the view that this exemption, or a somewhat analogous one, should be recognized and declared by a prize
court.

By the practice of all civilized nations, vessels employed only for the purposes of discovery or science are considered as
exempt from the contingencies of war, and therefore not subject to capture. It has been usual for the government sending
out such an expedition to give notice to other powers, but it is not essential.

THE CASE OF S.S. LOTUS

International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a
permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory [p19] except by virtue of a
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in
respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive
rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory,
and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly
not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside
their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and
most suitable.

[47] This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt
without objections or complaints on the part of other States ; it is in order to remedy the difficulties resulting from such
variety that efforts have been made for many years past, both in Europe and America, to prepare conventions the effect of
which would be precisely to limit the discretion at present left to States in this respect by international law, thus making
good the existing lacunæ in respect of jurisdiction or removing the conflicting jurisdictions arising from the diversity of the
principles adopted by the various States.
In these circumstances all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law
places upon its jurisdiction ; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.
In the first place, as regards teachings of publicists, and apart from the question as to what their value may be from the
point of view of establishing the existence of a rule of customary law, it is no doubt true that all or nearly all writers teach
that ships on the high seas are subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the State whose flag they fly. But the important
point is the significance attached by them to this principle; now it does not appear that in general, writers bestow upon this
principle a scope differing from or wider than that explained above and which is equivalent to saying that the jurisdiction of
a State over vessels on the high seas is the same in extent as its jurisdiction in its own territory. On the other hand, there
is no lack of writers who, upon a close study of the special question whether a State can prosecute for offences committed
on board a foreign ship on the high seas, definitely come to the conclusion that such offences must be regarded as if they
had been committed in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies, and that consequently the general rules of each
legal system in regard to offences committed abroad are applicable.

[69] In regard to precedents, it should first be observed that, leaving aside the collision cases which will be alluded to later,
none of them relates to offences affecting two ships flying the flags of two different countries, and that consequently they
are not of much importance in the case before the Court. The case of the Costa Rica Packet is no exception, for the
prauw on which the alleged depredations took place was adrift without flag or crew, and this circumstance certainly
influenced, perhaps decisively, the conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator.

[70] On the other hand, there is no lack of cases in which a State has claimed a right to prosecute for an offence,
committed on board a foreign ship, which it regarded as punishable under its legislation. Thus Great Britain refused the
request of the United [p27] States for the extradition of John Anderson, a British seaman who had committed homicide on
board an American vessel, stating that she did not dispute the jurisdiction of the United States but that she was entitled to
exercise hers concurrently. This case, to which others might be added, is relevant in spite of Anderson's British nationality,
in order to show that the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the country whose flag the vessel flies is not universally
accepted.

[71] The cases in which the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag was flown has been recognized would seem
rather to have been cases in which the foreign State was interested only by reason of the nationality of the victim, and in
which, according to the legislation of that State itself or the practice of its courts, that ground was not regarded as
sufficient to authorize prosecution for an offence committed abroad by a foreigner.

[72] Finally, as regards conventions expressly reserving jurisdiction exclusively to the State whose flag is flown, it is not
absolutely certain that this stipulation is to be regarded as expressing a general principle of law rather than as
corresponding to the extraordinary jurisdiction which these conventions confer on the state-owned ships of a particular
country in respect of ships of another country on the high seas. Apart from that, it should be observed that these
conventions relate to matters of a particular kind, closely connected with the policing of the seas, such as the slave trade,
damage to submarine cables, fisheries, etc., and not to common-law offences. Above all it should be pointed out that the
offences contemplated by the conventions in question only concern a single ship; it is impossible therefore to make any
deduction from them in regard to matters which concern two ships and consequently the jurisdiction of two different States.

Asylum (Colombia v. Peru)

In recognizing "the institution of asylum", this article merely refers to the principles of international law. But the principles
of international law do not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by the State granting diplomatic
asylum.

The Colombian Government has also relied on Article 4 of this Agreement concerning extradition of a criminal refugee
from the territory of the State in which he has sought refuge. The arguments submitted in this respect reveal a confusion
between territorial asylum (extradition), on the one hand, and diplomatic asylum, on the other.

In the case of extradition, the refugee is within the territory of the State of refuge. A decision with regard to extradition
implies only the normal exercise of the territorial sovereignty. The refugee is outside the territory of the State where the
offence was committed, and a decision to grant him asylum in no way derogates from the sovereignty of that State.

In the case of diplomatic asylum, the refugee is within the territory of the State where the offence was committed. A
decision to grant diplomatic asylum involves a derogation from the

sovereignty of that State. It withdraws the offender from the jurisdiction of the territorial State and constitutes an
intervention in matters which are exclusively within the competence of that State. Such a derogation from territorial
sovereignty cannot be recognized unless its legal basis is established in each particular case.
For these reasons, it is not possible to deduce from the provisions of agreements concerning extradition any conclusion
which would apply to the question now under consideration.

The Colombian Government further relies on the Havana Con- vention on Asylum of 1928. This Convention lays down
certain rules relating to diplomatic asylum, but does not contain any provision conferring on the State granting asylum a
unilateral competence to qualify the offence with definitive. and binding force for the territorial State. The Colombian
Government contends, however, that such a competence is implied in that Convention and is inherent in the institution of
asylum.

Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India)

it is self-evident that' a right which is so contradictory and the content of which is so indeterminate and indeterminable can
find no basis in any of the general or particular titles alleged by Portugal, that is to say, either in general custom, or in the
principles of international law which can be derived therefrom. or in the rreneral principles of law recognized by civilized
States, 'or in pa&icular ameements. or in local custom which. if it exists. must be assimilated t g the partkular agreements;

far from revealing the existence of a general customary rule in conformity with the claims of Portugal relating to a right of
passage, an examination of the practice followed, and in particular of the agreements which have been concluded on this
subject, estab- lishes the categorical refusa1 of States to be bound by forma1under- takings either with regard to the
transit of goods where the enclave is included within the customs regime of the State through which pas- sage is to be
effected, or with regard to the transit of armed forces at least where those forces exceed a given number, or where the
passage is designed to prevent or to put down political, social or economic disturbances.

North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands)

The conclusions so far reached leave open, and still to be con- sidered, the question whether on some basis other than
that of an a priori logical necessity, i.e., through positive law processes, the equidis- tance principle has come to be
regarded as a rule of customary interna- tional Inw, so that it would be obligatory for the Federal Republic in that way,
even though Article 6 of the Geneva Convention is not, as such, opposable to it.

With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have
become LI general rule of international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time,
a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, pro\ ided it included that of
States whose interests were specially affected. In the present case however, the Court notes that, even if allowance is
made for the existence of a number of States to whom participation in the Geneva Convention is not open, or which, by
reason for instance of being land-locked States, would have no interest in becoining parties to it, tlie number of
ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though respectable, hardly sufficient. That non-ratification may sometimes
be due to factors other than active disapproval of the convention concerned cari hardly con- stitute a basis on which
positive acceptance of its principles can bc implied: the reasons are speculntive, but the facts remain.

Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law on the basis of what bras originally a purely conven- tional rule, an indispensable requirement
would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose
interests are specially affected, should have been bot11 extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
invoked;- and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved.

78. In this respect the Court follows the view adopted by the Perma- nent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case,
as stated in the fol- lowing passage, the principle of which is, by analogy, applicable almost word for word, nzutatis
mutandis, to the present case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 1927, at p. 28):

"Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found ... were sufficient to prove ...the circunistance alleged ...,it would
merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they
recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of
having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to
infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other hand, ...there are other circuinstances
calculated to show that the contrary is true."
Applying this dictum to the present case, the position is simply that in certain cases-not a great nuinber-the States
concerned agreed to draw or did draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance. There is no
evidence that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of custom-
ary law obliging them to do so-especially considering that they might have been motivated by other obvious factors.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)

It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary interna- tional law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice
and opinio juris of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and
defining rules deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them."

It is also clear that it is the State which is the victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has
been so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another State to exercise the right of
collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to
be expected that the State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.

The Court finds that in customary international law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American legal
system, there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence of a request by the State which
regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. The Court concludes that the requirement of a request by the State whch is
the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the require- ment that such a State should have declared itself to have been
attacked.

In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has to emphasize that, as was observed in the
North Sea Continental Shelfcases, for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned "amount to a
settled practice", but they must be accompanied by the opiniojuris sive necessitatis. Either the States taking such
action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct is

"evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for
such a belief. i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
necessitatis." (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77.)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW

The Diversion of Water from the Meuse

What are widely known as principles of equity have long been considered to constitute a part of international law, and as
such they have often been applied by international tribunals. A sharp division between law and equity, such as prevails in
the administration of justice in some States, should find no place in international jurisprudence ; even in some national
legal systems, there has been a strong tendency towards the fusion of law and equity. Some international tribunals are
expressly directed by the compromis which control them to apply "law and equity". Of such a provision, a special tribunal
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration said in 1922 that "the majority of international lawyers seem to agree that these
words are to be understood to mean general principles of justice as distinguished from any particular systems of
jurisprudence". Numerous arbitration treaties have been concluded in recent years which apply to differences "which are
justiciable in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity".
Whether the reference in an arbitration treaty is to the application of "law and equity" or to justiciability dependent on the
possibility of applying "law or equity", it would seem to envisage equity as a part of law.
Court has not been expressly authorized by its Statute to apply equity as distinguished from law. Nor, indeed, does the
Statute expressly direct its application of international law, though as has been said on several occasions the Court is "a
tribunal of international law". Article 38 of the Statute expressly directs the application of "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations", and in more than one nation principles of equity have an established place in the legal
system. The Court's recognition of equity as a part of international law is in no way restricted by the special power
conferred upon it "to decide a case ex cequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto". It must be concluded, therefore, that
under Article 38 of the Statute, if not independently of that Article, the Court has some freedom to consider principles of
equity as part of the international law which it must apply.
It would seem to be an important principle of equity that where two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal
obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take
advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the other party. The principle finds expression in the so-
called maxims of equity which exercised great influence in the creative period of the development of the Anglo-American
law. Some of these maxims are, "Equality is equity" ; "He who seeks equity must do equity". It is in line with such maxims
that "a court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject-matter of the litigation has been
improper". A very similar principle was received into Roman Law. The obligations of a vendor and a vendee being
concurrent, "neither could compel the other to perform unless he had done, or tendered, his own part". The exceptio non
adimpleti contractus required a claimant to prove that he had performed or offered to perform his obligation. This
conception was the basis of Articles 320 and 322 of the German Civil Code, and even where a code is silent on the point
Planiol states the general principle that "dans tout rapport synallagmatique, chacune des deux parties ne peut exiger la
prestation qui lui est due que si elle offre elle-meme d'executer son obligation".

Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania)

It is clear that knou-leoge of the mineIaying cannot be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact
that a minefield discovered in Albanian temtorial waters caused the explosions of which the British warships were the
victims. It is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary to
international law has occurred, may be called upon to give an explanation. It is also true that that State cannot evade such
a request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State may, up
to a certain point, be bound to supply particulars of the use made by it of the means of information and inquiry at its
disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters
that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it
necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from.other circum- stances, neither
involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.

On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive temtorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing upon
the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State as to such events. By reason of this exclusive
control, the other State, the. victim of a breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be dowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial
evidence. This indirect evidence is admitted in al1 systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It
must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a single
conclusion.

Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)

It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of
the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the Statebeing thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though
not made within the context of inter- national negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a
quidpro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is
required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature
of the juridical act by which the pro- nouncement by the state was made.

44. Of course, not al1 unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a
particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When
States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

45. With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not a domain in which international law imposes
any special or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference, for such
statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments in international law, which does not require that
they should be couched in written form. The question of form is not decisive. As the Court said in its Judgment on the
preliminary objections in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear : "Where ... as is generally the case in
international law, which places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no particular
form, parties are free to choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results from it." (I.C.J. Reports
1961,p. 31.) The Court further stated in the same case: ". . . the sole relevant question is whether the language employed
in any given declaration does reveal a clear intention . . ." (ibid., p. 32).

46. One of the basic principles governing the creation and perfor- mance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the
principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-opera- tion, in particular in an age when this
CO-operationin many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of
treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral
declara- tion. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and
are entitled to require that the obli- gation thus created be respected.

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand)

As regards the question of forms and formalities, as distinct frorn intentions, the Court considers that, to cite examples
drawn from the field of private law, there are cases where, for the pro- tection of the interested parties, or for reasons of
public policy, or on other grounds, the law prescribes as rna~idaiorycertain fonnalities which,hence, beconle essential for
the validityof certain transactions, such as for instance testamentary dispositions ;and another example, amongst many
possible ones, would be that of a marriage cere- mony. But the position in the cases just mentioned (wills, marriage, etc.)
arises because of the existence in those cases of mandatorv req;irernents of law as to forms and forrnalities. Where, on th:
other hand, as is generaUy the case in international law, which places the principal ernphashs on the intentions of the
parties, the law prescribes no particiilar form, parties are free to choose what form they please provided their intention
clearly results frorn it.

It is this last position which obtains in the case of acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of Che Cmrt. The only
formality required is the deposit of the acceptance with the Sec. General of the United Nations under paragraph 4 of
Article 36 of the Statute. This formality was accomplished by Thailand. For the rrst-as regards fom-paragraph 2 of Airticle
36 merely provides that States parties to the Statute "may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ...the
jurisdiction of the Court", etc. The precise form and language in which they do this is left to them, and there is no
suggestion that any particular form is required, or that any declarations not in such form will be invalid. No doubt custom
and tradition have brought it about that a cer- tain pattern of terminology is normally, as a matter of fact and convenience,
employed by countries accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; but there is nothing mandatory about the
employment of this language. Nor is there any obligation, notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 36, to mention
such matters as periods of duration, conditions or reservations, and there are acceptances whch have in one or more, or
even in all, of these respects maintained silence.

Such being, according to the view taken by the Court, the posi- tion in respect of the form of declarations accepting its
compul- sory jurisdiction, the sole relevant question is whether the language employed in any given declaration does
reveal a clear intention, in the terrns of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, to "recog- nize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in
al1 legal disputes" concerning the cate- gories of questions enumerated in that paragraph.

Judicial Decisions

Jesse Lewis (United States) v. Great Britain (David J. Adams case)

Then the duty of this inter- national Tribunal is to determine, from the international point of view, how the provisions of the
treaty are to be interpreted and applied to the facts, and consequently whether the loss resulting from the forfeiture of the
vessel gives rise to an indemnity

The fundamental principle of the juridical equality of States is opposed to placing one State under the jurisdiction of
another State. It is opposed to the subjection of one State to an interpretation of a Treaty asserted by another State.
There is no reason why one more than the other should impose such an unilateral interpretation of a contract which is
essentially bilateral. The fact that this interpretation is given by the legislative or judicial or any other authority of one of the
parties does not make that interpretation binding upon the other party. Far from contesting that principle, the British
Govern- ment did not fail to recognize it

CONTENTIOUS CASES

Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case

Once the Court has found that a State has entered into a commitment con- cerning its future conduct it is not the Court's
function to contemplate that it will not comply with it. However, the Court observes that if the basis of this Judgment were
to be affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance with the provisions of the Statute;
the denunciation by France, by letter dated 2 January 1974, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, which is relied on as a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, cannot constitute by itself an obstacle to the
presentation of such a request."
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand)

The Court recalls that the process of interpretation is premised upon the “primacy of the principle of res judicata” which
“must be main- tained” (Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998 in the Case concerning the Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), pp. 36-37, para. 12). Accordingly, as the Court has previously held :

“[t]he real purpose of the request must be to obtain an interpretation of the judgment. This signifies that its object must be
solely to obtain clarification of the meaning and the scope of what the Court has decided with binding force, and not to
obtain an answer to questions not so decided. Any other construction of Article 60 of the Statute would nullify the provision
of the article that the judgment is final and without appeal.”

ADVISORY OPINIONS

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)

The request is put forward by a United Nations organ with refer- ence to its own decisions and it seeks legal advice from
the Court on the consequences and implications of these decisions. This objective is stressed by the preamble to the
resolution requesting the opinion, in which the Security Council has stated "that an advisory opinion from the rnternational
Court of Justice would be useful for the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Narnibia and in
further- ance of the objectives the Council is seeking"

The fact that, in order to give its answer, the Court might have to pronounce on legal question~supon which divergent
views exist between South Africa and the United Nations does not convert the case into a dispute between States. (There
was therefore no necessity to apply Article 83 'of the Rules of Court, according to which, if an advis13ry opinion is
requested upon a legal question "actually pc:ndin~g between twoormoreStates", Article31oftheStatulk,dealingwith judges
ad hoc, is applicable; the Government of South Africa having requested leave to choose a judge ad'hoc, the Court heard
its observations on that point on 27 January 1971 but. in the light of the above consiclerations, decided by the Order of 29
January 1971 not to accede to that request.)

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Court draws its competence in respect of advisory opinions from Article 65, paragraph 1, of its Statute. Under this
Article, the Court "may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized
by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request".

For the Court to be competent to give an advisory opinion, it is thus necessary at the outset for the body requesting the
opinion to be "authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request". The Charter
provides in Article 96, para- graph 1, that: "The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question."

Some States which oppose the giving of an opinion by the Court argued that the General Assembly and Security Council
are not entitled to ask for opinions on matters totally unrelated to their work. They suggested that, as in the case of organs
and agencies acting under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and notwithstanding the difference in wording between
that provision and paragraph 1 of the same Article, the General Assembly and Security Council may ask for an advisory
opinion on a legal question only within the scope of their activities.

In the view of the Court, it matters little whether this interpretation of Article 96, paragraph 1, is or is not correct; in the
present case, the Gen- eral Assembly has competence in aily event to seise the Court. Indeed, Article 10 of the Charter
has conferred upon the General Assembly a competence relating to "any questions or any matters" within the scope of
the Charter. Article 11 has specifically provided it with a competence to "consider the general principles . . . in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments". Lastly, according to Article 13, the Gen- eral Assemblv "shall initiate studies and make recommendations for
the purpose o f . . . encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification".

The Court must furthermore satisfy itself that the advisory opinion requested does indeed relate to a "legal question"
within the meaning of its Statute and the United Nations Charter. The Court has already had occasion to indicate that
questions "framed in terms of law and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by their very nature susceptible of a
reply based on law . . . [and] appear . . . to be questions of a legal character" (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1975, p. 18, para. 15)

The question put to the Court by the General Assembly is indeed a legal one, since the Court is asked to rule on the
compatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons with the relevant principles and rules of international law. To do this,
the Court must identify the existing prin- ciples and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law.

The fact that this question also has political aspects, as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which
arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a "legal question" and to "deprive the Court of a
competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute" Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the
legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentiallyjudicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality
of the pos- sible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them by international law.

Furthermore, as the Court said in the Opinion it gave in 1980 concern- ing the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March
1951 between the WHO and Egypt: "Indeed, in situations in which political considerations are promi- nent it may be
particularly necessary for an international organiza- tion to obtain an advisory opinion from the Court as to the legal
principles applicable with respect to the matter under debate . . ." (I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 87, para. 33.)

The Court moreover considers that the political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the request and
the political implica- tions that the opinion given might have are of no relevance in the estab- lishment of its jurisdiction to
give such an opinion.

14. Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute provides: "The Court may give an advisory opinion . . ." (Emphasis added.) This
is more than an enabling provision. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the Statute leaves a discretion as to
whether or not it will give an advisory opinion that has been requested of it, once it has established its
competence to do so. In this context, the Court has previously noted as follows:

"The Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the reply of the Court, itself
an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should
not be refused."

The Court has constantly been mindful of its responsibilities as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations" (Charter,
Art. 92). When considering each request, it is mindful that it should not, in principle, refuse to give an advisory opinion. In
accordance with the consistent jurisprudence of the Court, only "compelling reasons" could lead it to such a refusal. There
has been no refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion in the
history of the present Court; in the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Arrned
Conflict, the refusal to give the World Health Organization the advisory opinion requested by it was justified by the Court's
lack of jurisdiction in that case. The Permanent Court of International Justice took the view on only one occasion that it
could not reply to a question put to it, having regard to the very particular circum- stances of the case, among which were
that the question directly con- cerned an already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was neither a party to
the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to
take part in any way.

15. Most of the reasons adduced in these proceedings in order to per- suade the Court that in the exercise of its
discretionary power it should decline to render the opinion requested by General Assembly resolu- tion 49175K were
summarized in the following statement made by one State in the written proceedings:

"The question presented is vague and abstract, addressing complex issues which are the subject of consideration among
interested States and within other bodies of the United Nations which have an express mandate to address these matters.
An opinion by the Court in regard to the question presented would provide no practical assistance to the General
Assembly in carrying out its functions under the Char- ter. Such an opinion has the potential of undermining progress
already made or being made on this sensitive subject and, therefore, is contrary to the interests of the United Nations
Organization."

Certain States have however expressed the fear that the abstract nature of the question might lead the Court to make
hypothetical or speculative declarations outside the scope of its judicial function. The Court does not consider that, in
giving an advisory opinion in the present case, it would necessarily have to write "scenarios", to study various types of
nuclear weapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial technological, strategic and scientific information. The
Court will simply address the issues arising in al1 their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to the situation.

Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights

The Council has requested the present advisory opinion pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United
Nations. This paragraph provides that organs of the United Nations, other than the General Assembly or the Security
Council, "which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities".

Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court states that "[tlhe Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal
question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to
make such a request".

A distinction should thus be drawn between the advisory nature of the Court's task and the particular effects that parties to
an existing dispute may wish to attribute, in their mutual relations, to an advisory opinion of the Court, which, "as such, . . .
has no binding force" (Interpretation of Peace Treaties ~vithBulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advi- sory
Opinion, 1.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 71). These particular effects, extra- neous to the Charter and the Statute which regulate
the functioning of the Court, are derived from separate agreements; in the present case Article VIII, Section 30, of the
General Convention provides that "[tlhe opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties".

The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived from Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter and from Article
65 of the Statute (see paragraph 22 above). Both provisions requise that the question form- ing the subject-matter of the
request should be a "legal question".

Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter also requires that the legal questions forming the subject-matter of advisory
opinions requested by authorized organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies shall arise "within the scope of
their activities".

Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists 


Ex aequo et bono 


Jus Cogens (Peremptory norms of general international law) 


Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium)

It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from
those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not irriply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity
does not imply jurisdiction.

The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunityfrom jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs
does not mean that they enjoy immunity in respect of any crimes they might have com- mitted, irrespective of their gravity.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual crimiinal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional
immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional i~nmunitymay well
bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from al1
criminal responsibility.

Wei YE, v. Jiang ZEMIN

A jus cogens norm is a special type of customary international law. A jus cogens norm "`is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.'" Most
famously, jus cogens norms supported the prosecutions in the Nuremberg trials. ("The universal and fundamental rights
of human beings identified by Nuremberg — rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts ... — are the
direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens.").
In Sampson we held that the FSIA did not include an implied exception9 to its general grant of sovereign immunity to
foreign states where a foreign state was accused of violating jus cogens norms.

Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening)

the rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not the courts of one
State may exercise jurisdic- tion in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the question whether or not the
conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or unlawful. That is why the application of the con-
temporary law of State immunity to proceedings concerning events which occurred in 1943-1945 does not infringe the
principle that law should not be applied retrospectively to determine matters of legality and responsi- bility (as the Court
has explained in paragraph 58 above). For the same reason, recognizing the immunity of a foreign State in accordance
with customary international law does not amount to recognizing as lawful a situation created by the breach of a jus
cogens rule, or rendering aid and assistance in maintaining that situation, and so cannot contravene the principle in Article
41 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.

To the extent that it is argued that no rule which is not of the status of jus cogens may be applied if to do so would hinder
the enforcement of a jus cogens rule, even in the absence of a direct conflict, the Court sees no basis for such a
proposition. A jus cogens rule is one from which no dero- gation is permitted but the rules which determine the scope and
extent of jurisdiction and when that jurisdiction may be exercised do not derogate from those substantive rules which
possess jus cogens status, nor is there anything inherent in the concept of jus cogens which would require their
modification or would displace their application. The Court has taken that approach in two cases, notwithstanding that the
effect was that a means by which a jus cogens rule might be enforced was rendered unavail- able. In Armed Activities, it
held that the fact that a rule has the status of jus cogens does not confer upon the Court a jurisdiction which it would not
otherwise possess (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application : 2002) (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 32, para. 64, and p. 52, para. 125). In
Arrest Warrant, the Court held, albeit without express reference to the concept of jus cogens, that the fact that a Minister
for Foreign Affairs was accused of criminal violations of rules which undoubtedly possess the character of jus cogens did
not deprive the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the entitlement which it possessed as a matter of customary
international law to demand immunity on his behalf (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 24, para. 58, and p. 33, para. 78). The Court considers that the same
reasoning is applicable to the application of the customary international law regarding the immu- nity of one State from
proceedings in the courts of another.

ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962)

When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is
bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations con- cerning the treatment to be afforded
them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be
drawn between the obligations of a State towards the inter- national community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of al1 States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, al1 States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.

Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary inter- national law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimina- tion. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law, others are conferred by international instru- ments of a universal or quasi-universal character.

35. Obligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the same category. It cannot be
held, when one such obligation in particular is in question, in a specific case, that al1 States have a legal interest in its
observance. In order to bring a claim in respect of the breach of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to
do so, for the rules on the subject rest on two suppositions:

"The first is that the defendant State has broken an obligation towards the national State in respect of its nationals. The
second is that only the party to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach."
(Reparationfor Injuries Suflered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp.
181-182.)
UNILATERAL ACTS

Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France)

It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of
the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the Statebeing thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though
not made within the context of inter- national negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a
quidpro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is
required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature
of the juridical act by which the pro- nouncement by the state was made.

Of course, not al1 unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a
particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When
States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

With regard to the question of form, it should be observed that this is not a domain in which international law imposes any
special or strict requirements. Whether a statement is made orally or in writing makes no essential difference, for such
statements made in particular circumstances may create commitments in international law, which does not require that
they should be couched in written form.

One of the basic principles governing the creation and perfor- mance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the
principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent in international co-opera- tion, in particular in an age when this
CO-operationin many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of
treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral
declara- tion. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and
are entitled to require that the obli- gation thus created be respected.

Legal Status of Eastern Greenland

he Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this nature given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his
Government in response to a request by the diplomatic representative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling
within his province, is binding upon the country to which the Minister belongs.

The Court is unable to read into the words of the Ihlen declaration "in the settlement of this question" (i.e. the Greenland
question) a condition which would render the promise to refrain from making any difficulties inoperative should a
settlement not be reached. The promise was unconditional and definitive. It was so understood by the Norwegian Minister
for Foreign Affairs when he told the Danish Minister at Christiania - on November 7th, 1919, that "it was a pleasure to
Norway to recognize Danish sovereignty over Greenland" (dispatch from the Danish Minister at Christiania to the Danish
Minister for Foreign Affairs of November 8th, 1919). It was also in the same sense that the Danish Minister at Christiania
had understood the Ihlen declaration, when he informed the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 22nd, 1919, that M.
Ihlen had told him "that the plans of the Royal Government in regard to the sovereignty of Denmark over the whole of
Greenland would not encounter any difficulties on the part of Norway".

Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali)

In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of al1 the factual circumstances
in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant
States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government,
that Government's unilateral declarations had "conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention
effectively to terminate these tests" (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51 ; p. 474, para. 53). In the par- ticular
circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound othenvise than by
unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the
applicants without thereby jeopardizing its con- tention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case
are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding
character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the nor- mal method : a fornial
agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kirid was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber
finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral
act with legal implications in regard to the present case.