actual and compensatory damages in the
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,
Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan,
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal
seeking the nullification of the remand by the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the
records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch
21.
The petition at bench arose from the
following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine
Military Academy, a member of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of
the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990,
the petitioner was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong
Caf Bar and Restaurant located along Barlin St.,
Naga City. He somehow got involved in a
shooting incident, resulting in the death of one
Rodney Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an
amended Information was filed with the RTC of
Naga City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain
Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with
murder. The accusatory portion of the amended
Information reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of
Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential
Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and
accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber
.45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca
thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and
fatal wounds which caused his death, and as a
consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N.
NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered
amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100
(P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.[1]
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order
preventively suspending the petitioner from the
service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as
amended by P.D. No. 1847. When apprised of the
said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP
issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91,
preventively suspending the petitioner from the
service until the case was terminated.[2]
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the RTC, while accused
Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted
bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,[3] the
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December
23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash[4] the Information alleging that as
mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408,[5] in
relation to Section 1, Presidential Decree No.
1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court
martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and
officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the
petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief
of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that
under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should last
for only 90 days, and, having served the same,
he should now be reinstated. On September 23,
1993,[6] the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote
Judge David C. Naval requesting information on
whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners
suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus, on
February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion
in the RTC for the lifting of the order of
suspension. He alleged that he had served the
90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for
compassionate justice. The RTC denied the
motion on March 9, 1994.[7] Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its
case. The petitioner commenced the presentation
of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a
Motion to Dismiss[8] the case. Citing Republic of
1
the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,[9] he argued
that since he committed the crime in the
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an
Order[10] denying the motion to dismiss. It,
however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in
relation to his office as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution
manifested that it was no longer presenting any
evidence in connection with the petitioners
motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its
case, and that its evidence showed that the
petitioner did not commit the offense charged in
connection with the performance of his duties as
a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
According to the prosecution, they were able to
show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was
not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b)
the offense was committed just after midnight;
(c) the petitioner was drunk when the crime was
committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company
of civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed
in a beerhouse called Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant.[11]
For his part, the petitioner testified that at
about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at
the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin
St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on alleged
drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No.
03-04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R.
Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the
sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and Roberto
Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he
was on a surveillance mission on the aforestated
date.[12]
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an
Order declaring that the petitioner committed the
crime charged while not in the performance of his
official function. The trial court added that upon
the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,[13] the issue had
become moot and academic. The amendatory law
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense
charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC
since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of
27 as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3)
thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the
prosecution to amend the Information pursuant
to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion[14] and R.A.
No. 7975. The amendment consisted in the
inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense
charged was not committed by the petitioner in
the performance of his duties/functions, nor in
relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration[15] of the said order, reiterating
that based on his testimony and those of
Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense
charged was committed by him in relation to his
official functions. He asserted that the trial court
failed to consider the exceptions to the
prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975,
which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not
be applied retroactively.[16]
The petitioner further alleged that Luz
Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through
counsel, categorically and unequivocably
admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an
official mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made
a volte face and issued an Order reversing and
setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared
that based on the petitioners evidence, he was on
official mission when the shooting occurred. It
concluded that the prosecution failed to adduce
controverting evidence thereto. It likewise
considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in her
complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was
on official mission when the shooting happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file
a Re-Amended Information and to allege that the
offense charged was committed by the petitioner
in the performance of his duties/functions or in
relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No.
7975, to thereafter transmit the same, as well as
the complete records with the stenographic
notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is
hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it
is hereby declared that after preliminary
hearing, this Court has found that the offense
charged in the Information herein was
committed by the accused in his relation to his
function and duty as member of the then
Philippine Constabulary.
2
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et
al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file
a Re-Amended Information alleging that the
offense charged was committed by the Accused
in the performance of his duties/functions or in
relation to his office, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended
Information, the complete records of this case,
together with the transcripts of the stenographic
notes taken during the entire proceedings
herein, are hereby ordered transmitted
immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan,
through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for
appropriate proceedings.[17]
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk
of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to
return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184
to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch
21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975,[18] the RTC retained
jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
petitioner had a salary grade of 23.Furthermore,
the prosecution had already rested its case and
the petitioner had commenced presenting his
evidence in the RTC; following the rule on
continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should
continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set
the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the
petitioner to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, assailing
the Order of the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan remanding the records of the
case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether
or not the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the
amended information was filed with the RTC on
February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in
effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the
case against him as he was charged with
homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal, and the crime was committed while in
the performance of his duties. He further asserts
that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that
crimes committed by members and officers of the
PNP with a salary grade below 27 committed in
relation to office are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment
thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner
asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No.
7975, only those cases where trial has not begun
in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of the
law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the
contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor contends that the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that
R.A. No. 7975 should be applied
retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the crime committed by the
petitioner when the amended information was
filed with the RTC, by the time it resolved
petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995,
R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the
law should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in
accordance with law and the rulings of this Court
when he ordered the remand of the case to the
RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal
cases is determined by the allegations in the
Information or the Complaint and the statute in
effect at the time of the commencement of the
action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional
requirements must be alleged in the
Information.[19] Such jurisdiction of the court
acquired at the inception of the case continues
until the case is terminated.[20]
3
 Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the
following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .[21]
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have
exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over
crimes committed by public officers in relation to
their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the
offender and the discharge of official duties must
be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in
relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.[22] The amended Information
filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate
relation between his office and the discharge of
his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the
Information to include therein an allegation that
the petitioner committed the crime in relation to
office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It
bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D.
No. 1606 was already in effect and under Section
2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender
committed the crime charged in relation to his
office but occupies a position corresponding to a
salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial
Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may
be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police
Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was
charged with homicide punishable by reclusion
temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably
to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No.
7975 should not be applied retroactively has no
legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975
is a substantive procedural law which may be
applied retroactively.[23]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June
2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation
of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an
offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
which nullified the various contracts awarded by
the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for
the construction, operation and maintenance of
4
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent,
who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. While there was likewise a finding of
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was
no longer indicted because he died prior to the
issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005,
respondent was charged before the SB as
follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then
Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President
of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction
of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession
Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction
of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the
government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the
event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article
1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms
are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government
of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to
wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10)
days from today within which to show cause
why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person
and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order
contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by
reason of his voluntary appearance, when he
filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that
the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over
respondent's case, even if he is a private person,
because he was alleged to have conspired with
a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to
Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein
do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause
order of the SB, also contended that,
independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile,
the public officer with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official
authority as a government agent, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed
Resolution, pertinent portions of which read
thus:
5
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused
Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in
this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased
long before this case was filed in court, for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered
quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following
issues, to wit:
I (1) that the accused is a public officer;
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND
IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON
THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE,
IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS
ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL
LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED
THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into
any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether
or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(2) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled
rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-
graft law to repress certain acts of public officers
and private persons alike constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases,
among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the
present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the
death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and,
as such, prosecution against respondent may
not prosper.
6
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's
death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation
of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish
the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private
respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was
no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement
of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it
not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person
must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with
a public officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all instances,
be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present
case where the public officer has already died,
the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy,
any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of
each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefor.16 This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in
execution or furtherance of the common
purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or
dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The
death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint
offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of
two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy.
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a
charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention
that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-
conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that
the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public
officers and private persons alike, which
constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would
bar the prosecution of a private person who
conspired with such public officer in violating the
Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the
early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature
of and the principles governing conspiracy, as
construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when
the law specifically provides a penalty therefor
as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime
of conspiracy known to the common law is not
an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible
act from the view-point of morality, but as long
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a
common scheme, a felony is committed by two
7
or more malefactors, the existence of a
conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators.
In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and
Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be
imposed for the mere act of conspiring to
commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in
many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of
record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the
conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of
all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite
to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing
is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it
is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other
than his own, "when two or more persons agree
or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."
The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case
where this Court held that x x x it is impossible
to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration
the close and inseparable relation of each of
them with the criminal act, for the commission
of which they all acted by common agreement x
x x. The crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the x x x accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and
they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
Of course, as to any conspirator who was
remote from the situs of aggression, he could be
drawn within the enveloping ambit of the
conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral
ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the
latter were moved or impelled to carry out the
conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the
conspirators in the scheming and execution of
the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of
them the act of any one of them. It is in this
light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance
of the common design are liable as co-principals.
This rule of collective criminal liability emanates
from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for
the consequences of such criminal enterprise
they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private
respondent should be found guilty of conspiring
with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the
absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in
nature and involves evidentiary
matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy
against respondent is better left ventilated
before the trial court during trial, where
respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and
Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was
8
likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy
with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the
same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly
entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the
Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution,
granted respondent's motion to quash the
Information on the ground that the SB has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The
prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution
before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31,
2005, this Court denied the petition finding no
reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on
January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that
this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should
be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should
be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of
posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act
of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions
seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought
before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the court’s
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the
complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to
the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John
Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78,
86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears,
he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to
waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion
for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction
over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters
which called for respondent court’s exercise of
its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now
to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make
any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his
posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the
prosecution to show cause why the case should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his
person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to
point out that the instant case involves a
contract entered into by public officers
representing the government. More importantly,
the SB is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by
certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes
9
private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with
then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law,
both respondent and Secretary Enrile should
have been charged before and tried jointly by
the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the
death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested
of its jurisdiction over the person of and the
case involving herein respondent. To rule
otherwise would mean that the power of a court
to decide a case would no longer be based on
the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition
involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been
pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral
of the case to the Regional Trial Court would
further delay the resolution of the main case and
it would, by no means, promote respondent's
right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition
of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the
disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(Fourth Division),
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122
to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22,
1999, denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS) was established in December 1973 and
started its actual operations in 1976. Created
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as
amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to
establish a separate fund to guarantee
continuous financial support to the AFP military
retirement system as provided for in Republic Act
No. 340.[1]Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was
to be funded from three principal sources: (a)
congressional appropriations and compulsory
contributions from members of the AFP; (2)
donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to
the system; and (3) all earnings of the system
which shall not be subject to any tax
whatsoever.[2] AFP-RSBS is a government-owned
or controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act
No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special
Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002. It is administered by
the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of
Trustees and Management Group.[3] Its funds are
in the nature of public funds.[4]
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R.
Antonino, then a member of the House of
Representatives representing the First District of
the Province of South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit[5] with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate
transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at
General Santos City and questionable payments
of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government
had been entertained into between certain
parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to
investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose
S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-
RSBS,[6]together with twenty-seven (27) other
persons[7] for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-
RSBS funds and in defrauding the government
millions of pesos in capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes.[8]
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite
preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy
C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate
Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner and several other accused. The filing of
the Informations was duly approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve
10
(12) Informations were for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to
25133.[9] All were similarly worded, except for the
names of the other accused, the dates of the
commission of the offense, and the property
involved. Representative of the said Informations
is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and
prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL,
JR., a high ranking public official being then the
President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low
ranking public officer being the Project Director,
both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance
of their official duties, taking advantage of their
official positions and committing the offense in
relation to their offices, conspiring together and
confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX
GUAYBAR, both private individuals, did, there
and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally
execute and/or cause the execution of a falsified
Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property
located at General Santos City, by making it
appear therein that the purchase price of the
said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00)
PESOS at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused very well
knew and, in fact, agreed, that the same was
sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total
of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00)
PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale
as basis for payment of capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of
the subject lot in the amount of
only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively,
when the capital gains, and documentary stamp
and other taxes should have been P524,475.00
and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-
changing and causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO
HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS
(P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
On the other hand, twelve (12) other
separate Informations indicted the accused for
Falsification of Public Documents, defined and
penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal
Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145.[11] Save with respect
to the names of the other accused, the dates of
the commission of the felonies, and the property
involved in each case, the Informations were,
likewise, similarly worded, representative of
which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and
sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in
General Santos City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public
official being then the President, and WILFREDO
PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the
Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in
the performance of their duties, taking
advantage of their official positions and
committing the offense in relation to their
offices, conspiring and confederating with each
other and with accused NILO FLAVIANO and
JACK GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting
with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent,
did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally falsify a public document by executing
and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale
for a 999-sq. m. property particularly identified
as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and
stating therein a purchase price of
only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN
THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in
truth and in fact, as all the accused very well
knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of
said lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a
total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby perverting the
truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to
Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging
want of jurisdiction.[13] He, likewise, filed an
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings[14] on February 16, 1999, because of
11
the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation
with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor opposed the said
motions.[15]
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the
aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano
& Associates filed a Notice of Appearance[16] as
private prosecutors in all the aforementioned
cases for the Association of Generals and Flag
Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)[17] on March 9, 1999. The
notice of appearance was apparently made
conformably to the letter-request of Retired
Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen.
Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof.
In a Resolution[18] dated April 5, 1999, the
Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed
by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently,
a warrant of arrest against him was issued.[19] He
posted a cash bail bond for his provisional
liberty.[20]
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the
appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates
as private prosecutors, contending that the
charges brought against him were purely public
crimes which did not involve damage or injury to
any private party; thus, no civil liability had
arisen.[21] He argued that under Section 16 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party
may be allowed to intervene through a special
prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil
liability arising from the criminal offense
charged.[22] He maintained that if the prosecution
were to be allowed to prove damages, the
prosecution would thereby be proving another
crime, in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that
its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and
contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such
members-contributors, they have been
disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful
investments and residual interest at the AFP-
RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner
and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not
having waived the civil aspect of the cases
involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant
to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the law firm averred that its
appearance was in collaboration with the Office
of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in
any event, was subject to the direction and
control of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[23]
Replying to the comment, the petitioner
refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil
interest in the criminal cases involved. He posited
that AGFOI was neither a member nor a
beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover,
considering that it was funded partly by the
national government and individual soldiers by
way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never
contributed a single centavo to the funds of the
AFP-RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI, as an
organization, has a distinct personality of its own,
apart from the individual members who compose
it.[24] Hence, it is of no moment if some members
of AGFOI are or have been members and
beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[25] with the
Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the
Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the
proceeding be suspended and his arraignment
deferred pending the resolution of the
reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its
Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days
from today within which to elevate its evidence
and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion
for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999
and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28,
1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform
this Court within the said period as to its
findings and recommendations together with the
action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso,
this authority from the Court for the prosecution
to evaluate its evidence and take such
appropriate action as regards accused Ramiscals
subject motion shall also include the case
regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.[26]
In the meantime, in a Resolution[27] dated
June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short
shrift of the petitioners opposition and denied his
12
plea for the denial of the appearance of the law
firm.[28] In justifying its resolution, the
Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
Considering that the offended parties are
members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by
the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be
affected by the action of the Court resolving the
criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there
appears a strong legal presumption that their
appearance should not be disturbed. After all,
their appearance is subject to the direct
supervision and control of the public
prosecutor.[29]
The petitioner moved for a reply, that the assailed orders of the
reconsideration[30] of the Sandiganbayans
Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was
opposed[31] by the prosecution. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[32] denying
the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the
nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22,
1999 Resolutions of the graft court, and raised
the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND
ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171,
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO
CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE
PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY
ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED
PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT
CASES.[33]
In support of his petition, the petitioner
reiterated the same arguments he put forth
before the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers
that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was
improper since the assailed Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and
not final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was
to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also
argues that the petition is premature because the
reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been
completed. On the merits of the petition, he
posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-
RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the
outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the
appearance of the private prosecutor was subject
to the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of
Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure was proper.
The Ruling of the Court
The Assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are
Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something
intervening between the commencement and the
end of a suit which decides some point or matter
but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy. The Court distinguished a final order
or resolution from an interlocutory one
in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] as
follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or
a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the
controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to
await the parties next move (which, among
others, may consist of the filing of a motion for
13
new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes final
or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, final and executory.[35]
Conversely, an order that does not finally
disposes of the case, and does not end the
Courts task of adjudicating the parties
contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by
the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or
inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as
above pointed out, an interlocutory order may
not be questioned on appeal except only as part
of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
the final judgment rendered in this case.[36]
The rule is founded on considerations of
orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals
and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when all such orders
may be contested in a single appeal.[37]
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be
assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal
on questions of law only.[38]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan
merely resolved to allow the appearance of the
law firm of Albano & Associates as private
prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI,
represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen.
Navarro who were, likewise, investors/members
of the AFP-RSBS, is the offended party whose
rights may be affected by the prosecution of the
criminal and civil aspects of the cases and the
outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private
prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. The
Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on
their merits, more specifically, the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities
attendant to the commission of the crimes
charged. Assuming that the Ombudsman would
maintain the finding of probable cause against
the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the
cases, and, thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would
sustain the finding of probable cause against the
petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the
graft court would then have to proceed to trial,
receive the evidence of the parties and render
judgment on the basis thereof. The petitioner
would then have the following options: (a) to
proceed to trial, and, if convicted, file a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said
resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial
justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal of
appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their
merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are
used only to help secure, not override substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made, their aim would be defeated.
Consequently, in the interest of justice, the
instant petition for review may be treated as a
special civil action on certiorari.[39] As we held
in Salinas v. NLRC,[40] a petition which should
have been brought under Rule 65 and not under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible
rule. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits.[41]
Although there is no allegation in the petition
at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner
made the following averments: that the graft
court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the
offended party despite the plain language of the
Informations and the nature of the crimes
charged; and that the graft court blatantly
violated basic procedural rules, thereby
eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the
above cases. He, likewise, averred that the
Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the
entry of a party, through a private prosecutor,
14
which has no right to the civil liabilities of the
accused arising from the crimes charged, or
where the accused has no civil liabilities at all
based on the nature of said crimes. The petitioner
also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his
opposition thereto, in gross violation of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are
sufficient to qualify the petition as one under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v.
Court of Appeals:[42]
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if
it does not have the legal power to determine
the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where
the respondent, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as
determined by law. There is grave abuse of
discretion where the public respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[43]
Besides, unless we resolve the present
petition on its merits, other parties, like the
private respondents herein, may, likewise, enter
their appearance as offended parties and
participate in criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of
the Law Firm Albano
& Associates
The respondent law firm entered its
appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI,
purportedly upon the request of Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano
Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and
other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to
have been disadvantaged or deprived of our
lawful investments and residual interest at the
Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP
because of alleged plunder of the Systems
Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of
Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf
as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.)
COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)
(Sgd.)
BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)[44]
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal
services of the respondent law firm were not
engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and
in behalf of the other retired generals and star
rank officers claiming to have residual interests in
or to be investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of
the lots subject of the Informations against the
petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the
records that the Board of Directors of the AGFOI,
authorized them to engage the services of the
respondent law firm to represent it as private
prosecutor in the above cases. Neither is there
any resolution on record issued by the Board of
Directors of the AGFOI authorizing Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the
services of the respondent law firm to represent
it as the private prosecutor in said cases. If at all,
the respondent law firm is the counsel of Aparri
and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged
are public offenses and, by their very nature, do
not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any
private party. He asserts that, as gleaned from
the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to
25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, the offended party is the government
because based on the deeds of sale executed in
favor of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived
of capital gains and the documentary stamp
taxes. He contends that the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for
falsification of public document under paragraph
4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not
contain any allegation that the AGFOI or any
private party sustained any damage caused by
the said falsifications. The petitioner further
15
argues that absent any civil liability arising from
the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter
cannot be considered the offended party entitled
to participate in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this
view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in
criminal action. Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a
member, beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-
RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would not
sustain a direct and material damage by an
adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the
AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to
any person similarly situated to intervene in the
proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy,
efficient and inexpensive disposition of the cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor
avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in
the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan because it
is a member of the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may
be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm
contend that the latter has a right to intervene,
considering that such intervention would enable
the members of AGFOI to assert their rights to
information and access to the official records,
documents, and papers, a right granted by no
less than paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-
RSBS are impressed with public character
because the government provided for its initial
funds, augmented from time to time by the salary
contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and
officers.
We agree with the contention of the
petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the
offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule
110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[45] of the Rules, all
criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability based
on the said criminal acts is impliedly
instituted[46] and the offended party has not
waived the civil action, reserved the right to
institute it separately or instituted the civil action
prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the
action inclusive of the civil action remains under
the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor.[47] The prosecution of offenses is a
public function.[48] Under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will act as private
prosecutor for the protection of his interests and
in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and further delay the final disposition of the case.
The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.[49] With
the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into
one composite proceeding, with the criminal
action predominating the civil. The prime purpose
of the criminal action is to punish the offender in
order to deter him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the
civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for
the damage or injury he sustained by reason of
the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.[50] Under Article 104 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of
the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The
civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102
and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
16
 Thus, when the offended party, through
counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the
proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance
merely as a matter of tolerance.[51]
The offended party may be the State or any
of its instrumentalities, including local
governments or government-owned or controlled
corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS, which,
under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution
of their properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification. For instance, in malversation of
public funds or property under Article 217[52] of
the Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article
213[53]of the Revised Penal Code, and violations
of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No.
705, as amended, to mention a few, the
government is the offended party entitled to the
civil liabilities of the accused. For violations of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,[54] any party,
including the government, may be the offended
party if such party sustains undue injury caused
by the delictual acts of the accused. In such
cases, the government is to be represented by
the public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil
liability of the accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person,
right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same
punishable act or omission of the accused,[55] or
that corporate entity which is damaged or injured
by the delictual acts complained of. Such party
must be one who has a legal right; a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action as will
entitle him to recourse under the substantive law,
to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he
has the legal right to the demand and the accused
will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil
liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere
expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The
interest of the party must be personal; and not
one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party.[56]
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may
also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-
RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a
legal right to intervene in the criminal cases
merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the
constitutional right of such members to have
access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are
such members entitled to intervene therein
simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are
public or government funds. It must be stressed
that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS
over its funds or property is merely inchoate and
incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS
which has a juridical personality separate and
independent of its members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended
party is the government, which was allegedly
deprived by the petitioner and the other accused
of the capital gains and documentary stamp
taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase
price of the property stated therein in favor of the
AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved
whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes
charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said
transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability
of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the
offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI
is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases
Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public
documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article
171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing
that in the felony of falsification of public
document, the existence of any prejudice caused
to third person or the intent to cause damage, at
the very least, becomes immaterial. The
controlling consideration is the public character of
a document and the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of truth therein solemnly
proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way,
have civil liability to a third person.[57]
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real
property covered thereby is underpriced by a
public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal
the correct amount of capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes due on the sale
causing undue injury to the government, the
offenders thereby commit two crimes (a)
falsification of public document defined in
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs
civil liability to the government as the offended
party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, but not for falsification of public document
17
under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of
sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the
payment of the capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct
amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the
government, and the petitioner and his co-
accused pocketed the difference between the
correct amount of taxes and the amount
entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may
be considered the offended party entitled to
intervene in the above criminal cases, through the
Government Corporate Counsel.[58]
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party
entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.
People vs. Benipayo
Facts:
Photokina Marketing Inc. filed an affidavit
complaint for libel against respondent Benipayo,
COMELEC Chairman, for allegedly being the one
alluded to by the respondent in his speech at UP
Diliman which was published in Manila Bulletin
issues.
Said speech is as follows: “Now, they are at it
again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is
so grossly disadvantageous to the government
that it offends common sense to say that it would
be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.”
Arguing that he’s an impeachable officer,
respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Prosecutor of QC. City prosec. Still
filed an information for libel against him.
Respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal
of the case on the assertion that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be
criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the
case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Trial court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was
committed by respondent in relation to his office
when he delivered speech in his official capacity
as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case
to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court
adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed the crime of
libel in relation to his office and that the trial court
is correct in saying that it has no jurisdiction over
the case?
HELD:
Criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamations shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all
other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law
defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot
simply override, in the absence of an express
repeal or modification, the specific provision in
the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid,
jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by
similar means.1 The grant to the Sandiganbayan2
of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation
to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of
its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
18
defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office. The
broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249,3 cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified,
such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations
exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification,
it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to
argue on whether the crime is committed in
relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by
the trial court that the respondent committed the
alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as
former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above
disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore,
orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand
to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further
proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds
unnecessary any further discussion of the other
issues raised in the petitions.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU
members of the State Prosecutor's
Office), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in
the country today than Mayor Antonio L.
Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands
accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the
verdict has already been rendered by many
outraged persons who would immediately
impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all
the prejudgments against him, he is under our
Constitution presumed innocent as long as the
contrary has not been proved. Like any other
person accused of an offense, he is entitled to
the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of
Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge
the order of the respondent judge denying his
motion to quash the informations for rape with
homicide filed against him and six other
persons. We shall treat it as we would any other
suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just
and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan
Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
conducted a preliminary investigation on August
9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but
was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano
Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad
issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at
Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was
served on Sanchez in the morning of August
13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was
positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO
III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the
rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez.
The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice
in Manila.
19
The respondent prosecutors immediately
conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty.
Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was
served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on
August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7,
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-
124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8,
in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713.
Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he
remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito
Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and
Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto.
Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the
arrest of all the accused, including the
petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice
subsequently expressed his apprehension that
the trial of the said cases might result in a
miscarriage of justice because of the tense and
partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the
petitioner and the relationship of an employee,
in the trial court with one of the accused. This
Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the
venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila,
where they were raffled to respondent Judge
Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations
were amended to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion
to quash the informations substantially on the
grounds now raised in this petition. On
September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez
then filed with this Court the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven
informations filed against him should be
quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to
present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4)
he is being charged with seven homicides arising
from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do
not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo
Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be
tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the
petition, to which we required a Reply from the
petitioner within a non-extendible period of five
days.1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The
Court may consider his non-compliance an
implied admission of the respondents'
arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his
petition, which is a ground for its dismissal.
Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural
lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the
basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9
and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention
that he was not accorded the right to present
counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August
9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano
Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the
presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after
reviewing them there is nothing
to rebut or countermand all
these statements as far as
Mayor Sanchez is concerned,
We are not going to submit any
counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuño to Atty. Brion:
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
20
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any
counter-affidavit because we believe there is
nothing to rebut or countermand with all these
statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of
counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other
witnesses who will come up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of
Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuño, told
Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-
affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such
counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993,
respondent Zuño furnished the petitioner's
counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with
copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and
Malabanan, and told him he could submit
counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993.
The following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuño:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the
sworn statement of witness Aurelio Centeno y
Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3
Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again
waiving the submission of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuño:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio
Sanchez is concerned, this case is submitted for
resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the
petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his
counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the
inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he
was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to
on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio
Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits
dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-
quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's
counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993,
was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and
he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained
quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on
his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he
has suddenly bestirred himself and would now
question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not
submit counter-affidavits, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to
be present at the preliminary investigation5, so
may he waive the right to present counter-
affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render
the same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the
information.6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or
if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of
the accused, order an investigation or
reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the
criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar,
however, the respondent judge saw no reason
or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness
in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the
petitioner submits that the proceedings
conducted by the Department of Justice are null
and void because it had no jurisdiction over the
case. His claim is that it is the Office of the
21
Ombudsman that is vested with the power to
conduct the investigation of all cases involving
public officers like him, as the municipal mayor
of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under
Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or
omission of any public official. However, as we
held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo
v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and
amended information filed in this case needed
the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not
disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of
the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe
that such approval was necessary at all.
In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990),
the Court held that the Ombudsman has
authority to investigate charges of illegal or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e.,
any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act
or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at
550) is not an exclusiveauthority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition.
Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have
any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority the panel of prosecutors to file and
prosecute the information or amended
information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the
government such as the Department of Justice,
in connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and
the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases,11 may
conduct the investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13,
1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. Under
Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected
by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by his voluntary submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not, required. It is
enough that there be an intent on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and an
intent onthe part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-
invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad
requesting him to appear at the said camp for
investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13
this
Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle
to note that ordinarily, an
invitation to attend a hearing
and answer some questions,
which the person invited may
heed or refuse at his pleasure,
is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain
circumstances, however, such
an invitation can easily assume
a different appearance.
Thus, where the invitation
comes from a powerful group
composed predominantly of
ranking military officers issued
at a time when the country has
just emerged from martial rule
and when the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has not entirely been
lifted, and the designated
interrogation site is a military
camp, the same can be easily
taken, not as a strictly voluntary
invitation which it purports to
be, but as an authoritative
22
 command which one can only
defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a
high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a
military camp. Although in the guise of a
request, it was obviously a command or an
order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly
he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed
by the "invitation," he went without protest (and
in informal clothes and slippers only) with the
officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A.
No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial
investigation" are applicable even to a person
not formally arrested but merely "invited" for
questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente
Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status"
after he was pointed to by Centeno and
Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary
Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño himself
acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn
statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner
had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did
not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. — A peace officer
or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were
not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did
they have any personal knowledge that the
petitioner was responsible therefor because the
basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of
Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape
and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on
June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before
the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the
offense had "in fact just been committed" when
the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner
was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional
Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant
of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against
him and the other accused in connection with
the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure,
but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was
issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he may move to quash the information,
but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the
accused raises other grounds in the motion to
quash, he is deemed to have waived that
objection and to have submitted his person to
the jurisdiction of that court.14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after
the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge
Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against
Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation
of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the
warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this
23
first warrant served as the initial justification for
his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that
the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a
person invalidly detained will cure the defect of
that detention or at least deny him the right to
be released because of such defect. * Applicable
by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section
4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed
or discharge authorized. — If it
appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the
judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or
if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall, anything in
this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas
corpus on the ground that she had been
arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In
their return, the respondents declared that a
new warrant specifically naming her had been
issued, thus validating her detention. While
frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the
Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become
moot and academic inasmuch as
the new warrant of arrest
complies with the requirements
of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court regarding the
particular description of the
person to be arrested. While the
first warrant was unquestionably
void, being a general warrant,
release of the petitioner for that
reason will be a futile act as it
will be followed by her
immediate re-arrest pursuant to
the new and valid warrant,
returning her to the same prison
she will just have left. This
Court will not participate in such
a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently
followed by the Court, 17 more recently in
the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven
informations charging seven separate homicides
are absurd because the two victims in these
cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the
Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or
more offenders who commit
rape, the homicide committed
on the occasion or by reason of
each rape, must be deemed as
a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with
homicide. Therefore, there will
be as many crimes of rape with
homicide as there are rapes
committed.
In effect, the presence of
homicide qualifies the crime of
rape, thereby raising its penalty
to the highest degree. Thus,
homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape,
loses its character as an
independent offense, but
assumes a new character, and
functions like a qualifying
circumstance. However,by
fiction of law, it merged with
24
 rape to constitute an constituent
element of a special complex
crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is
in the highest degree, i.e. death
(reduced to reclusion
perpetua with the suspension of
the application of the death
penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A
complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a simple
punishment for various
offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception
under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the
Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not
charged with only one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the
seven accused is charged with having himself
raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping
Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other
words, the allegation of the prosecution is that
the girl was raped seven times, with each of the
seven accused taking turns in abusing her with
the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their
lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill
and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged
separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later
killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate informations filed against each of them
allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan
Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate
rapes were committed in succession by the
seven accused, culminating in the slaying of
Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed
seven times, but the informations do not make
such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does
so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the
petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo
Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the
informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law
to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to
be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled
to include in the information a person against
whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt
exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence
involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at
bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave
abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed
or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in
special cases by the President of the
Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order
the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts
try and absolve or convict the accused but as a
rule have no part in the initial decision to
prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of
discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into
the precincts of the executive. But in such a
case the proper remedy to call for such
exception is a petition
for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition.22 Moreover, before resorting to this
relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another
person as a co-accused in the same case must
first avail itself of other adequate remedies such
as the filing of a motion for such inclusion.23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that
because no charges have been filed against
Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the
25
petitioner and his co-accused should also be
dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of
the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged
commission of the crimes, the cases against
them should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts.
This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but
we shall discuss it just the same for the
guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as
amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the
petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is it covered by
paragraph (2) because it is not an offense
committed in relation to the office of the
petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the
"offense committed in relation to the office" as
follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office
contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into
the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to
be such that, in the legal sense, the offense
cannot exist without the office. In other words,
the office must be a constituent element of the
crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder.
The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. being a public
functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty
is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere
to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises
not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission
of the crime
There is no direct relation between the
commission of the crime of rape with homicide
and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor
because public office is not an essential element
of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not
even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately
connected with the performance of the
petitioner's official functions to make it fall under
the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives
were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a "third degree"
investigation held at a police substation. The
appearance of a senator as their counsel was
questioned by the prosecution on the ground
that he was inhibited by the Constitution from
representing them because they were accused
of an offense committed in relation to their
office. The Court agreed. It held that even if
their position was not an essential ingredient of
the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate
26
connection between the office and the offense,
as alleged in the information, that brought it
within the definition of an offense "committed in
relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these
allegations that, although public
office is not an element of the
crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main
respondents herein, according
to the amended information, the
offense therein charged
is intimately connected with
their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in
the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed they
had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they
would not have committed it
had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-
defendants of respondent Leroy
S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was
their superior officer, as Mayor
of Basilan City. (Emphasis
supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at
bar and find no allegation therein that the crime
of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner
was connected with the discharge of his
functions as municipal mayor or that there is an
"intimate connection" between the offense and
his office. It follows that the said crime, being
an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular
courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds
invoked by the petitioner are not supported by
the facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be
rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
who has started the trial of the criminal cases
against the petitioner and his co-accused, may
proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make
today is not a decision on the merits of the
criminal cases being tried below. These will have
to be decided by the respondent judge in
accordance with the evidence that is still being
received. At this time, there is yet no basis for
judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The
Court will caution against such irrelevant public
speculations as they can be based only on
imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with
the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142,
101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147
and to decide them with deliberate dispatch. SO
ORDERED.
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, Petitioner,
vs
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:
Hannah Serana was appointed by former
President Estrada as a student regent of UP
Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President
Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of
the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case
against her before the Sandiganbayan. She
moved to quash the information. She claimed
that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her
person, in her capacity as UP student regent
because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer
with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was
not committed in relation to her office; and the
funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government. As
to jurisdiction over her person, she contends
that as a UP student regent, she is not a public
officer who held the position in an ex officio
capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack
of merit.
27
Issue: given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over Serana’s case. of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
Held:
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this protection. The State cannot rob him of this right
case. In Geduspan v. People, the SC held that
while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provisions of law placed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provisions of law. advertisements are legitimate forms of
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested
the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over expression.
Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager
of government-owned or controlled Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section
corporations, state universities, or educational
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of
Regents performs functions similar to those of a constitutional. The Court agrees with the
board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.
Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP protected speech and that the government has
student regent) is among those enumerated and
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her. an obligation to protect private individuals from

defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE
new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that

online defamation constitutes “similar means” for

Constitutional law; Unsolicited
committing libel. But the Court’s acquiescence
commercial communications, also known as
goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes
“spam” is entitled to protection under freedom of
the author of the libelous statement or
expression. To prohibit the transmission of
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to
intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code
read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
associated with internet media is distinct from
separate category of speech which is not
that of print.
accorded the same level of protection as that

28
 Criminal law; Section 5 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the

the Cybercrime Law that punishes “aiding or petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6,

abetting” libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. The 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as

terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for

that generates chilling effect on those who violating the fundamental rights protected under

express themselves through cyberspace posts, the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the

comments, and other messages. Its vagueness Respondents, singly and collectively, from

raises apprehension on the part of internet users enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the

because of its obvious chilling effect on the Cybercrime Act.

freedom of expression, especially since the crime Named as Respondents are the Secretary

of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local

cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, Government, the Executive Director of the

as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such Information Communications Technology Office,

as libel are not punishable unless consummated. the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the

In the absence of legislation tracing the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

interaction of netizens and their level of

responsibility such as in other countries, Section ISSUES/GROUNDS:

5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The

4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’

Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child constitutionally protected rights to

Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. freedom of expression, due process,

equal protection, privacy of

FACTS: communications, as well as the

Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Constitutional sanctions against double

Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative

Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file authority and the right against

a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under unreasonable searches and seizure;

29
o • Sections 6 and 7 of the authority, infringes upon the

Cybercrime Act more than judicial power of the judiciary,

doubles the liability for and violates the Petitioners’

imprisonment for any violation of Constitutionally-protected right

existing penal laws are in to due process and freedom of

violation of the petitioners’ right expression; and

against Double Jeopardy; o • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as

o • Section 12 of the Cybercrime a cybercrime and in relation to

Act, which permits the NBI and Section 6 of the law increased

the PNP “with due cause” to the penalty from 6 months to 4

engage in real time collection of years and 2 months to the

traffic data without the benefit of greater period of 6 years to 10

the intervention of a judge, years, infringes upon the right to

violates the Petitioners’ freedom of expression and also

Constitutionally-protected right restricts the freedom of the

to be free from unreasonable press. Under Section 12, a prima

searches and seizure as well as facie finding by the Secretary of

the right to the privacy of DOJ can trigger an order directed

communications; at service providers to block

o • Section 19 of the Cybercrime access to the said material

Act, which authorizes the without the benefit of a trial or a

Respondent Secretary of DOJ to conviction. Thus, RA 10175

block or restrict access to any infringes upon the right to

content upon a prima freedom of expression and also

facie finding that the same restricts the freedom of the

violates the law, contains an press. The increased penalties,

undue delegation of legislative plus the ease by which allegedly

30
 libelous materials can be o • with the passage of the

removed from access, work Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente

together as a “chilling effect” Sotto III’s earlier threat to

upon protected speech. criminally prosecute all bloggers

2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate and internet users who were

remedy in the court of law, and that this critical of his alleged plagiarism

Petition is therefore cognizable by the of online materials for use in his

SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, speech against the Reproductive

Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and Health Bill became real; threat of

pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 criminal prosecution under RA

Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 10175 will work to preclude

people such as Petitioners from

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS: posting social commentaries

1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free online, thus creating a “chilling

Speech: effect” upon the freedom of

o • imposes heavier penalties for expression;

online libel than paper-based o • gives the DOJ Secretary

libel; single act of online libel blanket authority to restrain and

will result in two convictions block access to content whether

penalized separately under the authored by private citizens or

RP and the Cybercrime Act; the organized press sans any

o online libel under the Cybercrime hearing of any kind but merely

Act will ensure the imprisonment upon a mere prima

of the accused and for a much facie showing that a particular

longer period. Such changes will Internet article constitutes online

result in a chilling effect upon the libel;

freedom of speech;

31
 o • respondents must demonstrate ICTs in violation of the equal

how the Cybercrime Act will fare protection clause

under strict scrutiny 3. The Real Time Collection of

2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy

violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal and the Right Against Unreasonable

Protection Clauses of the Constitution: Searches and Seizure:

o • Persons who commit crimes o • No compelling state interest

using information and that justifies real time collection

communication technologies of data; the authority vested on

(ICTs) face the possibility of the Philippine National Police and

being imprisoned more than the National Bureau of

double the imprisonment laid Investigation to collect data is

down in the RPC or special law, not bounded by any reasonable

simply by the passage of the standard except “due cause”

Cybercrime Act; which presumably, the PNP and

o • the cybercrimes defined and NBI will determine for itself;

punished under Section 6 of the o • While the privacy of suspected

Act are absolutely identical to the terrorists, through the Human

crimes defined in the RPC and Security Act, are protected by

special laws which raises the the intervention of the Court of

possibility that an accused will be Appeals

punished twice for the same before surveillance operations

offense in violation of the are conducted, the privacy of all

Constitution; citizens may be infringed without

o • Congress created a class of judicial participation in the

offenders who commit crimes Cybercrime Act;

“by, through or with the use” of

32
 o • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is “judge, jury and executioner” of

required to justify the incursion all cybercrime-related

into the right to privacy; complaints;

o No limits imposed upon the PNP o To consider that all penal

or the NBI since they can lawfully provisions in all specials laws are

collect traffic data at all times cybercrimes under Section 6, it •

without interruption; follows that:

o • No stated justification for this 1. Complaints filed by

warrant-free unlimited incursion intellectual property

into the privacy of citizens rights owners may be

4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take acted upon the

Down Authority under Section 19 of the Respondent DOJ

Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and Secretary to block

is an Undue Delegation of Legislative access to websites and

Authority content upon a

o • The DOJ Secretary’s mere prima

overwhelming powers to order facie showing of an

the restriction or blocking of infringement;

access to certain content upon a 2. Foreign sites (e.g.

mere prima facie finding without Amazon.com) offering

any need for a judicial goods on retail to

determination is in clear violation Philippine citizens may

of petitioners’ Constitutionally be blocked for violating

protected right to due process; the Retail Trade Law;

o • The Cybercrime Act 3. Foreign service

contemplates that the providers such

respondent DOJ Secretary will be as Skype may be

33
 blocked from offering Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent
the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite
voice services without discretion and becoming the supreme authority
in the Philippine Internet landscape
securing a license from

the National
Telecommunications
Communication;
4. YouTube video may be
blocked for presumably
violating the IP Code.
o • The Cybercrime Act fails the
two tests laid down by the Court
in Abakada Guro Party List v.
People vs Valdez
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is
charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended
by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly
caught in flagrante delicto and without authority
of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven
(7) fully grown marijuana plants known as
Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs
maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was
arraigned and with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued.

Purisima (GR No. 166715) to

The prosecution presented its witnesses,
namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
determine the validity of
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo
G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member
delegation of legislative power:
of the police force, who testified how the
information was received, the commencement of
(1) the completeness test and
their operation and its details under the specific
instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly,
(2) the sufficient standard test
they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They,
then, proceeded to look around the area where
1. Nowhere in the
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two
Cybercrime Act’s
rows, approximately 25 meters away from his
nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned
declaration of policy
the prohibited plants and, according to Balut,
the latter admitted that they were his. They
does it lay down the
uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
legislative policy with
plants and arrested him. One of the said plants
was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
respect to the blocking
Laboratory for analysis which produced a
positive result. The prosecution also presented a
of content. No limits
certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the
upon the takedown
land cultivated by appellant where the growing
marijuana plants were found, was part of the
power of the respondent
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but
DOJ Secretary;

34
no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been
issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole
witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person
whose identity he does not know. He was asked
to go with the latter to see something. This
unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa
hut. Five armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything
about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao
poked a fist at him and told him to admit
ownership of the plants. Appellant was so
nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police team then brought him to
the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by
the police. Appellant contends that there was
unlawful search. First, the records show that the
law enforcers had more than ample time to
secure a search warrant. Second, that the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does not remove appellant from the mantle of
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s
person, which includes his residence, his papers,
and other possessions.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of
the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is
admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by
lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination
of the existence of probable cause given the fact
that police had ample time to obtain said
warrant. The protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and
only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants. The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers
both innocent and guilty alike against any form
of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless
of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated
plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue,
which involves the admissibility of the marijuana
plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said
plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search
and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial
poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible
error on the part of the court a quo to have
admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana
plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal
prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
a crime was committed and that the accused is
the author thereof. The evidence arrayed
against the accused, however, must not only
stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is
“generally admissible” evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a
character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at
trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on
the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences
against the accused and to have relied upon said
proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly
tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees
that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.” To justify the conviction of the
35
accused, the prosecution must adduce that
quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the proposed Koronadal City public market
constitutional presumption of innocence. The
(project).[6]
prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence
and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, In a June 27, 1996 order, the
he is entitled to an acquittal.
Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among

Miguel vs Sandiganbayan others, to submit his counter-affidavit. On

October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension,

DECISION
the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.[7] In its

BRION, J.: July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found

probable cause against the petitioner and some

Before the Court is a petition
private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019
for certiorari under Rule 65[1] filed by Fernando
and against the petitioner alone for Falsification
Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25,
of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of
2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions[2] of the
the Revised Penal Code.[8]
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the

petitioners suspension from public office and (ii)

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
the corresponding informations with the
of the suspension order.
Sandiganbayan.[9] The information for violation of

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor That on 10 January 1995 or

Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials[3] of
Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging
petitioner, among others,[5] with violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with
the consultancy services for the architectural
aspect, the engineering design,
construction supervision and management of the
sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of
Koronadal, South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the [petitioner], a high
the ranking public officer in his
capacity as former Municipal
Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, and as such while in
the performance of his official
functions, committing the
offense in relation to his
and the office, taking advantage of his
official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private
[individuals] xxx acting with
evident bad faith and

36
 manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner
and criminally give unwarranted
asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension
benefits and advantages to said
[accused], by inviting them to period.[15]
participate in the prequalification
of consultants to provide the
Detailed Architectural &
Engineering Design and Despite the extension period asked and
Construction Supervision and
given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-
Management of the proposed
Koronadal Public Market, without affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz
causing the publication of said
invitation in a newspaper of to declare that the petitioner had waived his right
general circulation, thereby
excluding other consultants from to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001
participating in said resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman
prequalification.[10] (Emphases
and underscoring added) Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.[16]

On motions separately filed by two of the On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz

petitioners co-accused,[11] the Sandiganbayan asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment

ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor and trial of the petitioner and of the other

(OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, accused private individuals.[17]

2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed

suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which On August 6, 2002, after several

the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The extensions sought and granted, the petitioner

Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for

within which to file his counter-affidavit with the the criminal cases against him. On February 18,

OSP.[12] 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners

motion because of the pending OSP

Instead of submitting his counter- reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier

affidavit, the petitioner asked[13] the termination of the reinvestigation for the

Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to petitioners continuous failure to submit his

submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the counter-affidavit.[18] The petitioner did not

expiry of the extension requested, the petitioner question the denial of his motion.

asked[14] the OSP for an additional thirty-day

period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the

37
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the

arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal validity of his suspension order.

cases.[19]
THE PETITION

On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to

Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan

27, 2005, the petitioner filed his Vigorous gravely abused its discretion in ordering his

Opposition based on the obvious and fatal defect suspension despite the failure of the information

of the [i]nformation in failing to allege that the to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits

giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages and advantages by the petitioner was made

was done through manifest partiality, evident bad through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or

faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[20] gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the

phrases evident bad faith and manifest partiality

On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan actually refers not to him, but to his co-

promulgated the assailed accused,[25] rendering the information fatally

resolution[21] suspending the petitioner pendente defective.

lite The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing

before the issuance of his suspension order.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et
Motion is GRANTED. As prayed
for, the Court hereby orders the al.,[26] he claims that [n]owhere in the records of
suspension of [the petitioner]
from his position as City the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution
Mayor, Koronadal City, South
requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a
Cotabato, and from any other
public position he now holds. His specific date of hearing why he should not be
suspension shall be for a period
of ninety (90) days only.[22] ordered suspended.[27] For the petitioner, the

requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an

reconsideration of his suspension order and actual hearing to settle the defect in the

demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.[23] The information.

Sandiganbayan denied his motion,[24] prompting THE OSPS COMMENT

38
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the
Citing Juan v. People,[29] the OSP argues
information since all the elements of the offense
that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of
specifically pleaded by way of ultimate
the suspension order already satisfied the
facts. These elements are:
purpose of conducting a pre-suspension

1. The petitioner was the Municipal hearing i.e., basically, to determine the validity of

Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded

at the time material to the acts his right to preliminary investigation both by the

complained of; Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner

moved for a reinvestigation with the

2. The petitioner acted with manifest
Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner
partiality and evident bad faith when
was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No.
he invited only his co-accused private
3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
individuals to participate in the
Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash
prequalification of consultants for the
the information, although unsuccessfully, after he
project instead of publishing it in a
had been declared to have waived his right to
newspaper of general circulation;
submit countervailing evidence in the
and
reinvestigation by the OSP.[30]

3. The petitioners actions, performed

ISSUES
in relation to his office, gave

unwarranted benefits and There are only two issues presented for

advantages to his co-accused.[28] our resolution:

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to 1. Whether the information, charging

mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the the petitioner with violation of

allegations in the information, by conveniently Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is

failing to cite the phrase acting with evident bad valid; and

faith and manifest partiality when the petitioner

quoted the relevant portions of the information in 2. If it is valid, whether the absence of

his petition. an actual pre-suspension hearing

39
 renders invalid the suspension order on whether the material facts alleged in the

against the petitioner. complaint or information shall establish the

THE COURTS RULING essential elements of the offense charged as

defined in the law. The raison detre of the

We dismiss the petition for failure to
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused
establish any grave abuse of discretion in the
to suitably prepare his defense.[34]
issuance of the assailed resolutions.

The information for violation of RA 3019 is

In arguing against the validity of the
valid
information, the petitioner appears to go beyond
In deference to the constitutional right of an
the standard of a person of common
accused to be informed of the nature and the
understanding in appreciating the import of the
cause of the accusation against him, [31]
Section 6,
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
partiality. A reading of the information clearly
Procedure (Rules) [32]
requires, inter alia, that the
reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad
information shall state the designation of the
faith and manifest partiality was merely a
offense given by the statute and the acts or
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of
omissions imputed which constitute the offense
the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
these acts or omissions and its attendant
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-
circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
accused private individuals. This is what a plain
concise language and in terms sufficient to enable
and non-legalistic reading of the information
a person of common understanding to know what
would yield.
offense is being charged x x x and for the court

to pronounce judgment.[33] Notably, in his petition, the petitioner

would have us believe that this elemental phrase

The test of the informations sufficiency was actually omitted in the information[35] when,

is whether the crime is described in intelligible in his reaction to the OSPs comment, what the

terms and with such particularity with reasonable petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of

certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the phrases position, in relation with the other

the offense charged. In particular, whether an averments in the information. Given the

information validly charges an offense depends supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified

40
by the phrase acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, the remedy of the petitioner,
if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars
and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense
charged.[36]
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss
of benefits. Any public officer
against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or
under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should
he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries
and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer
under this provision is mandatory,[37] the
suspension requires a prior hearing to determine
the validity of the information[38] filed against
him, taking into account the serious and far
reaching consequences of a suspension of an
elective public official even before his
conviction.[39] The accused public officials right to
challenge the validity of the information before a
suspension order may be issued includes the right
to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal
proceeding leading to the filing of an information
against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution
on the ground that the acts charged do not
constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the
petitioner relied upon, the Court required, by way
of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension, that
(c) upon the filing of
such information, the trial
court should issue an order
with proper notice requiring
the accused officer to show
cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be
ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory
provisions of the Act. Where
either the prosecution
seasonably files a motion for
an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a
motion to quash the
information or challenges
the validity thereof, such
show-cause order of the trial
court would no longer be
necessary. What is
indispensable is that the trial
court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the
validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling,
issuing the corresponding order
of suspension should it uphold
the validity of the information or
withholding such suspension in
the contrary case.
41
 (d) No specific rules need be
laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice
it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and
adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against
him, e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due
preliminary investigation; that
the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a
violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
bribery provisions of the Revised
Penal Code which would warrant
his mandatory suspension from
office under section 13 of the
Act; or he may present a motion
to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of
any show cause order issued by the
Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office
was ordered. As clear as the day,
however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for
the trial court to issue a show cause order when
the motion, seeking the suspension of the
accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the
prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-
suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information so that the trial court can have a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial
on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings
that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a
challenge to the validity of the information by way of a
motion to quash.[42]
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed
at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension
hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing
alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a
suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the
Court considered the opposition of the accused
(to the prosecutions motion to suspend pendente
lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to
actually set the prosecutions motion for hearing.
The same conclusion was reached in Juan v.
People,[46] where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while
there was no pre-suspension
hearing held to determine the
validity of the Informations that
had been filed against
petitioners, we believe that the
numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the
goal of this procedure. The right
to due process is satisfied nor
just by an oral hearing but by the
filing and the consideration by
the court of the parties'
pleadings, memoranda and other
position papers.
42
 provision that would call for a liberal

Since a pre-suspension hearing is interpretation in favor of the accused public

basically a due process requirement, when an official and a strict construction against the

accused public official is given an adequate State.[51] The suspension required under this

opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed

against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if

3019, then an accused would have no reason to acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to

complain that no actual hearing was reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits

conducted.[47] It is well settled that to be heard which he failed to receive during his

does not only mean oral arguments in court; one suspension.[52]

may be heard also through pleadings. Where

Rather, the suspension under Section 13
opportunity to be heard, either through oral
of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
measure[53] that arises from the legal
denial of procedural due process exists. [48]

presumption that unless the accused is

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or

his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in

Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after the same way that upon a finding that there is

receiving an adverse ruling from the probable cause to believe that a crime has been

Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of committed and that the accused is probably guilty

the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a

filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea warrant for the arrest of the accused.[54]

for reconsideration.[49] Given this opportunity, we

Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a
find that the petitioners continued demand for the
mere preventive measure whose duration shall in
conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing
no case exceed ninety (90) days,[55] the adequacy
based on the same alleged defect in the
of the opportunity to contest the validity of the
information,[50] which we have found wanting has
information and of the proceedings that preceded
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
its filing vis--vis the merits of the defenses of the
Another reason that militates against the
accused cannot be measured alone by the
petitioners position relates to the nature of
absence or presence of an actual hearing. An
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal

43

opportunity to be heard on ones defenses,
however unmeritorious it may be, against the
suspension mandated by law equally
sufficiently serves both the due process right of
the accused and the mandatory nature of the
suspension required by law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A.
No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that a public office is a public
WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No.
01442 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is
and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape by sexual assault and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also
ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of
₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages. "AAA" is entitled to an interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum :from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

trust.[56] In light of the constitutional principle SO ORDERED.2

underlying the imposition of preventive The said Decision supposedly became final and
executory on December 20,
suspension of a public officer charged under a
2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court
valid information and the nature of this received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections
informing us of the death of accused-appellant
suspension, the petitioners demand for a trial- on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our
directive, the Director of the Bureau of
type hearing in the present case would only Corrections submitted on November 11, 2013, a
certified true copy of the death certificate4 of
overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote,
accused-appellant.
the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of
this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012 or
petition for lack of merit.
before its finality on December 20, 2012.
SO ORDERED.
Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his
appeal before this Court was still pending
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff resolution.
Appellee,
vs.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-
provides:
Appellant.
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally
RESOLUTION
extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
Decision1 in this case finding accused-appellant penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond when the death of the offender occurs before
reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive final judgment;
portion of the Decision reads:

44
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a Union Bank vs People
similar situation wherein the accused-appellant
died before his appeal could be resolved. The FACTS:
Court explained the implications of the accused-
appellant’s demise as follows: Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury
when she falsely declared under oath in the
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of Certificate against Forum Shopping. Tomas filed
the accused pending appeal of his conviction a motion to quash citing that the Makati MTC
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his has no jurisdiction as the document was
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action submitted and used in Pasay and that there was
is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a no crime committed as not all of the elements of
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil perjury was present.
action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
The lower courts denied the motion saying that
grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Makati has jurisdiction as it was notarized there
and ruled that she was sufficiently charged with
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11,
perjury.
2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of
its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso
died, his appeal before the Court was still ISSUE: Whether, in a crime of perjury, the
pending and unresolved.1âwphi1 The Court proper venue is where it was notarized or where
ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it it was used.
was not immediately informed of his death.
RULING:
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders
the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, The SC ruled that Makati was the right venue.
even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said The SC cites Rule 110, Sec. 15 of the Rules of
Decision has not yet become final, and the Court Court where it was stated that criminal action
still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. shall be instituted where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential
The Court had no course of action but to set elements occurred.
aside its Decision and dismiss the criminal case
against Amistoso by reason of his death.
The SC, one-by-one stated the elements of
perjury and provided that Tomas did all things in
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of
Makati, thus making Makati the right venue for
this Court finding accused-appellant guilty
the case.
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason
of his death on August 16, 2012. Consequently,
the same must be set aside and the case against
accused-appellant must consequently be
dismissed.

ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012

Decision of this Court is SET ASIDE and Criminal
Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED
on account of accused-appellant's demise.

SO ORDERED.

45