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Mirasi System and Local Society in Pre-Colonial South India <This paper is a revised
English version of Mizushima 1990b and 1991.>
MIZUSHIMA, Tsukasa
I. Introduction
The raiyatwari settlement introduced by the colonial government in the early nineteenth
century was revolutionary in its very sense. What was revolutionary was, however, neither its
highly excessive tax-assessment or the cash payment, both of which surely gave critical impact
upon South Indian society, but its assignment of autonomous identity to every land plot. A land
plot, which was demarcated, numbered, assessed, and, if a raiyat agreed to be registered as
revenue payer, allotted to him, came to the center stage of historical development as the chief
actor. It could now absolutely and independently express the relation among the different forces
concerned. In the pre-colonial South Indian society, on the other hand, land plot could never
assert its autonomous status by isolating itself from the other relationship. Land had been
located and incorporated in the nexus of social relationship and any rights viewed to be landed
had been just one of the expressions in it. Study on land ownership for clarifying the social
structure, therefore, naturally has limited perspective as the pre-colonial South Indian society
was not necessarily stratified by the orders of land ownership which means exclusive ownership in
the modern period.
What is presented instead in this paper is to view the pre-colonial society from the
aspect of 'share distribution system'. As will be shown, the produce of the village was divided
into many shares in the shapes of dues, state tax, or cultivators' share. Lives of those engaged
in production activities were maintained by these shares in the produce, which had been
customarily established and linked to the roles necessary for maintaining the local society (the
term of 'local society' will be defined later). Such combination of roles with the right in the
share of the produce, including that of the tax-free land, was widely found not only in South
India but also in other parts when the British began its rule. <Many of the collectors engaged in
revenue administration at the initial stage of colonial rule noticed different types of tax
exemption and allowance variously designated from area to area, though they did not necessarily
locate them in the share distribution system discussed here. See, for instance, those reports
contained in the Papers on Mirasi Rights.> In South India the customary right like inheritance or
inherited rights was called kani, and the person with such right was called kaniyatchikaran in
Tamil. In the British revenue administration the right was generally designated as mirasi, an
Arabic term, and the holder was called mirasidar. Mirasi right was known to be transferable either
by sale, mortgage, or inheritance.
Production activities in the local society was maintained by this share distribution
system, each share being linked to a certain assigned role. We will call such system as Mirasi
System or System. Mirasi System actually constituted the core of the local society in the pre-
colonial period. The economic structure, class structure, and other features of the society were
expressed in the System. By the detailed investigation into the System and by discerning its
salient features, the structure of pre-colonial South Indian society is to be clarified. As
similar type of share distribution system was observed in other parts of India, the findings of
the present study will have wide applicability. <One view to understand the structure of local
society in the pre-colonial period as Mirasi (Vatan) system has been presented by H. Kotani on
medieval Deccan. See for instance, Kotani 1985. The present study, though based on completely
different sets of sources, owes much to his argument, with several important differences in
understanding the nature of change occurring in the concerned period. As to the problems of
Kotani's theory and the difference with the one presented in this paper, see Mizushima 1990a.>
The source-material used here is Barnard Report. In the 1760s, just after the Jagir (the
area corresponding to the present Chingleput district, Tamil Nadu) was granted to the East India
Company, Barnard, a British surveyor, collected detailed information of all the villages in the
Jagir. With the assistance of village accountants and the village documents kept by them, Barnard
compiled the accounts of more than two thousands villages more or less in the same format. Such
records covering all the villages in one district in the eighteenth century Asia may be very rare.
We will call these accounts as Barnard Report or the Report. The contents of the Report were the
lists of numerical figures concerning many aspects of every village, such as land use, Inam (tax-
exemption), caste, shares in the produce, livestock, poligar (in charge of law and order)
<Poligars' duty was to safeguard the villages under their jurisdiction. They usually had several
talliars (talaiyaries or watchmen) and prevented robbery or other crimes. Some of the bigger
poligars had armed force and played an important role in the military operations. More details
will be studied later.>, landholders, crop, and others. Unfortunately no descriptive account about
the contents of the Barnard Report is available in other sources, which poses some difficulty in
the following analysis. The format or categorization adopted in the Record is here assumed to be
significant, but it is not certain whether the format of the Report was Barnard's invention or the
exact copy of the original. <Prof.Y.Subbarayalu of Tamil University kindly suggested me that the
original is in the shape of palm leaves and is kept in Tamil University. I have no chance to
confirm the information.> Though the Report and the analysis into it may have certain limitation,
a careful statistical examination of the contents will give us more insights than any other
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records in clarifying the social structure of the Indian society in the pre-colonial period. We
will take up as case study Salavaucum paragana (administrative unit below district), the records
of which are comparatively readable than other volumes. <Barnard Report is kept in the Tamil Nadu
Archives. The Report is bundled in each paragana. There are twenty-six volumes in total excluding
the duplicates. The record of Salavaucum paragana is titled 'Jaghire - Barnard's Survey Accounts
of Salavakam Vol. 69'. Microfilming has been completed recently, and the data processing is in
progress. This paper is the result of on-going computational analysis.>
II. Tax-free Land, Dues, and Mirasi System

Mirasi System was a share distribution system by which production activities in the local
society was maintained. Any right took the shape of shares in the produce in the System. Share in
the System was expressed in three different types. First was as tax-free land, second as dues in
kind, and third as shares for the state and the cultivators, all of which were distributed to the
various recipients. Features of the Mirasi System were clearly expressed in the ways of allocation
of these shares. Actually the major portion of Barnard Report is occupied by the details of
allocation of tax-free lands, dues, and shares for the state and the cultivators. We will examine
them in this order. Table II-1 is the aggregated result of information showing the frequency of
villages where the different items were recorded.
Land in Salavaucum paragana, where seventy-two villages were located (see Fig.II-1, II-2,
and Table II-2), was categorized into three types in the Report, i.e. 'free-gift land', 'circar
land', and the rest. The first two can be called 'tax-free land' and 'state land' respectively
(see Table II-3). <Terms used in the tables and figures, such as caste names, personal names, and
others, are the reproduction from the original record in most of the cases. Some of the terms are
partly standardized for convenience sake. This is because the same person, caste, place, etc. are
very often spelled differently from page to page in the Report. For instance 'Brahmin' is spelled
'Braminy', 'Braman', 'Bramin', and others. There are also many Tamil-style English usages in the
Report. They are also standardized in most cases.> 'The rest' included the lands under the heads
of wood and bad ground, Yary (Eri or Yeri: reservoir), and others. They were basically the lands
not for cultivation as indicated in Table II-4. This type of land can be called 'land for public
use'. <The same type of land was called 'poramboke' in the colonial land administration.> The
total extent of Salavaucum paragana was 22,496 cawnies or 29,694 acres, of which the tax-free land
occupied ten per cent, the state land fifty-two per cent, and the rest thirty-eight per cent.
The point to be observed in this categorization is that the 'circar (state) land' in the
Report was the counter term of tax-free land. The state land signified, therefore, taxable land,
not necessarily state ownership of land. The state had right to levy tax from lands when it was
brought under cultivation and some crop was produced. In the tax-free land, the exempted tax, or
the state's share, was granted to the recipient of tax-free land. Even if the land granted was
clearly demarcated, what was granted was not the land but the share of the produce to be levied by
the state.
Two broad categories of tax-free land could be observed in the Report. They were the tax-
free land 'belonging to the village establishment' and 'the property of strangers', both of which
were then categorized into 'old' and 'new' respectively. 'Old' and 'new' were the terms to
distinguish the year of the grant of the tax-free land. If the grant was made before the reign of
Nawab Sadatullah Cawn (in Nawabship between 1710-32), it was classified as 'old'. All the later
grants till the Barnard's survey were 'new'. The year of the grant, the grantor's and grantee's
names were often recorded in the latter cases.
The usage of the terms, 'village establishment' and 'stranger', needs careful verification
as they connote the notion what was 'village' and what was 'local society' in the period. The
analysis of the respective recipients' lists gives hints for its clarification. The first point to
be noticed was that those receiving tax-free lands belonging to the village establishment were not
always residing in the village where the land was allocated. In Ahlapaucum village, for instance,
the recipients of the irrigated 'old tax-free land belonging to the village establishment' were
the pagodas (temples), Vaithaverty Brahmin, landholders, chief of the village, poligar, conicoply
(kanakapillai: village writer/accountant), shroff (money changer), artificers (smiths) <The
artificers here most probably signify the Kammalan caste composed of five occupational sections,
i.e. goldsmith, brass-smith, carpenter, stone-mason (or sculptor), and blacksmith. (Thurston 1909:
Vol.III, 106-125.)> , Yary servant, cowkeeper, barber, and cornmeter (probably a measurer of land
or grain). None of Vaithaverty Brahmin, poligar, conicoply, artificer, or barber were, however,
found in the list of the households residing in Ahlapaucum. The recipients of the tax-free land
belonging to the village establishment were, therefore, not necessarily those residing in the
village but rather were those in some way or other involved with the activities in the concerned
village. They were granted tax-free land for their services pertaining to the 'village
establishment'. A barber's service, for instance, is essential for the villagers' life in India,
as he officiates marriage and other rituals, and his wife often works as a midwife. <Thurston
1909: Vol.I, 32-41.> Though there was no barber residing in Ahlapaucum, the tax-free land was
allocated to some barber who resided outside and provided service to the Ahlapaucum villagers.
Such sphere forming the basic unit of production activities as wider than a single village is
termed as local society in this paper. The spatial aspect will be discussed later in more detail.
The composition of the recipients of the tax-free land belonging to the village
establishment in all the villages of Salavaucum paragana indicates a few more features of this
type of tax-exemption. Table II-5 shows the major recipients of the old tax-free land belonging to
the village establishment. The total extent of the land in the category was around ten per cent of
the total area or fourteen per cent of the land fit for cultivation. Of them poligars (& Talliars)
occupied 31 per cent, conicoplies 25 per cent, artificers 10 per cent, cornmeters 7 per cent,
landholders 7 per cent, chiefs of the villages 5 per cent, and shroffs 5 per cent. These seven
recipients occupied around 90 per cent. Artificers, conicoplies, cornmeters, poligars, and shroffs
were granted tax-free land in almost all the villages.
What is indicated by these figures is, first of all, that the reason of the grant was not
because of their contribution to the state but because of their contribution to the local society.
This nature of the grant becomes clearer by examining the rest of the recipients in the same
category. Artificers, Panjangum (astrologer) Brahmins, barbers, potmakers, snake doctors,
washermen, temples, Brahmins, landholders, and chiefs of the villages were found among the list.
Most of them were apparently not directly involved in the state administration. Instead they
performed essential roles to the production activities of the local society. The reason
artificers, conicoplies, cornmeters, poligars, and shroffs were the major recipients was because
they were the core members of the local society. The state must have expected their cooperation by
assuring their vested interests in the form of tax-exemption.
Secondly the spatial implication of 'village establishment' did not necessarily correspond
to a 'village' as stated before. Though tax-free land to the artificers, conicoplies, cornmeters,
poligars, or shroffs were located in almost all the villages in the area, the recipients'
households were not always found among them. What was located in the village was just the land for
the village establishment, which could be allocated to any outsiders who performed roles linked to
the 'village establishment' incorporated in a wider organizational unit.
Lastly it is noteworthy that poligars were included in this category. Its implication will
be studied later.
Another category of tax-free land was 'the free-gift land the property of strangers'.
Table II-6 and Table II-7 are the lists of major 'strangers' who were granted tax-free land, old
and new, in Salavaucum paragana. The 'old' occupied 110 cawnies or 0.8 per cent and the
'new' occupied 101 7/8 cawnies or 0.7 per cent of the land fit for cultivation. Among the
recipients of the 'old', both of town conicoply (revenue accountant probably staying in Salavaucum
town) and Permal Pagoda of Wyouoor were found in twelve villages. The extent granted to the former
was 18 5/8 cawnies and to the latter 18 1/2 cawnies. Sydda Moostapah Fakeer (Muslim priest) of
Salavaucum town had 18 1/2 cawnies in three villages. Yawkoopshaw Fakeer of Seetaupoorum was
granted the whole of Seetaupoorum (14 cawnies). The other recipients received just a few cawnies
in one or two villages respectively. Among the recipients of the 'new', Sydda Moostapah Fakeer and
Sooltaun Fakeer, both of Salavaucum town, dominated others. The former was newly granted 41 1/2
cawnies in ten villages and the latter was granted 30 cawnies in a single village. The high share
of the Muslim priests in the new grants must have been the result of the Nawab rule in the period.
The rest were the grants between 1/2 and 5 cawnies of land in a village or two.
The list of the recipients of the tax-free lands in this category, which included among
others Conigo (Kanungo) of the district, chiefs of the district such as Moodooramanaick,
Vanagoovamoodelliar, and Vencatachela Brahmin, Sydda Esmall Fakeer of Salavaucum, Ramia (Brahmin)
of Conjiverum (Kanchipuram: a famous religious center), indicates that the majority of grants were
made personally to officials or priests of higher level. They were either individuals or
institutions that played some role at the intermediary level between the local society and the
state. The reason why they were called 'strangers' is by now evident. In contrast to those
recipients of the tax-free land 'belonging to the village establishment' they were not only the
outsiders but the people or institutions of much higher level or the level 'strange' to the
villages concerned. Thus we have found by the study on the recipients that the categorization of
tax-free lands into the two types as observed in the Report was well based on the notion prevalent
in the period.
The last but nevertheless important issue regarding tax-free land remains to be noted. As
mentioned above, what was granted to the recipient of tax-free land was the share to be taken as
land-tax by the state. The dues to be studied below as well as the share for the cultivators were
also collected from the tax-free land. In this sense the ownership of tax-free land in the period
had a completely different nature from the exclusive ownership of land plot under the raiyatwari
system in the later period, even though the tax-free land was clearly demarcated. It was the
ownership of share in the produce like other types of shares in the Mirasi System.
Along with the description of tax-free lands, the details of dues occupy a major portion
in the Report. We will next investigate the nature of dues in the Mirasi System.
Four categories of dues were recorded in the Report. They were 'dues paid previous to
treading the corn' (D/Tread), 'dues paid previous to measuring the corn' (D/Measure), 'dues paid
half by the circar (state) and half by the cultivators' (D/Half), and 'dues paid by the circar
(state) alone' (D/State) (abbreviations in parentheses will be used hereafter).
A few sources in the concerned period give accounts how the dues were distributed. For
instance Ellis wrote that "Mereis [due or fee] of all descriptions are received in three ways, in
the straw before threshing, in grain before measuring, from the government share after division...
the same officer sometimes receiving a merei once only, sometimes twice, and sometime thrice."
<Replies from Mr.F.W.Ellis, Collector of Madras, to the Mirasi Questions, 30 May 1816, Papers on
Mirasi Rights: 178 foot note 6.> Buchanan, who traveled South India at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, vividly described the way of dividing the rice produce as follows:
"In almost every village (Grama) the customs of the farmers, especially in dividing the
crops, are different. The Shanaboga, or village accomptant, keeps a written account of these
customs; which is referred to as being the law, or custom of the manor... The corn, when cut
down, is made up into burthens, as large as a man can carry on his head. From each of these is
taken a bunch, equal in all to about 56/80 parts of the seed sown. These parts are divided thus:
To the Nirgunty, or distributor of water 16 [seers], to the Toti, or watchman 16, to the Aduca, or
beadle, called here Cauliga, 16, to the iron smith 8. Then from the heap is taken, by the Toti, or
watchman, whatever sticks to the seals of mud, that he puts on to prevent embezzlement, which may
be about 3, by the Pujaries, or priests of the village gods 4, by vagrants of all religions and
kinds, who, under pretence of dedicating themselves to God, live by begging 4, by the Gauda who
rents the village, as his perquisite 8, by the government, as its perquisite, called Sadi 16, by
the hereditary Gauda, or chief of the village, in order to defray the expense of the feast which
is given to Ganesa, under the form of a stake of the Cassia Fistula 16. The heap is then measured,
and divided equally between the government, or renter, and the farmer; but a certain portion is
left, which is divided as follows: From this portion twelve Seers for every Candaca [160 seers] in
the heap are measured, of which the accomptant takes one third, and the remainder goes to the
renter... From what remains there is taken, by the Panchanga, or astrologer 1 [seer], by the
Cumbhara, or potmaker 1, by the Assaga, or washerman 1, by the Vasara-dava, or blacksmith and
carpenter 1, by the measurer the sweepings about 8 [totally 12 seers]. It is evident, from the
very unequal size of the heaps, and various rates of produce in different soils and seasons, that
no exact calculation can be formed of the amount of these perquisites on the whole crop. If the
heap contain 20 Candacas, and the produce be ten seeds, then they will amount to about 17 per
cent.; of which the government gets 5 1/2 per cent.; or all together 47 per cent. of the crop;
from which is to be deducted the expence of the tanks." <Buchanan, I: 299-300.>.
Though we do not have any descriptive account how the four types of dues recorded in the Report
were distributed, it must have been as follows. When the crop was harvested, D/Tread and D/Measure
were taken aside and were paid to the respective recipients. Then the rest of the produce was
measured and was divided between the state and the cultivators. After this, D/Half and D/State
were paid.
The first notable aspect to be observed in the format of Barnard Report is that not the
original gross produce but the rest of the produce after measurement (that is, after D/Tread and
D/Measure were allotted) was assumed to be one hundred per cent. The shares for the state and the
cultivators and the dues for the various recipients of D/Half and D/State were then calculated and
the total of these four always amounted to a hundred per cent. This fact implies that the amount
of dues recorded in the Report in cullum, marakkal, and measure was not the absolute amount but
the proportional share in the produce. Another implication is that the 'measuring the corn' was
the initial step for the state's intervention. D/Tread and D/Measure, which were paid previous to
measuring the produce, were in this sense beyond the reach of the state. This aspect will be
studied later when we discuss about 'formation'. The second important point to be observed is that
not only the dues but also the state's and the cultivators' shares were treated in the same way in
the Report, that is, as proportional share in the produce. Even though the proportions of the
state's and the cultivators' shares were by far bigger than the dues, both of them were none but
shares in the produce. In this sense tax, rent, fee, dues, or whatever it may be, any right took
the shape of share in the produce.
The study and the comparison of the respective categories of dues gives us some more
information about the nature of Mirasi System. We will examine the 'dues paid previous to treading
the corn' or D/Tread first. In Salavaucum paragana there were fifty-seven types of recipients of
D/Tread. Number of villages where the recipients received D/Tread, range of dues, and the average
share for the major recipients are indicated in Table II-8. Artificers, barbers, conicoplies,
shroffs, and washermen received D/Tread in almost all the villages (N=72). They were followed by
snake doctors (curer of snake bites), cornmeters, Panjangum Brahmins, and poligars with Talliars.
The amount of D/Tread differed greatly from village to village and from recipient to recipient. In
average poligars received the highest share of one cullum per every hundred cullum (i.e. one per
cent of the gross produce), followed by artificers with eight marakkals, conicoplies with six
marakkals, shroffs with four marakkals, and cornmeters with three marakkals. The total amount of
D/Tread in the respective villages ranged from 1.06.0 (C.M.M: cullum, marakkal, measure) to
7.02.3. In average it was around four per cent of the gross produce.
The number of the types of the recipients who received 'dues paid previous to measuring
the corn' or D/Measure was seventy-three. The details of major recipients are indicated in Table
II-9. Those receiving D/Measure in most villages were landholders, barbers, Panjangum Brahmins,
cornmeters, and washermen. They are followed by cultivators' servants, snake doctors, shroffs,
conicoplies, O(A)mmun Padari Pagoda, artificers, Valloovuns (priests for the Pariah, Pallan and
other out-castes), and village Pagodas. Among them, the cultivators' servants received the highest
share of two cullums six marakkals in every hundred cullum (2.5 per cent) of the gross produce.
The rest received less than a half cullum each. The total amount of D/Measure ranged from 1.06.0
to 8.08.2. In average it was around five per cent of the gross produce.
The first to be noticed is that all the recipients of D/Tread and D/Measure were of the
'village' level. This is highly contrastive with the composition of the recipients of dues paid
half by the state and half by the cultivators, in which, as is clarified later, most of the
recipients were those in the intermediary level between the local society and the state. Actually
many of the recipients of D/Tread and D/Measure overlapped those of tax-free land 'belonging to
the village establishment'. This finding is in a sense understandable because D/Tread and
D/Measure were both pre-empted before the state's intervention. It is, however, to be reminded
that the recipients were not necessarily living in the village where the dues were paid, as was
the case with those of tax-free land. The unit of production activities was not the single village
but a wider area beyond the village level or local society. These dues were linked not with those
residing in the village but with some roles essential to the village incorporated in the local
society.
The second to be noticed is related with the reason why the state had to admit tax-
exemption to those in the local society. It is stated above that many of the recipients of D/Tread
and D/Measure overlapped those of tax-free land 'belonging to the village establishment' and that
both D/Tread and D/Measure were beyond the reach of the state, which indicates that the recipients
held the right of tax-exemption as their customary right into which the state could never
interfere. Instead of depriving the right, the state reconfirmed the vested interests and expected
collaboration of the local society.
Thirdly the timings of receiving dues seemed to be related to a certain extent with the
recipients' roles in the production processes. The difference in the composition of recipients and
their amounts between D/Tread and D/Measure may be that the former was paid first with straw.
Almost all the recipients of D/Tread received D/Measure as well, whereas some recipients received
D/Measure only. For instance poligar received D/Tread in fifty-three villages but D/Measure in
twenty-one villages only, which may be explained that their main role was to protect the standing
crop from thieves till harvest. On the other hand cultivators' servants received D/Tread in one
village only but D/Measure in as many as sixty-two villages. This may be because their main role
was that of harvesting, threshing, and carrying the crop till it was measured. On the other hand
landholders received D/Tread in five villages only but D/Measure in almost all the villages. This
may be because they were in the final stage of sharing and were not necessarily involved in
agricultural operations.
After paying D/Tread and D/Measure, amounting to nine per cent of the gross produce, the
produce was measured and two other types of dues were deducted from the rest of the produce or net
produce. They were dues paid half by the state and half by the cultivators (D/Half) and dues paid
by the state alone (D/State).
There were twenty-two types of recipients of D/Half in Salavaucum paragana. Major
recipients are indicated in Table II-10. Those who received D/Half in more than fifty villages
were Conigo (Kanungo) of the district, Daismooc (Deishmuk) of the district, Dovetraw (see below),
Conjiverum Pagoda, Mullah Saib of Salavaucum, Paulia Pandarum (non-Brahmin temple priest) of
Conjiverum, and cultivators' servants. They were followed by Yary fund with twenty-seven villages.
This fund was for the maintenance of the reservoir. The others were granted in fewer than four
villages. As to the amount of shares, cultivators' servants received the highest share of around
4.09.1 or 4.8 per cent of the net. Next came Dovetraw, a two (Do) per cent share originally
granted to Toorelmull who assisted Nawab Sadatullah Cawn in the negotiation with the Marathas,
<Report of Mr.Place, 6 October 1795, Extract from Chingleput District Records: 15.> followed by
Daismooc of the district (1.11.5), Conigo of the district (0.11.7), Mullah Saib of Salavaucum
(0.11.7), and Conjiverum Pagoda (0.11.7). The total amount of D/Half was much larger than other
types of dues. It ranged between 9.10.6 and 15.10.1 and the average came around thirteen per cent
of the net or twelve per cent of the gross.
First to be noticed is the contrast in the composition of recipients of D/Tread and
D/Measure with D/Half. Almost all the recipients except the cultivators' servants were those
beyond the village level. They were either the state's high officials, highly esteemed priests or
religious institutions, all in the intermediary level between the local society and the state or
those without any base in the village concerned. In this sense they were very much similar to
those granted tax-free lands the property of 'strangers'. Many of them seemed to be closely
attached to the state by their contribution to the state rule, both administratively and
religiously. At the same time they played an indispensable role for the local society,
administratively by connecting the state and the local society and religiously as the center for
worship. All these clearly explain why this type of dues was paid half by the state and half by
the cultivators.
The reason why cultivators' servants were included in this category needs some
interpretation. Why did the state grant dues to those not supposed to play any role for the state,
though it was not strange that the cultivators paid dues to their servants ? One interpretation
may be that the state utilized them for public works like construction, transporting ammunition,
and others. The majority of the cultivators' servants consisted of Pariah, Palli (agriculturist of
low rank), and other lower castes. <According to Ellis, most of Pariahs and Pullers were slaves
attached to the lands of the Vellaler (agricultural caste) and the Palli were generally serfs on
the lands of the Brahmin. (Minute of the Board of Revenue, on the different modes of Land Revenue
Settlement, as existing in different Districts, 5 January 1818, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 368.)>
These low castes occupied around thirty per cent of the total population in the period. <The total
number of households and the number of castes in the seventy-two villages in Salavaucum Paragana
were 1,894 and 67 respectively. Salavaucum Paragana had the largest number of households (192).
All others had less than a hundred, including five uninhabited villages. Of the 67 castes Pariah
had 286 H. (H.- households, 15%), followed by Palli (211 H. or 11%), Vistnoo Brahmin (143 H. or
8%), Puccolum Vellala (agriculturist of high rank: 109 H. or 6%), cowkeeper (109 H. or 6%),
Tooliva Vellala (89 H. or 5%), Reddi (agriculturist of high rank: 79 H. or 4%) and others.> By
bearing the dues together with the cultivators, the state must have exercised control over them.
Another feature to be noticed about D/Half was the uniformity of the amount of dues
compared with other types (see Table II-10). This uniformity may be interpreted first by the fact
they were allocated to those who did not have any base in each village concerned. They had rather
a close relationship with the state. The amount, therefore, was not affected by the local
condition except that for Yary fund, the amount of which naturally varied a lot among the villages
according to the size or condition of the tank. The second interpretation comes from the relation
between the state and the local society. Due to the very reason the dues were paid jointly by
both, they had to compete directly with each other, which gave the uniformity.
Dues paid by the circar alone or D/State had a few different features from the others. The
first was the very limited number of its recipients. In the seventy-two villages in Salavaucum
there were totally fifteen types of recipients (see Table II-11). Those having D/State in more
than fifty villages were artificers, conicoplies, shroffs, poligars, and cornmeters. The rest of
the recipients, however, numbered far less, all less than seven. Another feature was the high
concentration of the recipients among those in local society. Though some of those beyond the
village level, such as Conigo of the district, Conjiverum Pagoda, Daismooc of the district, or
Dovetraw, were also included in the list, the number of villages was only two and the same two
villages. In short they were exceptional.
We have a few more points to clarify regarding D/State. The amount of the dues differed
greatly from village to village. Total amount of D/State in each village ranged from 2.04.4 to
9.10.6. (in average it was around 4.5 per cent of the net or 4 per cent of the gross). The amount
should have been more uniform, as D/State was under the state control and was was defrayed solely
by the state. There should be some reason. Is it true that the dues were granted because of the
recipients' contribution to the state ? It is understandable that the conicoplies, shroffs,
poligars, and cornmeters received the dues from the state because of their contributory roles for
the state's administration. <Tiruvendipuram Report of 1775 gives following account. Conicoply was
a village accountant to keep revenue records. The main duty of the shroff (money-changer) was to
sort and examine the money paid by the husbandmen (cultivator) for their rent and to keep it for
the payment to the revenue collector. Cornmeters surveyed land and measured produce for
assessment. Poligar was the head of Talliar or a village watchman. He kept law and order and
safeguarded the crop. Tiruvendipuram was located near Pondichery and consisted of thirty-two
villages near Pondichery. (Reports and Accounts of the Old Farm of Tiruvendipuram, Selections from
the Records of the South Arcot District, No.IV, printed at the Collectorate Press, 1888.)> This
explanation, however, cannot be applied to the case of artificers (carpenters, smiths). More
plausible explanation may be that the state granted the dues from their own share in order to
incorporate them, the core members of the local society. Artificers, for instance, were not only
skilled people but the leaders of left-hand factions in the right-hand versus left-hand conflict.
Judging from another evidence that the same members received D/Tread, D/Measure, and tax-free land
belonging to the village establishment in almost all the villages, we may safely conclude the
reason of wider variance of the amount was due to the local condition even though it was centrally
managed by the state.
To sum up, the average proportion of D/Tread, D/Measure, D/Half and D/State in the gross
produce in Salavaucum paragana were 4, 5, 12, and 4 per cent respectively. Totally the dues
occupied around one-fourth of the gross produce. <Place reported in 1795 about the proportion of
fees in the three paraganas of Tripassore, Carangooly, and Conjeveram. Swoduntra Dittum or fees
collected before the produce was measured amounted to 12 per cent of the gross produce. Purdie
marah and Aurdie marah, both of which were collected from the Teerva (assessed) produce, was from
9 46/64 to 12 53/64 per cent in the former and 2 1/2 per cent in the latter. Adding the share from
the Mauniam or tax-free land, the total deductions composed from 30 25/64 to 34 5/8 per cent of
the gross produce in the three paraganas. (A Letter from Mr.Place, Collector of the Jaghire to the
Board of Revenue, 6 October 1795, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 19-24.) Actually the proportion of
these dues in the total produce was variable from place to place and from time to time. For
instance Hodgson reported from Dindigul that the share was stated to have been 6 1/4 in every 100
of the gross produce prior to the acquisition of Dindigul, which was estimated at 40 in the 100 in
1794, and was regulated at about 12 in the 100 in latter years. (Mr. Hodgson's Report on the
Province of Dindigul, 28 March 1808, Fifth Report, III: 552.) Wallace reported from Tanjore that
Sotuntrums [dues] and Mauniams [tax-exemption] amounted to about 12 per cent on the gross produce.
(Mr.Wallace's Report on Tanjore, 8 September 1805, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 100.)>
The last dimension of sharing system or Mirasi System was the division of produce between
the state and the cultivators. The produce was divided between the state and the cultivators in
different proportions after defraying all these dues. In principle the proportion of the share
allocated for the cultivators in the same village was higher when the cultivators were (1) not the
village residents but those from outside, (2) not the landholders but non-landholders, when the
land was (3) not paddy or irrigated land but cumbu or unirrigated land, (4) watered not from Yary
or reservoir by channels but by Picotahs (see-saw style irrigational equipment which works less
efficiently ) or wells, or (5) the duration of irrigation was shorter. In some village there were
as many as ten different proportions. In short the share for the cultivators was higher when more
labor was needed or less yield was expected.
The state land, both cultivated and uncultivated, occupied fifty-two per cent of the total
area. The proportion of cultivated land in the state land was sixty-six per cent, from which the
state collected its share as land-tax. <The proportion of the irrigated land in the state land
was as high as fifty-six per cent in the area. The taluk maps prepared in the 1960s indicate at
least one or two reservoirs in every village. Besides the Cheyyar and the Palar rivers run in the
north and east of the area.> The cultivators' share in Salavaucum fell between the range of
63.10.5 and 34.04.0 (C.M.M.), and that of the state between 51.06.3 and 20.01.6 (C.M.M.). The
average in the gross produce was around 43 per cent for the cultivators and 32 per cent for the
state. Calculating from the proportional extent of tax-free land and the state's share transferred
to the recipients, the final share of the recipients of tax-free land comes to 7 per cent and that
of the state to 25 per cent.
The proportional shares between the state and the cultivators indicate the following
points. Firstly the variance signifies delicately established share-balance between the two in the
respective localities, which was also observed in the case of D/State. Secondly the proportion
variable to the different conditions confirms the point that the very base for revenue
administration was not land but produce. Tax was imposed not upon the land but upon the produce
from the cultivated land. Thirdly the share for the state was very high, occupying nearly one-
fourth of the gross produce. The dues 'paid by the state alone' or the dues 'paid half by the
state and half by the cultivators', along with the high share for the state, indicates the state's
significant involvement and role in the Mirasi System. The state did its most to maximize its own
share by intervening into the interests of the local society, and at the same time made
compromises to get their collaboration by affirming the tax-free land or dues. This fact never
allows us to confine the presence of the state within a ritualistic sphere so far as the period
under study was concerned. <Stein 1980.>
The highly competitive relationship between the state and local society observed in the
Mirasi System studied above leads us to discern two competitive forces. We will call 'the wielding
of power as well as movement to maximize one's own interest' as 'formation'. The force to protect
and maximize the interests of the local society may be thus termed as 'communal formation' and the
counter-force to enlarge the state's interests as 'state formation'. Each of the formations seeks
dominance over others to reach a maximum of autonomy. By discerning these two formations in
operation, we can clearly understand the nature of dues, tax-free lands, state's and cultivators'
shares so far examined, or the Mirasi System itself. If we characterise the Mirasi System from
this view point, it can be summarized in the following manner. In the Mirasi System the state and
the communal formations operated competitively in enlarging own shares in the produce. Not only
the amount of various types of dues but the extent of tax-free land, the number of villages where
dues or tax-free lands were granted, or the composition of the recipients, could be considered as
the expression of their highly competitive power-balance between the two. The state tried
accommodating the local interests by allowing dues to the core members of the local society while
seeking more shares for its own. On the other hand the members of the local society tried hard to
increase their share in the shape of dues, tax-free land, or cultivators' share. There must have
been serious conflict between the state and the members of local society to finalize the share
proportion, as was observed at the initial period of colonial rule. The Mirasi System was formed
and maintained in the course of such conflicts and compromises between the state and the communal
formations.
Secondly the Mirasi System was a highly flexible system. The right to the share, which had
been customarily established and frequently transacted, was linked not necessarily with the
recipient but with the role performed by him. Even if the players of roles changed or were
replaced, the shares were still reserved there. Vacancy caused by the recipient's disappearance
could be easily filled by any newcomer wishing to overtake the role. It could, therefore,
accommodate the people's high mobility, due to the precarious nature of Indian agriculture or to
the nomadic herding. Newly created roles could be also absorbed in the System by allocating a new
share to their players. Here the activities concerned not only the economic aspect but also the
religious and other aspects, which was indicated by the fact that the temples and Brahmins were
also included among the recipients of various dues. <The role of religious institutions such as
temples and maths is considered important in generating identity for any local society. The issue
will be undertaken on some other occasion.> In addition any change in power-balance between the
state and the communal formations or class relation among the members of the local society could
be covered by the adjustment of internal mechanisms (shares, tax-free land, and their recipients),
so that the System itself would never break down. Though it is not yet ascertained when the Mirasi
System as a system was established in South India, <James Heitzman investigated the usage of the
term 'kani' or 'cawny', the Tamil equivalent of 'mirasi', in the Chola inscriptions, and argued
that the term occurs within the following three main contexts. They are 1. the situation in which
property or possession entailed performance of a specified duty within a village or a temple, 2.
the enjoyment of properties or prerogatives in connection with membership in a temple staff, and
3. the property in land. According to him, the term had never been used till 985 A.D., but came to
be used far more frequently after 1070 A.D. (Heitzman 1987: 54-57)>, this flexibility surely
allowed the Mirasi System to survive as the core system of South Indian society for a very long
period. Mirasi System was thus a very indigenous and highly effective institution in the history
of South India.
We have a few more important issues left untouched in the analysis of Mirasi System. In
the Report almost all the villages have some account about 'landholders' and the 'shares' held by
them (see Table II-12 for the number of villages held by the respective castes). For instance, in
the case of Ahlapaucum village, the Report recorded 'Landholders shares Vistnoo Braminies 8
fixed'. Other villages were also held in several 'shares', the biggest as many as eighty. The
'share' in this usage is the equivalent of 'karai' or 'pangu', that is, the ownership share of the
village. In the colonial records such owner as entitled to karai/pangu was called kaniyatchikaran,
and was often called as mirasidar. 'Landholder' in the Report therefore signifies mirasidar.
<Though the term 'mirasidar' could be applied to anyone having hereditary right, it was mostly
used to designate the kaniyatchikaran who owned the village.>
How can we, then, locate the landholders in the Mirasi System ? Strangely enough, the
Report does not have information proving their superior position in the village. For instance the
Vistnoo Brahmins in Ahlapaucum, whose households numbered thirty-one, held the village in eight
fixed shares. If these landholders held the village in shares as owners of the village, there
should have been some privileged right, namely the landlord' share in the produce from the
concerned village. It is true the landholder in Ahlapaucum received two cawnies of tax-free land
belonging to the village establishment and six marakkals (1/2 cullum) of the produce in every
hundred cullums as dues paid previous to measuring the corn. Such benefits as appropriated by them
were, however, too negligible once divided among the thirty-one households. There should have been
some other privileged right, which was not recorded in the Report.
Interestingly enough Place, the collector of the Jagir at the end of eighteenth century,
did not record any figures about the mirasidars' landlord rent. Though Place acknowledged the
mirasidar's hereditary right, he considered it sequestable if mirasidar neglected the 'duties' of
cultivating lands, paying tax, or being disobedient to the state authority. What he considered as
the hereditary right was not the landlord rent, either. Place noted:
"Were I called upon to define the term meerassee, and its properties, I think it bears
exact analogy to a fee. I would call meerassee a freehold estate of inheritance, and a meerassadar
a tenant in fee simple, holding of a superior lord, on condition of rendering him service. His
lord is the Circar, his estate the usufructuary right of the soil, and the service he owes, a
renter of a stated portion of the produce of his labour." <Extract from Mr.Place's Final Report on
the Jagir, 6 June 1799, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 53-54.>
On the other hand Ellis, who made a fairly long report about the mirasi right as a
collector of Madras, clearly noticed the landlord' rent in contrast to his predecessor. In fact
the objective of Ellis' report lay in reversing the assertion of Place on the mirasi rights. This
is most clearly expressed in his following note. "Mr.Place, whose authority on all subjects
connected with Mirasi must be admitted to be great, holds exactly the reverse of what is here
stated ... totally inapplicable to Mirasi, as it originated, and as it exists." <Replies from
Mr.F.W.Ellis, Collector of Madras, to the Mirasi Questions, 30 May 1816, Papers on Mirasi Rights:
341, footnote 4.> What was unfortunate for Ellis was that he could not find any information within
his reach about the exact proportion of landlord rent. <Replies from Mr.F.W.Ellis, Collector of
Madras, to the Mirasi Questions, 30 May 1816, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 196.> It was finally in the
year 1820 when the landlord rent in Chingleput was recorded with concrete figures. Smalley noted
that the landlord rent in the district varied from less than one per cent to eleven per cent and
the average was about three and a half per cent. <From Mr.Smalley, Collector of Chingleput, to the
Board of Revenue, 4 November 1820, on the Introduction of a Ryotwar Settlement into his District,
Papers on Mirasi Rights: 398.>
The existence of mirasidar and their landlord share was, however, not the isolated case in
South India. Several accounts recording the landlord's share by the administrators of different
districts are found in the early colonial record. By far the highest share taken by the mirasidars
was found in Tanjore, the stronghold of mirasidars. According to Harris, the collector of Tanjore,
mirasidars received nearly half of the coodee-waurum (cultivators' share). <Harris noted that
under the Mahratta management or pre-British period the coodee-waurum was 40 per cent. and the
mirasidars had 20, "and in some places even 25 of it. At present the coodee-waurum varies between
50 and 60 per cent., and they receive from 23 1/2 to 26 1/2 of it," whereas "in other parts of
India" it was "never more, but often less, than 5 per cent. of the net produce". (Report of Mr.
Harris, to Committee at Tanjore, 9 May 1804, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 87.)
The stronger position of the mirasidars in Tanjore as reflected in the higher share seemed
to be due to their more direct control over the tenants. According to Wallace, the collector in
Tanjore, "...they [mirasidars] superintend and direct the labours of the poragoodies [tenants] in
all the particulars of rural economy... In cases ...they [poragoodies] are unable to supply the
agricultural stock, advances are made to them either in grain or money by the meerassadars..."
(Report of Mr.Wallace on the Settlement of Tanjore, for Fusly 1214, 1 May 1805, Papers on Mirasi
Rights: 96-97.) "The far greater mass of them [mirasidars], till their lands by the means of hired
labourers, or by a class of people termed Pullers, who are of the lowest caste, and who may be
considered as the slaves of the soil." (Mr.Wallace's Report on Tanjore, 8 September 1805, Papers
of Mirasi Rights: 99.) These remarks seem to imply a kind of individual control over the
cultivators under them. This does not, however, deny the existence of the share distribution
system discussed here. The same author described the details of sotuntrums (dues) and mauniams
(tax-free land). There were three classes of them, first for agricultural purposes, second in
support of certain village officers, and third for charitable and religious purposes, and for the
maintenance of the police. They amounted to about 12 per cent on the gross produce and were born
jointly by Government and the Mirasidars. (Mr.Wallace's Report on Tanjore, 8 September 1805,
Papers of Mirasi Rights: 100-105.)> Compared with Tanjore, the landlords of other areas had lower
share. Hodgson reported from Tinnevelly that the share for the mirasidar was about 13.5 per cent
on the gross produce. <Report of Mr.Hodgson, on the Revenues, &c. of the Province of Tinnevelly,
24 September 1807, Fifth Report, III: 346.> J. Cotton reported from Tinnevelly by quoting the
figure of 4 7/8 per cent for the land on swamy bogum tenure, in which the mirasidars received the
landlord share from the tenants who bore all the cost including the land tax, and the figure of
around 10 to 12 per cent on other type of land. <Replies from Mr. J.Cotton at Tinnevelly to the
Mirasi questions, 8 May 1817, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 162.> R. Peter, in his reply to the mirasi
questions, reported that the average annual value of mirasi right in Madura was about one-tenth of
the produce. <Replies from Mr.R.Peter at Madura to the Mirasi questions, 10 January 1815, Papers
on Mirasi Rights: 159. > Another important source of the period, Tiruvendipuram Report of 1775,
recorded the existence of landlord rent in the area near Pondichery. It amounted to ten per cent
of the produce or ten per cent of the tax from the land cultivated by the non-landlords.
<Tiruvendipuram Report:10.
Munro, the mother of raiyatwari system, had a slightly different view about the landlord
right. He did not deny altogether the mirasidar's right of claiming landlord rent from the tenant,
so far as the mirasidar paid the public revenue and made terms with the tenants on his own accord.
Mirasidar, however, had no claim for rent from land for which he neither paid the public revenue
nor found a tenant but for which the government provided one. Secondly Munro thought the mirasi
right was worth little and was seldom salable except in a few district. (Sir Thomas Munro's Minute
on the state of the country, and condition of the people, 31 December 1824, Papers on Mirasi
Rights: 435, 444.)>
Why, then, were there no figures about the landlord rent in the Barnard Report ? The first
possible reason is simple, that is, the landlord rent did not exist. This explanation is, however,
hard to sustain. For instance the Ahlapaucum Vistnoo Brahmins, who were by no means engaged in
cultivation, would not be able to maintain their life without receiving the rent. The second and
more plausible explanation is that the landlord rent was not recorded in the village accounts
Barnard depended on, as the landlord-tenant relation was not directly related with the revenue
administration. This is implied by the fact that the number of shares in thirty-nine villages in
Salavaucum were recorded 'unknown' in the Report. The residing places of the landholders in
thirteen villages were also recorded 'unknown'. Barnard might have attempted to obtain information
about their rights, in vain. The third possible explanation is also related with the second one.
Barnard did not expect the landlord rent due to the prevalent notion among the eighteenth century
western Europeans who generally thought the state to be the sole owner of the land. This notion is
clearly expressed by the following statement. "It is the first feature in all the Governments of
India that the Sovereign, whether he be a Mussulman or a Hindoo, is lord of the soil." <Extract
from the Minutes of Consultations, 8 January 1796, Papers on Mirasi Right: 26.> The categorization
of all the land as 'state land', except the land for public purposes and the tax-free land,
indicates the high plausibility of this explanation.
Though further verification is indispensable for clarification, it can be assumed that the
landholders received a considerable share in the produce as the landlord rent and then the share
was divided among them according to the specified number of ownership-share they held. This leads
us to discern a different type of flow of the produce, namely, the higher or secondary level of
distribution from the initial recipients to the secondary recipients in the Mirasi System. Not
only the rent paid by the tenant to the landholders or by the cultivators to the labourers but
also the payments from a poligar to his followers or from a temple to its servants could be also
included in this secondary distribution. <The following accounts indicate that daily wage was paid
to the agricultural laborers: "...in every village a custom prevails..., whereby the servants [of
the husbandmen] during a stated number of months in the year, are to receive a further payment in
grain from their masters, which continues or ceases in proportion to the extent of their fees, and
in the end equalized the whole to about 2 1/2 cullums or 105 pucca seers per month." (A Letter
from Mr.Place, Collector of the Jaghire to the Board of Revenue, 6 October 1795, Papers on Mirasi
Rights: 20.) "The labouring servants are for the most part Parias...; they receive wages, partly
in money, and partly in those fees..." (Place's Final Report on the Jagir, 6 June 1799, Papers on
Mirasi Rights: 47.)
The following account indicates the prevalence of daily wage for the works other than
cultivation.
"The paragoody warum [the labourers' share under mirasidar] to the paragoodies, and the
allowance to the slaves, are granted for the labour of cultivating. In every other work [than
cultivation], the paragoodies and slaves fare alike, and are considered as coolies. When employed
on the circar maramut [original note: repairs performed, at the expense of the circar, to the
rivers and great channels], they receive from the circar; and when employed on the coodeemaramut
[original note: repairs performed, at the expense of the tenantry, to the small channels, and to
the banks of the paddy fields], they receive from the meerassadars, daily hire, at fixed rates."
(Report of Mr. Harris, to Committee at Tanjore, 9 May 1804, Fifth Report, III: 341.)> As the
Report does not have information about such secondary distribution, the task will be attempted in
other occasion by using some other historical material.
Another issue to be considered in this regard is the position of the landholders in the
Mirasi System and in the communal formation. In Chola period we know Nattars as the
representatives of the local society called Nadu. According to Subbarayalu, Nadu was the groupings
of agricultural settlements formed by natural factors conducive to agriculture, and each Nadu was
basically a cohesive group of agricultural people tied together by marriage and blood
relationships. The people who occupied the dominant position in each Nadu were Nattars. Among the
group members in the Nadu assembly, Nattars, being the representatives of the villages of
agricultural landholders and being the prime landholders in the respective Nadu, presented
themselves as the chief spokesmen of the people in the region. <Subbarayalu 1973: 33-34, 39-40.>
Though it is beyond the scope of the present study to verify his argument, Nadu and
Nattars may be presumed to be the space and bearers of communal formation in its ideal or original
form. As Subbarayalu indicated, matters concerned with the Nadu were settled by the Nattars in the
local assembly called by the same name or Nadu. These Nattars must have had some communal tie like
caste or kinship relation among themselves in the respective local societies called Nadu. Though
the Nattars were originally just the representatives of their community, they must have taken a
leading position in the locality as time went on. As more and more communities with different
interests were incorporated in the respective localities and formed heterogeneous society, such
Mirasi System as observed in the eighteenth century must have gradually taken shape. As one
belonging to the community dominating over a local society extending beyond a single village,
landholders or mirasidars, who somehow or other inherited the status of Nattars of the previous
period, played a leading role. They represented the local society in the negotiation with the
state while being compromised by the state for realizing the latter's interests there. <The
following remark by B.Sancaraya can be clearly understood in this context. "The Mirasudar looks on
himself as entitled to direct the affairs of the village, to stand forward on all occasions when
the affairs of the Sircar are in discussion, and to receive any Tasrif [original note: honorary
presents at the time of forming the annual settlements] given by it, and the pre-eminence thus
claimed is allowed him by others. (Translation of Answers to the Questions enclosed in
Mr.Secretary Hill's Letter to the Board of Revenue, 2 August 1814, by B.Sancaraya, late
Sheristadar to the Collector of Madras, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 227.)> The landholders maintained
the cohesion of the local society by holding the villages in it either jointly or individually
based on the communal identity among themselves.
The last untouched issue in the Mirasi System is the state formation. It is actually not
an easy task to define what the state was and who its bearers were in the period of political
turmoil in the eighteenth century. Not a small number of local powers, including Europeans,
struggled hard to gain the state control in the different parts of South India. Two factors should
be considered in this regard. First was as much as one-fourth of the gross produce was set aside
for the state. Second was the payment of D/Half and D/State by the state in the Mirasi System.
Third was the existence of supra-local level administrators like kanungo, deshmuk, or town
accountant, and of local level state servants like village accountant, measurer, etc. among the
recipients. <As to the roles of kanungo and deshmuk, see Letter from Mr.Place, Collector of the
Jaghire to the Board of Revenue, 6 October 1795, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 21-22.> The second point
implies the deep involvement of the state with the System and the third point implies the
existence of state revenue collection machinery. The first point, on the other hand, implies the
very firm notion of state's share in the share distribution system. Though the present paper does
not argue the state's function in the local society, the state must have played some important
roles such as public work, military operation, etc. Anyhow, from the viewpoint of share
distribution system what was important was that the state's share was always reserved whoever the
holder of the state power was. Those who asserted themselves as the holder of state power tried
hard to usurp this very state's share by having access to the throne of Nawabship or, more often,
by resorting to coercive measures. In the political situation in the eighteenth century there was
a frequent shift of over lordship from year to year. In a sense whoever succeeded in usurping the
state's share in the produce by any means could be called as the holder of the state power. Mirasi
System was the System that never cared who the performers of the assigned role were so far as the
expected role was fulfilled. The highly flexible nature of the Mirasi System could be observed
even here.
III. Emergence of New Formation and Decline of Mirasi System

It has been verified so far that the Mirasi System was the share distribution system in
which shares took several forms, were customarily established, and were linked with specific roles
necessary for maintaining a local society. It was also indicated that the System was the product
of conflict and compromise between the state and the communal formations in the sphere of a local
society.
In the period under study, however, there has occurred several noticeable changes leading
to the decline of the Mirasi System. The changes were multiple, and needs several approaches for
clarification. First we will take up the collapse of the cohesion of local society.
It was mentioned above that not a single village but an area comprising several villages
was a primary unit where the Mirasi System functioned. This can be verified by the simple fact
that majority of villages in the concerned period had insufficient number of castes in maintaining
village reproduction cycle. In Salavaucum paragana, for instance, the number of castes in the
respective villages was largest in Salavaucum village where members of thirty-three different
castes resided. Four other villages had more than twenty different castes. The others, however,
had less than ten. Table II-1, which indicates the number of villages each of the castes resided
and the number of villages several types of dues or tax-free lands were granted, clearly shows
that many of the villages lacked essential functional castes even though the dues or other shares
were reserved. Some of the activities essential to village life were performed by the people from
outside, which implies the historical stage where a village was still incorporated in the
organizational structure of the societal unit wider than a single village and was not yet self-
contained. A village was, thus, nothing but a part of the local society and could survive only as
a part thereof.
If a basic unit of a local society was wider than a single village, which territorial unit
among those prevalent in the period did actually correspond to it ? Barnard Report, for instance,
used three territorial categories, that is, village, magan(-am), and paragana. Salavaucum paragana
consisted of seventy-two villages which were divided into eight magans. If there were any
corresponding to a basic unit other than a village, it should be a magan. The name of the eight
magans were Salavaucum, Cuddungherry, Sautanunjerry, Culliapettah, Perramatoor, Mungalum,
Vellapootoor, and Undavaucum. They corresponded to the name of principal villages in the
respective magans. These principal villages had comparatively bigger population than others and
were often designated as Cusbah or town in other parts of the Report. It seems they had a town-
like nature. Though no information is available how each magan boundary was demarcated, a magan
seemed to be a cluster of villages in the center of which a principal village was located. From
these evidences magan might be taken as the basic territorial unit corresponding to a local
society, in which Mirasi System functioned. <There are a few evidences indicating a magan to be
the basic unit for administration. For instance the Committee of Revenue proposed in 1775 to set
up local courts in every magan. A few other sources of the period also referred magan as the basic
local unit. (Letter from the Committee of Revenue to the President and Governor and Council of
Fort St. George, 28 July 1775, in Madras Revenue Proceedings, 12 July 1775.) See Mizushima 1986
(III-2 and Appendix 14) for the discussion on magan and the list of magans with constituting
village names in the Jagir. For the argument regarding the geographical units in South India, see
Stein 1977, 1982, Subbarayalu 1973. As to the views and the problems concerning the demarcation of
region, see Saberwar 1971.>
The investigation into several aspects of spatial distribution, however, does not confirm
it and rather verifies the inconsistency between magan and the organizational sphere. We will
examine the spatial aspect of poligars' jurisdiction, landholding castes, and the service area
below.
There is an argument that views the Vijayanagar state as a feudal one in which the nayakas
played a key role and ruled a territory called Nayakattanam. <Karashima 1992.> Poligars in the
concerned period are also known to have taken overlordship in some parts of South India like the
nayakas in the previous period. First point to be clarified is, therefore, the relation between
the nayaka in the previous period and the poligar in the concerned period.
The investigation into the poligars' names indicate a close relation between the two. Most
of the poligars had the title 'Naick' in their names. In Salavaucum paragana, for instance, there
were fifty-three poligars. <As the overlapping cases cannot be ascertained by names alone, the
total number of poligars could be slightly fewer, most probably forty-nine.> Of them, all except
one <Permal Pagoda of Wyouoor is recorded as the poligar of Wyouoor, a shrotrium village given to
the same Pagoda.> had the title 'Naick' at the end of their names. <'Moodrial', the caste name,
was used along with 'Naick' in fifteen of the cases. Another title, Puttrawar, was used in the
same way by ten poligars. There are a few more information about the use of 'Naick' title in the
poligars' names. Of one hundred twenty poligars appeared in the villages of Salavaucum, Parumbauk,
and Saut Magan paraganas in the Report, one hundred six had the same title. Of one hundred
seventy-seven poligars in the Jagir recorded in the Permanent Settlement Records prepared in 1801,
one hundred fifty of them had the name 'Naick'. (Permanent Settlement Records, Vol.26, Privilege
of Poligar, in a Letter from Mr.Greenway, 30 October 1801.)> So far as their names are concerned,
close relationship between the nayakas in the previous period and the poligars in the eighteenth
century is hinted. Then, how was the status and power of the poligars compared with nayakas ?
The crucial point to be noticed is that the poligars were thought to be one of village
establishment in the Barnard Report. Their tax-free land or dues were not classified either in the
categories for the 'strangers' or those in the intermediary level. Instead poligars received them
apparently as one of the 'village establishment'. They occupied nearly thirty per cent of the
total of the tax-free land belonging to the village establishment and were granted the land in
almost all the villages. The amount of D/Tread was largest among others, too. They were given
D/Tread in fifty-three villages, D/Measure in twenty, and D/State in almost all the villages.
These figures clearly indicate their position as one of the village establishment in the local
society.
According to Tiruvendipuram Report, the role of the poligar was as follows:
"The duty of the Polygar is now, and is said immemorially to have been to appoint Taliars
to watch in 26 villages of the Farm both by night and by day at his own expense, for to prevent
any of the Inhabitants as well as strangers from being robbed; and in case any person is robbed
within the precincts of the 26 villages, he is to make good his loss to him, unless he apprehends
the thief; one month before the paddy and small grain is fit for cutting in these villages, he is
to provide Taliars to watch it, as also after it is cut and lyes in the fields; and if any of it
is stolen he is to make it good to the cultivator. He is to take care of all thieves that are
apprehended in these villages, he is to prevent the husbandmen from quitting the villages
themselves, or from driving away their working cattle, and from carrying away their instruments of
husbandry. In case an Invasion is apprehended from a Foreign Enemy, he is to furnish if ordered by
the Amuldar or Renter a body of Peons or Sibbendy to protect the whole Farm, for which charge of
Sibbendy he is paid besides his usual privileges." <Tiruvendipuram Report: 4.>
It is indicated from this account that the role of the poligar in Tiruvendipuram was basically
maintaining law and order in the twenty-six villages under his jurisdiction. They performed their
role in the local society as part thereof. It is also observed that he was placed under the
amuldar (revenue collector) or revenue renter even though he had some military force. Viewed from
this aspect the poligar did not seem to be a kind of feudal lord but the head of peons.
A few other aspects should be studied to assess the poligars' status in the society. The
list below indicates the caste composition of the poligars in the three paraganas of Salavaucum,
Parumbauk, and Saut Magan recorded in the Barnard Report.
Naick 56
Moodrian Naick 34
Rajah 10
Puttrawar Naick 9
Palli Naick 3
Moodrian 1
Perumal Pagoda of Wyouoor 1
Pillai 1
Unidentified, others 5 (N=120)
Of these poligars the caste origin of Naick or Rajah, which composed the majority, are hard to
ascertain. What we can know instead is that a few Tamil castes like Moodrian and Palli occupied
important portion. It is known both of Moodrian and Palli were not high in the caste hierarchy of
Tamil society compared with Vellala, Pillai, and other castes. For instance there were no Moodrian
landholders in the Barnard Report. Though there were several Palli landholders in Salavaucum, both
of Place and Ellis considered them a servant class under Brahmin mirasidars. <Minute of the Board
of Revenue, on the different modes of Land Revenue Settlement, as existing in different Districts,
5 January 1818, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 368; Mr.Place's Final Report on the Jagir, 6 June 1799,
Papers on Mirasi Rights: 47.> Except one Pillai, we cannot find any of other high Tamil castes
among the poligars. <Prof. Y. Subbarayalu hinted me that Puttrawar could be the title of Nattar in
this period in personal communication. If so, there is a possibility to find some high castes
among the poligars. This point needs further verification.>
As to the caste composition of poligars in the Jagir, we have another record prepared by
Place for the year 1792-93. It was as follows: <Permanent Settlement Records, Vol.44, Account of
the Privileges enjoyed by Poligars of the Jagir for Fusly 1202.>
Naick 80
Naidoo 67
Rajah 20
Pillai 3
Reddi 1
Others, unidentified 10 (N=181)
Here the majority were consisted of those of Telugu origin like Naidoo or Reddi and few of the
influential local agricultural castes were in the list.
The last point to clarify is spatial aspect of poligars' jurisdiction. The list below
indicates the number of villages under the respective poligars in the three paraganas of
Salavaucum, Parumbauk, and Saut Magan recorded in the Barnard Report. Apparently most of the
poligars had just one or two villages under his jurisdiction.
1 80 5 5
2 18 6 - 9 5
3 6 12 1
4 4 21 1 (N=120)
The same findings can be obtained from another record on the poligars in Chingleput prepared by
Greenway in 1801. <Chingleput Permanent Settlement Records, Vol.26, A Letter from Mr.Greenway, 30
October 1801, in Board's Consultation, 31 March 1802.)> The list below indicates nearly half of
the poligars had less than two villages under his jurisdiction and three-fourths of them had less
than ten.
0 - 2 88 51 -100 5
3 - 5 26 128 1
6 - 10 19 131 1
11 - 20 23 388 1
21 - 50 12 (N=177)
These investigation clearly indicates that the jurisdiction of the respective poligars was rather
small. Barnard Report suggests, however, another spatial aspect, that is, 'poligar-village'. In
Salavaucum the number of poligar households was thirty-three, spread over twenty villages. There
were several villages where several number of poligars resided and from where the poligars
extended their jurisdiction. We will call such a village as 'poligar-village'. Yeddamitchy, for
instance, had in it eleven poligars <The number could be less as the actual identification is
hardly possible by poligar names alone.> whose jurisdiction spread over nineteen villages. Next
came Comarravaddy whose poligars covered nine villages. Other poligar-villages covered three to
six villages each. The spatial concentration of the villages under the respective poligar-villages
suggests a possibility that there had existed a kind of 'circle of villages' which might be
related with magan. The possibility was, however, very little. The circle of villages had little
to do with the magan boundary. For instance the circle of villages under the Yeddamitchy poligars
scattered Magan 01, 02, 05, and 06. Of these four magans all except Magan 01 had some other
poligars belonging to other circle of villages. The reason of the concentration of circle of
villages seemed to be due to the proximity of poligars' domicile.
To sum up the findings about poligars in the concerned period, they performed the role of
safeguarding the local society as one of the village establishment and were originated not from
the influential agricultural caste but mostly either from low castes or Telugu castes. They were
in many cases village watchmen, even though a few of them had fairly influential military power
like the nayakas in the previous period and sometimes offered military service to the state in
some parts of South India. Connecting the influential nayakas in the Vijayanagar period directly
with the poligars in the period is not sustainable so far as the period and area under study was
concerned. <Generally speaking soldiers in the eighteenth century were paid soldiers. They very
often changed their loyalty due to the arrears of wage payment. We can find many accounts of such
cases in the Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai. It may be noted, therefore, that there is no
necessity for us to take the military contribution of poligars to the state as the ground in
placing poligars as state agents.> Besides they had under their jurisdiction a very limited number
of villages, which had little to do with magan boundary.
We will next examine the spatial distribution of village ownership share. In the previous
chapter it was suggested that the landholders or mirasidars represented the local society as the
bearer of the communal formation. Can we, then, discern as the base of spatial entirety any
communal tie among the landholders ? For its clarification we will investigate the spatial
distribution of the landholding castes as well as the villages held by each of them, and relate it
with magan boundary.
The largest landholding caste in Salavaucum paragana was Gentoo Brahmin, which held
twenty-four villages while living in seventeen villages (see Table II-12). The Vistnoo and the
Siva Brahmin castes held eighteen and four villages respectively. In total the Brahmin castes held
forty-six villages. Next came the Vellalas, which held seventeen villages. Tooliva Vellala held
ten villages, Puccolum Vellala six, and Conidighetty Vellala one. Among others Palli held nine
villages, conicoply two, cowkeeper one, and Raja one. Eishverum Pagoda, Permal Pagoda, and
Seetanunjerry Pagoda held three, three, and one respectively. The remaining three villages were
held by some not known to Barnard.
As to the spatial distribution of these holdings, it is true that a few castes held
villages in concentrated localities. For instance Siva Brahmins held villages in the northern part
of Salavaucum paragana, and Puccolum Vellalas in the northeastern part. On the other hand the
Puccolum Vellala, Reddi, and Tooliva Vellala castes show separated and concentrated habitation
areas for each of them. The distribution of their areas was, however, not closely overlapped
either with the landholding area or with any magan.
What is important in this regard was that there were many instances of villages held by
the landholders living elsewhere. Of the seventy-two villages in Salavaucum twenty-eight were held
by those living somewhere else (two overlaps). Among them twenty-five had none of the same caste
members with the landholders among the residents. The exceptional case was Puccolum Vellala which
dominated Magan 04. Such case was, however, very exceptional. Other villages held by other castes
were scattered without showing any concentration. One might rather say that the villages held by
the respective castes were spatially mixed like a mosaic tile. Thus the cohesion of local society
cannot be observed from the aspect of landholding.
Lastly we will examine the service area of some of the so-called 'village' functionaries.
The point to be is whether every magan had them in its composing villages.
1. Artificers (Carpenters, Ironsmiths)
There were twenty-seven carpenters living in twenty-one villages. All the eight magans in
Salavaucum paragana had from one to four villages where carpenters resided. Sixteen households
belonging to ironsmiths were scattered among fourteen villages. Dues and tax-free land were
granted to the artificers in almost all the villages. Magan 06, however, had no ironsmith in any
of the villages.
2. Barbers
Sixteen barbers were living in thirteen villages. Salavaucum and Annahdoor villages had three and
two households respectively, others one. They received D/Tread and D/Measure in almost all the
villages. No barber was, however, found in magan 02, though the tax-free land belonging to the
village establishment was allocated to them in two villages where no barbers resided.
3. Potmakers
There were thirteen households of potmakers in eleven villages. Magan 06 did not have any potmaker
while other magans had one or two. D/Tread and D/Measure were granted in half of the villages,
only a few in magans 06 and 07. Tax-free land was granted in nine villages in which potmakers did
not necessarily reside.
4. Washermen
There were twenty-four households of washermen in twenty-four villages. <There was another village
where some washermen lived. But the number of the households is unreadable due to the damage of
the original record.> All magans had from two to five washermen respectively except magan 02 where
no washermen lived. D/Tread and D/Measure were granted in almost all the villages. There were
seven villages where the tax-free land was granted to them, but their location did not always
correspond to their places of residence.
5. Snake Doctors
There were twenty-two households of snake doctors in fifteen villages. All the magans except magan
06 had from one to five. D/Tread and D/Measure were granted to them in almost all the villages
including magan 06. Tax-free lands were found in seven villages, though the lands were not always
located in the villages where they lived.
6. Shoemakers
There were only two shoemakers, living in Salavaucum and Pannioor. Salavaucum was the largest and
Pannioor was the second largest village in the paragana. In this sense shoemakers should not be
called as 'village' functionaries. Neither dues or tax-free land was recorded in the Report.
Usually Sakkili is the caste name for shoemaker in South India, but their name does not appear,
either. The two shoemakers must have been engaged in shoemaking in town bazaars, which may explain
reason none of their shares was found in any of the villages.
7. Panjangums (Panjangum Brahmins or astrologers)
There were six Panjangum living in four villages. No Panjangum was found in six magans, but
D/Tread and D/Measure were granted in most of the villages. Tax-free land was granted to them in
twelve villages, but hardly any relation can be observed with their residing places.
8. Conicoplies
Sixty-six households of conicoply lived in twenty-seven villages and in all the magans. They were
granted D/Tread, D/Measure, D/State, and the tax-free land belonging to the village establishment
in almost all the villages in the paragana.
9. Shroffs
There were thirty-five shroff households in twenty-one villages. Other features were same as
conicoply's case.
The examination above indicates, first of all, the incapacity of any single village to
carry on production activities independently due to the lack of essential functionaries. Even if
some shares were reserved for the functionaries, many villages were found to be without any
recipients among the residents. The location of the tax-free land did not always correspond to the
recipients' places of residence, either. Thus a certain number of villages were covered by one
functionary. In other words the spatial coverage of his function was not confined to his village
of residence but was spread among a certain number of villages. On the other hand, however,
positive correlation between their service area and the magan could be hardly observed. There were
some magans without essential service castes, either.
In the above investigation into the spatial aspect of poligars' jurisdiction, landholding
castes, or the service area, the entirety of a magan as a basic spatial unit of the Mirasi System
was seriously suspected. If the basic production unit was not a magan, then, how was the 'local
society' composed of ? Or rather to say, was the local society still alive ? The answer seems to
be negative. It is by now quite clear that neither the caste-unity which had provided the base for
local society called Nadu in the Chola Period, or the nayaka rule which once demarcated the
boundary of nayaka territory called Nayakattanam in the Vijayanagar Period, could enforce their
unifying role any more by the concerned period. Though the features of the share distribution
system, which maintained the production activities at an area above village level, were surely
observable, the above investigation leads us to the conclusion that they were just the remnants
and the classical type of local society was not observable any more. There must have proceeded
steady historical process destroying the integration and entirety of the local society. Our next
task is to verify the main forces to cause the change by the information contained in the Report.
To say the conclusion at first, it was none but the emergence of new formation that had
caused the decline of local society. The new formation is termed here as individual formation. The
bearer of the new formation was the village leader who utilized his village/s as his power base.
Due to the emergence of individual formation led by the village leaders, the collapse of local
society was in progress in two sides, one within the Mirasi System and another outside the System.
We will investigate the former first.
The new individual formation was expressed as the change of the historical nature of
landholders and the emergence of village leader from among the landholders. It was previously
assumed that the landholders were, following Nattar of the Chola period, the bearers of the
communal formation. They had some communal tie among themselves over several villages even if they
held ownership shares individually. <An individual type of landholding, for instance, can be even
included in the category of communal landholding if the individual landholders had some communally
exclusive tie with other landholders.> Such communal tie among the landholders had, however, been
fairly weakened in the concerned period. As investigated above, the distribution of village
ownership share held by the respective landholding castes was spatially mixed like mosaic tile and
showed little cohesive communal unity in any locality. Actually the ownership share had been very
often transacted with those outside the local society including merchant communities. The village
leaders, who bore the individual formation, had grown out of such landholders as had lost the
communal tie and identity with the local society to which they once belonged to. Instead of being
dependent upon the communal tie or unity based on wider area as their power base, they utilized
village/s to support their independent power.
Such change as described here can be discerned in the Barnard Report, too. The
landholders, who were allocated D/Tread or D/Measure in almost all the villages, acquired 144 1/8
cawnies of tax-free land belonging to the village establishment in thirty-four villages. The fact
that they were granted in one-half of the villages indicates that such grants to them were
comparatively of more recent origin than those given to 'village establishment' like artificers,
shroff, conicoply, cornmeter, poligars, who were granted the same type of tax-free land in almost
all the villages. The recent origin of the grant is further indicated by another evidence. Of the
sixteen cawnies of 'new' tax-free land belonging to the village establishment allocated to nine
recipients the landholders occupied five cawnies in three villages. Such new grant as done to the
village leader can be interpreted as the symbolic expression of the change in landholders'
historical position. Formerly the landholders occupied, as the owners of the village, a higher
position in the village structure and held the village as such. Rather than expressing their
status by acquiring a land plot as tax-free land, they had chosen holding the leading position
while demanding landlord rent from the under raiyats. As the nature of landholders changed from
the one buried in a communal tie to the one based on his own power, they must have begun seeking
the privilege of tax-exemption, too. The state naturally responded to their request in order to
incorporate them under the state power.
In this regard the argument of Eric Stokes might be referred. In his comparison between
the 'office mirasi' and 'landed mirasi' in the raiyatwari tenure in South India and in the joint
landlord tenures in north India, Stokes seems to suggest two choices to be taken by the village
elite, one to seek grants of tax-free land from the state, and the other to impose landlord rent
upon tenant. He, then, understands the difference of the prevalence of these two types as the
regional difference. <Stokes 1977: 55-57. For instance he states that the landed mirasi was found
where the System of village officers supported by office mirasi was weakest. Though this paper
does not go further into this issue, it should be noted that even Tanjore villages had many types
of office mirasi (see several types of Inam in Gough 1981: 38-44.) even though the landlord's rent
occupied very high proportion. These office mirasi tended to be buried unnoticed in the statistics
as they were often located inside Inam village. Anyhow it may suffice here to say the structure of
Mirasi System did not fundamentally differ between Tanjore and Chingleput even though the
proportional shares might greatly vary.> Instead it is asserted here that the landholders started
seeking tax-free land ('office mirasi' in Stokes' usage) as they began to separate themselves from
the communal tie.
The same evidences could be also obtained about the 'chief of the village' in the Report.
Totally 97 7/8 cawnies of the old tax-free land belonging to the village establishment was granted
in twenty-five villages to the chief of the village. Of the nine recipients newly granted sixteen
cawnies of tax-free land belonging to the village establishment one chief of the village obtained
seven cawnies in one village. Both these figures indicates the recent origin of the 'chief of the
village' as was the case with landholders' tax-free land.
There is one important difference between the chief of the village and the landholders in
the Mirasi System. Landholders received either D/Tread or D/Measure in almost all the villages
whereas the chief of the village did not receive any dues in any of the villages. As studied
before, D/Measure or D/Tread were usually allocated to those related with 'village establishment'.
From the traditionally established position in the local society, it was natural for the
landholders to be allocated these dues. On the other hand the case of the chief of the village
without having any dues in any of the villages was very exceptional among the recipients in the
System, in which some dues were usually allocated whenever tax-free land was reserved. This
difference indicates that the position of the chief of the village was, unlike that of
landholders, of very recent origin. In this regard it may be noted that the non-existence of the
office of Patel or village headman in Tondaimandalam (including Chingleput) was well noticed at
the beginning of colonial rule. <Minute of the Board of Revenue, on the different modes of Land
Revenue Settlement, as existing in different Districts, 5 January 1818, Papers on Mirasi Rights:
377.> It was only in 1816 when the appointment of village headman in all the villages throughout
the Tamil country was administratively enforced. <Replies from Mr.F.W.Ellis, Collector of Madras,
to the Mirasi Questions, 30 May 1816, Appendix, Papers on Mirasi Rights: 254, foot note 25.>
Individual formation born by these village leaders was heterogeneous to the Mirasi System.
As it gradually invaded the Mirasi System, villages under the respective village leaders
strengthened autonomous position from the rest of the society. The local society accordingly began
to lose its entirety. The newly emerging village leaders were actually the very class who had led
this process. By increasing their dues and tax-free land and by usurping other shares, they
destroyed the Mirasi System and broke down the local society into smaller sphere of their own,
usually village/s. Local society was on the verge of collapse in the eighteenth century, by which
time village leaders had emerged as the dominant force transforming South Indian society.
It may be noted here about the difference between the 'quasi-individual' formation in the
earlier period and the individual formation discussed here. For instance many individuals or
institutions, mostly government high officials or religious authorities, were included in the list
of recipients of D/Half or of the tax-free land allocated to the outsiders. These individuals were
granted them because of their contribution to the state or to the local society. The grant was,
therefore, backed by the state and the communal formations, without which they would soon have
lost their rights. On the other hand, the village leaders discussed here maintained their status
and rights neither by the support from the state or the communal formations but by their own. Even
if the privileges were granted and appropriated individually, the power base between the two was
of completely different nature.
The role and power of the emerging village leaders and their relation with the Mirasi
System can be clarified by the list of collections and disbursements by the Gramattans (Puttah
Monigars or village headmen) contained in a Collector's letter from South Arcot. <Letter from the
principal collector in the Southern Division of Arcot, 15 December 1805, Madras Board of Revenue
Proceedings, 2 January 1806.> The letter contains the accounts concerning the thirty-one
Gramattans. We will take up one of them, the Gramattan of Acolagramum village in Tindivanam, for
case study.
Table III-1 is the account of Acolagramum. According to the Table the Gramattan's
'unauthorized collection' amounted to 45.2.65 (Pagoda, Fanam, Cash - gold currency: to be
abbreviated as P.F.C.). He disbursed the amount for various purposes. He paid, for instance,
16.23.58 (P.F.C.) to the Mahatady peons who came to collect revenue, 1.22.40 (P.F.C.) to the peons
of Vatavalum Bundary (probably a poligar) who came to apprehend thieves, 24 F. to repair a tank, 2
P. to a church (Hindu pagoda) Brahmin, and 1 P. to a carpenter. The accounts of other villages
recorded in the same letter also indicate various items the Gramattans provided with money. The
expense for festivals, rituals, pagodas, road repair, tank repair, the fees to Brahmins, Muslim
priests, conicoplies, watchmen, pilgrims, surveyors, carpenters, ironsmiths, dancing girls,
actors, and the bribes to revenue collectors, etc. were all defrayed through the hands of the
Gramattans. The village leaders had thus become the sponsors of those engaged in various
activities in the village. As was clearly indicated by their support of the village festivals,
Brahmins, or pagodas, they took leadership not only in secular matters but also in the religious
activities. Though this study does not discuss the nature of the leadership in general, it is
noteworthy that such support to the religious activities as found in the Gramattan's case was an
essential qualification for any leadership in India.
The second noticeable aspect observed in the account is that the amount of such
'unauthorized collection', which meant the collection done by the Gramattans privately without the
state sanction, occupied in some villages as high as fifty per cent of the state tax from the
village. Such status and influence as possessed by them in the village must have forced the state
allow them the privilege of tax exemption to win their cooperation.
The last important aspect in this regard was that the collection was not only
'unauthorized' by the state but also done independently of the Mirasi System. In other words it
went on outside the sphere of both the state and the communal formations. The village leaders
overtook most of the activities the Mirasi System had previously performed. For instances the
Gramattans paid to the conicoply or accountant 'above his pay', or embezzled the payment due to
artisans, and so on.
The emergence of such village leaders as described above critically gave damage to the
Mirasi System in due course. They behaved independently as the bearer of the individual formation.
Their behavioral pattern differed completely from that of the Nattars, the bearer of the communal
formation in the Chola period, who endeavoured to protect the local society from the intervention
of the state formation. The power base of village leaders lay in their village(s) itself. Local
society was in the process of collapse in the eighteenth century, and the village(s) under the
respective leaders had steadily become the basic unit of the society. We will examine a case of
such village leader later in the next section.
Another main cause for the collapse of local society was the development of the commercial
activities which had been occurring outside the Mirasi System. The decline of local society
occurred in parallel with the increasing crisis of the Mirasi System caused by the development of
commercial activities in the period. Though a detailed study is not attempted here, drastic
increase of cotton piece-goods trade through the European commercial powers from the late
seventeenth century is noteworthy. Mirasi System, which originally provided the base for unity of
local society and of the communal formation, had to give place not only to the emerging village
leaders but also to the commercial activities growing outside the Mirasi System. The analysis of
the Barnard Report verifies this hypothesis.
Table II-1, which is the aggregated result of grants in dues and tax-free land to the
different castes in Salavaucum paragana, indicates that the traders such as Chitties, Caumities,
chunam sellers, toddy (drink) sellers, and oil sellers, or the 'non-village' artisans such as
weavers, cotton refiners, or woodcutters, were hardly granted any dues or tax-free land in any of
the villages. This fact signifies that their position in the local society differed from that of
'village' service castes like barbers, artificers, washermen, or Panjangums, that is, their
activities were performed outside the sphere of the Mirasi System or of the local society even if
they resided within it. Their relation with the local society differed completely in the sense
that the village functionaries were totally supported by or incorporated in the local society,
whereas the non-village artisans were only partly incorporated in it by a nominal payment of just
a part of their income to it (more accurately to its representatives as will be discussed below).
Their relation with the local society was partial and the major part of their wealth was
accumulated outside the local society or the Mirasi System.
The state and the communal formations attempted to incorporate the developing commercial
activities, too. The former imposed Juncan (customs) on the goods passing the customs offices.
Fees for the local society was at the same time collected along with Juncan. The Tiruvendipuram
Report has information about this issue. In Tiruvendipuram Farm there were eight customs offices
in the 1760s when the area was surveyed by the East India Company. Different customs rates were
imposed according to the goods or traders. Fees were also collected. For instance the rates of
Juncan and fees imposed on the goods in the six customs offices in the area (Sharady, Ramaporam,
Padrycopang, Comerapuram, Toutaput, Cuddalore river side) are indicated in Table III-2. Juncan
collected there was paid to the state, whereas the fees collected by the revenue-renter's
conicoply were distributed among the pagodas, Nattars, head conicoply, Brahmins, Fakeer (Muslim
priest), and Pandarum (non-Brahmin priest) as indicated in Table III-3. Poligar received one-
eighth of the total customs.
Two points should be observed from these tables. The first is that the relation of the
state and the communal formations with the commercial activities was symbolically expressed in the
forms of customs and fees. Secondly the relation between the local society and those engaged in
commerce and industry was partial. To say more concretely on the latter point the recipients of
the fees in the local society side were not the local society in general but pagodas, Nattars, a
head conicoply and the poligar only. The relation of the fee-payers with the local society was
thus confined to the one with these four recipients. On the other hand in the case of village
functionaries, a carpenter, for instance, performed his role in exchange for dues collected from
the whole produce in the local society. Their relation with the local society was, in this sense,
formed with the local society as a whole. These pieces of evidence signify that the local society
failed to incorporate those engaged in commerce and industry by granting dues or tax-free land. In
other words the local society failed to incorporate them in the Mirasi System. The internal
mechanism of granting dues or tax-free land in the Mirasi System could not adjust itself to the
development of commercial activities. The accumulation of wealth by those engaged in the
developing commercial activities took a different form from we saw in the Mirasi System.
The state, on the other hand, seems to have attempted to have comparatively more direct
relation with commerce and industry. It imposed tax directly upon producers such as weavers and
dyers. Tax was also levied from the shops of beetle-nut and tobacco, oil, toddy and arrack, salt,
carts, fisherman, and the coolie houses in Tiruvendipuram. Some additional fees were collected
along with the state tax, which were taken by the poligar or watchmen in most cases. In the Jagir,
Sattavaid has a list of the state taxes imposed upon those engaged in commerce and industry (see
Table III-4). It was not the local society but the state that tried to hold the commercial and
industrial activities under control. It it, however, to be noted that the amount collected by the
state was fairly negligible compared with the land revenue.
It has been indicated by the above investigation that the state attempted to control the
commercial activities by imposing customs and direct taxes while the local society did the same by
levying fees. It was also verified that both of them could gain only a partial success in their
attempts. The Mirasi System, formed and maintained in the competitive relation between the two
formations, failed to hold the progress of the changes caused by the commercial development by
their conventional means of granting dues and tax exemption.
Those engaged in commerce and industry, who had grown outside the sphere of the Mirasi
System or local society, had begun to leave the local society in its very sense. Their destination
was urban centers, especially those coastal cities developing rapidly in the eighteenth century
due to the increase of foreign trade by the European East India Companies. The study on this
aspect was attempted elsewhere. <See for detail, Mizushima 1991: Chapter 3.> It is suggested here
that the village leaders participated in the increasing rural-urban grain trade by utilizing their
control over the production activities. It is highly possible they accumulated their wealth
through it and strengthened their economic position and independence. All these factors helped to
generate the new structure of wealth-accumulation, which grew independently of the out-dated
Mirasi System.
Communal formation based on the local society was thus steadily collapsing, both
internally and externally, and the individual formation had emerged as the dominant formation of
the period. The bearer of the individual formation, namely the village leaders, took the political
leadership of the period as well and threw South Indian society into the turmoil that led finally
to colonization. It is to be noted that the political unrest, which went along with such
structural change, led to the growth of some of village leaders as the leaders of much bigger
territory consisting of number of villages. No matter how large the territory might have been,
however, their rule had nothing to do with the communal formation or the Mirasi System. <A name
list of renters in the village settlement of South Arcot in the first year of colonial rule or
1801 (Board of Revenue Miscellaneous Records, Vol.12, Jummabundy of Each Village for Fusli 1211,
Board's Consultations, 13 July 1802.) gives some interesting information. The analysis of the
renters' names is not yet completed, but it seems that around one-third of the renters rented a
single village, though there were also a few renters who rented more than a hundred villages.
Larger scale renters were in some cases those having 'nayaka' title in their names. They were
probably the former poligars. The majority were, however, from socially high ranking castes like
Brahmin, Mudali, Reddi, Pillai, and Row. More detailed analysis of the record will be done in some
other occasion.> They simply utilized village/s as their power base to separate themselves from
the pre-existed system and assert their individual power.
To sum up, the Mirasi System, which had functioned as the core system in reproducing the
local society and had been established for a long period in the competitive relation between the
state and the communal formations, was being deformed from within by the emerging individual
formation born by the village leaders and was being capsuled from outside by the developing
commercial activities in the eighteenth century. In this historical process the local society
which had been identical with the spatial base of the communal formation in its original form came
on the verge of break down into the villages controlled under the respective village leaders.
Local society in eighteenth century South India was thus the remnant of the lost integration and
entirety and was alive only in notion as symbolized by the collection of fees in the customs
office by Nattar and others who had represented the local society.
We will examine the significance of such a change as observed in the pre-colonial period
by comparing it with the later development since colonial rule in the next section.
IV. South Indian Society since Colonial Rule

South Indian society the English East India Company began to rule in the late eighteenth
century was in the transient period and was in its climax of political turmoil due mainly to the
structural change described above. Among others, the land policy enforced by the colonial
government gave critical impact upon South Indian society. In this section the development for the
last two centuries is briefly summarized to clarify more clearly the significance of pre-colonial
development.
At the initial stage of the colonial rule the revenue administration of most of the areas
which came under the Company was left in charge of the revenue renters, so that the Company did
not care much about the internal structure of the society. The first of its revenue system, the
Zamindari system, was also the one in which the ownership of a large area was allocated to the
Zamindaris, so that the Company need not know the state of each farm so long as the revenue was
secured.
It was the end of the eighteenth century when the British started revenue administration
on their own. Soon they faced great difficulty in deciding to whom land ownership should be
granted. There were two choices, other than the Zamindari system (or its equivalent in smaller
scale, the Mittahdari system), to be taken for the Board of Revenue in Madras. The first was to
make the village as primary revenue unit and to give land ownership to the landholding body of the
village. It was called village settlement and supported mainly by the administrators (Collectors)
in charge of the richer coastal districts. The second was to make the land plot as primary unit
and to give its ownership to the respective raiyats. It was called raiyatwari settlement and was
supported mainly by the collectors like Munro who worked in the drier inner districts. It is to be
noted that the revenue officers had in a sense the same view about the influential position of the
village leaders even though they differed in their opinion to whom the ownership should be
granted. What the supporters of the raiyatwari settlement aimed at was to eliminate the power and
influence of the leaders exercising power over a large area by making settlement directly with the
'inferior patels or other substantial farmers' of the respective villages. <Murton 1973: 167.> On
the other hand the supporters of the village settlement intended to collect revenue by utilizing
the village leaders' control over the village. <For detail, see Mizushima 1986: Chapter II.>
Anyhow after the period of trial and error in the first decade of the nineteenth century the final
decision to introduce the raiyatwari system came from London and was enforced accordingly.
Under the raiyatwari settlement the village land was divided into hundreds of plots, each
plot being demarcated, assessed, and granted to a raiyats who took responsibility of paying tax.
The principle of making the land plot as the primary unit of revenue administration gave critical
impact upon the later development of South Indian society as well as upon the Mirasi System.
First of all the raiyatwari settlement gave a final blow to the Mirasi System by
abolishing dues and by separating tax-free land from the reproduction structure of local society.
Dues allotted to various recipients were amalgamated into land assessment. The difference of land
tax according to the cultivators' status was abolished in the late nineteenth century. Though a
considerable volume of land was left unassessed or favourably assessed, they were separated from
the production system of local society and played very limited role. Both the Mirasi System, which
had till then somehow existed as the production system of the local society, and the communal
formation, which had worked as its core, finally ceased to play their historical role. As a
result, those previously supported by the Mirasi System lost their base and had to enter the
individual relationship with the respective households. <From this viewpoint the Jajmani system
can be characterized as a disguised system of the old Mirasi System. The individual service
relationship among the villagers under the Jajmani system was the one newly formed after the
collapse of the Mirasi System. Even though the same allowance (dues) or the service-exchange
relation would remain, the whole context differs in the relation of the recipients with the local
society, which no more exists. The same interpretation can be applied to the tax-free land called
Inam. It seems as much as one-third of the total cultivated area in the Madras Presidency was
exempted from the full rate of assessment. (Stein 1977: 68.) Though further study is essential to
clarify the nature of Inam tenure in the colonial period, there is much possibility to interpret
the grant of extensive Inam strengthened the individual utilization of landed plot separated from
the reproduction activities once observed in the local society. I would like to advance the
argument in future occasion. Anyhow Inam holding was finally abolished by Madras Inam Estate
(Abolition and Conversion into Raiyotwari) Act in 1956. >
The second and the more drastic result of the raiyatwari system was the shift of the base
of the individual formation. Formerly the village leaders utilized village/s as their power base,
which often gave entirety to the village/s under the respective village leaders. Under the
raiyatwari system, however, it was a land plot upon which the individual formation was based. This
has gradually led the process of breaking down the village entirety in due course. <At the initial
stage of revenue administration, the colonial government fully noticed the possible effect of
raiyatwari settlement. The Committee at Tanjore, for instance, reported in the year 1807 as
follows: "Land in India is seldom a separate farm. All land belongs to some village or another,
whether it be cultivated or waste... there is then always, in the arable and cultivated land
generally, a community of interests...; all labour for village works of general utility; all
contribution for religious ceremonies; all the pay and labour of the village artisans and
officers, are regulated by this communion of interest. A ryotwar rent may separate the villager's
stock from that usually clubbed for public rent." (Report from the Committee at Tanjore, 22
February 1807, Fifth Report, III: 520-521.)> By taking up Reddimangudi village in Tiruchirapalli
district as a case study, we will trace the process of collapse of the village society. <For
detail, see Mizushima 1983.>
In Reddimangudi the Reddiyar (Telugu agriculturist) caste almost monopolized the village
land by owning seventy-eight per cent of the occupied land (excluding Inam land) in 1864, the
first year the detailed village record on landholding is available (see Table IV-1). By the time
when a village study was conducted by the author in 1982-1983 their share had come as low as
twenty-seven per cent. On the contrary, the other castes, which possessed hardly any land in 1864,
had acquired a large extent of land during the period. The share of the Gounder (shepherd) caste
in the years of 1864, 1898, 1924 and 1982 was 0, 2, 12, and 18 per cent respectively. That of the
Muthraja (Muttiriyan: Tamil agriculturist) caste was 8, 17, 16, and 22 per cent. The same of the
'untouchable' castes like Pariah, Pallan, Sakkili, or Christian Pariah had increased gradually
from one to nineteen per cent for the last hundred years or so. Such a drastic change in the
landholding ratio as occurred in Reddimangudi was also observed in the neighboring village, too.
<Mizushima & Nara 1983.>
The historical process underlining the drastic decline in the landholding structure in
Reddimangudi can be analyzed in the following way. The fact that the Reddiyars almost monopolized
the village in the year 1864 despite the availability of large extent of cultivable land for any
other castes implies that those regarded as raiyats and granted land ownership in the raiyatwari
settlement were not always the direct cultivators but the members of the community to which a
village leader belonged. Among the early records we can trace the protest movement against the
high government tax in the concerned area. In April 1805 the Tahsildar office was attacked by the
inhabitants of Turaiyur (an area in the north western part of Tiruchirapalli) and several guards
were injured. The leaders of the riot then ran off to Salem, a neighboring district, but later
asked the permission from the government to return home. As one of the leaders was not granted the
permission, some of the leading people in the area petitioned for his return. Among the
petitioners was found the name 'Mangooly [Reddimangudi] Moodoo Reddy'. The disturbance continued
even after the incident, and some leading Reddiyars went to Madras to demand the tax-reduction
directly from the authority. Wallace, the Collector, tried hard to pacify the disturbance in the
area and wrote to the Board of Revenue in Madras to arrest the people who went to Madras. In the
list of the warrant, we can again find the name 'Mootoo Reddy of Maungoody'. <Letter from Kinlock
to the Board of Revenue, 27 April 1805, Board of Revenue Proceedings, 2 May 1805, Letter from the
Principal Collector in Tanjour and Trichinopoly, 20 July 1805, Board of Revenue Proceedings, 29
July 1805. For detail, Mizushima 1986: 107-109.> Though it cannot be verified whether Reddimangudi
was under his sole control or not, we may guess the existence of some leading figures among the
Reddiyars there. Anyhow the fact that the monopoly of landholding by a single community was
observed at the early stage of the colonial period indicates that the individual formation based
on the village/s was still too powerful to be ignored in the actual process of settlement work. It
may be added such a state of landholding structure was quite contrary to the original intention of
the raiyatwari settlement, in which the state and a raiyat should have direct contact in the
concerned land plot.
Though it took a long time, however, the raiyatwari settlement steadily materialized its
implied intention. Individual formation based on land plot began to take root deep in South Indian
society and started breaking down the village just like the individual formation based on the
village/s had previously broken down the local society. In this process the share of the ruling
village community in landholding drastically dropped. Three factors could be considered to have
caused the change. First is the loss of unity among the Reddiyars caused by its members' migratory
movement. The survey of all the genealogies in Reddimangudi indicates the movement of considerable
number of villagers to other parts of India or to foreign countries. A number of people had also
left through marriage. Many families no longer had any descendants in the village. The Reddiyars
were no exception. The symbolic case was the disappearance of three among the four kaniyatchikaran
(mirasidar) families said to have owned Reddimangudi in shares. Two of them had disappeared from
Reddimangudi without leaving any descendants, and one had emigrated to some other village. Only
one kaniyatchikaran family was found to live in Reddimangudi. <The kaniyatchikaran's leading
status was still observed symbolically in their performing chief role in the rituals of the
village festival.> It is beyond doubt that such movement of the ruling caste members destroyed the
unity among them, which led to the weakening of their monopolizing control over landholding.
Secondly the shift of the main irrigational facility from Yary or reservoir to wells had changed
the land use pattern in the village. <The number of wells recorded in the village map of 1892 was
only 23 but increased to 161 in 1982.> The shift from reservoir, which necessitated the unity
among the users (the majority were the Reddiyars) for its maintenance, to a well which offered an
individual use of water, canceled the necessity for cooperation among them. The third factor was
related with the second one. Due to the increased importance of irrigated land, the exclusion of
other castes from using the reserved cultivable land lost its importance for the Reddiyars. Not
the extent of the landholding but the availability of water resources attracted more attention of
the Reddiyars. A study of the ownership of newly reclaimed land in Reddimangudi done elsewhere
indicates that the castes other than Reddiyars acquired a considerable extent in the area formerly
categorized as cultivable waste. <Mizushima 1983.>
The disappearance of the base for the unity among a ruling village community and the
resulting decline of their landholding share has occurred in the fundamental historical process in
which the basic production unit shifted from a village to a land plot, with the relevant shift of
base in the individual formation. Village leaders with their followers of the same caste, who once
invaded the local society and snatched the village/s away from it, lost their base due to the
invasion of other raiyats who snatched the land plots from the village/s. The bearer of the
individual formation thus shifted from the ruling community of the village to the respective
raiyats. Another important change is that the individual formation came to confront directly with
the state formation. As a result the bearer of the individual formation had to find a new type of
formation in order to cope with the formidable colonial rule. Though nationalism seemed to have
offered itself as a new formation, Indian villagers today are still desperately in need of finding
out what formation should be established and on what unit they should stand.
This paper is an attempt to describe the share distribution system called Mirasi System
and to trace briefly the later development occurred in South Indian society from the eighteenth
century onwards by using the Barnard Report and some other sources and by the information obtained
through the author's field studies.
The main points discussed can be summarised as follows; 1. the share distribution system
which created and maintained the local society can be termed as Mirasi System, 2. the System had
been formed on the competitive power-balance between the state and the communal formations and had
been based upon a wider regional sphere than a single village, 3. the power balance between the
two formations was expressed as the various types of tax-free land and shares in the produce in
the System, 4. the System could absorb the changes in the power-balance by adjusting the
proportion of the shares, 5. the System in the later pre-colonial period was, however, seriously
challenged by the two factors irrelevant to the System, that is, first by the emergence of the
individual formation born by the village leaders within the System, second by the development of
commercial activities growing outside the System, 6. the System could not retard the progress of
these two by its internal mechanism of adjusting share-balance and was under the process of
collapse in the eighteenth century, 7. the village leaders gradually established their
independence both in the economic and political fields by participating in the commercial
activities and by overtaking the various activities once performed by the System, 8. the emergence
of the individual formation born by the village leaders threw South Indian society into the
political turmoil and finally led to the colonization, 9. under the British rule the raiyatwari
settlement destined the System to be demolished by abolishing many of the vested interests in the
System and confined the unit of production relation into a land plot while overpassing the
village, 10. with the disintegration of the villages the village leaders, who had emerged as the
bearer of the individual formation, had to lose their base, and the main phase of power struggle
was formed between the state and the raiyats, who now became the bearer of the individual
formation based on a land plot, 11. the structural change discussed above has deformed the South
Indian society into a highly disintegrated one and people are urged to establish a new formation
to cope with the problem.
Lastly the terms of 'formation' and 'local society' should be detailed. In this paper the
terms of state, communal, and individual formations have been used as an analytical tool in rather
an unconventional way. 'Formation' is here assumed to have had specific territorial base and
bearer respectively in the different stages of historical development in the different areas. As
its territorial base state formation had the state, communal formation had a wider communal region
than a village, and individual formation had a village before the raiyatwari settlement and a land
plot after its enforcement in South India. As to the bearers of the formations, on the other hand,
state formation had the state power, communal formation had Nattars in Chola period and mirasidars
in the later period, and the individual formation had the village leader before the raiyatwari
settlement and a raiyat after it. As such, each of the formations has had historical reality in a
particular sphere in a particular historical stage.
On the other hand 'local society' is here considered to be the sphere in which these
formations work among each other. It is a sphere with particular human organizations and
environments, where a man is given birth, mixes with others, inherits and creates world view,
culture, or tradition. The sphere of the local society expands or shrinks in the different stages
of historical development. In South India, the original form, or I should say the ideal type, of
the local society was an sphere controlled socially and economically by a ruling caste having
marriage network in it and the sphere of local society was identical with the sphere of the
communal formation. Local society had been recurrently reproduced by the production system called
Mirasi System, which was created and maintained in the competitive relationship between the state
and the communal formations. In the eighteenth century, however, the sphere of a local society was
under the process of breaking down into villages due to the emergence of village leaders, the
bearers of individual formation. South India was colonized in the mid way of this historical
process, and raiyatwari settlement, which totally differed from the Mirasi System, was enforced.
As the raiyatwari settlement was based on a tiny land plot and many of the institutions connected
with the Mirasi System was abolished, local society was destined to disappear from the scene of
South India.
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II. Tax-free Land, Dues, and Mirasi System

III. Emergence of New Formation and Decline of Mirasi System

IV. South Indian Society since Colonial Rule

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