TOPIC: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, LIBEL AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
Case #70: RAFAEL S. MERCADO vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL,
BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY
The information in this certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in
full the alleged offensive telegram. The telegram was in response
to the appeal of the then President Marcos to give information on
undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the
objectives of the New Society to request that investigation image
of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service
Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties
and spending above her salary taking into account that her
husband is jobless.
Proof of malicious intent and bad faith (Determination to file cases)
October 14, 1972 Petitioner filed a letter of Violations on RA 2260 & Civil
complaint with the Chairman of
the Board of Transportation
October 28, 1972 Telegram was sent to the Graft and Corruption practices
(14 days after filing Secretary of Public Works and
1st petition) Communication (Libelous
Telegram)
November 23, 1972 Filed an administrative case to Dishonesty, pursuit of private
the Board of Transportation business or corrupt practices
and misconduct or discourtesy
July 17, 1973 Motion for reconsideration of
June 26, 1973 decision by the
Board of Transportation
While Administrative Filed with the Constabulary Selling a carnapped Willys
Case was pending Highway Patrol Group
Filed in the Criminal
Investigation Services
ISSUE:
Whether or not the landmark case of United States v.
Bustos, enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free
press guarantees of the Constitution constitute a bar to
prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to
a superior.
RULING:
A libel prosecution must survive the test whether
or not the offending publication is within guarantees of
free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not
inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for
such approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing
and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before,
It should continue to be so. (United States v. Bustos)
Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that
qualified privilege, and this is one such instance, may be “lost by
proof of malice”. A communication made bona fide upon any
subject matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable.
What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is the
summary of his conduct in filing case after case, even when others
are pending. The tenacity with which the petitioner had pursued
a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a
doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of
petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity of
proving malice.
*The prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present the
necessary evidence to prove malice; and denial, to it of the
opportunity to do so, upon the defendants’ motion to
quash constitutes reversible error.
*Libel refers to a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act or
omission, status tending to cause dishonour, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Petitioner contended that the telegram is a form of
privileged communication (Denied by the lower court). Telegram
did not “constitute an offense” (Denied).
On the other hand, respondent contended that the
communication in issue was made by the petitioner with evident
malice an bad faith, a matter explicitly stated in the information
filed with the respondent Court, and the pretense that it was
made allegedly in line with the President’s appeal, cannot cover
up such fact. Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the
petitioner, and/or that he was motivated by vengeance and ill-will
in making the said communication as evident in the following:
August 25, 1982-final decision
Service Rules Lack of Merit
Dismissed
June 26, 1973-decision
Innocent of charges
Dismissed
Same charges August 29, 1973-decision
Lack of merit
Dismissed
February 9, 1973-decision
Engine Lack of Evidence
Case Closed
Corrupt Practices March 27, 1973-decision
Insufficiency of Evidence
Case Closed
Case #71: EUGENIO LOPEZ vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and FIDEL G. CRUZ
Lopez, publisher of The Manila Chronicle, published a news
story about a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Island
named Fidel Cruz. Fidel Cruz called the attention of the authorities
in Manila stating that people in that island are constantly living in
fear because there’s a murderer running loose, killing several
people. When the platoon of scout rangers of the Philippine
Defense Establishment led by Major Encarnacion went to the
island, they did not find the alleged killer. Instead, they found
Fidel Cruz who just wanted a transportation home to Manila
because he felt lonely in that isolated part of the country,
therefore, concocting the story. Major Encarnacion branded the
report of Fidel Cruz as “hoax” which was dubbed as “hoax of the
year”. Later on, the This Week Magazine of Manila Chronicle
published a picture of sanitary inspector Fidel Cruz. But the
pictures published were that of private respondent former Mayor
Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Upon knowing said publication, the private respondent sued the
petitioners for damages alleging the defamatory character of the
publication of his picture. The CFI of Manila awarded damages to
him which was affirmed by the CA upon appeal. Hence, the
petitioners appealed to this Court invoking their right to press
freedom and that they should not made to pay at all since they
did an honest mistake because they were in a rush to meet the
deadline and that they immediately published a correction of the
publication.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners should not be liable for
damages on the ground of freedom of the press.
RULING:
They are still liable for damages but their liability is reduced
due to prompt correction they made.
No liability would be incurred if it could be
demonstrated that it comes within the well-nigh all-
embracing scope of freedom of the press. Included therein
is the widest latitude of choice as to what items should see
the light of day so long as they are relevant to a matter of
public interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its
truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies
attendant on newspapers and other publications being
subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such showing
could be plausibly made, however, it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that there was in fact the commission of
such quasi-delict. It was held in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong
Gui, that "the repeal of the old Libel Law (Act No. 277) did not
abolish the civil action for libel." A libel was defined in that Act
as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or
natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule".
Moreover, so long as it is done in good faith,
newspapers have the legal right to have and express
opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would
infringe upon the freedom of the press. In the language of
the then Chief Justice Paras, who penned the opinion: "The Court
of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record
to prove that the publication of the news item under Consideration
was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was
intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an
honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests of the
public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards
none.' Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name
and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents,
under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to
race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of
words."
Finally, for liability to arise then without offending
press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Case #72: PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLE'S
JOURNAL)vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing
in this country with his Filipina wife and their children. Claiming
that the report - Swiss Shoots Neighbors' Pets - was false and
defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing
to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil
case for damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists,
Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina
Lee.Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and
admiration he enjoyed in the community, and that since it had
been published, he and his wife received several queries and
angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives.
The petitioners claim that Lee sought confirmation of the
story from the newspaper's correspondent in Parañaque, who told
her that a woman who refused to identify herself confirmed that
there had indeed been an incident of pet-shooting in the
neighborhood involving the respondent. However, the
correspondent in question was never presented in court to verify
the truth of this allegation. Neither was the alleged Commission
on Immigration and Deportation(CID) source presented to verify
that the source letter had indeed come from the CID, , nor even
that the same was a certified true copy of a letter on file in their
office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the news report fall under privileged
communication and therefore protected by the constitutional
provision on freedom of speech.
RULING:
We hold that the constitutional privilege granted under the
freedom of speech and the press against liability for damages
does not extend to the petitioners in this case.
The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute."The
right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under
all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words — those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."
Libel is not protected speech . Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code defines libel as "a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead."
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites
must be met: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or
condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.
In this case, there is no controversy as to the existence of
the three elements. The respondent's name and address were
clearly indicated in the article ascribing to him the questionable
practice of shooting the wayward pets of his neighbors. The
backlash caused by the publication of the article was in fact such
that stones had been thrown at their house, breaking several
flower pots, and daily and nightly calls compelled him to request
a change of their telephone number.These facts are not contested
by the petitioners. What the petitioners claim is the absence
of proof of the fourth element — malice.
The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of
society and the orderly administration of government inevitably
lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged communication.
"A privileged communication may be either absolutely
privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if
the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in
Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the
other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive. To this genre belong 'private
communications' and 'fair and true report without any
comments or remarks.'" The appellate court correctly ruled that
the petitioners' story is not privileged in character, for it is
neither "private communication" nor a fair and true report
without any comments or remarks.
US v. Bustos defined the concept of private communication
thus: "A communication made bona fide upon any subject-
matter in which the party communicating has an interest,
or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without
this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. A
pertinent illustration of the application of qualified
privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without
malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public
official when addressed to an officer or a board having
some interest or duty in the matter."
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written
by the spurious Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost
its character as such when the matter was published in the
newspaper and circulated among the general population.
A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated in public,which was
what the petitioners did in this case.
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals , we stated that "the enumeration
under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We stated
that the doctrine of fair commentaries means "that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In
order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition."
 The respondent is a private individual, and not a public
official or public figure. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc ., that
a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory
falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public
official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the
falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest.
Having established that the article cannot be considered as
privileged communication, malice is therefore presumed, and
the fourth requisite for the imputation of libel to attach to the
petitioners in this case is met. The news article is therefore
defamatory and is not within the realm of protected
speech.
Case #73: TEXAS vs. JOHNSON
During the 1984 Republican National Convention,
respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration to
protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some
Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets,
Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No
one was physically injured or threatened with injury, although
several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning.
Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in
violation of a Texas statute, and a state court of appeals affirmed.
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding
that the State, consistent with the First Amendment, could not
punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not a state statute that criminalizes the
burning of an American flag in political protest violate the First
Amendment.
RULING: Preserving the flag for preventing a breach of the peace
and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national
unity is related to the suppression of expression because Texan
is concerned that flag burning may lead people to believe the flag
does not stand for national unity and nationhood or that the
nation is not unified. O’Brien is not applicable.
Johnson was convicted because of his expression of
dissatisfaction with the policies of his country. The interest in
preserving the special symbolic character of the flag is subject to
the most exacting level of scrutiny. Precedent does not suggest a
state may promote its view of the flag through prohibiting the
expressive conduct of its citizens.
The principle that the government cannot prevent
expression it disagrees with is not contingent on the particular
method one seeks to express an idea. As a result, it would be
inconsistent to hold an individual is free to express
disagreement with a political viewpoint in any manner
except flag burning. It is nonsensical to allow a state to
permit flag burning in some instances and not others as
such a principle lacks discernable or defensible
boundaries. As a result, the First Amendment cannot
support Johnsons’s conviction of flag burning for the
purpose of political expression.
Case # 74: ARTURO BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126466. January 14, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven published
an article in PhilSTAR Daily in the column Jaywalker about the
alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference"
without naming or identifying private respondent. Conference is
the FNCLT, aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation
laws of the country and seeking to source its funds for the
project from the public at large, and in itself public in character.
Wenceslao, elected executive director of FNCLT,
reacted to the articles and filed a complaint with the National
Press Club (NPC) against Borjal for unethical conduct. He
accused Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to
obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA Borjal
Associates, and using it for character assassination.
ISSUE: WON Wenceslao can invoke that the article was against
his capacity as a private person, hence no application of public
figure doctrine.
WON the disputed articles constitute privileged
communications as to exempt the author from liability.
HELD:
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not
identify private respondent Wenceslao, but is public in
character. The public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the
participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
The article constitute privileged communications,
author is exempted from liability. Fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that
such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as
it might reasonably be inferred from the facts
Questioned writings are not within the exceptions of
Art. 354 RPC, however this does not necessarily mean that
they are not privileged.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely
privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if the
author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of
Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre
belong "private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks."
Doctrine of privilege in these two (2) cases resonates
the rule that privileged communications must, sui generis, be
protective of public opinion. Honest criticisms on the conduct
of public officials and public figures are insulated from
libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and
press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. No matter how
intemperate or deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the
privilege is not to be defeated nor rendered inutile
While, generally, malice can be presumed from
defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice. Even
assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere
error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove
actual malice.
NO DAMAGES.
Case # 75: BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004
FACTS: Private petitioners are Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada), the
president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and
Publishing Co., Inc., which publishes the Baguio Midland Courier,
and Cecille Afable, the Editor in Chief. While private respondent
Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in
Baguio City.
Before the election, private petitioner Afable wrote in her
column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the
various elective positions in Baguio City. In one of her article
private petitioner discussed the inability of mayoralty candidate
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. to pay his fees with the Baguio Midland Courier
during his previous campaign when he run for congress and his
inability to pay his medical services. Claiming that the
aforequoted portions were tainted with malice, private
respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel
against herein petitioners. Private petitioners contended that the
columns were not libelous or without malice and were protected
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press.
ISSUE: WON the publication is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press and cannot be
considered libelous.
HELD: The publication is not libelous.
The Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION applies to fair comment on matters of public
interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false,
expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable
degree of care and on reasonable grounds. The principle,
therefore, does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers
to destroy the persons of candidates for public office by exposing
the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general
public with publications tainted with express or actual malice. The
remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an
article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.”
While the law itself creates the presumption that every
defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged
character of a communication destroys said presumption.
The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the
plaintiff. In the present case, private respondent was unable to
prove that petitioner Afables column was tainted with actual
malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence that, indeed,
TOPIC: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Case # 76: APOLONIO CABANSAG vs GEMINIANA MARIA
FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957
FACTS: The petitioner, Apolonio Cabansag, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment
of respondents, Geminiana Fernandez and others from a parcel of
land. The case undergoes multiple postponement and delayed
from January 13, 1947 until August 12, 1954. On December 30,
1953, President Ramon Magsaysay assumed office and issued
Executive Order No. I creating the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission (PCAC). The petitioner irked and disappointed
by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC. The
petitioner alleged that he has long been deprived of his land thru
the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer. Base on the letter,
Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion
before Judge Morfe praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared
in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in
his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long
been deprived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical
lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-
charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn declared in
contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him
in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter- charges,
Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to
show cause in writing within 10 days why he should not be held
liable for contempt for sending the above letter to the PCAC which
tended to degrade the court in the eyes of the President and the
people. Cabansag contended that his action did nothing but to
exercise their right to petition the government for redress of their
grievance as guaranteed by our constitution but he was still
convicted by the lower court on the basis that the act of
respondents to put it belittle or degrade or embarrass it in its
administration of justice, and so it punished them for contempt
to protect its judicial independence.
ISSUE: WON the independence of the judiciary has primacy over
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance.
HELD:
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the
determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt
to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of
expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the
"clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency"
rule. The first means that the evil consequence of the comment
or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil" sought
to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and
unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what
words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas
cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and
present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice. The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has
been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted
determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right
of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a
remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies
in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the
constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and
limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt. This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary
that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
private respondent incurred an obligation which had remained
unpaid until the time the questioned article was published.
Afable’s article constituted a fair comment on a matter of
public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent
who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City.
Considering that private respondent assured his would-be
constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money,
petitioner Afables column with respect to private respondents
indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his
financial status which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to
them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded
some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private
respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of
the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private
respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the
interest of private respondent.
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive
evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
In the case, while the course of action of Cabansag may
not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed
his letter to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court,
such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger
must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of
justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency"
to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for
the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the
government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
Case # 77: PEOPLE vs SALVADOR ALARCON
G.R. No. 46551, December 12, 1939
FACTS: The Court of first Instance of Pampanga in criminal case
No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et
al., convicted the accused except of the crime of robbery
committed in band. Because of this decision a denunciatory letter,
signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines. Copy of this letter was acquired by
the respondent, Federico Mañgahas a columnist of the Tribune, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the
letter in an article published by him. The letter contains “'Fifty-
two (52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged
and convicted on a trumped up charge of robbery in band because
they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where
they are working. These tenants contend that they have the right
to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the
obligation to give them rations of palay for their maintenance and
their families to be paid later with their share of their crop. But
this is not all. When the convicted tenants appealed the case and
were released on bail pending their appeal, court and public
officials exerted pressure upon one of their bondsmen, as this
bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them,
and the fifty-two tenants were arrested again and put in jail.”
Because of this the lower court found Federico Mañgahas guilty
of contempt of court. Federico Mañgahas contended that the
publication of the letter in question is in line with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
ISSUE:
WON the act of publication which Federico Mañgaha
contend that it is in line with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press be considered contempt of court.
HELD:
Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. It must, however, clearly
appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and
embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to
be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the
all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision
of a pending case.
 In the case, the court has a concession that the letter
complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in
band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order
confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently
filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it
was then without power to reopen or modify the decision
which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
could not have been influenced by the questioned
publication.
Case # 78: COLUMN OF MR. RAMON TULFO IN THE
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
[AM No. 90-4-1545-0 : April 17, 1990]
FACTS:
1. On 13 October 1989, respondent Ramon Tulfo published an
article entitled "Idiotic Decision" in his column "On Target" in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating therein that the Supreme
Court rendered an "idiotic decision" in legalizing the
checkpoints. This was followed by another article in the same
column on 16 October 1989, entitled "Sangkatutak na Bobo,"
Tulfo referring therein to the members of the Supreme Court
as "stupid" for having rendered such decision on checkpoints,
and calling them "sangkatutak na bobo justices of the
Philippine Supreme Court."
2. In a resolution dated 19 October 1989, the Court required
Tulfo to show cause in writing why he should not be punished
for contempt of court, for making such derogatory statements
in his column against the Supreme Court and its members.
3. Without denying the writing and publication of the questioned
articles, Tulfo raised the following defenses in his
"Explanation:"
- that he was just reacting emotionally to said decision of
the Court because he had been a victim of harassment,
abuse, and oppression by checkpoints;
- that the use of the adjective "idiotic" was meant and
intended in the sense of the decision being "illogical,
irrational, unwarranted and unwise;"
- that the words "stupid justices" and "sangkatutak na bobo"
in the 16 October 1989 article are not his own words but
that he was merely quoting the words of some lawyers in
reaction to the decision, without any intention on his part
to degrade, ridicule, insult and bring disrepute to the
Court;
- that the case having been decided and terminated, the
comments made in said articles as to the soundness of the
Court's decision do not constitute contempt of court;
- that said articles did not pose any clear and present danger
or serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice.
4. A Motion for Intervention was filed by the National Press Club,
Union of Journalists of the Philippines, Press Photographers of
the Philippines, and the People's Movement for Press Freedom
on the grounds that the court demanding explanation from
Tulfo (why he should not be charged with contempt of court)
is an unwarranted assault and undue restriction on freedom
of speech and press.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not respondent Tulfo is guilty of
contempt of court
2. Whether or not the court’s resolution demanding
explanation from Tulfo (why he should not be
charged with contempt of court) is an
unwarranted assault and undue restriction on
freedom of speech and press.
HELD:
1. Yes. The court found Tulfo's “explanation” to be fatally devoid
of merit and ruled him guilty of contempt of court.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. This
is a power to impose silence, respect, and decorum and to protect
themselves from insults and pollution. Contempt of court is
defined as disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition
to its authority, justice and dignity. Any improper conduct which
tends, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice is punishable for indirect contempt. It is
imperative that the Court should preserve its authority, dignity
and the respect due it. Otherwise, the people will lose confidence
in the Court and they may take the law into their own hands.
According to the SC, “there are two (2) types of publication of
newspaper comments on proceedings in court, which have been
considered in contempt proceedings, namely: (a) those in which
the object of the publication is to affect the decision in a pending
case or action, and (b) those which have for their purpose the
bringing of courts or judges or other court officers into discredit.”
Tulfo's articles comprise both types of publication.
a. As already pointed out, at the time his articles were written
and published, the case on the checkpoints was sub judice as
the Court's decision therein had not became final. Thus, the
comments may still affect the decision.
b. The Court does not assume a posture of infallibility or
perfection in its decisions or rulings. In fact, its decisions are
open to criticisms for as long as they are couched in respectful
language and, above all directed at the merits of the case.
Where, however, comment in the guise of a critique is
intended merely to degrade and ridicule the Court, as well as
to insult its members, thereby causing or conditioning the
public to lose its respect for the Court and its members, the
comment becomes clearly an obstruction or affront to the
administration of justice; hence, it is contemptuous. To cast
doubt before the public eye as to the integrity of the judicial
institution by malicious imputations of disrepute and
incompetence to the Supreme Court and its members, does
not fall under the category of fair criticism. The right to
criticize is not absolute or unlimited. Above all, it must
be bona fide and should not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Any intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of one's duty of respect to the courts.
Reading through the two (2) articles written by Tulfo,
respectively entitled “Idiotic decision” and “Sangkatutak na
Bobo”, it is plain that Tulfo intended to ridicule and degrade
the Court and its members before the public, not merely to
criticize its decision on the merits, as he would now like to
make this Court believe. The general tone and language used
in Tulfo's articles belie his belated allegation that the word
“idiotic” was used in the sense of the decision being merely
“illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise.”
Being emotional is no excuse for using such language. Being
of age and presumably gifted with reason, Tulfo must have
been fully aware of the seriousness of his undertaking to insult
the Court and its members. He must assume responsibility.
Moreover, had Tulfo honestly intended to express his opinion
that the decision was “illogical”, he would not have used such
language. Also, his defense that he’s quoting other lawyers is
disproven by his parting shot and personal statement at the
end of the article, which says "(T)o the sangkatutak na bobo
justices of the Philip-pine Supreme Court, please take note!"
2. No. Freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute, and freedom of expression has, on
appropriate occasions, to be adjusted and accommodated to the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
is the maintenance of the authority, integrity and orderly
functioning of the courts. The protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
framework of a functioning and orderly system of
justice.[17] Freedom of expression is not license to insult the Court
and its members and to impair the authority, integrity and dignity
of the Court.
The inherent power of courts to punish any publication calculated
to interfere with the administration of justice is not restricted by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, for freedom
of the press is subordinate to the authority, integrity and
independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of
justice. Freedom of the press must not be confounded with license
or abuse of that freedom. Writers and publishers of newspapers
have the right, but no greater than the right of others, to bring to
public notice the conduct and acts of courts, provided the
publications are true and fair in spirit; in short, there is no law to
restrain or punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what
is done in or by the courts,[18] provided that free expression is not
used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members.
Consequently, Tulfo's as well as intervenors' claim to press
freedom, is not well taken in this instance.
Case # 79: NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. AUGUSTO
S. SANCHEZ
FACTS:
Union of Filipino Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No.
78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism
and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they
had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre
Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building,
at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's
premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a
kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in
utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved
their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after the justices received their
leaders. Said justices were the chairmen of the divisions where
their cases were pending. Those picketing were warned to cease
because the acts constitute contempt of court.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders
concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts,
together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the
picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons
were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's
leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by
the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of
about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and
not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done had constituted direct
contempt of Court.
Held:
The Court accepted the apologies offered by the
respondents and, at this time, forego the imposition of the
sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier.
The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in
the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.,G.R. No.
73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in
any other light than an acknowledgment of the euphoria
apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed
freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to
apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who
attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in
any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated
through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the
Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to “proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice.”
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the
citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural
and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter
the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts.
For “it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere
that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.”
Moreover, “parties have a constitutional right to have their causes
tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to
have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and
forms of law free from outside coercion or interference.” The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an
affront to the dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the
above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at
large.
The individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not
knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective
laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech
and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt
to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of
either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the
ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any
such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes
contempt of court.
Case # 80: IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone
A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a journalist who is a columnist in the
newspaper the “Manila Standard,” and who “incidentally happens
to be a lawyer,” has his own column entitled "Opinion."
Petitioner Jurado had been writing about alleged
improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several
months . Jurado's allegation in his column— “that six justices,
their spouses, children and grandchildren spent vacation in Hong
Kong as reward by PLDT for their votes in its favor in the case of
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).” What may be called the seed
of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated
in the so-called “controversial case” of PLDT vs.ETPI. In
that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was
9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. A report of the
purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes proffered
the conclusion that the Court decision “looks, reads and
sounds like the writing of the PLDT's counsel”.
This was later condemned as a lie, an outright fabrication,
by the PLDT itself. The Supreme Court, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the
Court, cited Jurado in contempt. Petitioner Jurado invoked that
the content of his column was in accordance to his right to
freedom of press.
ISSUE: Whether the principle of press freedom invoked by
Petitioner Jurado in justification of false or misleading published
writings valid.
RULING:
The Court ruled that there is no constitutional protection
for deliberately false or recklessly inaccurate reports. It is worth
stressing that false reports about a public official or other
person are not shielded from sanction by the cardinal right
to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Such have no
constitutional value. They do not advance society’s interest in
inhibited and wide open debate. Similarly, in a 1969 case
concerning a patently false accusation made against a public
employee avowedly in fulfillment of a “legal, moral, or social
duty,” this Court ruled that the guaranty of free speech
cannot be considered as according protection to the
disclosure of lies, gossip or rumor.
The fear that these principles would have a “chilling effect” on the
exercise of free speech is unfounded due to the larger number of
journalists who do avoid ventilating stories that would otherwise
be highly sensational. This decision merely seeks to instill again
the sense of responsibility of all journalists to check the truth of
information before publishing. This will not deter the
determination of truth or the public exposure of wrong.
Petitioner Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they
were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom
he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as
they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the
judges engaged in that function.
Clearly unrepentant, exhibiting no remorse for the acts and
conduct detailed here, Jurado has maintained a defiant stance.
“This is a fight I will not run from,” he wrote in his column of
March 21, 1993; and again, “I will not run away from a good
fight,” in his column of March 23, 1993. Such an attitude
discourages leniency, and leaves no choice save the application
of sanctions appropriate to the offense.
 TOPIC: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, MOVIE CENSORSHIP, OBSCENITY AND
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Case # 81: Disini v. Secretary of Justice
FACTS: Petitioners Disini et al. moved to have several provisions
of R.A. 10175 (The Cybercrime Law) be declared unconstitutional
for violating the rights of privacy, speech, expression, and other
constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or note the following provisions violate the
corresponding rights.
RULINGS:
4(a)(3) — Punishes intentional or reckless alteration,
damage, etc. of computer data without right. Petitioners argue
that it suffers from overbreadth, intruding into the area of
protected speech and expression by creating a chilling effect on
those freedoms.
Under the over breadth doctrine, proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved
by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, invading
protected freedoms. But, the provision does not encroach such
freedoms at all. It just punishes a form of vandalism, the act of
willfully destroying without right things that belongs to others.
§4(b)(3) — Punishes Computer-related Identity Theft, e.g.
intentional question, misuse, transfer, possession, etc. of
identifying information of another person. Petitioners claim that
it violates rights to due process, privacy, and press.
Two constitutional guarantees create “Zones of Privacy” (zones
where intrusion therein is impermissible unless excused by law
and in accordance with customary legal processes): right against
unreasonable searches and the right to privacy of communication
and correspondence. In assessing this question regarding
privacy, a court must determine whether a person exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable searches. The
Petitioner failed to show that government effort to stop these acts
violates privacy.
Also, the over breadth doctrine will not hold because the provision
is not intruding into guaranteed freedoms like speech. There is
no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.
As for the right to press, members thereof have nothing to fear
since the provision prohibits identity theft. The theft of identity
information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose.
§4(c)(1) — Punishes Cybersex: the willful engagement,
maintenance, etc. of lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
activity with the aid of a computer system. Petitioners claim that
this violates freedom of expression. Private communications of
sexual character between spouses or consenting adults are
deemed criminal.
The deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress does
not show intent to punish such private communications. The
element of “engaging in a business” is necessary to constitute the
illegal cybersex. The Act seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white
slave trade, and porn for favor and consideration.
§4(c)(3) — Punishes Unsolicited Commercial Communications.
The Gov’t justifies this provision by arguing that the transmission
of such amounts to trespass to one’s privacy because the persons
sending these unsolicited commercial communications, i.e.
“spams”, enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
It also wastes storage and network capacities, reducing the
efficiency of commerce and technology
The Gov’t failed to show that spam does reduce the efficiency of
the technology. Also, people have been receiving spam through
post, and that was not outlawed because some people may have
interest in them. What matters is that the recipient has the option
to open the email, which he does.
Prohibiting transmission of unsolicited ads would amount to
denying the person the right to read his emails. Commercial
speech is also entitled to protection. Unsolicited ads are
legitimate forms of expression.
§5 — Punishes Abetting or Aiding Cybercrime and Attempted
Cybercrime. Petitioner agues that it suffers from over breadth,
creating a chilling effect on protected expression.
While physical acts of aiding or abetting is easily seen as criminal,
acts of aiding or abetting in the internet are harder to assess as
criminal. Suppose a blogger posts an article claiming that a
certain person is a thief. Will those who “Like”, “Comment”, and
“Share” his post be liable for aiding or abetting? These acts are
just knee-jerk sentiments. Also considering that there may be
thousands of people who do these acts, who would charged and
imprisoned?
Libel in cyberspace can stain a person’s reputation and may lead
to cyberbullying. Still, a governmental purpose cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary
enforcement. The terms “aiding and abetting” constitute such
sweep that generates a chilling effect of those who express
themselves in cyberspace.
Also, who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the
visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are not
give “fair notice” or warning as to what is criminal conduct and
what is lawful conduct.
Thus, §5 with respect to §4(c)(4) punishing Libel, as well as
§(c)(3) punishing spam and §4(c)(2) on Child Porn is
unconstitutional. [Regarding §4(c)(2), Petitioners argued that
persons who reply to a “tweet” containing ideas of child porn may
be considered as aiding or abetting child porn.]
§12 — Allows real-time collection of traffic data provided that
there is a court warrant. Petitioners claim that this is a direct
violation of the right to privacy by allowing the Gov’t to snoop into
messages or information that is sent to one another.
The State does have a compelling interest in enacting The
Cybercrime law for there is a need to put order the activities in
cyberspace for public good. Thus, It should be able to monitor
traffic data. But, to fight cyber crimes, it must monitor real-time
data because the criminals can just move the physical location of
their computers to evade detection.
Privacy has two categories: (1) Decisional, the right to
independence in making certain important decisions; and (2)
Informational. Informational Privacy has two aspects: the right
not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live
freely without surveillance and intrusion. There is a two-fold test
in determining whether a person has a right to privacy: (1)
Subjective Test, the one claiming the right must have an actual
or legitimate expectation of privacy; and (2) Objective Test, his
expectancy must be one society is prepared to accept as
objectively reasonable.
The challenge fails the first test. Similar to physical packages,
computer data travels across the internet in packets, which
contains data seen by the service provider. This is to ensure
successful cyberspace communication. Because of this, this data
being sent out is no longer private.
But, these packets can be gathered in bulk, pooled together, and
analyzed to find patterns and create profiles of persons containing
information beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed.
Thus, the data in these packets are protected.
Also, it should be noted that §12 empowers law enforcement
authorities, “with due cause”, to collect data. The law does not
even relate the collection of data to probable commission of a
crime. The phrase is not defined by the law and does not describe
the purpose of the collection. This provision gives a too sweeping
authority.
§19 — The DOJ may issue an order to restrict or block access to
computer data which is prima facie found to be in violation of the
Law. Petitioners claim that this stifles the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Computer data produced by their authors may constitute personal
property. Thus, they are protected by the prohibition in §2,
Article III of the Constitution. The provision actually allows the
seizure of computer data without a warrant; a DOJ order cannot
substitute for a judicial search warrant.
It may also constitute as speech. Thus, §19 is also a restriction
of speech. The problem is that there is no judicial intervention.
The executive officer may seize data with a warrant, and the law
does not consider any of the tests regarding the restrains on free
speech (Dangerous Tendency Doctrine, Balancing of Interest
Test, and Clear and Present Danger Rule). It merely requires that
the data to be blocked by found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the Law. Thus, §19 is unconstitutional.
Case # 82: GR No 212398 November 25, 2014
Emilio Ramon “ER” Ejercito vs COMELEC
Facts: During the campaign period for the 2013 National and
Local Elections, Ejercito, the incumbent governor of Laguna and
a re-election candidate, distributed a so-called orange card
which Ejercito and his cohorts claim could be used in any public
hospital in the Laguna. San Luis, another gubernatorial
candidate claims that the orange cards are material
considerations in convincing the voters to favor Ejercito which is
a violation to the Omnibus Election Code. Ejercito also had
advertisements aired in national television which he claims were
sponsored by different organizations which San Luis claimed
that it exceeded the allowed expenditures for campaign. The
COMELEC then disqualified Ejercito. Ejercito contends that the
support he received is a form of free expression of those
supporters to aid him in his campaign.
Issue: Whether or not his disqualification violates his
supporter’s freedom of expression.
Ruling: The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to
the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not
trample upon the free exercise of the voter/supporter’s rights of
free expression. The law’s concern in limiting campaign
expenses is to ensure equality among aspirants. Any restriction
on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than
necessary to achieve the essential governmental interest of
promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It
bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional
objective set in Sec 4, Art IX-C of the Constitution.
Case # 83: GR No 205357 September 4, 2014
GMA Network Inc. vs COMELEC
Facts: Five separate petitions against COMELEC was filed by
GMA Network, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas and
other broadcasting companies. They allege the validity of Sec
9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. The assailed resolution
limits radio and television broadcast advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national elections for
aggregate total of 120 and 180 minutes respectively. Petitioners
contend that the resolution infringes the freedom of expression
and of the press of the candidates and also the public to be
informed on matters of public concern.
Issue: Whether or not the restriction on airtime political
advertisement is violative of the freedom of expression and of
the press.
Ruling: The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts the candidate’s
ability to reach out and connect with the people. Accordingly for
a national candidate to reach out to as many of the electorates
as possible, then it might also be necessary that it conveys his
message through dialects that the people in the locality may
readily understand and relate to. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the
playing field - does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. It is
recognized that television and radio is the most effective way by
a candidate to express his candidacy and unduly restricting it
amounts to curtailing his right to connect with the people.
Case # 84: GR No 206020 April 14, 2015
1-United Transport Koalisyon(1-UTAK) vs COMELEC
Facts: 1-UTAK assails the validity of COMELEC Resolution 9615
which provided rules for implementing RA 9006 or the Fair
Elections Act. The resolution prohibits the posting of any
campaign material in prohibited public places including public
utility vehicles and transport terminals. Petitioner contends that
it violates the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and
transport terminals; that the prohibition curtails their ideas of
who should be voted by the public. COMELEC on the other hand
contends that the resolution is a valid content-neutral regulation
and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional right to
freedom of speech and that it has a valid objective of
maintaining equal opportunities for candidates for campaign.
Issue: Whether or not the restriction restrains freedom of
expression.
Ruling:
Petition is granted. The resolution provides that PUV
and transport terminal owners who violates the provision will
have their license or franchise revoked. This effectively inhibits
the owners from expressing their preferences by pain of penalty.
The prohibition is not a valid content-neutral regulation thus
repugnant to free speech. The governmental interest in
imposing such prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech and that there is no necessity to restrict the right to free
political expression by the owners.
NOTE: Content-Neutral Regulation
- is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-
defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power
of the Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression;
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Case # 85: GR No. 205728 January 21, 2015
Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC
Facts: In 2013, the Diocese posted a twin-tarpaulin containing
messages to its dissent to the RH Law including list of
candidates and political parties who voted against marked as
“Team Buhay” and those who voted for marked as “Team
Patay”. COMELEC found this as an election paraphernalia
heading for a conscience vote for or against the listed
candidates and political parties. COMELEC sent a letter ordering
the Diocese to remove the poster for the conscience vote
messages and also violating the prescribed election campaign
material size prescribed by RA 9615 or they will be charged for
election offense case. The Diocese then responded that the
poster is not an election campaign material but a form of their
political expression regarding the RH Law.
Issue: Whether the tarpaulins are a form of expression or
political propaganda and if it can be regulated.
Ruling:
The tarpaulins consists of a social advocacy which is a
protected speech, not an election campaign propaganda or
material. First, the petitioners are not candidates to be subject
to election regulations by the COMELEC. It is not paid for by a
candidate or party but a mere advocacy by the petitioners
against the RH Law. Public expressions or opinions or
discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on
attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed
to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall
not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan
political activity contemplated under this Article.
Second, the order of the COMELEC violates the right of the
petitioners to freedom of expression. It is a form of political
expression which is being encouraged to promote dialogues on
public affairs and to express grievances on a peaceful manner.
The COMELEC contented that it the removal is a content-neutral
regulation which includes controls merely on the incidents of the
speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech(in this
case, the size of the tarpaulins). However, the Court saw it as
content-based regulation which is a restriction based on the
subject matter of the utterance of the speech(in this case, the
conscience vote messages). Content-based regulation bears a
heavy presumption of invalidity of the speech and uses the clear
and present danger rule as measure. In this case, there is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the
posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of
freedom of expression nor it did affect anyone’s substantial
rights. Furthermore, the message of petitioners in this case will
certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in
their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner,
taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply
believes unlike messages of candidates which is more direct and
self-laudatory in content.
 Case # 86: Gonzales V Kalaw Katikbak
FACTS: The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez,
President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly
registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of
Domestic Trade. The respondent is the Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its
Chairman.
In a resolution of respondent Board, a permit to exhibit
the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults
Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was
granted.
COTP: Such classification "is without legal and factual basis and
is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression.
ISSUE: WON the classification infringed the freedom of
expression
HELD: NO.
Respondent board can, to safeguard other
constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for
general patronage and what may require either parental
guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the
principle that freedom of expression is the rule, and
restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is
against its validity.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an
evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to
the expression complained of.
The adult classification given the film serves as a
warning to theater operators and viewers that some contents of
Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture
were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at
least nearly naked, on the theater stage. It cannot be denied
though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to
manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
Case # 87: Lagunzad V Sotto, Vda. De Gonzales
FACTS: Lagunzad began the production of a movie entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story" it is based on the murder of Moises Padilla
sometime between November 11 and November 17, 1951.
Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party
(then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon,
Negros Occidental.
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public
life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his
private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of
his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent
herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
A licensing agreement was executed by the parties to
allow the petitioner to depict the private life of the respondents
by paying the latter.
COTP: The petitioner contended that he was threatened in
signing the license agreement. Moreover, the agreement
infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman,
he had the right to express his thoughts in film on the public life
of Moises Padilla without prior restraint
ISSUE: WON the license agreement infringes on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
HELD: NO.
The right of freedom of expression is not without
limitations.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom
of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the
mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court
to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or
type of situation."
The interests observable are the right to privacy
asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.
Case # 88: Ayer Productions V Judge Capulong and Juan
Ponce Enrile
FACTS: Ayer Productions envisioned for commercial viewing the
re-enactment of the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at
EDSA to be entitled "The Four Day Revolution".
COTR: Juan Ponce Enrile [private respondent] asserts right of
privacy and claims that the production of the mini-series would
constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy
COTP: Petitioners contended (1) that the mini-series film would
not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his
family and (2) that in producing "The Four Day Revolution," they
are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression
protected under our Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the proposed film infringes Enrile’s right of
privacy.
HELD: NO.
Freedom of speech and of expression includes the
freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theatres or to diffuse them through television.
The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist
publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The
interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the
right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful
publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution"
relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place
at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train
of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such
subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The
subject matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the
petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not to the private life of
private respondent Ponce Enrile.
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear
and present danger test" be applied in respect of the instant
Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must
here be reached: The production and filming by petitioners of
the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does
not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an
unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
Case # 89: KMU V Director General
FACTS: EO 420, which mandates government entities that issue
IDs (philhealth, sss, gsis) to adopt a uniform data collection
format for their IDs, is questioned on its constitutionality.
COTP: The gathering of data such as (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth
etc. infringes on the citizens right to privacy
HELD: The petition is without merit.
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and
other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
performance of their governmental functions. There have
been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these
government entities violate their right to privacy. There have
also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities
in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity
because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing
ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides
strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data
collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of
strict administrative safeguards.
 Case # 90: MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION
Facts: An episode of “The Inside Story” entitled “Prosti-tuition,”
produced by Loren Legarda was aired by ABS-CBN depicting
female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. Philippine Women’s University (PWU)
was named as the school of some of the students involved.
MTRCB alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU
and respondents did not submit “The Inside Story” to MTRCB for
review and exhibited the same without its permission, violating
Sec. 7 of PD 1986, Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of
MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
MTRCB declared that all subsequent programs of the “The Inside
Story” and all other programs of the ABS-CBN Ch. 2 of the same
category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval
before showing. The law gives the Board the power to screen,
review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of
the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete and/or
prohibit the exhibition and/or television broadcast of
television programs. The law also directs the Board to
apply contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard to
determine those which are objectionable for being
immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines
and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage
the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.
Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute
“prior restraint” on respondents’ exercise of freedom of
expression and of the press, and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not
apply to the “The Inside Story” because it falls under the category
of “public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political
editorials” governed by standards similar to those governing
newspapers.
Issue: Whether or not the MTRCB has the power or authority to
review the “Inside story” prior to its exhibition or broadcast by
television?
Ruling:
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except something
therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law
to justify it. (Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere
debemos). Thus, when the law says “all television programs,” the
word “all” covers all television programs, whether religious, public
affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the
legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word
or expression.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether
petitioner MTRCB has authority to review “The Inside
Story.” Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether
petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not
disapprove or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it
cancel respondents’ permit. Respondents were merely penalized
for their failure to submit to petitioner “The Inside Story” for its
review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve whether
certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations specified by respondents contravene the
Constitution.
There is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986
and MTRCB Rules and Regulations contravene the Constitution.
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry:
(1) that the question must be raised by the proper party;
(2) that there must be an actual case or controversy;
(3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and,
(4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must
be necessary to the determination of the case itself. The fourth
requisite is wanting.
MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor
did it cancel respondents’ permit. The latter was merely penalized
for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its review
and approval. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality is not
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Case # 91: Reno vs ACLU
Facts: The federal government enacted Communications
Decency Act to protect minors from explicit material on the
Internet by criminalizing the knowing transmission of "obscene or
indecent" messages to any recipient under 18; and also the
knowing sending to a person under 18 of anything "that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs."
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) contends that there
would be less restrictive alternatives to meet the government's
objective, and that the act prohibits the freedom of speech
protected under the 1st Amendment. They argue that while
children have a right to be protected from explicit content, adults
also have a right to access such content. The government, on the
other hand, defended stating that there were similar decency laws
upheld by the SC, affirming the regulatory power of the
government over such matter.
Issue: Whether or not CDA violates freedom of speech.
Held:
Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment
because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket
restriction of free speech
The law fails to provide any definition of "indecent" and omits any
requirements that are "patently offensive." It has many
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it
problematic for First Amendment purposes. The act applies to a
medium that cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner because it is a CONTENT-BASED BLANKET
which restricts speech.
Communications Decency Act violates the First and Fifth
Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions
of the types of internet communications which they criminalized
In this case the Act failed to clearly define "indecent"
communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or
individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide
supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of
internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the
transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social
value. The act is invalid because of its vagueness (Overbroad
doctrine) the meaning of “indecent” could mean anything.
** Content-based blanket - restriction based upon the
subject matter or type of speech (this definition is not from
the case)
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a content-based blanket
restriction on speech is overly broad by prohibiting protected
speech as well as unprotected speech, such restriction is
unconstitutional.
Case # 92: Miller vs. California
Facts: Miller, owner of a business that distributes pornographic
books and films, was convicted under a California law that banned
selling, possessing, distributing, or publishing obscene materials.
On appeal, Miller argues that the Californian community standard
in determining obscenity of materials had failed to comply with
the Supreme Court's decision in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, which
would require a national standard for obscenity because obscene
works must be completely lacking in redeeming social value.
Issue: WON the sale and distribution of obscene materials by
mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech
guarantee?
Held: No, since obscene materials is not even protected by the
1st amendment. However, the Court acknowledged "the inherent
dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression", and
said that "State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials
must be carefully limited.
The Court, in an attempt to set such limits devised a set of
three criteria established in Roth v. United
States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, which must be met
for a work to be legitimately subject to state regulation:
1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary
"community standards", would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in an offensive way,
sexual conduct or excretory functions, as specifically defined by
applicable state law; and
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
This obscenity test overturns the definition of obscenity set out in
the Memoirs decision. Obscenity then is that which was "utterly
without redeeming social importance."
Case # 93: Fernando vs CA
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision
of the Court of affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila (RTC), Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 99-176582,
convicting Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos for
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969. The PNP-CIDG NCR
conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair. After searching the premises,
they confiscated 25 VHS tapes and ten different magazines, which
they deemed pornographic. Petitioners contend that the
prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they
were selling pornographic materials.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’
conviction.
Ruling:
No. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the
State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate
to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral
and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. In
this case, the Court disregarded its decision in previous decided
cases and ruled that it is futile at this point to formulate a perfect
definition of obscenity that shall apply in all cases, and that
obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should
be treated on a case to case basis and on the judges’ sound
discretion.
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest
word is that of Miller v. California which established basic
guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. The Court affirmed the decision by the lower court
convicting Fernando and Estorninos.
TOPIC: ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (PURPOSE AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE GUARANTY
Case # 95: Alvero vs. Dizon
Facts:
Petitioner has been accused of treason. That at the
hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part
of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly
seized by soldiers of the United States Army accompanied by
Filipino guerrillas in the petitioner’s house. The petitioner
immediately objected to the presentation of said documents and
called the attention of the respondent judges to the fact that he
had filed a petition in which he protested against the procedure
of the government in the seizure of said documents and asked for
their return to the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the arresting officer committed unlawful
searches and seizures when they obtained the document being
reclaimed by the petitioner.
Held:
No. The purpose of the constitutional provisions against
unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
Case # 94: EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
(DYRE) vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR
Facts:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow
the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily
closed on grounds of national security. The respondents alleged
that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition.
Because of some adjustments in the administration of the
company, the petitioner through its president suddenly filed a
motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition. The case now is
already moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the
Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of
the freedom of speech and expression clause. However, a
broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or for the
rights of others. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting
is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to
newspaper and print media.
As cited in the case of the American Court in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, confronted
with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, it
explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of
communications, receives the most limited protection from the
free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, Material
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture
theatres may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in
radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly
tuning in and out. In addition to that, unlike readers of the printed
work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate,
analyze and reject the utterance.
security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the
sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative
or judicial sanction. It also gives remedy against such usurpations
when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal Government
from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private
person or under authority of state law.
As the soldiers of the United States Army that took and
seized certain papers and documents from the residence of herein
petitioner, they were not acting as agents or on behalf of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines Those
papers and documents came in the possession of the authorities
of the Commonwealth Government through the Office of the CIC
of the United States Army in Manila. The use and presentation of
said papers and documents as evidence for the prosecution
against herein petitioner at the trial of his case for treason cannot
now be legally attacked on the ground of unlawful or
unreasonable searches and seizures or on any other constitutional
ground as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in
similar cases.
 TOPIC: TO WHOM DIRECTED
Case # 96: PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI
Facts: On August 14 1987, the appellant and his common-law
wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was
received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal
the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out
for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the
courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as
part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the
NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In
the presence of the NBI agents. Job Reyes opened the
suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside A
case was filed against Andre Martin in violation of RA.6425 and
was found guilty by the court of quo. Andrea filed appeal in the
Supreme Court clamming that his constitutional right of privacy
was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package
was inadmissible as evidence against him.
TOPIC: WHO MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT
Case # 97: BACHE AND CO. vs. RUIZ
Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co.
(Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation
to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53,
72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner
Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness,
Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s
letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled
up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio
subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of
Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still
unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that
the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon
request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and
Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed
by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the
BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground
that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached
to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their
search which yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying
that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be
issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and
that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the
corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and
attorney’s fees.
After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order
dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In
the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total
sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized.
Issues: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced
against private individual
Held:
The Sc held based on the speech Commissioners
Bernas that the Bill of the Right Governs the relationship
between the individual and the state. The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled
that it was Mr Job who opened the box in the presence of NBI
agents in the place of his business. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Mr. Reyes into a warrant less search and seizure proscribed by
the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search.
The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the
legality of the seizure of documents from its office.
Ruling:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs.
Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the
Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that
the corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of
each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they
hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case
is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various
corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects
were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the
latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong,
and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a
petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different
footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the
search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no
personal examination conducted by the Judge of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer
to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or
not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and
Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes,
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury,
and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of
Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income
tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation
of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of
business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of
Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business
or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are
embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are
under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are
under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the
things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat
the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-
embracing as to include all conceivable records of the
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business
inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Case # 98: Stonehill vs Diokno
FACTS:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they
were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or
“used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to
above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and
void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of
Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices
of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Case # 99: ZURCHER vs. STANFORD DAILY
A student newspaper (respondent) published articles
and photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police at
a hospital, and staff members, brought this action under 42 USC,
s. 1983 against, among others, law enforcement and district
attorney personnel (petitioners) claiming that a search warrant
issued on a judge’s finding of probable cause that the newspaper
(which was not involved in the unlawful acts) possessed
photographs and negatives revealing the identities of
demonstrators who had assaulted police officers at the hospital
had deprived respondents of their constitutional rights. The
District Court granted declaratory relief on the grounds that an
issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of one
not suspected of crime unless there is probable cause, based on
facts presented in a sworn affidavit, to believe that a subpoena
duces tecum would be impracticable. The court also held that,
where the innocent object of the search is a newspaper, 1st
Amendment interests make search constitutionally permissible
only in rare circumstances where there is a clear showing that (1)
important materials will be destroyed or removed from the
jurisdiction, and (2) a restraining order would be futile.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of a warrant to search and
seize photographs and negatives revealing the identities of
demonstrators who assaulted police officers deprives their
constitutional rights.
RULING:
Petition is granted. Decision of the District Court is
reversed.
A state is not prevented by the 4th and 14th
Amendments from issuing a warrant to search for evidence
simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be
searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal
involvement. The critical element in a reasonable search is
not that the property owner is suspected of crime, but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the “things” to be
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if
any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any
event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of
the search and seizure in both premises
HELD:
No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners
herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object
to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not
be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
searched for and seized are located on the property to
which entry is sought.
The District Court’s ruling denying search warrants
against third parties and insisting on subpoenas would undermine
law enforcement efforts, since search warrants are often used
early in an investigation before all the perpetrators of a
crime would have been identified. The delay in employing
a subpoena duces tecum could easily result in
disappearance of the evidence. Nor would the cause of
privacy be served, since search warrants are more difficult
to obtain than subpoenas.
Properly administered, the preconditions for a search
warrant (1) probable cause, (2) specificity with respect to
the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
(3) overall reasonableness; all of which must be applied with
particular exactitude when 1st Amendment interests would be
endangered by the search, are adequate safeguards against the
interference with the press’ ability to gather, analyse and
disseminate news that respondents claim would ensue from use
of warrants for third party searches of newspaper offices.
*Subpoena duces tecum is a writ ordering a person to
attend a court and bring relevant documents.
Case # 100: WILSON ET AL. vs. LAYNE, DEPUTY UNITED
STATES MARSHAL, ET AL.
Attorney General of the US approved “Operation Gunsmoke”
which is a special fugitive apprehension program in which US
Marshals worked with state and local police to apprehend
dangerous criminals concentrating on armed individuals wanted
on federal and/or state and local warrants for serious drug and
other violent felonies. One of the targets was Dominic Wilson, son
of the petitioners, who violated his probation on previous felony
charges of robbery, theft and assault with intent to rob. Thus,
three warrants were issued to him. In said warrants, there was
no mention of media presence or assistance. In the execution of
the warrants to Dominic Wilson, the Marshals invited a reporter
and a photographer from the Washington Post as part of their
ride-along policy. The photographer took pictures but did not
publish it. However, the officers learned that Dominic is not in
the house. Nevertheless, the petitioners sued the respondents for
money damages contending that bringing members of the media
to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest
warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. But the District
Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not media ride-along constitutes a violation of
the petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights.
RULING:
Yes.
The Court hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment
for police to bring members of the media or other third parties
into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence
of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of
the warrant. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles
of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where, as
here, police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant
in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant.
It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were
entitled to enter petitioners’ home that they were entitled to bring
a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth
Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion. Certainly the presence of the reporters, who did
not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the
police in their task, was not related to the objective of the
authorized intrusion, the apprehension of petitioners’ son.
Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by respondents to
support the reporters’ presence–publicizing the government’s
efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law
enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting
suspects and the officers–fall short of justifying media ride-
alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the
execution of a warrant may in some circumstances be
constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third parties
was not.
TOPIC: EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Case # 101: JOSE BURGOS, ET. AL. vs. THE CHIEF OF
STAFF
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent xecutive Judge of the then CFI of Rizal,QC,
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
"We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles
and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution
of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
"We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued
probable in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution
RULING:
The search warrants which are the subject of the petition are
utterly void.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of
probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence
gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises
above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described
were used and are continuously being used for subversive
activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of,
illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less
than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance,
this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
However, petitioners’ Fourth Amendment right was not
clearly established at the time of the search. Thus, the
respondents are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. A
government official performing discretionary functions
generally are granted a qualified immunity and are
“shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Moreover, “clearly established” for qualified
immunity purposes means that the contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. His
very action need not previously have been held unlawful,
but in the light of pre-existing law its unlawfulness must
be apparent. It was not unreasonable for a police officer at the
time at issue to have believed that bringing media observers
along during the execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home)
was lawful. First, the constitutional question presented by this
case is by no means open and shut. Accurate media coverage of
police activities serves an important public purpose, and it is not
obvious from the Fourth Amendment’s general principles that the
officers’ conduct in this case violated the Amendment. Second,
petitioners have not cited any cases of controlling authority in
their jurisdiction at the time in question which clearly established
the rule on which they seek to rely, nor have they identified a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable
officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.
Finally, the federal marshals in this case relied on a Marshal’s
Service ride-along policy which explicitly contemplated media
entry into private homes, and the sheriff’s deputies had a ride-
along program that did not expressly prohibit such entries. The
state of the law was at best undeveloped at the relevant time,
and the officers cannot have been expected to predict the future
course of constitutional law.
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched,
the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this
Court in Alvarez case.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of
press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in
Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely:
"(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized."
The two search warrants were issued without probable
cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a
specific offense must be alleged in the application;
abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing
specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the claim
that certain objects were being used as instruments and means
of committing the offense of subversion punishable under P.D.
No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific
provision of the decree. I n the words of Chief Justice C
Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to
convict anybody" of violating the decree without reference to any
determinate provision thereof. The search warrants are also void
for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col.
Rolando Abadilla to seize and take possession, among other
things, of the following: Subversive documents, pamphlets,
leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives
and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April
6 Movement. The obvious question is: Why were the documents,
pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they
contain to make them subversive? There is nothing in the
applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions.
Case # 102: CHANDLER ET AL. vs. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF
GEORGIA, ET AL.
Under the Georgia statute, to qualify for a place on the
ballot, a candidate must present a certificate from a
stateapproved laboratory, in a form approved by the Secretary of
State, reporting that the candidate submitted to a urinalysis drug
test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election
and that the results were negative. § 21-2140(c). The statute lists
as "[i]llegal drug[s]": marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidines. § 21-2140(a)(3). The
designated state offices are: "the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School
Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of
Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme
Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior
courts, district attorneys, members of the General Assembly, and
members of the Public Service Commission." § 21-2-140(a)(4).
Petitioners, Libertarian Party nominees for state offices
subject to the statute's requirements, filed this action in the
District Court about one month before the deadline for submission
of the certificates. Naming as defendants the Governor and two
officials involved in the statute's administration, petitioners
asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests violated their rights under
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The District Court denied petitioners' motion
for a preliminary injunction and later entered final judgment for
respondents.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the drug tests required by the statute ranked
as searches are reasonable.
2. Whether or not the certification requirement is warranted by a
“special need.”
RULING:
1. Georgia's drug-testing requirement, imposed by law and
enforced by state officials, effects a search within the
meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing. But particularized exceptions to the
main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
When such "special needs"concerns, other than crime
detection, are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment
intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry,
examining closely the competing private and public interests
advanced by the parties. As Skinner stated: "In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence
of such suspicion."
We note, that the testing method the Georgia statute
describes is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the "special
needs" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted
for excessive intrusion.
2. Our precedents establish that the proffered special need
for drug testing must be substantial-important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Georgia
has failed to show a special need of that kind. Nothing in the
record hints that the hazards respondents broadly describe are
real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity. The statute
was not enacted, as counsel for respondents readily
acknowledged at oral argument, in response to any fear or
suspicion of drug use by state officials.
In contrast to the effective testing regimes upheld
in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's certification
requirement is not well designed to identify candidates who
violate antidrug laws. Nor is the scheme a credible means to deter
illicit drug users from seeking election to state office. The test
date-to be scheduled by the candidate anytime within 30 days
prior to qualifying for a place on the ballot-is no secret. As counsel
for respondents acknowledged at oral argument, users of illegal
drugs, save for those prohibitively addicted, could abstain for a
pretest period sufficient to avoid detection. Even if we indulged
respondents' argument that one purpose of Sections 21-2140
might be to detect those unable so to abstain respondents have
not shown or argued that such persons are likely to be candidates
for public office in Georgia. Moreover, respondents have offered
no reason why ordinary law enforcement methods would not
suffice to apprehend such addicted individuals, should they
appear in the limelight of a public stage. Section 21-2-140, in
short, is not needed and cannot work to ferret out lawbreakers,
and respondents barely attempt to support the statute on that
ground.
We reiterate, too, that where the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches
calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable", for
example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to
courts and other official buildings. As in this case, public safety is
not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the
suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged.
Case # 103: People v. Chua Ho San
G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999
FACTS: Police officers were deployed to patrol along Bacnotan
coastlines to attend to the reports of rampant smuggling of
firearms and other contraband. While in the coastal area of
Bulala, CID (Chief of Police of Bacnotan) intercepted a radio call
from the officers patrolling at Barangay Tammocalao requesting
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. They immediately
proceeded to the area with CID instructing his men in strategic
places when dealing with similar situations. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger (Chua) appeared carrying a
multicolored strawbag and walked towards the road. The officers
became suspicious of Chua as he suddenly changed direction and
broke into a run upon seeing them approach. Badua (Officer) held
Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then
introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not
understand what they were saying. They tried to communicate
with him in English, Tagalog and Ilocano but to no avail until
finally they resorted to the use of sign language. Cid motioned
with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to
the request. The said bag was found to contain several
transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances,
which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station,
where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his
constitutional rights. Chua was initially charged with illegal
possession of methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC
which characterized the search as incidental to a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, hence it allowed the admission of the
items seized as corpus delicti. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused who was acting suspiciously
constitutes Probable Cause allowing the police officers from
conducting an in flagrante delicto arrest.
HELD: There was no probable cause.
The Court first explained that the Constitution bars State
invasions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except
if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may
be permitted in the following cases, to wit: (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs
searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to
a lawful arrest.
In cases of in flagrante delicto, a peace officer or a
private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact [or
as recent case law] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
In the case at bar, there are no facts on record
reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation
in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police
officers from conducting the conspicuous search. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact
that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to
the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held
that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to
a lawful arrest. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject
regulated substance was held to be inadmissible as evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted.
Case # 104: People vs. Molina
 TOPIC: PARTIALLY VALID WARRANT
Case # 105: People vs. Roberto Salanguit
G.R. No.s 133254-55, April 19, 2001
FACTS: The accused was charged with two separate violation of
RA 6425. One for the illegal possession of 11.14 grams of Shabu
and another for illegal possession of 1,254 grams of marijuana.
The confiscation of the mentioned illegal drugs was in the
pursuant of the search warrant issued by Judge Dolores Espaol.
The search warrant specifically mentioned the place to be
searched which is the accused premise in Binhagan St., San Jose,
Quezon City and the properties to be search are Undetermined
Quantity of Shabu and Drug Paraphernalia. This search
warrant was supported by the witness SPO1 Edmund M. Badua
who acted as a poseur-buyer and bought 2.12 grams of shabu
from the accused but SPO1 Edund M. Badua did not testify in
the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on
anything about drug paraphernalia.
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: The search warrant is invalid on
the following grounds:
1. There was no Probable Cause to search for Drug
Paraphernalia;
2. That Search warrant was issued for more than one
offense;
3. The place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.
HELD: The conviction of the accused on the illegal possession of
Shabu was affirmed but acquitted on the illegal possession of
Marijuana.
1. The contention of the accused that the search warrant
is invalid because there was no probable cause to search for drug
paraphernalia is not tenable. The court held that the fact there
was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it
is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as
to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to
its existence. In the case of Aday v. Superior Court the court held
that “Although the warrant was defective in the respects
noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole.
Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain
articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be
condemned merely because the warrant was defective
with respect to other articles. In so holding we do not
mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be
treated as severable under all circumstances. We
recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained
which are essentially general in character but as to minor
items meet the requirement of particularity, and that
wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the
expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld
as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.”
2. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that
deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong
to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
3. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be
searched. For example, a search warrant authorized a search of
Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five
apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number
3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate
by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the
apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83
Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass. In this case, the location of
accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the
place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
On the issue of the illegal possession of Marijuana, the
accused assailed the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the
plain view doctrine. Plain view doctrine to be applied there
must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery
of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of
the evidence before the police. In the Case, the court held that
once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed,
the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found. What the plain
view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. In the third requisite, the court held that the there is no
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police
since the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused
was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in
a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could
not have been readily discernible as marijuana.
Case # 106: MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
[G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004]
FACTS: With search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of
Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description
stated in the search warrants (almost any item in the petitioners
store can be seized on the ground that it is used or intended to
be used in the illegal or unauthorized copying or reproduction of
Microsoft software and their manuals).
Offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright
infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition
under Article 189 of the RPC. NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz
related to the RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp sold to its
customers items without giving the accompanying ownership
manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity... ->
PROBABLE CAUSE
Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants due
to no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are
in the form of general warrants, but RTC denied motion.
ISSUE:
WON THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE
SEARCH WARRANTS (question of fact)
WON THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE GENERAL
WARRANTS
HELD:
There is a probable cause. The testimonies of two
witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence
they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause.
As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned
with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full-blown trial. It does not require a specific kind of
evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation. Findings of the
judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should
overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear
dictates of reason.
Not a general warrant:
Paragraph (d) of the warrant - The articles to be
seized were not only sufficiently identified physically,
they were also specifically identified by stating their
relation to the offense charged, meets the test of
specificity.
Paragraph (c) of the warrant - lacking in particularity
since it covers property used for personal or other
purposes not related to copyright infringement or
unfair competition
A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the
items specifically described in the warrant. A search warrant is
severable; the items not sufficiently described may be cut off
without destroying the whole warrant. All items seized under
paragraph (c) are inadmissible.
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as
far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The description of
the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or
precise. The nature of the description should vary according to
whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter
of concern.
TOPIC: PERSONAL DETERMINATION BY JUDGE
Case # 111: GR No 147607 January 22, 2004
People of the Philippines vs Benhur Mamaril
Facts: Appellant was convicted for violation of Sec 8 of RA 6425
as amended by RA 7659 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
police officers presented a search warrant to conduct a search at
his parent’s house and seizure of alleged marijuana leaves in
sachets and bricks which were confiscated for forensic
examination. Mamaril was also arrested and put to undergo urine
sample where he was found positive for shabu. On trial, he
contended the confiscated drugs to be inadmissible in evidence
as the search warrant was illegally issued considering that the
judge’s personal examination of the witnesses was not put in
writing. Atty. Enrico Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court of RTC-39,
Lingayen testified that he cannot find the stenographic notes
during the examination of the witnesses. The RTC nevertheless
convicted Mamaril for said violation.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
Ruling:
Despite the incriminating evidence against Mamaril, he
was acquitted by the Court on ground that the search warrant
was invalid. Sec 2 of the Bill of Rights as well as Rule 126(Sec 4-
TOPIC: EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
Case # 112: GR No. L-45950 June 20, 1938
Leona Pasion Vda de Garcia vs Diego Locsin, CFI-Tarlac
Facts: Mariano Almeda, an Anti-Usury agent obtained from the
CFI-Tarlac a search warrant commanding any law officer to
conduct a search on the house and store of the petitioner and
seize possible documents and papers relating to her activities as
an usurer. Pasion was ill when the warrant was served so it was
her bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, who issued the receipt after the
search and seizure of the papers. The papers were kept for a
considerable period of time by the Anti-Usury Board before
turning it to the fiscal who filed six criminal cases against the
petitioner. Petitioner then assails the validity of the search
warrant. The respondent judge admitted that the warrant was
invalid but there was a waiver on the rights of the petitioner on
her rights against searches and seizures marked by her
acquiescence to the search and the considerable time that
lapsed before she demanded back the confiscated documents.
Issue: Whether or not there is a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.
Ruling:
There was no waiver on the part of the accused. First,
the search warrant was invalid because it was Almeda who
determined the existence of the probable cause and not the
judge who only certified the affidavit made by Almeda. Aslo, the
confiscated papers were not immediately delivered to the court
as the law required but was kept by the Board and the Provincial
Fiscal for a period of time.
Pasion may not have objected to the search conducted because
she was sick that time but it does not constitute an implied
waiver of her rights. The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a personal one and can only be waived by the person
concerned or his authorized representative. The acquiescence to
a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or
an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law. The petitioner also have made
verbal demands to return the papers obtained from the Board as
was admitted by its acting chief before the charges were filed
against her in court. The delay in the written demand then does
not constitute implied waiver. The Board and the Fiscal are
required to return all the confiscated documents from the
petitioner.
NOTE: Requisites of a Valid Waiver of a Constitutional Right.
1. that the right exists;
2. that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
5) of the Rules of Court provides that a search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce…. which must be ….in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath…..
Due to the testimony of Atty. Castillo that they could not find the
sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing
that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions
and answers in writing as required by law, the issued search
warrant is declared null and void.
There is also no showing that the appellant waived his right to
question the validity of the search just because of his silence
during the search. He later objected in the validity of the search
warrant and the admissibility in evidence of the confiscated drugs
which became the main contention in his appeal.
NOTE: Importance of Personal Determination by Judge
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it
if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
3. that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
CASE #112: PASION VDA. DE GARCIA vs. LOCSIN
Mariano Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board,
obtained from the justice of the peace a search warrant
commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house
or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, because he believed
that she has in her possession "certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer"
which are contrary to the Anti-Usury Law. He presented the
search warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper and proceeded to
seize the papers and documents even without the presence of the
petitioner because she was ill and confined at that time. Six cases
were then filed against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-
Usury Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner against
unreasonable searches and seizures is violated and that the
search warrant was illegally issued
RULING: Yes.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be
valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and
such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized. These
requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal
Procedure particularly with reference to the duration of the
validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer
seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding
court.
In the instant case the existence of probable cause was
determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All
that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by
agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear
that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be
sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the
properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued
the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over
to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building
up cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the
warrant was issued there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily
for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court is,
therefore, correct in reaching the conclusion that the search
warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac.
NOTE: May the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures be waived? Doubtless, the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The waiver may be either express or
implied. No express waiver has been made in the case before
us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by
implication. It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of
a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right
exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
CASE #113: YEE SUE KOY vs . MARIANO G. ALMEDA
An information had been filed in the Court of First Instance
of Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip
and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act
No. 2655.
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda,
chief agent of the Anti- Usury Board, the justice of the peace of
Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of
applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, issued a search warrant commanding any peace officer to
search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam
Sing & Co., as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to
seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory
notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their
activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in
violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring them
forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay.
Petitioners pray that the search warrant and the seizure of
the articles be declared illegal and set aside; that the respondents
Mariano G. Almeda and Jose S. Estrada, as agents of the Anti-
Usury Board, be ordered and directed to return to the petitioners
the said articles; that pending these proceedings the provincial
fiscal of Occidental Negros be commanded to refrain from using
said articles as evidence in criminal case filed against petitioners;
that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, in case all or some of the articles in question
should be introduced as evidence for the prosecution in said
criminal case be likewise commanded to refrain from admitting
the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued and the seizure
accomplished thereunder are illegal.
RULING: The criticism of the petitioners that the search warrant
in question was not issued in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders No. 58, is
unfounded. On the contrary, we are satisfied that strict
observance of such formalities was followed. As both Mariano G.
Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal
knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they
could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be
not as their were stated under oath. The existence of probable
cause had been determined by the justice of the peace of
Sagay before issuing the search warrant complained of, is
shown by the following statement in the warrant itself.
CASE #114: NARCISO ALVAREZ vs . THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF TAYABAS
Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-
Usury Board, applied for a search warrant and presented to Judge
David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit
alleging that according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez
kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the
affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the questions were
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear
to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts
but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a warrant
ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the
day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-
mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury
Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at 7:00 pm and
seized articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals,
cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts,
inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt
books, promissory notes and checks.
Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant
be declared illegal and that all the articles in question be returned
to him. He claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the
following reasons: (a) it was based solely upon the affidavit of the
petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable
cause; (b) it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that
made by the applicant; (c) it authorized its execution at night;
(d) lack of an adequate description of the books and documents
to be seized; and (e) it was issued for the sole purpose of seizing
evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings
that might be instituted against him for violation of the Anti-Usury
Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for affidavit of another
witnesses to support the application for search warrant.
RULING: No.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General
Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must,
before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that
of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent
in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of
the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses
for the purpose of determining the existence of probable
cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient
facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if
the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit
of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts
is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is
likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the
agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
CASE #115: MATA vs. BAYONA
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent
Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged
failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court. Specifically, the contention is that the search
warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the
application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private
respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and
sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge.
Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of
respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent
to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of
Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under
PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him
alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the
Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets'
without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case
could be found the search warrant and other pertinent
papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he
had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which
inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to examine the witness.
RULING: We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality
for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More
emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits
TOPIC: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
CASE # 116: Olaes vs People (G.R. Nos. 78347-49
November 9, 1987)
FACTS: The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by
the respondent judge is unconstitutional because it does not
indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have
committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of
the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights. In support
of this argument, they cite Stonehill v. Diokno, where
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant satisfies the
requirement of the particularity of the description to be made of
the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
RULING: The Court ruled that the search warrant issued in the
instant case does not come under the structures of the Stonehill
doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare reference to the
laws in general, without any specification of the particular
sections thereof that were alleged to have been violated out of
the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such modifications.
There is no similar ambiguity in the instant case.
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant
states that it is in connection with "Violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause
to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of No.
628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their
possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited
and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the
offense stated above." Although the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no
question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.
The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of
Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the
"place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
CASE # 117: DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
FACTS:
P/Major Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed
with the RTC of Manila an application for the issuance of a search
warrant, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.). In his application for search warrant, the
specifics, description and location of the firearms were identified,
including the deposition of the witness from whom the intelligence
report was gathered. Judge issued a search warrant through
probable cause.
Petitioner moved to quash the search warrant, one of the
claim states: The search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be
searched.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant in the case at bar is a general
warrant.
HELD: NOT A GENERAL WARRANT.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary
in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that
his declarations are false.
with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place
intended. In the case at bar, the application for search warrant
and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched
as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more
particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and
Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr.
Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the
second floor. The designation of the places to be searched
sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor
and second floor of the PUP.
The failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of
such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score.
CASE # 118: Chia vs Collector of Customs
FACTS: Confidential information was made known to the Regional
Anti-Smuggling Action Center, Manila Bay Area (RASAC-
MBA) where assorted electronic and electrical equipment were
illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate. Allegedly
these foreign goods are unloaded from foreign ships to Philippine
waters using motorized bancas (termed as shipside transaction)
and landed on Philippine soil without passing through the Bureau
of Customs, evading payment of the corresponding customs
duties and taxes. These were found inside "Tom's Electronics" and
"Sony Merchandising (Philippines)". RASAC requested from the
Collector of Customs for the issuance of warrants of seizure and
detention over said items who later on issued requested warrants
indicating the description of the stores and items to be seized.
Petitioner contended that the warrants served were general
warrants and prayed for its nullification.
ISSUE: Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are
general warrants issued in violation of Rule 126, Section 3, of the
Rules of Court and of the constitutional right of a person to be
secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures
HELD: The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this
case were not general warrants; for they were the responsible
officers authorized by law" to issue the warrants and that they
identified and described the stores and articles to be seized. They
acted in pursuant to the provisions of Sections 2208 and 2209 of
the Tariff and Customs Code which provides that:
SEC. 2208. RIGHT OF POLICE OFFICER TO ENTER
INCLOSURE — For the more effective discharge of his
official duties, any person exercising the powers herein
conferred, may at any time enter, pass through or
search any land or enclosure or any warehouse, store
or other building, not being a dwelling house.
A warehouse, store or other building or enclosure used
for the keeping or storage of articles does not become
a dwelling house within the meaning hereof merely by
reason of the fact that a person employed as watchman
lives in the place, nor will the fact that his family stays
there with him alter the case.
SEC. 2209.- SEARCH OF A DWELLING HOUSE. — A
dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a Judge of the court or such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon
sworn application showing probable cause and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized.
 CASE # 119: 20TH Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988
FACTS:
On the basis of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property), the petitioner write a letter with the NBI
alleging that certain outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in a
videotape. The NBI acted on the complaint and conduct
surveillance and investigation and subsequently applied for 3
search warrants. The application was granted by the RTC of
Makati. The NBI now proceeded with the raid and seized the items
described in the search warrant. The Private respondents filed a
motion to lift the search warrant and released seized properties.
The RTC issued an order lifting the 3 search warrants issued
earlier against the private respondents by the court.
ISSUE: WON the lifting of the search warrant has a valid ground.
HELD: Yes, the lifting has valid grounds.
1. The absence of probable cause since the NBI agents
who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the
subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged
commission of the offense by the private respondents. The
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirement of probable cause not mere
allegation as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
2. The Search warrants are in the nature of General
Warrants. Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders
and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a video tape
store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are
generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not
necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles
without specification and/or particularity that they were
really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the
search warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video store.
CASE # 120: PEOPLE VS CHOI
FACTS:
Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance,
applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Angeles City, Pampanga, against respondent Christopher Choi
for violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in
relation to Section 169 of RA 8293, also known as the Intellectual
Property Code. After examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey, Judge
Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17.
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Respondent alleged that Judge
Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
quash the search warrant, arguing that probable cause was not
sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not
probing and exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly
describe the place to be searched.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The CA erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant allegedly
because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The People
assail the finding of the CA that, in issuing the search warrant,
Judge Gatbalite purportedly did not comply strictly with the
requirement to determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses through
searching questions and answers.The People also assert that the
CA erred in applying the doctrine in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation since it had already been superseded by Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be
issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause
means such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The
determination of the existence of probable cause requires the
following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses
personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath and
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although
there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination
must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. The judge must not simply
rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry
on the intent and justification of the application The questions
should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the
affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the
judge fails to determine probable cause by personally examining
the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
before issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is
committed.
CASE # 121: CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO vs. HON. ERNANI
CRUZ PAÑO
FACTS:
 Prior to August 6, 1984, petitioner and others were
accused of Rebellion.
 Petitioner and others were arrested by a Constabulary
Security Group (CSG) at the intersection in Quezon City.
 The CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City. 428 documents, a portable type writer and
two boxes were seized.
 In connection with the Search Warrant issued,
earlier that day, respondent Judge issued a search
warrant to be served at one of the petitioner’s
residence.
 On the basis of the documents seized, charges of
subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed but the
fiscal’s office merely charged petitioners with illegal
possession of subversive materials.
 Petitioners contend that the search warrant is void
because it is a general warrant which does not
sufficiently describe with particularity the things
subject of the search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether the lack of particularization in the search
warrant issued by respondent judge constituted a violation on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized.
RULING: The Court finds merit in the Petition.
The Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search
Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles
they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter
and 2 wooden boxes. The warrant describes the materials to be
seized as documents, papers, and other records of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/NPA. It does not mention which books or
manuals are subversive or allow them to commit Rebellion. It is
thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on
the constitutional mandate requiring particular description
of the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on
August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño is hereby annulled and set aside
CASE # 122. PICOP vs. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253 (1999)
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon paschal applied for a
search warrant, suspecting that the management of Paper
Industries Corp. of the Philippines owns high-powered firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives illegally. Respondent-Judge
Asuncion issued the subject warrant, allowing the search of
“PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur” and
seizure of a number of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives.
Later, the police enforced the warrant and raided the PICOP
compound and seized the weapons. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash. They argue that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable.
ISSUE: Was the warrant unlawfully served or implemented?
RULING:
YES. The requisites of a valid search warrant are as
follows: (1) probable cause of present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) complainant and the
witnessed (s)he may produce are personally examined by the
judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) applicant and
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5)
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
The place was not particularly described. (The lack of a
more specific description will make is apparent that there has not
been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described
items are to be found in a particular place.) The warrant
authorizes a search of the aformentioned premises but did not
specify such premises. The PICOP compound consists of 200
offices, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, and many other
structures. With the lack of specificity, the warrant actually allows
to search the entire compound.
The Police state that they submitted sketches of the
premises to be searched and that none of the housing units were
searched because they were not among those identified during
the hearing. The argument is not convincing. The sketches were
not made integral parts of the warrant. Also, the fact the the raid
team knew which of the buildings contained the firearms does not
justify the lack of particulars. Furthermore, the place to be
searched cannot be changed, enlarged, or amplified by the police.
The police cannot search a place that is not described in the
warrant.
[The warrant also did not satisfy the 3rd and 4th requisite.
None of the witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial
court for the judge to personally examine them. Moreover, the
applicant’s participation in the hearing for the issuance consisted
only in introducing one witness. The judge did not ask probing
questions to the witness. His Honor mainly relied on the
affidavits. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. Besides, the witness’s
testimony does not show that he had personal knowledge that the
Petitioners were not licensed to have firearms, etc. He simply
believed that they had no license.]
CASE # 123: Yousef Al Ghoul vs. CA, G.R. No. 126859,
September 4, 2009
FACTS: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the
R.T.C., issued two search warrants for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound. The
next day, police searched both Apartment No. 8 and No. 2. In
No. 8, they found and seized a .45 caliber pistol. As for No. 2,
the police seized a number of pistols, assault rifles, and
explosives. The firearms, ammunitions, explosives, and other
incendiary devices seized were acknowledged in the receipt
signed by an SPO. Petitioners were then charged for Illegal
Possession of Firearms, Ammunitions, and Explosives, violative of
P.D. 1866.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders
violated §§ 2, 3 of Article III of the Constitution. The place was
not described with particularity. The two-witness requirement
was not followed when only one witness signed the receipt for the
properties seized.
ISSUE: Was the seizing of the articles legal?
RULING: As to the .45 caliber pistol, NO. As held in PICOP v.
Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged,
nor amplified by the police. The warrants did not make any
mention of Apartment No. 8, only No. 2. Thus, the pistol was
illegally obtained and is inadmissible.
As to the other articles seized in No. 2, YES. The
warrants specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was
done in the presence of its occupants. The objects to be seized
were also described with particularity, even giving the particular
type of firearm, ammunition, and types of explosives. Indeed,
the articles seized are of the same kind and nature of the articles
described in the warrants.
The nature of the items to be seized did not require a
technical description. Even the law does not require precise and
minute details. Had this been the case, it would be virtually
impossible to obtain a search warrant. Once described, the
articles to be seized need not be so invariant as to required
absolute concordance between those described and those seized.
Substantial similarity is enough.
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the
description of objects to be seized is when the things described
are limited to hose which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued. In this case, the items
described could bear a direct relation to Illegal Possession of
Firearms, Ammunitions, and Explosives.
[As to the two-witness rule, the same applies only if the
lawful occupants are absent. The Petitioners, who were the lawful
occupants of Apartment No. 2 are present when the search and
seizure was conducted. In fact, one of the Petitioners admitted
being and actual occupant/resident.
CASE # 124: Del Rosario V People
FACTS:
The police received a report that accused-appellant
Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without
the necessary licenses.
A search warrant was then issued which yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792
with five magazines of caliber .45 found at the masters bedroom;
(b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios found in the
room of appellants daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with
Serial No. 48673 containing 8 pieces of live ammunition found in
the kitchen of the house.
DOTA:
That the search conducted at his residence was illegal as
the search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution and
consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also
submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and
ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other firearm, a .22
caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios
found in his daughter’s bedroom, were either planted by the
police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search
warrant.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of items not mentioned in
the warrant was illegal
HELD: Yes, it was illegal.
The 4th requisites of a valid search warrant state that:
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid
search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted
and excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain
view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen
of petitioners’ house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not
mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal.
 TOPIC: OBJECT OF SEIZURE
CASE # 125: Unilab V Isip
FACTS: Respondents were subjected to a search and seizure for
alleged counterfeiting of UNILAB's REVICOM multivitamins by
virtue of a warrant. They, however, insisted that the things
seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in
the search warrant. Thus, the trial court issued an advisory that
the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against
the respondents in any proceedings. The petitioner asserts that
the description in the search warrant of the products to be seized
finished or unfinished products of UNILAB is sufficient to include
counterfeit drugs within the premises of the respondents and that
the products seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may
be seized by them.
ISSUE: WON the seizure is valid.
HELD: NO. Objects, articles or papers not described in the
warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized
by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be
presumed as plain view.
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves
to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for
TOPIC: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
CASE # 126. Pollo V Constantino-David
FACTS: An unsigned letter-complaint which contain allegations
of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC was
received by the respondent. The complaint states that an
employee of CSC was representing himself as a lawyer to
government employees having a pending case in the CSC.
Upon investigation several legal documents were found
on the computer of the petitioner related to administrative cases
of CSC.
DOTA: He is not the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a
lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the
CSC. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated
January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the
files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister,
relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not
authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as
these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and
protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search
and seizure. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible
as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.
ISSUE: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer
of the petitioner constituted an illegal search.
HELD: Even conceding for a moment that there is no such
administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued
the search in its capacity as a government employer and
that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the
inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that
a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for
parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the
Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it
was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for
parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a
highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of
doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a
quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective
in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of
administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an
administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but
must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not
have any trust and confidence in it.
The Commission effected the warrantless search in an
open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of
the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on
another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful
arrest or some other legitimate reason for being present,
unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
Since different items were seized, it was thus incumbent on the
NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items
were seized based on the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to
prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI
agents; evidence should have been adduced to prove the
existence of all the essential requirements for the application of
the doctrine, but petitioners failed.
[A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers
of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in
the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to
seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be
general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.]
hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the
respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of
the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his
computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the
warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not,
in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable
exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an
employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and
efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its
employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the
questioned search are deemed
CASE # 127: Luz V. People
FACTS: Accused was flagged down for riding a motorcycle
without helmet. Seeing the accused uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket, the policeman told the accused to
empty his pocket. A plastic sachet which is suspected to contain
shabu was found.
DOTA: Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was
not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the
city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure of the alleged subject shabu
is invalid.
HELD: Petitioner is Acquitted.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he
was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not,
ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that
he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody
of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write
his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under
arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to
the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was
at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified
that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were
waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii)
search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a
stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to
this case.
FOR REFERENCE: It must be noted that the evidence seized,
although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain
view. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside
petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to
the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not
suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC
found that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of
his pocket
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule.
While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that
a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
CASE # 128: GR No 200334 July 30, 2014
People vs Cogaed
FACTS: Police investigators in San Gabriel, La Union received a
SMS tip that one Marvin Buya will be transporting weeds. SPO1
Taracatac intercepted a jeepney boarding Cogaed and Dayao who
are carrying bags which the officer ordered the bags to be opened.
The bags contained seemingly bricks of weeds which led to the
arrest of Cogaed and Dayao. The trial court initially declared the
arrest to be unlawful as there is no showing that Cogaed was
performing something unlawful that time but nevertheless
convicted him because he waived his right to object the
irregularity of the arrest when he did not protested to SPO1
Taracatac’s opening of his bag. Cogaed claimed that Buya only
requested them to transport the bags. Cogaed appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid warrantless search in this
case.
RULING: The arrest is invalid. One of the exceptions of a search
warrant is the “stop and frisk” situations which is conducted in
order to prevent a crime, when dealing with a rapidly unfolding
and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.
However, a reasonable degree of suspiciousness must be present
TOPIC: VALID WAIVER
CASE # 130: People vs Omaweng
43 SCRA 46, 1992
FACTS:
A cream-colored Ford Fiera driven by Conway Omaweng
was flagged down by Joseph Layong and other Police
Constabulary Soldiers in a checkpoint somewhere at the junction
of Sagada and Bontoc Roads in Mt. Province. Omaweng acceded
to the PC soldiers’ request of inspecting his vehicle. The soldiers
noticed a travelling bag partially covered by a spare tire under
the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and
his companions asked Omaweng if they could check the travelling
bag, Omaweng consented. Layong opened the bag and found 41
packets of pulverized substances which were later on proven to
be marijuana. Omaweng was charged and convicted with
violation of Sec 47, Art II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted were
unreasonable.
RULING:
in order to validly effect warrantless search in a stop and frisk
situation. In this case however, there is nothing suspicious to a
passenger who is just sitting and carrying a bag aboard a jeepney.
There is nothing criminal in boarding a jeepney and carrying a
bag. Also, the one arrested is Victor Cogaed, clearly not the same
to Marvin Buya who was supposed to be transporting the weeds.
There is no waiver of rights in here as the mere silence of Cogaed
in not objecting to SPO1 Taracatac’s orders does not imply his
consent to the search. It was just a mere passive reaction to the
coercive environment brought about by the officer of the law.
Cogaed is acquitted.
NOTE: "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself
that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer
CASE # 129: GR No 202692 November 12, 2014
Sydeco vs People
FACTS: Sydeco was convicted by the Manila RTC for the charges
of violation of RA 4136 for drunk driving and Art 151 of the RPC
for resisting arrest. A police checkpoint was set up along Roxas
Boulevard when the police spotted a swerving vehicle with Sydeco
behind the wheel and ordered it to stop. The police ordered
Sydeco to stop that he can rest first but he resisted and attempted
to flee. The police claimed that he smell liquor and saw beer cases
inside the vehicle. Sydeco was arrested and first brought to the
hospital for examination and found positive of alcohol. The CA
upheld his conviction, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is valid.
RULING: The arrest is not valid. RA 4136 provides that a person
caught for a traffic violation must demand the license of the driver
and be issued a ticket. However, the testimony of the defense
provides that the police ordered them to stop and when they
noticed that Sydeco is drunk, they removed the car keys and
pointed a gun at them which was ironically corroborated by the
arresting officers themselves. They were ordered to stop based
on the swerving of the vehicle but it must be noted that swerving
is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone
constitutes reckless driving. Sydeco’s gestures and words at the
police may be crude but not enough to amount to being criminal.
The absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of
liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner the police
yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast
doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting
arrest. Sydeco is acquitted.
No. Omaweng willingly gave prior consent to the search
and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted in his vehicle and
travelling bag. He waived his rights against unreasonable
searches when he consented to have the search made. The right
to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived. Since in the course of the valid search, 41 packets of
drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no
warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said
packages were identified by the prosecution witness and later on
formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any
objection whatsoever.
CASE # 131: People vs. Correa
FACTS:
On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 35) indicting appellants
Antonio Correa y Cayton @ Boyet, Rito Gunida y Sesante @
Dodong, and Leonardo Dulay y Santos @ Boy Kuba for having
violated Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as
amended, allegedly committed as follows: that on or about June
18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, transport, give
away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, deliver or
transport eight (8) bundles of dried flowering tops of MARIJUANA
wrapped in pieces of papers and plastic tapes weighing 16.1789
kilograms, a prohibited drug.
The Information indicated that the appellants were All
Under Arrest and that No Bail (was) Recommended. When
arraigned, the appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY. After trial, the
lower court found the appellants guilty as charged. The common
defense interposed by the three accused is in the nature of alibi.
The core of their contention is that they were arrested without
warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City. They also denied that they
were delivering and transporting dried marijuana flowering tops
when they were apprehended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence confiscated is the fruit of an
illegal search warrant conducted without any search warrant.
RULING:
No. The appellants are now precluded from assailing the
warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily submitted
to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure.
The appellants never protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller, after
identifying himself as a police officer, opened the tin can loaded
in the appellants vehicle and found eight (8) bundles. And when
Faller opened one of the bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The
NBI later confirmed the eight (8) bundles to be positive for
marijuana. Again, the appellants did not raise any protest when
they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were
brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution.
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
vol. I, page 631). The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly. The appellants effectively
waived their constitutional right against the search and seizure in
question by their voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment and by participating in the trial.
CASE # 132: People vs. Ramos
FACTS:
A civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command
Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by
the name of" Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling
marijuana. Tests buys were made using marked money. The
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place
where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for
illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out
the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used
in the test buys were found among her possessions and were
confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of
Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash
can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the
wares she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the
station.
At the station, Ramos executed a statement confessing
to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal.
The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine
Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and
thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends
however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM
operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which
she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed
that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills
by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which
was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was
her money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to
the Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where she signed a
document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel
during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the
document at the Fiscal’s Office.
ISSUE: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless
search of the trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under her
control.
HELD:
The trash can (where the contraband were found)
was found under the table where her legitimate wares were being
sold. The accused was the only person who had access to the
trash can. The same was under her immediate physical control.
She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under
the table to the exclusion of all other persons. It is only necessary
that the defendant must have dominion and control over the
contraband. These requirements are present in the situation
described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash
can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. Therefore, the twenty
sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's
finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.4
CASE # 133: People v. Barros
FACTS:
Bonifacio Barros was charged and convicted of violating
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Barros was coming from
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province to Baguio City where he carried four
(4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for
distribution and sale.- M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James
Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command,
rode the Dangwa Bus.- Barros carrying a carton, board the bus
and seated himself and put the carton under his seat.- After
alighting at their station, Sgt. Ayan ordered C2C Bongyao to
inspect the carton and found out it contained marijuana.- As both
P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan Bonifacio Barros carrying that same
carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bonifacio was
arrested and subsequently convicted.- Barros now appeals from
the judgment of conviction and claims that his right to due
process was violated when he was searched without the
mandatory warrant.
ISSUE: WON Bonifacio’s non-objection to the search made in the
moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a
waiver.
HELD:
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such
search and seizure becomes unreasonable within the meaning of
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The fruits of the
search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Exception:
1) Peace officers may conduct searches of moving vehicles,
it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant
before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant may be sought. However only visual
inspection.
The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the
unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless
arrest simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver,
it must appear first that the right exists. Secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
CASE # 134: Spouses Veroy v. Layague
FACTS:
The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao
City to a caretaker.Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an
information that rebel soldiers are allegedly hiding there. With the
help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the yard
since the owner was not around and they did not have a search
warrant. They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house
was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of
rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to search the
house with the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family
friend, must be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms,
including the children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun
and other effects, which were the basis of the charge of illegal
possession of firearms against them.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet
been served on them, petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since
it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter
refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet
received copies of their warrants of arrest.
The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for
being obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
ISSUES: Whether or not the permission by the owner of the
house is sufficient to legalize the search and warrant.
RULING:
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had
permission to enter their house, it was merely for the purpose of
ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to
room search inside the house. The items taken were, therefore,
products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional
rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The permission to enter a house and search for persons and
effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in
excess of the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum
prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized
simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary in the context of this case.
CASE # 135: People vs. Damaso
FACTS: A Philippine Constabulary officer and some companions
went to the house rented by accused-appellant where they were
allowed entry into the house by the house help. upon entering,
they saw radio sets, pamphlets, Xerox copiers and a computer
machine. They asked and were granted permission to look around
by the persons inside the house. In one of the rooms, they saw
books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and
ammunitions, among others. They confiscated the articles and
brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They
likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that
appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items
confiscated therefrom.
ISSUES: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to
allow the warrantless search of his house.
RULING: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866,
in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person
as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other
subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of
the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason
being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the
requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show that
Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz
Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it.
There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz
Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she
was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his
house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if
Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any
color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the
authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation
here demanded urgency which could have prompted the
authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is
silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house
at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his
house. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and the appellant is acquitted with costs de oficio.
CASE # 136: LOPEZ VS COMM. OF CUSTOMS
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Velasco was not inside their rented
hotel room when a team of agents raided their room and seized
documents and papers. They were allowed entry inside said room
by a woman who appeared to be petitioner’s wife but turned out
to be a manicurist.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was consent to allow the
warrantless search and seizure of Velasco’s rented hotel room.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that the state policy of
minimizing smuggling must be carried out with due respect for
constitutional rights, and that whenever there is a showing that
the safeguards of the fundamental law are disregarded, then
judicial redress is appropriate. But such is not the case here
Where, at the time the government agents entered and searched
the hotel room then being rented by petitioner, a woman who
appeared to be the wife of petitioner was inside the room, and,
upon being informed of the purpose of the search, invited the
petitioners to enter and search the room and even voluntarily
gave the documents and things requested by the officers, even if
the said woman, who could be aptly described as the wrong
person, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, was not the wife
of petitioner, but a mere manicurist by occupation, the officers of
the law could not be blamed if they acted on the appearances.
There was a person inside who for all indications was ready to
accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have
precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was
there. Under said circumstances, there was consent sufficient in
law to dispense with the need for a search warrant.
CASE # 137: Caballes vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja
and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the
jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes
y Taiño. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not
answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes'
consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).
The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45.
Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8
kilometers away from Sampalucan.
Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information.
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police
officers who were on routine patrol, merely on "suspicion" that
"it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court
as adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent,
express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any
evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made
by the police officers and the admissibility of evidence obtained
by virtue thereof was valid?
RULING: No. The warrantless search and seizure made by the
police officers and the admissibility of evidence obtained by virtue
thereof was not valid.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely:
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;(2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles;(4) consented warrantless search;(5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear
that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner
intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged down,
Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at
the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those
words, the police officers were asking or requesting for permission
that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon
herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle. The "consent"
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the
validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the
consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the
accused was established by clear and positive proof.
In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police
officers were not asking for his consent; they
were declaring to him that they will look inside his vehicle.
Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested
and granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his
direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner
stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle
and saw the aluminum wires. It was only after he was asked
a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he
will inspect the vehicle.
CASE # 138: PEOPLE VS ASIS
FACTS: That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence upon person, stabbing one YU HING
GUAN a.k.a ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different
parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the
following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00, one
(1) wristwatch, one (1) gold necklace and undetermined items.
As a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death.
When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded
not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only
by a counsel de oficio but also by an interpreter from the Calvary
Baptist Church. After due trial, appellants were found guilty and
sentenced to death.
The RTC held that the crime charged and proved is robbery with
homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. It
ruled that although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery
were presented, the circumstantial evidence including the
recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused
definitely proved that the two (2) committed the crime.
the accused, Formento was linked to a crime by a substantial
evidence of a blood stained clothing . And was arrested but he
objects to the introduction of the bloodstained clothing because
he contends that the search was illegaly done and thus making
the obtaining of it illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The
prosecution contends that it was Formento’s wife who voluntarily
surrendered the bag and that constituted a valid consent to
search without a warrant.
ISSUE: whether Formento, a deaf mute has given consent to the
recovery of the bloodtained clothing during the warrantless
search?
RULING:
No. primarily the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one,
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so, on his or her
behalf.
In the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shirts were
recovered, Formento, together with his wife and mother, was
present.
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself
should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the
waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs.
Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein
was not present when the search was made.
Further to constitute a valid waiver. It must be shown that
(1) The right exist ;(2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento could not
have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place,
he did not understand what was happening at that moment. There
was no interpreter to assist him ---a deaf mute--- during the
arrest, search, and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda.
De Garcia vs. Locsin, “as the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
the supremacy of the law” becomes even more pronounced in the
present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was
no interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming
acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed
to plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained
pair of shorts was a piece of evidence on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus it is tainted and thus should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly as to
evidence vis-à-vis in the case in its totality, circumstantial
evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives the room for
conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just
raise the possibility of, or even the probability, of guilt, it must
engender moral certainty. Otherwise the constitutional
presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves
acquittal.
CASE # 139: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs . NOEL
TUDTUD y PAYPA
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a
"civilian asset" named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about
Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of
marijuana in their area. For five days, they gathered information
and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. According
to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
They saw Tudtud and a man carrying a carton marked “King
Flakes.” They then asked him if they could see the contents of the
box. Tudtud obliges saying “it was alright.” The box yielded pieces
of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto
asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what
seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. They then
arrested them, informed them of their rights and brought them
to the police station.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right” is
considered a waiver.
RULING: There is an effective waiver of rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures if the following
requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right.
The prosecution failed to establish the second and third
requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers
introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they
see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the
marijuana, appellant Tudtud said "it was alright." He did not resist
and opened the box himself.
Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a
person failed to object to a search does not amount to
permission thereto. As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to all search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law.
Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed
her bag or the chairs containing marijuana to the arresting officer,
this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.
Consequently, appellants' lack of objection to the search
and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellants' box does not come under the
recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence.
And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of
the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
appellants cannot be sustained.
TOPIC: INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST
CASE # 140: CHIMEL vs. CALIFORNIA
Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search
warrant, were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where
they awaited petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served
with the warrant. Although he denied the officers' request to "look
around," they conducted a search of the entire house "on the
basis of the lawful arrest." At petitioner's trial on burglary
charges, items taken from his home were admitted over objection
that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His conviction was
affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held, despite
their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant
was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the
warrant "in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had
sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the arrest,
the arrest was lawful. The courts also held that the search was
justified as incident to a valid arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not a warantless search of the entire home is
permissible when the search is incident to a lawful arrest that
takes place in the home.
RULING:
Absent a search warrant, only the area in the
possession or control of the arrestee may be searched
incident to a lawful arrest. It is reasonable for the police
to search an arrestee to ensure officer safety and no
evidence is destroyed.
In Contrast, a search of the area outside of the
arrestee’s immediate control is not reasonable because it
is not justifiable to ensure safety or preservation of
evidence. The Fourth Amendment requirements of
establishing probable cause or producing a warrant were
intended to prevent the search of private homes.
Permitting a warrantless search of a private home would
encourage the police to make every arrest in a suspect’s home so
they could legally undertake a search absent probable
cause. Since the coins found were not in the area under the
immediate control of Chimel, the search and seizure was
unconstitutional.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must,
of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"
- construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt,
remains: "After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will
among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears
to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done under a
general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection,
for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by
hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed offender
were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to
know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not
at home."
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went
far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from within which
he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could
have been used as evidence against him. There was no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for
extending the search beyond that area. The scope of the search
was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand.
CASE #141: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN DE LA
CRUZ y GONZALES
Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article
IV, both of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by Presidential Decree No.
1675.
A "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics
Regional Unit to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as
the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana
worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo
Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first
negotiated with on the purchase, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo
Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got
from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining
that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy
gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his
head. They then effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The
P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of
Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.
Accused contended that the Buy-Bust Operation, being done
to enforce Republic Act 6425, is unconstitutional and any
evidence acquired under such method should not be admissible
in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of evidence without warrant
in a Buy-Bust Operation is violative of the Constitution.
RULING:
The Solicitor General explains that a buy-bust operation is
the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a
malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of
entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces
the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment
of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing
a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated.
Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal
in the act of the commission of the offense.
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is
seizure of evidence from one's person without a search
warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not
necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in
the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-handed.
There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are
admissible in evidence.
CASE # 142: PEOPLE vs. KALUBIRAN
Respondent was arrested in a buy-bust operation by the
Narcotic Command agents for selling 2 sticks of marijuana, a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, to one of the team members
who acted as the buyer. One of the agents frisked Kalubiran and
found 17 sticks of marijuana. After examining and evaluating the
evidence of the parties, he was found guilty. Kalubiran argued
that he could not have sold the marijuana in public as this would
be contrary to human nature and caution. He even added that his
right against unreasonable search and seizures has been violated
and in not according him the presumption of innocence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kalubiran’s arrest constitutes a violation
of his right against warrantless arrest.
RULING:
The people he was with at the time were his own group,
friends who were probably aware of his unlawful trade and did not
care much what he did. Moreover, it is to be expected that he did
not sell the marijuana openly or with reckless fanfare but with
appropriate furtiveness, as befitted him shameful trade.
The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante
delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a
warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a
crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful
arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116.
In addition to the aforecited Rules, there is abundant
jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and
seizures under the conditions established in this case.
CASE # 143: PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT
FACTS:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first
regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also
was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding
stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan
noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag
and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four
suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It
contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped
to get two traveling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally
presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy
each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.
DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Accused raised the issue of illegal
search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish
was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that
the two (2) traveling bags were not owned by him, but were
merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113
of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and
he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.
While it is true that the officers were not armed with a search
warrant when they searched the accused’s personal effects, there
was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that the
accused was committing a crime. The receipt of information by
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused
to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was
trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object
sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to
be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian
traveling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a
prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
CASE # 144: RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., police officers
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports
of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling something
to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.
The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana.
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his
residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags
of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search made inside the
accused-petitioner’s house (where 10 more tea bags of marijuana
were found) became unlawful since the police operatives were not
armed with a search warrant.
RULING:
The prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed
committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of
conviction was proper.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides: A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; Petitioners arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule.
He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation.
The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and
discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized
were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
On the other hand, as for the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the
same are inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest do not fall
under the said exceptions.
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid
under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house, however, which
yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful
since the police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and
control of petitioner. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.
CASE # 145: People vs. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990)
FACTS: Pat. Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan were
conducting a surveillance mission. The surveillance was against
persons who may commit misdemeanors and who are engaged in
trafficking dangerous drugs. This mission was based on
information supplied by informers. At one point, they noticed a
person carrying a traveling bag who was acting suspiciously.
Quevedo and Punzalan confronted the man and told him to open
the bag. They found a kilo of leaves which were later found to be
marijuana. They took the person, Medel Tangliben (who was
waiting for a taxi to deliver the marijuana), to police headquarters
for further investigation. The marijuana was admitted as
evidence against Tangliben.
ISSUE: Is the marijuana seized a product of an unlawful
warrantless search?
RULING:
NO. One exception to the general rule of requiring a
search warrant is a search incident to lawful arrest. Furthermore,
a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
inches presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
accused was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest,
so his case falls squarely with the above exception.
In an earlier case, officers received a tip that the accused
was carrying marijuana. When the accused disembarked the
vessel, the police detained him and inspected the bag, which
contained marijuana. The Court ruled that the marijuana is
inadmissible because it was seized illegally. The case did not
present any urgency to seize the drugs. The police had at least
two days within which the police could have obtained a warrant
of arrest and search.
In the present case, there is urgency. There was an
informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying the drugs. Faced
with on-the-spot information, the officers had to act quickly.
There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. To
require a warrant for such on-the-spot situations would make the
apprehension of drug pushers much harder if not impossible.
Thus, containment of crime is also made harder or impossible.
CASE # 146: People vs. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592
(2000)
FACTS: The special Operation Unit, Narcotics Command
apprehended a suspected drug courier, Mabel Cheung Mei Po,
after she delivered a transparent plastic bag with a white
crystalline substance inside. She chose to cooperate, revealing
the name of the source of the drugs: Che Chun Ting.
The Narcotics Command deployed a team for Ting’s
entrapment and arrest. Mabel called Ting asking for a kilogram
of shabu. When Ting notified Mabel the he was ready to deliver,
Mabel relayed the message to NARCOM and the latter prepared
the entrapment. Mabel went to Unit 122 to meet Ting, with
NARCOM agents waiting in a car nearby. The instant the agents
saw Ting give Mabel the shabu, they moved in and arrest Ting.
The agents also conducted a search of Unit 122, which was later
found to be owned by Ting’s girlfriend. The agent seized more
shabu from the Unit.
ISSUE: Was the seizure of the drugs legal?
RULING:
As the the drugs seized in Unit 122, NO. The
requirement of a warrant for search and seizure is not absolute.
One exception is the searching of a lawfully arrested person for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense. Said search may extend beyond
the persons of the one arrested to include the permissible ares or
surroundings within his immediate control.
Unit 122 was not even Ting’s residence; it was that of
his girlfriend. It can hardly be said that the inner portion of the
house constituted a permissible area within his reach or
immediate control to justify a warrantless search.
The warrantless search justified by a lawful arrest is
limited by the subject, time, and place of the arrest. As to the
subject, the search is sanctioned only with respect tot he person
of the suspect, and the things that may be seized are limited to
“dangerous weapons” or “anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of the offense.” As to time and place, the
search must be conducted at about the time of arrest or
immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect
was arrested or the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control.
The purpose of the exception are only to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm for the persons being
arrested who may be armed.
As the the drugs seized from Ting, YES. Accused was
caught in flagrante delicto. NARCOM agents saw him hand over
a bag of white crystalline substance to Mabel. His arrest was
lawful and the seized bag of shabu was admissible in evidence.
CASE # 147: PEOPLE VS. ESTELLA
FACTS: The trial court found appellant guilty of violating Section
8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 for illegal
possession of illegal drugs. The drugs were seized in a hut which
was not proved to be owned by the appellant. After the conviction,
he appealed alleging the legality of the police search undertaken
in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized.
The OSG contends that the search is incident to the
lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Whether the police search legal as it was incident to the
lawful arrest?
RULING: No. The police authorities cannot claim that the search
was incident to a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a
lawful or valid arrest and can only be invoked through Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Paragraphs a and b are not applicable. Neither the appellant falls
under paragraph c. It was not proven that he was in possession
of the subject prohibited drug during the search. It follows,
therefore, that there was no way of knowing if he had committed
or was actually committing an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. Without that knowledge, there could have
been no search incident to a lawful arrest.
Assuming that appellant was indeed committing an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers, and that the
arrest without a warrant was lawful, it still cannot be said that the
search conducted was within the confines of the law. The scope
of the search should be limited to the area within which the person
to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or
she can destroy. However in this case, the search was made
within the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within
appellant’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the
bounds of that which may be considered to be incident to a lawful
arrest.
Without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant,
the prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty.
ACQUITTED.
CASE # 148: PEOPLE VS. LIBNAO
FACTS: Appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga were found guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The intelligence operatives of PNP began conducting
surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in Tarlac. They
conducted a checkpoint upon learning that two drug pushers,
riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery. On the following
day, the police officers flagged down a tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the
appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga with
a black bag in front of them.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory and were positively identified as marijuana. They were
both found guilty. Libnao appealed alleging that during her arrest,
she was not committing a crime and that there was no warrant.
Her right against illegal and unwarranted arrest and search was
violated by the police officers who arrested both accused. In the
same manner, she impugns the search made on her belongings
as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under
circumstances when warrantless search is permissible
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of accused against illegal and
unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police officers
who arrested both accused?
RULING:
No. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not
absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of
which relates to search of moving vehicles. Peace officers in such
case, however, are limited to routine checks where the
examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When
a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, reasonably arising out
of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile
or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.
There was a probable cause in this case. The warrantless
search and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended,
she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery
or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section
4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the
instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
TOPIC: PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
CASE # 149: People V Musa
FACTS: Accused was charged of selling marijuana during a buy-
bust operation. Upon retrieval of the marked money, the accused
said that he gave it to his wife. The officers then searched for the
marked money inside the house and incidentally found a plastic
bag containing marijuana somewhere in the kitchen.
DOTA: The marijuana in the plastic bag should be inadmissible
as a product of illegal search
HELD: Inadmissible.
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine may not,
however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person
searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money
which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag
was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested
the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to
move from one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag.
The NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the
inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly
opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within
their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain
view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana.
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the
"plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained
in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
CASE # 150: Padilla V CA
FACTS: Apprehended as a hit-and-run suspect, petitioner Robin
Padilla was caught in possession of high-powered firearms with
live ammunitions. Thus, he was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. However, he
contends that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.
ISSUE: WON the firearms and ammunitions seized without
warrant are admissible as evidence.
HELD:
YES. One instance when a warrantless search and
seizure of property is valid-- Seizure of evidence in "plain view",
the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c). the evidence
must be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.
The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle
magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is
caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his
Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the
M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said
rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held
that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover
a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus
delicti."
"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently
found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant."
CASE # 151: People V Valdez
FACTS: Appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. The police
found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to
look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw
seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants.
DOTA: That there was unlawful search. First, the records show
that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a
search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in
an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
COTS: Warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine
HELD:
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the
doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that
they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was
arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the
prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies
only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area"
before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further
search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question
were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
 CASE # 152: Arizona V. Hicks
FACTS: A bullet fired through the floor of respondent's apartment
injured a man on the floor below. Police entered the apartment to
search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. While
there, one of the policemen noticed two sets of expensive stereo
components and, suspecting that they were stolen, read and
recorded their serial numbers -- moving some of them, including
a turntable, to do so -- and phoned in the numbers to
headquarters. Upon learning that the turntable had been taken in
an armed robbery, he seized it immediately.
DOTA: That the policeman's obtaining the serial numbers
violated the Fourth Amendment because it was unrelated to the
shooting, the exigent circumstance that justified the initial entry
and search.
COTP: That the policeman's actions were justified under the
"plain view" doctrine.
HELD: The policeman's actions come within the purview of the
Fourth Amendment. The mere recording of the serial numbers did
not constitute a "seizure," since it did not meaningfully interfere
with respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers or
the stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment
was a "search" separate and apart from the search that was the
lawful objective of entering the apartment. The fact that the
search uncovered nothing of great personal value to respondent
is irrelevant.
The search was invalid because, as the State concedes, the
policeman had only a "reasonable suspicion" -- i.e., less than
probable cause to believe -- that the stereo equipment was
stolen. Probable cause is required to invoke the "plain
view" doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be illogical
to hold that an object is seizable on lesser grounds, during an
unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed to
obtain a warrant for it if it had been known to be on the premises.
CASE # 153: People vs Compacion
GR No. 124442, 20 July 2001
FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police
informant that Armando Compacion was growing and cultivating
marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong
conducted surveillance at the residence of Compacion. During the
surveillance SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Basilio saw 2 tall plants in
Compacion’s backyard, suspected to be marijuana plants. The
NARCOM team of Bacolod applied for a search warrant, but failed
to acquire one because it was already late at night and it is way
beyond office house. Even without the warrant, the police officers
went to Compacion’s residence to search and seize the suspected
marijuana. The plants were uprooted and yielded positive results
for marijuana testing.
ISSUE: Whether Compacion’s right against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 2 and 3 (2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution
are safeguards against reckless, malicious, and unreasonable
invasion of privacy and liberty. A judicial warrant makes the
search and seizure reasonable but with some exceptions.
Consequently, Compacion's right against unreasonable search
and seizure was clearly violated. As a general rule, objects in the
"plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be
present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid
intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence
without further search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced
their way into Compacion's premises without the latter's consent.
It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance
of the residence of Compacion on 9 July 1995 on the suspicion
that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they
allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the
agents entered his premises on 13 July 1995, their intention was
to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to
secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be
issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the
marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a
surveillance and barged into Compacion's residence. As held in
People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the crime
to which he was charged.
NOTE: Exceptions in acquiring a judicial warrant:
a) when the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a
search;
b) when the owner of the premises waives his right against
such incursion;
c) when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
d) when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws;
e) when it involves prohibited articles in plain view;
f) when it involves a “stop and frisk” situation;
g) when the search is under exigent and emergency
circumstances; or
h) in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for
the enforcement of fire, sanitary, and building regulations.
CASE # 154: GR No 139301 September 29, 2004
People vs Huang Zhen Hua & Jogy Lee.
FACTS: Two search warrants were issued by the Executive
Judge of the RTC Manila where one was issued to the appellants
in their condominium unit executed by PARAC operative, Anciro
Jr. PARAC operatives knocked on the unit where Lee opened for
them. They searched the master’s bedroom where Huang Zhen
was sleeping and allegedly found kilos of shabu in violation of
RA 6425. Appellants denied their knowledge on the confiscated
drugs contending that they are just tourists and just came in the
country. They contend that the arrest was illegal as the evidence
was only planted to incriminate them. Pangan, a security officer
of the building testified that the police came in barging and
kicked the door in the entrance and that he saw no shabu that
was taken out and that he only came to know that shabu was
seized when he wasthed the news.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants were properly arrested.
RULING:
In the case of Huang Zhen, he was acquitted by the
Court on ground that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove
the quantum of evidence against him that it was not sufficiently
proven of his knowledge of the shabu nor his possession of any
regulated drug. The Court however upheld the conviction of Lee.
She failed to prove that there is irregularity in the process of
arrest prosecution proved that the officers complied with the
rules in making themselves known and their purpose in entering
the unit. They also brought a Cantonese interpreter for Lee as
she cannot understand English. Generally, officers implementing
a search warrant must announce their presence, identify
themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully
have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to
them the search warrant to be implemented by them and
explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to
and understood by them but there can be exceptions.
Lee also failed to prove that the drugs were planted as if her
contention is true, she could have informed her counsel
immediately for him to make a defense for her or even charged
the officers who planted the evidence before the information
was set against her. The testimony of Pangan was also
overlooked as it was admitted that he was not actually in the
unit when the search was ongoing. Also the taking by the
officers of some items belonging to the appellants is justified as
it was in their plain view and may connection to the offense. The
items taken such as passports, cards, passbook and other
papers are may be necessary to establish corroborating
evidence to further prove the charge against the accused.
NOTE: Unannounced intrusion into the premises is
permissible when:
(a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession
thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it;
(b) when such person in the premises already knew of the
identity of the officers and of their authority and persons;
TOPIC: ENFORCEMENT OF FISHING, CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS
CASE # 155: Roldan vs. Arca
FACTS:
Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner (Roldan) requested
the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony
Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for
alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. The two fishing
boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish
caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found
aboard the two vessels. Criminal charges were filed against the
crew members of the fishing vessels for violations of Act No.
4003, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 462, 659 and
1088, i.e., for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the
same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in
custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and
cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels.
Likewise, the Court of First Instance of Palawan ordered the
Philippine Navy to take the boats in custody. Respondent
company filed a complaint with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila
against herein petitioners. On October 18, 1965, the respondent
Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the
preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond
of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can validly direct and/or effect
the seizure of the vessels of private respondent for illegal fishing
by the use of dynamite and without the requisite licenses.
RULING:
Yes. When the Philippine Navy, upon request of the
Fisheries Commissioner, apprehended on August 5 or 6, 1965 the
fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI, otherwise known
respectively as Srta. Agnes and Srta. Winnie, these vessels were
found to be without the necessary license in violation of Section
903 of the Tariff and Customs Code and therefore subject to
seizure under Section 2210 of the same Code, and illegally fishing
with explosives and without fishing license required by Sections
17 and 18 of the Fisheries Law. Moreover, the two fishing boats
were subject to previous violations of Sections 12, 17 and 18 of
the Fisheries Act from March 28, 1963 until August 5 or 6, 1965.
This rendered the said vessels subject to forfeiture under Sections
76 and 78 of the Fisheries Act, as amended.
Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the search warrant must be sought before such warrant
could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a
search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply
to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws.
They are usually equipped with powerful motors that
enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy
or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and
seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful
arrest. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two
vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite
and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without
a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful.
Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and
dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful
arrest.
(c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there
is an imminent peril to life or limb; and
(d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock
at the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the
officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence
is being attempted.
CASE # 156: People v Gatward
FACTS:
U aung win, after being caught for violating the
dangerous drug act by importing heroin into the philippines,
provided information that helped the authorities catch gatward, a
drug courier from bangkok who is connected with u aung win’s
contact in thailand. U aung win pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to 25 years or reclusion perpetua, while gatward was sentenced
to 35 years of reclusion perpetua. Gatward filed an appeal, only
to withdraw it afterwards.
ISSUE: Whether or not gatward’s and u ang win’s suitcases may
be searched without warrant
HELD: While no search warrant had been obtained for that
purpose, when appellant checked in his bag as his personal
luggage as a passenger of klm flight no. 806 he thereby agreed
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and
regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and
waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent
arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it
was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his
bag, or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of accused u aung win
in criminal case no. 94-6269 is likewise unassailable. His
culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also
upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which
was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence
thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this
country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for
customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport.
There was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law
to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any
authority to do so.
CASE # 157: People vs. Johnson
FACTS:
Leila johnson was arrested at the airport after she was
found to have in her possession more than 500 grams of shabu
when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a gate in
the airport. After a thorough search on respondent, packets of
shabu were seized from her. Accused (respondent) was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In
the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made
upon her was not valid and that her constitutional rights were
infringed when such search was conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search was made.
HELD:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated
as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of
section 5, rule 113 of the 1985 rules of criminal procedure which
provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. The circumstances surrounding the
arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph a or b of the
rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected
to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.
The shabu seized from her during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures. Persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of
subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With
increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal
detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked luggage
are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures
suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the
reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or
substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having
thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was
justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
“shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
CASE # 158: PEOPLE v. HEDISHI SUZUKI
G.R. No. 120670. October 23, 2003
FACTS:
Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of marijuana
(1.9kg), defined and penalized under Section 8, Article II of R.A.
TOPIC: “STOP AND FRISK”
CASE # 159: Terry vs. Ohio
FACTS:
Acting suspiciously, the petitioner and another man was
approached by a Cleveland detective McFadden. When McFadden
spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, he
found a pistol in petitioner’s overcoat pocket. The officer ordered
the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took
out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their
hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and
Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket.
He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since
he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a
weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until
he felt the guns. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure (stopping and frisking) is
valid.
HELD:
Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the
circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that
of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for
weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and
dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the
individual is armed.
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable,
secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure
cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat is required.
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and
seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances
against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate.
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function
of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to approach
petitioner and his companions.
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying
a weapon.
No. 6525. Items, inside the box of piaya, were detected by
metal detector at the airport.
Suzuki contends that he did not know it was a
marijuana as the box was only given as a pasalubong by the
woman he had sexual relations with.
ISSUE: WON the agents had legal authority and probable
cause to search and open the box in question.
HELD:
YES, based upon the Memorandum of Understanding,
pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to R.A. 6235.
Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag or attach
case with the following limitation:
c. It can be readily opened for inspection (PAFM
3-9, page 2-4).
Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for Safeguarding
Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, particularly
paragraph 3.6.4 when x-ray inspection is not possible or
when the x-ray image of a bag gives rise to suspicion, x x x, a
manual search must be carried out…
Appellant gave his consent when PO1 Casugod asked
him to open the box was confirmed by SPO1 Linda and PO3
Poyugao. As succinctly found by the trial court, appellant cannot
deny that he consented by feigning ignorance of the English
language
To sustain the stand of the accused exclusively limiting
the authority to open and search suspicious luggages would
result to absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their
authority to perform their duty of maintaining order, preserving
peace, protecting life and property and other police works such
as crime detection, while within the airport premises.
Search conducted pursuant to routine airport
security procedure as an exception to the proscription
against warrantless searches.
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable
cause to arrest must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
of the situation.
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest
where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before being
possessed of information justifying arrest.
NOTE: Distinctions between a "stop" and an "arrest" (or a
"seizure" of a person), and between a "frisk" and a "search." It is
argued, the police should be allowed to "stop" a person and
detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he
may be connected with criminal activity. Upon suspicion
that the person may be armed, the police should have the
power to "frisk" him for weapons. If the "stop" and the
"frisk" give rise to probable cause to believe that the
suspect has committed a crime, then the police should be
empowered to make a formal "arrest," and a full incident "search"
of the person. This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that
a "stop" and a "frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and
petty indignity," which can properly be imposed upon the citizen
in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police
officer's suspicion.
CASE # 160: PEOPLE vs. SOLAYAO
FACTS:
An investigation was conducted to act on reports on the
presence of armed men roaming around barangays of Caibiran
Biliran. The agents came across the group of Solayao and became
suspicious of them because the accused-appellant himself is
drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. They
became more suspicious over the group when they fled upon
noticing of the approaching of the officers, leaving Solayao alone.
A 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as
"latong."(shotgun), was found in his possession. When he asked
accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm
or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence
group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess
the same. Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition defined and penalized
under PD No. 1866.
ISSUE: WON the firearm is inadmissible evidence as it was the
product of an unlawful warrantless search and constitutes a
violation of constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
HELD:
 NO. The firearm is an admissible evidence and the act is not
a violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The court referred to the Posadas case where the Supreme
Court said that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to
flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something
in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The
said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
Supreme Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and
seizure in the Posadas case brought about by the suspicious
conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search
even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after the officer told Solayao not to run
away, the former identified himself as a government agent. The
peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm
(that he has in his possession “latong”), but since they were in
the task verifying the report that there were armed men roaming
around in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the suspicious acts of Solayao’s group.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an
instance where a search and seizure may be effected
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause
to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court
when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.
***he was still acquitted because the prosecution failed to
produce evidence that the Solayao has no license to carry the
firearm.
CASE # 161: Manalili vs. CA
FACTS:
Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery. This was done after receiving information that drug
addicts were roaming around said area. The policemen chanced
upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner.
Officers were able to introduce themselves and
policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner
had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed
the officer to examine it, a suspected crushed marijuana residue
was found.
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves
found in his possession, contending that they were products of an
illegal search.
Respondent, counters that the inadmissibility of the
marijuana leaves was waived because petitioner never raised this
issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
admissibility in evidence. He adds that the search was legal
because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected
marijuana is unreasonable, and hence inadmissible as evidence.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the search was valid being
akin to a stop-and-frisk. The general rule is a search and seizure
must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this
constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any
proceeding. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another
exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant.
(Terry vs. Ohio)
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his
companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had
red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular
hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such
investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s possession.
CASE # 162: MALACAT vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a
hand grenade after he was searched by a group of policemen
when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was hanging
around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with
other Muslim-looking men. When the policemen approached the
group of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the
police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a
search was made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence,
the present petition wherein petitioner contended that the lower
court erred in holding that the search made on him and the
seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident
to his arrest and that it erred in admitting the hand grenade as
evidence since it was admissible because it was a product of an
unreasonable and illegal search.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was
valid.
RULING:
Trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk"
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot
be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk,"
it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light
of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
CASE # 163: FLORIDA v. J. L. No. 98-1993 (2000)
RULING:
We hold that it is not. An anonymous tip that a person is
carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police
officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for the protection
of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for
weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual
conduct where, inter alia, the officer reasonably concludes in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous.
Here, the officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon
arose not from their own observations but solely from a call made
from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip lacked
sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to
make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and
therefore left the police without means to test the informant's
knowledge or credibility. The contentions of Florida and the United
States as amicus that the tip was reliable because it accurately
described J. L.'s visible attributes misapprehend the reliability
needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable suspicion
here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.