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[No. 5270. January 15, 1910.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. H. N. BULL, defendant and appellant.

1.AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE WAR, TREATIES, AND TO ACQUIRE


TERRITORY; STATUS OF ACQUIRED TERRITORY.—The Constitution confers upon the United
States the power to make war and treaties, and to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, but does not become a part of the United States until formally
incorporated therein by Congress. Until this is done, it is the duty of Congress to provide all needful
rules and regulations for its government, and in legislating with reference thereto, Congress is limited
only by those provisions of the Constitution which go to the very root if its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place.

2.THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS.—


The Government of the Philippine Islands is not that of a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not on the inhabitants of the Philippines and the Philippine Government.

3.ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS ORGANIC LAWS.—For its powers and the
limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looks to the orders of the President before
Congress acted, and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the
formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the sovereign
constituency which lies back of American constitutions.

4.ID.; A COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISM WITH THE USUAL DEPARTMENTS.—


Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly-
assigned to such departments.

5.ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT.—The legislative power delegated to the


Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms, subject to specific limitations. The grant
is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated.

6.ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS.—An act of the legislative authority of the Philippine
Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject matter
has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the
organic law.

7.ID.; ID.; RESERVATION BY CONGRESS OF POWER TO SUSPEND ACTS UNTIL APPROVED.


—The reservation by Congress of the power to suspend valid Acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature, does not operate to suspend such Acts until approved by Congress, or when approved,
expressly or by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid Acts of the Government
of the Philippine Islands until annulled.

8.ID.; ID.; POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE.—The power to regulate foreign


commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the
United States it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly
through the legislative body created by it, to which its power in that respect is delegated. Congress has
not, except in certain specific instances, legislated directly upon the subject, but, by the grant of general
legislative power, it has authorized the Government of the Philippines to enact laws with reference to
matters not covered by the Acts of Congress, and report its action to Congress for approval or
disapproval. The limitations upon the power of the Commission or Legislature to legislate do not affect
the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries.

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ACT No. 55.—Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
Islands and was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner Amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed.
The Military Government and the Civil Government instituted by the President had the power, whether
it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign countries and the ports
of the territory. The Act passed in furtherance of this power has remained in force since its enactment,
without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval.

10.ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND CREWS OF SHIPS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS.—When a


foreign merchant ship enters territorial waters, the ship's officers and crew are subject to the jurisdiction
of the territorial courts, subject to such limitations only as have been conceded by the territorial
sovereign through the proper political agencies.

11.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS ON SHIPS.—The offense of failing to provide


suitable means for securing animals while transporting them on a ship from a foreign port to a port of
the Philippine Islands is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines when the forbidden
conditions existed during the time the ship was within territorial waters, regardless of the fact that the
same conditions existed when the ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.

12.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT No. 55.—In a prosecution under Act No. 55, as
amended by Act No. 275, the information need not allege that the court was sitting at a port where the
cattle were actually disembarked. The allegation in the information that an act was done willfully
includes the allegation that it was done knowingly.

[No. 45685. November 16, 1937]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents. People vs. Vera., 65 Phil.
56, No. 45685 November 16, 1937

1.PROBATION ; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO CIRCUMSTANCES OF


OFFENSE; SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS; LEGAL RELATION AND ETHICAL
STANDARD.—Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation
case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it
to reverse the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, especially
where from its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings
of the parties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in
subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER; PRESIDENT'S VETO
NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT.—In vetoing a bill, the President may express the
reasons which he may deem proper, but his reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the
determination of actual controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether or not the Executive
should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his
constitutional power of veto but which happens- to be at the same time pending determination before
the Supreme Court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever
opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway the judgment of the
court one way or another and prevent it from taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to
take in a given case.

3.ID. ; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.—If it is ever necessary to make any vehement


affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that the judiciary is independent of
the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government—independent in the
performance of its functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and
understands it.

4.ID.; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED.—The constitutionality of an act of the


legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota presented.

5.ID. ; ID. ; RESORT TO EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The


question of the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in
the ordinary course of law, even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng
vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of
a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see also 12 C. }., p. 783); and in
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259, affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an
act of the legislature unconstitutional in an" action of., quo warranto brought in the name of- the
Government of the Philippines. It has also been. held "that the constitutionality of a statute may be
questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. 3., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97,
117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action
under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an
application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is
necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and
certiorari. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059;
Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas.,
982; 1 L, R. A. [N. S.], 843, and cases cited.)

6.ID.; ; ID. ; ID. ; PROHIBITION ; RULE WHERE JURISDICTION is EXCLUSIVELY DERIVED


FROM UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.—The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. The
general rule, although there is a conflict in the cases, is that the writ of prohibition will not lie where the
inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned,
because in such cases the inferior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of
the statute, and its decision may be subject to review, and consequently the complainant in such cases
ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the
inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be
prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute.

7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; LIMITED JURISDICTION IN
PROBATION CASES.—A Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited
jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature.

8.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY;


EXCEPTIONS.—As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may be raised at the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. But the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the
constitutionality of a statute should be presented. Thus, in. criminal cases, although there is a very
sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of
the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the
duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. And it has been held
that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the
jurisdiction of the court below.

9.ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY; RIGHT AND INTEREST OF
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONALITY.—The person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that
if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the
present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that 'the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.

10.ID. ; ID. ; RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT; BY FISCAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE


ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE PEOPLE.—The mere fact that. the Probation Act has been repeatedly
relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of
Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for
considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts will pass
upon a constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and
the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be
raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until
it is held void by the courts in proper cases.

11.ID.; ID. ; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY NECESSARY ; WAIVER IF


CASE CAN BE DECIDED ON OTHER POINTS.—While the court will meet the question with
firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the
legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points.
(Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock., 447, Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9
Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary
whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a
statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)

12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY.


—The Supreme Court will take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our
statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many persons
accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are
already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and
that the respondent M. C. U, has been at large for a period of about four years since his first conviction.
All await the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent muItiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.

13.ID. ; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.—Under a doctrine


peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The
Supreme .Court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of
Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the National Legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution.
And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to- the supreme law by setting aside a statute in
conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.

14.ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF


CONSTITUTIONALITY; RATIONALE OF PRESUMPTION.—All reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of
every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U. S. vs. Ten
Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs.
Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the
executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. Then, there is that peculiar
political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through
an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a
law as violative of the Constitution except in clear cases.

15.ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE PHILIPPINES.—Section 21 of the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No.
4221, vests in the Governor-Gerieral of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested in the President of the Philippines.
The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the Philippines differ in some respects. The
adjective "exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones
Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the
President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to
light. The framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state
constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after conviction". So too,
under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is
also the rule generally followed in the United States.
16.ID. ; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS.—
The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment;
"but," says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." The reason for the distinction is
obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" but
extends to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a
conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment,
depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity
to hold office.

17.ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.—Our


Constitution makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in
the pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty
may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of the National
Assembly.

18.ID. ; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.—The benign prerogative


of mercy reposed in the Executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor
can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments
of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to
one, of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases
expressly provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the pardoning power is
conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the
legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control
the proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).

19.ID.; PROBATION; POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT A PROBATION


LAW.—The Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a
probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative
power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the legislature may
confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the
beginning and end of the punishment, and whether it should be certain, or indeterminate, or
conditional. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts—particularly the
trial courts—large discretion in imposing- the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It
is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to
best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer.

20.ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS; PROBATION DlSTINGUISHED


FROM REPRIEVE AND COMMUTATION.—Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they
the same. They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In
probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely
exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation
Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The
probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody—subject to the control of the
probation officer and of the court, he may be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of
probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed
upon him. Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence.
21.ID. ; ID.; ID. ; PROBATION NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PARDONING POW-ER.—The Probation
Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to
those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had
never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the power
of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

22.ID.; DIVISION OF POWERS.—Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive
cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

23.ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—


The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law
and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the National
Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas
delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency,
was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of
judicial power, and found its way into America as an enlightened principle of free government. It has
since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.

24.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT


INFLEXIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.—The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power
is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. On quite the
same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories
of the United States as it may select, Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to
the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be done. Doubtless, also,
legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of
the Constitution of the Philippines ilippines provides that "The National As limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, -to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the Same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or
other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy."

25.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In testing


whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature
so -that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. In United
States vs. Ang Tang Ho {[1922], 43 Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The
general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to
be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise
of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
26.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of its
provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to
exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter
for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary
of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION
AS. TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs.
Clinton County Comrs. [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec.
68.) To the same effect are decisions of the Supreme Court in the Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919], 39
Phil., 660) ; and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234).

28.ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE


DOCTRINE.—Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 118, 170172; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat, 1; 6
Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legisture may delegate a power
not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all
branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency to relax the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic
forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work
on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Professor Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution
of the United States and is accepted.

29.ID.; ID.; ID.; OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT NOT CONTINGENT ON SPECIFIED FACTS
OR CONDITIONS; DlSCRETION VESTED IN PROVINCIAL BOARDS ARBITRARY.—The
legislature has not made the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or
conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of
the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any- fact, or await the happening
of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule—limited by no principle of expediency announced
by the legislature.. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It
may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or have any reason whatsoever
for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a. probation officer. This is a matter
which rests entirely at its pleasure.

30.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LOCAL OPTION LAWS ; EIGHT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT;


SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW NOT COUNTENANCED.—The legislature
may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while
recognizing the force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in many jurisdictions have
sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p.
171.) But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive
different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying the
right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands
of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon in matters of general legislation
like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion
may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.

31.ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF


PROBATION ACT.—The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the
authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers they thereby are
given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the
provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law
is not tested by what has been done, but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen &
Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)

32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION BOTH A


GRANT AND LlMITATION OF POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration
and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile."
(People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives because of the
unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government
is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained
under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular
provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a
constitution is both a grant and a limitation. of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that,
subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.

33.ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS; CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION ON


REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." This
basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on
all the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent
domain. What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis,
and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable
must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.

34.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION;


PROBATION ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act No. 4221,
the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards. While inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of
the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be
the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial
of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable
on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act
No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no
difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law
may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. In other words, statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect of denying the equal
protection of the law it is unconstitutional.

35.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT; GOVERNMENT OF LAWS; EQUALITY


CLAUSE NOT "A ROPE OF SAND".—Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act
be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year—and have probation during that year—
and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While
this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to
show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to
prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand."

36.ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ; PRESUMPTION AGAINST MUTILATION OF


STATUTE.—In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute,
and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the
constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.

37.ID. ; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF ACT; PROBATION


AND PROBATION OFFICERS.—Section 11 of the Probation Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked
with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare
idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be
deserving of the intended beneficial results of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be
gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system
dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards. If not one of the
provinces—and this is the actual situation now—appropriates the necessary fund for the salary of a
probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a
probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without a probation system.

38.ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT ANALYZED; SECTIONS 10 AND 11 OF ACT; RULE OF


STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—The probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to
in section 10 are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under
section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10
are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office
established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer, When the
law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court; that "the
probation officer" shall supervise and visit the probationer; that the probationer shall report to the
"probation officer", shall allow "the probation officer" to visit him, shall truthfully answer any
reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition; that the
court shall notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation, it means the
probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never could
have been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to require a probationer in Batanes, to report to a
probation officer in the City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the
probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to
instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are
assigned to him by law.

39.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WlSDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION; PROGRESSIVE


INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.—That under section 10 the Secretary of
Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of
course, possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the
law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to
pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding
progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to
read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose—not even to save a
statute from the doom of invalidity.

40.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF PROBATION OFFICERS


BY SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JUDICIAL NOTICE.—The clear intention and policy of the law is
not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to
make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of
P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for
the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive
such compensation as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in
the Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to
fix the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or later on. to include said salaries in an
appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000, appropriated in section 10 is to cover,
among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be
left of the amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers
in the provinces, We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the Philippines, and
we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central
office, there can be in. each province, as intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that
of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that there can
be a system of probation in the provinces without probation officers.

41.ID. ; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY; PROBATION ACT AS


REPUGNANT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW.—Probation as a development of modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what
modern criminologists call the "individualization of punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the
character of 'the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in
order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in many cases, convicts may
be reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an
opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform.
The welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely
incidental. But while probation is commendable as a system and' its implantation into the Philippines
should be welcomed, the law is set aside because of repugnancy
to the fundamental law.
42.ID. ; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES COURTS; LOCAL CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT.—The
constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the
dual character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in the Philippines. The
situation of a state of the American Union or of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal
Government of the United States is not the situation of a province with respect to the Insular
Government; the distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace
the integrated judicial system of the Philippines; "General propositions do not decide concrete cases"
and "to keep pace with * * * new developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles
should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and environments.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition,

[No. L--2044. August 26, 1949]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of


Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.
[No. L-2756. August 26, 1949]

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES,


Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.
[No. L-3054. Agosto 26, 1949]

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
contra, EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.
[No. L-3055. Agosto 26, 1949]

LEON MA. GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFPICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, respondents.
[No. L-3056. Agosto 26, 1949]

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

1.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENTION OF THE LAW, How ASCERTAINED.—The


intention of an act is to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered
will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a mle by its results.

2.ID.; ARTICLE VI OP THE CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED.—Article VI of the Constitution


provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been
defined to mean restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in
duration, extent or scope. The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question
intended to mean restrictive in duration.

3.PRESIDENT; EMERGENCY POWERS; JUSTIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF.—Emergency, in


order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency."
4.ID. ; LEGISLATURE HAD EESTRICTED THE LIPE OF EMERGENCY POWERS.—In the
language of section 3 of Act No. 671, the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy
action or other causes brought on by war.

5.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; AUTOMATICAL EXTINCTION OF Acr No. 671;


CONTEMPORARY CoNSTRUCTiON.—Commonwealth. Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period"
and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatic extinction. of the law
upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to
keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not
a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged.

6.ID.; CONTEMPLATED PERIOD FOR ACT No. 671J CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION.—


When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature wcrald hold its next regular session which was to open on January
1, 1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the
President was decided upon with. specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet.
Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to
amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a
law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under
any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of
government.

7.ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre
for its enactment, was a period coexetensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending
with the convening of that body.

8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ACT NO. 671 BECAME INOPERATIVE WHEN CONGRESS MET IN
REGULAR SESSION; EXECUTIVE ORDERS THEREAFTER ISSUED, VALiDiTY OF.—
Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law.

9.ID.; SYSTEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; LEGISLATION Is PRESERVED FOR


CONGRESS ALL THE TlME.—The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have
given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Conigress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the
United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department—unless we
regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not
even when that Eepublic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to
preserve the Union. The truth is that under cmr concept of constitutional government, in times of
extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and
judicial," given the ability to act, are cialled upon "to perform the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to thera respectively."

10.JUDGES; DlSQUALIFICATION; MEMBERS OF SlIPREME COURT; OBJECTION SHOULD


BE MADE ON TIME.—A motion to disqualify a member of tlie Supreme Court filed after the said
member had given his opinion on the merits of the case cannot be considered because a litigant cannot
be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision
has been rendered.

11.ID. ; ID. ; MEMBER OF SUPREME COURT FORMERLY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.—The


fact that a member of the Supreme Court while Secretary of Justice had advised the Chief Executive on
the question involved in a certain case, does not disqualify him to act when it is brought before the
court, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in said case as counsel of any of the
parties when the Chief Executive is not a party thereto.

12.ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; WHO MAY TAKE PART IN THE ADJTJDICATION;


RULE 53, SECTION 1 WITH RULE 58, SECTION 1, INTERPRETED.—One who is not a member
of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part in that adjudication. The word
"adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision. And a decision
of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article
VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Eule 53, section 7, of
the Eules of Court). Pronaulgation means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing
and publication.

13.ID. ; ID. ; ID.; ID.—One who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed
and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision.

14.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EACH OF THE GREAT BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO


COMPLY WITH ITS OWN DUTY.—Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will
emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the
Government, within its own allocated sphere, complies with its own constitutional duty,
tmcompromisingly and regardless of difficulties.

15.EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT LAWS.—Executive Orders, even if issued within the powers
validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly
the same manner as the judgments of the Supreme Court, municipal ordinances and ordiriary executive
orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.

16.ID.—Executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under
section 26, Article VI of the Co-nstitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations.

17.JUDGES; REQUIRED NUMBER OP VOTES TO ANNUL EXECUTIVE ORDERS.—There is


nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the votes of eight justices to nullify a
rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. Hence, a mere majority of six members
of the Supreme Court is enough to nullify them.

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