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Russell L. Ackoff
I frequently talk to groups of managers on the nature of systems thinking and its
asked, "If this way of thinking is as good as you say it is, why don't more
It is easy to reply by saying that organizations naturally resist change. This of course
is a tautology. I once asked a vice president of marketing why consumers used his
product. He answered, "Because they like it." I then asked him how he knew this.
He answered, "Because the use it." Our answer to the question about failure of
There be many reasons why any particular organization fails to adopt systems
thinking but I believe there are two that are the most important, one general and one
specific. By a general reason I mean one that is responsible for organizations failing
to adopt any transforming idea, let alone systems thinking. By a specific reason I
mean one responsible for the failure to adopt systems thinking in particular. First,
All through school, from kindergarten all the way through university, mistakes are
treated as bad things. We are downgraded for them. Furthermore, no effort is made
to determine whether we have learned anything from them. The grade given, not
which also makes it clear that mistakes are a bad thing and that they will be held
against us. Managers laugh when I tell them of an organization I once heard of that
offers an annual prize for the best mistake made last year. That mistake is defined as
the one from which they have learned most. When August Busch, III, was CEO of
the Anheuser-Busch Companies he once told his assembled vice presidents, "If
you didn't make a serious mistake last year you probably didn't do your job
because you didn’t try anything new. There is nothing wrong in making a mistake,
but if you ever make the same mistake twice you probably won't be here the next
We cannot learn from doing anything right. We already know how to do it. Of
course we may get confirmation of what we already know and this has some value,
but it is not learning. We can learn from mistakes if we identify and correct them.
Therefore, organizations and individuals that never admit to a mistake never learn
anything. Organizations and individuals that always transfer responsibility for their
mistakes to others also avoid learning. One need look no further for an example than
other than a disposition inherited from educational institutions, we must recognize that
there are two types of mistake: errors of commission and errors of omission. An
should not have been done. For example, when Kodak acquired Sterling Drugs it
made a very costly mistake. It had to be sold subsequently. Its sale involved a
considerable write-off.
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Robert F. Bruner, in his book, Deals from Hell (Wiley, 2005,New York) cites a
number of acquisitions that went sour in a big way. The Sony-Columbia merger in
1989 resulted in a $2.7 billion write-off. The acquisition of National Cash Register by
AT&T, cost AT&T $4.1 billion. His champion of errors of commision is the merger of
AOL and Time Warner. It resulted in a $200 billion loss in stock-market value and a
Bruner points out that in most such cases the executives responsible such losses
made significant gains in their own compensation. They were able to disclaim
it should have done. For example, when Kodak failed to acquire Xerox when it
could have, or when Xerox failed to develop the small computer produced by its
employees. Of the two types of error, errors of omission are usually the more
important. The deterioration and failure of organizations are almost always due to
Not to long ago IBM get into serious trouble because it ignored the reduction of the
size of computers. Fortunately, it eventually corrected this error but it came close to
going out of business. Kodak is currently in a precarious position because it did not
press the development of digital photography. General Motors and Ford are in
trouble because they have not innovated in ways that Toyota and Honda have.
Now for a key fact: accounting systems in the western world only take account of
errors of commission, the less important of the two types of error. They take no
and in which only errors of commission are identified, a manager only has to be
concerned about doing something that should not have been done. Because errors
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accountability for them is seldom made explicit. In such a situation a manager who
wants invoke as little disapproval as possible must try either to minimize errors of
The best way to do this is to do nothing, or as little as one can get away with. This is
a major reason that organizations do not make radical changes.
A number of years ago when I was working on a project for a major automotive
two-day course on systems thinking to the company’s top 200 managers and
there would be plenty of discussion. He had the following plan: four sessions of
junior vice presidents, three of intermediate level vice presidents, two of senior vice
presidents, and finally one of the executive office. The sessions were to be conduct
At the end of the first session to junior vice presidents one said, "This stuff is great. I
would love to use it but you are talking to the wrong people. I can't introduce it
without the approval of my boss. Are you going to get a chance to present it to
him?" I told I would in one of the later courses. He assured me he would hit his
boss for approval as he came out of his session. In each of the first four sessions of
In the first group on the second tier, with intermediate level vice presidents, the same
issue was raised. I was told they also wanted to introduce systems thinking but
could not do so without their bosses’ approval. Again I told them their bosses
would eventually be exposed to the same ideas. In each of the three sessions at
In the two sessions involving senior vice presidents the same issue was raised.
They asked if I would have a chance to present the material to the CEO and his
executive committee. I said I would. I could hardly wait to hear what the CEO would
say.
At the end of the session which he attended he said, "This stuff is great. I would love
to use it. But I can't do it with the approval and support of my subordinates. Are
you going to get a chance to present it to them?" This was a typical organization,
one in which the principal operating principle was "Cover your ass.” Application of
this principle produced a management that tried to minimize its responsibility and
accountability. The result was a paralyzed organization, one that almost never
initiated change of any kind let alone innovation. It made changes only when a
Decision Record should include (a) the expected effects of the decision and by
when they are expected, (b) the assumptions on which the expectations are based,
(c) the inputs to the decision (information, knowledge and understanding), and (d)
2. Monitor the decisions to detect any deviation of fact from expectations and
assumptions. When a deviation is found, determine its cause and take corrective
action.
prepared for it. In this way one can learn how to correct mistakes; that is, learn
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how to learn more rapidly and effectively. Learning how to learn is probably
the most important thing an organization or individual can learn.
treated in this way. Making explicit the assumptions on which such a decision
is based and monitoring them can lead to a reversal of the decision in time.
Very few managers have any knowledge or understanding of systems thinking, and
for good reason. Very little of our literature and lectures are addressed to potential
users. I very seldom come across an organizational decision maker who has had any
it is not sufficient.
Until we communicate to our potential users in a language they can understand, they
and we will not understand what we are talking about. If Einstein could do it with
Infeld, 1951). It is easy to hide the ambiguity and vagueness in our own thinking
language.
We have developed a vocabulary that equips our students with the ability to speak
with authority about subjects they do not understand. Little wonder they do not
This society should publish a journal addressed to potential users. It should have
managers on its editorial board. It should invite dialog with potential users either
provide a bridge between system thinkers and their potential users. These
conferences should reveal what are we doing and can do that they should know
about?
Furthermore, the articles published in our usual journals should be required to answer
the “so what” question at the end of each submission. The answer to this question
should be an explicit statement of how the author intends to affect the behavior or
Let’s start to think outside the box into which we have painted ourselves!
REFERENCES
Einstein, Albert and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1951.
Russell L. Ackoff
e-mail: RLAckoff@aol.com