Interpretation PDF

LAW NOTES LC-I [VI SEMESTER – INTERPRETATION OF STATUES]
Q. “Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious
lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly
meant for the legislature”.
Critically examine the above statement and clearly explain the purpose that various
rules of interpretation of statutes are intended to serve.
Ans. The theory of separation of powers provides for three organs of the State, i.e., the Legislature,
the Executive and the Judiciary. These three organs have been assigned different roles under the
scheme of things. Legislature enacts the law. Executive administers the law and Judiciary interprets
or adjudicates the law.
In Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed
that the Indian Constitution has not indeed recognized the doctrine of Separation of Powers in its
absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the government have been
sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can be very well said that our Constitution does not provide
for assumption by one organ or part of the State of functions that essentially belong to another.
The judicial organ of the State has been assigned the primary task of interpreting the law laid
down by the legislative organ, because while deciding the disputes between the parties before it, the
judiciary has to assign a clear, unambiguous and definite meaning to the words used in the statute.
Legislation is that source of law which consists in the declaration of legal rules by a competent
authority. When judges by judicial decisions lay down a new principle of general application of the
nature specifically reserved for the legislature, they may be said to have been legislated and not merely
declared the law which is their only function.
We must distinguish law making by legislators from law making by courts. Legislators can lay
down rules purely for the future and without reference to any actual dispute. The Courts, in so far as
they create law, can do so only in application to cases before them and only in so far as is necessary for
their solution. Moreover, the judicial law making always follows legislative law making whereas
sometimes the legislatures also follows certain judments of the Supreme Court.
There are various reasons as to why the Judiciary cannot legislate some of which are as follows:
(i) Courts lack the machinery to gather the information and essential financial resources.
(ii) Courts’ research regarding a particular matter is limited to the factual matrix of that
particular case, and tends to be subjective.
(iii) Courts have no means to oversee and supervise the subsequent implementation of their
decisions.
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(iv) Courts rely on advocates for research and information which may result into partisan
approach.
(v) Courts should decide what the law is and not what the law should be.
(vi) Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there.
(vii) Like legislature, the Courts don’t have the methods or opportunities to reverse their
orders by way of repeal or abrogation if they are found unworkable or require modification.
In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, the appellant was charge sheeted under
various sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case was pending before the Special
Court for more than two years but did not start. The Special Court directed the accused to be acquitted
in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Sharma v. State of Bihar.
The State preferred an appeal before the High Court against the acquittal of the accused and the
appeal was allowed by the High Court and set aside the order of acquittal.
Earlier, the Supreme Court in four different cases viz. Common Cause-I, Common Cause-II,
R.D. Sharma- I and R.D. Sharma II, consisting 3-judges bench each, had laid down periods of
limitation for conclusion of criminal trials. However, a Constitution Bench, i.e. 5-judges Bench in A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, had held that ‘it is neither advisable nor feasible to draw or prescribe an outer
time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings.
In view of the contradicting stands taken by the different benches of Supreme Court in above
mentioned cases, a 7-judges bench was constituted in the present case to decide the issue.
The Court observed that, we do not think, it is possible to lay down any time schedules for
conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, number of accused, the number of witnesses,
the workload in the particular Court, means of communication etc have to be kept in mind. When judges
by judicial decisions lay down a new principle of general application of the nature of specifically reserved
for the legislature, they may be said to have legislated and not merely declared the law. The primary
function of the judiciary is to interpret the law, and not to legislate.
The Court further observed that prescribing periods of limitation amounts to legislation, which in
our opinion, cannot be done by judicial directives and is not within the scope of the judicial law making.
Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove the obvious lacunae and fill the
gaps but they cannot entrench upon the field of Legislation properly meant for the legislature.
Court held that such bars of limitation uncalled for and impermissible for two reasons: First,
because it amounts to impermissible legislation and Secondly it runs counter to the doctrine of
precedent in view of the law laid down in A.R. Antulay case.
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In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu, the notification issued by the Government
of Tamil Nadu under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring the land for public purpose
was in issue. But the proviso to Section 6 provides that, the declaration cannot be made under section 6
in respect of any land covered by the notification under section 4(1) of the Act after the expiry of 3 years
or 1 year from the date of its publication, as the case may be.
The Madras High Court held the notification valid.
The Supreme Court observed that if a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of
process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative
casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. There is no scope for reading
something into it.
It is well settled principle of law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision
which is plain and unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be
found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has
been intended but what has been said.
The Court further observed that the purpose for providing period of limitation seems to be the
avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired, because compensation
starts from the date of notification under Section 4(1). It was held that in the present cases the
declaration under section 6 could not be issued after the time provided for it and the notification issued
by the Tamil Nadu Government was invalid.
 In D.M. Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, the respondent was appointed as Mali in the
service of appellant run by Haryana Tourism Corporation. Subsequently, they were told to perform the
duties of the Tractor Driver, though there was no post of Tractor Drivers in the club and their services
were regularized against the post of Mali and not Tractor Driver. The respondents filed a Civil Suit
claiming regularization against the posts of Tractor Drivers.
Their claim was rejected by the trial court and the decision of the trial court was set aside by the
first appellate court. In second appeal, the High Court held that the post of the Tractor Driver should be
created.
The Supreme Court held that the Court cannot direct the creation of post. Creation and sanction
of posts is a prerogative of the executive or legislative authorities and the Court cannot arrogate to itself
this purely executive or legislative function and direct creation of posts in any organization.
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The Court further observed that there are many limits on the powers of the judiciary and judges
must exercise judicial restraint and must not encroach into the executive or legislative domain. In the
name of judicial activism judges cannot cross their limits and try to take over functions which belong to
another organ of the State.
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Statute must be read as a whole: - Whenever the question arises as to the meaning of a certain
provision in a statute, it is proper and legitimate to read that provision in its context. This means that the
statute must be read as a whole. According to this principle of statutory interpretation, the intention of
the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole i.e., a forest view approach has to be
adopted rather than a tree approach. It means that an individual section must be construed in the light
of the whole Act and must be compared with other parts of the Act.
The conclusion that the language used by the legislature is plain or ambiguous can only be truly
arrived at by studying the statute as a whole. Words take color from the context in which they are used
keeping pace with the time. The same word may mean one thing in one context and another in different
context, therefore, the same word used in different sections of a statute or even when used at different
places in the same clause or section of a statute may bear different meanings. That is why it is
necessary to read the statute as a whole in its context.
In Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading, S.A., the appellant entered into a contract with the
first respondent which contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration to be held as per the rules
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The 1st respondent filed a request for arbitration with
ICC and the parties agreed that the arbitration be held at Paris and ICC had appointed a sole arbitrator.
The first respondent filed an application under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 against the appellant and the 2nd respondent and sought relief of an order of injunction. The
appellant contended that Part I of the said Act would not apply to arbitrations where the place of
arbitration is not in India.
The Court observed that in selecting out of the different interpretations, the Court will adopt that
which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than leaving the statute as redundant. The statute must be
read as a whole in order to bring out a wholesome and consistent meaning of the provisions as intended
by the law makers.
All the parts and sections of an Act must be construed together and every clause of a section
should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof, so that the construction to
be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.
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The Court further observed that Sec. 2(2) provides that Part I would apply where the place of
arbitration is in India. It is not providing that Part I shall not apply where the place of arbitration is not in
India. It is also not providing that Part I will only apply where the place of arbitration is in India. Thus
the legislature has not provided that Part I is not to apply to arbitrations which take place outside India.
The use of the language is significant and important. The legislature is emphasizing that the provisions
of Part I would apply to arbitrations which take place in India, but not providing that the provisions of
Part I will not apply to arbitrations which take place out of India. By omitting to provide that Part I will
not apply to international commercial arbitrations which take place outside India the effect would be that
Part I would also apply to international commercial arbitrations held out of India. But by not specifically
providing that the provisions of Part I apply to international commercial arbitrations held out of India, the
intention of the legislature appears to be that unless the parties by agreement express or implied,
exclude it or any of its provisions.
A reading of the provisions shows that the said Act applies to arbitrations which are held in India
between Indian nationals and to International Commercial Arbitrations whether held in India or out of
India
The Court held that the whole reading of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 gives out a
sound meaning to the provisions of the Act that the Part I is applicable to all the arbitrations whether
held in India or outside India. Court further held that the provisions of Part I would apply to all
arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India, Part I would
compulsorily apply. In cases of International Commercial Arbitrations held out of India also it would
apply.
Such an interpretation does not lead to any conflict between any of the provisions of the said Act.
On this interpretation there are no lacunae in the said Act. This interpretation also does not leave a party
remediless.
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RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION
The basis of the principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to
contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute. The Act has to read as a
whole and its provisions have to be harmonized giving effect to all of them.
The rule of harmonious construction is well settled and says that when there are in an enactment
two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that; if
possible, effect could be given to both.
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This doctrine enunciates that when two legal provisions are so placed that they are simmingly
opposite to each other, then it is the duty of the Court to so harmonize both, as effect could be given to
both of them.
It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same Act and
whenever it is possible to do so, to construe provisions which appear to be conflicting so as to harmonize
them. The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is
possible to effect reconciliation between them. Although it may be very difficult to determine whether
separate provisions of the same statute are overlapping or are mutually exclusive but the court tries to
harmoniously construe them.
The essence of the rule is that effect should be given to both the legal provisions. When both
the provisions are unfettered, they have to be so harmonized that there may be no conflict between
them. Apparently conflicting statutory provisions should be harmoniously construed for avoiding
interpretation which may render any one of them ineffective.
The Purpose of this rule is to prevent or avoid inconsistency or repugnancy between two sections
or within a section or between different provisions of a statute or between the two statutes.
This rule is based on the basic or general rule of interpretation i.e. no word to be construed in
isolation and statute must be read as a whole.
In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, there is an ancient temple dedicated to

Sr. Venkataramana being run by a trust; the trustees were members of Gouda Saraswath Brahmins Sect.
The legislature of the province of Madras enacted ‘The Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act’, 1947.
Sec. 3(1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding any law, custom or usages to the contrary, persons
belonging to the excluded class (Harijans) shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship
therein. Trustees of the Venkataramana temple claimed that it was a private temple and it therefore did
not fall within the purview of the Act.
The main question for determination was that whether the right guaranteed under Article 26(b)
is subject to a law protected by Article 25(2)(b) that is throwing the suit temple open to all classes and
sections of Hindus.
The Supreme Court observed that Article 25(2)(b) provides nothing in this Article shall affect
the operation of any existing law or prevent the state from making any law - providing for social welfare
and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus. Art. 26 provides that subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in the matter of
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religion. The result is that there are two provisions of equal authority, neither of them being subject to
the other. The question is how the apparent conflict between them is to be resolved.
The Court observed that the rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an
enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted
that; if possible, effect could be given to both.
Applying the harmonious rule construction, full effect can be given to Article 26(b) in all matters
of religion, subject only to this that as regards one aspect of them, entry into a temple for worship, the
rights declared under Art. 25(2(b) will prevail. Article 26(b) must be read subject to Article 25(2)(b).
The right protected by Art. 25(2)(b) is a right to enter into a temple for purposes of worship, and that it
should be construed liberally in favour of public. But it does not follow that the right is absolute and
unlimited in character. As a temple cannot be kept open for all the hours.
In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, the issue was whether the order of suspension
passed by the Governor under Art. 161 could operate when the Supreme Court had been moved for
granting special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court, as the matter had
become sub judice on filing the SLP.
The Court observed that the extent of the power of pardon is vested in the Governor by virtue of
Art. 161 and in the President by Art. 72. Art. 142 gives power to the Supreme Court to pass such
decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in a matter pending before it. The
same power dealing with the matter of suspension of sentence is vested both in the Supreme Court and
also in the Governor. When both the provisions are thus unfettered, they have to be harmonized so that
there may be no conflict between them.
The Court observed that the ambit of Article 161 is very much wider and it is only in a very
narrow field that the power contained in Art. 161 is also contained in Art. 142. Therefore, on the
principle of harmonious construction and to avoid a conflict between the two powers, it must be held that
Article 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence during the time that Art. 142 is in operation
and the matter is sub judice in the Supreme Court.
The Court observed that the suspension of the sentence for the period when this court is in seize
of the case could have been granted by this court itself. If in respect of the same period the Governor
also has power to suspend the sentence, it would mean that both the judiciary and the executive would
be functioning in the same field at the same time leading to the possibility of conflict of jurisdiction. Such
a conflict was not and could not have been intended by the makers of the Constitution.
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As a result of these considerations, the court came to the conclusion that the order of the
Governor granting suspension of the sentence could only operate until the matter became sub judice in
the Supreme Court on the filing of the petition for special leave to appeal. After the filing of such a
petition the Supreme Court was seized of the case which would be dealt by it in accordance with law. It
would be for the Supreme Court to pass such orders as it thought if it as to whether the petitioner should
be granted bail or should surrender to his sentence or to pass such other or further orders as it might
deem fit in all the circumstances of the case
The Court thus held that the order of the Governor granting suspension of the sentence could
only operate until the matters became sub judice in the Supreme Court on the filing of the SLP. So, the
Governor in this case had no power to grant suspension of the sentence for the period during which the
matter was sub judice in the Supreme Court.
In Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, the Oriental Gas Co was originally constituted
and registered in England and it was empowered by an Act to lay pipelines in Calcutta and to excavate
the streets for the said purpose. The West Bengal Government passed the Oriental Gas Co. Act and the
management of Oriental Gas Co was taken over by Calcutta Gas Co.
The Parliament in exercise of its powers under Article 246 passed The Industries (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1951.
The issue was whether it was within the legislative competence of the West Bengal Legislature to
pass the impugned Act regulating the Gas industry.
The Court observed that the Central Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest to take
under its control the scheduled industries. The provisions of the impugned Act are confined only to the
affairs of the Oriental Gas Co. Ltd. It would be seen that the impugned Act intends to serve the same
purpose as the Central Act, though its operation is confined to Oriental Gas Co.
The Court further observed that there are so many subjects in three lists in the Constitution that
there is bound to be some overlapping and the duty of the court in such a situation is to try to harmonize
them, if possible, so that effect can be given to each of them. Entry 24 of the State List covers entire
industry in the State. Entry 25 of the State List is limited to only the gas industry. Corresponding to
Entry 24, there is Entry 52 in Union List. Therefore, by harmonious construction it became clear that gas
industry was exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State List over which the State has full control. The
express intention of the Constitution is to treat the subject of gas and gas works, in normal times, as a
state subject and in emergent times as Central subject.
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It is, therefore, clear that the scheme of harmonious construction gives full and effective scope of
operation for both the entries in their respective fields. The Court held that the impugned Act was within
the legislative competence of the West Bengal legislature and was therefore validly made.
In Sirsilk Ltd. V. Government of A.P., there was a dispute between the appellant and its
workmen which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal passed an award and sent it to the
Government under Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which the award has to be
published by the appropriate government within 30 days. Before, the award could be published; the
parties arrived at a settlement and sent a letter to the government not to publish the award.
The issue was whether Section 17 was mandatory or directory or was it possible for the
government to stop the publication of the award.
It was observed that when the word ‘shall’ was used in section 17(1), the intention was to give a
mandate to the government to publish the award within the given time. Section 18(1) of the amended
Act provides that a settlement arrived at between the parties shall be binding on the parties to the
agreement. Section 18(3) provides that an award which has become enforceable shall be binding on
all parties to the dispute.
The Court viewed that there is no doubt that a settlement of the dispute between the parties
themselves is to be preferred where it can be arrived at to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is
likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award, as it is arrived at by the free will of the parties and is
a pointer to there being goodwill between them. Nonetheless, the court held that it is necessary to
reconcile the mandatory character of the provision contained in Sec. 17(1) for the publication of the
award to the equally mandatory character of the binding nature of the settlement arrived at between the
parties as provided in Sec. 18(1).
The Court observed that it is true that Sec. 17(1) is mandatory and ordinarily the Government
has to publish an award sent to it by the Tribunal; but where an exceptional situation like the one in the
present case arises which may lead to a conflict between a settlement under Section 18(1) and an award
binding under Section 18(3) on publication, the only solution is to withhold the award from publication.
Therefore, the Government was directed not to publish the awards sent to it by the Industrial Tribunal in
view of the binding nature of the settlements arrived at between the parties under Sec. 18(1).
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RULE OF STRICT INTERPRETATION
The penal statutes define and create the offences and impose penalty of fine and or
imprisonment. Because such statutes impose criminal liability upon the offender, they are strictly
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interpreted by the Courts, as the power to provide for punishment is vested with the legislature and not
the Court. A penal statute is one which punishes certain acts or wrongs. Penal statutes are those which
provide for penalties for the disobedience of law and are directed against the offenders in relation to the
State by making liable to imprisonment, fine or other penalty.
The Court must always see that the person to be penalized comes fairly and squarely within the
plain words of the enactment. It is not enough that what he has done comes substantially within the
mischief aimed at by the Statute.
If in construing a penal provision there appears any reasonable doubt or ambiguity, it will be
resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty. In implementing penal laws, when a
situation arises that even after applying the strict and literal interpretation, the prosecution is not able to
prove the criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the
accused.
In Tola Ram v. State of Bombay, it was observed that if two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which
exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is not competent to the
Court to stress the meaning of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out the intention of
the legislature.
According to Maxwell, the strict interpretation seems to manifest itself in four ways: (i) in the
requirement of express language for the creation of an offence, (ii) in interpreting words strictly setting
out the elements of an offence, (iii) in requiring the fulfillment to the letter of statutory conditions
precedent to the infliction of punishment, and (iv) in insisting on the strict observance of technical
provisions about criminal procedure and jurisdiction.
The degree of strictness to be applied in the construction of a penal statute depends on the
severity of the statute. Thus, more severe the statute, the more strictly it is construed but there cannot
be one rule and it varies from case to case.
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INTERPRETATION OF TAXING OR FISCAL STATUTES
A taxing statute imposes financial burden upon the subjects and hence needs to be strictly
construed as a tax not provided for by the legislature cannot be imposed by the Courts by interpreting it
in a vague and liberal manner. A taxing statute means a statute a statute or an Act making compulsory
imposition of tax or fee. In Harshad Mehta v. Custodian, it has been held that there are three stages
in the imposition of a tax viz., (1) declaration of liability in respect of persons or property; (2) assessment
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of tax that quantifies the sum which the person liable has to pay; and (3) methods of recovery if the
person taxed does not voluntarily pay.
The general rule is that a taxing statute should be construed strictly, i.e., a person should not be
taxed unless the words of the statute unambiguously impose the tax on him, and the right and liability to
tax should be strictly construed. If there are two views possible, the one favourable to the assessee in
matters of taxation has to be preferred. The assessee should be given the benefit of doubt and the
opinion which is in his favour should be given effect. In interpreting a fiscal statute, the Court cannot
proceed to make good the deficiencies if there be any, the Court must interpret the statute as it stands
and in the case of doubt, in a manner favourable to the assessee.
In Bowers v. Gloucester Corporation, the license of hackney carriage of respondent was

revoked under section 50 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 which provided that “the commissioners
may, upon the conviction for a second time of the proprietor or driver of any such hackney carriage for
any offence, suspend or revoke the license of any such proprietor or driver.” The respondent had been
found guilty of many offences of different character.
The issue was whether the words any offence means a different offence each time or as any
and every single offence?
The Court observed that the words ‘any offence’ in Sec. 50 means what it says, “any offence”,
and that it is quite unnecessary, before the power of revocation arises, that there should be two
convictions for two identical offences.
The Court held, it seems, by applying ordinary principles of interpretation that the word ‘any’
must be given the wide meaning which it undoubtedly bears. Secondly, the mischief aimed at is that a
strict control should be kept on taxicab drivers. Thirdly, the absurdity resulting if a man is permitted to
show that he has committed a different offence every time and yet his license not being revoked.
The Court allowed the appeal and held that ‘any’ means any one offence and there was power to
revoke the license on commission of any second offence.
George Banerji v. Emperor, the appellant was made liable to tax for using a bicycle with a
motor wheel attachment without a license.
The issue was whether the vehicle in question is a motor bicycle or a bicycle simply ?
The Court observed that unless the language under which they are sought to be charged is
perfectly clear, the charging authorities are not entitled to assess a charge as the public have a right to
know the basis of charge.
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The vehicle in question is not a motor car, neither it is a motor bicycle. This is a vehicle with two
wheels which is propelled sometimes by a motor and sometimes without, and it is a temporary
attachment and not a part of the vehicle itself. Held that the vehicle was undoubtedly a bicycle and set
aside the conviction and allowed the appeal.
In Empress Mills, Nagpur v. Municipal Committee, Wardha, the goods of the appellant
company were neither unloaded nor reloaded at Wardha but were merely carried across through the
municipal area. The Municipal Committee of Wardha imposed a terminal tax.
The issue was whether the terminal tax is leviable on the goods or not which are in transit and
are only carried across the limits of the Municipality.
The Court observed that in construing words of a taxing statute if there are two possible
interpretations, then effect is to be given to the one that favours the citizen and not the one that imposes
a burden on him.
Even according to the ordinary meaning of the words, goods which are in transit or are being
transported through can hardly be said goods imported into or exported from. Import means to bring in
and export means to carry out. Terminus means the point to which motion or action tends, finishing
point and sometimes that from which it starts, the starting point. The Court opined that if terminal
besides the above meaning has an additional meaning also and that meaning signifies the termini or the
jurisdictional limits of the municipal area even then the construction to be placed on the term should be
the one that favours the tax payer, in accordance with the principle of construction of taxing statutes,
which must be strictly construed and in case of doubt must be construed against the Taxing Authorities
and doubt resolved in favour of the tax payer.
The Court held that the terminal tax under section 66(1)(O) is not leviable on goods which are in
transit and are only carried across the limits of the Municipality. The Court allowed the appeal and
reversed the decision of the Nagpur High Court.
In A.S. Sulochana v. C. Dharamalingam, the father of the appellant had granted a lease in
favour of the father of the respondent and both of the fathers having died, respondent was accepted as a
tenant. The father of the respondent had sub-let the property and that is why the appellant instituted
the suit for eviction on the ground of unlawful sub-letting. Admittedly, neither of the two parties had
knowledge of the terms of the lease.
The High Court took the view that a tenant sought to be evicted must himself have been guilty of
the contravention and the present contravention was done by his father and not by the respondent.
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The issue was whether the son could be evicted for the sub-letting done by his late father.
The Court observed that Section 10(2) opens with the words “A landlord who seeks to evict his
tenant” and provides that if the tenant has created a sub-tenancy without the written consent of the
landlord, he will be liable to be evicted. Here, who is the “tenant” whom the landlord wants to evict ?
That tenant is the respondent. Did he violate Sec. 10(2)(ii)(a) and sub let the rented premises ? The
answer is “no”.
The Court observed that it being a penal provision in the sense that it visits the violator with the
punishment of eviction, it must be construed strictly. When the statute says that the tenant who is
sought to be evicted must be guilty of the contravention. The Court cannot say, guilty of his predecessor
in interest will suffice. The respondent inherited the tenancy, not the sin, if any, of his father. The law in
its wisdom seeks to punish the guilty who commits the sin, and not his son who is innocent of rent law
offence. The Court held that the son cannot be punished for the sub-letting done by the
father.
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MISCHIEF RULE OF CONSTRUCTION: HEYDON’S CASE
The mischief rule was laid down in Heydon’s case wherein it was held that to arrive at the real
meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act.
And for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive
or enlarging, four things are to be considered:
(i) what was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law
did not provide, (iii) what is the remedy that the Act has provided, and (iv) what is the reason of the
remedy,
and then the office of all judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and
advance the remedy and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and
pro privato commodo; and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of
the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.”
This rule requires that to decide the true scope of an enactment, the Courts may have regard to
all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature,
such as the history of the legislation and the purposes thereof, the mischief which intended to suppress,
and the other provisions of the statute.
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If the words used in a legislation are ambiguous and uncertain and are incapable of giving a
certain meaning, the Mischief Rule can safely be relied upon.
Advantages
The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting Acts as opposed to the
Golden or Literal Rules.
It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Disadvantages
It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16 th century, when common law
was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.
In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft Acts on behalf of the King and were therefore
well qualified in what mischief the Act was meant to remedy.
It can make the law uncertain.
Limitations to the Heydon’s Rule
The main limitation upon this rule is that it cannot be approached directly, as first literal rule has
to be considered. Its main limitation is that unless there is any such ambiguity or uncertainty, it would
not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction.
Moreover, the rule cannot be used to stretch the meaning and apply unnatural meaning to
familiar and simple words or to give such a meaning to the provisions which is altogether different from
the intention of the legislature.
In R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, the contentions of the petitioners was that prize competition as
defined in Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act would include both the competitions in which
success depends upon chance and those in which it depends upon substantial degree of skill. The Act
encroaches upon the right to carry on trade and is violative of Article 19(1)(g).
The contentions of the respondent was that prize competition as defined in Section 2(d) of the
Act means and includes only competitions in which success does not depend upon any substantial degree
of skill and are essentially gambling in their character and gambling activities are not trade or business
within the meaning of that expression in Art. 19(1)(g).
The Court observed that trade and commerce protected by Art. 19(1)(g) and Art. 301 are only
those activities which could be regarded as lawful trading activities and gambling is not trade but res
extra commercium.
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When a question arises as to the interpretation to be put on an enactment, what the Court has to
do is to ascertain the intent of them that make it. That, however, does not mean that the decision
should rest on a literal interpretation of the words used in disregard of all other materials. If the literal
interpretation leads to a different intention then to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to
get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act. To arrive at the real meaning, it
is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to
consider, according to Lord Coke: ( 1) What was the law before the Act was passed; ( 2) What was the
mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; ( 3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and
(4) The reason of the remedy”
Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions (Control and Tax) Act was passed with the object of
controlling and taxing lotteries and prize competitions within the province of Bombay. To avoid the
taxing provisions, people shifted the venue of their activities to neighbouring states like Mysore etc. To
prevent this mischief, Legislatures of concerned States passed a resolution under Art. 252(1) authorizing
Parliament to enact the requisite Central Legislation for the control and regulation of prize competitions.
Hence, the court observed that having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof
and the wording of the statute, the competitions which were sought to be controlled and regulated by
the Act were only those competitions in which success did not depend to any substantial degree of skill.
Now the object of the Act was to control and regulate prize competitions of a gambling character.
Competitions involving skills could only be regulated and not controlled, while control and regulation
would be required in case of gambling.
The Court after discussing various cases observed that, “When a statute is in part void, it will be
enforced as regards the rest, if that is severable from what is invalid. It is immaterial for the purpose of
this rule whether the invalidity of the statute arises by reason of its subject-matter being outside the
competence of the legislature or by reason of its provisions contravening constitutional prohibitions”.
That being the position in law, it is now necessary to consider whether the impugned provisions
are severable in their application to competitions of a gambling character, assuming of course that the
definition of “prize competition” in Section 2( d) is wide enough to include also competitions involving skill
to a substantial degree.
1. In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid parts
thereof, it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor. The test to be applied
is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the
statute was invalid.
2. If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be
separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the
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Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate that after striking out
what is invalid, what remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be
upheld notwithstanding that the rest has become unenforceable.
3. Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and separate from those which are
invalid, if they all form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole, then
also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole.
4. Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are independent and do not form
part of a scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to
be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, then also it will
be rejected in its entirety.
5. The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend on
whether the law is enacted in the same section or different sections; it is not the form, but the
substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the
Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provision therein.
6. If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be enforced
without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down
as void, as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation.
7. In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to

take into account the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it.
Applying these principles to the present Act, the Court observed that the principle of severability
is applicable when a statute is partially void for whatever reason that might be, and that the impugned
provisions are severable and therefore enforceable as against competitions which are of a gambling
character.
The Court held that the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act
are only those competitions in which success does not depend on any substantial degree of skill. It was
held that the impugned provisions are severable in their application to competitions in which success
does not depend upon any substantial knowledge and skill.
In CIT v. Sodra Devi, a partnership was entered into between the assessee and her three
major sons and the three minor sons were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. The income tax
tribunal included the income falling to the shares of the three minor sons into the total income of the
assessee. The High Court upon a reference came to the conclusion that it was not the intention of the
legislature to include in the income of the mother, the income of her minor children.
The issue before Supreme Court was whether the word individual in section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 includes also a female and the income of the minor sons is liable to be included in
the income of the mother.
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The Supreme Court observed that Section 16(3) of the Act provides “In computing the total
income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included. - (a) so much
of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly:
(ii) from the admission of the minor to the benefits of the partnership in a firm of which such
individual is a partner.
(b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets
transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such
individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both.”
The Court after analyzing section 16(3) in detail observed that the manner in which the
expression “for the benefit of his wife, a minor child or both” is used in section 16(3)(b) renders the
words “any individual” or “such individual” ambiguous.
Then the Court referred to the Income Tax Enquiry Report, 1936 and observed that the mischief
which was sought to be remedied by the Enquiry Committee recommendations was the one resulting
from the widespread practice of husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives and fathers
admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. This evil
of tax evasion was sought to be remedied by the enactment of Section 16(3) in the Act.
Writing the majority judgment the Court held that there is no room for any doubt that
howsoever that mischief was sought to be remedied by amending the Act, the only intention of the
legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or minor child, in computation of the
total income of the male assessee, the husband or the father, as the case may be, for the purposes of
the enactment. The only intention of the Legislature by putting the words “any individual” or “such
individual” as used in section 16(3) could only have been meant as restricted the male and not including
the female of the species.
However, in minority decision it was held that the word “individual” means both male and
female on the ground that statute must be read as a whole and that the word “individual” was present in
the other provisions as well meaning both male as well as female, before the section 16(3) was added.
In Utkal Contractors v. State of Orissa, the State of Orissa granted a license for collection of
sal seeds from eleven forests divisions to M/s Utkal Contractors. The Orissa legislature passed the Orissa
Forest Produce (Control of Trade) Act, 1981 with the stated object to prevent smuggling of forest
produce.
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The issue was whether purchase of sale seeds grown in government forests is outside the
purview of the Orissa Forest Produce Act, 1981.
The Court observed that the object of the Act was to prevent smuggling of those varieties of
forest produce as were grown both in government forests and private land. No provision and no word in
the statute may be construed in isolation. A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The
reason for a statute is the safest guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their color from
the reason for it.
Bearing these broad rules in mind, the court tried to examine the Act and the argument. The
statement of Objects and Reasons is explicit that the Act was proposed to be enacted to prevent
smuggling of forest produce grown in government lands under the guise of produce grown on private
lands. This was sought to be achieved, as stated in the preamble by the creation of a State monopoly.
Since the State was already the owner of the forest produce grown on government land, what was
necessary and sufficient to be done by the proposed legislation was to vest in the government the
exclusive right to purchase forest produce grown on private land.
Further, the court noticed that from the extracts and summary of the relevant provisions of the
Act it can be seen that section after section deals with purchase of forest produce which, in the
circumstances, can only refer to purchase of forest produce grown on private holdings since there can be
no question of or providing for the purchase by the government of forest produce grown on government
lands. The scheme of the Act, is therefore, fully in tune with the object set out in the Statement of
objects and Reasons and in the preamble, namely, that of creating a monopoly in forest produce by
making the government the exclusive purchaser of forest produce grown in private holdings.
The Court further observed that as provided by section after section, we can see that the Act
deals with purchase of forest produce which, in the circumstances, can only refer to purchase of forest
produce grown in private holdings since there can be no question of or providing for the purchase by the
Government of forest produce grown on government lands..
It was held that the Act and the notification issued under the Act do not apply to forest produce
grown in government forests.
In Smith v. Hughes, the appellants were common prostitutes who were indulged in solicitation
of their customers in a street for the purpose of Prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of ‘The Street
Offences Act, 1959’. The Magistrate had fined the common prostitutes for soliciting in public streets.
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The Court observed that the defendants in each case were not physically present in the street
but were in a house adjoining the street or in the balcony and attracted attention of men in street by
tapping on the windows and calling down to them.
The words of Section 1(1) of the Act are, “ it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter
or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.”
The Court referred to the mischief aimed to be solved by the Act that this was an Act to clean up
the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common
prostitutes. The Act does not say specifically that the person who is soliciting must be in the street.
It was held that whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing on a balcony,
or at a window or whether the window is shut or open or half open, in each case her solicitation is
projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. In the result the prostitutes were held
guilty of solicitation in the streets and the appeals were dismissed.
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THE PRIMARY RULE OF INTERPRETATION
Literal Rule- According to this rule, the words and language used in a statute should be interpreted
literally and without adding or subtracting anything into it. The words used by the legislature must be
construed in the light of their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The true intention of the
legislature can be safely derived by applying this rule. The literal meaning should be preferred when it is
clear.
Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of
interpretation may be applied. Ordinarily court should not depart from literal rule as that would really be
amending the law in the garb of interpretation which is not permissible. This rule can be easily
understood under the following headings:
Natural and Grammatical Meaning – Statutes must be construed according to the natural
and grammatical meaning of the words. Where the words are clear, there is no ambiguity, no obscurity
and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take
upon itself the task of amending the statutory provisions.
Plain or ordinary meaning – when the language of a statute is plain, words are clear and
unambiguous and give only one meaning, then effect should be given to that plain and ordinary meaning
only.
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Popular sense or common parlance meaning – the words used in an Act must be
interpreted in the light of their popular meaning or common parlance meaning as understood by the
common man and the persons dealing with such things or articles in their day to day life.
Exact meaning preferred to Loose Meaning – Every word has a secondary meaning too.
Therefore, in applying the above stated rule one should be careful not to mix up the secondary meaning
with the loose meaning. Loose meaning should not defeat the secondary meaning of a word.
Technical words in technical sense – The another important rule is that technical words are
understood n the technical sense only. For example if the Act is one passed with reference to a particular
trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business
or transaction knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be
construed as having that particular meaning.
The statement of Lord Evershed M.R. that the length and details of modern legislation has
reinforced that claim of literal construction as the only safest rule, is true to some extent as the statutes
provide for every detail of the provisions and sections and there remains no need for applying any other
rule. The literal rule gives the plain, natural and sensible meaning to the words used by the legislature.
And if the meaning and intention of the legislature is clear upon a literal reading of the provisions, then
the rule is the best and safest guide to infer the intention of the law makers. The literal meaning should
be preferred when it is clear.
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PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT
If there is nothing to modify, alter, or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be
construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of words and sentences.
The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of legislature. But intention must be
deduced from the language used only.
Whereby the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is
enacted by the legislature it must be enforced howsoever harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense
the result may be.
The duty of the court is to expound the law as it is. A judge is not competent to modify the
language of an Act in order to bring it in accordance with his own views as what is right and reasonable.
The Courts should not add words by taking the plea that legislature omitted it in the Act.
A literal construction would not be denied only because the consequences to comply with the
same may lead to a penalty.
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In Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, an appeal is filed by the six appellants claiming a
decree for Rs.26,000/- as madages for defamatory statements made by certain Members of Parliament
on the floor of the Lok Sabha.
The Court observed that Art. 105(2) confers immunity inter alia in respect of anything said …… in
Parliament. The word ‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to ‘everything’. The only
limitation arises from the words ‘in Parliament’ which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the
course of the business of Parliament. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business
was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in
any Court. It is of the essence of parliamentary system of Government that people’s representatives
should be free to express themselves without fear of legal consequences.
Therefore, the court held that in view of the clear provisions of the Constitution of India, the
decision under appeal was correct and accordingly the appeal fails and was dismissed.
In Jugal Kishore v. Raw Cotton Co., the issue before the Supreme Court was that whether
the respondent company can claim to be the transferees of the decree within the meaning of Order 21
Rule 16 CPC.
The Court analyzed the Order 21 Rule 16 and pointed out that it includes a sequence of events
i.e. first a decree has been passed and secondly, the decree has been transferred by (i) assignment in
writing or (ii) by operation of law.
The Court observed that the cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is to read the statute
literally i.e. by giving to the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical
meaning. In the present case, a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and the
literal rule of interpretation can safely be applied.
Section 8 of Transfer of Property Act provides that the transfer of property passes to the
transferee all the interest which transferor is then capable of passing in the property. The document of
transfer covered only the residue items and not all the properties to which they might in future become
entitled. The Court held that at the date of transfer of the debt to the respondent company, the
transferors could not transfer the decree because it did not exist. Further, in the document of transfer
there was no provision purporting in terms for transferring any future decree.
In B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, a government servant was residing in a government allotted
accommodation and his own house was leased to the respondent. Later on, the government took
decision that government servants who own houses in the locality should vacate the government
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accommodation. But before the order of government to vacate the premises, he retired from the service.
The question arose whether he can get the benefit of Section 14A, and Sec. 25B(5) of DRC
Act.
The Court observed that amended Section 14A(1) reads, where a landlord who, being a person in
occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the government, ……….. a right to recover
immediately possession of any premises let out by him.
The Supreme Court observed that Section 14(A) confers a right to recover immediate possession
of premises by the landlord. The condition is that the landlord being a government servant was allotted
the residential premises by Central Government and is now required to vacate such residential
accommodation by any general or special order.
Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficulty in giving the plain meaning
to the word ‘person’ as not being confined to Government servants for it is seen that accommodation has
been provided by the Government not only to Government servants but to others also.
The Court observed that if the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous
then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The
words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the legislature.
Therefore, the Court held that the landlord who retired before the date on which the notice to
quit was given by the Government is also entitled to the benefits of Section 14A.
In Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant STO, the petitioners were dealers in betel leaves
and their business in the betel leaves was sought to be taxed by the Sales Tax Department. The
petitioners filed writ petitions under Art. 32 challenging the imposition of Sales Tax on betel leaves by the
Sales Tax Officer.
The vegetables i.e. Item 6 of second schedule were exempted from sales tax as per Section 6 of
the Act and item 36 is Beal Leaves which was omitted by amendment of schedule.
The Court observed that the intention of the legislature is clear from the fact that the
amendment omitted the Item 36 from the Schedule and the Item 6 i.e. vegetables does not include betel
leaves.
Oxford dictionary defines the word “Vegetables” as of pertaining to, comprised or consisting of,
or derived, or obtained from plants or their parts. The Court observed that the word ‘vegetable’ must be
construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common
parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of everyday use, it must be construed in
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its popular sense meaning, that sense which the people conversant with. Moreover, the legislature by
using two distinct and different items i.e. Item 6 ‘vegetables’ and Item 36 ‘betel leaves’ has indicated its
intention to levy tax upon the betel leaves.
It was held that betel leaves are not exempt from taxation and are liable to be Sales Tax.
In Motipur Zamindary Co. v. State of Bihar, the question raised in the appeal was whether
sugar cane falls within the term “green vegetables” and is therefore exempt from Sales Tax.
The High Court answered the question against the appellant and held that sugar cane was not
included in the term green vegetables.
The Court observed that in Webster’s Dictionary sugar cane has been defined as a grass
extensively grown in tropical and warm regions for its sugar. Therefore, it cannot be said that sugar
cane falls within the definition of the words green vegetables.
The Court observed that the word vegetables in taxing statutes is to be understood as in
common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and
are used for the table. Sugar cane cannot be included under the term vegetable as understood by the
common man.
In State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed, the respondents were dealers and vegetable
venders whose sales in the green ginger were taxed by the Sales Tax department.
A single judge of the High Court disagreed with the view taken by the Sales Tax authorities and
held that green ginger is vegetable. The decision of the Single Judge was affirmed by a Division Bench of
the High Court.
The Supreme Court observed that the word ‘vegetable’ is not defined in the Act but it is well
settled as a result of decisions of Supreme Court in Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant STO and
Motipur Zamindary Co. Ltd. V. State of Bihar, that this word, being word of everyday use, must be
construed not in any technical sense, not from any botanical sense, but as understood in common
parlance by the common man.
The term ‘vegetable’ is to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of

vegetable which are grown in kitchen garden and are used for the table. The Court observed that
obviously green ginger is a vegetable grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and is used for the table. It
may not be used as a principal item of the meal but it certainly forms part of the meal as a subsidiary
item. The Court further observed that ginger is an item ordinarily sold by vegetable vendor and both the
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vegetable vendor who everyday deals in vegetables and the housewife who daily goes to the market to
purchase vegetables would unhesitatingly regard green ginger as vegetable.
The Court held that green ginger is included within the meaning of the words vegetables
commonly known as ‘sabji, tarkari or sak’ and therefore exempt from Sales Tax.
In M.V. Joshi v. M.U. Shimpi, the appellant was a dealer in butter and was a proprietor of a
shop. The Food Inspector of the area visited his shop and took sample for analysis. Upon the analysis of
the samples it was found that the butter was adulterated as defined in Section 2(1)(a) of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the butter prepared from curd was not butter
within the meaning of the Rule and that the rule being a part of a penal statute, it should be construed in
favour of the accused.
The Supreme Court observed that one of the fundamental principles of interpretation is that the
primary test is the language employed in the Act and when the words are clear and plain, the Court is
bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature. Accordingly court said that to be butter it
should comply with the following conditions: (i) it shall be a product from milk or cream; (ii) the said milk
or cream shall be that of cow or buffalo, or of both; (iii) the product shall be prepared from the said milk;
and (iv) it shall be prepared exclusively from the said milk. The word exclusively in our view, refers to
the milk or cream of cow or buffalo. The word exclusively therefore has no relation to other milk
products. The plain meaning of the words used in the section indicates that butter prepared from milk or
cream, by whatever process, is comprehended by the definition.
The emphasis is therefore on the basic material from which butter is prepared and not on the
process by which it is made. Dahi is prepared from milk by souring it. Butter prepared from Dahi can,
therefore be said to be prepared from milk itself, after it has undergone the process of souring. There is
also a third method, which is used in some dairies and that is to produce butter directly from milk itself.
In all these cases, the basic material from which butter is made is milk. Only the processes adopted for
making it are different. Butter made from Dahi or curd, is therefore also butter made from milk.
The Court observed that there is no doubt that the butter prepared out of curd falls within the
plain meaning of the words in the said rule. Moreover, the conclusion we have arrived at is not only
supported by the plain words of the rule, but also carries out the clear intention of the legislature, as the
Act was passed to make provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food.
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GOLDEN RULE
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GOLDEN RULE – the Golden Rule is a modification of the literal rule, i.e., where the literal rule fails, to
bring out the real intention of the legislature, the golden rule is applied. According to this rule if there is
any absurdity or repugnance in the ordinary meaning of the words used, the language may be varied or
modified so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further.
In other words, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that
would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that
absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.
Golden rule has to be applied with a meticulous approach because – A dangerous rule, as one
goes beyond of statute, unlike the literal rule. Restriction is also there as one is allowed to deviate but
only to avoid inconvenience and no further i.e. whether justice done or not. There is no objective
criterion by which one can say a particular interpretation is absurd. It seems to leave it to each judge to
say whether an interpretation is absurd or not. Time and again, the courts in India have mixed up the
golden rule with beneficial rule.
The case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, is relevant to be considered here as it gives the
view of majority regarding the departure from rule of literal construction when it is permissible. Majority
was of the opinion that though normally the plain ordinary grammatical meaning of an enactment affords
the best guide and the object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature
enacting it, other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to if the language is contradictory,
or ambiguous or leads readily to absurd results. Similarly, where a literal interpretation leads to absurd
or unintended result, the language of the statute can be modified to accord with the intention of the
Parliament and to avoid absurdity.
In Lee v. Knapp, the question of law was whether or not by leaving the van and going away
himself to his company’s office, the defendant committed a breach of Sec. 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act,
1960, which provides, so far as material, that if in any case owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on
a road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that motor vehicle, the
driver of the motor vehicle shall stop and, if required so to do by any person having reasonable ground
for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the
identification marks of the vehicle.
The defendant made an accident and handed over the duty to stop at accident site to his
manager. The defendant contended that in his own understanding of the word ‘stop’ he had stopped.
Section 77(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provides that if in any case owing to the presence of
a motor vehicle on a road an accident occurs whereby damage is caused to a vehicle other than that
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vehicle, the driver of the motor vehicle shall stop, and if required so to do by any person, give his name
and address.
The Court observed that a momentary pause will not exempt the driver from the necessity of
stopping to give the particulars contemplated by the section. The obligation under the section is to stop
for such a period as may be reasonable to enable the question to be put, if there is anybody in the
vicinity who desires to put them.
The Court observed that literal interpretation of the word ‘stop’ would lead to an absurdity into
the meaning and purpose of the Section which can easily be avoided by applying the golden rule of
interpretation. The word ‘stop’ in section 77(1) of the Act requires the driver to stop for a reasonable
time and not a momentary pause, to give his particulars to the persons who have a right so to do. The
defendant did not remain at the scene of the accident long enough to give others his particulars of name
and address. So, he was rightly convicted.
In G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannereselvam, the appellant fought and won election to the

Madras Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates’ Constituency. His election was set aside
by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court by holding that he did not possess the required educational
qualifications of Graduates’ Constituency.
The Supreme Court observed that it may be that the grat/great mass of modern legislation, a
large part of which consists of statutory rules, makes some departure from the literal rule of
interpretation more easily justifiable today than it was in the past. But the object of interpretation is to
discover the intention of the law makers in every case. This object can obviously be best achieved by
first looking at the language used. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only if
the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. The plain and ordinary
meaning of the term electorate under Art. 171 is confined to the body of persons ‘who elect’. Thus, the
use of the term “electorate”, in Art. 171(3) of our Constitution, could not, by itself, impose a limit upon
the field of choice of members of the electorate by requiring that the person to be chosen must also be a
member of the electorate.
The High Court in the judgment under appeal has tried to write some words into or adding them
to the statute to the effect that the candidates from graduates’ constituencies of Legislative Councils
must also possess the qualification of having graduated. This contravenes the rule of plain meaning.
The language used and history of Art. 171 enables us to presume a deliberate omission of the
qualification that the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate. And no absurdity results
if we presume such an intention.
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It was held that the learned single judge had really invaded the legislative sphere. The defect in
law, if any, could be removed only by law made by Parliament.
In Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, On September 24, 1984, the Act in question
became law as the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Before the amendment, Sec. 23(2)
provided solatium at 15 per cent on the market value. After 1984 amendment, solatium was raised to 30
% on the market value.
Section 23(2) has been given limited retrospectivity by supplying Transitional provisions under
Sec. 30(2). Sec. 30(2) provides that the provision of Sec. 23(2) shall apply, and shall deemed to have
applied, also to and in relation to any award made by the collector or Court under the provision of the
Principal Act after 30th April, 1982 (date of introducing of Land Acquisition Amendment Bill) and before
the commencement of this Act i.e. 24th Sept., 1984.
The question arose in this case whether Sec. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984
providing for higher solatium would apply to award made subsequent to Sept. 24, 1984 even
though the acquisition commenced prior to the said date.
The Court observed that Sec. 23(2) forms part of a scheme of determining compensation for land
acquired under the Act. It provides 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land in consideration
of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. It thus operates on the market value of the land acquired.
The market value of the land is required to be determined at the date of publication of the notification
under Sec. 4(1). It cannot be determined with reference to any other date. In the instant case
notification was published on 20th October, 1967 and the amending Act came into force on Sept., 24,
1984. The amended Sec. 23(2) by itself is not retrospective in operation.
The Court observed that the purpose of Sec. 30(2) seems to be that the awards made in that
interregnum must get higher solatium in as much as to awards made subsequent to September 24, 1984.
The Court observed that if there is obvious anomaly in the application of law the court could
shape the law to remove the anomaly. If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to absurdity or
inconsistency, the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an interpretation which will give
effect to the purpose of the legislature. That could be done, if necessary even by modification of the
language used. The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the courts decide.
They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific
cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the literal
meaning of the statute, then the court must strike the balance.
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Therefore, it was held that benefit of higher solatium under Sec. 23(2) should be available also to
the present case because this would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstances of the
case and in the light of the purpose of Sec.30(2).
In Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, the appellant was a coalminer under a

contract with Hickleton Colliery Co. The business of the Company was transferred to the respondent
company and his contract was never terminated by notice. The appellant continued to work believing
him to be working with Hickleton Company but receiving wages from the respondent company. The
respondent company denied him to be their employee and that there existed any contract of service
between the appellant and the respondent company.
The Court observed that golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given
their ordinary meaning. We must not shrink from an interpretation which will reverse the previous law,
for the purpose of a large part of our statute law is to make lawful that which would not be lawful
without the statute, or conversely, to prohibit results which would otherwise follow.
The Court observed that the interpretation of section 154 amounts to saying in reference to
current contract of the transferor company that an order made under section 154 strikes out the name of
the transferor company and substitutes that of transferee company as the party to contract. This
interpretation of section 154 appears to lead to absurdity. The truth is that many contracts are not
capable of being dealt with by the method said to be involved in the language of Sec. 154. For example,
what would become of a contract which remunerates a manager with a share of the profits of a
constituent undertaking. Such contracts cannot be dealt with by simply substituting a new employer for
the old, for the nature of the contract necessarily depends upon the old employer continuing to be a
contracting party, and any change of employer gives the contract an entirely new meaning.
After examining section 154 with close attention and considering the consequences of its
application in different cases, it was held that when the Court makes an order under Sec. 154 of the
Companies Act, 1929, transferring all the property and liabilities of the transferor company to the
transferee company, a contract of service previously existing between an individual and the transferor
company does not automatically becomes a contract between the individual and the transferee company,
Section 154 cannot be widely construed.
Purposive Construction
It is necessary to give full effect to the purpose and object of the Act. The purpose and object of
the Act must be given its full effect by applying principles of purposive construction. There is a definite
purpose and spirit behind every Act in pursuance of which it was enacted by the Parliament. The Courts
in the guise of interpretation, have to do the job to promote that intended purpose and spirit of the Act.
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Purposive construction must be applied to provisions to ensure that true intent of the makers
must be carried on.
Purposive construction should be adopted by the courts and the construction which advances the
objective, protect the interest of the party and keep the remedy alive should be preferred. When an
expression is capable of more than one meaning, the court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a
manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the grave consequences of the
alternative constructions. If a decision runs counter to the very intent and purpose for which the
enactment was made, the decisions need to be corrected and this has to be done despite lapse of time.
Provision should be construed in the context of the object of the Act seeks to achieve but
construction should not be so as to travel beyond the scope of the provisions of the Act. Purposive
construction need not be applied where relevant Act has been amended from time to time on the basis of
fresh needs and has not remained static.
In Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, The common questions before the
Supreme Court were whether the two Acts namely the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrata Adhiniyam,
1968 and Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967 were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under
Art. 25(1) and whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them. The provisions of the two
Acts which were in dispute were related to prohibition of forcible conversion and punishment thereof.
It was contended by the appellant that the right to propagate one’s religion means the right to
convert a person to one’s own religion and that the right to convert a person to one’s own religion is a
fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 25(1).
The Court observed that Art. 25(1) reads as follows: subject to public, order, morality and
health, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice
and propagate religion.
The word propagate has been used in Art. 25(1) for what the Article grants is not the right to
convert another person to one’s own religion, but to transmit or spread one’s religion by an exposition of
its tenets. Art. 25(1) guarantees freedom of religion to every citizen and not merely to the followers of
one particular religion. The two Acts therefore clearly provide for the maintenance of public order
because if forcible conversion had not been prohibited that would have created public disorder in the
states.
In S.R. Chaudhary v. State of Punjab, respondent No.2 Tej Prakash was appointed as a
Minister of Punjab on the advice of C.M. H.S. Brar, and at the time of his appointment as such minster,
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he was not a member of the Legislative Assembly of Punjab. He failed to get himself elected as a
member of the Legislature within a period of six months and submitted his resignation. Upon change in
leadership of the ruling party, the respondent was again elected as Minister by CM.
The appellant filed a petition seeking writ of quo warranto against respondent No.2 as his
appointment for a second time without being elected was violative of constitutional provisions and
therefore, bad. The High Court dismissed the petition.
The issue before Supreme Court was whether the re appointment of a person as Minister for a
second time without being elected to the assembly, during the term of the same Legislative Assembly,
was invalid and hence void.
The Court observed that under Article 164(1), the Governor shall appoint the Chief Minister
exercising his own discretion, according to established practice and conventions. All other Ministers are
to be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. This however is subject to an
exception provided by Article 164(4) to meet an extraordinary situation, where the Chief Minister
considers the inclusion of a particular person, who is not a member of the Legislature, in the Council of
Ministers necessary. To take care of such a situation, Article 164(4) of the Constitution provides that “A
Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the legislature of the state shall
at the expiration of the period cease to be a minister.
The Court observed that Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted
with an object oriented approach. A Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense.
The word used may be general in terms but, their full import and true meaning, has to be appreciated
considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve.
Art. 164(4) provides that if a non-member is appointed a minister, he would cease to be a

minister unless in a short period of six consecutive months from the date of his appointment he gets
elected to the legislature. The non-election could not permit him to be appointed as a Minister once
again during the term of the Legislative Assembly. The privilege is only a one time slot, and it is not
being the privilege of the Chief Minister, therefore, it is not permissible for the different Chief Minister to
appoint the same individual as Minister during the course of same assembly. The privilege to vote in the
House is conferred only on members of the House of the Legislature of a State. It does not extend to
non-elected Ministers. He may address the House or take part in the proceedings but he cannot vote an
MLA. None of the powers or privileges of an MLA extend to that individual. All these disabilities also
clearly go to suggest that six months clause in Article 164(4) cannot be permitted to be repeatedly used
for the same individual without his getting elected in the meanwhile. Art. 164(1) and 164(4) have to be
so construed that they further the principle of a representative and responsible government.
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It was held that the re appointment of the Respondent No.2 as Minister, during the term of the
same Legislative Assembly, without getting elected in the meanwhile, was improper, undemocratic,
invalid and unconstitutional.
In AIR Karamchari Sangh v. AIR Ltd., the appellants were the employees of the respondent.
The Central Government constituted two tribunals to make recommendations in respect of fixing or
revising wages of working journalists as well as non-working journalists. The tribunal passed its award to
which the respondent submitted its reply inter alia contending that it was not running a newspaper
establishment and publications published by the company were not the newspapers.
The Supreme Court observed that the term ‘newspaper’ is defined by section 2(b) of the Act
which reads as, ‘newspaper means any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on
public news and includes such other class of printed periodical work as may, from time to time be notified
by central government.’ A newspaper employee is defined by section 2(e ) as any working journalist and
includes any other person employed to do day to day work in, or in relation to, any newspaper
establishment.
The Court further observed that there is no dispute in the present case that the law reports are
printed works and that they are periodicals. The only question which remains to be considered is
whether they contain public news or comments on public news. The law reports which are being
published by respondent No.1 are reports of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of India and these
decisions are, no doubt, of public importance. The contents of these law reports constitute news in so
far as the subscribers and the readers of these reports are concerned. It is by reading these law reports
that they come to know of the latest legal position prevailing in the country, so these reports carry news
and the public is interested in them.
The Court further observed that the Act in question is a beneficent legislation which is enacted
for the purpose of improving the conditions of service of the employees of the newspaper establishments
and hence even if it is possible to have two opinions on the construction of the provisions of the Act, the
one which advances the object of the Act and is in favour of the employees for whose benefit the Act is
passed, has to be accepted. It was held that the law reports published by respondent are newspapers
and the employees of respondent no.1 are newspaper employees and should be extended the benefit of
orders passed by the Central Government.
In State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap, the respondent was appointed member of the Orissa State
Public Service Commission. During his tenure as a member, he was appointed chairman of the
Commission. The State took the view that the six years assured to him by Art. 316(2) commenced to run
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from the date he became member simpliciter and did not receive a fresh start, from the later date when
he assumed office of chairman.
The Court observed that where it is plain, the language prevails, but where there is obscurity and
lack of harmony with other provisions, it may be legitimate to take external assistance, such as the object
of the provisions, the mischief sought to be remedied, the social context, the words of the authors and
other such allied matters.
Thus, while both are members, they hold different offices. The tenure to the office of chairman
begins when he starts functioning as chairman. The cardinal point is the identity of the office and the
injunction is against the re appointment to that particular office. The offices being different, it is wrong
to describe the appointment of a member to the office of chairman as re appointment.
It was held that when an ordinary member of a Public Service Commission is appointed as the
chairman of the Commission, he is eligible for a period of six years as chairman in that office and his
tenure of six years does not start on his becoming an ordinary member of the Commission.
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EJUSDUM GENERIS RULE
The maxim ejusdum generis means of the same kind or nature. The rule signifies that where
words having general or wide import or meaning are associated in the text with more limited or specific
words, they are, by implication, given a restricted meaning. When particular words pertaining to a class,
category or genus are followed by general words, the general words are construed as limited to things of
the same kind as those earlier specified.
The rule of ejusdum generis is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or
genus are followed by more general words. In such a case the more general words are construed as
limited to things of the same kind represented by the specific words. The rule of ejusdum generis is not
of universal application. It applies only when:
(i) the statute enumerates the specific words;
(ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
(iii) the class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
(iv) the general terms follow the specific enumeration; and
(v) there is no indication of a different legislative intention.
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If the general words are given their full and natural meaning, they would overshadow the specific
words, making the later redundant and superfluous. Likewise, if the class of specific words is given its
full meaning, the general words become useless. Both the classes have to be given effect to as the
legislature has not used them just for the sake of using but with a definite intent and meaning.
This rule reflects an attempt to reconcile incompatibility between the specific and general words
in view of other rules of interpretation that all words in a statute are given effect, if possible, that a
statute is to be construed as a whole and that no words in a statute are presumed to be superfluous.
In Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. East India Hotels Ltd., the respondent used to own
and run Oberoi Grand five star hotel in the city of Calcutta. The hotel had three restaurants within its
premises. The company had obtained licenses from the corporation by paying fees under section 443 of
the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951. The Corporation increased the fees of license to
Rs.15,000/- in respect of each of the places of recreation and amusement under section 443 of the Act.
The company challenged the increase of licence fee by a writ under Art. 226.
Construing section 443, the High Court found that theatre, circus, cinema house, dancing hall
have been specifically mentioned followed by the expression ‘other similar places of public resort,
recreation or amusement’ which are of general nature. Applying the principle of ejusdum generis, the
Division Bench came to the conclusion that the general words are intended to have a restricted meaning
in the sense that other similar places must fall within the class enumerated by the specific words. The
Division Bench held that a restaurant which occasionally or incidentally provides the amusement is not a
place of public resort, recreation or amusement.
The Supreme Court observed that it was not necessary for the Division Bench of the High Court
to rely on the rule of ejusdum generis in this case. The provision of section 443 of the Act is on the face
of it clear and unambiguous and, as such, there was no occasion to call into aid the said rule. It is clear
that any other place in section 443 must be a similar place to the four categories mentioned in the
section. As admitted, there are dancing floors in the restaurants where the residents and other guests
entertain themselves by dances, vocal music, cabaret dance etc. A dancing hall cannot operate without
obtaining a licence under section 443 of the Act.
It was held that the restaurants run by the company were places similar to the dancing halls and
hence they were places of public amusement covered by the provisions of sec. 443.
In Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn., Section 21 of the Town Police Clauses Act
provided for certain local authorities to make orders for the route to be observed by all carts, carriages,
horses and persons and for preventing obstruction of the streets in all times of public processions,
rejoicings, or illuminations, and in any case when the streets are thronged or liable to be obstructed.
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The Court observed that the words ‘in any case’ ought to be treated as intended only to cover
cases of the same class or genus as the three preceding instances i.e. public processions, rejoicings or
illuminations and the words ought not to be construed as covering the case of ordinary day to day life.
It was held that in view of the principle of ejusdum generis, the general words, ‘in any case’ etc
were intended to be confined and should be confined to cases within the genus or category of which
public processions, rejoicings and illuminations are specific instances. The three instances suffice to
constitute a genus which, even if not confined to instances strictly similar to those three, may be stated
as special occasions.
In Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, the objects for which the company is
established are, to make, or sell, or lend on hire railway carriages and wagons, and all kinds of railway
plant, fittings, machinery, and rolling stock to carry on the business of mechanical engineers and general
contractors. Riche wanted to construct a railway line and entered into a contract with the directors of the
company to take bonds or shares in exchange and to give to Riche the business of supplying the iron and
rolling stock. The Court of exchequer held the contract was ultra vires.
It was observed that upon all ordinary principles, those words must be referred to the sentence
which immediately precedes them. The first part of the sentence talks about the selling, or lending
railway carriages, wagons, and all kinds of railway plant, fittings, machinery and rolling stock. The later
part talks about to carry on the business of mechanical engineers and general contractors.
Under the rule of ejusdum generis, the term general contractors would be referred to that which
goes immediately before, and indicates the contracts as mechanical engineers are in the habit of making,
and are in their business required, or find it convenient to make for the purpose of carrying on their
business. If the term general contractors is not to be so interpreted, it would authorize the making of
contracts of any and every description. It was held that a contract of this kind was not within the
memorandum of association.
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NOSCITUR A SOCIIS RULE
It simply means that meaning of a word should be known from its accompanying or associating
words. This rule is based on the maxims, a man is known by the company he keeps. The rule says that
words used in an Act of Parliament derive their meaning with reference to words found in immediate
connection with them.
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When two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they
are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were, their color from each other, i.e.,
the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general.
Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis.
The philosophy behind the rule is that the meaning of the doubtful word may be ascertained by reference
to the meaning of words associated with it. The word noscitur means to know and sociis means the
association or society.
The rule applies only where there is any doubt about the meaning attached to the words. Before
the rule of noscitur can be pressed into service, it must be shown that the words are employed in the
same sense or that they are susceptible of analogous meaning. It is only where the intention of the
legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not
clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied.
In Commissioners v. Savoy Hotel, while interpreting a Purchase Tax Act, which used the
expression ‘manufactured beverages including fruit juices and bottled waters and syrups etc.’ it was held
that the description fruit juices as occurring therein should be construed in the context of the preceding
words.
In State of Karnataka v. Union of India, Art. 194(3) of the Constitution which refers to
powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the legislature of a State was construed. The Supreme
Court held that the words Powers must take its colour from words in immediate connection with it and
that it should be construed to refer not to legislative powers but to powers of a House which are
necessary for the conduct of its business.
Distinction between Noscitur Rule and Ejusdum Generis Rule
The maxim ejusdum generis is applied where general term follows the specific or narrower words
preceding it. On the other hand, noscitur rule applies where two or more words which are susceptible of
analogous meaning are compiled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. The
main distinction is that while applying noscitur rule, the meaning of more general words takes colour
from the associated words or words preceding or following, whereas as per ejusdum generis rule the
preceding words must form a genus or a class or category and they must be specific.
Noscitur a sociis rule is wider than the ejusdum generis rule, rather the later is an application of
the former. In fact, the doctrine of ejusdum generis is only an illustration or specific application of the
broader maxim noscitur a sociis.
In Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. V. CCE, the issue was whether toilet soap would be household soap.
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The Court observed that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis is that it is a legitimate rule of
construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate
connection with them i.e. when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are
clubbed together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. The philosophy behind the
noscitur rule is that the meaning of the doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of words associated with it.
When considered in the legal setting and commercial parlance, it can be said that toilet soap
being of everyday household use for the purpose of the bath, it took its shelter in commercial parlance
under household. It was held that the toilet soap would fall within the meaning of the word household.
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UT RES MAGIS RULE
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat means that a sensible meaning has to be given
to the words of an Act of Parliament so as to make it valid. It says that an interpretation leading to the
contrary should be avoided. It has to be construed ut res magis.
The legislature while enacting a statute has a specific purpose in mind and do not legislate for
the sake of legislation only. And that is the reason, the Courts while interpreting a law must give a
reasonable and sensible meaning to the wordings of the statute so as to carry out the intention of the
legislature. It may not be correct to say that a word or words used in a statute are either unnecessary or
without any purpose to serve, unless there are compelling reasons to say so looking to the scheme of the
statute. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it effective and operative on the
principle of ut res magis valeat quam pareat.
A machinery must be so construed as to effectuate the liability imposed by the charging section
and to make the machinery workable. The courts tend to be strongly against a construction which
reduces statute to be ineffective or useless. Therefore, whenever alternative constructions are possible
the court must give effect to that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for
which the statute has been enacted and not to that which would put hindrances or obstacles in its way.
In Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab, the appellant was prosecuted and convicted for theft of
electrical energy from the Punjab State Electricity Board. The appellant contended that his conviction
was illegal in view of sections 39 and 50 of the Indian Electricity Act.
Section 39 provides that whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy shall be
deemed to have committed theft within the meaning of IPC.
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Section 50 provides that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence
against the Act except at the instance of government or electrical inspector or of a person aggrieved by
the same.
Supreme Court observed that the words of an Act of Parliament must be construed so as to give
sensible meaning to them. The section 39 makes something which was not a theft within IPC because if
the abstraction was a theft within IPC, the section 39 would be unnecessary. The liability to punishment
would arise not under the IPC but really because of section 39. It will be impossible to hold that without
section 39 there is any liability to punishment under the IPC for abstraction of electricity.
The Court held that the appellant committed an offence against the Act and the prosecution in
respect of that offence would be incompetent unless it was instituted at the instance of a person named
in section 50.
In Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, the respondent was paying a sum of money
as licence fee to the appellant on the basis of yearly valuation. The Corporation by a resolution changed
the basis of assessment of licence fee as according to seating capacity of cinema houses. The Calcutta
High Court quashed the resolution of enhancing the fee structure.
The Court analyzed the various provisions of the Act and observed that Section 443 of the Act
provides that no person shall without a licence granted by the corporation keep open any cinema house
for public amusement. Section 548(2) says that for every licence under the Act, a fee may, unless
otherwise provided, be charged at such rate as may from time to time be provided.
The Court observed that a statute has to be read so as to make it valid and if possible an
interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided. Court held that on the interpretation of
the statute on the basis of principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat it was clear that the expression
fee used in Section 548 of the Act means a tax because a fee means some amount of money in lieu of
services rendered by someone who is absent in the present case. Section 548 made no provision for
services to be rendered and any other reading would make the section invalid. The court allowed the
appeal of the corporation.
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INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal
construction. The other rule of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative
intention is not clear.
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An aid is a device that helps or assists. For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the
court has to take recourse to various internal and external aids.
A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it. The reason for a statute is the safest
guide to its interpretation. The words of a statute take their color from the reason for it. The reason lies
in the internal and external aids for construction of the statute.
Internal aid mean those aids which are available in the Act or Statute itself. Each and every
part of an enactment helps in interpretation.
1. Long Title: The Long Title to an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its
construction. In the past, the long title was not considered a part of the statute and, therefore, it was
not put in the category of internal aids to construction. Long title gives a general description of the
object of the Act. Long title along with the preamble is a good guide regarding the object, scope or
purpose of the Act.
Short title of the Act can be said to be the nick name of the Act. It is only an abbreviation for
purposes of reference and it is not a useful aid to construction.
Although the title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an enacting provision and though useful in
case of ambiguity of the enacting provision, is ineffective to control their clear meaning. In other words
it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment.
In Kedar Nath v. State of W. Bengal, the section under which the State Government was
empowered to choose as to which particular case should go for reference to the Special Court be tried
under a special procedure, was challenged as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Rejecting the
contention, the Supreme Court held that long title of the Act which said as An Act to provide for the more
speedy trial and more effective punishment of certain offences was clear enough to give the state
government discretion as to which offences deserved to be tried by the special courts under a special
procedure.
In Bishambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, the Apex Court observed that Sec. 3(1) authorizes
the State Government to issue a notification declaring that the Estate specified therein has passed to the
State.
It was argued that Sec. 3 giving an unfettered discretion to the State Government to issue or not
to issue notification with respect to an estate is discriminatory.
The Court after taking into consideration the long title of the Act and the two preambles to the
Act observed that the object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the rights, title and interest in land of
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intermediaries by whatever name known. This is a clear purpose of the policy which is sought to be
implemented by the operative provisions of the Act.
The Court further observed that whatever discretion has been vested in the State Government
must be exercised in the light of this policy and, therefore, it cannot be said to be an absolute or
unfettered discretion, for sooner or later all estates must necessarily be abolished.
In Manohar Lal v. State of Punjab, the appellant Manohar Lal had a shop at Ferozepur Cantt.
and was carrying on the business of books in it. Section 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940
regulates the hours of work of Shop Assistants and commercial employees. The validity of Section 7 was
challenged in the present case.
The Supreme Court observed that the long title of the Act reads, “An act to limit the hours of
work of Shop Assistants and Commercial Employees and to make certain regulations concerning their
holidays, wages and terms of service.” The long title acts as a guide for the determination of the scope
of the Act and the policy underlying the legislation and indicates the main purposes of the enactment.
The ratio of the legislation is social interest in the health of workers who form an essential part of the
community.
From this it would be apparent that the Act is concerned and properly concerned with the welfare
of the worker and seeks to prevent injury to it, not merely from the action of the employer but from his
own. In other words, the worker is prevented from attempting to earn more wages by working longer
hours than is good for him. If such a condition is necessary or proper in the case of a worker, there does
not seem to be anything unreasonable in applying the same or similar principles to the employer who
works on his own business.
The legislation is in effect in the exercise of social control over the manner in which business
should be carried on and regulated in the interests of the health and welfare not merely of those
employed in it but of all those engaged in it. A restriction imposed with a view to secure this purpose
would, in our opinion, be clearly saved by Article 19(6).
It was held that the provision of Section 7(1) of the Act as valid and Constitutional and dismissed
the appeal.
2. Preamble: - A preamble is very much part of the statute and is put in the beginning of an Act to
define the necessity and purpose behind the enactment. The courts have always leaned in favour of
admissibility of the preamble as an aid to construction of a statute. It is not an enacting part but it is
expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title.
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It has been treated to be a key fro the interpretation of the statute. It may provide – (i) the
ground and cause of making statute, (ii) the evils sought to be remedied, (iii) or the doubts which may
be intended to settle.
Preamble can be an aid in construing a provision when the provision is ambiguous. It can afford
useful assistance to ascertain legislative intention but cannot control otherwise the plain meaning of a
provision. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear,
the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the
preamble may be resorted to explain it. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the
provisions of an Act, though we could be justified in resorting to it, and we will be required to do so, if we
find that the language used by the Parliament is ambiguous.
The preamble of the Constitution of India is a major document which reveals the intention of the
Constitution makers and has been held by the Supreme Court to be a major aid in the construction of the
Constitution. It is generally referred to as the mini constitution and is the soul of the Constitution. The
preamble is a part of the Constitution and is the key to open the mind of the makers.
In Keshvananda Bharti v. Union of India, the Court held that the Preamble is a part of the
Constitution and its aid can be validly taken in interpreting the Constitutional provisions.
3. Headings: Headings constitute an important part of the Act itself. In comparison to preamble
of statute, they may provide a better key to the construction of sections which follow them. Headings
are of two kind, those prefixed to a section and those prefixed to a group or set of sections. Heading of
a section indicates factors to be considered in.
It is well settled that the headings prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words
of the provision; they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the
words used in the provision are clear and unambiguous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain
meaning of the words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt the heading or sub
heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision.
4. Marginal Notes: A marginal note is the side heading given to every section of a statute which
summarizes the effect of the whole section. The Marginal notes are not considered part of the provision
so they cannot be considered as legitimate aid to construction of the provisions of the section. In the
interpretation of a statute, marginal notes are not used because most of these notes are inserted by the
draftsmen and not by the legislators and not even under the instructions of the legislators.
5. Proviso: A proviso generally carves out an exception to the general rule enacted in the main
section, and it prevails over the provisions of the section and controls its meaning. The whole section is
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read subject to the proviso. In other words, we can say that the role of a proviso is that it qualifies the
generality of the main enactment by providing an exception to it.
A proviso should be read with the main provision and its object should be found out by the court.
The main part of an enactment cannot be construed without reference to the proviso. The proviso
removes ambiguity of the main section of the enactment. A proviso to a provision in a statute has
several functions and while interpreting a provision of the statute, the court is required to carefully
scrutinize and find out the real object of the proviso appended to that provision. It is not a proper rule of
interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the main part of the section be construed first
without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be
had to examine the proviso. It is therefore, an accepted rule of interpretation that the section and the
proviso must be read as a whole.
A proviso should not be read as if providing something by way of addition to the main provision
which is foreign to the main provision itself. A proviso to a section cannot be used to import into the
enacting part something which is not there.
There is no doubt that where the main provision is clear, its effect cannot be cut down by the
proviso. But where it is not clear, the proviso, which cannot be presumed to be surplus age can properly
be looked into to ascertain the meaning and scope of the main provision.
Even if the enacting part is clear, effort is to be made to give some meaning to the proviso and
to justify its necessity. But a clause or a section worded as a proviso, may not be a true proviso and may
have been placed by way of abundant caution (Allay Fears)
In State of W. Bengal v. Union of India, the proviso appended to S. 9 of the Coal Bearing
Area (Acquisition and Development) Act 1957 was held to have an important bearing on the construction
of the Act that the Union has power to acquire the interest of a State in a coal bearing land.
From the various decisions of the Supreme Court, it can be summed up about the nature,
functions and limitations of a proviso:
(i) A proviso creates an exception to the main part of the section.
(ii) The proviso is always subordinate to the main section.
(iii) A proviso is construed in relation to the section to which it is appended.
(iv) It is used as a guide to the construction of the enactments.
(v) A proviso is not to be construed as excluding or adding something by implication.
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(vi) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.
(vii) A proviso should receive a strict construction.
6. Explanation: An explanation is added to a section to explain the meaning of words used in

section and to clarify the intention of the legislature by removing the doubts which might arise if the
explanation was not given. An explanation is appended with a definite purpose and care should always
be taken to construe the explanation consistent with that purpose. The explanation does not limit or
expand the meaning of the section but only tries to remove the doubts or confusion, if any.
An explanation may be added to include something within or to exclude something from the
ambit of the main enactment or the connotation of some word occurring in it.
The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, observed that an explanation
is a part of the section to which it is appended and the whole section should be read together to know
the true meaning of the provision. The explanation is to be limited to the purpose for which it was
created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field.
The object and scope of the explanation can be summed up as follows:
(i) The explanation explains the meaning of the main section.
(ii) An explanation is not a substantive provision as it merely clarifies or explains the

meaning.
(iii) In case of any ambiguity in the meaning of the section, the Explanation clears it.
(iv) An explanation can be retrospective or prospective.
(v) An Explanation cannot take away any substantive right which has been conferred by the
main provision.
(vi) The Explanation makes the main provision meaningful and purposeful by supporting it
with a clear meaning.
(vii) The Explanation cannot change the provision or any part of it.
It can be concluded that an Explanation is generally construed to harmonize it with the main
section and to clear the confusion and ambiguity so as to give a clear and definite meaning to the whole
enactment.
In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., it was held that if on a true reading of an Explanation it
appears that it has widened the scope of the main section, effect be given to legislative intent
notwithstanding the fact that the Legislature named that provision as an Explanation.
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7. Illustrations: An illustration is an example for instance added to a section to make clear the
meaning and scope of the section. The illustrations are examples which make it easy to understand the
legal provision in simple and commonsense meaning. The legal provisions and terminology tend to
become abstract or technical, hence the illustrations try to simplify the meaning by giving the examples.
The illustrations form part of the section, but however, they do not form part of the statute.
Illustrations are relevant and valuable in the construction of the language of the section, hence they
should not be rejected so easily.
8. Schedules: The statutes are usually divided into Parts and Schedules for the purpose of
convenience and easy comprehension of the scheme and layout of the Act. The Schedules are generally
put at the end of the Acts and contain the details which are left or cannot be included in the main
sections.
The schedules form part of statute to which they are appended. They often contain details and
prescribed forms for working out the provisions of the statute. Their contents are taken into
consideration by the Courts while interpreting the provisions of the statute.
The division of a statute into sections and schedules is done only for convenience and, therefore,
a schedule may contain substantive enactment which may even go beyond the scope of a section to
which the schedule may appear to be connected by its heading.
But expression in the schedule cannot control or prevail against the express enactment. But in
case of doubtful words in an enactment, a schedule may be utilized for the purpose of throwing light on
their meaning.
EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
In the interpretation of a statute, the Courts are duty bound to assign a meaning and
construction to the provisions which is in consonance with the intention of the legislature. However,
where the meaning is not clear, the Courts have to take help from various sources to gather this
intention. And one such course is to take the help of external sources.
The external aids are required only when the language used in the statute is not clear and leads
to ambiguity.
1. Parliamentary History – At the time of passing of an Act, the Parliamentary history of the
legislation, the Bills presented, the debates etc have been treated by the English Courts and the Supreme
Court of India as not to be admissible as an aid to the construction. The Supreme Court of India has
used the aid of Parliamentary history in resolving questions of construction but it can be said that the
Supreme Court generally has enunciated the said rule of exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it
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was traditionally enunciated by English Courts. But in few cases it has been held that legislative history
within prescribed limits may be consulted by the courts in resolving ambiguities. In determining the
legislative intent, even a minister’s budget speech was taken into consideration.
(i) Bills: there are many stages in passing of an Act and the process is initiated by the introduction
of a bill in the legislature which is debated thoroughly before its passing into an Act. The debates on a
Bill are not admissible for construction of the Act.
In State of Travancore v. Bombay Co. Ltd. And Ashvini Kumar case, it was held that a
speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the subjective intent of
the speaker, but it could not reflect the mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the
bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in accord.
In S.P. Gupta v. President of India, the Court observed that Legislative history of a
constitutional provision though not directly germane for the purpose of construing a statute may however
be used in exceptional cases to denote the beginning of the legislative process which results in the logical
end and, but in no case the legislative history be a substitute for an interpretation which is in direct
contravention of the statutory provision concerned.
(ii) Statement of Objects and Reasons: the statement attached to the bill describing the objects
and purposes and the reasons for which the bill is to be passed, gives the understanding of the
background, the antecedent state of affairs and the object that the law seeks to achieve. It cannot be
used to know the true meaning of the provisions but its help can be taken to ascertain the history of the
enactment.
In Shashikant Laxman Kale v. UOI, The Court observed that the distinction between the
purpose or object of an enactment and the legislative intention governing it is that the former realties to
the mischief to which the enactment is directed and its remedy, while the latter relates to the legal
meaning of the enactment. There is thus clear distinction between the two. While the purpose or object
of the legislation is to provide a remedy for the malady, the legislative intention relates to the meaning or
exposition of the remedy as enacted.
It was further observed that for determining the purpose or object of the legislation, it is
permissible to look into the circumstances prevailing at that time which necessitated the passing of that
law. For this limited purpose, it is permissible to look into the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for the then existing malady.
In Ashvini Kumar’s case, statement of objects and reasons appended to a bill are emphatically
ruled out as an aid. It seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce bill and what
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objects he sought to achieve. But these objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective
which the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law.
That means objects and reasons in relation to a particular legislation may be relied upon for
construing any of its provisions when the clauses have been adopted by Parliament without any change
in enacting the bill, but where there have been extensive changes during the passage of bill in
Parliament, the objects and reasons of the changed provisions may or may not be the same as of the
clauses of the original bill and it will be unsafe to attach undue importance to the statement of objects
and reasons or notes on clauses.
In State of West Bengal v. UOI, it was held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a bill, when introduced in the Parliament, can be used for the limited purpose of
understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce
the bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve.
(iii) Committee Reports: Before the framing of the Bill, usually the matter is referred to a
committee to consider it in detail and give its report thereon. These reports of the Commissions and
Committees have been referred to as evidence of historical facts or of surrounding circumstances and at
times have been used or referred for interpreting the Act. When there is an ambiguity in the meaning of
a provision and the Act was passed on the recommendation of a committee report, aid can be taken of
that report to interpret the provision. For example reference was made to IT Inquiry Report in CIT v.
Sodra Devi and to the Press Commissions Report in Express Newspaper’s case.
RULE OF EXCLUSION: - The rule of exclusion provides that in interpreting statutes, the proceedings in the
legislatures, including speeches delivered, parliamentary debates and press discussions and other
external sources, cannot be cited in the Courts and must be excluded from the purview of sources of
interpretation.
The British and American Courts are of the opinion that the general history of a statute and the
various steps leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications of the original bill or
reports of Legislative Committees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the legislature where
it is in doubt, but they hold that the legislative history is inadmissible where there is no obscurity in the
meaning of the statute.
The rule of exclusion has been criticized by jurists as artificial. The trend of academic opinion
and the practice in the European system suggest that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the
ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. However, it is not
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suggested that such extrinsic materials should be decisive but they must be at least admissible. Resort
may be had to these sources with great caution and only when ambiguities are to be resolved.
In State of Mysore v. R.V. Bidap, it was observed that where it is plain, the language prevails
but where there is lack of harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances, it may be
legitimate to take external assistance such as the object of provisions, the mischief sought to be
remedied, the social context, the words of the authors and other allied matters.
However, the Courts must not and cannot blindly follow the above view in each and every case
as there is a danger of giving an altogether different meaning to the intention of the legislators.
The reason behind the rule was explained in Gopalan v. State of Madras, wherein it was
observed that, “a speech made in the course of the debate on a bill could at best be indicative of the
subjective intent of the speaker, but it could not reflect the mental process lying behind the majority vote
which carried the bill. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the minds of all those legislators were in
accord.”
Krishna Iyer J., referred to the debates and speeches of various members of the Assembly to
infer out the true scope of Article 316(2) in R.V. Bidap case.
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LAW NOTES LC-I [VI SEMESTER – INTERPRETATION OF STATUES]

The Madras High Court held the notification valid.

RULE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, there is an ancient temple dedicated to

RULE OF STRICT INTERPRETATION

INTERPRETATION OF TAXING OR FISCAL STATUTES

In Bowers v. Gloucester Corporation, the license of hackney carriage of respondent was

MISCHIEF RULE OF CONSTRUCTION: HEYDON’S CASE

It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

Limitations to the Heydon’s Rule

7. In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to

THE PRIMARY RULE OF INTERPRETATION

The term ‘vegetable’ is to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of

In G. Narayanswami v. G. Pannereselvam, the appellant fought and won election to the

In Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, the appellant was a coalminer under a

Art. 164(4) provides that if a non-member is appointed a minister, he would cease to be a

EJUSDUM GENERIS RULE

(i) the statute enumerates the specific words;

(ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;

(iii) the class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;

(iv) the general terms follow the specific enumeration; and

(v) there is no indication of a different legislative intention.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS RULE

Distinction between Noscitur Rule and Ejusdum Generis Rule

UT RES MAGIS RULE

INTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

(i) A proviso creates an exception to the main part of the section.

(ii) The proviso is always subordinate to the main section.

(iii) A proviso is construed in relation to the section to which it is appended.

(iv) It is used as a guide to the construction of the enactments.

(v) A proviso is not to be construed as excluding or adding something by implication.

(vi) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive provision.

(vii) A proviso should receive a strict construction.

6. Explanation: An explanation is added to a section to explain the meaning of words used in

The object and scope of the explanation can be summed up as follows:

(i) The explanation explains the meaning of the main section.

(ii) An explanation is not a substantive provision as it merely clarifies or explains the

(iv) An explanation can be retrospective or prospective.

EXTERNAL AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

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