For Digest: Deadline, Sunday(Feb.

25) 11:59 pm
Coverage for Monday(Feb.26) Start tayo sa Rule 41 case of Gov of Kingdom of Belgium vs. CA
until Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. COA

Start Digest on Page 3! Thank you.

Format
Case name
By: insert name

Doctrine:
F:
I:
H:

Rule 42 Petition for Review RTC to CA

1. Sps. Plopenio vs. DAR - Alba
2. Sps. Lanaria vs. Planta - Arid
3. Bernardo vs. People - Bernardo
4. Heirs of Jose Esplana vs. CA - Bigornia
5. Gutierrez vs. Cabrera - Corona
6. Barredo vs. People - De Castro

Rule 43

7. Fabian vs. Desierto - Gaite

8. Nava vs. NBI - Grande
9. Belongilot vs. CUA - Jovero
10. Carpio-Morales vs. CA - Lapuz
11. COMELEC-Querubin vs. COMELEC - Mano
12.Galindo vs. COA - Marasigan
13. Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. COA - Pangilinan
------------------------------------------------------end of coverage----------------------------------------------------
Case Digest of Argovan - Videogram Due on March 4

14. Argovan vs. San Miguel Corp - Radovan

15. Orosa vs. Roa - Rosario
16. St.Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC - Samson
17. National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesm - Torres
18. Abbot Laboratories Phils vs. Abbot Laboatories Employees Union - Valencia, E
19. CEU vs. CA - Alba
20. CHED vs. Mercado - Arid
21. SSC vs. CA - Bernardo
22. Deloso vs. Marapa - Bigornia
23. B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs.Alzul - Corona
24. Maniebo vs. CA - De Castro
25. Vergel de Dios vs. CA - Gaite
26. Videogram Regulatory Board vs. CA - Grande
Rule 42

1. Sps. Plopenio vs. DAR

Sps. Plopenio vs. DAR

G. R. No. 161090, July 04, 2012
By: Alba, Ma. Angela

Doctrine: The only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review to the Court
of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.

Facts: Petitioners in the two consolidated cases own several hectares of land of coconut land in Caramoan,
Camarines Sur. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio located in the same locality was valued by the
DARAB at P51,125.60 per hectare. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the DAR for
acquisition and distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at P23,485.00 per
hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners
rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for summary administrative proceedings.

A copy of the PARAD’s Decision affirming the valuation made by Land Bank was received by petitioners on 27
September 2002. On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The
PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21 December
2002.

Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after their receipt of the
PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of
denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be
allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003.

The SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file
their Petitions on time. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motions were denied. From the Decisions
and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before this Court.

Issue: Whether the Decisions or Orders of the SAC-RTC may be directly appealed to the Supreme Court.

Held: No. The consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible because petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode
of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this Court.

Section 60 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides:

Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the
decision shall become final.

An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case
may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme Court within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy of said decision.

Clearly, following the letter of the CARL, petitioners should have appealed the SAC-RTC Decision to the CA. While
the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court via a
Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courts designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals.
The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and
appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be
taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those
dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC
is via a Rule 42 petition for review to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises
questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

2. Sps. Lanaria vs. Planta

(2)
Sps. Lanaria v. Planta
G.R. No. 172891, November 22, 2007
By: ARID, Hannah Mhae G.

Doctrine: There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant
may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure as regards Rule 42 Section 2. This ruling is in consonance with
the fact that the Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records which must be
annexed to the petition, apart from the assailed judgment, final order, or resolution.

Facts: Petitioner Francis John Lanaria is the son of decedent Belen M. Lanaria, while respondent Francisco M.
Planta is the nephew and one of the heirs of the late Rosario Planta. Rosario was the registered owner and
possessor of a parcel of land situated in Iloilo City.

Respondent was the plaintiff[1]min a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against the spouses Henry Lanaria and
the late Belen M. Lanariabefore the MTC of Oton, Iloilo. The Complaint alleged that sometime in 1950, Rosario
Planta, through her permission and generosity, allowed the grandparents and parents of Belen Lanaria to construct
their house on a portion of the parcel of land with an implied promise to vacate the premises and restore
possession thereof to her or her heirs upon demand. A formal demand to vacate was sent to defendants on 4 July
2003, but they refused to heed the same.

MTC: rendered its Decision in favor of respondent Francisco M. Planta. Respondent was declared the lawful co-
owner of the subject lot. Petitioners were ordered to vacate the lot and to deliver physical possession thereof to the
respondent, and to remove and transfer at their expense the house and other improvements introduced on the lot.

RTC: affirmed with modification the Decision of the MTC, deleting the award of attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. The RTC agreed with the MTC in finding that the registered owner Rosario Planta and her heirs, one of
whom is respondent, are entitled to the possession of the parcel of land considering that the subject lot is titled
property. The RTC and the MTC explained that respondent is under the protective mantle of the Torrens Title so
that even if the registered owner and successor-in-interest are not in actual possession of the property, they are
nevertheless considered owners thereof and, as such, have the right to recover or vindicate it from any person
found to be unlawfully possessing it.

Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC.

On 3 August 2004, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Petition for Review
sought the reversal of the MTC and RTC Decisions, and prayed for the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioners argued the lack of a cause of action on the part of respondent. Attached to the Petition for Review were
original or certified true copies of the decisions and orders of both lower courts.

Court of Appeals: finding petitioners Petition for Review deficient in form and substance, resolved to outrightly
dismiss the petition.

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Allow/Admit the Inclusion of Pleadings and Other
Material Documents. Petitioners explained that the failure to attach copies of documents in support of their petition
was due to oversight and inadvertence, and asked the Court of Appeals to allow the inclusion of the pleadings
attached to the Motion for Reconsideration, in the most prevailing interests of substantive justice, equity and
substantive rights. The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration and in not allowing the inclusion of the
pleadings and other material documents submitted together with the Motion for Reconsideration.

Held: YES, petition is meritorious.

Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the procedure for appeals from the Decision of
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Said section reads:
SEC. 2. Form and Contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with
the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a)
state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges
thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that
it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised,
the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court,
and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied
by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of
plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. (Emphasis ours.)

Non-compliance with any of the foregoing requisites is a ground for the dismissal of a petition based on
Section 3 of the same Rule, to wit:
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.

The Court ruled that the subsequent submission of the following documents annexed to their Motion for
Reconsideration - viz, Complaint for Ejectment, Transfer Certificate of Title, Answer to the Complaint, Four
Affidavits, Position Paper filed by petitioners, Memorandum on Appeal, Appellees Memorandum, and Motion for
Reconsideration - constitutes substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule 42. Jurisprudence pertaining to the same
has established that submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial
compliance with the requirement that relevant or pertinent documents be submitted along with the petition, and
calls for the relaxation of procedural rules. There is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and
substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. This ruling is in
consonance with the fact that the Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records
which must be annexed to the petition, apart from the assailed judgment, final order, or resolution.

Moreover, under Section 3(d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals is
with authority to require the parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary to promote the interests
of substantial justice. When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of copies, the
Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to complete the annexes or file the necessary
number of copies of the petition before docketing the case.

Respondent contends that petitioners violated anew formal and procedural requirements for failure to comply with
the provisions of Section 4(d), Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming that the Petition for Review,
Motion for Reconsideration, other Material Documents, and Comment submitted to this Court were neither
duplicate originals nor duly certified true copies. In an En Banc Decision promulgated on 3 February 2000, this
Court declared that Rule 42, governing petitions for review from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, requires that only
the judgments or final orders of the lower courts need to be certified true copies or duplicate originals.
 3. Bernardo vs. People

Bernardo vs. People

G.R. No. 166980. April 3, 2007
By: Gerard Bernardo

Doctrine: The extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the
expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date
later than the expiration of such original period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
holiday.

Facts:
(basically, nag ask si petitioner ng 30 days extension to file petition for review from June 1, 2004 (15th day after
decision). CA granted the motion, but, for 15 days only (bale, up to June 16, 2004), however, this decision was
only made on June 21, 2004)

Two Informations were filed against the petitioner for violating B.P. 22. At the pretrial, petitioner failed to appear
despite notice, prompting the MeTC to issue a warrant of arrest against him and set the cases for trial in absentia.
After the prosecution presented its first witness, petitioner filed a Waiver of Appearance, a Motion to Lift Warrant of
Arrest, and a Motion to Quash. The trial court lifted the warrant of arrest in view of petitioner’s appearance but
denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit. At the following trial date, petitioner failed to appear despite notice,
drawing the trial court to proceed with his trial in absentia and issue warrant of arrest against him. The trial court
found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. 22 in all the cases.

Ten months following the promulgation of the judgment, petitioner posted a bond before another branch of the
court. The trial court cancelled the bond and issued an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner thereupon filed a Motion
for Partial Reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA. Petitioner filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review within 30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsel’s
receipt of the RTC Order denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals, by Resolution of June 21, 2004, granted petitioner an extension, but only 15 days
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 42, to file his Petition. Apparently unaware of the above-said Resolution
of June 21, 2004 under which his petition would be filed not later than June 16, 2004, petitioner used
up the 30-day extension sought and filed his petition on July 1, 2004. Petitioner in fact received the
June 21, 2004 Resolution only on July 9, 2004.

By Resolution of July 30, 2004, the appellate court denied petitioner’s petition due course for having
been filed 15 days late and for failure to attach the MeTC Decision and other pertinent and material documents.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by Resolution of January 14, 2005, the appellate court
noting that the MeTC Decision attached to the Motion for Reconsideration was a mere photocopy and uncertified.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in reckoning the period of 15 days extension from the expiry date of the
original period of 15 days from receipt of the decision of the regional trial court or final order appealed from,
instead of from date of the receipt of the order granting extension.

Ruling: NO.
Petitioner argues that the 15-day extension granted to him by the appellate court should be reckoned from his date
of receipt of its June 21, 2004 Resolution. The argument fails. A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC is clear. It provides that “[a]ny
extension of time to file the required pleading should . . . be counted from the expiration of the period . . .” The
extension should thus be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the expiration of such
period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the
expiration of such original period, not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.

Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in not resolving his motion for extension before the expiration of the
15-day extension so that he would have known that his request for 30 days was not granted.

Petitioner’s position does not lie too. Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an “additional
period of 15 days only” within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a “further
extension” not to exceed 15 days may be granted “for the most compelling reason,” petitioner had no basis to
assume that his request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers
should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement would be granted or that they would be
granted the length of time they pray for.

Petitioner claims, however, that his motion for extension presented a compelling reason for the grant of a further
extension. Justifying the 30-day period sought, petitioner explains that he was implicitly seeking both a 15-day
extension and a further extension of 15 days.

The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in restrictive terms. Section 1 of Rule 42
provides that “[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.”

Petitioner’s motion for extension was anchored on a lone ground, his counsel’s being “pre-occupied in the
preparation of petitions, memoranda, briefs, and other lengthy pleadings in cases as important as this case” and in
“daily court appearance and personal commitments.” Sustaining petitioner’s lone ground would obliterate the
distinguishing essence of a further extension for it would do away with the necessity of presenting compelling
grounds addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

But crediting arguendo petitioner’s “implicit” justification, this Court sees no reason to disturb the exercise by the
appel late court of its discretion in denying a “cumulative” extension and in effectively ruling that heavy workload
of counsel is not a most compelling reason.

4. Heirs of Jose Esplana vs. CA

Heirs of Jose Esplana vs. CA
G.R. No. 155758, October 31, 2008
By: Donna Bigornia

Doctrine: Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court is very clear that petitioners are allowed an extension of only 15
days to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although a further extension not to exceed 15 days may
be granted only for the most compelling reason. Further, before the Court of Appeals may grant the 15-day
extension to file a petition for review, Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the payment of the full amount
of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit of the necessary amount for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period.

Facts: Esplana filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, quieting of title with damages against
Pedro de Lima before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). The MTC tried and decided the case as an action for forcible
entry. The MTC dismissed the complaint. Regional Trial Court (RTC) remanded the case to the MTC for the court to
decide the issue of ownership. Pursuant to the RTC Order, the MTC tried the case anew to resolve who between the
contending parties has the real ownership over the property. MTC found the preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendant; hence, it dismissed the Complaint. The petitioners appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto and dismissed the appeal. The petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the
RTC decision on February 21, 2002. On March 7, 2002, petitioners’ counsel filed before the Court of Appeals a
motion for extension of 30 days within which to file a petition for review reckoned from March 8, 2002. He stated
that he could not submit the petition on the deadline, March 8, 2002, due to Jose Esplana’s untimely death, his day
to day court appearance and the voluminous paper works in his office. Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
granting petitioners only 15 days, reckoned from March 8, 2002 or until March 23, 2002, which was received by
the petitioners’ counsel on May 29, 2002. However, he already filed the petition for review on April 5, 2002, which
was within the 30-day extension requested for. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and expunged it
from the records of the case for having been filed out of time on April 5, 2002, instead of the deadline, March 23,
2002. After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the appeal of the petitioners on the ground that it was filed out of time.

Ruling: No. Petition is dismissed.

Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner an appeal by petition for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals is taken:

SECTION 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial
Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees,
depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court is very clear that petitioners are allowed an extension of only 15 days to file a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although a further extension not to exceed 15 days may be granted
only for the most compelling reason. The grounds stated by petitioners (death of the original party; indecision to
pursue the case on appeal) in not so compelling as to entitle them to a further extension.
Further, before the Court of Appeals may grant the 15-day extension to file a petition for review, Sec. 1, Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court requires the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit of
the necessary amount for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period. These, petitioners failed to do.
Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers are
expected to be knowledgeable of the rule on the grant of such motion. The requirements for perfecting an appeal
within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.

5. Gutierrez vs. Cabrera

(5)
Gutierrez vs. Cabrera
By: Jose Enrico Corona

Doctrine: Formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for review
that erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals. In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners attention
to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.

Facts: Felicima Gutierrez purchased a land from her mother, Buenaventura. Primitive entered into a lease
agreement with Cabrera over the parcel of land. After some time, Felicima’s son, Apolinario, checked the property.
Cabrera hacked Apolinario with a bolo. Cabrera then filed a case for trespassing before the MTC. the complaint was
dismissed. Petitioners now asked Cabrera o vacate the land but Cabrera refused. Petitioner filed an ejectment suit
before the MTC. Cabrera filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. MTC denied the motion.
MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. RTC affirmed despite the allegation that what was involved was agrarian
dispute hence it should have been within DAR’s jurisdiction.

Cabrera appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner opposed on the ground that the lower court judge was not
impleaded hence contrary with Sec. 2 Rule 42. CA reversed the decision of the MTC and the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal should have been dismissed for failure to implead the lower court judge?

Held: No. Impleading a lower court judge as respondent in the petition for review does not automatically mean the
dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.

Formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for review that
erroneously impleaded the Court of Appeals. In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners attention to the
defects and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.

The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case. While the Court has
unquestionably the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to
dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. This is in
accordance with Rule 1, Section 6[33] which encourages a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that
will help secure and not defeat justice.

BAKA ITANONG NI SIR (REGARDING DEFECT IN NOTICE OF HEARING)

Apropos the last issue, concerning the motion to dismiss filed by respondent before the MTC, we have time and
again warned that a notice of hearing which does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, is a worthless piece of paper and would not merit any consideration from the courts. The clerk
of court does not have the duty to accept it, much less, to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The
defect cannot be cured by any subsequent action of the court and it is grave abuse of discretion of the court to
overlook the mandatory rule on notice and act on the motion.
6. Barredo vs. People

(6)
Barredo vs People
By: Kathrina De Castro

DOCTRINE: Failure to attach a copy of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) decision in a petition under Rule
42 is not fatal where it is the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not that of the MTCC, which is the subject
of the appeal

FACTS: Petitioner Barredo was charged for perjury before the Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) in Cities of Butuan City.
She allegedly makes an untruthful statement in her affidavit-complaint for usurpation of authority and illegal
detention against Atty. Ricardo Gonzalez. That the latter “usurped police functions” by instructing the police to
impound her truck loaded with sacks of rice and illegally detain her truck helpers following a vehicular mishap on
September 12, 1998 which involved her truck. The MTCC rendered judgment convicting Barredo of perjury. The
decision was affirmed by the RTC. On petition for review with The CA, it dismissed the petition outright on technical
ground – failure to attach a copy of the MTCC decision.

Barredo filed an MR but was denied, hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari. Barredo contends that her petition
before the appellate court merits reinstatement since she attached thereto a carbon original of the RTC decision
which affirmed the trial court’s decision, and which restated verbatim the findings of facts of the trial court. On the
other hand, Atty. Ricardo Gonzalez claimed that “no persuasive reason” was given by petitioner to justify her
failure to append to her petition a copy of the MTCC decision.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing Barredo’s petition for review

HELD: Yes. While Rule 42, Section 2(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that, inter alia,
the petition shall “be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts,” the cited deficiency in petitioner’s petition does not make it insufficient in form and
substance since it is the decision of the RTC, not that of the MTCC, which is the subject of her appeal. What is
important is that in her petition, she attached thereto the original copy of the RTC decision which quoted
extensively the findings of the MTCC, including its discussion on the application of the law, that were affirmed in
toto.

In the case of Silverio vs CA: “x x x [A] party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his complaint or defense. He ought not to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. Rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application based on technicalities will only frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. x x x. In the case at
bar, it was inappropriate for the Court of Appeals to deny the petition on the ground alone that the petitioner failed
to attach to the said petition a duplicate original or true copy of the MTC decision because it was supposed to
review the decision not of the MTC but of the RTC, notwithstanding that the latter affirmed in toto the judgment of
the MTC. In short, the failure to attach the MTC decision did not adversely affect the sufficiency of the petition
because it was, in any event, accompanied by the RTC decision sought to be reviewed.”

Rule 43
7. Fabian vs. Desierto

Fabian vs Desierto
G.R. 129742, 16 September 1998
By: Rhio

Doctrine: The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the
Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was
precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Facts: Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the
offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, and
private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public
works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office. Later, misunderstandings and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried to terminate their relationship,
private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him.

Respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without
pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the
former’s new counsel had been his “classmate and close associate” hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997,
set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondent from the
administrative charges.

Petitioner’s argument: Fabian claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law “increasing” the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court “as provided in this Constitution,” and such appellate jurisdiction includes “all cases in
which only an error or question of law is involved.” Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitution authorizes
this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final judgment or orders
“as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,” said Section 27 does not increase this Court’s appellate jurisdiction
since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari under Rule 45, then what may be
raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether Sec. 27 of RA 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to this Court of the aforementioned
adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of the Constitution

Held: No. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on
“Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court,” explicitly states:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Thus, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

8. Nava vs. NBI

NAVA vs. NBI

G.R. No. 134509 April 12, 2005
 By: Grande, Jonicocel
Doctrine: Appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now
cognizable by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65 may be filed with this Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution.

Facts: The case subject of this Petition emanated from anonymous letter-complaints filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman alleging that fake Equivalent Record Forms (ERFs) of several teachers of the Davao City National High
School were made the bases for the Plantilla Allocation List (PAL) for calendar year 1988 and for the teachers'
corresponding promotion and salary upgrading.
The Office of the Ombudsman referred the matter to the NBI and directed it to conduct a fact-finding investigation.
The investigation by the NBII disclosed, among others, the submission by a certain Velez of a Service Record
containing fabricated facts and the handing in of fake ERFs by other teachers which were the bases of the PAL
approved as correct by Nava who was then the DECS Regional Director. The NBI recommended the filing of
appropriate charges against the teachers and officials concerned.
Nava filed before the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Reinvestigation which was granted in a
Resolution. Special Prosecution Officer Corpuz recommended the dismissal of the charges against Nava and
Granada for insufficiency of evidence. This recommendation was, however, disapproved by the Ombudsman.
A Petition filed pursuant to Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
in relation to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Venancio R. Nava (hereinafter, Nava) assails the
disapproval by the Ombudsman of the Order.
The NBI pointed out that the instant Petition is one for review on certiorari pursuant to Section 27 of R.A. 6770 in
relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which provision of law had already been declared unconstitutional in
Fabian case. Pursuant to the Court's ruling, appeals from orders, directives or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. In any event, as the instant case is not an administrative disciplinary case, the proper
remedy should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, even assuming
that this remedy was pursued, since there is nothing on record to even suggest that the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to have the case against Nava dismissed, the NBI insists that the Petition
must fail.
Nava in his Consolidated Reply stressed that the instant Petition was filed on before the promulgation of the Fabian
case; and maintained that it was then his honest position that Section 27 of R.A. 6770 was available as a remedy
in non-administrative cases notwithstanding its silence on the matter. Nava implored the Court to consider the
instant Petition instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as the actuations of the
Ombudsman amount to a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Held: NO.
The court agrees that the alternative remedy avails. Although as a consequence of the decision in Fabian, appeals
from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the
Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed
with this Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution. In Kuizon case, we held that the Court has
jurisdiction over such petitions questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.
As Nava himself beseeched the Court to consider his Petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, we shall
treat the same as one.
Deliberating upon the Petition and the arguments in support thereof side by side with the comments of the
respondent thereon, we find that the Petition fails to show a grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Nava's asseveration that the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion when he disapproved the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor urging the dismissal of the case
against the petitioner and without giving any reasons therefor is specious. The Ombudsman is not duty bound to
render anew a statement of facts or elaborate on the applicable law.
Likewise, it cannot be said that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion because he opined
differently from the Special Prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to
believe that Nava is guilty of the offense charged. If the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint outright for lack of
merit, it necessarily follows that it is also within his discretion to determine whether the evidence before him is
sufficient to establish probable cause. In case of conflict between the conclusion of the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor, the former's decision shall prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision
and control of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman's act of disapproving the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor to dismiss the case against
Nava was not whimsical or capricious. He disapproved the recommendation of the Special Prosecutor because in his
estimation, there was sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This was an exercise of the powers of the
Ombudsman based on constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise.

9. Belongilot vs. Cua

(09) Belongilot v. Cua
G.R. No. 160933, Nov. 24, 2010
By: Jovero, John Tristram V.

Doctrine: Remedy against decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases should be a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. However, the Supreme Court has the duty to take
cognizance of the allegations of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the performance of this duty, there is no legal
stumbling block if it deviates from the requirements of form and procedure that stand in the way in favor of
substance.

Facts: The petitioner’s wife, Leonarda Belongilot, was the owner of several parcels of land. Sometime in 1979,
Juanito Constantino forcibly entered and took possession of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the subject lots), and converted
them into a fishpond. Leonarda filed an ejectment complaint against Constantino before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator Board (PARAB). Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Gregorio B. Sapora, in his
Decision of May 21, 2001, directed Constantino and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the subject
lots.

Constantino filed, on October 8, 2001, a notice of appeal before the PARAB, but PARAD Toribio F. Ilao dismissed
this notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. PARAD Ilao issued a writ of execution in favor of Leonarda.

Constantino, through Atty. Restituto David, filed, on May 21, 2002, a petition for injunction with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), without
asking for the reconsideration of the dismissal of his notice of appeal. He prayed that the implementation of PARAD
Sapora’s May 21, 2001 Decision be restrained and that his notice of appeal, dated October 8, 2001, be given due
course.

Leonarda filed, on November 21, 2002, a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction, alleging that the DARAB has
no jurisdiction over the petition because of Constantino’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the April 16,
2002 Order of PARAD Ilao. She further argues that the decision sought to be restrained had already been
implemented. Meanwhile, the DARAB, in its Resolution of December 27, 2002, granted Constantino’s application for
a writ of injunction, and "enjoined" the implementation of the writ of execution. The DARAB also ordered that the
records of the case be elevated to it within 15 days from receipt of its resolution.

On January 20, 2003, the petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an amended criminal complaint, for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, against the respondents in their capacity as officers and members of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the DARAB, respectively.

Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed the decision of the Ombudsman via Rule 45 instead of
Rule 65.

Issue: Whether or not appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy?

Held: No. It is not the proper remedy. The proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, SC
still took cognizance of the case.

The petitioner’s complaint before the Ombudsman, charging the respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is undoubtedly criminal in nature. The petitioner’s recourse to this Court should have,
therefore, been through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, instead of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Thus, from a procedural perspective, the OSG’s claim that the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy
appears to be correct.

We would have readily agreed with the OSG’s conclusion had the petitioner simply dwelt on errors of law in his
petition. Our reading of the petition, however, and as our discussions below will show, readily reveals that the
petition, while entitled and presented as a petition for review on certiorari, in fact, outlines and charges acts that
collectively constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Ombudsman. In other words, while the petitioner followed the Rule 45 procedures, the substance of the petition
handily satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus viewed, the issue before us is whether
the procedure and its form or substance should have primacy.

Our choice when faced with this kind of conflict, particularly one that involves grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is clear. No less than the Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly
directs the Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but, "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." We, thus, have the duty to take cognizance of the allegations of grave abuse of discretion; in the
performance of this duty, we see no legal stumbling block if we deviate from the requirements of form and
procedure that stand in the way in favor of substance.

10. Carpio-Morales vs. CA

(10) Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals

By: Jesus Ros Lapuz, Jr

Dontrine: Orders and decisions of the Ombudsman are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.

Facts: This involves the charges of Plunder and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involving the
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building against former Makati mayor Binay jr. The Ombudsman found
after conducting a fact-finding investigation that the evidence against Binay Jr. is strong thereby placing him under
a preventive suspension for not more than 6 months without pay, during the pendency of the cases against him.
On the other hand, Binay Jr. contended, among others, that he could no longer be prosecuted because the alleged
anomalies against him transpired during his first term as Mayor of Makati and having been elected for the second
term, it effectively condoned his administrative liability rendering the case moot and academic. In addition, Binay
jr. likewise contends that, in any event, the preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman was misplaced as it
failed to show that the evidence of his guilt is not strong. Thereafter, the Court Appeals issued a TRO against the
implementation of the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, to which the latter elevated by the Supreme
Court contending that the CA has no subject matter jurisdiction over the matter as under the Ombudsman Act,
only the Supreme Court may enjoin its orders.

Issue: Does the CA have subject jurisdiction over the instant case rendering the second paragraph of the
Ombudsman Act unconstitutional?

Held: Yes.
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to
effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore
concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s
posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part material in
that they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman.

In the case of Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since
it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation
of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with
Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above intimated, applies only to a review of
“judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court, or other courts authorized by law”; and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman,
the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals.

As a consequence of the SC’s ratiocination that Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. Since the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus —
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 — attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid.

11. Comelec-Querubin vs.Comelec

Querubin vs Comelec
G.R. No. 218787. December 8, 2015
By: Razna Mano

Doctrine: The Supreme Court has consistently held that the phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional
commissions, the Commission on Elections included, that may be brought directly to the SC on certiorari is not all
encompassing, and that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions’ exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers.

Facts: On October 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Banc, through its Resolution No. 14-0715, released the bidding
documents for the “Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for the Lease of Election Management System (EMS) and
Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical Scan (OP-SCAN) System” to be used in the 2016 National
and Local Elections. The COMELEC Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) set the deadline for the submission by
interested parties of their eligibility requirements and initial technical proposal on December 4, 2014.

The joint venture of Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and Jarltech
International Corporation (collectively referred to as “Smartmatic JV”), Indra Sistemas, S.A. (Indra) and MIRU
Systems Co. Ltd. likewise signified their interest in the project, but only Indra, aside from Smartmatic JV,
submitted its bid.

Upon evaluation of the submittals, the BAC, through its Resolution No. 1, declared Smartmatic JV and Indra eligible
to participate in the second stage of the bidding process. The BAC then issued a Notice requiring them to submit
their Final Revised Technical Tenders and Price proposals to which the eligible participants complied. Smartmatic
JV, on March 26, 2015, was declared to have tendered a complete and responsive Overall Summary of the
Financial Proposal. Meanwhile, Indra was disqualified for submitting a nonresponsive bid.

Subsequently, for purposes of post-qualification evaluation, the BAC required Smartmatic JV to submit additional
documents and a prototype sample of its OMR. The prototype was subjected to testing to gauge its compliance
with the requirements outlined in the project's Terms of Reference (TOR).

After the conduct of post-qualification, the BAC, through Resolution No. 9 dated May 5, 2015, disqualified
Smartmatic JV on two grounds, viz.:

1. Failure to submit valid AOI; and

2. The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system shall be capable of writing all data/files,
auditlog, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least two (2) data storages.

The ruling prompted Smartmatic JV to move for reconsideration which was denied by BAC.
Aggrieved, Smartmatic JV filed a Protest to the COMELEC En Banc seeking permission to conduct another technical
demonstration. Accordingly, Smartmatic JV was allowed to prove compliance with the technical specifications for
the second time, but this time before the electoral tribunal's Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). This was
followed by another technical demonstration before the Commission en banc.

The seven-man commission was unanimous in holding that Smartmatic JV’s OMR+ sufficiently satisfied the
technical requirements itemized in the TOR.

Notwithstanding Smartmatic JV’s compliance with the technical requirements in the TOR, Commissioner Luie Tito F.
Guia (Guia) would nonetheless dissent in part, questioning the sufficiency of the documents submitted by the
Smartmatic JV.

Petitioners now assail the Decision of the COMELEC through Rule 64.

In challenging, petitioners; filing as taxpayers, alleged that the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring Smartmatic JV as the bidder with the lowest
calculated responsive bid. According to petitioners, Smartmatic JV cannot be declared eligible, even more so as the
bidder with the lowest calculated responsive bid, because one of its proponents, SMTC, holding 46.5% of the
shares of Smartmatic JV, no longer has a valid corporate purpose as required under Sec. 14 of BP 68 and that the
primary purpose of SMTC is to to do, perform and comply will all the obligations needed for the automation of the
2010 national and local elections which was already fulfilled.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 64 is the proper remedy.

Held: NO.

The Court has consistently held that the phrase “decision, order, or ruling” of constitutional commissions, the
COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and
that it only relates to those rendered in the commissions’ exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the
case of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision’s coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings issued pursuant
to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of elective offices.

The instant petition revolves around the issue on whether or not Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate in the
bidding process for the COMELEC’s procurement of 23,000 units of optical mark readers. The case does not stem
from an election controversy involving the election, qualification, or the returns of an elective office. Rather, it
pertains to the propriety of the polling commission’s conduct of the procurement process, and its initial finding that
Smartmatic JV is eligible to participate therein. It springs from the COMELEC’s compliance with the Constitutional
directive to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Specifically, it
arose from the electoral commission’s exercise of Sec. 12 of RA 8436, otherwise known as the Automated Elections
Law, as amended by RA 9369, which authorized the COMELEC “to procure, in accordance with existing laws, by
purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other
services, from local or foreign sources free from taxes and import duties, subject to accounting and auditing rules
and regulation.”

It goes without saying that petitioners’ action, having been lodged through an improper petition, is susceptible to
outright dismissal. As the Court held in Pates v. COMELEC, 591 SCRA 481 (2009), a Rule 64 petition cannot simply
be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. The clear distinction between the instant petition
and Pates, however, is that in Pates, therein petitioner failed to present an exceptional circumstance or any
compelling reason that would have warranted the liberal application of the Rules of Court. In stark contrast, herein
petitioners, as will later on be discussed, were able to establish a meritorious case for the relaxation of the rules,
relieving them from the rigid application of procedural requirements. We therefore treat the instant recourse as one
filed not merely in relation to, but under Rule 65.

12. Galindo vs. COA

GALINDO vs COA
 GR No. 210788, January 10, 2017
By: Mariz

Doctrine: In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy in case of an adverse
decision is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission and not a petition for certiorari before this Court under Rule
64.

Facts: On 2 June 2008, then MWSS Administrator Diosdado Jose M. Allado wrote a letter to then COA Chairman
Reynaldo A. Villar (Chairman Villar) about unrecorded checks relating to Mendoza's cash advances which were
allegedly used to pay claims for bonuses and other benefits of persons assigned at the COA Auditing Unit of the
MWSS (COA-MWSS).

Chairman Villar issued Office Order No. 2009-528, dated 21 July 2009, and constituted a team from the COA's
Fraud Audit and Investigation Office - Legal Services Sector (FAIO-LSS) for a fact-finding investigation. The team
submitted its Investigation Report dated 24 June 2010. The COA summarized the results of the Investigation
Report as follows:

1. In 2005 and 2006, COA-MWSS personnel received cash amounting to ₱9,182,038.00; and in 2007,
₱38,551,133.40 from the CAs drawn by Ms. Mendoza in payments of allowances and bonuses;

2. In previous years (1999 to 2003), a total amount of ₱1,171,855.00 representing bonuses and other benefits was
also received by COAMWSS personnel from the MWSS;

3. Atty. Cabibihan and 10 of his staff availed of the Car Assistance Plan (CAP) of the [MEWF] under which they paid
only 40% of the purchase price of the vehicle by way of loan from and payable to the MEWF in the total amount of
P2,878,669.36, while the balance of 60% was paid by MEWF, hence, constituting fringe benefits in the total
amount of ₱4,318,004.03;

On 30 July 2010, Chairman Villar issued Letter Charges for Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office
Rules and Regulations to petitioners Galindo and Pinto, along with other COA-MWSS personnel.

The COA found that the allegations against petitioners Galindo and Pinto are supported by substantial evidence,
and found them guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. The COA
determined that petitioners Galindo and Pinto received unauthorized allowances from Mendoza's cash advances,
and availed of the MEWF's car assistance plan. The COA also found that Pinto received benefits and/or bonuses
from the MWSS from 1999 to 2003. The COA imposed on petitioners Galindo and Pinto the penalty of suspension
for one year without pay.

The COA relied on the basic rule in administrative cases that the quantum of evidence necessary to find an
individual administratively liable is substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Galindo and Pinto, along with the other respondents in the administrative case, filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the COA denied in its Resolution dated 2 October 2013. Petitioners Galindo and Pinto, through their counsel
Egargo Puertollano Gervacio Law Offices, received the COA's Resolution on 8 October 2013. Their counsel withdrew
their services on 21 October 2013.

Galindo and Pinto filed, through their new counsel Walden James G. Carbonell, the present petition on 30 January
2014.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners availed of the correct remedy

Held: No.

In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy in case of an adverse decision is an
appeal to the Civil Service Commission and not a petition for certiorari before this Court under Rule 64.
Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Audit and the
Commission on Elections. It refers to Rule 65 for the mode of review of the judgment or final order or resolution of
the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. A petition filed under Rule 65 requires that the
"tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law x x x."

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided by this Constitution, or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." The Administrative Code of 1987 is the law that
provided for the Civil Service Commission's appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases:

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it
may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty
days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office
head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the
Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case
the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

(3) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report
and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph (4) of
the following Section.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal,
the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal
in the event he wins an appeal.

Section 49. Appeals. – (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which
shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen
days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall specifically state the
date of the decision appealed from and the date of receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the
grounds relied upon for excepting from the decision.

(2) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds: (a) new evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; (b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on
record; or (c) error of law or irregularities have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the
respondent: Provided, That only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained.

The Administrative Code of 1987 also gave the Civil Service Commission the power to "[p]rescribe, amend and
enforce regulations and rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws." Sections 61 and 45 of the 2012 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service echo the
Administrative Code of 1987, and read:

Section 61. Filing. - Subject to Section 45 of this Rule, decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in
an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof. In cases the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and then finally to the Commission. All
decisions of heads of agencies are immediately executory pending appeal before the Commission. The decision
imposing the penalty of dismissal by disciplining authorities in departments is not immediately executory unless
confirmed by the Secretary concerned. However, the Commission may take cognizance of the appeal pending
confirmation of its execution by the Secretary.

Section 45. Finality of Decisions. - A decision rendered by the disciplining authority whereby a penalty of
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is
imposed, shall be final, executory and not appealable unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
However, the respondent may file an appeal when the issue raised is violation of due process.

If the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days'
salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.

The COA promulgated rules of procedure for its agency, which include rules for disciplinary and administrative
cases involving officers and employees of COA. Sections 1 and 10 of Rule XIV on Administrative Cases of the 2009
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit state:

Section 1. Applicability of Civil Service Law and Other Rules. - The procedures set forth in the pertinent provisions
of the Civil Service Law, The Omnibus Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 292 and COA Memorandum No. 76-
48 dated April 27, 1976, in administrative cases against officers and employees of the Commission, are hereby
adopted and read into these rules.

Section 10. Appeal. - Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision in
accordance with the rules prescribed under existing Civil Service rules and regulations.

In the present petition, Galindo and Pinto failed to explain why they filed a petition for certiorari before this Court
instead of an appeal before the Civil Service Commission. Galindo and Pinto also failed to allege and show that the
COA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The supposed petition for certiorari imputed
errors in the COA's appreciation of facts and evidence presented, which are proper subjects of an appeal.

There is no question that the case that Galindo and Pinto sought to be reviewed is an administrative disciplinary
case. We previously ruled in Saligumba v. Commission on Audit that our power to review is limited to legal issues
in administrative matters, thus:

The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons:

1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the
discipline of its personnel.
2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We
cannot do so on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to legal issues. (Emphasis supplied)

13. Law Firm of Laguesma vs. COA

The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs.

Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 185544. January 13, 2015
By: Pangilinan, Gene Alexis

Doctrine: Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has a reglementary period of sixty
(60) days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution, however, specifies that the
reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional commissions is thirty (30)
days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling.

Facts: In 2001, officers of Clark Development Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
approached the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo (petitioner) for its possible assistance in
handling the corporation’s labor cases. Clark Development Corporation sought from the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) its approval for the engagement of the petitioner as external counsel.

The OGCC approved the engagement of the petitioner. The petitioner commenced rendering legal services to Clark
Development Corporation. However, Clark Development Corporation had yet to secure the authorization and
clearance from the OGCC or the concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) of the retainership contract.

Clark Development Corporation requested the Commission on Audit for concurrence of the retainership contract it
executed with the law firm. The State Auditor informed Clark Development Corporation that its request for
clearance could not be acted upon until the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel approves the retainership
contract with finality.

The Commission on Audit thus disallowed the payment of retainer fees to the law firm of Laguesma Magsalin
Consulta and Gastardo for legal services rendered to Clark Development Corporation.

The petitioner received the decision of the Commission on Audit on October 16, 2007. It filed a motion for
reconsideration on November 6, 2007. It received notice of the denial of its motion on November 20, 2008. The
petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari on December 19, 2008.

Issue: Whether or not the petition was filed on time.

Held: No. The petition was filed out of time. Ordinarily, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
has a reglementary period of 60 days from receipt of denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Constitution,
however, specifies that the reglementary period for assailing the decisions, orders, or rulings of the constitutional
commissions is thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision, order, or ruling. For this reason, a separate rule was
enacted in the Rules of Court.

Section 2 of Rule 64 specifies that “a judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65,
except as hereinafter provided.”

The phrase, “except as hereinafter provided,” specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under this rule follows
the same requisites as those of Rule 65 except for certain provisions found only in Rule 64. Under this rule, a party
may file a petition for review on certiorari within 30 days from notice of the judgment being assailed. The
reglementary period includes the time taken to file the motion for reconsideration and is only interrupted once the
motion is filed. If the motion is denied, the party may file the petition only within the period remaining from the
notice of judgment.

Between Rule 64 and Rule 65, the most patent difference between the two is Rule 64 Section 3 which provides for
a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC or COA. The period
is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening
period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead
of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

In this case, petitioner received the decision of the Commission on Audit on October 16, 2007. It filed a motion for
reconsideration on November 6, 2007, or after 21 days. It received notice of the denial of its motion on November
20, 2008. The receipt of this notice gave petitioner nine (9) days, or until November 29, 2008, to file a petition for
certiorari. Since November 29, 2008 fell on a Saturday, petitioner could still have filed on the next working day, or
on December 1, 2008. It, however, filed the petition on December 19, 2008, which was well beyond the
reglementary period.
------------------------------------------------------end of coverage----------------------------------------------------

14. Argovan vs. San Miguel Corp

15. Orosa vs. Roa
JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA vs. ALBERTO C. ROA
By: Kaye

Doctrine: The exclusion of the DOJ from the list under Section 1 of Rule 43 is deliberate, being in consonance with
the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Notably, the provision includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the
fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before any
appellate recourse may be resorted to. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an
appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before
resort can be made to the courts.

Facts: Petitioner and respondent are both dentists. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit charging respondent with
the crime of libel, which stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written
by respondent and published in the Dental Trading Post. The article delved into the possibility of an examiner in the
licensure examination where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to
enable his children to top the same. In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is
defamatory as it besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board
examinations in 1994. Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate
report on a matter of both public and social concern."

Pasig City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground that the
publication is a bona fide communication on matters of public concern, and made without malice.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. Acting on the appeal, Chief State Prosecutor set aside the findings of the City
Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for libel against respondent.

Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary reversed the Chief State Prosecutor’s
Resolution and directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information earlier filed with the RTC.

Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was denied. Therefrom, petitioner went to the
CA on a petition for review under Rule 43, but was dismissed on the ground that the Prosecution Office and
the DOJ are not among the quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or
resolutions are subject to review by the CA.

Issue: Is a petition for review under Rule 43 a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice
directing the prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case?

Held: NO, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA,
under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial bodies to the CA. As may be noted,
the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43. Its absence from the list of
agencies mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the coverage of said
Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase "among these agencies," thereby implying that the
enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies therein listed.

There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in
consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus
and offices. This power of control, which even Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the
Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and
heads of line agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.
Notably, Section 1, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby
accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that
office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.

16. St.Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC

17. National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesm
18. Abbot Laboratories Phils vs. Abbot Laboatories Employees Union
19. CEU vs. CA
20. CHED vs. Mercado

(20)
CHED v. Mercado
G.R. No. 157877, March 10, 2006
By: ARID, Hannah Mhae G.

Doctrine: Under Rule 43, Section 4, which governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals,
[t]he appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or
from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo. The use of the disjunctive preposition or in the rule suggests that a petitioner has the option to file the
petition for review after notice of the assailed judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior motion for
reconsideration, or after the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below. Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of
the court or agency a quo requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or resolution before
appeal may be taken, then failure to comply with the requisite is a ground to dismiss the appeal on the basis of
prematurity. In the case at bar, under Section 50,[1][25] Rule III of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the CSC, a party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration.

Facts: Through a letter-complaint Dimayuga, Dean of the College of Criminology, Republican College, accused
respondent Mercado of arrogance, abuse of power and authority, ignorance of the appropriate provisions of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and incompetence before the CHED. Respondent Mercado is the Senior
Education Specialist of the Office of Programs and Standards of the CHED.
The complaint stemmed from the Republican Colleges application for the recognition of its Master in Criminology
Program with the CHED. As part of the standard procedure, respondent Mercado would evaluate Republican
Colleges compliance with the prescribed requirements. Respondent

Mercado allegedly acted with arrogance when she manifested that the fate of Republican Colleges application
rested on her to the extent of maligning the person of Dimayuga during the inspection conducted at the Republican
College.

The Office of Programs and Standards Director issued a Memorandum directing respondent to explain in writing
why no administrative charges should be filed against her. Respondent Mercado complied, denying the allegations
against her. Dimayuga submitted a reply.

CHED sitting en banc: rendered a decision finding respondent guilty of discourtesy in the course of official duties.
Respondent Mercado was reprimanded and warned that a similar violation in the future will warrant a more severe
punishment.
Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the September 27, 1999 CHED decision. Attached to the motion was
a resolution supposedly issued and signed by former CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala (Alcala Resolution),
dismissing the charges against respondent Mercado on the strength of an affidavit of desistance purportedly
executed by Dimayuga.

The CHED, however, deferred the resolution of respondent Mercados motion for reconsideration when it discovered
that no record of the Alcala Resolution was on file and that there was a marked discrepancy in the signature
appearing in the affidavit of desistance of Dimayuga and the sample signature she submitted.
CHED en banc passed Resolution placing respondent under preventive suspension for a period of sixty (60) days
without pay. A hearing and investigation committee was also created for this purpose.
Respondent Mercado failed to appear before the hearing committee despite the issuance of at least three (3)
subpoenas. At the hearing,only Dimayuga appeared and testified under oath that she never signed any affidavit of
desistance and denied that it was her signature appearing on the affidavit of desistance presented by respondent
Mercado. The hearing committee received the testimonies of the CHED Records Officers, Maximina Sister and
Revelyn Brina, to the effect that the Alcala Resolution does not exist in the records.

The CHED en banc issued a resolution denying respondent Mercados motion for reconsideration and finding her
guilty of the subsequent charges, which include falsification, among others.
Respondent Mercado appealed to the CSC in which CSC denied. Respondent Mercado moved for its
reconsideration. The motion was granted.

The CHED filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification dated September 9, 2002 asking, among others,
whether CSC Resolution No. 02-1106 was final and executory and whether the CHED could still file a motion for
reconsideration in view of the one motion for reconsideration rule in CSC proceedings. For her part, respondent
Mercado filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution.

Pending resolution of its Manifestation with Motion for Clarification and before the expiration of the
period to appeal, the CHED filed a petition for review, assailing CSC Resolution. Without delving into
the merits, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity.

Meanwhile, with the CHEDs petition with the Court of Appeals filed and even decided already, the CSC acted on the
motion and manifestation filed by respondent Mercado and the CHED, respectively, through CSC Resolution No.
030054. In the resolution, the CSC granted respondent Mercados motion for execution and answered, belatedly
though, the queries raised in the CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for Clarification.
The CHED moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the appellate court denied the
motion.

Issue: W/N the appeal before the Court of Appeals suffers from prematurity.

Held: NO. The Court grants the petition. The Manifestation with Motion for Clarification filed by the
CHED does not partake of the nature of a motion for reconsideration. A reading thereof reveals that the
manifestation merely inquired into the ramifications of CSC Resolution, that is, whether the resolution
was already final and executory and whether the reinstatement of respondent Mercado was possible
considering that the position had already been filled up. The CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for
Clarification neither assailed CSC Resolution nor sought its reversal. The manifestation merely asked about the
propriety of filing another motion for reconsideration in view of the one motion for reconsideration rule in
proceedings before the CSC.

Thus, acting upon the CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for Clarification, the CSC issued CSC Resolution where it
acknowledged that available to the CHED as a recourse is the filing of a motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution. This indicates that the CSC did not treat the Manifestation with Motion for Clarification filed by the
CHED as a motion for reconsideration but rather as a simple request for clarification.
The Manifestation with Motion for Clarification being nothing more than an unadulterated query, the
appeal cannot be barred by litis pendentia. As a ground for dismissal, litis pendentia presupposes the
filing of two separate actions. Definitely, that is not the situation in the case at bar. From another
standpoint, the CHED can hardly be faulted for filing its petition with the Court of Appeals before the
expiration of the period to appeal since the CSC had failed to resolve its query in time. Indeed, the
CHED could have assumed that the CSCs inaction was tantamount to a negative response to its query.

The ground of litis pendentia not being in point, it follows that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
the CHEDs petition on the ground of prematurity.
There is nothing in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CSC that bars the filing of a
motion for clarification. However, the filing of the Manifestation with Motion for Clarification did not toll
the reglementary period for appeal of CSC Resolution. The records do not show that the CHED did file
subsequently a motion for reconsideration of the CSC resolution. Instead, the CHED elevated said resolution for
review by the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
filing of the petition for review prevented the resolution from becoming final and executory. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, had it failed to file the petition for review within the reglementary period, the CHED
would have lost its right to appeal the resolution.

As the CHED did not file a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 02-1106, it is relevant to ask: is the
filing of a motion for reconsideration a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for review? It is
not. Under Rule 43, Section 4, which governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals, [t]he appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its
effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. The use of the disjunctive preposition
or in the rule suggests that a petitioner has the option to file the petition for review after notice of the
assailed judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior motion for reconsideration, or after
the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in accordance
with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below. Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of
the court or agency a quo requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or
resolution before appeal may be taken, then failure to comply with the requisite is a ground to dismiss
the appeal on the basis of prematurity. In the case at bar, under Section 50 Rule III of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the CSC, a party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, without the benefit of a prior motion
for reconsideration.

21. SSC vs. CA

22. Deloso vs. Marapa
23. B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs.Alzul
24. Maniebo vs. CA
25. Vergel de Dios vs. CA
26. Videogram Regulatory Board vs. CA