Premier April 2019

Premier Debate
April 2019
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Premier Debate April 2019
Table of Contents
Table of Contents................................................................................................................. 2
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2
Pro ........................................................................................................................................ 4
Contentions ...................................................................................................................... 5
Representation ............................................................................................................. 6
Peacekeeping .............................................................................................................. 12
China ........................................................................................................................... 14
Blocks.............................................................................................................................. 16
AT: Efficacy .................................................................................................................. 17
AT: Opposition ............................................................................................................ 21
Con ..................................................................................................................................... 23
Contentions .................................................................................................................... 24
Efficacy ........................................................................................................................ 25
Opposition................................................................................................................... 30
Proliferation ................................................................................................................ 35
Human Rights .............................................................................................................. 37
Blocks.............................................................................................................................. 39
AT: Representation ..................................................................................................... 40
AT: Peacekeeping ........................................................................................................ 49
2
Introduction
Friends of Premier Debate,
The April 2019 Public Forum Debate topic is “Resolved: The United Nations should grant India
permanent membership on the Security Council.”
This brief includes 50 pieces of evidence to give you a running start on researching this topic.
It’s best viewed in draft mode/layout with the navigation pane displayed (in your View menu).
On PRO, the bulk of the evidence argues that affirming would improve representation. On CON,
the evidence centers on harms to efficacy and opposition from other countries. We also
provide blocks and potential contentions about peacekeeping, containing China, nuclear
proliferation, and human rights violations.
We want to remind readers about standard brief practice to get the most out of this file. Best
practice is to use this as a guide for further research. Use the citations to locate the articles and
read them for your own personal knowledge. You’ll find even better evidence that way.
Remember, briefs can be a tremendous resource but you need to familiarize yourself with the
underlying material first.
We’re always looking for ways to make the briefs better, so please, let us know what you think!
This is our third month of PF briefs, so please let us know what we can do to improve! And, if
you use these briefs please help us direct other debaters to premierdebate.com/briefs where
we will continue uploading .doc versions of the briefs.
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PF camp session. Our alums have achieved widespread success on the national circuit. Find at
more at http://www.premierdebate.com/camps/. In addition, look out for an update brief later
on this months.
Finally, we’d like to thank our researchers Serena Fitzgerald and Peter Zhang for their help with
compiling this file. This is some of the best, round-ready evidence you’ll see on the topic, and
we couldn’t have done it without them!
Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

Bob Overing & John Scoggin
Directors | Premier Debate
3
Pro
4
Contentions
5
Representation
India has a fifth of the world’s population, a rapidly growing economy, and a strong
democracy. PRO can argue that including India as a permanent member would make
the UN Security Council more representative of the world. PRO can also argue that
adding India would enable other countries to join the council in the future. PRO can
impact representation to the legitimacy of the UNSC, since if countries don’t think the
UNSC fairly represent their interests, they are less likely to abide by their decisions.
India deserves representation and would push for further expansion. Adding India as a
permanent member would improve the UNSC’s legitimacy.
Stuenkel ’10 Stuenkel, Oliver (Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas
Foundation in São Paulo). “Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and
the UN Security Council.” International Law, March 2010,
https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf. [Premier]
India’s major argument is that its inclusion would increase the UNSC’s legitimacy by
making it more representative of UN membership.81 In 2004, for example, India argued that it
deserved the seat because it was the world’s second largest country in terms of
population, with a large economy and the third largest contributor of troops to UN
peace-keeping missions.82 In addition, it has always been India’s proclaimed goal to
increase the representation of the “global South” and limit the infuence of the
established powers. The government argues that an “adequate presence” of developing
countries is needed in the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their
stakes in global peace and prosperity are factored into the UN’s decision making. Any
expansion of permanent members’ category must be based on an agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined selection. There must be an
inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India supports expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members’ category.
The latter is the only avenue for the vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral
part of a common package.”83 With regards to these principled motivations, India’s rhetoric has been and remains remarkably similar to that of
Brazil, another G77 member. But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai
Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is
diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing
mostly with security issues. This interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to
an ever more important organ.84 Finally, India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the
India seeks to
conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.85 Specifically,
expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-permanent members. The G4’s
proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied by two African nations,
two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for
Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa,
one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).
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India’s membership would renew the legitimacy of the UNSC by improving its
representation.
Dabhade ’17 Dabhade, Manish S. (Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University). “India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council
Reforms.” Rising Powers Quarterly, Volume 2, Issue 3, 15 December 2017,
https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/. [Premier]
Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalised big
power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right
away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India
would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making.
India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to
a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier,
powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-
political and geo-economic clout. It would serve as an equaliser to China, its rival and an
emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its
immediate neighbourhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic
alternative to the authoritarian China. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of
the international hierarchy of states. As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint
in diverse areas such as politics, development, economics, culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position
The Indian attempts at joining various
from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role).
regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply
indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of
various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and align them to suit
Indian ideas and interests. In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the
UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly
irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the
council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”
Absent reform, countries will increasingly look to institutions other than the UNSC.
Brookings ’15 Brookings Institute. “The UN Security Council in an Era of Great Power Rivalry and
India’s options.” Brookings, 13 February 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-un-security-
council-in-an-era-of-great-power-rivalry-and-indias-options/. [Premier]
UN Security Council reforms have been called for by many nations, who argue that the
framework set up after the Second World War is not relevant today. Reforms have broadly been
discussed under the three main headings: working methods; the veto; and the enlargement of the Council. The workings methods of the
Council have been very opaque and autocratic, however, this has drastically changed through the reform exercise and continues to be worked
on. On the issue of the veto, however, while there have been discussions on its removal the problem remains that the permanent members can
veto any changes to the UN charter, resulting in the continuation of the veto. The issue of the enlargement of the membership of the Council
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was first organised in 1993 by Singapore and gained popularity amongst other nations. Council reforms gained momentum when a high level
panel for reform of the United Nations system, including the Security Council, was set up by the UN Secretary General. The panel laid out
forceful reasons for the reform of the Security Council in its report released in December 2004. The panel recommended the addition of both
permanent members and non-permanent members. The panel proposed two models for reform: Model A called for six new permanent
members who would be distributed according to regional groupings – Asia Pacific, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The model also
recommended three additional non-permanent members. Model A clearly mentioned that neither of the members would have veto powers.
However, most schemes which have been suggested for the inclusion of more permanent members on the council have failed to have an
impact. Another reason being that smaller countries still need to be convinced that they have an interest in seeing a change in the Council
especially with more non-permanent seats. However, it remains a challenge. Model B, which has become salient again today, recommended
altering the UN Charter to allow for a set of semi-permanent members who would enjoy a term of more than 2 years and would be eligible for
immediate re-election once their term was up. This category would be different from the non-permanent members, therefore, creating another
level of membership. However, once again, neither of these members would have veto powers. Since these recommendations in 2004 nothing
with the United States’ public
more has happened with regards to membership for countries like India. However,
support recently there is some hope. It is an important step forward, though not enough
to open the way for India to put forth its candidacy for permanent membership status.
The longer it takes to reform the Security Council, the greater the danger of it becoming
irrelevant. With the changes in the international power structure, the significant
security business of the world will start to be transacted elsewhere, as it will require the
leading powers such as India, that are not in the Security Council. Hence, the longer the
reforms take, aspirants will leave and be forced to form their own organisation.
Continued lack of reform to the UNSC will reduce legitimacy and harm future
compliance with decisions.
Quarterman ’10 Quarterman, Mark (Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies). “Security Council Reform and the G-20.” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 9 November 2010, https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-council-
reform-and-g-20. [Premier]
Seen in the context of the upcoming G-20 summit, President Obama’s pledge might have been a shot across the bows of those who support the
The Security Council, World Bank,
status quo in the international institutions created in the aftermath of the World War II.
and International Monetary Fund have governance and decisionmaking structures that
reflect the global power configuration of the past and do not take into account the
changed environment created by emerging powers such as India. The G-20, by contrast, is inclusive
and provides a voice for “centers of influence.” If the older organizations were merely quaint relics of a bygone era, this would not be an
each has an essential role to play in global governance that is weakened
important problem. But,
by its lack of representativeness. Each organization provides too great a voice to Europe,
which is diminishing in clout, in particular in relation to rising Asian powers. Leaving
significant voices out of international organizations lessens their legitimacy, which can
reduce compliance with their decisions. The five permanent members of the Security
Council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There are
no African or Latin American countries among them. The membership structure of the
council—which was last reformed in 1965 to expand the nonpermanent membership from 6 to 10—is heedless of the
changed regional power environment of the early twenty-first century. States that have
8
a legitimate claim to a larger role in the Security Council by dint of their regional
significance, economic clout, and/or military size and prowess include India , Brazil, Germany,
Japan, and South Africa.
India should be recognized for its peacekeeping contributions, population, economy,

and principles.
Parikh ’15 Parikh, Maithili (Student at Harvard Law School). “Will India Make It To The United Nation’s
Elite Clout?” Global Scope, October 2015, https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2015/10/india-un-security-
council-seat/. [Premier]
India’s case for permanent membership seems to be

Determined in the face of challenges,
strengthening every year. One of the foremost is that the membership of the UNSC today does not
reflect the geo-political realities and the development of the multi-polar world order
majorly due to the role of countries such as Brazil and India. India ranks amongst the world’s
largest UN Peacekeeping Operations contributors, with nearly 180,000 troops serving in
44 missions. She definitely makes a compelling case for herself on the topic of population; currently India boasts of a
population of 1.28 billion and reckons to be the most populous country by the year
2022. By denying India permanent membership, the UNSC is virtually acquiescing to
having a large chunk of the world population remain unrepresented. Incidentally, India
is also the second largest growing economy in the world, possibly making it an excellent
hub for foreign investments and growth, especially in light of the economic breakdown
in traditionally booming economies such as China and the United States of America.
Above all, the most cogent argument in India’s case is the liberalism, democratic
principles and secularism it boasts of, overlapping with the UN core principles.
The UN security council lacks diversity now. The power of the veto is unjustified.
Guruswamy ’18 Guruswamy, Mohan (President at Center for Policy Alternatives). “A second class
seat on the Security Council; Is this what India wants?” National Herald, 26 August 2018,
https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/a-second-class-seat-on-the-security-council-is-this-
what-india-wants. [Premier]
The UNSC does not reflect the world order or its diversity. In the Cold War era, veto
powers ensured that one bloc could not override the interests of the other one. Nothing
reflected this more than the composition of the permanent members of the Security
Council. Four out of the five were “white” nations. Two, China and France, were defeated nations. Two,
Britain and France, were colonial powers. The other ten memb ers of the Security Council are elected
members from the various regions. These members are without the veto and with little voice or clout . It might
be pertinent to add at this stage that the US has for long felt that the representation in the UNSC P-5 was inadequate. In his book, “Nehru —
The Invention of India,” Shashi Tharoor, then a UN Under Secretary General, writes that Indian diplomats who have seen files swear that
9
Jawaharlal Nehru “declined a United States offer” to India to “take the permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council” around 1953
a
and suggested that it be given to China because “the seat was held with scant credibility by Taiwan.” While it can be argued that
Security Council of a smaller number of countries is desirable to make the UN effective, it must also reflect world
realities and be more representative of its diversity . For instance, Africa and Latin America are not represented
in the P-5. Likewise the Islamic world does not find a place. India, which has a fifth of the world’s population,
does not find a place. The biggest economy in Europe, Germany, does not find a place. On the other hand with two members, UK
and France, Western Europe is over represented. With Russia added, Europe has three members. Clearly
this is not a satisfactory arrangement. The UNSC does not reflect the world order or its
diversity. In the Cold War era, veto powers ensured that one bloc could not override the interests of the other one. The veto thus came to
be used 252 times since 1946. Since 1996, Russia has not exercised the veto even once whereas the USA has used it six times and China twice.
This presumably reflects the settled shape of the world order now? Clearly the use of the veto itself must be reviewed. One nation alone must
no longer be allowed to block the consensus of the UNSC. It’s time a threshold of members to collectively enforce veto is discussed. The times
The G-4 nations are all bigger
have also changed. The USA is no longer the dominant economic and political power it was.
economies than Russia, France and Britain. They possibly have bigger global footprints
than them. How can the power to veto be justified for these three and denied to the G-
4? In the past few years, India’s diplomacy has centered on a craving to just become a
member of the UNSC. It seems a second-class membership is now feasible. The big question then is whether this is what India
wants. Or do we want a greater democratisation of the UNSC to reflect the status and size of the G-4?
As a permanent member, India would pursue democracy and diversity, but is currently
excluded because of the private interests of P5.
the status quo bias amongst the existing P5, despite the General Assembly consensus,
More significantly,
remains the overriding obstacle to adding permanent seats. This has been amply
demonstrated by the lack of any progress since 2015 as the US, China and Russia have
not yet submitted their country positions for TBNs and no agreement at all on the
criteria for deciding permanent membership of the Council . Conclusion India has emerged as
a foremost, singularly acknowledged rising power seen by most states, great and small,
as making a legitimate claim to a place in the changing architecture of global
governance, including the UN Security Council. The Indian interests in joining the
reformed UN Security Council stem from its long, civilisational history, an exceptional,
globally impacting geography and demography, its rapidly increasing traditional great
power ambitions, and assuming its rightful place in the community of nations in addition
to its truly rich, varied and significant historic contributions to the UN system.
Successive Indian leaderships have therefore, emphasised time and again, the pressing
need to democratise the international relations embodied in the UN and its all-powerful
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Security Council. Reiterating this, the Indian PM Modi said in September 2014: We must reform the United Nations, including the
Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century won't be effective in
It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing
the 21st.
turbulence with no one capable of addressing it… Let us fulfill our promise to reform the United Nations Security
Council by 2015. Though these Indian desires repeatedly articulated at the highest levels of government remain unfulfilled and seemingly
intractable, its ideas and diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, over the last few decades on the UN Security Council and its reforms including its
The Indian decision makers realise
quest for a permanent seat, highlight a growing, powerful consciousness in India.
that it is now historically placed to become an international rule maker and shaper, as
opposed to a meek rule-follower in the policy relevant future. It truly marks a rising
India’s dramatic desire to move to the centre from the periphery of global politics.
Future crisis will especially involve newer states. Including India would check back
against Western militarism.
Deo and Pradhan ’15 Deo, Neelam (Co-founder and Director of Gateway House) and Pradhan, Karan
(Karan Pradhan is a Senior Researcher at Gateway House). “Should India Give Up on the UN Security
Council?” The Diplomat, 9 November 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-
the-un-security-council/. [Premier]
In fact, whether India should seek membership is a matter of debate within the country. Former colonial powers are not going to allow a
though India may
change, nor will China allow other Asian countries, particularly Japan, to enter. But there is also the view that
not gain much from becoming a part of an archaic organisation, the world needs an
expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the
council. At a time when faster growing economies, more youthful populations, and the
concentration of natural resources are mainly in the developing world, as are problems
like the dispersion of capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, a reform of global
political management systems to respond to crises and violence —such as the chaos in West Asia—is
even more imperative. If the UNSC includes India and Brazil, and also represents Africa and West Asia, it will
infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the
world’s cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.
11
Peacekeeping
India is the biggest contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts. PRO can argue that if
India is not recognized for its contribution, then it may choose cut back on its
contributions to peacekeeping. PRO can impact this to the positive impacts of UN
peacekeeping efforts.
India has been a consistent and generous contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts.

Yadav ’14 Yadav, Manish K. (PhD Research Scholar in the Department of Political Science at Singhania
University). “India’s Quest for United Nations Security Council Permanent Seat with Special Reference to
its Peace Keeping Credentials.” Global Journal of Political Science, Volume 2, Number 1, 2014,
https://www.ripublication.com/gjps/gjpsv2n1_01.pdf. [Premier]
India’s spontaneous and unreserved participation in United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations over the years has been a clear reflection of the country’s commitment to
the objectives set out in the United Nations Charter not in terms of Rhetoric and Symbolism, but in Real and
Practical terms. This commitment has been acknowledged by the international community, successive Secretaries General and the United
the effectiveness of such participation and commitment
Nations Secretariat. But even more significantly,
to United Nations peacekeeping efforts has drawn respect and praise from fellow
professionals of other countries and many others that have served jointly with our
commanders, observers, police monitors and contingents, in various parts of the world.
Hence, the image of the Indian armed forces and police in the international arena is that of
highly competent, professional, and well-trained forces. The qualitative change is even
more important, in that most of the recent conflicts have taken place, or are taking
place, within states, or between elements that were part of unitary states till they began
to fall apart. They have not always been fought by national armies, but by Para-
militaries and irregulars, in which process, civilians have been the main victims (90 per cent
today as against 10 per cent two decades or so ago). In many cases, state institutions have collapsed; in a
few cases, there are no governments. As a result, humanitarian emergencies have

forced the international community to intervene. This is why the demands on United
Nations peacekeeping have gone well beyond traditional peacekeeping. They now
encompass activities like demobilization of troops and armed Para-militaries or
irregulars, promotion of national reconciliation, restoration of effective governments,
the organization and monitoring of elections, provision of broader support to
humanitarian aid missions, including protection of “safe areas” and escort of relief
convoys, and so on. The focus in the last few years is increasingly on ‘protection of civilians’ in the mission areas. United Nations
peacekeeping operations have therefore become more expensive, more complex, and more dangerous.6. According to Paul Diehl, “The primary
goal of a peacekeeping operation is to halt armed conflict or prevent its recurrence. It achieves this goal by acting as a physical barrier between
hostile parties and monitoring their military movements”. Since its first peace keeping operations undertaken
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in 1948 to supervise truce in Palestine, Over 750000 military and civilian personnel have
serve in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Peace keeping operations are set
up by the Security Council, Which is responsible for maintenance of International Peace
and Security. The operations must have the consent of the host government. It is imperative that they must not be used in any way to
favor one party against the other.7. India as one of the founder member of the United Nations and has appreciated its responsibilities towards
the United Nations Charter and consistently contributed towards United Nations efforts in maintenance of International Peace and Security. It
India’s participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations started in
may be noted that
1950 and continues till date. In fact India has earned the distinction of being amongst
the longest serving and the largest troop contributors to the United Nations
Peacekeeping activities.
Continued denial of membership would force India to downscale peacekeeping

efforts.
Gupta ’16 Gupta, Virendra (Former Member of the Indian Foreign Service). “UNSC reforms and India's
chance.” The Pioneer, 6 February 2016, https://www.dailypioneer.com/2016/columnists/unsc-reforms-
and-indias-chance.html. [Premier]
If these strategies do not work we would be left with no option but to think in terms of
threatening to leave UN or in the very least reducing our exposure to that organisation
by downscaling our participation in peace keeping and other UN activities. In order for this to
be effective, it would need to be carefully coordinated with other G-4 countries. This may sound too radical but then no organisation
can really survive if it fails to adjust itself to the changing global dynamics. History bears
testimony to how the league of Nations founded in 1920 had to be wound up when it
failed to prevent Second World War. It was perceived as a ‘league of victors’ created by
Allied Powers which had remained slow in decision making. Most of this probably holds true for UN as
well.
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China
India is an important strategic partner of the US, as well as a rival to China. PRO can
argue that if India gains a seat, its increased influence would help to check back
against the rise of China. Moreover, PRO can argue that India would perceive
permanent membership as a product of U.S. support, which would help cement
relations between the two countries. PRO can impact this to reasons why China’s rise
is bad or dangerous.
A permanent seat for India would help project US power and interests across Asia,
checking back against China’s expansion.
Kraugthammer ’10 Kraugthammer, Charles (Winner of Pulitzer Prize and Nationally Syndicated
Columnist). “Why Obama Is Right about India.” National Review, 12 November 2010,
https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/11/why-obama-right-about-india-charles-krauthammer/#.
[Premier]
The visit to India was particularly necessary in the light of Obama’s bumbling over-enthusiasm in his 2009 trip to China, in which he lavished
much time, energy, and praise upon his hosts and then oddly tried to elevate Beijing to a G-2 partnership, a kind of two-nation world
condominium. Worse, however, was Obama’s suggesting a Chinese role in South Asia — an affront to India’s autonomy and regional
Chinese hegemony. This hegemony is the growing source of
dominance, and a signal of U.S. acquiescence to
tension in Asia today. Modern China is the Germany of a century ago — a rising,
expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun. The story of the first half of the 20th century was
Europe’s attempt to manage Germany’s rise. We know how that turned out. The story of the next half-century will be
how Asia accommodates and/or contains China’s expansion. Nor is this some far-off
concern. China’s aggressive territorial claims on resource-rich waters claimed by
Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Japan are already roiling the
neighborhood. Traditionally, Japan has been the major regional counterbalance. But an aging, shrinking Japan cannot sustain that
role. Symbolic of the dramatic shift in power balance between once-poor China and once-
dominant Japan was the resolution of their recent maritime crisis. Japan had detained a
Chinese captain in a territorial-waters dispute. China imposed an embargo on rare-earth
minerals. Japan capitulated. That makes the traditional U.S. role as offshore balancer all
the more important. China’s neighbors, from South Korea all the way around to India,
are in need of U.S. support of their own efforts at resisting Chinese dominion. And of all
these countries, India, which has fought a border war with China, is the most natural
anchor for such a U.S. partnership. It’s not just our inherent affinities — democratic,
English-speaking, free-market, dedicated to the rule of law. It is also the coincidence of
our strategic imperatives: We both face the threat of radical Islam and the longer-term
challenge of a rising China. Which is why Obama’s dramatic call for India to be made a
permanent member of the Security Council was so important. However useless and
14
obsolete the U.N. may be, a Security Council seat carries totemic significance. It would
elevate India, while helping bind it to us as our most strategic and organic Third World
ally. China is no enemy, but it remains troublingly adversarial. Which is why India must
be the center of our Asian diplomacy. And why Obama’s trip — coconuts and all — was worth every penny.
Endorsement for India’s seat will cement US-India relations.

Carpenter ’10 Carpenter, Ted G. (Vice President for Defense and Foreign-Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute,). “Long Overdue: Adding Permanent Members to the UN Security Council.” Cato Institute, 8
November 2010, https://www.cato.org/commentary/long-overdue-adding-permanent-members-un-
security-council. [Premier]
In his address to India’s parliament on Monday,President Obama explicitly endorsed New Delhi’s bid to
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It was an effective diplomatic
move from the standpoint of Washington’s bilateral relationship with India. Not surprisingly, the
audience gave that portion of the speech a thunderous ovation. More significant, though, is that Obama’s
endorsement sends a clear signal that the United States acknowledges India as not only
a rapidly rising economic power, but a significant political and security player in the
international system as well. The president’s comments also reduce concerns that the
arms control crowd in his administration might roll back the improved relationship that
had developed between the two countries during the Bush years. Arms control zealots have never
forgiven India for deploying a nuclear arsenal and striking a blow against the fraying nonproliferation system. Because that faction seemed to
there were legitimate worries
have greater influence in the Obama administration than it did in the previous administration,
that the nonproliferation issue could create a chill in U.S.-Indian relations. That prospect
now seems less likely.
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Blocks
16
AT: Efficacy
India would be flexible. It opposes the use of veto, and is open to not having the
power.
On the most important question of veto, India’s position is fully aligned with the G4,
L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto and till it exists, it needs to be
provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council , which should have
all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category, including the right of veto. (March 2016) The Indian
position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent

members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing restrictions. India, showing a
marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with the same
responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle.
It is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is
taken during a review process.
The benefits from improved legitimacy outweigh the potential harm to efficacy.
It is important to recognize the potential shortcomings of Security Council reform. An

enlarged body could be too big and unwieldy to operate effectively. The additional vetoes that new
permanent members might receive could mean a greater possibility for deadlock. Not giving the new permanent members vetoes, which has
featured in some reform proposals, would create two classes of permanent membership. The United States should understand that an
expanded council will not necessarily be any more likely to support U.S. initiatives thanu the current one. For example, India and the United
But the
States differ sharply on the extent to which the United Nations should intervene in the internal affairs of member states.
increased legitimacy and effectiveness that would come with reform would outweigh
its possible disadvantages.
The UNSC isn’t effective in the first place – granting India membership is just an act of
diplomacy.
17
The roster of the Security Council’s permanent

President Obama’s overall objective, though, is admirable.
members reflects the distribution of international influence and status in the late 1940s,
not today. It’s hard to justify fading, second-tier powers such as Britain and France
having that status, while Japan and a rapidly rising major power like India remain on the
outside. That just creates needless irritants. Permanent membership on the Security
Council is far more a matter of prestige than real power. Both supporters and opponents of the UN have
always viewed the organization as being far more important than is actually the case. For good or ill, the nation-state is
still the primary decision-making unit in the international system. The UN Security
Council has been aptly described as a “waste basket” for dealing with problem issues.
Over the decades, it has been tasked with addressing issues that the major powers did
not deem important enough to handle on their own or through more effective multi-
lateral organizations — in Washington’s case, that was usually NATO. The UN Security Council’s role as a
marginal international player is not likely to change in the foreseeable future regardless
of the number or composition of the Council’s permanent members. Enlarging the
Council is a diplomatic gesture that should be carried out , and President Obama has made an appealing,
relatively low-cost move. One hopes that China and other opponents of enlargement come to
understand that the issue is not important enough to warrant their expenditure of
diplomatic capital.
India’s membership could spur more widespread reform that avoids problems of
efficacy.
Kelly ’10 Kelly, Michael (Creighton University School of Law). “UN Security Council Membership: The
Admission of India and Other Necessary Reforms.” The Jurist, 24 November 2010,
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2010/11/un-security-council-membershp-the-admission-of-india-
and-other-necessary-reforms/. [Premier]
a comprehensive reform of the Security Council’s permanent membership could be

And yet
had if candidates and current members are willing to barter. The non-permanent seats
should be left in place at ten. And the permanent seats should increase by two for a
total of seven. Russia, China, and the U.S., by virtue of their economic, political, and
nuclear strength should also be left in place. But the remaining four seats should be
dedicated to regional representation for Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Each
regional permanent seat should be filled on a rotating basis among three states in that
region for a two-year term. The European seat would be shared among France, Britain, and Germany. The Asian seat would be
shared among Japan, India, and Pakistan (or Indonesia). The African seat would be shared among Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria (or Kenya).
The Latin American seat would be shared by Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina (or Chile). This would ensure the most diverse
18
representation while also ensuring a relatively small, and thus more efficient and
manageable, Security Council.
A procedural veto would solve – the measure is referred to the General Assembly
instead.
Kelly ’10 Kelly, Michael (Creighton University School of Law). “UN Security Council Membership: The
Admission of India and Other Necessary Reforms.” The Jurist, 24 November 2010,
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2010/11/un-security-council-membershp-the-admission-of-india-
and-other-necessary-reforms/. [Premier]
But the specter of veto-proliferation hovers over any talk of Security Council expansion. Thus, only current veto holders should continue to
wield the “substantive veto” that can kill anything. That means the European seat would continue to hold such power along with Russia, China,
For new permanent seats, a “procedural veto” may be devised. That power
and the U.S.
would entail a referral mechanism such that when a new permanent Security Council
casts a veto, instead of killing the measure outright, the question is referred to a
standing committee of the General Assembly. The benefits of creating a procedural veto
are two-fold. New permanent members ascend to the Security Council with a veto
power, although not one of the same order that currently exists. And the General
Assembly potentially gains a long-sought role in matters of international peace and
security. An ancillary benefit is that the threat substantive veto usage is reduced from
five to four at any single meeting of the Council.
There’s no need to add extra seats for Brazil, Japan, or African nations – these
countries don’t have as much military, political and economic growth.
Davies ’18 Davies, Leon. “Should India be Given a Permanent Seat at the United Nations Security
Council?” Ideas on Info, 7 April 2018, https://www.ideasoninfo.co.uk/ideas-on-info/2018/4/7/should-
india-be-given-a-permanent-seat-at-the-united-nation-security-council. [Premier]
Her membership is equally supported by the USA, France, and Russia. The only real obstacle for
India is China. France also supports the membership of Brazil, Germany and Japan alongside an African nation. But the biggest
argument against such a move is that the UNSC would become ungovernable. A UNSC
with ten permanent members, all with a veto, is less likely to come to a consensus that a
UNSC with only 5 members. There is, however, another suggested alternative to simply
adding more permanent members. This would be to dissolve the UK and French seat into a European seat (something
admittedly more difficult after Brexit, but not impossible) leaving only 4 permanents thus leaving space for India. This European seat would also
act as a representative for Germany, thus withdrawing the need to have a German seat. Such a restructuring of the permanent seats would
much better represent the current balance of power and would not overly complicate the organization or reduce the chances of consensus
This would leave out Japan and Brazil as well as Africa, but as of yet, Brazil
within the UNSC P5.
and Japan don’t have the military, political and economic growth of India. Japan is still in
recession and is all but totally reliant on the US for defense. Brazil is in arguably more
19
economic and political turmoil and has little military might. There is, to date, no African
country that can realistically compete either. This is not to say that thing might not change in the future, Japan and
Brazil’s economies can recover and their military and political influence still grow.
20
AT: Opposition
China and Russia are not totally opposed, and the decision would be made by the
general assembly, so they can’t do anything about it anyways.
Sidhu ’15 Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh (Non-Resident Fellow at New York University's Center on
International Cooperation). “UNSC: Misreading an opportunity.” Brookings Institute, 17 August 2015,
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/unsc-misreading-an-opportunity/. [Premier]
Of the three, the U.S. is the most supportive of the IGN process to reform the UNSC , while China is
the least and Russia is in the middle. The U.S. letter, for instance, backs “a modest expansion of permanent
members, though any consideration of an expansion of permanent members must take into account the ability and willingness of
countries to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the United Nations.” The U.S. letter
also underlines its preference that “consideration of new permanent members must be country-specific in nature” rather than on a regional
it is evident that Washington is supportive of
basis. While the U.S. does not identify any single country in this letter,
the candidacy of the G-4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) in general and India in
particular. One clear indication of this is the near identical wording of the U.S. letter and the input of the aspirant G-4 countries in the
framework document text, which asserts that in the election of new permanent members “due regard shall be paid, in the first instance to the
maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization”.Given India’s impeccable
peacekeeping credentials and increasing role within the UN system, along with the
public endorsement for a permanent Indian seat by President Barack Obama, it is
evident that New Delhi has a strong case and equally reliable support. Even Russia , which
was initially opposed to any additional permanent members (its promise to India notwithstanding), appears to have shifted its
position and is now prepared to consider “any reasonable option of expanding the
Security Council including the so-called “intermediate solution”, which is actually a compromise”. Moreover, Russia also
“supports broader representation ” from Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is also consistent with
the BRICS position, most recently asserted at the Ufa summit, “China and Russia reiterate the importance they
attach to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and
support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN ”. In contrast China’s hard line objection in its letter to
“not populate the framework document” is in keeping with its opposition to any new permanent members on the UNSC. This is also in
China’s position on UNSC reform should not
contradiction of its commitment at the BRICS summit. Nonetheless,
discourage India entirely. China claims that reforms should “give top priority to
increasing representation of developing countries” and “representation of different civilizations and cultures”;
clearly, India qualifies on both counts. However, even if China and other permanent members are opposed
to UNSC reforms there is very little they can do to stop the IGN process, which is located
within the UN General Assembly where no country has a veto. As long as India and other
aspirant countries can get the requisite two-third support from the UN membership for
a negotiated text, the process will move forward regardless of opposition from the
UNSC permanent members.
21
22
Con
23
Contentions
24
Efficacy
The UNSC is only able to make decisions because only five members possess veto
power. CON can argue that including additional permanent members or expanding the
size of the council would make it much harder to agree on anything. CON can impact
this prolonged conflicts, as the UNSC may be unable to intervene in time.
Introducing more permanent members would paralyze action, leading to prolonged

conflicts and mass suffering.
Chowdhary ’15 Chowdhary, Abdul M. (Legislative Aide to Member of India's Parliament). “Why India
Should Seek Abolition Of UN Veto Rather Than Permanent Membership.” Huffington Post, 14 July 2015,
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/abdul-muheet-chowdhary/why-india-should-seek-abo_b_8809202.html.
[Premier]
The main flaw of the veto is its tendency to paralyse action even when it is desperately
needed. In the case of Syria, between 2011 to 2015 Russia and China have jointly vetoed four
proposals for sanctions against Bashar Al-Assad and a resolution that would have
requested the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate crimes against humanity.
Similarly from 2001 to 2006, the USA used the veto nine times to protect its ally Israel
and block any action on Palestine. This has been part of a larger trend where conflicts
involving the great powers have tended to be endlessly prolonged, resulting in
unimaginable suffering for the people affected. During the Cold War (1947-1991), a staggering 68
and 61 vetoes were used by the USSR and USA respectively, leading to the worsening of
then ongoing conflicts. There is a very real danger that the expansion of the Security
Council with the veto still in place will make it utterly dysfunctional. The proposal for
increasing the number of seats along with regional representation will bring a far
greater number of diverging interests to the table and if the veto is thrown into the mix
it will be a lethal cocktail that will ensure the demise of the UN. One only has to look at the experience
of the League of Nations to realise this. Under article 5 (1) of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
decisions of the Council required the agreement of all the Members present. This made
it virtually impossible for the 15-member Council to function and as a result it was
unable to prevent World War II. Extending the veto to new permanent members will
ensure that the UN meets the same fate. As second-class citizenship (permanent membership without veto) is
unacceptable, the only remaining option is to press for the veto's abolition.
25
Enlarging the council will slow decision-making and increase competition.
Hirsch and Bowen ’16 Hirsch, John L. (Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute) and
Bowen, James (Former Editor of the Global Observatory.). “If Security Council Is So Flawed, Why Does
Everyone Want a Seat?” Global Observatory, 26 April 2016,
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/04/security-council-reform-cold-war/. [Premier]
There is an inherent tension between the calls for a more representative Council and for
it to demonstrate more effective and timely responsibility. Proponents of enlargement argue that adding
six to 10 new permanent and elected members will itself dilute the influence of the P-5 and make the Council’s decisions more acceptable to
external critics such as Columbia University Professor
the vast majority of member states. Conversely,
Edward Luck argue that enlargement will only dilute the effectiveness and timeliness of
Council decision-making—i.e. that it will prove far harder to get 21-24 member states to
expeditiously agree on a clear course of action than it is for the current 15. Enlargement ,
in this argument, would also lead to more sub-groups competing with each other behind the
scenes for control of the Council agenda. Underneath these arguments is the reality that
in most instances the Council works reasonably well and rapidly when the P-5 are in
agreement with each other (the overwhelming majority of Council resolutions are adopted by consensus). It only
reaches gridlock when members disagree with each other, as in the case of intervening
in the Syria crisis.
The UNSC will remain effective and relevant, with or without reform.
Hirsch and Bowen ’16 Hirsch, John L. (Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute) and
Bowen, James (Former Editor of the Global Observatory.). “If Security Council Is So Flawed, Why Does
Everyone Want a Seat?” Global Observatory, 26 April 2016,
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/04/security-council-reform-cold-war/. [Premier]
Notwithstanding the recurrent criticism regarding membership and procedures, several realities create a quite different narrative, namely that
the Council has continued to be one of the central pillars of the international system
since the end of the Cold War. Even with the many anachronisms and failures attributed
to it, major decisions involving global peace and security are regularly put before its
members. US respect for the Council has been largely rehabilitated under the
presidency of Barack Obama, suggesting that the regime characteristics of Council
members might matter more than structure. Post-Cold War criticism of the Council also ignores the fact that the
pre-1990s power struggles between the US and Soviet Union, and those countries in their respective spheres of influence, had a similarly, if not
Persistent criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the
more pronounced, paralyzing effect on decision-making.
Council, and the UN more generally, also fails to take account of the common,
statistically verifiable observation that the present is among the most peaceful periods
in human history—even as the intensity of recent conflicts seems to threaten this record. Furthermore, the
evolution of the Council in the post-Cold War era has seen it take on more expansive
role in seeking peace, which is evident in the growth of resolutions approving
26
peacekeeping missions, the imposition of sanctions, and more normative projects such
as the landmark Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, in 2000 . The Security Council:
Where the Action Is Given these realities, there is no shortage of member states lining up to join
the Security Council, even as they and others criticize it as an ineffective platform for
representing their interests. Kenya, for example, is one of two African countries currently bidding to serve on the Council from
next year. This is despite its disappointment with past Council actions, including its failure to delay International Criminal Court proceedings
against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. In fact, countries often actively vie to serve as rotating members on the
Council five to 10 years ahead of time. Due to the fact that seats are allocated on a regional basis and any member state must first receive the
endorsement from its grouping, they also often compete among themselves. This year, for example, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden are all
vying for the two seats allocated to the European group. Notably, 128 states, excluding the P-5, have been on the Council for one or more two-
year terms. Those which have done so most frequently include Japan (11 times), Brazil (10) Argentina (8), Pakistan (7), India (7), and Colombia
(7). In contrast, just 68 UN members have never sought Council membership. These are mostly small states—predominantly small island
nations—a handful of perennially dysfunctional countries such as North Korea, and former Soviet republics. Among this latter category,
Kazakhstan is now actively campaigning for a seat, indicating that it represents a desirable reentry point into the international order. The long-
term planning involved in bids to join the Council is also striking. Estonia began preparing its application in 2012 to join the Council in 2019.
Canada, under its new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, is hoping to rejoin in 2021, having lost its bid in 2010, while Australia’s Foreign Minister
Julie Bishop outlined in 2015 a plan to join the Council in 2029. This was not long after the end of its 2013-14 term and was criticized as too far
off by the parliamentary opposition. Saudi Arabia has been the only country to decline membership after being elected, citing—perhaps
disingenuously in light of current actions in Yemen and elsewhere—its “historical responsibilities towards its people, Arab and Islamic nations as
well as towards the peoples aspiring to peace and stability all over the world,” and the Council’s supposed failure to do the same. Despite the
persistent criticisms from Africa and elsewhere, no larger cohesive boycott movement has developed to seek meaningful change. The
underlying reality is that the Security Council is where the action is. Most major
international decisions on peace and security sooner or later come before it. The
Council has the juridical and political power to take decisions under Chapters VI and VII
of the UN Charter, involving a wide range of multilateral options to address actual or
potential conflict. These range from mediation and sanctions to the deployment of special political missions and peace operations.
Despite its limitations, it seems virtually certain that the Security Council will remain the
primary body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security for
years to come. With or without reform, the line of applicants for election to two-year
terms will remain long.
India’s entry would necessarily be part of a larger reform package.

Menon ’13 Menon, Rajan (Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the City College
of New York/City University of New York and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council). “India's
Tough Road to the Security Council.” The National Interest, 4 April 2013,
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/indias-tough-road-the-security-council-8305. [Premier]
Another problem is that India’s entry into the Security Council can occur only as part of the
Council’s reform. Restructuring is certainly needed. The “P-5,” China aside, reflects the balance of global
influence and power circa 1945. Japan’s not in the Security Council, but Britain is? France is a member, but Germany isn’t? Brazil,
the world’s seventh-largest economy, doesn’t deserve a seat? Yet Security Council reform brings its own
problems. China may be even more opposed to Japan’s membership than to India’s.
France is the sole state from continental Europe. Won’t that cachet evaporate if
27
Germany, which already dominates the EU, joins the Security Council and comes to be seen by its
other members as more consequential? Can Gallic pride handle that? And who will represent Latin
America? The default answer: Brazil. Tell that to the Argentines. How about a spot for Africa? But
who should get it? Perhaps South Africa, the continent’s economic powerhouse. No, maybe Nigeria, its most populous
country. Indonesia has more Muslims than any other nation. Shouldn’t it have a seat? Advocates of
Security Council reform are right that the club needs to reflect today’s world. The
assumption, though, is that it will work better once it’s “reformed.” Is that necessarily
true? Five veto-wielding states make consensus hard enough. Imagine the proceedings
when eight or nine have blocking power, with the newcomers constituting a group with
divergent worldviews on important issues. Obama’s latest visit left many Indians smiling. Yet India’s road to the
Security Council will be long and hard—no matter how much it deserves a place or how likely that its hopes will eventually be requited.
Smaller countries are more creative and better contributors. Granting permanent
membership would lead to less innovation and more diplomatic bottlenecks.
Nadin ’14 Nadin, Peter (Independent Researcher based in Sydney, Australia with PhD from the
University of Western Sydney). “United Nations Security Council Reform.” Our World, 1 May 2014,
https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/united-nations-security-council-reform. [Premier]
Another argument, aside from the inequality argument, is the argument founded on the notion that if
you get the regional powers, the so-called ‘heavy lifters’ (the largest countries in terms of economy,
population and military power) in the room, Council outcomes will be improved. This was the original rationale
for the institutionalized privilege afforded the five veto wielding permanent members. The expectation was that
permanent members would contribute more to the maintenance of international peace

and security. So what about the argument for creativity? In the Council, a brand of creativity is
required to ensure more contextually sensitive resolutions are crafted. Herein lies the
counter-argument: if you allow the so-called heavy lifters in the room they will throw
their weight around, for the sake of it, rather than acting in a more creative and
constructive manner. In the past many of the smaller countries have been the real
innovators, because (1) they understand their limitations, (2) they’re not trying to run
the world, (3) they tend to carve out a niche in the Council’s agenda, and (4) often
contribute through the power of the better argument. The Arria Formula (Diego Arria of
Venezuela), the refinement of the Panel of Experts (Robert Fowler of Canada), and even the concept of
peacekeeping (Lester B. Pearson of Canada) were all suggestions of smaller powers. India, Brazil,
Japan, and Germany are all global economic heavyweights, but that does not necessarily
mean they are the creative heavyweights that the Council needs to function more
effectively. The old adage “whether elephants make love or make war, the grass gets trampled” is an expression that applies to the
concern held by many smaller countries. Their fear is that if six new permanent seats are created, they
will be cut out of decision-making and their creativity will be lost to the Council.
28
29
Opposition
China, Russia, and even the US have reasons to oppose India’s bid to permanent
membership. CON can argue that if India gained a permanent seat, there would
greater tension between countries, risking escalation into a conflict.
The US, Russia, and China all oppose India’s bid to the security council. The rhetoric
doesn’t reflect their actual beliefs.
Kumar ’16 Kumar, Rajeesh (Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses). “India’s
UNSC Bid: Is it different this time?” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 8 December 2016,
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-unsc--bid_rkumar_081216. [Premier]
nothing has changed

A careful reading of the report of the deliberations of the UNGA on November 7, 2016 would suggest that
at the ground level; only the rhetoric of member states has been amplified. In a repeat
of the scenario of past debates, two of the permanent members — the United States
and Russia – inflexibly opposed any alteration to the existing veto system. The other two major
powers — France and the United Kingdom -- extended their support to reform that would keep alive the competence of the UN. China, as in
The debate witnessed a division
the past, took an ambiguous position towards the expansion and reform of the Council.7
of opinion among the P5 members, whose unanimous consent is a pre-requisite for any
reform, particularly on the question of veto. For instance, Vladimir K. Safronkov, representing the Russian
Federation, observed that Council reform was one of the most complex issues on the UN agenda since the approaches of the major
players are highly divergent.8 He also noted that any proposal which would “infringe on the rights of
current permanent members, including historic right to veto” was unacceptable. 9 While
Russia continues to back India’s claim for a permanent seat from among the G-4 countries, its strong opposition to changes in veto has
generated an apprehension that it is now inclined to support India as a permanent member only
without veto power. The US also opposed an expansion or alteration of the veto and
demanded the consideration of aspiring members’ contribution to peace and security as a criterion for granting permanent seats in an
Since the start of the reform initiatives in 1992, the majority of Chinese statements has
expanded Council.10
contained identical phrasings. A sample of such statements includes the following: “Council reform should be carried out on
the basis of broad consensus”; “A proposal that was acceptable to the overwhelming majority of Member States had not yet emerged”; and
Three among the five permanent members of the Security
“No artificial deadline should be set”.11
Council are still against Council reform that would entail a change in their present
status. The possibility of changes in the positions of the US and Russia are unlikely since
they are in a state of relative decline. Since it is their current status in the Council that
provides them pre-eminence on issues related to international peace and security, they
are not expected to support any move that reduces their say in global politics. It is
unrealistic to think that China would give up its present privileged status in the UN, even
as it seeks greater influence and presence in global politics as a rising power. Moreover, reading
the text of the November 7 debate makes it clear that additional permanent seats with veto power is at best
30
a distant possibility. The P5 are unlikely to approve the promotion of any states to
permanent status due to the fact that such a change would eventually dilute their
power. Therefore, for reform-seekers including India, there is nothing to rejoice in the
recent UNGA debate.
Even if India gets US support, membership would upset China.

Menon ’13 Menon, Rajan (Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the City College
of New York/City University of New York and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council). “India's
Tough Road to the Security Council.” The National Interest, 4 April 2013,
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/indias-tough-road-the-security-council-8305. [Premier]
Obama won big points in India with his promise. Ironically, this was in part because his administration hasn’t cultivated the country as a
strategic partner with anywhere near the seriousness that George W. Bush’s did. Hence Indians appreciated the president’s pledge all the
more. But it’s not in Obama’s power to realize India’s UN dream. Admitting more states as
permanent members of the Security Council requires a two-thirds affirmative vote in
the General Assembly and a sign-off by the Council’s five current permanent members .
That’s where things get sticky. China isn’t eager to have India in this exclusive club and can gum up
the procedural machinery in various ways short of outright opposition. Beijing is too smart to do
the latter. The India-China relationship is more complex than is often presumed. China is now India’s leading trade
partner (the turnover was about $80 billion last year). Some American strategists salivate at the specter of
an U.S.-India alignment against China, but from New Delhi’s perspective, that’s not a
good arrangement. The more room for maneuver, the better. Still, when it comes to India’s Security
Council aspirations, China is scarcely an asset.
India’s membership would exacerbate tensions between the US and China.

There are, however, some major questions that remain following Obama’s speech. Most notably, if India is added to the roster of permanent
It’s a little hard to
Security Council members, how many others — if any — should be added? And if so, which countries?
advocate adding India without simultaneously adding Japan, since Japan has both a
larger economy and (on balance) a more potent conventional military. The one major difference, of course,
is that Japan would be the only permanent member that is not a nuclear-weapons state. But should that be enough to disqualify Tokyo?
There is also the matter of China’s probable opposition. Beijing has been noticeably
unenthusiastic about India’s bid, and has been downright hostile to Japan’s . And the
desire to block Tokyo’s UN ambitions existed long before the nasty spat erupted
between the two countries this autumn over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets. A threatened
31
Chinese veto may stymie Obama’s proposal before it can advance very far. Moreover,
by making such a splashy endorsement of India’s bid, President Obama may have
further exacerbated tensions in the U.S. relationship with China.
India’s permanent membership causes regional instability with Pakistan and conflict
with China, and other members would face opposition.
The path to permanent membership for each is tortuous and opens a virtual Pandora’s
Box of difficulties. Amending the UN Charter, which would be necessary for changing the Security Council membership, is not an
easy process. Such a change would come into force when it has been adopted and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the General
Pakistan has already spoken out against
Assembly, including all of the permanent members of the council.
permanent membership for India, citing the effect of such a change in status on
“regional stability,” and China is not likely to greet one of its Asian rivals with open
arms. Brazil’s membership would likely be opposed by Argentina and other Spanish-
speaking Latin American countries, which would object to a Portuguese-speaking country “representing” them on the
Security Council. Germany, which would be the third EU permanent member of the council, would likely fail because of the overrepresentation
Japan, which has a
of Europe and the unwillingness of either France or the United Kingdom to give up a permanent seat.
complicated and not always positive relationship with China, would probably not receive
China’s support for its candidacy. South Africa is considered to be a candidate for a
permanent African seat on the council, but it would likely face opposition from Nigeria
and Egypt, which also covet the seat.
The only way India can become a permanent member is if China votes yes – that
would crush China’s relations with Pakistan.
Kaura ’15 Kaura, Vinay (Assistant Professor in the Department of International Affairs and Security
Studies at Sardar Patel University). “China on India’s UNSC Bid: Neither Yes Nor No.” The Diplomat, 3
June 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-on-indias-unsc-bid-neither-yes-nor-no/. [Premier]
Chinese support for India’s quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC)
remains a distant dream. While addressing the students of the Tsinghua University during his recent China visit, Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi explicitly underlined the positive impact of China’s support for a permanent seat for India at the UNSC. “China’s
support for India’s permanent membership of a reformed UNSC and for India’s membership of export control regimes like Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) will do more than just strengthen our international cooperation. It will take our relationship to a new level. It will give Asia a
stronger voice in the world.” The joint statement signed that came out of the visit, however, only stated that China “understands and supports
India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations including in the Security Council.” In other words, India has no option
but to wait for unambiguous Chinese support. It has become a customary feature during high-level official visits for
32
the Chinese side to merely “understand and support” India’s aspirations for a greater international role. As long as both nuclear-armed Asian
rivals find themselves at odds in reshaping international institutions, including the UNSC, Asia can never hope to have a stronger voice in the
The fate of India’s bid is mainly in the hands of the veto-wielding permanent
world.
members of the UNSC, and China is the only veto-wielding permanent member that has
yet to extend unequivocal support to India’s bid to become a permanent member. Any
accommodative shift in China’s position on permanent seat is likely to recalibrate
Beijing’s ties with Islamabad, as the latter has been vociferous in opposing India’s entry
to the SC. Beijing is not likely to upset its “all weather friend” at this juncture,
undermining the centrality of Pakistan in the China’s geopolitical calculus. Beijing also fears that
India’s entry into the UNSC would be a huge loss for China’s current global status and prestige among the third world countries. Another factor
for China is India’s solidarity with Japan, China’s arch rival, in making a joint bid for the UNSC membership.
Tensions between India and China have the potential to escalate into war – the US
should not endorse escalation.
Markey ’15 Markey, Daniel S. (Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council
on Foreign Relations). “Armed Confrontation Between China and India.” Council on Foreign Relations, 18
November 2015, https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india. [Premier]
Multiple China-India disputes sparked at nearly the same time is a realistic, if unlikely,
scenario during the next twelve to eighteen months. An assessment of the overall strategic context
shows that China-India border spats are increasingly common, Tibetan protests are
worsening while Beijing's stance on Tibet hardens, China has made other aggressive
moves in the South China Sea, and Pakistan has done too little to restrain anti-Indian
terrorist groups. Specific warning indicators of worsening land-border tensions would
include upticks in the frequency and depth of probing patrols by either side; unilateral
revision of the "rules of the road" for tactical military operations (for instance, if one side begins firing
warning shots when past practice has been to display flag signals); new military construction projects or
deployments along the border, whether of troops or hardware (such as missile sites, landing strips, or vehicles); and
official use of new diplomatic formulations or visa policies that aggressively press
broader territorial claims. Warning indicators of China's involvement in an India-Pakistan
conflict already underway would include new joint China-Pakistan military exercises or
Chinese arms sales. A Chinese revision of its official diplomatic stance on Kashmir—
shifting back to full support for Pakistan's favored position—or action to support that
position at the United Nations would also represent a warning sign. Warning indicators
of an impending Tibet contingency include increased protest activity by Tibetan
opposition groups, such as another surge in self-immolations or demonstrations; new announcements by the Dalai Lama about his
plans for reincarnation or evidence of his rapidly deteriorating health; and unanticipated shifts in policy or official rhetoric on Tibet by Beijing or
Warning indicators for a maritime contingency between China and India would
New Delhi.
include aggressive new Chinese harassment of other oil-exploration operations off the
33
Vietnamese coast, a significant expansion of Chinese patrols as part of its counterpiracy
mission in the Gulf of Aden, and provocative Chinese rhetoric directed against Indian oil
exploration in the South China Sea. New Indian oil-exploration investments in partnership with Vietnam, sales of
particularly potent military equipment (especially the Brahmos missile), and senior-level statements about "maritime freedom" or China's
The United States has
appropriate role in traditional Indian waters could also signal a brewing crisis. Implications for U.S. Interests
a major interest in peaceful and cooperative relations between China and India. They
are the world's two largest countries by population and important U.S. trading and
diplomatic partners. A series of disputes resulting in an armed confrontation between
China and India would roil international markets, exacerbate fears in other Asian
capitals about Chinese assertiveness, and distract Beijing and New Delhi from
constructive agendas of economic development in their own countries and in Asia . The
resulting setbacks to the Chinese and Indian economies could potentially harm U.S. investors, retailers, manufacturers, and service providers.
An armed confrontation between China and India would put the United States in a no-
win position. Beijing would likely perceive any U.S. support to India as part of an
unwelcome U.S. strategy to contain China. That would contribute to a sharpening of
global competition between China and the United States in ways Washington would
prefer to avoid, or at least to postpone. But if Washington were to remain neutral or favor China's
position, India would perceive U.S. policies as abandonment. That would jeopardize
prospects for U.S.-India strategic partnership pursued by the Barack Obama and George W. Bush administrations
through diplomatic initiatives like the civil nuclear deal and motivated by a long-term goal of sustaining the liberal international order favored
by the United States. Partnership aside, a humiliating India retreat from a crisis with China (for example, pulling back from Indian claims along
A U.S.
the LAC) would undercut U.S. efforts to support India's rise as a regional and international power and a counterweight to China.
failure to back India in the face of Chinese military intimidation would also weaken the
U.S. government's ability to reassure its East Asian allies elsewhere, including those
along the South China Sea. In sum, Washington has no interest in backing offensive moves
by New Delhi that unduly antagonize Beijing. In the event of an armed confrontation, however, the United States
has a significant interest in resolving the crisis on terms that would promote a closer U.S. partnership with India.
34
Proliferation
India’s strategy for winning permanent membership has included its pursuit of nuclear
weapons. CON can argue that rewarding India would implicitly endorse its strategy,
which could set a bad precedent for other contenders. CON can impact this to the
harms of nuclear proliferation and arms races.
India has tried to gain representation by developing nuclear weapons. This has led to
dangerous arms races and proxy wars against Pakistan, which should not be rewarded
with membership.
Raja ’17 Raja, Rameez (D Scholar at Department of Political Science at Jamia Millia Islamia). “India’s
struggle for permanent seat at UN Security Council.” Foreign Policy News, 14 April 2017,
http://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/04/14/indias-struggle-permanent-seat-un-security-council/.
[Premier]
India’s nuclear tests were not enough to get UNSC permanent seat. The
Coming to main point,
belief that nuclear tests are the prerequisite for UNSC permanent seat was a wrong
decision from the Indian side. India’s nuclear tests provoked Pakistan to follow the suit
and channelized the natural resources in the wrong directions for building nuclear
arsenals. Moreover, nuclear weapons failed to stop Pakistan for proxy war and both states indulged in the never ending arms race. India’s
mistakes provided an opportunity to Pakistan to internationalize Kashmir issue and Pakistan did its best to keep Kashmir on the world’s front
page. There is no doubt that Pakistan has become a nuclear state with a begging bowl (foreign assistance) but it succeeded in its mission to
internationalize the Kashmir issue and Kargil War of 1999 was fundamentally about Kashmir to internationalize it. India also lost its
Germany and Japan
conventional opportunity to wage a war over Pakistan and is spending billions of dollars in defence annually.
are the typical examples for India to renounce its nuclear policy which achieved power
and status by utilizing resources in the right directions even though they have a capability to manufacture
nuclear weapons. It is wrong to assume that India-Pakistan relation is just like US-USSR Cold
War relations. One can easily differentiate between the two, the entire Kashmir region
is in dispute; the US-USSR had no direct territorial dispute. Wars have been fought
between India and Pakistan; US-USSR fought none. China is also involved in the border
dispute with India and this is totally different from Cold War which was two way
conflict, but in South Asia, the three way territorial conflict is a dangerous alarm. The
arms race will hit badly the economy of both India and Pakistan where majority of
people happen to live below poverty line and these two states cannot compare with the US which spent more money
on command and control system, storing, radioactive wastes, cleaning of the environment and less on nuclearization. The state like India is
trapped to find respect inside where majority of people have insufficient information about India’s nuclear arsenals and poor people are daily
The respect to India for its nuclear tests from the
battling for life and other basic necessity of life.
international community is too far and permanent seat for UNSC seems impossible for
India. The Human Rights Violations in Kashmir and North Eastern States and
35
discrimination against Dalits and Muslims are the other factors that thwarted India’s
respect at the international level. Recently, the attack on African people at Noida is a big
blow to India’s status at the international level. Many Indian newspapers were seen
wondering if India falls in the category of racist states after the attack.
India’s stances on nuclear policy have been one of hypocrisy. India will use nukes as
long as it’s pragmatic.
Malhotra ’15 Malhotra, Shairee (Associate Researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies).
“India’s Potential at the UN Security Council.” Fair Observer, 23 September 2015,
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/indias-potential-at-the-un-security-council-
12050/. [Premier]
Historically, India has been vociferously critical

Let us also consider India’s behavior in the global nuclear regime.
of the international nuclear order, even famously coining the term “nuclear apartheid,”
and it has ardently proposed for global disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
has encountered the most persistent resistance from India. The country refuses to sign on the grounds
that it is an inherently “discriminatory” treaty, perpetuating the nuclear status of old powers while serving to inhibit new ones from emerging
and preventing them from enhancing their security. However, since India conducted its nuclear tests in
1998—and the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal, through which America bypassed the NPT to accommodate India in nuclear commerce— a
major transformation has occurred in Delhi’s attitude. As C. Raja Mohan states, India’s traditional
and powerful stance on nuclear disarmament has moved to the less ambitious goal of
nuclear restraint and arms control measures preventing the spread of nuclear
technology. India’s normative opposition to the international nuclear order and the
“discriminatory” regime argument were suggestive of its relative power position in the
international system and only lasted till Delhi developed nuclear weapons itself. Once
this was achieved, India’s attitude altered from its traditional defiance of nuclear order
to supporting it in countering states like Iran, which Delhi voted against in 2005, 2006,
2009 and 2011 vis-à-vis its nuclear program. India, in consistency with the behavior of
other powers on being part of the nuclear system, is now inhibiting other states from
becoming a part of it.
36
Human Rights
India and Pakistan have been in conflict for decades, and one crucial point of clash is
Kashmir. CON can argue that India has committed human rights violation in Kashmir
that should exclude it from pursuing a seat. CON can impact this to setting norms on
human rights.
India has conducted egregious human rights violations in Kashmir. Granting them a
permanent seat would greenlight future violations of international norms.
Nawaz ’17 Nawaz, Shamsa (Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad). “Violation
of the UN Resolutions on Kashmir: India’s Quest for UNSC Permanent Membership.” Strategic Studies,
2017,
https://www.academia.edu/37138288/Violation_of_the_UN_Resolutions_on_Kashmir_Indias_Quest_fo
r_UNSC_Permanent_Membership. [Premier]
Kashmiris want an honourable space for themselves according to the UN Charter. In 1990,
when a popular uprising broke out, the most shouted slogan was, ‘until a plebiscite is held, our struggle will continue.’37 The history
has seen large processions heading towards the UNMOGIP headquarters demanding for
their independence. The protests were relodged on August 18, 2008, and called for the implementation of the UN resolutions. On
March 1, 1990, more than one million Kashmiris marched towards the UNMOGIP headquarters and called for the UN-supervised plebiscite.
More than 600 memoranda were submitted for the UN Secretary General to urge India to grant Kashmiris their right of self-determination.38
The disputed status of Kashmir and the continuous denial of India to their right of self-
determination have further strengthened their national identity. The Plebiscite
Movement, originated by the Plebiscite Front in 1955, has greatly contributed to keeping the demand alive
along with the presence of the UN resolutions. It represents the popular demand. On
the other hand, the role of the UN has been invalidated with the passage of time. The
most recent UN attempt was made in 2002, when Indo-Pak forces confronted each
other at the borders. India mobilised half a million troops to pressurise Pakistan, not to
side with the Kashmiri freedom fighters on their principle demand. However, the current
wave of atrocities by India to suppress the movement after the extrajudicial killing of
the freedom fighter, Burhan Wani, in July 2016, and the use of pellet guns to blind several have not
been able to stir the world’s conscience. The use of the brutal force by India is
impertinence to an international organisation. It compounds vulnerability for peaceful
world governance. The functions and the powers of the UNSC under the UN Charter are
to maintain international peace and security and investigate the disputes, which
eventually might lead to any international friction. The threats, which might violate peace, are also determined
and terms of settlement are recommended. The UN needs to assume its role more assertively.
Furthermore, the US support to India’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC would give a
37
free rein to India to continue with the violation of international norms and further lead
to the failure of yet another crisis management body.
38
Blocks
39
AT: Representation
Permanent membership is the exact opposite of democracy.

Nadin ’14 Nadin, Peter (Independent Researcher based in Sydney, Australia with PhD from the
University of Western Sydney). “United Nations Security Council Reform.” Our World, 1 May 2014,
https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/united-nations-security-council-reform. [Premier]
At the recent reform debate the Indian representative argued that an enlarged Council
would address the “democratic deficit, which prevents effective multilateralism, a multilateralism that is based on a
democratically-evolved global consensus”. There is an instant attraction to the idea of democratization, but it remains to be seen
whether adding more permanent members to the Council constitutes an act of

democratization. Yes, adding additional members from the Global South is a valid
proposition, but giving these additional members permanency captures a very anti-
democratic sentiment.
Only abolishing veto power can bring about true representation. Pursuing permanent
membership trades off with advocating for abolition.
[Premier]
The abolition of the veto will make the UNSC into a far more effective body. Decisions
will be no longer hamstrung by the vested interests of a few countries. The thrust on
negotiation and compromise will become far stronger, leading to easier and quicker
resolution of disputes. Proxy wars will not drag on endlessly, extracting their terrible
cost in human lives. The rest of the international community will have a powerful tool to
bypass the great powers, especially when they are in collaboration. Finally, it will bring
genuine democracy and sovereign equality into the UNSC. It is for these reasons that
there is overwhelming support for abolishing or at least limiting the use of the veto. Based
on the submissions by member states, approximately 109 nations, including the African Group and L.69, have
outrightly called for its abolition. Eighteen countries, including the Netherlands,
Vietnam, Peru and Ukraine, have called for its limited use and restriction in the case of
genocide and crimes against humanity. Even France, a permanent member, has seen the light and
has called for its limited use. Adding together the countries who support the veto's
abolition/limited use results in a total of at least 111 member states. This is 17 short of the 2/3rds
majority of 128 countries required for amending the UN Charter. It is here that India must put the bulk of its
efforts. Abolishing the veto is a sine qua non for the efficacy, legitimacy and even
40
survival of the UNSC. Rather than hankering after the humiliating goal of second-class
citizenship among the permanent members, India can provide leadership to the rest of
the world and focus on ensuring that the veto is abolished. With the right mobilisation,
especially among the island states, the magic number of 128 can be reached. If
accomplished, it would be an achievement whose ramifications cannot be fully imagined
and India would have done the world a gargantuan favour. The removal of the veto will have one
additional effect, whose ramifications are also profound. It is that the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members will
become largely irrelevant. Thus, a final consideration can be the abolition of the category of permanent members itself. The first reason for this
is that it will be a logical complement to removing the veto, ushering in complete and genuine democracy that will immensely strengthen the
body. The entire expanded membership can then consist only of non-permanent members and as all seats will be filled by elections it will be a
built-in guarantee for ensuring that the UNSC always reflects the geopolitical realities of the day. The second reason is that the number of
permanent members cannot keep increasing indefinitely. It can be safely stated that France and the UK are no longer great powers in this day
and age. However they will continue to remain on the Council even after its expansion. Similarly, after the next review, which may happen a
century later, would the size be further increased while retaining existing membership? Logically speaking such a process would result in an
ever-larger council that would be both absurd and ineffective. Therefore the saner alternative is to abolish the category of permanent members
itself and fill all seats through elections only. This would make the UNSC conform to its sister organs such as the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and the UNGA. The success of the UN in the socio-economic sphere can be largely attributed to the democratic structure of the
ECOSOC, where all posts are filled through elections. Similarly, the failure of the UNSC has already been attributed to its undemocratic nature.
Thus reason dictates that the permanent category of members be abolished. This is unlikely to happen during this round of reforms owing to
the lack of consensus on it. Only one member state --Panama --- has made this suggestion in the negotiating text. Nevertheless, it is a question
The abolition of the veto will thus have a
that cannot be indefinitely evaded and the sooner it is addressed the better.
thoroughly transformative effect on the functioning of the Security Council and

accordingly on international peace and security. India has a historic opportunity to step
up to the challenge, look past the gratuity of immediate self-interest and pursue
reforms that will make the UN into a body truly capable of dealing with the challenges
of the 21st century.
India has agreed to join without veto power. It wouldn’t have any real power.
[Premier]
In its written submission to the UN, India has made

Of these, the most significant is the "question of the veto".
a tremendous diplomatic compromise by agreeing to abstain from using the veto till 15
years after the present reforms (if they happen at all) come into force. Thus it is effectively asking for permanent
membership without veto power. Even with such a compromise, it is uncertain whether the country will get a permanent
seat on the UNSC. This is mainly due to lack of support from the permanent five members but also due to the difficulties in reaching a
consensus on several aspects of the negotiating text such as the size of an expanded council and regional representation. Nevertheless,
assuming that somehow India manages to "pull it off", the question necessarily arises:
what is the point of being on the Council without having veto power? Decision-making
in the UNSC is governed by article 27 of the UN Charter which states that on non-
procedural matters, which is where the main work of the Council takes place, all the
permanent members must agree for a decision to be taken. This is where the veto comes into play as any
41
However apart from this there is no
member can simply refuse to concur, leading to the lapsing of the decision.
major difference between permanent and non-permanent members. Thus, if India

becomes a permanent member of the UNSC without veto power, it will in reality have
the status of a non-permanent member. In the words of Ambassador Asoke Kumar Mukerji, former Permanent
Representative, this will amount to "second class citizenship" and besides will be an utterly
insubstantial achievement. The alternative of pursuing permanent membership with veto power is something that has
already been tried and has failed, hence the current capitulation. This, therefore, leaves one final option -- examining whether the veto as a
category itself must remain.
The UNSC is ineffective, and even with veto power, India wouldn’t gain much utility.
Pursuing membership would trade off with better bilateral negotiations.
Taneja ’15 Taneja, Kabir (Scholar at The Takshashila Institution). “India's Infatuation With the UN
Security Council.” The Diplomat, 27 April 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/indias-infatuation-
with-the-un-security-council/. [Premier]
The past decade has portrayed the United Nations, and particularly the UNSC, as a
quagmire of ineptness and failure, with enough conflicts festering in the world to
overwhelm the entire UN ecosystem. In many cases, such as UNSC resolution 1973,
which led to the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, international action has only made
the situation on the ground worse. These lapses, for example, can be held directly
responsible for incidents such as the recent drowning of 700 Libyan migrants in the
Mediterranean Sea. More recently, the Syrian civil war has further weakened the role of
the UNSC in preventing conflicts. In 2013, the UN threw up its hands in a gesture of
defeat. “Syria is our collective failure,” said UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, adding that it would remain a “heavy burden” on the
standing of the UN. In Syria, the UN and its various aid agencies have been more than critical in
picking up the shattered pieces of the UNSC’s failures by delivering food, medicines, and
other aid to a population ravaged by five years of civil war. The challenges for India in
the global arena are not going to be solved with a UNSC seat. In fact, other than the
symbolism of gaining veto power – itself of questionable utility – most multilateral
forums around the world today have become mere events, with most breakthroughs on
trade, security, and other issues relevant to India largely coming through bilateral
negotiations. For example, the historic carbon emissions agreement between the U.S. and
China was achieved on a bilateral level, and now will be showcased at the crucial Paris climate talks later this year.
Climate change is a global undertaking, but two of the biggest contributors reached a
deal on a heavily contested issue on a one-to-one level. The UNSC is a WWII holdover. Do
France and the U.K. today really deserve to be on the UNSC, while Germany, the biggest economy in Europe, and Japan, the third biggest in the
The UN and UNSC have for far too long ignored economic realities and the
world, are not?
political drift to the east, highlighted by the recent European dash to join the China-led
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). India has a long-standing wish to be a UNSC
42
member, as a symbol and as a calling card of its “arrival.” But rather than chasing
membership of a fancy club, India should focus its diplomatic capital on bilateral
forums.
India can look to other bodies for representation, like the ACABQ, Committee on
Contributions, and Human Rights Council.
Gharekhan ’17 Gharekhan, Chimaya R. (Former Permanent Representative and Under Secretary
General in the United Nations). “Let us be realistic about the UNSC.” The Hindu, 7 December 2017,
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/let-us-be-realistic-about-the-unsc/article21284696.ece.
[Premier]
There are other bodies in the UN that are not as well known but are important enough
to be represented on like the ACABQ (Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) and the
Committee on Contributions. The former consists of 16 members elected by the UNGA on the
recommendation of the Fifth Committee of the UNGA dealing with the budget of the UN. Usually, the members are
officers of the permanent missions serving on the Fifth Committee. Most often, they are of the rank of first secretary or counsellor;
Ambassadors rarely offer their candidatures. The Committee on Contributions recommends the scale of assessments to the budget and the
share of each member. This is a very important function, since the share decided by the UNGA
applies to all the specialised agencies, etc. Even a 0.1 % change can make a difference of
hundreds of thousands of dollars. We have had distinguished persons serving on both these committees, such as G.
Parthasarathy, S.K Singh, as well as our current permanent representative, ambassador Syed Akbaruddin. Some stalwarts have
also lost these elections. There is also the Human Rights Council; we have had almost
continuous representation on it. The U.S. lost the election to it a few years ago; there is
widespread resentment against the P-5’s presumption to a permanent seat on all
bodies.
Subramaniam ’15 Subramaniam, Chitra (Co-Founder and Managing Editor of The News Minute).
“Does India really need a permanent seat at the UNSC?” The News Minute, 16 July 2015,
https://www.thenewsminute.com/artccle/does-india-really-need-permanent-seat-unsc-32301.
[Premier]
Earlier this month Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote to 193 nations on a host of issues. Among them was a call to “rethink how the
multilateral system can be made more inclusive and effective”. He referred to reforms in the United Nations (UN) system to adequately reflect
global changes and progress. Between the lines there were strong tailwinds for India to become a permanent member of the UN Security
Other than a prestige issue, a permanent seat at the high table serves little or
Council (UNSC).
no purpose in today’s geo-politics. However generations of diplomats and all Indian Prime Ministers have worked at
securing a permanent UNSC seat. Will that happen? This writer does not think so and argues about the irrelevance of such pursuits. For a start,
China will not allow it and all others will follow Beijing. If the government of India believes that the UN should reflect ground realities, it needs
root and branch changes and not cosmetics at the top. There is no economic benefit or political capital to be
43
gained. Here’s why. The forties and fifties in the last century were times of great
transition. The world saw a wave of new democracies emerge, World War II had drawn to a close after an atomic bomb had been
dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan), millions were dead in Europe and Germany was split into two at the point where the advancing
Allies and the Germans stopped – in Berlin. The Cold War had replaced guns and cannons. On the other side of the Atlantic in the United States
(US), institutions were erected by the victors of the war who also wrote the history of success and failure. The UN situated in New York gave
itself a Security Council with five permanent members – United States, France, China, United Kingdom and Russia – all with a power to veto any
decisions. In addition, there were ten non-permanent members representing various regions of the world for a two-year term. The UNSC had
several tasks but the main one was to maintain international peace and security. Not far away in Washington even as the war waged in Europe,
over 700 people from the Allied nations gathered in Bretton Woods to draw up the first charter of rules and regulations for commercial and
financial relations of the world’s major trading nations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were born. At the turn of the last century, GATT became the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the world’s first global
trade policeman. Gunboat diplomacy would be replaced with trade sanctions. The Cold War all but made the UNSC irrelevant as countries were
either lined up with the Allies or with Russia. The fall of the Berlin wall signaled change but that change happened in ways no one could foresee.
The three-way split of Yugoslavia into Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in the 90’s was bloody. The UN watched helplessly and sent in
peace-keeping forces when nothing could be salvaged. Even more controversial were the UN-authorised invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and
The body had also been set aside by Russia walking
the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US without a UNSC nod.
into Crimea last year leading to questions about its relevance. While the UNSC is
authorized to pass resolutions relating to war and maintaining peace, US Ambassador
Richard Holbrook secured one on HIV/AIDS leading to criticism that it was a show where
the winner takes all. Seventy years after the UN was created, the disparities between
rich and poor countries has grown, the world is more democratic but not more peaceful
and international trade and market mechanisms have become the only arbiter of
diplomacy short of war. Many of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain
unmet and governments are no longer willing to fund vague goals with vested interests –
poverty and disease pays to keep people rich and richer. Germany is also pursuing a permanent UNSC seat but stands astride between foreign
policy and wishful thinking. Indeed, it was banned from the club because it lost the war, but that was 70 years ago. With some 61 million
people, Germany is the world’s third largest exporter after China (pop. 1.3 billion) and the US (pop. 319 million). Germany’s power is
omnipresent in Europe including during the recent Greek crisis and the bail-out. Japan flushed with cash today is also not pursuing a UNSC seat.
Today the UN is a toothless tiger, high on verbiage and
Brazil and South Africa also want a permanent seat.
low on action in contrast to the WTO which has teeth and reach. There are many wars -
great lakes in Africa and the Middle East, for example - where the UN has watched
helplessly and issued statements. The UN’s only relevance is when it brings food and
other assistance to people in distress and that too is happening selectively. It has been
ineffective and absent in protecting the wave of refugees coming to Europe from North
Africa and in content with making motherhood and apple pie statements about the
Rohingyas in Myanmar. On human rights – the basis of all human intercourse – it is a victim of its own
hypocrisy. The world needs a UN, a place where people can seek protection, aid, assistance and human rights. The current
structure – a bureaucratic behemoth – is uncouth, lazy, hypocritical and self-perpetuating. The new body
has to be vibrant, responsive and responsible. This year is also the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in former Yugoslavia where
brother killed brother and walls were erected through people homes to carve out new maps. The survivors said if their country – Yugoslavia –
was economically sound, splitting it would have been difficult. Somewhere in all this, there is a message for India, potentially one of the world’s
economic security will provide the stability, gravitas and
largest markets. It goes something like this -
confidence that the UNSC cannot.
44
The UNSC has no influence – India should not waste its time.
Deo and Pradhan ’15 Deo, Neelam (Co-founder and Director of Gateway House) and Pradhan, Karan
(Karan Pradhan is a Senior Researcher at Gateway House). “Should India Give Up on the UN Security
Council?” The Diplomat, 9 November 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-
the-un-security-council/. [Premier]
Meanwhile, even as the reform remains in abeyance, global geopolitics have changed. Today, there are three
major conglomerations of problems: the turmoil in West Asia, encapsulated by the
brutal Islamic State, which is quickly redrawing the map of the region; the rise of an
increasingly expansionist and assertive China; and the renewed standoff between the
West and Russia. It is worth noting that although matters of war and peace are the core function
of the UNSC, it has not been consulted on any of these issues. The most blatant
instance was Obama’s address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he
defended airstrikes on Syria and Iraq. The U.S did not deem it necessary, once again, to
seek the approval of the UNSC. Sadly, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon was pressured to support the U.S.’s unilateral
actions, though he expressed the vain hope that the UNSC will lead the effort against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the east,
China has completely rejected international arbitration on territorial disputes with its
maritime neighbours, despite the Philippines taking the issue to the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. And amid steadily deteriorating Russia-West ties, U.S.-
led NATO has not taken the issue to the UNSC, though it has accused Moscow of
breaching international law and compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity by annexing Crimea. With these disagreements —as well as the opposing perspectives on Syria—
the equation between the West and Russia has deteriorated to a point reminiscent of
the hostilities between the two during the Cold War. The new standoff over Ukraine has
completely paralysed the UNSC. However, such disregard was already evident when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 without
the Security Council’s authorisation, distorted the sense of UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011 by justifying the invasion of that country,
These repeated unilateral actions raise questions about the
and recently ordered airstrikes on Syria.
UNSC’s relevance. It then becomes necessary to ask if India should persist in its efforts
to be part of an organisation that lacks weight and sway.
As a permanent member of the council, India would always put its own interests first
rather than those of other countries.
12050/. [Premier]
The nature of international relations, or IR, determines that India’s behavior will be
consistent with the traditional behavior of the Security Council’s permanent members,
45
with strategic interests trumping institutional imperatives. While during the Cold War era, India attempted
to make its presence relevant in the international realm by pragmatically resorting to normative vocabulary, these were typical of the
instruments employed by a weak state to secure its interests in the global hierarchy. India is no longer attempting to set
fresh criteria and establish alternative universalities in reshaping the world. Instead, in
tandem with altering global realities and its emergence as a major player, it is focusing
on playing the game of realpolitik. Institutions are not a mitigating factor where the
interests of great powers are threatened, and they are only pertinent when there is no
conflict between these. Like the permanent members, India is satisfying its political
interests first, while refusing to act in the face of massive brutality. As Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul
assert, there is a “behavioral requirement of great power status: a great power is and becomes what a great power does.” In the words
of former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: “We are living in a world of unequal power, and we have to
use the available international system to promote our interests. ” While Singh stated this in the context
of widening India’s development options, there is no reason why the country would not do exactly that
if it gains a permanent seat on the UNSC. This would allow India to more substantially
articulate and pursue its foreign policy choices and interests. In accordance with its rise in the
international community, India is increasingly being expected to take a stance on global issues.
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s enthusiastic and innovative emphasis on foreign policy, the likelihood is that India will do
so—but only to secure and preserve its national interests, rather than any noble cause
of maintaining world peace. India, or any other UNSC contender, cannot alter the
fundamental interest and power that is based IR. It is unlikely that India will add some
great “value” to the effectiveness of the Security Council. Ultimately, IR is dominated by
securing a country’s self-interest, and India being a rational actor in the international
system will predictably behave and operate no differently than other great powers.
India would not seek to represent other countries. It would promote its own interests.
Stuenkel ’10 Stuenkel, Oliver (Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas
Foundation in São Paulo). “Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and
the UN Security Council.” International Law, March 2010,
https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf. [Premier]
For years, India’s representatives have called for a revitalization of

India’s strategy is comparable.
the UN General Assembly, seeking to strengthen the system. In April 2010, for example, Hardeep Puri,
Permanent Representative of India to the U.N., said that “the General Assembly should take the lead in setting the global agenda and restoring
the centrality of the United Nations in formulating multilateral approaches to resolving transnational issues.”106 In a similar fashion, Indian
representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which, despite its pre-eminence in the charter, has proved too
weak to provide coherence to the work of the specialized agencies,107 should be at the heart of international efforts of development.
There is a fundamental agreement with the UNGA’s principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures. India’s foreign policy is still in" uenced by its ties to the NonAligned Movement and the G77.108
However, similar to Brazil, India’s alignment with the dispossessed is increasingly at odds with
its efforts to join the “club of the powerful”. Aside from a stronger role for the United
46
Nations General Assembly, India has traditionally argued for UN Security Council Reform
– in accordance with the 1992 Accra Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement.109 India’s position has thus been
traditionally part of the Non-Alignment Movement, although the NAM never reached
the cohesion of a power bloc. Furthermore, India has diverged increasingly to the
pragmatist side. India, a co-founder of the NAM in 1955, has always pledged adherence to the movement, and Indian political leaders
continue to mention it frequently.110 However, there has been growing internal criticism of India’s NAM
stance,111 and India’s foreign policy over the past decade indicates that it at times
diverges from its traditional, multilateralist strategy- for example when it signed a
bilateral nuclear deal with the United States. 112 A former Indian diplomat argued that India exerts considerable
influence over both the G77 and NAM, a leadership position India will attempt to hold on to as long as possible. He admits, however, that
India’s economic development may make India’s adherence to both clubs increasingly
untenable.113 In a similar fashion, Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally though not formally, India has (..) already le+ (…) the Non-
Aligned Movement.”114 Raja Mohan adds that “by the late 1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political
straightjacket the NAM had become on its external relations.”115
India’s push for “peace” have actually been motivated by pragmatic considerations.
12050/. [Premier]
Should it attain a permanent seat on the UNSC, the question is whether India would
positively influence the ethos of the council, or if it would simply behave like the
permanent members have historically done. The presence of more states, while rendering the Security Council
more internationally representative, would not alter the fundamental structure and dysfunctional mechanism of the UNSC. The veto power
thwarts the UN from tackling major international issues, while granting the permanent members disproportionate sway over its workings.
Examining India’s two-year presidency at the UNSC, which culminated at the end of 2012, reveals that Delhi has confidently amplified some
India’s cooperation and outreach with African states reeks of
pressing issues. On reforms,
pragmatic considerations to gain traction at the UN General Assembly for its permanent
seat bid. A major victim of international terrorism itself, India persuaded the UN
Counter-Terrorism Committee to adopt a document that emphasizes “zero tolerance”
to terrorism. Furthermore, India has also pushed for efforts toward peacekeeping and anti-
piracy, all of which augment the country’s interests. Yet through its unassertive stance in
2011-12 over the Syrian crisis, India lost an opportunity to underscore its democratic
credentials and use its two-year term at the UNSC positively, preferring to first and
foremost maintain its autonomous decision-making. India’s abstentions on the issue of
Gaza—which the country has historically been supportive of—took place during a real peaking of Indo-Israeli
ties, especially in the defense and military sectors. India’s abstentions on human rights
violations in several countries, including Sri Lanka, Ukraine and North Korea, are
indicative of a selective approach to peace.
47
Legitimacy is first and foremost a question of action – efficacy is prerequisite.

Gardiner and Schaefer ’05 Gardiner, Nile (Director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom)
and Schaefer, Brett (Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs). “U.N. Security Council
Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest.” The Heritage Foundation, 18 August 2005,
https://www.heritage.org/report/un-security-council-expansion-not-the-us-interest. [Premier]
Security Council expansion will make it far more difficult for the United States to work through the Council. With the exception of Germany and
Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for additional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely vote against the
U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Secu-rity Council with these nations as permanent mem-bers will likely be less supportive of
any enlargement of the Coun-cil would make it more unwieldy and
U.S. policy priorities. Moreover,
subject to conflicting interests contributing to gridlock that will paralyze the Council and
decrease the proba-bility that it will act quickly or effectively to address threats to
international peace and security. The U.N. Security Council's legitimacy depends far
more on its actions than its membership. The Security Council is by no means perfect as
it cur-rently stands. It is subject to delay and indecisive-ness, as its failures in Iraq and Sudan clearly demonstrate. However,
a larger Council would not solve these problems. On the contrary, it would further
undermine the Council's ability to act decisively as timely action would fall victim to
political impasse, conflicting interests, or debate among nations that have little to
contribute to the Council's ultimate responsibility-enforcement of international peace
and security. However imper-fect, the current composition of the Council is infinitely
preferable to ill-considered expansion that will surely weaken its standing and ability to
meet its mandate-ultimately making the Security Council less relevant and increasing
the likeli-hood that crises will be addressed outside of the U.N. framework.
48
AT: Peacekeeping
India isn’t acting out of altruism – peacekeeping is free training and a chance to
exercise influence.
Taneja ’15 Taneja, Kabir (Scholar at The Takshashila Institution). “India's Infatuation With the UN
Security Council.” The Diplomat, 27 April 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/indias-infatuation-
with-the-un-security-council/. [Premier]
Of course,South Asian countries are not participating entirely out of altruism. India takes
advantage of what UN peacekeeping missions offer. The missions are a chance to
bolster the combat readiness at UN expense; for Bangladesh, they are an opportunity for airmen to get some flying
time. In 2013, two Indian peacekeepers died in South Sudan after Neur rebels targeting
the majority ethnic Dinka community, which sought shelter at the base, attacked their
UN compound. In fact, both South Sudan and Sudan are diplomatically important to
India – Sudanese oil fields were the first overseas fields to receive Indian investment –
and they remain an integral part of New Delhi’s diplomatic maneuvering against China
in Africa.
India contributes less than its competitors.

Parikh ’15 Parikh, Maithili (Student at Harvard Law School). “Will India Make It To The United Nation’s
Elite Clout?” Global Scope, October 2015, https://www.youthkiawaaz.com/2015/10/india-un-security-
council-seat/. [Premier]
An obscure barrier to India’s permanent membership is also the stiff competition it faces
from Japan, Brazil and Germany, all of which enjoy a greater economic size and per
capita income. India’s meager financial contributions to the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation could also work against her pitch as a permanent member. The
difficulty lies in India’s conspicuously dismal numbers of per capital income, despite its seemingly progressing economy.
Even if it lost membership, India would still contribute to peacekeeping to check China
and expand global influence. It would pressure other countries instead of backing out.
Williams ’13 Williams, Audrey (Policy Programming Intern at the Stanley Foundation). “A Smarter
Approach: The Future of Indian Peacekeeping.” 2013, The Stanley Foundation,
https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach. [Premier]
India began contributing to UN missions for two overarching reasons: first,

Like many countries,
to provide training for its soldiers and second, to improve its clout within the
international community—which was especially true for New Delhi since it had its eye on a very specific, very significant prize, a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Now half a century after India joined its first peacekeeping mission, the country’s calculus has
49
After decades of missions, the
begun to change—the incentives that first held true for the country are no longer relevant.
training benefits for India’s soldiers have plateaued, and a Security Council seat may be
too ambitious a dream. But a number of factors have kept India from pulling out—
maybe the most important as a reaction to the resurgence of China as a world power.
While Beijing was against any involvement in peacekeeping operations in the past, it has
had a change of heart. The number of Chinese peacekeepers is nowhere near India’s,
but it is growing. Much like India in its early peacekeeping days, China was swayed by
the opportunities that sending troops abroad provided such as training its soldiers and
increasing its standing in the international community. Another issue that will likely
keep Indian peacekeepers on UN missions in the future is New Delhi’s continued goal to
be a world power. In many regards, India’s bureaucracy is slow to articulate—much less execute—the
country’s foreign policy strategies, making peacekeeping one of the South Asian giant’s
few foreign policy strategies that is both highly visible and well executed. If a withdrawal
is out of the question, then India’s only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is
a smarter approach to its present and future contributions. India will likely take more care in choosing
new missions by instituting a reform process. Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging
other countries to step up their contributions. India does not want to see UN
peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of
present or future missions. The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead, it has highlighted
the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using
blue helmets.
Peacekeepers are underfunded and suffer poor leadership.

Autesserre ’19 Autesserre, Séverine (Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Columbia
University). “The Crisis of Peacekeeping.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2019,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping. [Premier]
peacekeepers have one of the hardest jobs in the world. They

The UN’s defenders rightly point out that
operate in places rife with ruthless militias, abusive armies, corrupt officials, and shabby
infrastructure. Instructions from the Security Council to support the host government
further complicate their task, since rebels are less inclined to cooperate when they
believe that the UN is aiding the enemy. Moreover, since great powers tend to care little
about the crises the UN is sent to address, peacekeepers are given precious few
resources with which to accomplish their ambitious mandates. At $7 billion annually,
the UN peacekeeping budget may seem impressive. But it equals less than 0.5 percent
of global military spending, and with it, the organization is expected to help resolve
more than a quarter of all ongoing wars. The main consequence is too few people on
the ground, which makes it difficult for the UN to even scratch the surface of its
50
mandates. In Congo, for example, the UN mission’s gender office in the province of North Kivu—where
sexual violence is pervasive—was staffed by one lone UN volunteer for years. Meanwhile, the number of
UN soldiers is usually paltry given the size of the territories they’re supposed to monitor
or pacify. There is roughly one peacekeeper per 400 square miles in Western Sahara,
one per 50 square miles in Congo, and one per 30 square miles in South Sudan. Compare that
to the peak of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, when there was one foreign soldier per two square miles, or to the United States itself, where there
is one law enforcement officer per four square miles. Since the UN does not have its own pool of soldiers, it must rely on the goodwill of its
Countries are reluctant to risk the lives of their troops in conflicts in
member states to provide them.
which they have no stake, and so it often takes months for the UN to muster the forces
it needs. When it finally does, it almost always ends up with poorly trained and poorly
paid soldiers from developing countries. (In 2018, the top troop contributors to the UN were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and
Rwanda.) These troops are often poorly equipped, too—forced to get by without
helicopters and to make do with outdated vehicles. To make matters worse, their
commanders report not just to the UN leadership but also to their own country’s chain
of command. These officers know what their countries expect from them: to bring their
troops back home safe. When they have to choose between fulfilling the UN mandate
and avoiding casualties, they generally choose the latter. That is what happened in Srebrenica in 1995, when
the Dutch commander of a peacekeeping battalion, outnumbered and outgunned, had his soldiers stand by as Serbian forces rounded up and
Worst of all, some peacekeepers harm those they are meant
killed some 8,000 Muslim men and boys.
to help. In the Central African Republic, Congo, and Somalia, they have engaged in
torture. In Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo, they have been implicated in sex-trafficking rings.
In fact, over the past 12 years, the UN has received nearly 1,000 allegations of sexual
abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers. Those who commit such horrible acts are a
minority, but the bad apples have done grave harm to the UN’s reputation.
The UN makes poor strategic choices that guarantee failure.

Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which
provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical
support, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute
troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command. But
peacekeepers can’t hold the Security Council responsible for all their shortcomings.
Because they are the product of compromise, mandates are always vague, and they
always need to be interpreted. Besides, even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote ample
resources to a UN mission, the resulting efforts often fail. The problem is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, it has to
do with two strategic choices the UN frequently makes: first, to work with national
elites to stop violence from the top down and, second, to push for quick elections as a
51
way to consolidate the peace. The standard UN approach to ending wars is to host large,
costly conferences in order to strike agreements between governments and rebel
leaders and then organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are
based on faulty assumptions. The weakness of the top-down approach is that warfare is often the result of
not just national or international competition but local competition, too. In many
conflict zones, the fight is over such issues as land, water, livestock, and low-level
traditional and administrative power. In South Sudan, for example, it is not only tensions
between President Salva Kiir and the former vice president and now rebel leader Riek Machar that
fuel the current fighting; it is also clan rivalries and countless spats between herders and
farmers. When it comes to the UN’s fixation on elections, the problem is that pushing
for a vote before a country is ready may do more harm than good. In Angola in 1992, a
premature vote triggered a resumption of fighting between the ruling party and the
main rebel group (resulting in more deaths in two years than there were in the 17-year war that the UN had supposedly ended).
Both of these errors are on full display today in Congo, the site of both the world’s
deadliest conflict since World War II and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.
The UN attributes strife there to national and international factors: a weak central
government, tensions between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his opponents,
and disputes with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. It views elections, which Kabila has delayed for years, as a
sort of cure-all. In fact, much of the violence in Congo is local in origin. Disputes often center on
who will control neighboring land, the exploitation of local mining sites, or the
traditional or administrative power over a village or a district. These tensions often
result in localized fighting in one village or territory but frequently escalate into
generalized conflict across a whole province and even at times spill over into
neighboring countries.
The UN ignores the local cultures and situations – it leads to counterproductive

missions.
Compounding these mistakes is the UN’s overriding disdain for all things local. Because
subject-area experience is valued more than country expertise, management positions
almost always go to foreigners, who usually have no in-depth knowledge of their host
societies, cultures, or institutions. Often, staff lack the language skills to communicate with
local people—or even, at times, with one another. In the mission in Cyprus, for example,
few peacekeepers speak Greek or Turkish; the same is true for Arabic or Nuer in South
52
Sudan, Albanian or Serbo-Croatian in Kosovo, and French or Haitian Creole in Haiti.
Peacekeepers’ everyday behavior only adds to the problem. Both the UN’s military personnel and its civilian
personnel live in fortified compounds and gather information mainly from elites.
Sometimes, the result is that they thoughtlessly apply universal templates. For example,
on seeing the success of so-called disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
programs in Burundi and Sierra Leone, the UN attempted similar initiatives in Haiti and
South Sudan, where conditions were different; the efforts failed. At other times, dangerous groupthink
takes hold. In Congo, for instance, between the last two rounds of elections , from 2006 to 2011,
most peacekeepers held a simplistic view of the primary cause of the violence (the illegal
exploitation of mineral resources), the main consequence (sexual abuse of women and girls), and the best solution
(a stronger state). By empowering the Congolese government and its army, the strategy that
emerged from this view actually led to an uptick in human rights violations, including
sexual abuse. The preponderance of foreign staff and foreign ideas also generates
resentment among local partners. In country after country, residents complain that
peacekeepers are arrogant and demeaning, live in lavish accommodations, drive fancy
SUVs, and spend far too much time relaxing and far too little actually doing their jobs.
They regularly disparage peacekeepers as neocolonial; local media portray them as parasites at best and thugs at worst. Fair or unfair, these
views often cause local people to refuse to cooperate with UN initiatives, even when
they support the underlying goals.
53

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Premier Debate

Good luck everyone. See you ‘round!

India should be recognized for its peacekeeping contributions, population, economy,

India’s case for permanent membership seems to be

India has been a consistent and generous contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts.

India’s spontaneous and unreserved participation in United Nations Peacekeeping

few cases, there are no governments. As a result, humanitarian emergencies have

Continued denial of membership would force India to downscale peacekeeping

Endorsement for India’s seat will cement US-India relations.

position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent

It is important to recognize the potential shortcomings of Security Council reform. An

The roster of the Security Council’s permanent

a comprehensive reform of the Security Council’s permanent membership could be

Introducing more permanent members would paralyze action, leading to prolonged

India’s entry would necessarily be part of a larger reform package.

permanent members would contribute more to the maintenance of international peace

nothing has changed

Even if India gets US support, membership would upset China.

India’s membership would exacerbate tensions between the US and China.

Historically, India has been vociferously critical

Permanent membership is the exact opposite of democracy.

whether adding more permanent members to the Council constitutes an act of

thoroughly transformative effect on the functioning of the Security Council and

In its written submission to the UN, India has made

major difference between permanent and non-permanent members. Thus, if India

confidence that the UNSC cannot.

For years, India’s representatives have called for a revitalization of

Legitimacy is first and foremost a question of action – efficacy is prerequisite.

India contributes less than its competitors.

India began contributing to UN missions for two overarching reasons: first,

Peacekeepers are underfunded and suffer poor leadership.

peacekeepers have one of the hardest jobs in the world. They

The UN makes poor strategic choices that guarantee failure.

The UN ignores the local cultures and situations – it leads to counterproductive

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