Fetalinovs Comelec

VOL.
355, MARCH 26, 2001 125

Liang vs. People
G.R. No. 125865. March 26, 2001.*
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations; Asian Development Bank; The
slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted
to ADB officers and personnel—slander cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity.—
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s Motions for
Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated
therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot
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*FIRST DIVISION.
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Liang vs. People
be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against
him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be
considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances
constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:
International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations: Words and

Phrases; “International Organization,” Defined.—The term “international organizations”—“is generally used
to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary
international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such
that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means
for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “International Public Officials,” Defined.—International public officials have
been defined as: “x x x persons who, on the basis of an internatiIonal treaty constituting a particular
international community, are appointed by this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under
its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular international
community, and who are subject to a particular personal status.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Specialized Agencies,” Defined.—“Specialized agencies” are international
organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts, telecommunications, railways, canals,
rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health
and refugees.
Same; Same; Same; The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.—A
perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show that the
nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is.
Same; Same: Same; “Diplomatic Immunities” and “International Immunities,” Distinguished.—There
are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities. Firstly,one of the recognized
limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff
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of a mission may be appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express
consent of that State; apart from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts
performed in the exercise of their functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be
granted by the receiving State. International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State
of which the official is a national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the
receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international
immunities there is no sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has
to be found either in waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly,
the effective sanctions which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the
danger of retaliation by the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection.
Same; Same; Same; Methods of Granting Privileges and Immunities to Personnel of International
Organizations.—Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities
to the personnel of international organizations. The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the
case in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the
government of a state, upon whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions,
recognizes the international character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain
privileges and immunities to better assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel.
In this situation, treaty obligation for the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case
with the Central Commission of the Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at
Rome. The third is a combination of the first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to
recognize a certain status of an international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in
broad and general terms. The specific definition and application of those general terms are determined by an
accord between the organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of
Nations, the Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations. The Asian Development Bank and its
Personnel fall under this third category.
Same; Same; Same; The legal relationship between an ambassador and the state to which he is
accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the international official and those states upon
whose territory he might carry out his functions—the privileges and immunities of
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Liang vs. People
diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations.—There is a
connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international officials. The
connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established body of
diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This connection is purely historical. Both
types of officials find the basis of their special status in the necessity of retaining functional independence
and freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship between an
ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship between the
international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions. The privileges
and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal foundations. Whereas
those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based on customary
international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional law. Customary
international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an international official or to
grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from specific treaty provisions.
Same; Same; Same; The present tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of
international organizations to a minimum.—Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities
granted to the personnel of international organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of
protection in the exercise of their functions—The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and
France which provided “all the rights of neutrality” to persons employed in regulating navigation in the
international interest; The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the Danube
“complete independence of territorial authorities” in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League
which granted “diplomatic immunities and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope
of protection narrowed. The current tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of
international organizations to a minimum. The tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the standard
but rather as a recognition that the problem on the privileges and immunities of international officials is new.
The solution to the problem presented by the extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international
functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special position of both types of agents in that the special
status of each agent is granted in the interest of function. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was
curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not require
such extensive immunity for its officials. While the current direction of the law
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seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international organizations, the reverse is
true with respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal
entities. Historically, states have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to organizations
than they have to the personnel of these organizations.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only
with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute
immunity.—On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the
General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United
Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by
them in their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision.
The Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune
from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank
waives immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the
officers and staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only
with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute
immunity.
Same; Same; Same; The current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional
immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives.—Section 18 (a) of the General Convention
has been interpreted to mean that officials of the specified categories are deniedimmunity from local
jurisdiction for acts of their private life and empowers local courts to assume jurisdiction in such cases without
the necessity of waiver. It has earlier been mentioned that historically, international officials were granted
diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus considered immune for both private and official acts. In
practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because
the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the
current status of the law does not maintain that states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials
for acts of their private lives. This much is explicit from the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB
which contain substantially similar provisions to that of the General Convention.
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Same; Same; Same; The inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private
or official in the courts of the state concerned.—It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to
determine the nature of an act as private or official in the courts of the state concerned.That the prevalent
notion seems to be to leave to the local courts determination of whether or not a given act is official or private
does not necessarily mean that such determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision of
the Court, it may invoke proceedings for settlement of disputes between the organization and the member
states as provided in Section 30 of the General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is
official or private is made by the national courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the
international level if questioned by the United Nations.
Same; Same; Same; Asian Development Bank; Officials of international organizations enjoy “functional”
immunities, that is, only those necessary for the exercise of their functions of the organization and the
fulfillment of its purposes; Officials and employees of the Asian Development Bank are subject to the
jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.—
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested,
prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the
other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary
for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes. This is the reason why
the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers
and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The immunity of the Asian Development Bank is absolute whereas the
immunity of its officials and employees is restricted only to official acts.—Petitioner cannot also seek relief
under the mantle of “immunity from every form of legal process” accorded to ADB as an international
organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restricted
only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international law which seeks to narrow
the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to personnel of international
organizations, while at
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the same time aims to increase the prerogatives of international organizations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The authority of the Department of Foreign Affairs, or even the Asian
Development Bank for that matter, to certify that the Bank’s officials and employees are entitled to immunity
is limited only to acts done in their official capacity.—Considering that bank officials and employees are
covered by immunity only for their official acts, the necessary inference is that the authority of the
Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter, to certify that they are entitled to immunity is
limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as
the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign relations, nor the ADB, as the international
organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke immunity for private acts of bank officials
and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place. If the immunity does not exist, there is
nothing to certify.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Reyes for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitanfor ADB.
The Solicitor General for the People.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28, 2000, denying the
petition for review. The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1. 1)THE DFA’S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE
COURTS.
2. 2)THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
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1. 3)THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
2. 4)DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA
PROTOCOL.
3. 5)THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE
MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONER’S
CASE BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
4. 6)THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS
CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations 1 for grave oral defamation filed against petitioner, a
Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging that
on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to
Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner
enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, annulled
and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal cases. 2
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we rendered the
assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to officers
and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we
held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the
name of official duty.
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1 Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 & 53171 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60,
presided by Hon. Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla.

2 SCA Case No. 743 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160, presided by Hon. Mariano M.
Umali.
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On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted the Motion for
Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were directed to submit their
respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic immunity of the ADB,
its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well as the constitutional and
political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity
denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly
made by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall
squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the “Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development
Bank,” to wit:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when
the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioner’s and intervenor’s Motions for
Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As we have stated
therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the
immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had the effect of
prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we
merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner’s utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial
court to determine.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor
Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
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SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., (C.J., Chairman) I also join the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Puno.
Puno, J., Please see concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Jeffrey Liang of this Court’s decision dated
January 28, 2000 which denied the petition for review. We there held that: the protocol communication of the
Department of Foreign Affairs to the effect that petitioner Liang is covered by immunity is only preliminary
and has no binding effect in courts; the immunity provided for under Section 45(a) of the Headquarters
Agreement is subject to the condition that the act be done in an “official capacity”; that slandering a person
cannot be said to have been done in an “official capacity” and, hence, it is not covered by the immunity
agreement; under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner
is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions; the commission of a crime is not part of official duty; and that a preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is anchored on the following arguments:
1. 1.The DFA’s determination of immunity is a political question to be made by the executive branch of
the government and is conclusive upon the courts;
2. 2.The immunity of international organizations is absolute;
3. 3.The immunity extends to all staff of the Asian Development Bank (ADB);
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1. 4.Due process was fully accorded the complainant to rebut the DFA protocol;
2. 5.The decision of January 28, 2000 erroneously made a finding of fact on the merits, namely, the
slandering of a person which prejudged petitioner’s case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-
Mandaluyong; and
3. 6.The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations is not applicable to this case.
Petitioner contends that a determination of a person’s diplomatic immunity by the Department of Foreign
Affairs is a political question. It is solely within the prerogative of the executive department and is conclusive
upon the courts. In support of his submission, petitioner cites the following cases: WHO vs.
Aquino1; International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja2 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.;3 Lasco vs.
United Nations4 and DFA vs. NLRC.5
It is further contended that the immunity conferred under the ADB Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement is absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international
organizations against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow
such organizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity is
when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The
exception allegedly has no application to the case at bar.
Petitioner likewise urges that the international organization’s immunity from local jurisdiction empowers
the ADB alone to determine what constitutes “official acts” and the same cannot be subject to different
interpretations by the member states. It asserts that the Headquarters Agreement provides for remedies to
check abuses against the exercise of the immunity. Thus, Section 49 states that the “Bank shall waive the
immunity accorded to any person if, in its opinion, such immunity would impede the course of
_______________
1 48 SCRA 242 (1972).

2 190 SCRA 130 (1990).
3 238 SCRA 524 (1994).
4 241 SCRA 681 (1995).
5 262 SCRA 38 (1996).
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justice and the waiver would not prejudice the purposes for which the immunities are accorded.” Section 51
allows for consultation between the government and the Bank should the government consider that an abuse
has occurred. The same section provides the mechanism for a dispute settlement regarding, among others,
issues of interpretation or application of the agreement.
Petitioner’s argument that a determination by the Department of Foreign Affairs that he is entitled to
diplomatic immunity is a political question binding on the courts, is anchored on the ruling enunciated in the
case of WHO, et al. vs. Aquino, et al.,6 viz.:
“It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed
by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor
General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle
that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the
judicial department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.”
This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent cases of International Catholic Migration Commission vs.
Calleja;7 The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.8 Lasco vs. UN9 and DFA vs. NLRC.10
The case of WHO vs. Aquino involved the search and seizure of personal effects of petitioner Leonce
Verstuyft, an official of the WHO. Verstuyft was certified to be entitled to diplomatic immunity
______________
6 Supra note 1.
7 Supra note 2.
8 Supra note 3.
9 Supra note 4.
10 Supra note 5.
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pursuant to the Host Agreement executed between the Philippines and the WHO.
ICMC vs. Calleja concerned a petition for certification election filed against ICMC and IRRI. As
international organizations, ICMC and IRRI were declared to possess diplomatic immunity. It was held that
they are not subject to local jurisdictions. It was ruled that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of
Labor over the case would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international
organizations from political pressure or control by the host country and to ensure the unhampered
performance of their functions’.
Holy See v. Rosario, Jr. involved an action for annulment of sale of land against the Holy See, as
represented by the Papal Nuncio. The Court upheld the petitioner’s defense of sovereign immunity. It ruled
that where a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving state, which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission, with all
the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in that case is the Holy
See.
In Lasco vs. United Nations, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration was
sued before the NLRC for illegal dismissal. The Court again upheld the doctrine of diplomatic immunity
invoked by the Fund.
Finally, DFA v. NLRC involved an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank.
Pursuant to its Charter and the Headquarters Agreement, the diplomatic immunity of the Asian Development
Bank was recognized by the Court.
It bears to stress that all of these cases pertain to the diplomatic immunity enjoyed by international
organizations. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the same diplomatic immunity and he cannot be
prosecuted for acts allegedly done in the exercise of his official functions.
The term “international organizations”—
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“is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under
contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal
personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized
mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an
interest.”11
International public officials have been defined as:
“x x x persons who, on the basis of an international treaty constituting a particular international community,
are appointed by this international community, or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise, in
a continuous way, functions in the interest of this particular international community, and who are subject
to a particular personal status.”12
“Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields, such as posts,
telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy,
finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees.13
Issues
1. 1.Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to diplomatic

immunity;
2. 2.Whether an international official is immune from criminal jurisdiction for all acts, whether private
or official;
3. 3.Whether the authority to determine if an act is official or private is lodged in the courts;
4. 4.Whether the certification by the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner is covered by
immunity is a political question that is binding and conclusive on the courts.
_______________
ICMC vs. Calleja, supra note 2.

11
John Kerry King, The Privileges and Immunities of the Personnel of International Organizations xiii
12
(1949), citing: Suzanne Basdevant, Les Fonctionnaires Internationuxl (Paris: 1931), Chapter 1.
13 ICMC vs. Calleja, et al., supra, citing Articles 57 and 63 of the United Nations Charter.
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Discussion
I
A perusal of the immunities provisions in various international conventions and agreements will show
that the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is. Thus:
1. 1.Charter of the United Nations

“Article 105(1): The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
Article 105(2): Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the Organization.”
1. 2.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
“Section 2: The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall
enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly
waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of
execution.
xxx
Section 11(a): Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations
x x shall x x x enjoy x x x immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal
baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as
representatives, immunity from legal process of every kind.
xxx
Section 14: Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Members not for the personal
benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the United Nations. Consequently, a Member not only has the right but is under a duty to
waive the immunity of its representative in any case where in the opinion of the Member the immunity would
impede the course of justice, and it can be waived without prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is
accorded.
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xxx
Section 18(a): Officials of the United Nations shall be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.
xxx
Section 19: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Section 18, the Secretary-General
and all Assistant Secretaries-General shall be accorded in respect of themselves, their spouses and minor
children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in
accordance with international law.
Section 20: Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interest of the United Nations and
not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Secretary-General shall have the right and the
duty to waive the immunity of any official in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the
course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations.
xxx
Section 22: Experts x x x performing missions for the United Nations x x x shall be accorded: (a) immunity
from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) in respect of words spoken
or written and acts done by them in the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal
process of every kind.”
1. 3.Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
“Article 29: The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest
or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to
prevent any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity.
xxx
Article 31(1): A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in certain cases.
xxx
Article 38(1): Except in so far as additional privileges and immunities may be granted by the receiving
State, a diplomatic agent who is a national of or permanently a resident in that State shall enjoy only
immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his
functions.”
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1. 4.Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
“Article 41(1): Consular officials shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the case of a
grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority.
xxx
Article 43(1): Consular officers and consular employees shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
judicial or administrative authorities of the receiving State in respect of acts performed in the exercise of
consular functions.
Article 43(2): The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not, however, apply in respect of a civil
action either: (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular officer or a consular employee in which he
did not contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the sending State; or (b) by a third party for damage
arising from an accident in the receiving State caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.”
1. 5.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
“Section 4: The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have
expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any
measure of execution.
Section 13(a): Representatives of members at meetings convened by a specialized agency shall, while
exercising their functions and during their journeys to and from the place of meeting, enjoy immunity from
personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts done by them in their official capacity, immunity from legal process of every kind.
xxx
Section 19(a): Officials of the specialized agencies shall be immune from legal process in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.
xxx
Section 21: In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in sections 19 and 20, the executive head
of each specialized agency, including any official acting on his behalf during his absence from duty, shall be
accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and minor children, the
142
Liang vs. People
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with
international law.”
1. 6.Charter of the ADB
“Article 50(1): The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out
of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and
sell or underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of
competent jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank has its principal or a branch office, or
has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed
securities.
xxx
Article 55(i): All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including experts
performing missions for the Bank shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them
in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.”
1. 7.ADB Headquarters Agreement
“Section 5: The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of
or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell
or underwrite the sale of securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of
competent jurisdiction in the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
Section 44: Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President, Vice-President and
executive officers as may be agreed upon between the Government and the Bank shall enjoy, during their
stay in the Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with the Bank: (a) immunity
from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage; (b) immunity from legal process
of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity; and (c)
in respect of other matters not covered in (a) and (b) above, such other immunities, exemptions, privileges
and facilities as are enjoyed by members of diplomatic missions of comparable rank, subject to corresponding
conditions and obligations.
Section 45(a): Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purposes of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the
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Liang vs. People
Bank, shall enjoy x x x immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity, except when the Bank waives the immunity.”
II
There are three major differences between diplomatic and international immunities. Firstly, one of the
recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of the diplomatic staff of a mission may be
appointed from among the nationals of the receiving State only with the express consent of that State; apart
from inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of their
functions, nationals enjoy only such privileges and immunities as may be granted by the receiving State.
International immunities may be specially important in relation to the State of which the official is a
national. Secondly, the immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not
exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State; in the case of international immunities there is no
sending State and an equivalent for the jurisdiction of the sending State therefore has to be found either in
waiver of immunity or in some international disciplinary or judicial procedure. Thirdly, the effective sanctions
which secure respect for diplomatic immunity are the principle of reciprocity and the danger of retaliation by
the aggrieved State; international immunities enjoy no similar protection.14
The generally accepted principles which are now regarded as the foundation of international immunities
are contained in the ILO Memorandum, which reduced them in three basic propositions, namely: (1) that
international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one
government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to
democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; (2) that
no country should derive any financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds;
and (3)
_______________
14C. Wilfred Jenks, Contemporary Development in International Immunities xxxvii (1961).

144
Liang vs. People
that the international organization should, as a collectivity of States Members, be accorded the facilities for
the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The
thinking underlying these propositions is essentially institutional in character. It is not concerned with the
status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free
international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members.15
III
Positive international law has devised three methods of granting privileges and immunities to the personnel
of international organizations.The first is by simple conventional stipulation, as was the case in the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The second is by internal legislation whereby the government of a state, upon
whose territory the international organization is to carry out its functions, recognizes the international
character of the organization and grants, by unilateral measures, certain privileges and immunities to better
assure the successful functioning of the organization and its personnel. In this situation, treaty obligation for
the state in question to grant concessions is lacking. Such was the case with the Central Commission of the
Rhine at Strasbourg and the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. The third is a combination of the
first two. In this third method, one finds a conventional obligation to recognize a certain status of an
international organization and its personnel, but the status is described in broad and general terms. The
specific definition and application of those general terms are determined by an accord between the
organization itself and the state wherein it is located. This is the case with the League of Nations, the
Permanent Court of Justice, and the United Nations.16
The Asian Development Bank and its Personnel fall under this third category.
_______________
15Id. at 17.
16J. K. King, supra note 12, at 81.
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There is a connection between diplomatic privileges and immunities and those extended to international
officials. The connection consists in the granting, by contractual provisions, of the relatively well-established
body of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international functionaries. This connection is purely
historical. Both types of officials find the basis of their special status in the necessity of retaining functional
independence and freedom from interference by the state of residence. However, the legal relationship
between an ambassador and the state to which he is accredited is entirely different from the relationship
between the international official and those states upon whose territory he might carry out his functions. 17
The privileges and immunities of diplomats and those of international officials rest upon different legal
foundations. Whereas those immunities awarded to diplomatic agents are a right of the sending state based
on customary international law, those granted to international officials are based on treaty or conventional
law. Customary international law places no obligation on a state to recognize a special status of an
international official or to grant him jurisdictional immunities. Such an obligation can only result from
specific treaty provisions.18
The special status of the diplomatic envoy is regulated by the principle of reciprocity by which a state is
free to treat the envoy of another state as its envoys are treated by that state. The juridical basis of the
diplomat’s position is firmly established in customary international law. The diplomatic envoy is appointed
by the sending State but it has to make certain that the agreement of the receiving State has been given for
the person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State.19
The staff personnel of an international organization—the international officials—assume a different
position as regards their special status. They are appointed or elected to their position by the organization
itself, or by a competent organ of it; they are responsible to the organization and their official acts are imputed
to
_______________
17 See id. at 255.

18 Id. at 25-26.
19 Article 4, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
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Liang vs. People
it. The juridical basis of their special position is found in conventional law,20 since there is no established
basis of usage or custom in the case of the international official. Moreover, the relationship between an
international organization and a member-state does not admit of the principle of reciprocity,21 for it is
contradictory to the basic principle of equality of states. An international organization carries out functions
in the interest of every member state equally. The international official does not carry out his functions in the
interest of any state, but in serving the organization he serves, indirectly, each state equally. He cannot be,
legally, the object of the operation of the principle of reciprocity between states under such circumstances. It
is contrary to the principle of equality of states for one state member of an international organization to assert
a capacity to extract special privileges for its nationals from other member states on the basis of a status
awarded by it to an international organization. It is upon this principle of sovereign equality that
international organizations are built.
It follows from this same legal circumstance that a state called upon to admit an official of an international
organization does not have a capacity to declare him persona non grata.
The functions of the diplomat and those of the international official are quite different. Those of the
diplomat are functions in the national interest. The task of the ambassador is to represent his state, and its
specific interest, at the capital of another state. The functions of the international official are carried out in
the international interest. He does not represent a state or the interest of any specific state. He does not
usually “represent” the organization in the true sense of that term. His functions normally are administrative,
although they may be judicial or executive, but they are rarely political or functions of representation, such
as those of the diplomat.
There is a difference of degree as well as of kind. The interruption of the activities of a diplomatic agent
is likely to produce serious harm to the purposes for which his immunities were granted. But the interruption
of the activities of the international official
_______________
20J. K. King, supra note 12, at xiii.
21Id. at 27.
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Liang vs. People
does not, usually, cause serious dislocation of the functions of an international secretariat. 22
On the other hand, they are similar in the sense that acts performed in an official capacity by either a
diplomatic envoy or an international official are not attributable to him as an individual but are imputed to
the entity he represents, the state in the case of the diplomat, and the organization in the case of the
international official.23
IV
Looking back over 150 years of privileges and immunities granted to the personnel of international
organizations, it is clear that they were accorded a wide scope of protection in the exercise of their functions—
The Rhine Treaty of 1804 between the German Empire and France which provided “all the rights of
neutrality” to persons employed in regulating navigation in the international interest; The Treaty of Berlin
of 1878 which granted the European Commission of the Danube “complete independence of territorial
authorities” in the exercise of its functions; The Covenant of the League which granted “diplomatic immunities
and privileges.” Today, the age of the United Nations finds the scope of protection narrowed. The current
tendency is to reduce privileges and immunities of personnel of international organizations to a minimum. The
tendency cannot be considered as a lowering of the standard but rather as a recognition that the problem on
the privileges and immunities of international officials is new. The solution to the problem presented by the
extension of diplomatic prerogatives to international functionaries lies in the general reduction of the special
position of both types of agents in that the special status of each agent is granted in the interest of
function. The wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives was curtailed because of practical necessity and because
the proper functioning of the organization did not require such extensive immunity for its officials. While the
current direction of the law seems to be to narrow the prerogatives of the personnel of international
organizations, the reverse is true with
_______________
22Id. at 254-257.
23Id. at 103.
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Liang vs. People
respect to the prerogatives of the organizations themselves, considered as legal entities. Historically, states
have been more generous in granting privileges and immunities to organizations than they have to the
personnel of these organizations.24
Thus, Section 2 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states
that the UN shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it
has expressly waived its immunity. Section 4 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies likewise provides that the specialized agencies shall enjoy immunity from every form of
legal process subject to the same exception. Finally, Article 50(1) of the ADB Charter and Section 5 of the
Headquarters Agreement similarly provide that the bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process, except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to
guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities.
The phrase “immunity from every form of legal process” as used in the UN General Convention has been
interpreted to mean absolute immunity from a state’s jurisdiction to adjudicate or enforce its law by legal
process, and it is said that states have not sought to restrict that immunity of the United Nations by
interpretation or amendment. Similar provisions are contained in the Special Agencies Convention as well as
in the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement. These organizations were accorded privileges and
immunities in their charters by language similar to that applicable to the United Nations. It is clear therefore
that these organizations were intended to have similar privileges and immunities. 25 From this, it can be easily
deduced that international organizations enjoy absolute immunity similar to the diplomatic prerogatives
granted to diplomatic envoys.
Even in the United States this theory seems to be the prevailing rule. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act was passed adopting the “restrictive theory” limiting the immunity of states under international law
essentially to activities of a kind not carried on by
_______________
24 J. K. King, supra note 12, at 253-268.

251 Restatement of the Law Third 498-501.
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private persons. Then the International Organizations Immunities Act came into effect which gives to
designated international organizations the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is
enjoyed by foreign governments. This gives the impression that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has
the effect of applying the restrictive theory also to international organizations generally. However, aside from
the fact that there was no indication in its legislative history that Congress contemplated that result, and
considering that the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations exempts the United
Nations “from every form of legal process,” conflict with the United States obligations under the Convention
was sought to be avoided by interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the restrictive theory,
as not applying to suits against the United Nations.26
On the other hand, international officials are governed by a different rule. Section 18(a) of the General
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations states that officials of the United Nations
shall be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in
their official capacity. The Convention on Specialized Agencies carries exactly the same provision. The
Charter of the ADB provides under Article 55(i) that officers and employees of the bank shall be immune from
legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives
immunity. Section 45 (a) of the ADB Headquarters Agreement accords the same immunity to the officers and
staff of the bank. There can be no dispute that international officials are entitled to immunity only with respect
to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international organizations which enjoy absolute immunity.
Clearly, the most important immunity to an international official, in the discharge of his international
functions, is immunity from local jurisdiction. There is no argument in doctrine or practice with the principle
that an international official is independent of the jurisdiction of the local authorities for his official
acts. Those acts are not his, but are imputed to the organization, and without
_______________
26Ibid.
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Liang vs. People
waiver the local courts cannot hold him liable for them. In strict law, it would seem that even the organization
itself could have no right to waive an official’s immunity for his official acts. This permits local authorities to
assume jurisdiction over an individual for an act which is not, in the wider sense of the term, his act at all. It
is the organization itself, as a juristic person, which should waive its own immunity and appear in court, not
the individual, except insofar as he appears in the name of the organization. Provisions for immunity from
jurisdiction for official acts appear, aside from the aforementioned treatises, in the constitution of most modern
international organizations. The acceptance of the principle is sufficiently widespread to be regarded as
declaratory of international law.27
V
What then is the status of the international official with respect to his private acts?
Section 18 (a) of the General Convention has been interpreted to mean that officials of the specified
categories are denied immunity from local jurisdiction for acts of their private lifeand empowers local courts
to assume jurisdiction in such cases without the necessity of waiver. 28 It has earlier been mentioned that
historically, international officials were granted diplomatic privileges and immunities and were thus
considered immune for both private and official acts. In practice, this wide grant of diplomatic prerogatives
was curtailed because of practical necessity and because the proper functioning of the organization did not
require such extensive immunity for its officials. Thus, the current status of the law does not maintain that
states grant jurisdictional immunity to international officials for acts of their private lives. 29 This much is
explicit from
______________
J. K. King, supra note 12, at 258-259.

27
Id. at 186.
28
29 But see id. at 259. It is important to note that the submission of international officials to local
jurisdiction for private acts is not completely accepted in doctrine and theory. Jenks, in particular, has argued
for complete jurisdictional immunity, as has Hammarskjold.
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Liang vs. People
the Charter and Headquarters Agreement of the ADB which contain substantially similar provisions to that of
the General Convention.
VI
Who is competent to determine whether a given act is private or official?
This is an entirely different question. In connection with this question, the current tendency to narrow the
scope of privileges and immunities of international officials and representatives is most apparent. Prior to the
regime of the United Nations, the determination of this question rested with the organization and its decision
was final. By the new formula, the state itself tends to assume this competence. If the organization is
dissatisfied with the decision, under the provisions of the General Convention of the United States, or the
Special Convention for Specialized Agencies, the Swiss Arrangement, and other current dominant
instruments, it may appeal to an international tribunal by procedures outlined in those instruments. Thus,
the state assumes this competence in the first instance. It means that, if a local court assumes jurisdiction
over an act without the necessity of waiver from the organization, the determination of the nature of the act
is made at the national level.30
It appears that the inclination is to place the competence to determine the nature of an act as private or
official in the courts of the state concerned. That the prevalent notion seems to be to leave to the local courts
determination of whether or not a given act is official or private does not necessarily mean that such
determination is final. If the United Nations questions the decision of the Court, it may invoke proceedings
for settlement of disputes between the organization and the member states as provided in Section 30 of the
General Convention. Thus, the decision as to whether a given act is official or private is made by the national
courts in the first instance, but it may be subjected to review in the international level if questioned by the
United Nations.31
_______________
30Id. at 260-261.
31Id. at 189.
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Liang vs. People
A similar view is taken by Kunz, who writes that the “jurisdiction of local courts without waiver for acts of
private life empowers the local courts to determine whether a certain act is an official act or an act of private
life,” on the rationale that since the determination of such question, if left in the hands of the
organization, would consist in the execution, or non-execution, of waiver, and since waiver is not
mentioned in connection with the provision granting immunities to international officials, then
the decision must rest with local courts.32
Under the Third Restatement of the Law, it is suggested that since an international official does not enjoy
personal inviolability from arrest or detention and has immunity only with respect to official acts, he is subject
to judicial or administrative process and must claim his immunity in the proceedings by showing that the act
in question was an official act. Whether an act was performed in the individual’s official capacity is a question
for the court in which a proceeding is brought, but if the international organization disputes the court’s
finding, the dispute between the organization and the state of the forum is to be resolved by negotiation, by
an agreed mode of settlement or by advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. 33
Recognizing the difficulty that by reason of the right of a national court to assume jurisdiction over private
acts without a waiver of immunity, the determination of the official or private character of a particular act
may pass from international to national control, Jenks proposes three ways of avoiding difficulty in the
matter. The first would be for a municipal court before which a question of the official or private character of
a particular act arose to accept as conclusive in the matter any claim by the international organization that
the act was official in character, such a claim being regarded as equivalent to a governmental claim that a
particular act is an act of State. Such a claim would be in effect a claim by the organization that the
proceedings against the official were a violation of the jurisdictional immunity of the organization itself
_______________
32 Joseph L. Kunz, Privileges and Immunities of International Organizations 862 (1947), cited in J. K.
King, id. at 254.

33 1 Restatement of the Law Third 512.
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Liang vs. People
which is unqualified and therefore not subject to delimitation in the discretion of the municipal court.
The second would be for a court to accept as conclusive in the matter a statement by the executive government
of the country where the matter arises certifying the official character of the act. The third would be to have
recourse to the procedure of international arbitration. Jenks opines that it is possible that none of these three
solutions would be applicable in all cases; the first might be readily acceptable only in the clearest cases and
the second is available only if the executive government of the country where the matter arises concurs in the
view of the international organization concerning the official character of the act. However, he surmises that
taken in combination, these various possibilities may afford the elements of a solution to the problem.34
One final point. The international official’s immunity for official acts may be likened to a consular official’s
immunity from arrest, detention, and criminal or civil process which is not absolute but applies only to acts
or omissions in the performance of his official functions, in the absence of special agreement. Since a consular
officer is not immune from all legal process, he must respond to any process and plead and prove immunity
on the ground that the act or omission underlying the process was in the performance of his official functions.
The issue has not been authoritatively determined, but apparently the burden is on the consular officer to
prove his status as well as his exemption in the circumstances. In the United States, the US Department of
State generally has left it to the courts to determine whether a particular act was within a consular officer’s
official duties.35
Submissions
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, I submit the following conclusions:
First, petitioner Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his
immunity is not absolute.
_______________
34Jenks, supra note 14, at 117-118.

351 Restatement of the Law Third 475-477.
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Liang vs. People
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested,
prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. 36 On the
other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy “functional” immunities, that is, only those necessary
for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.37. This is the reason why
the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity from legal process to bank officers
and employees only with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank
waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local
courts for their private acts, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity.
Petitioner cannot also seek relief under the mantle of “immunity from every form of legal process” accorded
to ADB as an international organization. The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials
and employees is restricted only to official acts. This is in consonance with the current trend in international
law which seeks to narrow the scope of protection and reduce the privileges and immunities granted to
personnel of international organizations, while at the same time aims to increase the prerogatives of
international organizations.
Second, considering that bank officials and employees are covered by immunity only for their official acts,
the necessary inference is that the authority of the Department of Affairs, or even of the ADB for that matter,
to certify that they are entitled to immunity is limited only to acts done in their official capacity. Stated
otherwise, it is not within the power of the DFA, as the agency in charge of the executive department’s foreign
relations, nor the ADB, as the international organization vested with the right to waive immunity, to invoke
immunity for private acts of bank officials and employees, since no such prerogative exists in the first place.
If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify.
_______________
36Salonga & Yap, Public International Law 108 (5th ed., 1992).
371 id. at 511.
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Liang vs. People
As an aside, ADB cannot even claim to have the right to waive immunity for private acts of its officials and
employees. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement are clear that the immunity can be waived only
with respect to official acts because this is only the extent to which the privilege has been granted. One cannot
waive the right to a privilege which has never been granted or acquired.
Third, I choose to adopt the view that it is the local courts which have jurisdiction to determine whether
or not a given act is official or private. While there is a dearth of cases on the matter under Philippine
jurisprudence, the issue is not entirely novel.
The case of M.H. Wylie, et al. vs. Rarang, et al38 concerns the extent of immunity from suit of the officials
of a United States Naval Base inside the Philippine territory. Although a motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants therein invoking their immunity from suit pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the
trial court denied the same and, after trial, rendered a decision declaring that the defendants are not entitled
to immunity because the latter acted beyond the scope of their official duties. The Court likewise applied the
ruling enunciated in the case of Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan39 to the effect that a mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. While it is true that
the Chavez case involved a public official, the Court did not find any substantial reason why the same rule
cannot be made to apply to a US official assigned at the US Naval Station located in the Philippines. In this
case, it was the local courts which ascertained whether the acts complained of were done in an official or
personal capacity.
In the case of The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.,40a complaint for annulment of contract of sale, reconveyance,
specific performance and damages was filed against petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of,
among others, lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, which was denied by the trial court.
A motion for reconsideration, and subsequently, a “Motion for a
_______________
38 209 SCRA 357 (1992).

39 193 SCRA 282 (1991).
40 Supra note 3.
156
Liang vs. People
Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional
Defense” were filed by petitioner. The trial court deferred resolution of said motions until after trial on the
merits. On certiorari, the Court there ruled on the issue of petitioner’s non-suability on the basis of the
allegations made in the pleadings filed by the parties. This is an implicit recognition of the court’s jurisdiction
to ascertain the suability or non-suability of the sovereign by assessing the facts of the case. The Court
hastened to add that when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity
in a foreign court, in some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts
by the respondents through their private counsels, or where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the
courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved.
Finally, it appears from the records of this case that petitioner is a senior economist at ADB and as such
he makes country project profiles which will help the bank in deciding whether to lend money or support a
particular project to a particular country.41 Petitioner stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering
defamatory remarks against his secretary, the private complainant herein. Considering that the immunity
accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his official capacity, it becomes necessary to make
a factual determination of whether or not the defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation to
his official functions as a senior economist.
I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.
Motions denied with finality.
Notes.—It is beyond question that Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) is an
international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. (Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center vs.
Acosta,226 SCRA 49 [1993])
_______________
41TSN, G.R. No. 125865, October 18, 2000, p. 11, Rollo, p. 393.
157
VOL. 355, MARCH 26, 2001 157
Magellan Capital Management Corporation vs. Zosa
A categorical recognition by the Executive Branch that the IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international
organizations is a determination which is considered a political question conclusive upon the Courts. (Callado
vs. International Rice Research Institute, 244 SCRA 210 [1995])
——o0o——
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Liga ng mga Barangay National vs. Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 154599. January 21, 2004. *
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL,

petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE
ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA,
respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Requisites; Petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 may be invoked only against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.—A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a
special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 1. Petition for
certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Elsewise stated, for a
writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (l) it must
be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Function,
distinguished.—A respondent is said to be exercising judicial
junction where he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-
judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies ...
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
Same; Same; Same; Concurrent Jurisdiction; A becoming regard of
that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issu-
_______________
* EN BANC.
563
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 563

ance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals.—This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
Same; Same; Forum shopping; Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other.—Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentiaare present or when a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis
pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interests
in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Cruz, Cruz, & Neria Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series
of
564
2002, and respondent City Mayor’s Executive Order No. 011,
1
Series of 2002, dated 15 August 2002, for being patently contrary

2
to law.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National(Liga for brevity) is
the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines,
which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes the
duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial
chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan
political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that “[t]he liga at the
municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five
(5) members of the board of directors.” All other matters not
provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the
leagues of local government units shall be governed by their
respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform
to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws. 3
On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own

Constitution and By-laws to govern its internal
organization. Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said
4
Constitution and By-Laws states:

All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by
the “Liga Election Code” or such other rules as may be promulgated by
the National Liga Executive Board in conformity with the provisions of
existing laws.
_______________
1 Entitled An Ordinance Prescribing a Procedure for the Election of Officers of

the Liga ng mga Barangay and the Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng Sangguniang
Kabataan in the City of Manila. Rollo, pp. 16-17.
2 Entitled Creating the Committee on Election to Supervise and Implement the
Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay and the Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng

Sangguniang Kabataan in the City of Manila. Rollo, pp. 18-19.
3 Section 507, R.A. No. 7160.
4 Rollo, pp. 20-39.
565
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 565
By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Ligaadopted and
ratified its own Election Code. Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga
5
Election Code states:

1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC
Chapters. There shall be nationwide synchronized elections for the
provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be held on the third
Monday of the month immediately after the month when the
synchronized elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The incumbent
Liga chapter president concerned duly assisted by the proper government
agency, office or department, e.g.Provincial/City/NCR/Regional Director,
shall convene all the duly elected Component City/Municipal Chapter
Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC)
of the respective chapters in any public place within its area of
jurisdiction for the purpose of reorganizing and electing the officers and
directors of the provincial, metropolitan or HUC/ICC Liga chapters. Said
president duly assisted by the government officer aforementioned, shall
notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before
the scheduled election meeting on the exact date, time, place and
requirements of the said meeting.
The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Liga Election Code of
2002, setting on 21 October 2002 the synchronized elections for
6
highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of

Manila, together with independent component city, provincial,
and metropolitan chapters.
On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other
things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters
in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both
chapters thirty days after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A)
and (B) of the assailed ordinance read:
SEC. 3. Representation Chapters.—Every Barangay shall be represented
in the said Liga Chapters . . . by the Punong Barangay . . . or, in his
absence or incapacity, by the kagawad duly elected for the purpose among
its members . . . .
1. A.District Chapter
_______________
5 Id., pp. 40-52.

6 Rollo, pp. 53-56.
566
1. All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from
among themselves the President, Vice-President and five (5) members of
the Board . . . .
2. B.City Chapter
The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members

of the Board and they shall elect from among themselves a President, Vice-
President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor and create other positions as it
may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City

Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for his signature and approval.
On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had
been forwarded to the Office of the City Mayor, still unnumbered
and yet to be officially released, the Liga sent respondent Mayor
of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed
considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the
functions of the Liga through legislation, a function which was
clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. 7
Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed

city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No.
011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance.
Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition
raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF

MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002
PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA
CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH
PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF ELECTING ITS OFFICERS,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID CHAPTER’S ELECTIONS, AND
THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF THE LIGA NG
MGA BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED
TO BE GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS
AND THE LIGA ELECTION CODE.
_______________
7 Rollo, pp. 61-64.

567
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 567
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE ISSUED
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED
CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002.
In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No.
8039, Series of 2002, and Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002,
contradict the Liga Election Code and are therefore invalid. There
exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to mention the absence of
legal basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or even
assume, the functions of the Liga by prescribing, through
legislation, the manner of conducting the Liga elections other
than what has been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-
laws and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly, the subject
ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such,
should be declared null and void.
As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, the petitioner cites as reason therefor the fact that under
Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the Manila District
Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular
barangay elections. Hence, it argued that the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction would
be imperative to prevent the implementation of the ordinance and
executive order.
On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Peña, in his
capacity as a member of the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City
Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction. He supports the position of the Liga and
8
prays for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and

executive order, as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga
Barangay pursuant thereto, to be null and void. The assailed
ordinance prescribing for an “indirect manner of election”
amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which provides for the election of the Liga officers at
large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the petitioner and
intervenor, as well as the other 896
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 69-77.

568
Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be voted
upon in a direct election.
On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Manifestation in lieu of Comment. It supports the petition
9
of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city ordinance and executive
order are clearly inconsistent with the express public policy
enunciated in R.A. No. 7160. Local political subdivisions are able
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. Thus, the
enactments in question, which are local in origin, cannot prevail
against the decree, which has the force and effect of law.
On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the
hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG posits that technical rules of
procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition. While Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over
cases of this nature to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the
exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation
of this rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 primarily intended that the Liga ng
mga Barangay determine the representation of the Liga in the
sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and
crystallization of issues affecting barangay government
administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition is
a must.
On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the
assailed ordinance and executive order and pray for the dismissal
of the present petition on the following grounds:
(1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2)
the petition should not be entertained by this Court in view of the
pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of two actions
or petitions questioning the subject ordinance and executive
order; (3) the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the
act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.
The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary
remedy available to one aggrieved by the decision of a tribunal,
officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not the “board” and
“officer” contemplated in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because
_______________
9 Id., pp. 103-111.

569
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 569
both do not exercise judicial functions. The enactment of the
subject ordinance and issuance of the questioned executive order
are legislative and executive functions, respectively, and thus, do
not fall within the ambit of “judicial functions.” They are both
within the prerogatives, powers, and authority of the City Council
and City Mayor of Manila, respectively. Furthermore, the petition
failed to show with certainty that the respondents acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot
claim that it has no other recourse in addressing its grievance
other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact, there
are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of
Manila (one is for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief)
and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for prohibition; the two
other cases, for quo warranto), which are all akin to the present
petition in the sense that the relief being sought therein is the
declaration of the invalidity of the subject ordinance. Clearly, the
petitioner may ask the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief
being prayed for before this Court. Moreover, the petitioner failed
to prove discernible compelling reasons attending the present
petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by
this Court.
Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has
transgressed the proscription against forum-shopping in filing the
instant suit. Although the parties in the other pending cases and
in this petition are different individuals or entities, they represent
the same interest.
With regard to petitioner’s prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction in its petition, the
respondents maintain that the same had become moot and
academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng
mga Barangay on 15 September 2002 and their subsequent
assumption to their respective offices. Since the acts to be
10
enjoined are now fait accompli,this petition for certiorari with an

application for provisional remedies must necessarily fail. Thus,
where the records show that during the pendency of the case
certain events or circumstances had taken place that render the
case moot and academic, the petition for certiorari must be
dismissed.
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 130-136.

570
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss
this petition for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that
may be invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial junction where he
has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. 11
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which

applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative
officers or bodies . . . required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them
as a basis
_______________
11 1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 706 (1999)

citing Ruperto v. Torres, L-8785, 25 February 1957, and Municipal Council of
Lemery v. Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268 (1931).
571
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 571
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.” 12
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or

quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives
rise to some specific rights of persons or properly under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer
clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 13
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board,

or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As
correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the
City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance
by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done
in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively,
and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score
alone, certiorari will not lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition
for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of
the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance
and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition
for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
14
provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. (1)Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,

other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. (2)Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
_______________
12Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-71905, 13 August

1986, 143 SCRA 458, 462. See also Villarosa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
133927, 29 November 1999, 319 SCRA 470, 479; United Residents of Dominican
Hill, Inc. v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, 7
March 2001, 353 SCRA 782, 797.
13 Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, 143 Phil. 209, 219; 32 SCRA 188 (1970).
14 Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16

November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.
572
1. (a)All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Italicssupplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved. 15
Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe

for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear
disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been
adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to
this Court should be allowed.
We have held that this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari (as well as of prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma: 16
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according

to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefore will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court’s
docket.
_______________
15 Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, 21 August 1997, 278 SCRA 154,
172; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224
SCRA 236, 243.
16 G.R. No. 67787, 18 April 1989, 172 SCRA 415, 424.
573
VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 573
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez, the propensity of
17
litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our

judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court must be
put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon
the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction. 18
Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced 19
because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was

not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in
the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the
President of the Philippines, which would have greatly affected
all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an
act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the
duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously
alleged to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in
our constitutional scheme is coequal with Congress.
We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are
guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis
pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two
_______________
17 G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633.

18 Tano v. Socrates, supra note 15, at 174.
19 G.R. No. 132988, 19 July 2000, 336 SCRA 201.
574
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case. 20
In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the

parties in this case and in the alleged other pending cases are
different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot be
said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions
are indeed pending before the RTC of Manila and the Court of
Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues raised
before those courts, considering that the respondents failed to
furnish this Court with copies of the said petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., In the result.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 521 [2001])
——o0o——
_______________
20 Veluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139951, 23 November 2000, 345 SCRA
756, 764-765.
575
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VOL.

355, MARCH 26, 2001 125

PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion:

International Law; Diplomatic Immunity; International Organizations: Words and

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

1. 1)THE DFA’S DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY

presided by Hon. Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla.

1 48 SCRA 242 (1972).

1. 1.Whether petitioner Liang, as an official of an international organization, is entitled to diplomatic

ICMC vs. Calleja, supra note 2.

1. 1.Charter of the United Nations

1. 2.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations

1. 3.Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

1. 5.Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies

1. 6.Charter of the ADB

1. 7.ADB Headquarters Agreement

14C. Wilfred Jenks, Contemporary Development in International Immunities xxxvii (1961).

17 See id. at 255.

24 J. K. King, supra note 12, at 253-268.

J. K. King, supra note 12, at 258-259.

King, id. at 254.

34Jenks, supra note 14, at 117-118.

38 209 SCRA 357 (1992).

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, In

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL,

VOL. 420, JANUARY 21, 2004 563

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

Series of 2002, dated 15 August 2002, for being patently contrary

On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own

Constitution and By-Laws states:

1 Entitled An Ordinance Prescribing a Procedure for the Election of Officers of

Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay and the Panlungsod na Pederasyon ng

4 Rollo, pp. 20-39.

Election Code states:

highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of

5 Id., pp. 40-52.

The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members

The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City

Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF

7 Rollo, pp. 61-64.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA

prays for the declaration of the questioned ordinance and

8 Rollo, pp. 69-77.

9 Id., pp. 103-111.

enjoined are now fait accompli,this petition for certiorari with an

10 Rollo, pp. 130-136.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which

11 1 FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 706 (1999)

Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board,

1. (1)Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,

12Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-71905, 13 August

14 Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16

1. (a)All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe

This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according

litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our

Petitioner’s reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced 19

because the non-observance of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was