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THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. H. N. BULL, defendant and appellant.
3.ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS ORGANIC LAWS.—For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looks to the orders of the President before
Congress acted, and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the
formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the sovereign
constituency which lies back of American constitutions.
6.ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS.—An act of the legislative authority of the Philippine
Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject matter
has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the
organic law.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT No. 55.—Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
Islands and was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner Amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed.
The Military Government and the Civil Government instituted by the President had the power, whether
it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign countries and the ports
of the territory. The Act passed in furtherance of this power has remained in force since its enactment,
without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval.
12.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT No. 55.—In a prosecution under Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, the information need not allege that the court was sitting at a port where the
cattle were actually disembarked. The allegation in the information that an act was done willfully
includes the allegation that it was done knowingly.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. People vs. Vera., 65 Phil.
56, No. 45685 November 16, 1937
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN
PROBATION CASES.—A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature.
9.ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND INTEREST OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that
if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the
present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that 'the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.
15.ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No.
4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines.
The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the Philippines differ in some respects. The
adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones
Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the
President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to
light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state
constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So too,
under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is
also the rule generally followed in the United States.
16.ID. ; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.—
The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment;
"but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." The reason for the distinction is
obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" but
extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a
conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity
to hold office.
22.ID.; DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION
AS. TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec.
68.) To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39
Phil., 660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).
29.ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED FACTS
OR CONDITIONS; DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS ARBITRARY.—The
legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any- fact, or await the happening
of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule—limited by no principle of expediency announced
by the legislature.. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It
may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever
for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a. probation officer. This is a matter
which rests entirely at its pleasure.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
contra, EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
[No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949]
LEON MA. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFPICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, respondents.
[No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949]
ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
7.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre
for its enactment, was a period coexetensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending
with the convening of that body.
8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE WHEN CONGRESS MET IN
REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS THEREAFTER ISSUED, VALiDiTY OF.—
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.
13.ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID.—One who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed
and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.
15.EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS.—Executive Orders, even if issued within the powers
validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly
the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme Court, municipal ordinances and ordiriary executive
orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.
16.ID.—Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under
section 26, Article VI of the Co-nstitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations.