POST-ELECTION DISPUTE

5. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections,
stating that she is 7 months resident in the said district. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District
of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission
on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in
her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months. She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that
her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake". The provincial election
supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda thus, filed her amended COC
with COMELEC’S head office in Manila.

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos
was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her
well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she
moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of
Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a
resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood". During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election.
But the COMELEC suspend her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the SC.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of BP 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a COC must be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before election. Since COMELEC rendered the resolution on April
24, 1995, 14 days before the election, COMELEC already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the house of
representatives.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD: YES

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency
in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while
living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."

Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:

1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is mere physical
presence. Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a
person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that a person
may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost
her domicile in that province. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Applying this doctrine to the case of
petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to
an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in
her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore
of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the
elections and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the house of representatives.

HELD: NO

With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even
after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
 6. AQUINO VS COMELEC,

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City.

Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate
dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.

petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case.

On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among
others, his Affidavit, lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him
ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.

Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in
the Second District, petitioner garnered (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained (35,910)
votes.

private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995
and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension of proclamation.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to
Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995,
the decretal portion thereof residing:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to
proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to
be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and
judiciousness.

On the same day, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6,
1995. Declaring Agapito A. Aquino ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the
Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes,
issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.
ISSUE:

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE
INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION
BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL

HELD: NO

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a
member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the
winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the
proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of
the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the
COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after
the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates.

not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems
to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881.

ISSUE:

W/NOT COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR
AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

HELD: YES

in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in
which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election law
purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law. "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is
nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given
period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in
the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only
that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years
immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same
district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, from
data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear
and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for
the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in
the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of
two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City.

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a
resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of
(petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or
otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en
banc emphatically pointed out:

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate
of Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better.

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.30 These requirements are hardly
met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of
Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly met
by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati.
In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a newly
created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out
from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be
allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as
COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the
constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with
that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for
the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

ISSUE:

whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.

HELD: YES
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995
elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings
behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines
firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters
who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been
disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony
which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field
would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections.
He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections.

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.

This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum,
subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner
among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions. These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up,
though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim
the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second
placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that
the result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of
votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be
construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority
or plurality of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective
position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks
the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a
government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority
or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the
fundamental law itself.
 7. ARROYO VS HRET

G.R. No. 118597 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo
won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that
Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some
HRET employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the
two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of
Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is
actually based on a broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-
based anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of
the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled
otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the HRET later declared
Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE: Did public respondent HRET commit grave abuse of discretion in

(1) proceeding to decide the election protest based on private respondent's "precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence" theory;

(2) rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was procured,
and (3) annulling election results in some contested precincts?

HELD: YES

I. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory

However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in his memorandum cum
addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots.
From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of
ballots alone, private respondent’s belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of
evidence (consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco
in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild
process he fondly coined as “precinct-level document-based evidence.” This is clearly substantial amendment of the election
protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules.

After the expiration of the period for filing of the protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto, substantial
amendments which broaden the scope of the action or introduce an additional cause of action shall not be allowed. . . .

The majority members of the Tribunal in fact had already sensed the impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of
theory when it issued its "show-cause" order requiring the latter to explain why his election protest should not be dismissed.
But the majority violated with open eyes its own rules when they resolved not to dismiss the protest — a clear indication of
grave abuse of discretion. The least that public respondent HRET could have done thereafter was to conduct further hearing
so that petitioner Arroyo may have examined, objected to and adduced evidence controverting private respondent Syjuco's
"precinct-level document-based evidence" despite the time within which the parties are allowed to present their evidence has
already lapsed. But nothing in the records indicates that one was conducted. Petitioner's right to due process was clearly
violated at this particular stage of the proceedings.

Granting that private respondent's change in theory (being a substantial amendment) is merely disallowed and not a valid
ground for the outright dismissal of his election protest, nonetheless it has been consistently held that substantial
amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the filing of the election protest which, under Rule
16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. Private respondent's "precinct-level document-
based anomalies/evidence" theory having been introduced only at the homestretch of the proceedings, he is bound by the
issue which he essentially raised in his election protest and that is, a revision of the ballots will confirm his victory and the
irregularities/anomalies and massive fraud foisted upon him during the 1992 synchronized elections. For the rule in an election
protest is that the protestant or counter protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended
pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. Private respondent is
therefore bound by the final results of the revision confirming petitioner's victory over him by a plurality of 13,092 votes.

Thus, the final results of the revision and the admission of his eventual loss therein were sufficient reasons to confirm at a
much earlier time petitioner Arroyo's victory over private respondent Syjuco. These are the offshoots of the theory and cause
of action private respondent Syjuco originally banked on (revision). Private respondent cannot escape its adverse effects by
later on contriving unprecedented and wholly untested processes or theories such as the "precinct-level document-based
anomalies/evidence", the applicable and well-settled principle being "a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the
cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action
and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal". This is in essence putting
private respondent in estoppel to question the revision.

II. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured

a) The majority members of public respondent HRET undisputedly admitted and appreciated as evidence mere
photocopies of election-related documents when there is not even the slightest showing that the original or even certified true
copies thereof cannot be reasonably produced before the Tribunal. These photocopies violate the best evidence rule which is
simply meant that no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence
can be had.20 They should have been rejected altogether unworthy of any probative value at all, being incompetent pieces of
evidence.

b) Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and
photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision which, as the
Tribunal readily admitted, were never offered in evidence by either of the parties. Aside from that, acting upon the self-
serving allegation of private respondent Syjuco supported by mere photocopied election documents that around 12,075
signatures of voters scattered in 777 precincts were forged or falsified, the majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by
themselves without the participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the
contested signature are fake. This course of action grossly violates not only Rule 68 of the Tribunal's own rules which requires
that all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body, but also Rule 5 thereof which further requires the presence of
at least one (1) Justice-member to constitute a valid quorum. In order, therefore, that any and all matters presented before it
can be properly addressed and considered, the Tribunal is mandated to act as a collegial body. And without collective effort as
enjoined by Rule 68 but qualified by Rule 5 in this particular and most crucial stage of the proceedings, any resulting action
purporting to be the official act the Tribunal should be, as it is hereby, struck down as highly irregular.

III. Nullification of election results

The power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the
popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a
fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take
any other step. Thus, as a guide for the exercise of this power, no less than public respondent Electoral Tribunal itself has laid
down two mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism, namely (1)
that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, and (2) that the
votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.25 Public respondent HRET
proceeded to annul 50,00026 votes without a dint of compliance with these requisites as it annulled the results on the basis of
lost or destroyed ballots despite the presence and availability of election return and other competent secondary evidence
whose authenticity were never questioned,27 and on the basis of alleged forged signatures which were never competently
proved and substantiated by private respondent.28 Further, the tribunal nullified the 10% margin in several contested
precincts with alleged substitute voting which the dissenting opinion correctly observed as "a far cry from the existing 50%
rule". What is even worse is that the nullification of these votes was based on inadmissible documents some of them not
offered in evidence by private respondent. The Court cannot countenance such blatant nullification of votes as it fails to
comply with the established standard on annulment. Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the
duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of
the popular will, and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained.
Additionally, public respondent HRET disregarded election results on several precincts on the basis of omissions committed
either through mere oversight or plain negligence on the part of election officials or employees. The bulk of these omissions
consisted of lack or absence of the signature of the chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors on the voter's affidavits or
lists of voters/voting records, absence or excess of detachable coupons, number of detachable coupons not tallying with the
number of ballots, and missing voter's lists. We find that these omissions, mainly administrative in nature, cannot be used as a
ground to nullify election results in the absence of a clear showing of fraud. Voters duly registered and who have exercised
their right of suffrage should not be penalized by disregarding and junking their votes due to omissions not of their own
making. The settled rule is that in the absence of fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which
do not subvert the expression of popular will, as in this case, cannot countenance the nullification of election results.
Corollarily, the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the whole vote of a
precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby, even though the
circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment. These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and
election by registered voters had taken place in the questioned precincts. The Court, therefore, cannot stamp with approval
the conduct exhibited by public respondent HRET as it was attended by arbitrariness.

From the above findings, it now becomes apparent why private respondent's argument that the petition should be dismissed
for failure to first file a motion for reconsideration of public respondent HRET's majority decision, is untenable. Indeed, the
general rule is that a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion for
reconsideration. However, the partiality of the majority of the members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown through
their concerted action to disregard tribunal rules and the basic rules on evidence, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision
becomes nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental principle of due process.
And it is well-settled that a prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if, as in this case, petitioner's fundamental
right to due process was violated.

All told, the procedural flaws which marred the proceedings in the public respondent HRET from the time private respondent's
"precinct-level document based anomalies/evidence" theory was embraced by the majority members up to the rendition of
judgment suffice in themselves to render the public respondent HRET's majority decision declaring private respondent Syjuco
as the duly elected congressman of the then lone district of Makati a complete nullity. The persistent and deliberate violation
of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that
procedural rules should be liberally construed. For even if Rule 2 of the Tribunal's internal rules states that:

In case of reasonable doubt, these rules shall be liberally construed in order to achieve a just, expeditions and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every contest brought before the Tribunal.

But why the change of heart and open defiance in this case when the very same objections raised by public respondent HRET
in these cases squarely apply to the entirety of private respondent's massive documentary evidence?

If the Court, in striking down the majority decision of public respondent HRET, pays unwavering reverence to the rules of
evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence, it is because they have been tested through years of
experience as the most effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. And the Court will not allow even
the slightest diminution of, much less a complete and brazen departure from these time-honored rules especially when the will
of the electorate as expressed through the ballot, is at stake. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure
truth and exactness in elections as in anything else. Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before the public
respondent HRET and its majority decision in the election protest filed by private respondent, petitioner's proclamation as the
winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all.