SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

1. The complaint is made in the name of Kyle Phillips in his capacity as

director of Carnilinx (Pty) Limited (“Carnilinx”) of 4 Salisbury Street,

Johannesburg and the Fair-Trade Independent Tobacco

Association (“FITA”) of NSI House, 8A Keyes Avenue, Rosebank,

Johannesburg.

1.1. FITA was established in 2012 with a spirit to

encourage smaller manufacturers in the tobacco

industry in Southern Africa to collaborate in respect

of industry, regulatory and legislative matters which

are common to all and which, individually, there is

little hope of making any significant difference. FITA

is an independent non-profit company formed by

Southern African cigarette manufacturers

demanding a fair trading environment.

2. The entities and persons we believe were involved in the facts

set out below are:

2.1. British American Tobacco South Africa (“BATSA”) is

wholly owned by British American Tobacco PLC

(“BAT”). BATSA is a company duly registered and

incorporated in accordance with the company laws

of the Republic of South Africa and having its

 principle place of business at 34 Alexander Street,

Stellenbosch.

2.1.1. BATSA is part of British American Tobacco

PLC, a British multinational tobacco

company with its head quarters in London.

2.1.2. At the time of the commission of the

offences set out below, the directors of

BATSA were:

2.1.2.1. Brian Peter Finch

2.1.2.2. Luché Jacques Joubert

2.1.2.3. Dudley Christo Saayman

2.2. Martin Potgieter (“Potgieter”) was appointed as

Head of Business Development in January 2012. His

focus according to his business profile on the internet

is combating the illicit trade in cigarettes. He

manages and oversees BATSA’s Anti-Illicit Trade

efforts within the Southern African area. Also part of

the Anti-Illicit Trade efforts according to our

understanding were Johann van Rensburg (“Van

Rensburg”) and Jan Vermaak (“Vermaak”).

2.3. For the reasons dealt with herein under we verily

believe that Potgieter and/or persons in the employ

of BATSA whose full and further particulars are

currently unknown to us and the directors were

aware and/or actively participated in the offences

set out herein under.

2.4. The British American Tobacco PLC (“BAT”) is a

registered company as per English laws, and

incorporated in England and Wales, and carries on

business inter alia as a holding company. Its

principle place of business is Globe House, 4 Temple

Place, London, WC2R 2PG.

2.4.1. At the time of the various offences dealt

with herein below, the following persons

were directors:

2.4.2. Ann Frances Godbehere

2.4.3. Ming Sang Savio kwan

2.4.4. Christine Jacqueline Michelle Morin-Postel

2.4.5. Gerard Martin Murphy

2.4.6. Kieran Charles Poynter

2.4.7. Ngoako Joseph Ralebepa

2.4.8. Nicola Snook

 2.4.9. John Benedict Stevens

2.4.10. Karen Maria Alida De Segundo

2.4.11. Richard Jay Tubb

2.4.12. Salim Young

2.5. According to what Walter told us, the persons listed

hereafter were all employed by BAT at the time of

the commission of the said offences.

2.5.1. “Colin Daniels”. We, however, have

reason to believe from what we have

gleamed in various newspaper articles as

well as from our own research that this

person’s actual name is Colin Denyer

(“Denyer”). According to our research

Denyer was at the said time employed by

BAT as BAT’s Senior Investigations

Manager.

2.5.2. Allan Evans (“Evans”). According to our

research, Evans at the time held the

position of Senior Investigations Manager,

Anti-Illicit Trade Intelligence Unit (Eastern

Europe, Middle Eastern Africa).

 2.5.3. We are led to believe that Evans and

Denyer may also be involved in a

company called Hidden Technology

Systems International Ltd which is based in

the United Kingdom.

2.5.4. “Jane”

2.5.5. Ewan Duncan (“Duncan”) According to

our research, Duncan at the time was

employed by BAT as the head of their Anti-

Illicit Trade Intelligence Unit.

2.5.6. “Rachel”.

2.5.7. For the reasons dealt with herein under, we

verily believe that Potgieter and/or persons

in the employ of BATSA whose full and

further particulars are currently unknown

to us and the directors above were aware

and/or actively participated in the

offences set out herein under.

2.6 Belinda Sheila Gay Walter (“Walter”) is an adult female

admitted attorney of the High Court of South Africa.

During the relevant time, she practiced under the name

and style of Steyn Kinnear Inc., and thereafter Belinda

Walter Attorneys Inc.

2.6.1 Walter was actively involved in the creation of

FITA in 2012, and the first chairperson of FITA

after its formation. In her capacity as

chairperson of FITA she attended all the

officially convened meetings, and was privy to

business activities of FITA and the various

members. She was also privy to all the issues

dealt with in the said period.

2.6.2 We pause to point out that Walter also acted

during this period as the attorney of record for

FITA and for several of its members including,

but not limited to, Carnilinx and UATM. In this

capacity she acted in both criminal and civil

matters, and her conduct was covered by

legal professional privilege.

2.6.3 Walter resigned as FITA’s chairperson on or

about November 2013. Walter acted as

Carnilinx’s attorney until November 2013.

2.6.4 Between 25 October 2013 and 13 May 2014 or

27 May 2014, Walter was also involved in a

romantic relationship with one Johan van

 Loggerenberg (“van Loggerenberg”), a

former official of the South African Revenue

Services (“SARS”).

2.6.5 During the aforementioned period and whilst

acting as a legal representative for FITA and

its members, Walter operated as an

undercover operative for the State Security

Agency (“SSA”). We deal with this aspect

more fully herein after.

2.6.6 During the same period, Walter ALSO became

a paid informant of BAT. We have reason to

believe that she became a paid informer for

BAT as a result of being introduced to BAT by

one Chris Burger (“Burger”), her SSA handler.

This fact has been extensively reported in the

media, and is known and has been confirmed

by the South African Police Services (“SAPS”)

and Crime Intelligence (“CI”).

2.6.7 For the reasons more fully dealt with herein

under we have reason to believe that Walter

as well as the SSA during the said time period

committed the various crimes dealt with

herein under.
2.7 The State Security Agency was formed in 2009. The

mandate of the SSA is to provide the government with

intelligence on domestic and foreign threats or potential

threats to national stability, the constitutional order, and

the safety and wellbeing of the South African people.

We have been advised, which advice we accept, that

the SSA cannot operate outside legal confines and its

members are not mandated to break the law and/or

engage in criminal and/or unlawful activities in any form

or manner. We have further been advised that all

actions undertaken by persons in the employ of the SSA

must comply with the Constitution of the Republic, and

the applicable domestic and international law. The

conduct of intelligence is subject to the rule of law and

no member of the SSA is allowed to act above the law.

2.7.1 Burger at all relevant times hereto was a

member of the SSA and acted as Walter’s

handler. As will be demonstrated herein

under it is clear that Burger at all relevant times

hereto was working together with the persons

identified in BATSA and BAT.

2.8 Forensic Security Services (Gauteng) 2001/075337/23

(“FSS GP”) is a Closed Corporation incorporated in terms

 of the company laws of the Republic of South Africa

with its principle place of business at 205 Corobay Street,

Waterkloof Glen, Pretoria.

2.8.1 Francois Greyling (“Greyling”) is the sole

director of FSS GP.

2.9 Forensic Security Services (Kwazulu-Natal)

2001/055149/23 (“FSS KZN”) is a Closed Corporation

incorporated in terms of the company laws of the

Republic of South Africa with its principle place of

business at 99 Lighthouse Road, Bluff, Durban.

2.9.1 Stefanus Johannes Hofmeyr Botha (“Botha”) is

the sole director of FSS KZN.

2.9.2 According to our information Botha, FSS KZN

was requested in 2005 to assist TISA to address

the illicit trade in cigarettes and other

tobacco products in the SECU. FSS KZN was

specifically asked to gather information with

regards to the illicit trade and according to

Botha they make use of sub-contractors to

render their services. 1

1Affidavit by Botha in the High Court of South Africa, Western Cape (Cape Town) Case number
4928/15
 2.9.3 Derick Vosloo (“Vosloo”) was at all relevant

times hereto, according to Walter, a sub-

contractor of either FSS GP or FSS KZN.

2.10 The Tobacco Institute of Southern Africa (“TISA”) was

formed in 1991 to represent the non-commercial

common interest of both the manufacturers of tobacco

products and tobacco growers. TISA has its address at

Foyer Entrance A Sovereign Quay, 34 Somerset Road,

Greenpoint, Cape Town.

2.10.1 TISA has its members listed on its website.

Relevant for purposes of this application

however is BATSA.

2.10.2 At all relevant times hereto, TISA listed the

following persons as its directors:

2.10.3 Francois van der Merwe

2.10.4 Chad Limbert

2.10.5 Neetesh Ramjee

2.10.6 Brian Finch (Director of BATSA, 01 April 2010 to

29 February 2016)

2.10.7 Leslie Rance

2.10.8 Sean Donnelly

 2.10.9 Lizette Rau

2.10.10 Rudolf Ottermann

2.10.11 Jaco Malan

2.10.12 For the reasons set out herein under we have

reason to believe that both van der Merwe and

Finch were aware of the offences committed

during the relevant time period.

2.11 The Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations (”DPCI”),

commonly referred to as the Hawks, was established as

an independent directorate within the SAPS in terms of

Section 17C of the South African Police Service Act, 1995

as amended by the South African Police Service

Amendment Act, 2008 (Act 57 of 2008). The DPCI is

responsible for the combating investigation of National

Priority Crimes.

2.11.1 Brigadier Casper Jonker (“Jonker”) was a

member of the DPCI.

2.12 The South African Revenue Services (“SARS”) is the

nation’s tax collecting authority and is established in

terms of the South African Revenue Services Act 34 of

1997 as an autonomous agency. SARS is responsible for

 administering the South African Tax system and Customs

service. In terms of the relevant act SARS has a duty of

confidentiality towards its tax payers.

2.12.1 At the relevant time period, Danie Le Roux (“le

Roux”) Piet Swart (“Swart”) and van

Loggerenberg were all officials in the employ

of SARS.

2.13 The National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”) was created

in terms of Section 179 of the Constitution of the

Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. The NPA has

the power to institute and conduct criminal

proceedings on behalf of the State, carry out any

necessary functions incidental to instituting and

conducting such criminal proceedings (including

investigation), and to discontinue criminal proceedings.

2.13.1 At all relevant times hereto Advocate Johan

van Heerden (“van Heerden”) was an

advocate employed at the NPA. According

to the information provided to us he was

actively involved in the prosecution of SARS

and customs related matters vis a vis Carnilinx

and FITA members.

 2.14 The Illicit Tobacco Task Team (“Task Team”) is a multi-

agency task team that consists of members of the DPCI,

CI, SSA, NPA as well as TISA (BATSA and FSS).

2.14.1 Jonker headed the illicit Tobacco Task Team.

2.14.2 Colonel Hennie Niemann (“Niemann”) of CI

was likewise a member of the Illicit Tobacco

Task Team at the relevant time period.

2.14.3 Burger of the SSA was also a member of the

Tobacco Task Team at the relevant time

period.

2.14.4 FSS GP and/or FSS KZN was at the relevant

time period also represented on the said

Tobacco Task Team.

2.14.5 We also have reason to believe that Van der

Merwe similarly sat on the said Tobacco Task

Team.

2.14.6 Also sitting on the Task Team were members of

SARS whose full and further particulars are

unknown to us.

OPERATION KNYSNA

3. We have also been informed that BATSA and/or its Directors

and/ or individuals employed by BATSA with the knowledge

 of BATSA and/or its Directors and either one of the FSS’s refered

to below and its members conceived a project in 2013 called

“Operation Knysna”. The objects of Opertation Knysna were

contained in a written document or management plan which

was implemented in 2014. The primary target of this operation

was Carnilinx.

4. A business proposal was presented to BATSA by FSS and which

BATSA accepted. To this end Botha was provided with business

support and Mike Vosloo, Derrick Vosloo and Van der Merwe

were appointed, according to what we were told, to

implement the said plan.

5. As is more fully dealt with herein below we believe that the

entities and individuals named in this affidavit acted in concert

in execution of a common purpose to disrupt the business

affairs of Carnilinx, alternatively, conspired to disrupt the

business affairs of Carnilinx.

6. The Directors of the various entities are all liable in terms of

section 332 of the CPA.

 BACKGROUND TO INFORMATION CONTAINED IN OUR

COMPLAINT

7. On or about February 2014 Kyle Phillips, together with Mazzotti

and Sayed (directors of Carnilinx (Pty) Ltd), as well as two

attorneys of Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (“ENS”), one Andre

Erasmus (“Erasmus”) and a second attorney whose name

escapes us, as well as Advocate Nazir Cassim S.C. (“Cassim

S.C.”),and Malcolm Reeves (“Reeves”), a journalist from the

Sunday Times, met at the chambers of Cassim S.C., at which

time Walter freely and voluntarily, without undue influence,

and after being warned of her right to legal representation

and the consequences of making the disclosures referred to

herein under, stated what is set out herein after.

8. On or about April 2015 Walter again met with ourselves, Cassim

S.C. as well as Carnlinx’s new legal representative Shaheed

Dollie (“Dollie”) of Shaheed Dollie Incorporated.

9. As with the first meeting Walter was again warned about the

repercussions of the statement she was about to give and

advised to obtain the services of an attorney or legal

representative. Walter, however, made it clear that she wished

to proceed and did not need any legal representative. What

Walter stated at this occasion was reduced to writing by Dollie.

Walter however never signed the statement.

 WALTER’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SSA

10. According to Walter she became a covert agent/informant

for the SSA on or about October 2010. Her identifying number

with the SSA was “5332”. Walter’s primary role within the SSA

was centred around the tobacco industry. This, according to

Walter, was because of her extensive knowledge of an

involvement as an attorney in the tobacco industry in one way

or another since 2009.

11. According to Walter her handler at the SSA was the

aforementioned Burger.

12. According to Walter she initiated and subsequently formed

FITA in June 2012 at the behest of the SSA. She was tasked to

attract and invite various independent tobacco

manufacturers to join FITA, which she did. As a result of her role

in FITA, Walter subsequently became the attorney for a

number of the said tobacco manufacturers including

Carnilinx.

13. During the said period, Walter also acted for other tobacco

manufacturers such as UATM. This particular client was

introduced to Walter by one of the erstwhile SSA employees,

one Ferdinand Fryer who at one stage held the position of

“Head of Economic Intelligence”. We verily believe that Fryer

intentionally introduced Walter to UATM in order to facilitate

 SSA unlawfully and illegally obtaining information pertaining to

UATM.

14. According to Walter, the SSA illegally and unlawfully recorded

and surveyed the first FITA meeting. We have no reason to

believe that they did not continue to do so subsequently.

According to Walter, Burger informed her that the SSA at the

time made use of the services of FSS, who in turn used BAT

equipment and resources. We verily believe that the said

“operation” of illegally “spying” on us was paid for by BATSA.

We verily believe that TISA and specifically van der Merwe and

Finch, FSS GP, FSS KZN together with its directors, sub-

contractors and employees and BATSA were aware of this

unlawful and illegal conduct.

15. According to Walter her relationship with BAT came about as

a result of her identity allegedly being exposed to FSS by

Burger. According to her, Burger introduced her to Vosloo.

She alleged that Burger exposed her identity and role to

Vosloo on or about March of 2012.

16. On or about 5 December 2012, Vosloo in turn introduced

Walter to the aforementioned Denyer, although he was

introduced to her as Daniels. For ease of reference, we will

refer to him as Denyer hereinafter. This meeting took place at

the Intercontinental Hotel in Sandton.

17. During the meeting, Denyer advised Walter that their

intelligence agents and/or operatives were paid around

50 000 British pounds (“pounds”) annually, and that there were

bonus structures allegedly in place for successful prosecutions.

Denyer further indicated that he would in future have direct

contact with her and instructed her not to have any further

contact with Vosloo. According to Walter, the agreement was

that she would be paid offshore.

18. According to Walter, she was subsequently informed by Burger

that Vosloo reported to Burger on Walter’s relationship with

BAT. Walter in turn reported to Burger on her meetings with

BAT.

19. According to Walter, she again had contact with Denyer late

December 2012/early January 2013 and it was at the time

agreed that Walter would travel to London to meet Denyer. It

was agreed that Walter would be reimbursed for her flight. Her

understanding was that BAT would be the entity making the

payment. According to Walter, Denyer arranged for her to

attend a workshop/seminar in London. The said workshop was

to be paid for by Denyer. Again Walter understood that

payment was actually coming from BAT. Denyer further

arranged for a driver to collect Walter from Heathrow

international Airport and to take her to the Waldorf Hilton

 Hotel, Covent Gardens, where she stayed in room 205. We

attach hereto copies of Walter’s e-ticket marked “A“, as well

as the booking confirmation of the workshop she attended

with the British “Continuing Legal Training” marked “B“

20. According to Walter, she was introduced, during her three day

stay in London, to Evans and a female analyst called “Jane”.

Both these persons confirmed to Walter that they were BAT

employees. Our understanding was that the said persons were

particularly interested in information pertaining to Walter’s

clients such as ourselves and the other independent tobacco

manufacturers mentioned above. We again wish to point out

that whatever information Walter provided the said persons

she gleamed from her role as FITA chairperson, as well as being

privy to FITA’s and FITA members’ legal matters. We

furthermore believe that there could have been no doubt in

the minds of the said persons that they were not entitled to be

privy to the said information Walter “sold” to them. We verily

believe that both parties were at all relevant times aware that

they were acting unlawfully and illegally.

21. According to Walter, she was debriefed and questioned

regarding various persons or role-players in the industry. The

meetings took place in the meeting room in the Waldorf Hilton

Hotel as well as other offices. According to Walter, from that

 time onwards, she provided information intermittently to both

the SSA and BAT at their joint request

22. We verily believe that the aforesaid facts support the fact that

Burger, as a member of SSA, had an unlawful and illegal

relationship with BAT which extended to him sharing

information he obtained from Walter with BAT. His actions in this

regard, as already stated, were clearly unlawful and illegal.

23. According to Walter , her next meeting with BAT happened on

or about 12 March 2013 at the request of Denyer. They met at

a guesthouse east of Pretoria where she was informed that

Evans was to replace Denyer as the BAT “agent” responsible

for South Africa. According to Walter, she met Evans on or

about 18 March 2013 at the Hilton Hotel in Sandton where she

was briefly introduced to Duncan.

24. According to Walter, she met Evans again on 24 May 2013.

After collecting Evans from the facility of the Gautrain station,

Sandton, they continued to Kievits Kroon where they had a

meeting. According to Walter, Evans recorded the greater

part of the meeting. At the said meeting they discussed

various aspects and players in the tobacco industry and in

particular the GLTC factory. She was also shown video

footage of a “raid” at the premises of FOlLHA. According to

Evans, the footage came courtesy of a FSS member who

 accompanied the SAPS and/or SARS officials who conducted

the raid. He allegedly hid the camera with the intention of

getting footage regarding the factory layout. We again have

no doubt that Evans’ possession of the said footage and all

the acts that preceded him coming into possession of the said

footage were unlawful and illegal. According to Walter,

Evans’ trip to South Africa at the relevant times hereto

coincided with an inter-governmental tobacco task team

meeting held in Pretoria. Apparently Potgieter, BATSA as well

as representatives of FSS also attended the meeting.

25. During June 2013, Walter allegedly travelled to London. She

spent one day of the trip with BAT. We pause to point out that,

according to Walter, the payment arrangement at the time

was that she would be paid 36 000 pounds per annum

effective 1 January 2013. According to the arrangements with

Evans at the time, Walter did not take pounds with her to

London as it was agreed that she would be given cash as part

payment. On her arrival, Evans apparently gave Walter 3250

Pounds in cash. According to Walter, she signed a receipt for

the said money. We verily believe that the said actions of BAT

and its representatives as well as those of Walter, were illegal

and unlawful.
26. As per the arrangements, Walter did in fact meet Evans and

Jane at a hotel. She was, at the time, introduced to one

Rachel. The meeting continued for the greater part of the day

and she was particularly questioned regarding GLTC and

Carnilinx. We, again, have no doubt that the aforesaid

conduct was unlawful and illegal.

27. According to Walter, she at the time disclosed to BAT that she

had created a BBM chat group with Carnilinx which she

named “Evil Inc”. The content of what transpired on the BBM

chat group Walter handed over to BAT and to Burger. We

rather believe that she in fact “sold” it to BAT. We wish to point

out that at all relevant times the understanding between

ourselves and Walter was that the said chat group would be

used to also discuss and seek advice on legal professional and

privileged issues.

28. According to Walter, she discussed various payment methods

with Evans between June and July of 2013. Evans

recommended they give her a Travelex card. Our

understanding from Walter was that “they” referred to BAT.

The agreement was that the said card would not be in her

name and that the card would not be traced to her

personally. The said monies would be loaded by BAT onto the

card each and every month and Walter would be required to

 withdraw the cash either in South Africa or elsewhere.

According to Walter, she was handed her first card in July 2013

in South Africa during a meeting with Evans. According to

Walter, Evans assured her that the Travelex cards were widely

used by BAT’s intelligence network operatives internationally.

According to Walter, she discussed this issue with Burger who

confirmed that he knew about it.

29. According to Walter she met Evans on 19 July 2013 in South

Africa. After collecting Evans from the Gautrain Station,

Hatfield, they drove to Kievits Kroon where she booked a

conference room. We have a copy of this booking

confirmation. Evans recorded the majority of the meeting. It

was at this meeting that Walter was given the aforesaid

Travelex card. At the time the card had already been signed

on the signature strip and Evans provided her with the pin

code for the said card.

30. According to Walter, she next met Evans in Pretoria on 24

August 2014. The said meeting took place at his hotel room

at the City Lodge Hotel, Lynwood Bridge, Lynwood, Pretoria.

The greater part of the meeting was again recorded by Evans

and at the time Walter again provided him with information

regarding the tobacco industry and her clients. We again wish

to state without sounding repetitive that the conduct of Evans

 and Walter were illegal and unlawful. At this meeting Walter

was provided with a second Travelex card. According to

Walter, she signed the signature strip on the card and Evans

again provided her with a pin code. Walter provided us with

the said original Travelex cards, which we still have in our

possession

31. According to Walter she skyped, texted, whatsapped and

BBM’d Evans regularly throughout their relationship. She

however destroyed whatever she had on the instruction of

Evans who assured her that he kept a full record of all their

contacts. According to Walter, she was in fact shown printouts

of same by Evans.

32. Walter provided us with a cut and paste word document she

saved on or about 15 May 2013 when her internet connection

was terminated which serves as proof of the aforesaid contact

and relationship.

33. According to Walter she was at one point informed by BAT that

they had planted informants/spies in Carnilinx’s factory to spy

on Carnilinx.

34. According to Walter she did record one telephonic

conversation with Evans on 14 January 2014 on the instruction

of van Loggerenberg. We have a transcript of this recording.

35. Walter confirmed to us that she disclosed Carnilinx’s

information that she became privy to as Carnilinx’s attorney to

BAT. According to Walter, she mainly provided information to

BAT by way of a gmail account. According to Walter, the same

method of communication was used with Burger, if and when

they could not personally meet.

36. Walter stated further that on or about 4 September 2013 she

attended a meeting with van Loggerenberg, who at the time

was the executive responsible for enforcement and

investigations at SARS. This was the first time she met van

Loggerenberg. According to Walter, she reported this meeting

to both BAT and Burger, and recorded the said meeting at the

request of Burger. According to Walter, she

texted/whatsapped van Loggerenberg for the first time on 4

Septermber 2013.

37. Between 25 October 2013 and 27 May 2014 they became

involved in a romantic relationship. According to van

Loggerenberg, he had detailed and intimate knowledge of

everything stated above regarding FSS, BAT and her clients.

38. Because Evans failed to provide her with information she

requested she emailed Potgieter at BATSA. On 28 February

2014 Potgieter replied, and she responded to him on the same

 date. Walter’s email and the subsequent exchange between

her and Potgieter were provided to us by Walter.

39. We are advised that on 3 March 2014 Walter again

whatsapped Evans. A copy of the said discussions between

them was provided to us.

40. According to Walter, she thereafter addressed a letter of

demand to BAT which was delivered by way of facsimile.

Duncan responded thereto on 6 March 2014. A copy of the

aforesaid facsimile was provided to us by Walter.

41. I have been advised by Walter that she became aware that

van Loggerenberg was operating an unlawful covert unit on

27 May 2014, and that van Loggerenberg was intercepting her

own and other persons’ communications in an illegal and

unlawful manner. According to Walter, she reported this to his

superiors and to the SAPS.

CONCLUSION

42. We have reason to believe that the use of the aforementioned

Travelex cards, and the role of BAT therein amounts to money

laundering.

43. It is quite clear from what Walter told us, as well as what has

been reported in the press, that she was at all relevant times

aware of the fact that van Loggerenberg was operating an

 unlawful covert unit and that he was intercepting various

persons’ communications unlawfully and illegally.

44. We have, further, been advised by Walter that she attended

meetings with at least two advocates from the NPA as well as

an intelligence officer.

45. We have further been advised by Walter that van

Loggerenberg, in turn, advised her that her reporting of the

aforementioned to SARS, in respect of her tax affairs, and

acting as a whistle blower (media reports March 2014), would

protect her from prosecution. According to Walter she was

furthermore informed by van Loggerenberg that he was

liaising with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”)

regarding numerous tax irregularities pertaining to BAT and

BATSA, and that he had secured protection and immunity

from prosecution for her in the UK.

46. We have been provided with whatsapp messages between

van Loggerenberg and Walter wherein it specifically refers to

the unlawful conduct of BAT, and SARS’ action in respect

thereof.

47. We further pause to mention that we have been informed by

Walter that she learned that Burger held BATSA shares, and

that he had an interest in BAT’s continued market domination

and illegal and unlawful activities.

48. We verily believe from information at my disposal that Walter,

during the time she acted for FITA and its members, unlawfully

and corruptly provided SSA, BAT and BATSA with unlawfully

obtained information, for which she was paid.

49. We have also been advised that during the said period, Walter

endeavoured to obtain confidential tax payers’ information

pertaining to FITA and its members, as well as individual private

persons associated with FITA from van Loggerenberg.

50. We have also been advised that she disclosed information to

van Loggerenberg that was covered by legal professional

privilege.

51. The various offences which we believe were comitted and

should be investigated by the SAPS are:

51.1. Offences in terms of Sections 4,6, 20, 21 and 34 of the

Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act

12 of 2004;

51.2. The offence of contravening section 67 and 234 of

the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011;

51.3. The offence of contravening section 6(2) of the

Regulation of Interception of communications and

Provision of Communication related Information Act

20 of 2002;
51.4. And Defeating or Obstructing the Course of Justice.