WHO MAY ADOPT is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the Under Articles 184
ual welfare of the Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993
Facts:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of
America, married
Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later
naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses
jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed
Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living
with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as
well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. On 29 November
1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses James Anthony Hughes and Lenita Mabunay
Hughes are qualified to adopt under Philippine law.
Ruling:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under
any of theexceptional cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may
not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his
own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91,
Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the
spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was
silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family
Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now
expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in
only two instances: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the
Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adaptor one spouse
adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. The
respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court,
has theorized that James Anthony should merely be considered a
"nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the appellate
court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely
assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights
and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not
necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of
surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and
successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be
considered inconsequential to the parties.
The court are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this
instance, that an adoption can bring not so much for the prospective
adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. The court
also realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration
adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been
designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is
given, The court must obey its full mandate.
Even then, The court find it difficult to conclude this opinion without
having to call the attention of the appropriate agencies concerned to
the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption, a matter
that evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184,
last paragraph, Family Code).
REPUBLIC V. TOLEDANO
G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on
March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The
said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive
weeks.
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a
petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from
November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and
has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon
gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow,
likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to
support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition.
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse
sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on
March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The
said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive
weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse
is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married
Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19,
1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the
Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the
petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Clouse can adopt Solomon.
Ruling:
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph
Alcala .Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209
expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An
alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative
by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent
Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino
citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the
petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his
own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 18.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. CONCEPCION S.
ALARCON VERGARA,
G.R. No. 95551 March 20, 1997
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due
Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to
adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a
member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a
former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two
children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents,
gave their consent to the adoption. After trial, the lower court rendered
its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring
Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.
Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap
requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three
months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on
the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the
very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the
welfare of a child. The court also found that the petitioning spouses are
mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character,
sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended
adoptees. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question
of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law
to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. The Court finds the petition meritorious
and hereby grants it.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to
adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
Ruling:
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because
he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid
down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives
by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed,
thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.
On her own. Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the
law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to
exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife
may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the
optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt,
except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his
own illegitimate child; 2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for
they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister.
The Court is not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,
which is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than
defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, the Court cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition
for adoption.
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM AND
MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
GR No. 168992 May 21, 2009
Facts:
Monina Lim married Primo Lim on June 23, 1974. The two were
childless so they decided to adopt. Custody of minors Michelle and
Michael were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban. The couple
raised the two children as if they were their own. They were registered
with a surname of Lim, enrolled in exclusive schools and recognized
with the same surname in their school records and documents.
On November 28, 1998, Primo Lim died and after 2 years Monina
married an American citizen. Monina, then, decided to adopt the two
through the amnesty granted under Republic Act 8552 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. At the time fo the filing of
the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. The latter
gave their consent by executing an affidavit of consent. Olario also
executed an affidavit of Consent.
Issue:
Whether or not Monina validly adopted Michelle and Michael despite
her remarriage.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that petitioner, Monina, and her husband should have
jointly filed the petition for adoption due to the fact of the remarriage,
citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code. The provision under Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 is clear. It
reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of
full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of
the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application
for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been
certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and
that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may
be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
Monina’s claim that the affidavit of consent suffices is untenable.
Additional requirements must still be complied.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and
joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the
trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires
certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION
IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM
G.R. No. 168992 May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, optometrist, married Primo Lim on June 23, 1974. In the
course of their relationship, they were childless. Thus when the
opportunity came that Lucia Ayuban entrusted to them two minor
children, they grabbed it. They registered the two minor children as if
they are their real children and named them Michelle Lim and Michael
Lim. They treated the children as their own and even sent them to
exclusive schools.
On November 28, Primo Lim died. Petitioner then married Angel Olario,
an American citizen, on December 27, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner
decided to adopt the children pursuant to Domestic Adoption Act of
1998 or RA 8552. Later on, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michael and Michelle, 18 years old and 25 years old,
respectively. Michelle and Michael gave their consent. The husband of
petitioner gave his consent as well. However, the petition was
dismissed. The trial court stated that the petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her husband due to his remarriage. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner who remarried can singly adopt.
Ruling:
No. The principle of Dura lex sed lex (the may be harsh, but it is the
law) applies in the present case as it is explicitly stated in Section 7,
Art. III of RA 8552 “ who may adopt…..(c) The guardian with respect to
the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses.” The use of the word shall in the
said provision indicates that joint adoption by the husband and wife is
mandatory. And since petitioner remarry then the law requires that the
petition should be jointly filed by them. Moreover, the petition does not
fall in any of the three exceptions as enumerated in the
abovementioned provision.
LANDINGIN V. REPUBLIC
GR No. 164948 June 27, 2006
FACTS:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam,
USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 31, 1986;
Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia
Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal
grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,
went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second
marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of
the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed
away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children;
the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow,
has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed
and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with
the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of
the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioner’s custody. A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a
Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker
as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptee’s biological mother
Ruling:
No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption.
The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference
by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The
written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and reestablish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care
of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements
of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the
time of adoption.
Cang v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were
married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born
on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph
Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their
marriage, the Cang couple‘s relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband‘s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend
of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison,
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal Separation with alimony pendente
lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which
rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang
spouses providing that they agreed to ―live separately and apart or
from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United States where he
sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that
also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie,
reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times and placesǁ to
petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became
a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife
and never remarried. Upon learning of the petition for adoption,
petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an
opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the
children while his finances were ―too meagerǁ compared to theirs, he
could not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner
moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie
had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their
children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna
Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court
then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
petitioner.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has
abandoned them?
Ruling:
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have
elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so
abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon means to forsake
entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word
to the root idea of ―putting under a ban. The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent
never to resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
―any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It
means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
of care and support which parents owe their children.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct
did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly,
petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States,
he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his
wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims. t abandoned them. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately
executory.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
(DSWD) V. BELEN, A.M. NO. RTJ-96-1362 JULY 18, 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of
whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for
adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent
Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree
primarily on the "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the
adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand
have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting
rules have been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations,
respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial
custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and recommendations
are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study
Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent
Elma P. Vedaña. However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea
sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order
to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that
it did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that
there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to
conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare
officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of
the required reports for said minor's adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case
study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court.
Ruling:
A decree of adoption cannot be granted.
Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no
uncertain terms that:
No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of
Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in case of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the
child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective
adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations
on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of
Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such
case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a
complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate
the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to
the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and
involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting
parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption
cases:
1. To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development,
thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the
pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
2. To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the
aforesaid decree
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if
any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and
Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such
case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social
worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper
course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the
DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding
No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been
accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the
necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social
welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover,
respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinely for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution
and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption
proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.
By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or
unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose
adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large
measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on
equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned,
respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that
pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with
the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case
study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself
the facts on which the court was to act.
Nature of Effects of Adoption
REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ
GR 117209 FEBRUARY 9, 1996
FACTS:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of
the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his
adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change
of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose,
are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends
that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee,
as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the
change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5,
Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of
name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for
adoption.
RULING:
No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect
of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter
which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact,
even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper
name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must
remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation
of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license
to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a
mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor
is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in
and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available
under our remedial law system.

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARANTO
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto filed this petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then
fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime B.
Caranto since he was seven years old. Among those sought in the
petition was that “the first name which was mistakenly registered as
MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.”
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued
that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was
basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses Caranto, declaring MICHAEL C.
Mazon as the son by adoption of the spouses Caranto, and changing
his name to MICHAEL. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private
respondents’ petition for adoption.
2) Whether or not the decision of the RTC, insofar as it ordered the
correction of the name of the minor, is valid.
Ruling:
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It involves an
obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted.
The correction involves merely the substitution of the letters ch for the
letter d, so that what appears as Midael as given name would read
Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly
clerical one. Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to
Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both
names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and
tone (tono, tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication requirement is
to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can
make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
publication of notice in this case.
However, the trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of
persons. This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name.
Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the
Civil Code - to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of
Court in 1964 - covers those harmless and innocuous changes, such
as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding (Rule 108, 3). He is an indispensable party, without whom
no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the
correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a
case renders ineffectual all the proceeding subsequent to the filling of
the complaint including the judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for
correction of entry published (Rule 108, 4). While there was notice
given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for
adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the
prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned
that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also
being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA,
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mother’s middle
name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname
“Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant
to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother
as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural
father.
Ruling:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
TEOTICO V. DEL VAL
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth
P600,000. She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature
and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the
witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for
Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina
Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left
to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to
her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina
was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder
of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val
Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased
sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased
brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law
and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will
at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in
the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or
as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one
who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will,
defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest
in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not
appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any
portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a
legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under the civil code. Even if
her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter. Hence,
defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal
heir in the probate proceeding.
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME VS. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
AND SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
Facts:
John Colcol, an electrician employed by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc. on board the vessel Maersk Danville, died due to an accident that
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on him. He was
childless and unmarried at the time of his death. Hence, petitioner
Bernardina Bartolome, the biological mother of John, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS). It
was, however, denied because she no longer was considered as the
parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. Hence,
SSS said that John’s primary beneficiary was Cornelio and not the
petitioner. She would also not qualify as a secondary beneficiary even
if it were proven that Cornelio has already passed away.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption decree severed the relation between John
and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
Ruling:
The Court disagrees. It is true that when Cornelio adopted John,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, at the
time of Cornelio’s death, John was still a minor, at about four years of
age. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. The reversion of
parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
already provided under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act. The Court also finds support on
the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of
adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. From the foregoing, the Court held that the
biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption.
To strengthen her claim, records reveal that both petitioner and John
repeatedly used a common area as their residence, following
Cornelio’s death in 1987. It can then be assumed that aside from
having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually exercised the same, and that they lived together under one
roof.
GERONIMO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
Facts:
Karen Santos was claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano
Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the
death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration
No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to
her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants
executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino
and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property in question;
and that consequently they took possession and were able to transfer
the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed
that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the
land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property
and pays her damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered
judgment notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth
certificate.
Ruling:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate is not the one
envisioned by law finds support in numerous cases decided by the
Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue
of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil
Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child upon the information of a third person. Where the birth certificate
and the baptismal certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same. The birth certificate contains erasures.
The date of birth originally written in ball pen was erased and the date
April 6, 1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the
informant also originally written in ball pen was erased and the name E.
Dano was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is no signature
as to who received it from the office of the registry. Worst, respondent
Karen confirms the existence of her birth certificate when she
introduced in evidence a mere Certification from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more
suspicions of its existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption
that if such evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
ELITA LAHOM vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Isabelitz Lahom and Dr. Diosdado Lahom adopted
respondent Jose Melvin Sibulo. Respondent was two years old then
when he was adopted. He enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the
couple. In 1971, they filed a petition to legally adopt respondent. The
petition was granted. Thus, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed
the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. A sad turn of
events came many years later. Then, petitioner filed a petition before
the RTC Naga to rescind the decree of adoption on the ground that
respondent refused to use the surname Lahom as evidenced in his
PRC record and even in his practice of profession.
Prior to the commencement of the case, On March 22, 1988, RA No.
8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. It
removed from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case. The court favored the
respondent. Petitioner then filed a review for certiorari under rule 45 of
the rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject adoption, decreed on May 5, 1972, can still
be revoked or rescinded after the effectivity of RA No. 8552.
Ruling:
No. RA No. 8552, particularly Section 19 of Article VI, provides that
“Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit
the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.” The
said provision withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption
decree. The sole right to sever the legal ties lies on the hands of the
adopted child. In addition, when the petitioner filed the action, it was
already under the regime of the RA No. 8552 since it has abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code. Hence, the decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SUPPORT:
LIM-LUA V. LUA, G.R. No. 175279 June 5, 2013
Facts:
On September 2003, Susan Lim-Lua (Susan) filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo Lua (Danilo). In her
prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, Susan
sought the amount of P500, 000.00 as monthly support.
After due hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order
granting support pendente lite of P250,000.00 sufficient to take care of
the needs of Susan. This amount excludes the medical attendance
expenses needed by Susan. Moreover, the amounts already extended
to their two children should be continued by Danilo considering the vast
financial resources at his disposal.
According to Article 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable
from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from
the date of judicial demand. Since the complaint was filed on
September 2003, the amount of P250,000.00 should be paid by Danilo
to Susan retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support
pendente lite.
Danilo filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that Susan is not
entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for
herself a separate dwelling from their children and Danilo has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with family’s social and financial standing. Danilo’s motion
for reconsideration was denied, he then filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered a decision entering a new
order for Danilo to pay Susan a monthly support pendente lite of
P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and to pay Susan the
amount of P115,000.00 starting from September 2003 until March 2005
less the amount supposedly given by Danilo to Susan as her and their
two children’s monthly support.
Neither of the parties appealed the decision of the CA. In a Compliance
dated June 2005, Danilo attached a copy of a check he issued after
deducting the support in arrears. Said deductions include the purchase
of two cars for his children and payments made on the children’s credit
cards chargeable to Danilo. Susan asserted that none of the expenses
deducted by Danilo may be chargeable as part of the monthly support.
Since Danilo still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears
pendente lite, Susan filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court
with Damages. Danilo, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. The CA set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. CA
said that the RTC should not have completely disregarded the
expenses incurred by Danilo which certainly inured to the benefit not
only of the two children, but Susan as well.
Susan filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the expenses already incurred by Danilo, which
involves the purchase of cars to their children and purchases through
credit cards, may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing
to Susan and their children.
Held:
No, Article 194 of the Family Code provides that support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. As a matter of law, the amount of support which
those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the needs of the recipient. The general rule is to the effect
that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother
money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and
accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a
matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made
directly to the children.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA
was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its
sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions
made by Danilo in settling the support in arrears. The CA should not
have allowed all the expenses incurred by Danilo to be credited against
the accrued support pendente lite. The monthly support pendente lite
granted by the RTC was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also
Susan’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive
cars bought by Danilo for his children plus their maintenance cost,
travel expenses of Susan and Angelli, purchases through credit card of
items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been
disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support
pendente lite. The deductions should be limited to those basic needs
and expenses.
As to the financial capacity of Danilo, it is beyond doubt that he can
solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation,
health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as well
as those of Susan who was then unemployed and a full-time
housewife. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court
unmistakably show how much Danilo lavished on his children, it
appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter
altogether.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support
should be submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration
for nullity of marriage was filed. The amount of support may be reduced
or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support. As it was held in Advincula v. Advincula:
“…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is
of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during
the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased
or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.”
ACTUAL NEEDS VS CAPACITY TO PAY
LAM -VS- CHUA
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 11, 1994, respondent Adriana Chua filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and alleged that she was married to petitioner Jose Chua and
begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; that Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage; that she was forced into an agreement of dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future
properties in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, and
said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City; and that they had long been separated in bed and board and have
agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that for the declaration of their
marriage null and void but failed to claim and pray for the support of
their child, John Paul.
During the hearing, she testified that her married life was abnormal
because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and
instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars and that
she was also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child,
John Paul. She also presented two marriage contracts as evidence on
two marriages contracted by Jose before their marriage. However, no
evidence was presented regarding the amount of support needed by
John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give support.
Thus, the trial court declared the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and
void for being bigamous by nature and ordered Jose to give P20,000
monthly support to his son John Paul.
Jose then filed a Motion for Reconsideration as to the P20,000 monthly
support to his son and argued that there was already a provision for
support of the child wherein he and Adriana agreed to contribute
P250,000.00 each to a common fund as embodied in the decision of
the Makati RTC. He further alleged that he contributed P500,000. This
motion was denied by the trial court and held that the compromise was
null and void ab initio and was of no moment and cannot limit and/or
affect the support ordered.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
And the motion for reconsideration then filed was also denied.
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether or not Jose should give the P20,000 monthly support decided
upon by the court
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled negatively and held that the amount of
support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, it was
held that judgment for support does not become final for the right to
support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional;
for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his
or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his
increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
Thus, the compromise agreement between Jose and Adriana, as
approved by the Makati RTC, was not a bar to any further award of
support in favor of their child John Paul. It cannot be considered final
and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to
modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the
capabilities of the parents to give support.
In determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount
should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to the provisions of the Family
Code under Article 194 which provides that support must be in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family, Article 201 which states that
the amount of support should be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient, and Article
202 stating that Support should be reduced or increased
proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to furnish the same.
It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the
evidence presented before it which must prove the capacity or
resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to support their
children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the
monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation of the child. But the
only evidence presented by Adriana regarding her claim for support of
the child was her testimony where she requested for support and
wanted the amount of P20,000 to P25,000.
Thus, the Court held that the manner by which the trial court arrived at
the amount of support awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary
and without any basis.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
BRIONES V. MIGUEL
GR NO. 156343 OCTOBER 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael
Kevin Pineda. On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended
Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of
the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of
the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in
Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate.
The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese
national and is presently residing in Japan. Respondent Loreta P.
Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and
invokes Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Briones, as the natural father, may be denied the
custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother
who is away.
Ruling:
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over
their minor child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded
to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she
stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody over the minor, such
that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But
when she is abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have
custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she
is abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable fact, he
adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as evidenced by her
Special Power of Attorney dated May 28, 2001, granting to her sister
temporary custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan,
where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s argument moot.
While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA,
petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold
Departure Order," alleging therein that respondents were preparing the
travel papers of the minor so the child could join his mother and her
Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 1970
FACTS:
Appellant who is a minor, Carmen Quimiging and Felix Icao, a married
man, were neighbors in Dapitan City. Carmen, assisted by her parents
sued Felix for having a carnal intercourse with the former several times
by force and intimidation and without her consent. Carmen became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Felix, and the former
had to stop studying . Carmen claimed damages Php120.00 a month.
Duly summoned, Felix moved to dismiss for lack of action since the
complainant did not allege that the child had been born; trial judge
sustained defendant’s motion. Plaintiff amended the complaint but trial
court sustained the dismissal and ruled that no amendment to
complaint is allowable. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40 of the New Civil Code
which will entitle the child to claim support through the mother.
RULING:
Yes. Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of
the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme
Court says that since, as provided in Article 40 of the New Civil Code
(the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable
to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following
article), petitioner Quimiguing’s child, since time of conception, and as
having fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee.
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was
carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the
terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a
cause of action was doubly in error.
FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA
G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and curator ad
litem, Rosario
Gomez, instituted an action for support against petitioner Luis
Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is the latter‘s
acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the
allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son
and was not present at his baptism and that he was married at time of
Eugenio‘s birth. Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent
judge Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly
pension, pendente lite. On May 11, 1935, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of that order on the ground that it was issued in excess
of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of the plaintiff was
placed in issue by the pleadings; that the plaintiff has no right to
monthly support from the defendant until his status as a child of the
latter is finally determined in his favor and that as the guardian ad
litem of the plaintiff admits his lack of means to defray even the
ordinary expenses of existence it would be impossible for the
defendant to recover whatever amount he may have advanced to
plaintiff as support pendente lite, should it finally be decided that he is
not the father of the plaintiff.
The respondent judge, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta, denied that
motion, hence the institution of this special proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first
establishing his
status as petitioner‘s son.
Ruling:
Eugenio Francisco is not entitled to support without first establishing
his status as petitioner‘s son. The answer as to whether or not
petitioner‘s counsel really agreed to have him pay the pension during
the case‘s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the case. As in
the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status must be
proven first before a right of support can be derived. The Court ruled
that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his guardian ad litem,
his civil status as the petitioner‘s son. As such, no right of support can
be given because the very civil status of sonship, from which the right
is derived, is in question. It held that there is no law or reason which
authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son
in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that
he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there
is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in
issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by
a final judgment. Additionally, the respondent judge was without
jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of herein private
respondent‘s absence of aforementioned status.
SANTERO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
Facts:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero,
had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely, Princesita, Federico
and Willie (herein petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma
Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of
their mothers was married to their father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-
Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the decision
of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly without hearing) in the
amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition
fees, clothing materials and subsistence out of any available funds in
the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision
on the ground that private respondents were no longer studying, that
they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for
Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have
sufficient funds to cover the said expenses. Before the Supreme Court
could act on saod petition, the private respondents filed another motion
for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included Juanita, Estelita and
Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero
with Anselma Diaz, praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to
each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their
father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the CFI-Cavite
issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private
respondents, to submit a clarification or explanation as to the additional
three children included in the said motion. She said in her clarification
that in her previous motions, only the last four minor children were
included for support and the three children were then of age should
have been included since all her children have the right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of
Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children
based on the opposition of the petitioners.
Issues:
Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
Ruling:
Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or married
should not be regarded as the determining factor to their right to
allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of the New Civil Code. Records
show that a hearing was made. Moreover, what the said court did was
just to follow the precedent of the court which granted previous
allowance and that the petitioners and private respondents only
received Php 1,500.00 each depending on the availability of funds.
CHARLES GOTARDO VS. DIVINA BULING
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
Facts:
On December 1, 1992, the respondent met the petitioner at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the
petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. The petitioner started
courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they
became sweethearts in the last week of January 1993.The petitioner
gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on
Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took
care of him when he was ill.
In September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with
the respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house
managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas Oppus St.,
Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.The petitioner rented the room from
March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994. The sexual encounters occurred
twice a month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on
August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was pregnant.
When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans
to marry the respondent. They in fact applied for a marriage license.
The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception
and the bridal gown. Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out
of the wedding plans.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for
breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the
respondent amicably settled the case. The respondent gave birth to
their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up
and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter
on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.
When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed
her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite. In
June 25, 2002, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. The respondent appealed the RTC
ruling to the CA. In March 5, 2004, the CA departed from the RTC's
appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding that the latter
merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions
of the petitioner’s counsel.
Issue:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the
RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide
legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
Ruling:
The respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her
conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and
the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand, the
petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the
respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the
respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in
September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However,
the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.
The Court finds that the contradictions are for the most part more
apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the respondent to
comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later
corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her
contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of
the transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought
it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco but the latter took no action
on the matter.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of
obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus,
the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to
the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC
GR no. 189516 June 8, 2016
Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were
married in June 16, 1978. They had 5 children. Due to the alleged
Francisco’s infidelity they decided to separate and their children were
all in the custody of their mother.
Edna, then, filed a complaint against Colonel Francisco before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She
demanded that they be entitled to 75% of the retirement benefits of
Col. Otamias as their monthly support since the children were all living
with her.
Issue:
Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed
upon for the financial support of his legitimate family
Ruling:
The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the
parties, and its provisions should be respected in the absence of
allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in
executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not
contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in
the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity.
Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for
support of the wives of other retired military personnel in a similar
situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are
the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have
received a portion of their husbands' pensions. Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides. Section 31. The benefits
authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax
whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any
third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other
payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution so as
to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and his
family. On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under
the Family Code. Article 194 of the Family Code defines support as
follows: Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The
education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or
to and from place of work. The provisions of the Family Code also state
who are obliged to give support, thus: Art. 195. Subject to the
provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3)
Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood. Art.
196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or
half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent
set forth in Article 194 except only when the need for support of the
brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the
claimant's fault or negligence.
Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether
legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the
person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in
case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the
support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouses obliged
upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal
partnership.

LACSON V. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
Facts:
Maowee Daban Lacson (Maowee) and Maonaa Daban Lacson
(Maonaa) are legitimate daughters of Edward Lacson (Edward) and
Lea Daban Lacson (Lea). Not long after the birth of Maonaa, Edward
left the conjugal home, forcing Lea and the children to seek shelter
somewhere else. Maowee, Maonaa and Lea shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own from 1976 to 1994,
From the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger Edward for
support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note
dated December 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things
turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support,
despite Lea's efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. In the early part of 1995, Lea, in behalf
of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). That Edward, despite being
gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has
not provided them support since 1976.
The RTC granted Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite, ordering
Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or
18 years, of support in arrears. Edward’s appeal and move for motion
for reconsideration was dismissed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Hence, Edward's recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Edward shall be held liable to give support in arrears for
his failure to provide such to Maowee, Moanaa and Lea.
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual
determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the RTC respecting the
demand Lea made on Edward to secure support.
Edward, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token
amounts for schooling when support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance
and education, or, in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person
alive. The sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle for their
sustenance and education when Edward failed to give the same.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, their uncle can rightfully
exact reimbursement from Edward.
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT
LIM V. LIM
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009
FACTS:
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes
Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua
Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house
midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very
compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued
petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support.
The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000
pendente lite.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide
support to respondents.
Ruling:
Yes. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are
liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by
its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because at
the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them. Neither the
text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the
first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of
the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX
on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that
parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support,
they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and
its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees.
Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation
arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the
obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants
only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents
but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.
MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125074 June 30, 2006
FACTS:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of
her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with
the RTC Makati.
On February 16,1975, it was alleged that petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only
21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the
marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of
the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon
City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had
totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition,
Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of
America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was
accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England
College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education
hence the filing of Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support.
Petitioner likewise averred that demands were made upon Federico
and the latters father, Francisco, for general support and for the
payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin
sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these
matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter
being generally known to be financially well-off.
Issue:
Is respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her granddaughter’s
educational support.
Ruling:
Yes. The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the
order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco.
Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the
next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to
his granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that
respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns
and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the
majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from
these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns
shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real
properties here and abroad. It having been established that respondent
Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters
education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be
held liable for support pendente lite.
DE GUZMAN VS. PEREZ, GR 156013, JULY 25, 2006
G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde became
sweethearts while studying law in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their
studies were interrupted when private respondent became pregnant.
She gave birth to petitioner’s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on
October 2, 1987.
Private respondent and petitioner never got married. In 1991, petitioner
married another woman with whom he begot two children.
Petitioner sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice — the first in
1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill,
petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray the cost of the
child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these
instances, petitioner never provided any other financial support for his
son.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs,
private respondent accepted a job as a factory worker in Taiwan where
she worked for two years. It was only because of her short stint
overseas that she was able to support Robby and send him to school.
However, she reached the point where she had just about spent all her
savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The child’s continued
education thus became uncertain.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent failed or refuses to do his part in providing
his child the education his station in life and financial condition permit
and he be charged for neglect
Ruling:
Yes. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent.
Liability for the crime does not depend on whether the other parent is
also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any
parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child the
education which the family’s station in life and financial condition
permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the
neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the
prescription that in all questions regarding the care, custody, education
and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of Article 59(4) of
PD 603, the charge against him cannot be made in relation to Section
10(a) of RA 7610 which provides:
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
a. Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered
by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty ofprision mayor in its minimum period.
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of
neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of PD 603 “but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code.” The “neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is
also a crime (known as "indifference of parents") penalized under the
second paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, it
is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016
Facts:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco Otamias were
married in June16, 1978. They had 5 children. Due to the alleged
Francisco’s infidelity they decided to separate and their children were
all in the custody of their mother. Edna, then, filed a complaint against
Colonel Francisco before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. She demanded that they be entitled to75% of
the retirement benefits of Col. Otamias as their monthly support since
the children were all living with her.
Issue:
Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed
upon for the financial support of his legitimate family.
Ruling:
The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the
parties, and its provisions should be respected in the absence of
allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in
executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between
parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not
contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in
the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity. Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC
granted the request for support of the wives of other retired military
personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case.
Attached to the Petition are the affidavits of the wives of retired
members of the military, who have received a portion of their husbands'
pensions. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides: The
benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall
not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax
whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any
third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled
money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other
payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
NORMA DEL SOCORRO vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707 December 10,2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September
25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant
petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of
a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried
in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree
Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused
to receive the letter.
The crime charged was in violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262, also known as the Violence Against Women and Children
Act. It was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien.
Issue:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law.
Held:
The Court ruled that even if the petitioner invokes Article 195 of the
Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a
divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,
respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and
clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son,
are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by reason
of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for any financial
support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on
Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy,
the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by
their national law with respect to family rights and duties
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or
the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents
to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national
law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support
their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law
would still not find applicability for the reason that when the foreign law,
judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be
applied.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
LACSON V. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006
FACTS:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while
Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually
forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason,
shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Lea‘s mother-
in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her mother and then with her brother
Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return
later to the house of Lea‘s mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the
sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen
years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both
respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission,
however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e.,
from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand
having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following
provision of the Family Code to complete his point:Article 203 – The
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,
but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision
starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from
that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was
made upon him.
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
The Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz, Edmond
Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
Facts:
Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named Edmond
Ruiz, his only son, Maria Pillar Ruiz, his adopted daughter, and his
three granddaughters, namely, Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline, as his heirs. The three granddaughters and the
adopted daughter are the private respondents in this case.
He bequeathed to his heirs cash, personal and real properties, and
named Edmond Ruiz the executor of his estate. When Hilario died, the
cash component of his estate was immediately distributed among Ruiz
and the private respondents. However, Edmond did not take any action
for the probate of his father’s holographic will. Four years after the
death of Hilario, Pilar filed with the trial court a petition for the probate
and approval of Hilario’s will, and for the issuance of letters of
testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence. Hence, the
house and lot in Pasig which was bequeathed to the three
granddaughters by the testator was leased out by Edmond to third
persons. The probate court then ordered Edmond to deposit to the
Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totaling Php
540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Pasig property.
Edmond was able to turn-over the cash amounting to Php 348,583.00
only. Edmond filed a motion for the release of Php 50,000.00 to pay the
real estate taxes of the estate which was approved by the court.
Another motion for release of funds was filed, but was opposed by
private respondent Maria Pilar. Pilar filed a motion for the release of the
rent payments to the granddaughters, and for the distribution of the
Pasig property and the Blue Ridge apartments in accordance with the
will. This motion was granted by the court. It, however, delayed the
release of the titles. Edmond was ordered to submit an accounting of
the expenses for administration including provisions for the support of
the granddaughters. This was appealed by the petitioner to the Court of
Appeals, with the appellate court sustaining the order of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court has the authority to grant an
allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren.
Ruling:
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that only “the widow and minor or incapacitated
children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate,
shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance
as are provided by law.” It, however, should not be limited to the minor
or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator’s death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceased’s legitimate spouse and children, regardless
of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to
education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
In this case, the grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the
deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
The Court held that the appellate court erred in sustaining the probate
courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator
pending settlement of his estate.
REYES V. INES-LUCIANO
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint
was filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by
her father and the second attempt, wherein she was already living
separately from her husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed
for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The
husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the
wife committed adultery with her physician. The respondent Judge
Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The
husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not
entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and
that even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive.
The judge reduced the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.
Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order
granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband
appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an
action.
Ruling:
Yes. provided that adultery is established by competent evidence.
Mere allegations will not bar her right to receive support pendente lite.
Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In
determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the
case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other
documentary evidence appearing in the record. The SC on July, 1978
ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to
February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on
the accepted findings of the trial court that the husband could afford it
because of his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CARLITOS E. SILVA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos Silva, a married businessman, and Suzane Gonzales, an
unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage.
Their union produced two children namely: Ramon Carlos and Rica
Natalia. After some time, their relationship turned sour when Gonzales
returned to acting.
In February 1986, Gonzales did not allow Silva to have the children in
his company. This caused Silva to file a petition before the RTC
Quezon City for custodial rights over the children. Gonzales, however,
opposed this on the ground that Silva often engaged in gambling and
womanizing which she feared could affect the moral and social values
of the children. The trial court ruled in favor of Silva. Gonzales then
appealed it in the CA. The appellate court ruled in favor of Gonzales.
Hence, Silva filed this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a visitation right over his children.
Held:
Yes. The said right is vested by the provisions in the Family code
specifically Article 209 in relation to Article 220 states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority
to keep children in their company and to give them love and affection,
advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. Moreover, this
is fully supported by our Constitution that it speaks about “the natural
and primary rights of parents in rearing the youth. The interest of the
child is always the main priority of the law. Thus the decision of the trial
court is affirmed and the decision of the appellate court is denied
IMBONG V. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
Facts:
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. RH Law was enacted to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to
ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive
health be achieved. The RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health
and population control.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court. Various petitions are assailing the constitutionality
of RH Law. It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person
who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes
any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-
being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.
Issue:
Whether or not the provision in RH Law which debars parental consent
in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage is a valid provision.
Held:
No, it is not a valid provision. Section 7 of the RH law provides: “No
person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be
allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage.” There can be no other
interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut
off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
The State cannot replace a minor parent’s natural mother and father
when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their
consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote
unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution. It
disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that “the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.” The 1987 provision has added the
adjective “primary” to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to “only in
elective surgical procedures,” it denies the parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are “non-surgical
procedures.” The parents should not be deprived of their constitutional
right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would
result in the violation of one’s privacy with respect to his family. The
State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of
parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the
latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
TONOG V. CA
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah Tonog gave birth to Gardin
Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent
Edgar Daguimol. A year later, Dinah left for the United States and work
as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of Edgar and
her paternal grandparents.
Edgar then filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted said petition and
appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin Faith.
Dinah, upon learning of such appointment, filed a petition for relief from
judgment. Hence, the trial court set aside its original judgment and
allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar’s petition. Edgar, in turn,
filed a motion for reconsideration which was countered by Dinah
through filing a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.
In its resolution, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of
Edgar and granted the motion for custody of Dinah who afterwards
moved for immediate execution of said resolution.
Edgar then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which was dismissed for lack of merit. But upon motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court modified its decision and allowed
the physical custody of Gardin Faith remain with Edgar until the matter
of custody be determined by final judgment.
Dinah filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Who should be entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending
the guardianship proceeding
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the
welfare and well-being of the child.
Article 220 of the Family Code embodies the parents’ right to custody
over their children and thus states that parents and individuals
exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are
entitled, among other rights, to keep them in their company. The Court
held in Santos, Sr. v. CA that the right of custody accorded to parents
springs from the exercise of parental authority, or patria potestas in
Roman Law, which is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully
assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
Parental authority offers no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor. Hence, such authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law such as a waiver of parental authority only in cases
of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an
orphan institution. Entrusting the custody of a minor to another, such as
a friend or godfather, even in a document, is merely giving temporary
custody and not renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Statute also sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed
decision. For illegitimate children, Article 176 of the Family Code
provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority
of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be
observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother for the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
From the explanation of the Code Commission, the general rule is
recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child. Hence, a mother may be deprived of the custody of
her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons like
instances of unsuitability such as neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
illness, and if older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state
his preference, but the court, not being bound by that choice, may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be
given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
As for the temporary custody of a child whose guardianship
proceedings was still pending before the trial, the Court held that the
controlling factor should be the welfare of the said minor and that the
child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust
into a strange environment away from the people and places to which
she had apparently formed an attachment.
Hence, the Court ruled that for the present and until finally adjudged,
temporary custody of the Gardin Faith should remain with her father,
Edgar, pending final judgment of the trial court in the guardianship
case.
VANCIL V. BELMES
GR NO. 132223 June 19, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy
serviceman who died on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two
children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her
as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie
and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a
similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On
June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that
she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time
the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A.
being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s
motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie
and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved
around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother or the grandmother of minor Vincent should
be his guardian.
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx." Indeed,
being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of
the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a rightsupported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of
the parental relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized
by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the
Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability
of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability.
Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing
that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely
insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering
that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being
now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American
citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to
perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In
fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties
of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon
this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting
the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find
much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators
and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement; the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators
and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts here.
BONDAGGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY
G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years
of age) were married on February 3, 1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita,
Manila under Islamic rites and out of that union begot two children who
are born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. On October 21, 1987, or four months
before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion which
was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to Sabrina, respondent was still
married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced.After their
marriage, the couple moved in with respondents family in Makati City.
In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of
Sabrinas mother and Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children
until he got an order from the court but even with a court order, he
could only see his children in school.
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as
Christians and their names changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz
Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina
Artadi.
Fouzi alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila,and that she would wear short
skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits which are detestable
under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their
children sweep their neighbors house for a fee of P40.00 after the
children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in
school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to
ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from
school.
Issue:
Whether or not Sabrina shall have parental authority custody over their
minor children
Ruling:
The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the children, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are
not divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly
exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their
responsibility over their legitimate children.
In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals,we stated:
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.
We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children,
such that they both want to have them in their custody.Either parent
may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In
cases where both parties cannot have custody because of their
voluntary separation, we take into consideration the circumstances that
would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the
children. Although we see the need for the children to have both a
mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more capacity and
time to see to the childrens needs. Respondent is a businessman
whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most of
the time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children, absent
a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the mother.
However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the
husband of parental authority. In the case of Silva v. Court of
Appeals,we said that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
care for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be
unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even
when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is
lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer
absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being
of the child.
Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his Constitutionally
protected natural and primary right.
Petitioner Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy shall have custody over minors
Abdulaziz, and Amouaje Bondagjy, until the children reach majority
age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses of
rearing the children.
SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were
married, after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent
Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband and out of their marriage, two
children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on
February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20,
1987. In the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of
petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica stayed with
her parents at respondents house; on August 6, 1990, petitioners
husband Reynaldo Eslao died; petitioner intended to bring Angelica
with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust
the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son
just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of
the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the
meantime, the petitioner returned to her mothers house in Pampanga
where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing
in the United States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful
relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James
Ouye decided to get married; less than ten months thereafter, or on
January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California,
USA, to join her new husband. At present, the petitioner is a trainee at
the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a progressive
practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic and
earns US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States; the petitioner then informed the respondent about her
desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present
husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie
and Angelica and to provide for their support and education; however,
respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner
of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of the
respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty.
Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding
for the return of the custody of Angelica to her natural mother and
when the demand remained unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same. The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the
custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was
merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. Thus, Teresita does not have the
right to the custody of the child.
SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on
April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987,
Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic,
owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not
have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00.
Arabella could not be discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she
paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses
Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty.
She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and
imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course
and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan. Ty claimed that
Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who
claimed to be their guardian.The Office of the City Prosecutor of
Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner‘s complaint, filed an
information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal
Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City.
Ty then revealed that the child may be found in quezon city. When
Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace
Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she was
not entirely sure that it was Arabella. On October 13, 1992, petitioner
filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong‘s favor and ordered
the respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took
cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem
respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If
indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect
would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case;
and (3) Will the question of the child‘s welfare be the paramount
consideration in this case which involves child custody. The RTC
decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to take
back Arabella to return to her family.
Ruling: Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for
a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. To justify the grant of the writ of
habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic
requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH
G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007
FACTS:
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City
of Bacolod, and established their conjugal dwelling in
Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a child
was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple started
to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City,
while Franklininsisted that they stay in Boracay Island. On March 23,
2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for
money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter
to Makati City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon
thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter Simone
would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for
Agnes to produce Simone in court. On May 19, 2006, the CA issued a
Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26, 2006.
After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the CA,
on June 8, 2006, promulgated the assailed Decision
granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which was denied in
the CA’s August 3, 2006 Resolution for lack of merit. Petitioner then
filed in the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the private respondent Franklin Harvey Hirsch joint custody
with petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch of their minor daughter Simone
Noelle Hirsch.
Ruling:
The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents. The Convention on the
Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in
all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers
unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mothers custody.
PABLO-GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO
GR no. 154994 June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son. Jocelyn
brought with her their son when she left their conjugal home.
Consequently, the petition was granted by the RTC due to the failure of
Jocelyn to appear despite several notice sent to her known address. A
house helper testified that she doesn’t care about the child, that she
even saw her slapping her son. Another witness said that she was
having a relationship with a person of the same gender as hers.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the RTC and
placed the child under the custody of the mother.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the
mother.
Ruling:
Crisanto failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Joycelyn is
unfit to perform her obligations as a mother to the child.
No evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual
proclivities (lesbian) or that his proper moral and psychological
development suffered as a result
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation
of parent’s parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant
consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,”
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or
otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child.
Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c
reads:
“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reason for such measure.”
SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a
nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986 and beget only
one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the
time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents,
private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and
wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the
latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that
they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of
the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her
husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit
US where he underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately
tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were
of no avail.
Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted
the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control
of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not Leouel Santos Jr. should be in the matter of care,
custody and control of his grandparents.
Ruling:
No. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. Parental authority
and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the
boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of
the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of
their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and
custody over their children merely because of the normal
consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary
separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-
laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody
from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have
reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law
considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to be
unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental
authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private
respondents as grandparents should not be seen as incompatible with
petitioner's right to custody over the child as a father. Moreover, who is
to say whether the petitioner's financial standing may improve in the
future?
DAVID V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is
a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a
while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher
J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christo pher J. was followed by
two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986,
and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to
private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's
house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his
legal family.In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay.
Daisie agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back he child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy
for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Yes. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was
married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such,
pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.2
Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody
of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be
a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving
him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time
the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's
custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the
mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child
categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it
has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody
of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to the
private respondent
ESPIRITU V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first
met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by
the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse
in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to
work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime
later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law
relationship of husband and wife.They begot a child in 1986 named
Rosalind Therese. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a
brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a
second child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to
separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita
granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left
them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines
sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the
mother.
Ruling:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter’s welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child
under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother
for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best
custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children
were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s
infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the
position to extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to
their father.
PEREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996
FACTS:
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing
in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered
nurse. They were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Nerissa
who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of
her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also
sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York
and became a resident alien in February 1992. Ray stayed with her in
the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike
his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, they come home to Cebu for a 5-week vacation
and should be back to U.S. as they all have round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had
agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was
supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the
couple was no longer on good terms. That their love for each other was
fading became apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not
want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband’s meager
income of P5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but he was
being kept away from her by her husband.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas
corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of
their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
Issue:
Who should have rightful custody of a Ray Z. Perez II?
Ruling:
Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother,
herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately
executory.
It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose
attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period
of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from
her before he has even reached his first year. The mothers role in the
life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and
poetry, the depth of a mothers love has been immortalized times
without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy but in
reality.The decision under review casts doubt on petitioners capability
to take care of the child, particularly since she works on twelve-hour
shifts thrice weekly, at times, even at night. There being no one to help
her look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot properly attend to
him. This conclusion is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her
present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of
quality time for Ray II. Quite a number of working mothers who are
away from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a
family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Second,
many a mother, finding herself in such a position, has invited her own
mother or relative to join her abroad, providing the latter with plane
tickets and liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able to
take care of himself. Others go on leave from work until such time as
the child can be entrusted to day-care centers. Delegating child care
temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not
detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises
supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids or yayas under the eagle eyes of the mother. Third,
private respondents work schedule was not presented in evidence at
the trial. Although he is a general practitioner, the records merely show
that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on retainer
basis and teaches part-time.25 Hence, respondent courts conclusion
that his work schedule is flexible (and h)e can always find time for his
son26 is not well-founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent lives
near his parents and sister is not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitioners
work schedule cited in the respondent courts decision is not
necessarily permanent. Hospitals work in shifts and, given a mothers
instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the utmost care, petitioner
may be expected to arrange her schedule in such a way as to allocate
time for him. Finally, it does not follow that petitioner values her career
more than her family simply because she wants to work in the United
States. There are any number of reasons for a persons seeking a job
outside the country, e.g. to augment her income for the familys benefit
and welfare, and for psychological fulfillment, to name a few. In the
instant case, it has been shown that petitioner earned enough from her
job to be able to construct a house for the family in Mandaue City.
DACASIN VS. DACASIN
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent
Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21
September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from
the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois
court) a divorce decree against petitioner.In its ruling, the Illinois court
dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine
courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner
alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole
custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others,
lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction
to enforce the divorce decree.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the custody over the child
Ruling:
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002,
two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old
(having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States
because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law is also undisputed: "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother.
(This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is
mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a
narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. Clearly then, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime
between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years
old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has
also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint
custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses
have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint
parental authority when spouses live together However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law
if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary
is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children
under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a
child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law
decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of
the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed,
the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore
than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed,
immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a
communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as
these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of
the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS
INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS. ABEJAR
G.R. No. 170631 February 10, 2016
FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003. He was survived
by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso
Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O.
Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista
Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to as the
respondent heirs.
Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a
petition for the partition of the decedent's estate and the appointment of
a special administrator on July 4, 2003. However, on July 28, 2003, Iris
Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
decedent left a will dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate
of the will and for her appointment as special administration.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the
probate proceedings because Francisco was pretreated from the
will.On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of preterition. Thus, the RTC
ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or
negate the existence of preterition. Only the respondent heirs complied
with this order. After several postponements at the instance of Morales,
the reception of evidence for the evidentiary hearing was scheduled on
May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving
her right to present evidence on the issue of preterition. On June 23,
2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended the
intestate proceedings and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned
that probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension
order but the RTC denied the motion on September 1, 2006. The RTC
also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued
to Alfonso Jr.
The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary
revocation of the Letters of Administration. They also moved for the
inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.
On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition.
Issue:
Whether or not Francisco Olondriz is a compulsory heir in the direct
line
Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, the prepetition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies
shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired.
Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the
prepetition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total
intestacy.7
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco
Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate
son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales
could show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the
conclusion of his prepetition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to
present evidence that Francisco received donations inter vivos and
advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not
appear during the hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present
evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching the
reasonable conclusion that there was prepetition. We will not entertain
the petitioner's factual allegation that Francisco was not pretreated
because this Court is not a trier of facts. Furthermore, the CA
concurred with the RTC's conclusion. We see no cogent reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the lower courts.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES
LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
FACTS:
Since 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In
December 1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because
the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his
second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead
inside Julie Ann’s house. Both were only 18 years, it was later found
that Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he
committed suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann, Felipe and Shirley Gotiong, then filed a civil
case for recovery of damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the parents of Wendell, Cresencio and Amelia Libi.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted
by the respondent Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Held:
The court ruled that, yes, the petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son.
Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring
and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their
son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was freely
accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked
whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing
from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed.
The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the
liability of parents in cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their
liability is primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by
their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is
also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to
show that they have acted with the diligence required by law because if
their liability is merely subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family.
TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Facts:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her
death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint
for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he
was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after
the tragic incident.
Issue:
Whether or not parental authority concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was
lodged with the biological parents.
Ruling:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians
are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the civil code.
The Court did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over
the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting
incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of
Adelberto.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
AQUINAS SCHOOL V. INTON
G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade three stundent at Aquinas
School. Other respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin is a religion
teacher of Inton in that school. While Yamyamin was writing on the
blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed it and
sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis got up again
and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the
child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on
the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmate’s seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on
that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard
while seated on the floor.
Due to this, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (The Intons) filed an
action for damages on behalf of their son. The Intons also filed a
criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of RA 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. Not satisfied with the
ruling of the trial court as regards to the amount of damages awarded,
the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Intons asked the
Court of Appeals to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas
liable as well. The Court of Appeals then found Aquinas School liable
due to the employer-employee relation existing between the school and
Yamyamin.
Issue:
Whether or not Aquinas school is solidarily liable with Yamyamin for
the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
Ruling:
No. The Court has consistently applied the “four-fold test” to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a)
selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power
to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most
crucial is the element of control. Control refers to the right of the
employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work f
the employee as well as the means and methods by which he
accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an
agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill
its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas
to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the
school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the
task of catechizing the schools grade three students. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control
over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Court also held that Aquinas
took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the
subject by their religion teacher. It cannot be said that Aquinas was
guilty of outright neglect.
In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of
Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang also known as
Julian Lin Wang, to be amended/corrected as Julian Lin Wang
Julian Lin Wang, duly represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang vs.
Cebu City Civil Registrar, duly represented by Registrar Oscar B. Molo
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE V. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010
Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where
respondent Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment
about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the tutelage of
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the
adviser is Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the
experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who
was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result
of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass.
The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it
close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in
the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye
and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a
result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his
left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his wound had
not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery. Upon
learning of the incident and because of the need for finances,
[Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for
which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary
from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00. Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to
the petitioner’s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and
diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held
liable for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the accident.
Ruling:
As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of
care, Persons and Family Relation 500 caution and foresight
incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The
defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by
[petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid screening process
for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and
secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner
school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees
because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders
and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools
should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Facts:
On February 13-20, 1995, herein petitioner conducted an enrollment
drive for the school year 1995-1996. Part of the said event was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. It is alleged
that Sherwin along with other high school students were riding a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva. Their destination was
Larayan Elementary School, in Dapitan for the said campaign. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II and it was alleged that the latter
drove recklessly resulting to the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. The
herein respondents, the parents of the deceased, filed a case against
petitioner, James Daniel II and his parent and Vivencio Villanueva. The
RTC of Dipolog City favored the respondents. Petitioner, then,
appealed the case to the CA, but the latter simply reduced the actual
damages and still affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, however, it was denied as well.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner
liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Held:
Yes. Pursuant to Article 218 and in relation to Article 219 of the Family
Code the petitioner has a responsibility towards the child. However, in
Article 219, for the petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In the present case, the proximate is not
the petitioner nor the reckless driving of James Daniel. The proximate
cause was the mechanical defect in the jeep which is the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Moreover, there was no
evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James to drive the
jeep.
The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.
AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Facts:
On April 1972, while Alfredo Amadora (Alfredo) was in the auditorium
of his school to submit his physics report, a classmate, Pablito Daffon
(Pablito), fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo. Pablito was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, Alfredo’s parents filed
a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
states that “teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.” The civil action
was filed against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the
high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Pablito and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance held the remaining defendants
liable to Alfredo’s parents. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved. The CA held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not
applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that
Alfredo and the students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already ended; that there was
no clear identification of the fatal gun; and that in any event, the school
and its employees had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing
the injury.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos is not covered by Article 2180 of the Civil Code as it was not
a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.
Held:
No, the Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that Article 2180 of
the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Also, where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the
one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the
very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the
teacher while the child is under instruction. It is not necessary that at
the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual
physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child
and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for
the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall
be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over
him.
At the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the
authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose. Even the mere savoring of the company of his
friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would
have also brought him in the custody of the school authorities.
Nonetheless, the rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge.
Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student
body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. However, the evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The
mere fact that Alfredo had gone to school that day in connection with
his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher the
teacher-in-charge of Pablito. At any rate, assuming that the physics
teacher was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that he was
negligent in enforcing discipline upon Pablito or that he had waived
observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their
non-observance. The Supreme Court however clarified that the school,
whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable because
only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Thus,
its liability is only subsidiary. Absent the direct liability of the teachers,
the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable.
SALVOSA V. IAC
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF), an academic institution,
and Benjamin Salvosa, President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of BCF, were impleaded in the civil case for damages filed by
the heirs of Napoleon Castro against Jimmy Abon, a commerce
student and an appointed armorer of the Reserve Officers Training
Corps (ROTC) Unit of the said school.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Abon shot and caused the death of Napoleon Castro, a student of the
University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. Hence, Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide.
After hearing on the merits of the civil case for damages, the trial court
ruled that Abon, Salvosa and BCF were jointly and severally liable for
the damages.
On appeal by petitioners, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court and modified the amount of damages imposed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily
liable with Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Abon
Ruling:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that teachers or head or
establishments of arts and trades are also liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody. The rationale of such liability is that so long as the
student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.
Likewise, the phrase used in said Article, so long as they remain in
their custody, means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held that a student not ‘at attendance
in the school’ cannot be in ‘recess’ thereat. A ‘recess’ contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity
is conducted, and by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise,
the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute ‘attending school’ or being in the
‘protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law.
Hence, the Court held that Abon could not be considered at attendance
in the school or in the custody of BCF when he shot Castro, and ruled
that petitioners Salvosa and BCF could not be held jointly and severally
liable with Abon for damages under Article 2180.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from was REVERSED insofar as it
holds petitioners Salvosa and BCF solidarily liable with Abon for his
tortious act in the killing of Napoleon Castro.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) vs
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698 January 14, 1992
Facts:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the
school’s academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed
Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit
against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant
states no cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the
said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the case
was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual
relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has
not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even
when there obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation
does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that
PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would
presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to
pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the
safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements
and observe its rules and regulations.
Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their
student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his death.
ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA
MEMORIAL FOUNDATION V. PEREZ
G.R. No. 222740 September 28, 2016
Facts:
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four of its 4th year medical students
to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter
Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie
Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were
tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like
the previous batches, they were housed in the second floor of the
clinic.
On February 8, 2010, according to Ramos, he and his groupmates
reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately 10 o'clock in the
morning. When their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the group
went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the
evening. They again went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy
beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their breakfast the
next day and went to sleep sometime after midnight. Ramos admitted
that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage
called The Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also
admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage which
they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole
bottle.
On February 9, 2010, Ramos was awakened sometime between 3
o'clock and 3:30 in the morning when he heard Murillo shouting from
the other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran
to the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same,
he saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room
where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat, prompting him to
run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he tried to
extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom,
stayed behind. When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be
futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the girls in an
attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.
According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom
door and the group had started shouting for help. After a considerable
amount of time, he heard somebody outside instructing him to get back
from the window. When he did so, somebody broke the window and
started to dismantle the iron grills barring the same. By that time,
Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and
only remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through
the window.
Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical
students, including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke
inhalation resulting
to asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's
compensated the parents of the three deceased students in the
amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds.
Issue:
Is the petitioners held liable for the death of the three medical
students?
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in
the Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a requirement of
petitioners. The students were complying with an obligation under the
enrollment contract — they were rendering medical services in a
community center as required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent
upon petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the
enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they
would designate their students is safe and secure, among
others.Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard
their students against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA,
petitioners were remiss in inspecting the premises of the Cabiao
Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of
the victims.
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims
were bound by the enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were
negligent in complying with their obligation under the said contracts to
ensure the safety and security of their students.The petitioners were
obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As
found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in
violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no
permits or clearances from the appropriate government offices.
For this contractual breach, petitioners should be held liable.