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: CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 2 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................. 3
1. INTRODUCTION
This Safeguarding Memorandum describes the requirement for protection for Diesel hydrodesulphurization
unit of Nagarjuna Oil Corporation Ltd against loss of containment.
The location of relief devices, Emergency shutdown and capacity determining components are shown in
the piping instrument diagram of the unit (P&IDs) i.e. CS-140-PR-15-0001 to CS-140-PR-15-0044.
For purpose of unit, process description and design considerations reference is made to the basis of
design of unit no 1400; refer document number CC-140-PR-40-0001 Rev 4.
The following section describes the various devices that are employed to safeguard the plant during
upset situation. Principally these devices are described as:
a) Ultimate safeguards: Elements or systems that serve as the ultimate level of protection against
uncontrolled loss of containment. For Examples: Relief devices, thermal expansion valves,
depressurizing valves and sometime selectively instrument protected functions.
b) Penultimate safeguards are instrumented protective functions that provide the penultimate level of
protection against uncontrolled loss of containment.
c) Mitigating system: Elements or a system that is specifically included in the design to limit the
consequence of uncontrolled loss of containment e.g. remotely operated valves in the pump suction
lines.
This document is part of detail engineering and its contents will be part of operating manual.
The following assumptions have been made:
• All floors in structures are made from grating, which implies that all vessels located above 8.0m
elevation are not subject to sustainable fire.
• To avoid liquid overfill an operator intervention within 20 minutes after high level alarm is allowed, but
only if independent alarms are available.
• For the case of excess flow from a high pressure source (high pressure-low pressure interface) the
largest contribution of either; the fully open control valve or the fully open bypass valve shall be taken
into account. The calculation shall be based on the worst case situation: Typically this will be 100%
vapor breakthrough (no liquid) and shall be made for the actually installed valves (to be confirmed
during detailed engineering). The Cv of the bypass valve shall not exceed the Cv of the control valve.
For the highly improbable event that gas breakthrough takes place when both control valve and bypass
are fully open, the capacity of the relief valve shall be such that the downstream pressure shall not
exceed the hydro test pressure of the system, taking into account any differences between the hydro
test temperature and the maximum operating temperature. The calculated load for relief cases where
the upstream control valve is determining the relief load is to be confirmed based on the final installed
Cv of the control valves
• During a general power failure the cooling water supply, the steam supply and the control system will
continue normally.
• Relief valves shall be spared except in the case of: Thermal relief case only Protection of spared
equipment Relief valve installed for fire case only.
• Start-up lines shall be drained and blinded off after use. This to avoid potential overpressure from
high pressure / low pressure interface.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 4 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2. ULTIMATE SAFEGUARDS
2.2.1 140-PSV-301/311
140-PSV-301/311 will take care of all relief scenarios of individual bank of Automatic Backwash
Feed Filter 140-F-001. As Automatic back wash filter is vendor specified item relief load and case
has been given by vendor. Since feed filter is designed for the full pressure available from
upstream, only applicable case is external fire.
Number of PSVs to be given by vendor based on Number of Bank of Back Wash Filter.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 7 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.2 140-PSV-302A/B
The Safety valve 140-PSV-302A/B is placed on top the vessel Feed Surge Drum, 140-V-001 and will
take care of all relief scenarios of Feed Surge Drum.
Not applicable
Control valve 140-FCV-408 & 140-XZV-719 are AIR TO OPEN type at the Gas Oil Feed Pump 140-
P-001A/B discharge will fully close. All control valves in the upstream unit supplying feed will close.
No relief will occur.
2.2.2.4 Inadvertent valve opening/closing
• 140-PCV-330A and bypass control valve full open. There will be inflow of nitrogen to the feed
surge drum. The Excess vapor has to be relieved.
• 140-PCV-330B, pressure control valve inadvertent open .Vapor will flow to flare and pressure will
drop. No relief will take place.
Control valve 140-FCV-408 & 140-XZV-719 are AIR TO OPEN type at the Gas Oil Feed Pump 140-
P-001A/B discharge will fully close. On the other hand Gas oil feed continues to flow into feed surge
drum. As a result level of feed surge drum will rise, resulting overfilling of vessel.
Not applicable.
2.2.2.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable. This equipment will contribute to fire load as its (bottom) elevation is
within 8 meters of fire zone height.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 8 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable.
In case of FC-408 failure or Gas oil feed pump (140-P-001A/B) failure, back flow from Reactor
system will occur due to high differential pressure between Feed surge drum & Reactor. This will
lead to overpressure in Feed surge Drum.
2.2.3 140-PSV-303A/B.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable.
Not Applicable
a. If 140-PCV-332B open or inadvertently open. Relief will occur due to Excess Nitrogen flow to
sulfiding agent drum. Relief load will be the based on maximum CV of PCV-332B.
b. If 140-PCV-332B close or inadvertently close: No relief case.
c. If 140-PCV-332A open or inadvertently open: System pressure will be depressurized into flare.
No relief will occur.
d. If 140-PCV-332A close or inadvertently close: Over pressurization during filling with chemical
can occur.
Not applicable.
2.2.3.7 Fire
This equipment will contribute to fire load as its (bottom) elevation is within 8 meters of fire zone
height.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Relief will occur for blocked outlet case. Pump flow will be relieved.
Not applicable.
2.2.4.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 10 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Relief will occur for blocked outlet case. Pump flow will be relieved.
Not applicable.
2.2.5.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.2.6 140-PSV-306
140-PSV-306 is located on the cooling water return line of Reactor Influent Trim Cooler 141-EE-003.
Not applicable
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 11 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief is envisaged for 140-PSV-306.
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-003 are closed,
the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A thermal
expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no 2.2.6.8.
2.2.6.5 Blocked outlet
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line is closed the flow stops. Thermal expansion can
freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief case.
2.2.6.6 Other failure
Tube rupture case is not considered for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-306.
2.2.6.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-003 are closed
while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can occur resulting
in a liquid relief.
.2.7 140-PSV-307A/B.
During a general power failure Gas Oil Feed Pump 140-P-001A/B, Reactor Effluent Air Cooler will
stop. 140-UZ-714 will trip Reactor Feed Heater 140-H-001 on low Gas Oil Feed Flow; while Recycle
Gas Compressor will continue to run since it is steam driven. Residual heat on the furnace will
vaporize gas oil+ recycle gas feed in the furnace tube. However, since 50% of the fans are on
emergency power back-up, natural cooling duty by Reactor Effluent Air Cooler 140-EA-001 is more
than residual heat duty of Reactor Feed Heater 140-H-001. Hence no relief is applicable.
When the Air cooler 140-EA-001 fans stop, since only 50% of the fans are on emergency power back-
up, less condensation of vapor will take place in the air cooler. This vapor will pressurize the system
and relief will take place.
a. Total cooling water failure, Reactor Effluent Trim cooler 140-EE-003 will lose cooling water flow
and condensation of vapor will not take place. However relief load is less as compared to local
power failure case 2.2.7.1 b.
Separator bottom level control valve 140-FCV-416 & 140-LCV-510 will close. This will lead to build up
in the liquid level of the separator drum. In this scenario liquid in the high pressure loop will be pushed
to the Separator Drum as Recycle Gas Compressor will maintain in Operation. Liquid Overfilling can
occur also additional vaporization cause by residual heat in the heater can cause over pressurization.
Liquid escape route is available through vapor outlet line and hence it is not a credible scenario. No
relief will occur.
a. 140-FCV-416 Separator bottom level control valve (hydrocarbon side) fails closed or is
inadvertently closed. Results in build up of inventory in the separator drum. As discussed in
2.2.7.3 .No relief will occur.
b. 140-FCV-416 Separator bottom level control valve on (hydrocarbon side) open or is
inadvertently open. More Liquid will flow to Stripper, results in fall in liquid level in the
separator drum. - As system is open to Stripper, no relief will occur in PSV-930. PSV-
319 located at Stripper will take care of Gas Blow.
c. 140-LCV-510 Separator Bottom Level control valve on Sour Water Side fails closed or is
inadvertently closed. Vessel level will rise; More than 20 minutes after high alarm is available
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 13 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
for operator intervention before the vessel gets overfill. No relief case has been considered.
d. 140-LCV-510 Separator Bottom Level control valve on sour water side open or is inadvertently
opened. Hydrocarbon will go to the sour water system and level of separator drum boot
will fall. 140-UZ-704 Water side Safeguarding System of Separator will close 140-XZV-704 at
low interface liquid level. Gas Blow by case from Separator drum 140-V-006 to Sour water
flash drum 140-V-017 is not considered as all HC would have to routed to drum before gas
blow by can occur.
Recycle gas compressor 140-K-002 trips. Separator drum pressure will be settled at settle out pressure
of the compressor. Design pressure of the separator is more than settle out pressure. No relief case
applicable.
2.2.7.7 Fire
Fire scenario is applicable as (bottom) elevation of the following equipments is within 8 m fire zone
height. The combine fire load of the following equipments has to be considered. Two fire zone has
been considered based on API-521guidelines.
Fire Zone- I
Fire zone-II
140-EA-001 & 140-EE-003 are above 8m elevation & hence fire case is not applicable.
2.2.8 140-PSV-309A/B.
140-PSV-309A/B is located on the top of the Sour Water Flash Drum 140-V-017. This PSV is provided
for the protection of 140-V-017.
Not Applicable
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 14 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable
Sour water feed and product valves are fail to close type will close. No relief will take place.
a. 140-LCV-510 open or inadvertently open: More feed will flow to sour water flash vessel and
relief will occur. However at low low boot level 140-UZ-704 will trip140-XZV-704. However for
this scenario Gas Break Through need not to be considered as HC content of the drum need
to be emptied before gas break through occurs..
b. 140-LCV-510 close or inadvertently close: No sour water will flow to sour water flash vessel.
No relief will occur.
c. 140-LCV-556 open or inadvertently open: More sour water will flow to sour water unit 550.
Ultimately gas break through to SWS can occur.
d. 140-LCV-556 close or inadvertently close: No sour water will flow to sour water unit 550. Level
will build up in the vessel and Relief will occur.
e. 140-LCV-514 open or inadvertently open: More HC’s will flow to Close Drain drum. No relief
will occur.
f. 140-LCV-514 close or inadvertently close: No sour water will flow to Close drain drum and
level in the vessel will rise. As HC flow is very low sufficient time for operator intervention
should be available to eliminate relief
Not applicable.
2.2.8.7 Fire
Fire scenario is applicable as (bottom) elevation of this equipment is within 8 m fire zone height.
2.2.9 140-PSV-310A/B.
140-PSV-310 is located on the top of the Wash Water Drum 140-V-004. This PSV is provided for the
protection of Wash Water Drum
Not Applicable
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 15 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Local power failure causes trip of Wash Water Pump 140-P-002A/B. Tripping of pump causes build up
of liquid level in the Wash Water Drum. Level control valve at the liquid inlet line of Wash Water Drum
will close and control level. No relief case is applicable.
Not applicable
140-FCV-420, 140-LCV-542A & 140-FCV-451 are fail to close type will be closed. No relief will
take place.
a. 140-FCV-420 open or inadvertently open. More Stripped Sour Water will flow to Wash Water
Drum. However liquid relief due to overfilling is applicable as less than 20 minutes are
available after high alarm for operator‘s intervention .
b. 140-LCV-542A open or inadvertently open. More sour water will flow to Wash Water
Drum.Liquid overfilling can be possible as less than 20 min are available for operator
intervention.After some time, liquid level in the stripper reflux drum (140-V-008) will fall and
vessel will eventually empty .This lead to Gas break through from stripper reflux drum (140-V-
008) to wash water drum (140-V-004)
c. 140-FCV – 451 open or inadvertently open. More BFW will flow to wash water drum. Liquid
relief due to overfilling is possible as less than 20 minutes are available after high alarm for
operator‘s intervention.
d. 140-PCV-368A open or inadvertently open: Opening of 140-PCV-368A will pressurize the
Wash Water Drum and relief will occur.
e. 140-PCV-368B closes or Inadvertently close: In normal operation, PCV-368B is always in
closed condition. No relief will occur.
f. 140-LCV-544 open or inadvertently open. More water will flow to wash water drum. Liquid relief
due to overfilling is possible.
Blocked outlet might result in liquid overfilling as it takes 5 minutes from high level to overfilling at
normal feed flow.
2.2.9.6 Other failure
Not applicable.
2.2.9.7 Fire
Fire scenario is applicable as bottom elevation of the equipment is within 8 m fire zone height.
In case of FC-419 failure or Wash water pump (140-P-002A/B) failure , back flow from Reactor
system will occur due to high differential pressure between Wash water drum & Reactor.This will
lead to overpressure in Wash water Drum.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 16 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.10 140-PSV-312
140-PSV-312 is located on the top of the HP Amine Absorber 140-C-001. This PSV is provided for the
protection of HP Amine Absorber.
Not Applicable
Local power failure causes Lean Amine Pump 140-P-003A/B trip. No amine will flow to HP Amine
Absorber. No relief case is applicable.
Not applicable
a. All Feed and product control valve associated with this system will close. No relief will take
place.
a. 140-FCV-424 open or inadvertently open. More Lean amine will flow to the HP Amine
Absorber. However liquid relief due to overfilling is not applicable as more than 20 minutes
are available after high alarm for operator‘s intervention . No relief case is considered.
b. 140-FCV-424 AIR TO OPEN type will close. No Lean Amine will flow to HP Amine
Absorber .No relief will take place
c. 140-LCV-521 fully open due to control system failure or inadvertently open. More liquid will
flow to LP Amine absorber. After sometimes Level in the HP amine absorber goes down and
at low liquid level 140-UZ-709 will trip the shutdown valve 140-XZV-709. No relief will take
place through 140-PSV-312.
d. 40-LCV-521 AIR TO OPEN type will close. Bottom level of Amine Absorber will rise. However
Overfill of the vessel will take more than 20 minutes. No relief will take place
Not Applicable.
Not applicable.
2.2.10.7 Fire
Fire scenario is applicable as the bottom elevation of HP amine absorber is within 8 m fire zone
height.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 17 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.11 140-PSV-313
140-PSV-313 is located on the top of the Recycle Gas Compressor KO Drum .This PSV is
provided for the protection of Recycle Gas Compressor K.O. Drum.
Not applicable
140-FCV-423,140-LCV-524 are AIR TO OPEN type will be closed. Recycle Gas compressor will
trip. The system is designed above the settle out pressure. No relief will occur.
a. If 140-FCV-423 open or inadvertently open due to control system failure. Recycle Gas Compressor
suction side will be depressurized to flare or fuel gas header. No relief will occur for 140-PSV-313.
b. 140-FCV-423 air fail to close type control valve will close: Control valve 140-FCV-423 is always in
close position during normal operation. No relief will occur.
c. Failure of LCV-524: If LCV-524 open due to control system failure or inadvertently open. The Gas
Blow By will take place from 140-V-005 to 140-C-003. 140-PSV-318 at LP Amine absorber will
take care of Gas Blow by case. Hence no relief case is considered for 140-PSV-313
There is less chances for Slug carry-over from HP Amine Absorber as HP Amine Absorber is
adequately design .However during abnormal condition in case of slug carryover column
differential pressure will rise which can be monitor in DCS. Operator will take appropriate action for
avoiding slug carry-over. No Overfilling case is applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 18 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.11.7 Fire
Fire case relief load will be from 141-V-005. This equipment will contribute to fire load as its
(bottom) elevation is within 8 meters of fire zone height.
Not applicable.
2.2.12 140-PSV-314
140-PSV-314 is located on the cooling water return line of Hydrogen Make-up Kick Back Cooler
140-EE-004.
Not applicable
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-314
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-004 are
closed, the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A
thermal expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no
2.2.12.8.
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line are closed the cooling water flow will stop. Thermal
expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief will take place.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 19 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
No tube rupture case is applicable for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-314.
2.2.12.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-004 are
closed while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can
occur resulting in a liquid relief.
2.2.13 140-PSV-315.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Cooling Water failure on tube side of 140-EE-004 will lead to increase in Make up H2 temperature.
High temperature alarm is provided at H2 Make up compressor suction. No relief case for 140-PSV-
315.
2.2.13.3 Total instrument air failure
a. 140-FCV-431 fails to open type will fully open & 140-XZV-707 AIR TO OPEN type will fully close.
140-K-001A/B will operate on full recycle and no relief will occur..
b. If 140-FCV-431 close due to failure of control system or inadvertently close. No relief will
occur
Not Applicable
2.2.13.7 Fire
Fire case relief load will be from 141-V-002 & 140-EE-004 shell side which are coming in
same fire zones based on latest equipment layout.
Not Applicable
Nitrogen being heavier than Hydrogen will see substantial rise in temperature at higher pressure
than Hydrogen. Hence, the set point for N2 case is kept lower than the operating case to
accommodate rise in temperature within the system design limits.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
If the isolation valves on 140-K-001A 2nd stage discharge is close or inadvertently close,
blocked outlet case is viable. Relief will occur and relief load will be the rated capacity of the
compressor.
Relief case is similar to case described in inadvertent valve opening and closing above.
Not applicable.
2.2.14.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Nitrogen being heavier than Hydrogen will see substantial rise in temperature at higher pressure
than Hydrogen. Hence, the set point for N2 case is kept lower than the operating case to
accommodate rise in temperature within the system design limits.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
If the isolation valve on 140-K-001B 2nd stage discharge close or inadvertently closes, blocked
outlet case is viable. Relief will occur and relief load will be the rated capacity of the compressor.
Relief case is similar to case described in inadvertent valve opening and closing above.
Not applicable.
2.2.15.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable
2.2.16 140-PSV-318A/B
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable
All Feed and Product control valve associated with this system will close. No relief will occur.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 23 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
a) 140-FCV-434 closes: Lean amine feed control valve 140-FCV-434 AIR TO OPEN type will
close. No Lean amine will flow to the LP Amine Absorber. No relief will occur.
b) 140-FCV-434 opens or inadvertently: More lean amine will flow into LP Amine Absorber
consequently building up Amine Absorber Bottom level and try to overfill the vessel.
However liquid relief due to overfilling is not applicable as more than 20 minutes are
available after high alarm for operator‘s intervention
c) 140-LCV-532 fails to close: Rich amine control valve 140-LCV-532 AIR TO OPEN type will
close. Level will build up in the LP Amine Absorber. However liquid relief due to overfilling is not
applicable as more than 20 minutes are available after high alarm for operator‘s
intervention
d) 140-LCV-532 open or inadvertently open: Level of LP Amine Absorber will be fall. Gas break
through can be possible to ARU unit. However this is having no impact on the amine
absorber to be discussed in ARU unit separately.
e) 140-PCV-394A & 140-PCV-394B close: 140-PCV-394A & 140-PCV-394B fails to close will be
closed. The vapor will be accumulated in the column and excess vapor has to be relieved in the
LP amine absorber overhead PSV-318 A/B.
f) 140-PCV-394A & 140-PCV-394B open or inadvertently open. Fuel gas system will be
pressurized and relief will take place in the fuel gas header. This scenario will be discussed in
PSV of fuel gas header.
g) 140-LCV-524 fails open: Gas Break Through from 140-V-005 to 140-C-003 can be possible.
Relief will occur.
h) 140-LCV-521 fails open: More rich amine will flow from HP Amine absorber to LP Amine
absorber. Relief will occur. However Gas break through from 140-C-001 to 140-C-003 is
Possible.
Relief case is similar to above case 2.2.16.4.e. Blocked outlet case is applicable.
Not applicable.
2.2.16.7 Fire
Fire case relief load will be from140-C-003 & this equipment will contribute to fire load as its
(bottom) elevation is within 8 m fire zone height.
Not applicable
In case of Lean Amine booster Pump (140-P-003) trips , back flow will occur causing damage to
pump and possible over pressurization in LP amine absorber.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 24 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.17 140-PSV-319A/B
a) Stripper 140-C-002.
b) Stripper Preheated 140-EE-002 shell side.
c ) Stripper Air condenser 140-EA-002
d) Stripper Trim Cooler 140-EE-005
e) Stripper Reflux drum 140-V-008
f) HP Amine Absorber KO Drum 140-V-010
I. Local Power Failure of 140-P-005A/B: Flow of stripper product will stop and liquid level in
column bottom will rise. However liquid relief due to overfilling is not applicable as more
than 20 minutes are available after high alarm for operator‘s intervention
III. Local Power Failure of 140-P-004A/B: Reflux Failure to Stripper Resulting in Relief.
a. For cooling water failure case, 140-EE-005 will lose cooling water and condensation of
vapor will not take place. The vapors, which are normally condensed by 140-EE-005, have to
be relieved. Relief rate would be lower than Reflux failure / Local Power failure case.
Feed valve at Separator bottom 140-FCV-416 and steam valve 140-FCV-436 will close. Reflux
valve 140-FCV-439 will open and Gas oil product control valve 140- XV-740 at column bottom will
close. No relief will be considered as column will be operated on full circulation.
a. Steam valve FCV-436 opens or is inadvertently open: More steam will flow to the column
consequently pressurized the column and Relief will occur.
b. Steam valve FCV-436 fail close or is inadvertently close: No steam will flow to the column. No
relief case.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 25 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
c. Feed valve TCV-191A open or inadvertently open: Feed to column will be colder. No relief
case..
d. Feed valve TCV-191A close or inadvertently close: Failure of TCV-191A (close) or TCV-191B
(Open) Based on our calculation, there is no increase in outlet temperature of exchanger.
e. Feed valve TCV-191B open or inadvertently open: Failure of TCV-191A (open) or TCV-191B
(close) Feed to column will be colder. No relief case.
f. Reflux control valve FCV-439 closed or is inadvertently closed. Refer reflux failure case or
local power failure case.
g. Reflux control valve FCV-439 open or inadvertently open. More reflux will flow to the
Column. No relief case.
h. 140- XV-740 close: Level will rise in the stripper column. However liquid relief due to
overfilling is not applicable as more than 20 minutes are available after high alarm for
operator‘s intervention.
i. 140-FCV-416 open or inadvertently open: More liquid will flow to stripper. After some time
liquid level in the Separator drum will fall and vessel will eventually empty. This lead to Gas
Break Through from Separator Drum to Stripper.
j. 140-LCV-519 open or inadvertently open: Possibility of Gas Break Through from HP Amine
KO Drum to Stripper.
Tube rupture in Stripper Pre-heater 140-EE-002 is not considered as the relief case because the
mechanical design pressure of the shell side is more than 10/13th of the mechanical design pressure
of the tube side.
2.2.17.8 Fire
Fire case relief load is combined load of 140-C-002,140-V-008,140-V-010 and 141-EE-002 shell side.
All these equipment will contribute to fire load as their (bottom) elevation is within 8 m fire zone
height.140-EA-002 & 140-EE-005 are above 8m Elevation & hence Fire case is not applicable.
2.2.18 140-PSV-320
140-PSV-320 is located on the cooling water return line of Gas Oil Trim Cooler 140-EE-007. This
Not applicable
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 26 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-320
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-007 are
closed, the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A
thermal expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no
2.2.18.8.
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line is closed the cooling water flow stops. Thermal
expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief case.
No tube rupture case is applicable for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-320.
2.2.18.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-007 are closed
while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can occur
resulting in a liquid relief.
2.2.19 140-PSV-321
140-PSV-320 is located on the cooling water return line of Stripper Trim Condenser 140-EE-005.
Not applicable
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 27 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-321
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-005 are closed,
the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A thermal
expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no 2.2.19.8.
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line is closed the cooling water flow stop. Thermal
expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief case.
2.2.19.6 Other failure
No tube rupture case is applicable for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-321.
2.2.19.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-005 are closed
while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can occur
resulting in a liquid relief.
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 28 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable.
Relief will occur for blocked outlet case. Pump flow will be relieved.
Not applicable.
2.2.20.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.2.21 140-PSV-323
Gas oil product temperature to storage will rise. No relief will occur.
All feed and product control valve associated with the system will close. No relief will occur
a. 140-FCV-442 air fails close or inadvertently close: Gas oil product will be blocked. However the
coalescer is design above shut off pressure of Stripper Bottom Pump. No relief case is
applicable case.
b. 140-FCV-442 open or inadvertently open: More Gas oil product will go to storage. No relief
case.
c. 140-LCV-544 air fails to close or inadvertently close: Boot level in the coalescer will rise. No
relief will occur
d. 140-LCV-544 open or inadvertently open: Boot level in the Coalescer will fall and after that
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 29 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Gas oil product will goes to wash water drum. No relief will occur.
e. Inadvertently closing of Coalescer discharge isolation valve : same as 2.2.21.4 a
f. Inadvertently opening of Coalescer discharge isolation valve: No relief case.
Not applicable.
2.2.21.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable as ( bottom) elevation of the equipment is within 8 m fire zone
height.
Not applicable.
This is one pump with two head both protected with its own PSV.
Not applicable.
2.2.22.3 Total instrument air failure
Not applicable.
Relief will occur for Blocked outlet case. Pump flow will be relieved.
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 30 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.22.7 Fire
Not applicable.
2.2.23 140-PSV-928
140-PSV-928 is located on the cooling water return line of Hydrogen Cooler 140-EE-009. This relief
Not applicable
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-928
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-009 are
closed, the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A
thermal expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case
no2.2.23.8.
2.2.23.5 Blocked outlet
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line are closed the cooling water flow will stop. Thermal
expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief case.
No tube rupture case is applicable for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-928.
2.2.23.7 Fire
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 31 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-009 are
closed while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can
occur resulting in a liquid relief.
2.2.24 140-PSV-929
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
140-PCV-394A, 140-PCV-394B & 140-LCV-551 control valves are air fails to close type will close.
140-PSV-318 at LP Amine Absorber 140-C-003 is designed for Blocked outlet case. No relief case
applicable for 140-PSV-929.
a. 140-PCV-394A air fails close or inadvertently close: No relief case is applicable for 140-
PSV-929 as 140-PSV-318 is designed for Blocked outlet case.
b. 40-PCV-394A open or inadvertently open: More off gas will flow to unit 350 and system will be
depressurized. No relief case.
c. 140-PCV-394B air fails close or inadvertently close: No relief case is applicable for 140-
PSV-929 as 140-PSV-318 is designed for Blocked outlet case.
d. 140-PCV-394B open or inadvertently open: More off gas will flow to Fuel gas header and
system will be depressurized to fuel gas header. No relief case.
e. 140-LCV-551 open or inadvertently open: Level in the Off Gas K.O drum will fall and
eventually when there is no liquid in the drum, off gas will blow by to ARU unit along with rich
amine. However no relief case is considered for 140-PSV-929
f. 140-LCV-551 close or inadvertently close: No relief case.
Not Applicable
2.2.24.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable as the (bottom) elevation of the equipment is within 8 m fire
zone height.
Not applicable
2.2.25 140-PSV-930A/B
Not Applicable
Not applicable
Separator drum bottom control valve 140-FCV-416 fails to close type will close and Stripper
preheater inlet control valve fails open type will open .No relief case
a. 140-FCV-416 air fails close or inadvertently close: Separator Bottom flow to Stripper will
decrease. No relief case is applicable.
b. 140-FCV-416 air fails open or inadvertently open: As system to Stripper is open, no relief will
occur..
c. 140-TCV-191B air fails open or inadvertently open: More flow from Separator Drum to
Stripper. No relief case is applicable
d. 140-TCV-191B close or inadvertently close: Minimum flow stop limit is available for TCV-191B
to avoid total blockage of liquid. However excess liquid has to be relieved.
e. 140-TCV-191A air fails close or inadvertently close: TCV-191B is on operation, No relief
case.
f. 140-TCV-191A open or inadvertently open: More liquid will flow to Stripper, and feed
temperature will fall. No relief case
g. Closure of TCV-191A/B simultaneously will result in full flow relief by PSV-930.
Not applicable.
2.2.25.7 Fire
System is open to stripper, fire load of Stripper Feed Bottom Exchanger 140-EE-006
channel side is accommodated in Stripper 140-C-002 overhead PSV-319A/B.No relief case is
applicable
Not applicable.
2.2.26 140-PSV-931
Gas oil product temperature to storage will rise. No relief will occur.
Not applicable.
a. 140-FCV-442 air fails close or inadvertently close: Gas oil product will be blocked. However the
Salt Dryer is design above shut off pressure of Stripper Bottom Pump. No relief case is
applicable.
b. 140-FCV-442 open or inadvertently open: More Gas oil product will go to storage. No relief
case.
c. Inadvertently closing of Salt Dryer discharge isolation valve: same as above
d. Inadvertently opening of Salt Dryer discharge isolation valve: same as above
Not applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 34 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.26.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable as equipment (bottom) elevation is within 8 m fire zone height
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
2.2.27.3 Total instrument air failure
Not applicable.
Relief will occur for Blocked outlet case. Pump flow will be relieved.
Not applicable.
2.2.27.7 Fire
Not applicable.
2.2.28 140-PSV-941A/B
Not Applicable
Not applicable
140-FCV-423 on Recycle Gas Compressor K.O.Drum overhead line and PCV-394B on Off Gas K.O.
Drum overhead line which are fail to close type will close on instrument air failure. No relief case
applicable
a. 140-FCV-423 air fails close or inadvertently close: No recycle gas will flow to fuel gas
header. No relief case is applicable.
b. 140-FCV-423 open or inadvertently open: More recycle gas will flow to the fuel gas header.
Excess vapor has to be released through 140-PSV-941A/B.
c. 140-PCV-394B air fails close or inadvertently close: No off gas will flow to fuel gas header. No
relief case is applicable
d. 140-PCV-394B open or inadvertently open: More off gas will flow to fuel gas header .and
excess vapor has to be released through 140-PSV-941A/B.
e. Closing of Battery Limit Isolation valve can lead to pressurize the header and excess vapor has
to be released.
2.2.28.5 Blocked outlet
Not applicable.
2.2.28.7 Fire
Not Applicable
Not applicable.
2.2.29 140-PSV-942
This relief valve protects the Fuel Gas K.O Drum 140-V-023
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 36 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not Applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
a. Battery limit isolation valve inadvertently open of fully open: No relief is applicable as fuel gas
system is design for battery limit design condition.
b. Battery limit isolation valve inadvertently close: No fuel gas will flow to Heater. No relief case.
c. Manual isolation valve at fuel gas K.O drum down stream open or fully open: No relief case
d. Manual isolation valve at fuel gas K.O drum down stream close : Fuel gas system is design for
Battery limit design condition .No relief case
Not applicable.
2.2.29.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable as equipment (bottom) elevation is within 8 m fire zone height
This relief valve protects the shell side of Hydrogen Cooler 140-EE-009 and down stream piping.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
a. 140-PCV-922 open or inadvertently open: More hydrocarbon will flow to Storage. Excess vapor
try to pressurize the system and a relief will occur.
b. 140-PCV-922 closes or inadvertently close. No relief Case
c. Battery limit Isolation valve close: Hydrocarbon flow will be blocked and relief will occur.
Not applicable.
2.2.30.7 Fire
Fire case scenario is applicable as equipment (bottom) elevation is within 8 m fire zone height
This relief valve protects the Recycle Compressor Steam Turbine 140-KT-002 and down stream
piping.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
a. 140-SCV-681 open or inadvertently open: More steam will flow from HP Steam header to MP
Steam header through Recycle Gas Turbine. Excess Vapor has to be released through
PSV-604 A/B
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 38 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
b. Battery limit Isolation valve close: MP flow from Turbine to MP Steam Header will be
blocked and relief will occur.
Not applicable.
2.2.31.7 Fire
Not applicable.
2.2.32 140-PSV-977/979
140-PSV-977/979 is located on the cooling water return line of Make-up Gas Compressor Interstage
Cooler 140-EE-008A/B.
Not applicable
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-946A/B
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-EE-008A/B are
closed, the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the process side continues. A
thermal expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no
2.2.33.8.
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line are closed the cooling water flow will stop.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 39 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Thermal expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief will take place.
No tube rupture case is applicable for this relief valve, which protects the exchanger tube side.
Because the mechanical design pressure of the tube side is more than 10/13 of the mechanical
design pressure of the shell side and the normal operating pressure of the shell side is below the set
pressure of 140-PSV-977/979
2.2.32.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves of the 140-EE-008A/B are
closed while the heat input from the process side continues, expansion of the cooling water can
occur resulting in a liquid relief.
2.2.33 140-PSV-939
140-PSV-939 is located on Start up recirculation line origination from Salt Dryer V-019
overhead.
This relief valve protects the start up recirculation line. 4”A01A-1-140-P094 from
thermal expansion.
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Not applicable
Same as above.
Not applicable
2.2.33.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where there is hold-up of liquid in start-up recirculation line, it can heat up due to
solar radiations. Expansion of Hydrocarbon can occur resulting in a liquid relief.
140-PSV-901 A/C is located on 1st stage discharge of 140-K-001A after pulsation Bottle. This relief
Nitrogen being heavier than Hydrogen will see substantial rise in temperature at higher pressure
than Hydrogen. Hence, the set point for N2 case is kept lower than the operating case to
accommodate rise in temperature within the system design limits.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
If the isolation valves on 140-K-001A 1st stage discharge is close or inadvertently close,
blocked outlet case is viable.
Relief case is similar to case described in inadvertent valve opening and closing above.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 41 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
Not applicable.
2.2.34.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Nitrogen being heavier than Hydrogen will see substantial rise in temperature at higher pressure
than Hydrogen. Hence, the set point for N2 case is kept lower than the operating case to
accommodate rise in temperature within the system design limits.
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
If the isolation valve on 140-K-001B 1st stage discharge close or inadvertently closes, blocked
outlet case is viable.
Relief case is similar to case described in inadvertent valve opening and closing above.
Not applicable.
2.2.35.7 Fire
Not applicable.
Not applicable
2.2.36 140-PSV-754
140-PSV-754 is located on the cooling water return line of Condensate Pipe Cooler 140-SP-
Not applicable
Not applicable
On the cooling waterside, the cooling water temperature will increase but liquid expansion will be
handled by the cooling water system. No relief case for 140-PSV-754.
Not applicable
If inlet and outlet block valves of the cooling water supply and return line of 140-SP-PC004101 are
closed, the cooling waterside is blocked in while heat input from the condensate side continues. A
thermal expansion relief case will occur. Refer to Thermal expansion case below, case no 2.2.19.8.
If the outlet valves in the cooling water return line is closed the cooling water flow stop. Thermal
expansion can freely escape through the inlet valve. No relief case.
Not Applicable.
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
SAFEGUARDING MEMORANDUM
Cuddalore Refinery, Tamil Nadu Page 43 of 44
DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
2.2.36.7 Fire
Not applicable.
In any scenario where the cooling water inlet and outlet block valves are closed while the heat input
from the condensate side continues, expansion of the cooling water can occur resulting in a liquid
relief.
3. MITIGATING SYSTEM
Mitigating system are the elements or a system that is specifically included in the design to limit the
consequence of uncontrolled loss of containment e.g. remotely operated valves in the pump
suction lines, emergency shut down valves at separator drum overhead.
Tag No Location
3.1.1 140-XV-702A
3.1.2 140-XV-728
Solenoid actuated On/Off valve 140-XV-728 is provided on the 140-V-001 Feed surge drum bottom
DHU‐NOCL Project Doc No. : CS-140-PR-45-0002
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DHU‐NOCL
Project No: SO‐2331 Rev: 3
outlet line. 140-XV-728 is a fire safe valve will protect the damage of Gas Oil feed pump 140- P-
001A/B in case of fire or emergency situation. When 140-XV-728 closed; pump safe guarding
system 140-UZ-701 will trip the pump. The valve shall be placed as close as possible to the feed
surge drum. Local hand switch 140-HS-839 is provided 15 m away from the gas oil feed pump at a
safe location. The purpose of providing local switch 15 m away from the pump is that operator can
close the valve from remote location in case if it is not possible to isolate the feed surge drum
physically during fire.
3.1.3 140-XV-740
Solenoid actuated On/Off valve 140-XV-740 is provided on the 140-C-002 bottom outlet line. 140-
XV-740 is a fire safe valve will protect the damage of Stripper Bottom Pump 140-P-005A/B in case
of fire or emergency situation. When 140-XV-740 closed, pump safe guarding system 140-UZ-712
will trip the pump. The valve shall be placed as close as possible to the stripper outlet
nozzle .Local hand switch 140-HS-850 is provided 15 m away from the stripper bottom pump at a
safe location. The purpose of providing local switch 15 m away from the pump is that operator can
close the valve from remote location in case if it is not possible to isolate the stripper
physically during fire.
4. PENULTIMATE SAFEGAURDS.