From Colony to Superpower: Chapter X – A new age: Wilson, The Great War

and the Quest for a new World Order 1913-1921 by G. Herring

- Context of Wilson: initially reluctant to intervention in European Affairs, faced with

revolutions in Mexico, China and Russia from the start of his mandate [1913], accepted
to intervene due to necessity [Germany] and to have a voice in peace-making
- Personal background: studied law and got a PhD in history and PS from Johns Hopkins
University, became president of Princeton, very moral and deeply religious
o won in 1912 [republicans split between Taft and Roosevelt] and committed to
New Freedom reform [= equality of opportunity and democracy by tariff and
banking reforms] and externally oriented towards HRs [US would do well by
doing good] but culture blindness, racism and lack of experience
o appointed William Jennings Bryan [party leader] as secretary of state  more
travelling experience but also very Christian
o 1913 – advocates against gun-boat diplomacy and economic imperialism
[offering Colombia monetary compensation for Panamanian revolution]
o 1913-1914 Wilson and Bryan negotiated with 20 nations treaties for de-
escalation of military conflicts [“The Bryan Treaties”]  when diplomacy fails
submit issue to an international commission and refrain from war
- Upheavals in East-Asia and Latin-America [diverse but wish to eliminate foreign
interests]  ethnocentric humanitarianism seeking to direct them [x: positive response
to Chinese Revolution to move it to Christianity and democracy]
o Started to be integrated in the European War with Japan joining Allies  Japan
in China [Wilson gave some loans but that was all]
o In Latin-America vital interests so dollar-diplomacy  made Nicaragua,
Panama, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic protectorates
o 1915 – placed Haiti under occupation and eliminated German interests but it
remained impoverished
- The Mexico situation: Porfirio Diaz maintained economic open-door
o overthrown in 1911 by Francisco Madero  counterrevolutions and long
struggle
o new overthrow in 1913 by Victoriana Huerta  very violent  Wilson
introduced a moral standard of recognizing revolutions [before only will of the
people]
o US military intervention in 1914 to get rid of Huerta after covert plots failed –
troops really improved Veracruz
o Huerta replaced by Carranza and troops retracted  relative peace but evolved
with guerilla movements of Francisco Villa
o Wilson recognized Carranza and offered support but Villa attacked
o 1916 Villa attacked the US + movements in US for all-out war  Wilson
decided upon form but contained response
o Consequences: military preparedness in Congress voted in 1916 + stronger hand
in Germany
- The Great War:
o Tensions between all powers and the idea of short war  1914 technologically
advances and alliance system but lines remained virtually unchanged until
March 1917
o US very diverse preferences and Wilson feared internal war but sent aid [x: the
Belgian Relief] but neutrality very hard to achieve due to economic ties
[responses to British Blockade and German U-Boat strategy]
 o 1915 – sinking of the Lusitania UK boat and 128 Americans died  Wilson sent
diagram reaffirming humanitarian principles in Germany
o 1916 – Wilson and Robert Lansing [Bryan’s successor] declared Germany must
stop submarine warfare  military expansions + rise in “internationalists”
[=preserve US life by active involvement in world politics] and “isolationism”
o Wilson gets reelected in a narrow victory over republican Charles Hughes 
keeps to the idea of open negotiation restating war aims on both sides [UK asked
too much, Germany did not want to expose at all]
o 1917 – addresses to the Senate his “peace without victory” and new world order
[revolutionary ideas but detached from European realities”  Germany
announced an unrestricted submarine warfare  Wilson breaks relations with
Germany but insisted to be neutral mediator instead of belligerent
o Zimmermann telegram – Germany offered Mexico an alliance [to help
reconquer former territories in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona] + March 1917
Germany sunk 3 US boats violating US right of high seas
o April 1917 – declaration of war against Germany but at own command free from
Allied Forces
o Late 1917 Russia withdraws from war + end-the-war German offensive failed
in Paris
- The peace ideals – started even before the end of war with ideas that economic
colonialism and monopolistic trade arrangements created reasons to fight  American
exceptionalism imposing a liberal-capitalist line and a community of power
o The 14 points of 8 January 1918 – as a response to Lenin’s revelations of the
Allied secret treaties BUT referring to US as an Associated power [maintaining
own decisions at heart]
o Sent troops to Siberia and never wanted to recognize the Bolshevik revolution
but kept in mind the Mexico failure in a moderate act  fueled the myth that
US wanted to overthrow the Bolshevik government
o Germany sought armistice negotiation alone on the 14 points  UK and France
in theory agreed but maintained some liberty of interpretation
- Paris Peace Conference of January 12, 1919 - Wilson 1st president to go to Europe for
negotiations himself for six months in a summit diplomacy way + Germany excluded
and deep revenge sentiments all across Europe + very broad discussions for equality
and self-determination
o Clemenceau represented France and Lloyd George UK
o Allies owned to the US over 10 billion $ but the US economy came to depend
on war orders
o With Germany peace concluded between France’s wish for revenge and
Wilson’s just peace ideal  limits on military power and pledge from US and
UK to aid France in case of attack + extensive war reparations
o France and UK obtained mandates in Ottoman Empire, Africa and Middle East
o China – Shandong [birthplace of Confucius] remained to Japan
o In E. Europe new nations emerged due to self-determination and wish to buffer
between Germany and Russia [Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia] but old ethnical problems unresolved
o US forces from N. Russia were withdrawn [UK proposed to eliminate the
Bolshevik government by full-fledged military effort]
o Wilson justified concessions on issues to establish the League of Nations project
[thought it would soften up some of the concessions afterwards]
- League of Nations – Assembly of all nations + Council of the 5 victorious powers + 4
elected by assembly  supervise mandates, encourage peaceful resolution and employ
economic and military sanctions + collective security mechanism
o Reactions – very big protests from Germany, disappointment from colonies
[little attention for self-determination besides Europe], national struggles
internationalized
- US internal reaction – politically supercharged environment [labor violence, riots and
Red Scare] + Wilson stretched executive powers a lot + Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
who hated Wilson set out to humiliate the League
o What role should the US have – extent and nature of commitments –
internationalists were disappointed by Wilson’s tendency to uphold the world
order + many nationalities attacked the issues they cared about [American
Italians and colonial claims]
o Some Republicans opposed entry in the League due to fear of STQ perpetuation
o Other Republicans accepted but with limited involvement especially Article X
[war renouncing] and worries that US would be involved in issues extending
their wish
o Wilson started popularizing his ideas by speeches and trips [LoN as only
guarantee for peace] – he got very ill and abandoned the tours
o In the Foreign Relations Committee some reservations were decided [x: exclude
Monroe doctrine and domestic issues from the League jurisdiction. Severely
restrict obligations under article X and allow withdrawal – no obligation to
defend political integrity of any country
o 38 for and 53 against in the Senate
- Results of the war: US major player in world economy and politics + guiding US
principles in years to come

From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XIII – Five Continents and Seven

Seas: World War II and the Rise of American Globalism 1941-1945 by G.
Herring
- Context: America was no longer secure from foreign threat  better prepared than in
1917, Roosevelt set immense economic goals and Pearl Harbor determined full
mobilization BUT very divided policy formulation and new agencies [CIA] + increased
military role  some claim Roosevelt was lacking guiding principles and was blind
political issues
- Alliances as convenience marriages to meet urgent needs  US, USSR and UK in 1941
to combat Nazi Germany [but mutual suspicions and division in strategy and war aims]
 in terms of war strategy divisions on which front was more important [Germany was
very strong in France and US feared that a cross-channel attack in 1943 would fail] so
they eventually agreed on a peripheral approach
o USSR wanted a moderate expansion and friendly governments in buffer zone
o UK wanted its empire
o US wanted open economy, self-determination and UN leadership [had to face
internal opposition to scrap the Germany-first doctrine]  insisted to resolve
disputes only after the war end
- Teheran conference of 1943 Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin: the allied military situation
improved and win seemed guaranteed  discuss post-war strategies with Roosevelt
trying to get close to Stalin but not mentioning the bomb
- Post-war aims of the US: involvement in more areas but got entangled in unpredictable
issues such as decolonization or Israel-Palestine + advance American republics as
alternative to Fascism  good neighbor policy [in Latin America they tried to wipe out
European influence]  US won a lot from war in terms of trade in the W. hemisphere
but in terms of good neighbor policy it only had limited impact and ended with
Roosevelt [the blacklist of governments influenced by axis raised tensions 
strengthened oppression and dictatorship in many countries] + shift to Middle East due
to oil [especially in Saudi Arabia, Iran nation-building and Israel] – Roosevelt caught
between Arab interests and Zionist demands
- In SE Asia colonial problems became very pressing at the end of the war and Roosevelt
was very conflicted between self-determination and readiness for nation-states [India
became first-hand issue in US-UK alliance and US tried to mediate between Gandhi and
UK  could not do a lot so shifted anti-colonial rhetoric to French Indochina then under
Japan domination]  big internal/external opposition for the “trusteeship scheme”
- The China-tangle – Chiang Kai-shek hoped US will help him get rid of Japan and
undermine Mao’s dominance but his government was very weak and divided internally
so remained a second-class ally  1944 Japan’s position in China strengthened and
Zhou Enlai started strong dialogue with US
- The 1944 end of war: Red Army liberated Soviet territory and allies invaded and
liberated France, Japan was virtually ended  post-war issues moved to the spotlight
o Bretton Woods 1944 – the WB
o Planning in 1944 called for the Grand Alliance with UK and Russia policing
post-war Europe and US policing W Hemisphere and Pacific  Stalin in E. and
Central Europe
o Poland – special significance with US insisting on number of Polish-Americans,
UK hosting the anti-Soviet government in exile and Stalin insisting on friendly
government
o UK-Soviet meeting of lines of involvement with UK taking Greece alarmed the
US
o Conflicting positions on Germany [US and UK for restauration to balance
against USSR but Stalin for punitive peace]
- The Yalta conference of 1945 [initially saw as great peace but then as a treason of
Roosevelt who conceded Poland and E. Europe and sold Chiang Kai-shek]: before the
Red Army liberated much of E-C Europe and US was uncertain if the atomic bomb
would be ready for Germany so needed USSR to get involved to secure victory and
Roosevelt hoped for great-power cooperation
o USSR accepted to take part in the UN as it was designed by US without big
modifications + enter war against Japan + make an alliance with Chiang
o Disagreement on German dismemberment and reparations and the Poland issue
!April 12, 1945 Roosevelt dies!
- Legacy of Roosevelt: perceived interconnectness faster than any + moved towards
international cooperation from the unilateral perspective BUT refusal to confide in
others left a big power vacuum
- Harry S. Truman – a confirmed Wilsonian gravitating towards internationalism and
generally tough stance  beginning of mandate he was very undecided on the USSR
[initially gave aid in the fight against Japan but forced them to respect Yalta
o August 1945 – Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs to end war faster with less
casualties and to balance against the USSR in E. Europe [use to bludgeon the
soviets to accept US post-war order]
o Double shock of bombs and USSR Manchuria invasion made Japan surrender
 o Very controversial decision and Japan was weak and casualties estimated were
highly inflated by US
- US and USSR emerged as the only nations capable of exerting great influence beyond
own borders  US stronger than before + the bomb + booming economy + homeland
virtually untouched

From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XIV – A novel burden far from our
shores: Truman, Cold War and the Revolution in US Foreign Policy
1945-1953 by G. Herring
- Post-war casualties + multipolar pre-war Japan, Germany and Italy were occupied, UK
reduced to second-rank power, France greater loss, Eurocentrism crumbled, revolutions
in ME and Asia due to colonialism, domestic political turmoil everywhere,
technological advancements and collapse of distances, the UN, fear of a new war,
problems of readjustments by demobilization of troops  bipolar world order
o Truman lack of experience and knowledge so turn to experts, his peace
conducting was based on Wilson’s principles  big rejects of USSR influence
and made them seem uncooperative and threatening
- US/USSR first clashes:
o Council of Foreign Ministers September 1945 London – Molotov unwilling to
compromise and jokes about the bomb to seem powerful
o CFM in December 1945 Moscow – looked more like Yalta, USSR accepted the
international control of atomic energy  Truman rejected Byrnes’s soft stance
o Stalin – cruel and brutal but aware of Soviet limitations and did not push for
revolutions immediately as he didn’t want war
o The Long Telegram of Kennan – hardline against the soviets thought to respond
only to force  US started to tougher stance in Iran
o The Iran crisis – soviets left occupation forces in Iran after the withdrawal March
1946 deadline, demanded oil concessions and backed a separatist movement in
Azerbaijan  US saw this as an expansionist soviet threat so backed Iran 
Soviets retreated reinforcing the get-tough successes
o The Acheson-Lilienthal plan for international authority to control atomic
materials [so no single nation can get a dominant position] but fears of soviet
spies stealing the technology  failed so both continued developments
unmonitored
o The Turkey war-scare of 1946 – USSR wanted joint access to Dardanelles and
Bosporus so pushed for Montreux Convention revision but eventually USA
strategically won
- The Cold-war – 1947 US big economic plans to combat USSR influence and ongoing
insurgencies in countries where communism would be possible  Truman replaced
Byrnes with Marshall, triggered a big internal reorganization by unifying the armed
services, enlarged aid to Greece and Turkey as hotspots  the Truman Doctrine [Greece
intervention victorious in 1949] and the Marshall Plan VS. Stalin resistance by aiding
rebels [the Tito rupture in Yugoslavia]
o The Marshall Plan – 25 billion $ very hard to sell at home since inflation was
already raising  context of Mao winning in China and the Czechoslovakia
revolution
o CIA efforts to prevent a communist victory in Italian 1948 elections [carrot and
sticks mechanisms to prevent an escalation]
 o In E. Europe Kennan suggested a political warfare by sabotage, guerrilla
operation and propaganda activities to stage coups = Operation Rollback 1947-
1948 but huge failure as it was intercepted by the USSR  hardened the CW
divisions in Europe
o 1947 the Molotov plan + Communist Information Bureau for ideological purity
 marks the moment where Stalin refused to tolerate and differences in his
sphere
- Extending USSR sphere: 1947 Hungary + 1948 Czech + operation to solidify E.
Germany control by ceasing access to Berlin in July 1948
o The Berlin Blockade – Allied position in W. was solidified but risk of escalation
so Truman chose the unprovocative airlift  US won German gratitude and
Truman crucial support at home
o NATO 1949 security by unification idea – hard to build with divisions on
membership and US commitments but necessary after the BB
- Latin America especially susceptible to communism + South Africa racial politics + the
Arab-Jewish conflicts [the partition and following war] + East Asia growing problem
with China becoming communist [US tried a coalition government with Chiang having
the upper hand] after a long civil war in which US did not want to intervene [considered
still a second-hand theatre]
o Japan – general Douglas MacArthur reformed Japan drastically and proposed
negotiation for peace in 1947 but overthrown plan in 1948 for stability and
economic growth
- 1949-1950 globalization in containment policy + USSR developing in 1949 its own
atomic bomb + win of Mao in China totally shifted the balance
o US had to negotiate peace with Japan to balance against China
o Launch of NSC-68 as a total combat plan for soviet threats [especially extending
commitments to East-Asia]
- The Korean war with both Rhee Sung-man [protegee of Woodrow Wilson] and Kim Il-
sung passionate to unify on their own terms and US retracting in 1949 allowing full war
– Stalin backed Kim in the initial 1950 intervention but Truman also intervened fast due
to fear of spill over and losing European credibility  1951 stalemate but some limited
Chinese intervention still ongoing  1953 war ended with roughly 10% population
dead + China achieved great power status
- Cold War evolution: very big propaganda tools + arms race but Truman administration
shaken by internal scandals

Democratic Realism, an American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World

by Charles Krauthammer
- US unipolar power with decisive reach everywhere  initially confusion but with the
Afghanistan war fascination with the huge well mobilized display of power  Rome,
Britain, France aren’t a comparison because American’s aren’t colonialists or imperial
powers  US = commercial republic with overwhelming global power and custody of
international system
- Isolationism = hoard power and retreat due to historical superiority BUT today ideology
of fear [but did not oppose Afghan war because it was self-defence]  now it is just
intellectual reductionism because of transnational changes
- Liberal internationalism 90s = after Vietnam it became reflective anti-interventionism
[before containment] but then with Clinton it became hyper interventionism [Somalia,
 Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo] because of humanitarian principles  liberal internationalism
aversion towards force for national interest [shaping the international scene by power
projection abroad to secure goods] but encouragement towards humanitarian action
o Multilateralism [characteristic of LI] = series of treaties that may be
pragmatically useless but morally important [chemical and biological weapons]
+ reducing American freedom of action by making it constricted by the will and
interests of other nations
o Multilateralism is the attempt to gain assistance and legitimacy [x: Iraq should
have been brought to UN]
o PROBLEMS: multilateralism is a way to tie small powers to greater ones and it
constrains immorally US
- Realism = liberal project is hopeless illusion as states have central authority, shared
goodwill and IA doesn’t so US holds it together as the closest thing to a centralized
authority  pre-emption [improvement on classical deterrence] and unilateralism [often
road to multilateralism] BUT constraining due to definition of interest as power
- Democratic globalism = interest not as power but as principle [the success of liberty]
with enemy now being Arab Islamic totalitarianism secular and religious BUT it is not
Wilsonian idealism rather it is improved realism
o ONLY where it counts [=not hypocrisy but select only biggest threats or where
it can change the balance of power – Iraq]
- 9/11 – biggest problem [for future generations it will be the Chinese rise and the
demographic collapse of Europe]
o Isolationists say defend US but you can’t cause threat exceeds borders
o LI say that anything besides humanitarian or self-defence is wrong so give power
to a global architecture
o Realism say use pre-emption anywhere but they lack vision
o Democratic Globalism should temper universalistic aspirations and focus on
targeting and limiting goals [democratic realism]

The neoconservative moment by Francis Fukuyama

- DG of K = muscular Wilsonianism minus international institutions that seeks to use US
military supremacy to support US interests and democracy simultaneously  he will
aim to formulate the 4th strategy agreeing with the first 3 positions of K
o War in Iraq portrayed as success – didn’t find WMD, raise of anti-US sentiment,
growing insurgency, immense cost, no gains in Israel-Palestine conflict, no
legitimacy
- Excessive realism – the “where it counts” definition is very ambiguous: should include
only mortal threats [Iraq wasn’t – lesser magnitude]  strategic necessity of K is
actually broader than claimed = very little practical guidance
- Excessive idealism – the idea of transforming everything in democracy by sheer
political will [culture matters]  US was involved in 18 democracy-building projects
but only 3 succeeded [Germany, Japan, SK] and others were made worst + if Us is really
commercial republic why expand
- Allies, Institutions and Legitimacy – European allies weren’t refusing Iraq intervention
because it lacked UN frame but because it was dumb to begin with [Al-Qaeda did not
need the support of Iraq even if links existed] legitimacy is linked to substantial
principles of justice but it is not justice so associating it entirely with UN is wrong  if
there is legitimacy there is traction [the war coalition in Iraq was formed due to national
interests and it was very limited = many who are normally of same values did not join]
  the more you lack legitimacy the more you affect your future image + don’t have to
prove toughness at any point now + battlefield is ME
- Dealing with the Middle East – not all Muslims are yet enemies [majority in all countries
would emigrate to the US] but positive feeling lately have shrunk  US is disliked or
hated for what they do, not for who they are [except terrorists]  terrorists depend on
the perception and support of populations [as opposed to USSR]  recalibrate sticks
and carrots proportion
- Now: exercise power in pursuit of interests and values but more prudent and subtle 
diplomacy and coalitions, caution in nation-building, institution building internationally
and regionally  recalibration in a neoconservative fashion

In Defence of Democratic Realism by C. Krauthammer

- Isolationism obsolete + LI [legalism + multilateralism + humanitarianism with goal of
constructing a new international system mimic of a domestic society] + realism
emphasizing primacy of power
- Democratic globalism – spread of democracy as both end and mean to FP and different
from realism because it understands democracy as a mean to achieve global safety and
security [not only moral but also geopolitical value] BUT too ideal and outstretched
- Democratic realism as best alternative because it is targeted, focused and limited
intervening only where it counts
- An existential threat – what defines an existential threat is its intent, objective and
potential capability  to eliminate or reshape totalities [F says Islamism lacks appeal
but so did Nazis/ F undermines technology and religion]
- Neoconservatism – two branches [realism and globalism – different scope] so for
example NK is no pressing concern because it doesn’t aim to spread Juche
- Legitimacy – nobody denies the utility of international support but the question is
whether it should be a limiting factor and if we say yes then we assume that US problems
spark from lack of legitimacy [but even when UN intervened in Iraq it led nowhere] +
assumes that choice is between post-war and pre-war scenario when in reality prudential
considerations are crucial [assuming that not going to war had no cost is wrong] 
international support is important but sometimes it doesn’t tilt the balance
- Nation-building [is Iraq central to the war against radical Islamists?] – war on terror was
failing miserably because of the targeted operations that were simply insufficient 
even with all the hard tasks the war necessary + the war is not lost; Iraq’s faith is still in
the making + success in nation-building
- Future – the recalibration points are weak because they are evident [diplomacy, colonial
office and alliance of democracies are perfectly good ideas

From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XVI – Gulliver’s Troubles:

Kennedy, Johnson and the limits of power, 1961-1968 by G. Herring
- Kennedy 1961 “do anything in order to assure survival and success of liberty”:43 years
old, special interest in decolonization, appreciated FDR and Wilson [idealism and
pragmatism combined], appointed Dean Rusk as SoS meaning he wanted tight grip on
FP  new system more chaotic placing him at the centre of DM, chaos in the military
with a lot of civilians brought in, continued with containment, massive build-up of arms,
pushed for military and economic aid for countries under red threat
 o 1961 Cuba – CIA plans for covert operation to overthrow Castro but refused to
authorize air support [hoped for internal insurgency  US humiliated at Bay of
Pigs due to operation failure + big criticism for intervention in internal affairs
 Castro became an obsession so economic sanctions, diplomatically isolating
Cuba  1962 – USSR missiles discovered in Cuba
o Asia: Laos in civil war and the US backed government almost toppled but
Kennedy rejected intervention and wanted to negotiate [appearance of
weakness]
o Belin – wall started to be built in 1961 but none reacted due to fear of war
- The third world – 24 new nations until 1963  talk of non-alignment and an Afro-Asian
block BUT US started sending aid
o Tried to tilt some neutral leaders in Asia [Nehru in India] towards US without
jeopardizing other relations [Pakistan]  mainly failed to keep a balance
[overestimated Chinese aims after the 1962 border conflict and military aid
outraged Pakistan]
o Middle East – JFK sympathized with Arab nationalism, initially especially in
Egypt but after the 1963 Egypt-USSR tight relation he drifted away
o Africa – gave it a high profile in FP and supported nationalism and
decolonization [and tried to keep regional integrity – opposed Tshombe’s
secession of Khatanga] but with some limitations [Africa – opposed the ANC as
they thought it has pro-communist forces]
o Latin America – Good Neighbour Policy continued by Marshall Plan-like aid 
every source to be used to prevent another Cuba in the region  failed, short of
economic development and no political restructuring
o Vietnam – Kennedy increased the military presence of US in S. Vietnam but
ruptures between the two countries
- The Cuban Missile Crisis – 60 offensive missiles by Khrushchev in Cuba claiming he
was protecting from US invasion [but could be used to force concessions in Berlin] but
did not alter the overall balance of power  Kennedy refused to negotiate [feared that
negotiation will be dragged until the missiles become operational]  announced
quarantine in Cuba and demanded missile removal [dove] + pushed state of defense
readiness and sent submarines  war seemed imminent for Khrushchev so demanded
missile removal from Turkey in exchange for USSR removal in Cuba + promises of
non-attack  US accepted not to attack Cuba if missiles were removed [1st proposal]
 crises ended and Kennedy’s position at home was strengthened + steps towards
détente [1963 telegraphic link] + Moscow’s attempt to gain nuclear parity + EU started
to fear US involvement and to want own nukes + US-USSR rapprochement due to fear
that Mao would get nukes as well
- 22nd November 1963 – JFK is assassinated in Dallas  Lyndon Johnson becomes
president
- Context of Johnson: lacked passion for FP and would have preferred internal focus,
lacked experience, wanted to maintain continuity, due to Sino-Soviet split Moscow was
more willing to negotiate, 1964 China became a nuclear power  accommodation with
China [especially in Vietnam to prevent Korean War-like intervention] but cultural
revolution put a stop to that
- Latin America – Brazil in deep economic troubles
o US feared crisis in Panama but made some concessions to still allow US access
to the canal
 o 1965 Dominican Republic led by Cabral who was pro-US but had little internal
popularity  revolts  Johnson sent troops to evacuate US civilians  1966
election J. Balaguer
o 1966 Bolivia assassination of Che Guevara  red scare diminished considerably
- The Vietnam issue: N. Vietnam attacking S. Vietnam which was in deep struggle for
power between Catholics and Buddhists and seemed close to collapse  US wanted to
demonstrate that violent changes of the STQ would not be tolerated
o N. Vietnam gunboats attacked US destroyers in Gulf of Tonkin  US bombs
military installations across 7th parallel + passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
allowing Johnson the use of force to limit attacks on US troops  authority to
expand the war
o War expanded and S. Vietnam seemed to lose  dispatch of more US troops 
next 2 years US commitment expanded and bombings in the N.
o Could only hope for a stalemate as the bombings did not put an end to the
northern army  big opposition at home [costs and lives with no prospects]
o 1967 – ceiling on Us troops and scaling back war aims
o Consequences for US relations with USSR and China were less disastrous than
initially said because of open negotiations but not enough to settle a peace-deal
in Vietnam
o Big drifts in Europe because US wanted them to pay more for defence and W.
Germany wanted reunification and nukes
o In Asia Taiwan leaders were alarmed of China’s successes + US refused to take
out Chinese nukes + Japan feared it will be sucked into war and unhappy with
American pushes for higher market shares + all who accepted involvement asked
for high prices
- The Middle East – special relationship with Israel by expanding flow of weapons but
1967 war when US gave Israel power to respond as they see fit but then promoted
ceasefire when conflict escalated  Israel attacked US Navy ship close to Egypt coast
[to prevent intercepting radio traffic about the massacre in Sinai]
o Israel won in a very bloody war: now pushed for full alliance with Us which
threatened to compromise US interests in the region + Johnson feared Israel wish
to acquire nukes + Hussein in Iraq made Iraq prone to USSR sphere +
Palestinians got USSR weapons
o US sponsored R242 calling for Israel to give back the taken territories + denied
full alliance but kept lose relations
o The three pillars approach – Israel, SA and Iran as most important targets
- 1968 – European networks of rebellion inspired by Mao and Che Guevara mounted
protests against Vietnam and US imperialism and sought the 3rd way between capitalism
and communism
o Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
o Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy
o January – NK seized US intelligence ship Pueblo  11 months of negotiations
[thought to be the communist effort of opening a second front]
o January – N. Vietnam biggest offensive in the war  US policy makers pressed
for disengagement  March announced cutbacks and willingness to negotiate
o Gold standard started to collapse  May negotiations
o Pursue détente with USSR and in summer agreed to begin strategic arms
negotiation set at a summit in future September
o August USSR invades Czechoslovakia to stop the Prague spring and US tried to
avoid any appearance of interference + cancelled the summit
 o USSR and US went to great lengths to avoid confrontation
o US lack of intervention in CZ and push for NPT upset Germany [thought US did
not care about unification]
o End of post-war economic boom
- Legacy – arms control issues, détente with USSR, framework on which it can be build,
right direction with China BUT Vietnam damage of economy and paying high prices to
allies for a war that was dragging

From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XVII – Nixon, Kissinger and the

end of Post-war era, 1969-1974 by G. Herring
- Introduction: imaginative FP but sometimes radical in some essential elements [new
approach to match the new era] as US was rather declining in power [exploiting China-
USSR rivalry, scaling back commitments and using regional powers to maintain order]
 assumed a level of cooperation that did not exist + internally against the wave
[realism when US was turning to idealism] + undermined plans by used methods
- Nixon 1969 – postwar world was over [recovery happened] so slight independence from
US in the W block + USSR-China big tensions + destabilized 3rd world + US economic
boom ending and soon recession + big population division
o Kissinger – fled Nazi Germany when young’ served in the US army; professor
at Harvard
o Nixon – BA at Duke; served in navy during WW2
o Mutual suspicion and lack of close personal relations but huge centralization of
FP [National Security Council in the hands of Kissinger]  atmosphere of
secretiveness
o Main goal: US to stay in the world prevent isolationism] and peaceful
coexistence [detente and relation normalization with PRC]
- Ending the Vietnam war but maintaining the S.V government intact – negotiating with
USSR on trade agreements and nuclear limitations [to force USSR to compel N.
Vietnam] + negotiating with N.V by threats of war [similar to Truman’s Korea
negotiations]
o USSR could not help because they were fighting with PRC for 3rd war + peace
by coercion plan would not work  Nixon shifted the fight on SV troops =
Vietnamization [pay but reduce troops]
o 1970 – sending US-SC troops in Cambodia [neutral ground but exploited by
NV] hoping to put a US prone government there  military a success but
strategically a bad move as it sparked a civil war [internally anti-war movement]
o Big opposition at home  Huston Plan allowing intelligence to spy on
Americans
o Military situation in Vietnam remained stable but Hanoi less prone to negotiate
- Détente with USSR – trade agreements and weapon control negotiations due to shared
interests [reduce arms cost] but refused issue linkage [US complained about lack of help
in Vietnam negotiations] + in US sometimes very dual negotiations due to lack of
communication
o 1971 – conceptual breakthrough by negotiating a separate ABM treaty  ABM
and SALT I in 1972
- Normalization with PRC – tensions USSR-PRC led to border clashes  new tool for
US to negotiate  1970 Warsaw discussions on Vietnam and Taiwan  late 1970 Mao
invites Edgar Snow [US journalist thought to have influenced policy]
 o Ping-pong diplomacy – US team in Japan made friendly gestures  got invited
in China  opened way to civilian visits
o Nixon removed the trade embargo
o Zhou Enlai invites Kissinger to China  July 1971 in China but masked as an
Asia Tour and very secret  US made a lot of concessions but obtained an
invitation for Nixon
o Consequences: rift with Japan, tensions with Taiwan and defeat in the UN
- Relations with allies – the Nixon shocks had huge impact,
o Détente in Europe was led by Europeans – Brandt Ostpolitik and legalizing the
STQ in EE by treaties  1972 discussions on balanced force reductions
o US huge economic issues – Camp David secret meeting internally  New
Economic Policy closing the gold window and 10% surcharge on imports
o Relations with Japan at lowest point: Okinawa, trade issues
o 3rd world disengagement by the Nixon Doctrine [accompanied by
Vietnamization] – uphold commitments but cautious in taking new ones + lower
priority
o Latin America propriety only due to Cuba + concern that communist Allende
would win in Chile and ally with Castro  covert operation to throw Allende
by military coup and assassination but it failed and he became president of Chile
in 1970  economic warfare  1973 military coup and new government of
Pinochet [free market policies]
o 1971 Indian crisis with troops crossing in W. Pakistan  president Yahya Khan
of W. Pakistan launched air strikes  Nixon tilted towards Pakistan by
providing arms and threatened to stop summit with USSR if they support India
 Pakistan still lost and was forced to recognize Bangladesh’s independence
o Africa – little significance; tolerated with regimes in southern Africa and
generally racist stance
- The China visit of February 1972 – PRC agreed not to intervene in Vietnam; Nixon
agreed to control Japanese hegemon desire in Asia, US agreed that Taiwan was part of
China; Nixon indicated relation normalization in his 2nd term
o Very appreciated at home
o Unintended escalation in Vietnam
- The Moscow Summit – SALT I as a success but some disadvantages for the US +
commercial deals generally improving US economy  summit as first meeting since
Yalta to produce results that were concrete [working relation]
- Again ending the Vietnam war – Kissinger thought they should end it before the
election, Nixon thought after  started concession [new elections in the S (initially
wanted for Thieu to remain) and political settlement after ceasefire]
o Nixon reelected but negotiations stalled in late 1972  Christmas Bombing –
massive air attack by US
o By march 1973 US troops were out of Vietnam  neither peace nor horror
- The Middle East – the 6 days war exacerbating Arab-Israeli conflict  the “Twin pillars
approach” – give weapons to friendly states
o Saudi Arabia + Iran – Nixon supported the shah fully  blind eye to oppression
o Israel – ambivalent policy by recognizing R242 but helped hugely with weapons
- Kissinger-Nixon fallout after the election – huge fall in Nixon popularity + still fighting
in Vietnam even after peace settlement + congress stopping the war in Indo-china
o By 1973 Nixon and Brezhnev already failing to compromise [no progress on
SALT II + Nixon criticized for concessions]
o Normalization with PRC stalled as well
 o Yom Kippur war initially US stalled response but then intervened hugely as
Israel was losing [US feared that Israel might become belligerent and want nukes
if they don’t get helped in the war]  Arabs asked USSR or help and USA
orchestred overreaction  Kissinger – Sadat rapprochement
o world tour of 1974 – gallant but hopeless effort
- The Watergate scandal – burglary and attempted phone interception linked with Nixon’s
1972 campaign because some election team members were involve  CIA took over
the case  Nixon had installed a secret taping system in parts of the White House,
executive office and official retreat at Camp David in 1971  tapes were released and
Nixon’s complicity was discovered  resigned in 1974
- Legacy: significant diplomatic breakthrough but also huge failures [tensions in the 3rd
world]

From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XVIII – Foreign Policy in the age

of dissonance, 1974-1981 by G. Herring
- Context in the 70s: big economic crisis, old dangers and new ones, shift in national
priorities, cultural revolution, tendencies to turn inwards and shift to the right, legalizing
abortions 1973
- Gerald Ford – initially an isolationist, went to Yale Law School, turned internationalist
after WW2, kept Kissinger as national security advisor, more power to the Congress
[ability to withdraw troops deployed without legislative authorization]
o First things in office: clemency for Vietnam War draft evaders and full, free
absolute pardon for Nixon  Huge popularity drop instantly
- FP goals: uphold and expand detente, protect international position, defend from threats
o Cyprus [reason to fight between Greece and Turkey]  1974 pro-Greek rebels
overthrow government  Turkey invades  US aid to Turkey/ Congress
wanted to terminate it  Ford accepted to cut aid  Turkey shut down all US
military and intelligence installation  3 years embargo and huge damage of
US-Turkey relations
o Détente one-sided double standards and misunderstanding of political progress
 Congress negotiated a deal in which Soviet-Jews would have been given exit-
visas but praising in the media upset USSR  fallout of economic this 
Jackson [congressman] made SALT I mean equal number of missiles [hard to
achieve]
o Ford- Brezhnev Summit 1974 – seemed to achieve miracles [agreed on equal
number] but Congress rejected the proposals  détente was in shambles
o Vietnam – US cut aid, N. Vietnam captured southern army  Ho Chi Minh
Campaign to liberate Saigon  S. Vietnam falls on April 30, 1975  refugee
wave + US treated Vietnam as an enemy so extended the embargo on all
o Cambodia with the new government – seized a merchant US ship  US
prepared to ATTACK Cambodia, started military operations to regain the ship
and invaded Koh Tang  Cambodia released the ship
o Angola [independent from Portugal in 1975] – USSR sponsored MPLA because
they feared US-PRC jointly sponsoring FNLA  MPLA was gaining ground so
Ford wanted to sponsor UNITA but Congress overrode it and stopped aid
o Helsinki summit July-August 1975 – SH weakening Ford and détente + USSR
got recognition in E. Europe
o Elections in 1976 won by Jimmy Carter
- Context 1976: détente moribund, tough stance on USSR (Committee on Present
Danger) VS. adapt to changes by complex interdependency (Trilateral Commission) as
different views in US FP
o Carter: committed to change in FP, attended Naval Academy, tendency at
micromanagement, appointed SoS Cyrus Vance, appointed ambassador to UN
Andrew Young (African American), promised open-diplomacy and cooperation
with Congress, more moral and democratic FP
- Actions: first action was to announce troop withdrawal from SK [post-Vietnam aversion
to military involvement, aversion towards Park Chung-hee and troops more needed in
W. Europe]  firestorm in E. Asia
o Middle East: trying to minimize the antagonism of Arab-Israeli peoples --?
Proposed comprehensive settlement + 1977 declares he wants a Palestinian
homeland  toughing of Israel stance in WB and Gaza
o With USSR he sought negotiations but also downplaying the centrality of
Soviet-American relations  arms control to achieve reduction rather than just
limits + his campaign towards HRs created huge USSR backlash
o Panama Canal treaties as new conciliatory approach to Latin America + mutual
respect and partnership
o Normalization with China – Deng Xiaoping needed normalization to pursue own
interests + USA wanted to balance against USSR  visit to US in 1979  1st
March normalized relations
 Big protests in Taiwan
 Broad support in US
o Camp David Sadat-Begin Summit – Israel making some concessions even if
vague and Egypt recognizing it but after peace in 1979 Israel restarted the
building of settlements
o Africa Policy – against apartheid and for black majority rule [but did not
embargo SA – UN arms embargo on SA] + harder stance in Rhodesia and
eventually 1979 Mugabe won elections + the Khatanga secession though to be
planned by Castro but US decided to not intervene [though supported Mobutu’s
Zaire when they intervened]
o The HRs policy as a centre but recognized that sometimes difficult interpretation
- Beginning of the end – Iran 1978: initially one of US closest ally and a pillar of US
security in ME but uprisings could not be controlled by the shah  growing Anti-US
sentiment in Iran + growing presence of US there  November 1979 young radicals
stormed US embassy and took 66 hostages  OPEC raised petrol prices  energy crisis
o China invaded Vietnam in 1979
o Some progress on Sino-US and SALT with USSR but not much
o USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 [internal fights there]  US
increased covert aid [wanting to make Afghanistan USSR’s Vietnam]
o Carter Doctrine – any attempt by an outside force to gain the Persian Gulf is an
assault on US vital interests and will be answered with force
o 1980 – started to discuss military ties with PRC
o US crippling recession
o Camp David accords failed completely
o 1980 – attempt to regain the Iran hostages due to internal pressure failed
miserably + confirmed to Iran that US has belligerent intentions
 From Colony to Superpower: Chapter XIX – A unique and extraordinary
Moment: Gorbachev, Reagan, Bush and the end of the Cold War, 1981-
1991 by G. Herring
- Reagan: not much to intellectual content of FP but conquered hearts, restored US spirit
of Wilsonianism, was initially an actor, fierce anti-communist, host of TV programs, no
FP experience but deep views, aimed to overthrow leftist governments, unilateralist but
tempered by Haig and Schultz [SoS]
- Covert operations to undermine communism: chaos in implementation [very big
conflicting forces in US] and reluctance to send troops abroad
- The Reagan doctrine – sending covert arms shipments abroad  reescalation of the
Cold War and very belligerent rhetoric
o talks of sanctions for USSR if they intervene in Poland unrest  Poland martial
law  Poland got sanctioned
o scrapped the embargo on grain shipment for USSR [put by Carter]
o on arms control Regan built on Carter’s legacy [deterrence by military
superiority instead of mutually assured destruction talks]
o Strategic Defence Initiative SDI = missile defence system with lasers from
space-based platforms to destroy missile before they struck [to restore the sense
of security but intensified CW tensions]
o 1983 lowest relations point USSR-US
- The Middle East: naïve in conception and amateurish in execution trying to demonstrate
toughness
o Tried to improve relations with Israel after Carter’s support for Arabs
o Tried to unite in a strategic consensus Israel Jordan, Egypt and SA to check
USSR
o Israel started acting alone [annexed Golan Heights] so shift back to Camp David
o Crises in Lebanon because Israel invaded it in 1982 to eliminate PLO  US
adopted Israel’s goals as its own but very messy war  TNT exploded killing
marine officers [bloody Sunday in Beirut]  1984 withdrawal = PLO scattered
in ME, Israel in internal crisis
o Libya crisis as Gaddafi was anti-American  Reagan linked him with terrorism
and in 1982 implemented oil embargo  1986 naval and air attack on Libya
[bombings of Tripoli meant to kill Gaddafi failed]  Western nations also
imposed sanctions and expulsed diplomats
o Opening doors to Iran by selling arms  1980 Iran-Iraq war [initially US
supported Iraq but shifted to Iran]  Reagan tried to negotiate but without
success
o 1988 Palestinian intifada  Yasser Arafat PLO leader agreed to negotiate
- The Reagan doctrine as disdain for containment
o Poland – non-military covert program to encourage the Solidarity movement
[moderate win as it kept it alive during martial law]
o Cambodia – supporting insurgency opposing Vietnamese-imposed puppet
government
o Southern Africa – linking the ANC with communism in a policy of constructive
engagement [to not have to challenge apartheid]
o Afghanistan as the largest covert operation – aid to freedom fighters starting
1983 and jumped in 1985 as USSR was retaliating and anti-aircraft missiles in
1986 [the Stingers]  Gorbachev decided to withdraw
o Pro-communist revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador met with making
Central America a central issue  substantial commitment
 o Grenada pro-communist  US attacked it as to de-link from Nicaragua
o War against Nicaragua 1981 to 1984  Central America as the example of
limits of US power [set to exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam but only victory was
El Salvador, 30 thousand dead in Nicaragua]
o Supported friendly governments [Taiwan, Brunei, SA]
- The 2nd mandate:
o USSR: Brezhnev [1982]  Yuri Andropov [1984]  Konstantin Cherenko
[1985]  Mikhail Gorbachev  change was needed internally so perestroika
and glasnost
o Reagan’s big arms buildup was meant to push negotiations from strength
o Each leader served the other’s purpose
o Chernobyl 1985 – reinforced emotional fears of nuclear destruction in both
countries
o Geneva meeting 1985 – agreed to reduce arms
o Reykjavik 1986 – huge progress [only SDI stood in the war – they agreed on
everything beside it]
o 1987 - agreement on INF issue [intermediate range nuclear forces to be
eliminated from Europe] and huge scraping of missiles [over 1000 USSR,
around 900 USA]
o Bilateral discussions to diffuse issues such as Afghanistan or Nicaragua +
agreement on Joint Exploration of Space + discussed immigration and HRs more
openly + both called Iran-Iraq cease-fire
o 1988 Gorbachev’s UN speech – USSR has no monopoly on the truth  opened
self-determination in EE by proclaiming that freedom of choice is mandatory
o Effectively ending CW [aid to good governments made war costlier for the
soviets + higher internal priority by Gorbachev + cooperation]
 Iran-Iraq ceasefire
 South Africa – Angola ceasefire
 Vietnam retraction from Cambodia
 PLO recognizing implicitly Israel
- George H. W. Bush – amalgam of eastern moderate republicanism and conservativism,
navy pilot WW2, involved in oil business, he was Nixon’s ambassador to UN and
director of Central Intelligence, named James Baker III SoS, named Bent Scowcroft
[Kissinger’s protegee] as National Security Advisor
- Crisis in China [during Reagan the relations were good and the two cooperated in
Afghanistan and Cambodia] – Tiananmen 1989 so in May the Chinese government
imposed Martial Law  US imposed sanctions and cut of military ties  infuriated
China but did not slow their crackdown on dissidence  Bush did not know how to
take a firm stand without compromising US interests + with USSR no longer a threat
China lost its strategic use
- The 1989 EE revolutions: in Poland Solidarity was elected with no US involvement and
no USSR reaction + Hungary declared republic + fall of Berlin Wall + Czechoslovakia
velvet revolution  Bush struggled to find the right balance [initially cautious]
o Germany’s unification – Bush committed to unify Germany in NATO but
sensitive to Soviet concerns [2+4 model with Germany negotiating internally
but then with the occupying powers in external matters]
o Lithuania declared independence but USSR responded with all means short of
force and US needed Gorbachev to settle the Germany issue
- Iraq-Kuwait border dispute and Bush supported Iraq but when Saddam invaded and
conquered Kuwait US responded firmly [economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, UN
agreeing to use any means for expelling Iraq from Kuwait by 1991]
o January 1991 – operation Desert Storm – attacking Iraq’s communication
networks and air bases  huge Iraq loses in the first hours  war won fast but
Saddam never replaced because that was not on the agenda [Bush just hoped that
weakening him will be enough to provoke military coup + a Shiite Iraq might
be more dangerous = stability over principles]
- 1991 USSR collapse – Boris Yeltsin in power + the CIS
- Conclusions: Reagan general restoring of sentiment and well-being + big external
contextual help BUT ideological seal and mismanagement and abuse of power in the
name of security

America Unbound: Chapter VIII – The Bush strategy by I. Daalder and J.

Lindsay
- Context – The war in Afghanistan: broad international support [20 countries] even after
the fall of Kabul + August 2003 – international peacemaking force shifted to NATO 
legitimate cause of striking back + believed it would end there [Al Qaeda, bin Laden
and terrorism] and shift from overt military operations to covert law enforcement
- Bush’s war on terror: not limited to Afghanistan [1st phase]  Iraq [after the Gulf War
still Saddam Hussein was in power] and other failed states + WMD as major discussion
o The anthrax mailing cases [Robert Stevens editor at the Sun] + fears of a “dirty
bomb” [radiological material] attack
o Where do terrorist groups take their weapons from  seeking chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons
o Strategy including striking first [definitive for Bush]
- Axis of evil 2002: warning about all terrorist groups + the 3 rogue states Iran, Iraq and
NK  combination of terrorism, tyrants and technologies of mass destruction
o Concerns of WMD brought the focus to states that might help terrorists
o New thinking to match the threats [deterrence (shadowy groups with no nation
or citizens to defend) and containment (unbalanced dictators providing WMD to
terrorists) no longer sufficient]  take the battle to the enemy and confront
worst threats before they emerge [preemptive action to defend our liberty and
our nation]
- The preemption doctrine: big departure from FP [even if they used preemption before,
nobody made the case for it in principle]
o After the speech Condoleezza tried to play down the changes
- National Security Strategy [issued annually by the WH] September 2002: American
power at the center of the strategy [unparalleled military strength and embodiment of
freedom and democracy] + make world safe for freedom to flourish  essence: use
America’s unprecedented power to remake the world in its image
o Terrorists and rogue states will stop at nothing [WMD and blackmail +
deterrence against leaders willing to gamble will never work]
o Greater threat greater risk of inaction – strong legal case for preemption [but not
as a pretext for aggression]
o Moral imperative – eliminate threat so liberty can flourish [assumed that given
the choice all will choose freedom]
- Bush’s strategy – innovative in ways of achievement [abandoned a decades long
consensus of deterrence and containment] but advisors tried to downplay the centrality
of preemption [number will always be small]  criticism:
o Why declaring publicly something that was an option anyway [leaves the door
open for those who want to claim the same right + worsens perception]  much
to lose from turning an option to policy
o Countries will use it as covert to own national security scores [Russia in Georgia
to go after Islamic terrorists, India embraced it as universal]
o Conceptual confusion: preemptive [when the other is clearly about to attack –
1967 Israel] VS. preventive [before the state being attacked poses a real
imminent threat – to stop the threat from arising]
o Practical concerns: military response poses problems [precipitate use of
weapons you try to prevent]
- Real debate will be Iraq because it was clearly the only one with which US had a real
pressing problem

America Unbound: Chapter XII – The perils of power by I. Daalder and

J. Lindsay
- Bush’s revolution: on the short-term military successes were striking but question in the
long-term
o Understood US’s power is unmatched – distinguished by readiness to use it
o Used power to set international agenda
o Overestimated what unilateral exercise of power could achieve
o First 2 years the world lost trust in US interest in them or their problems
o Bush insisted to measure world in America’s way [black-white approach]
o Often punished non-alignment [in France – US banned high-level participation
in annual Paris Show/ alienated Germany and Latin America]
o Other issues [HIV/AIDS, poverty etc.] fell sideline
o Conducted diplomacy in a very shallow way [over emails and telephone]
o Withdrew US from international treaties [ABM, Kyoto Protocol, treaty
establishing ICC] and often bullied countries into signing bilateral treaties
o The treaties he sought were short-term oriented
o Resentment instead of respect [Germany and SK 2002 elections bringing anti-
Americans to power]
o Often perplexed by hostile image [Bush maintained that he was not elected to
be popular]
- Premise issue: US security lays on US unbound [unilateral exercise of power could
achieve major US FP goals]  not true, they required active participation of others
o Bush thought that unilateralism will foster cooperation because other shared
interests [many did not rush to reconstruct Iraq – 2003 90% of troops were
American]
o Forgot the idea of magnitude in peace [UN, Bretton Woods (FDR and Truman
recognizing that US will be more effective with international support)]
o During CW IOs were crucial to exert US authority
- 2003 adjustments – seemed to be walking away from his own revolution
o Comeback to ME and renewed multilateralism [turned to International Atomic
Energy Agency to assure Iran was ok]
o On NK he agreed on a regional approach and the 6 party talks
 o Reason for shift: discard revolutionary excess + problems complicated so they
required more cooperative effort + coming reelection

Fukuyama/ Krauthammer- put trump in one of these schools -> for portfolio