Bacarro vs.

Castano
(GR L-34597, 5 November 1982)

FACTS: Respondent boarded a jeep driven by Petitioner Montefalcon running at 40 kph. While
approaching Sumasap Bridge, a cargo truck coming from behind, blew its horn to signal its intention
to overtake the jeep. The jeep, without changing its speed, gave way by swerving to the right, such
that both vehicles ran side by side for a distance of around 20 meters. Then as the jeep was left behind,
its driver was unable to return to its former lane and instead it obliquely ran down an inclined terrain
towards the right until it fell into a ditch pinning down and crushing Castano’s right leg in the process.
Castano filed a case for damages against Rosita Bacarro, William Sevilla, and Felario Montefalcon.
Defendants alleged that the jeepney was sideswiped by the overtaking cargo truck. After trial, the CFI
of Misamis Oriental ordered Bacarro, et.al. to jointly and severally pay Castano. It was affirmed by the
CA upon appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on the part of the jeepney driver.
2. Whether or not extraordinary diligence is required of the jeepney driver.
3. Whether or not the sideswiping is a fortuitous event.

HELD:

1.) Yes. The fact is, petitioner-driver Montefalcon did not slacken his speed but instead continued to
run the jeep at about forty (40) kilometers per hour even at the time the overtaking cargo truck was
running side by side for about twenty (20) meters and at which time he even shouted to the driver of
the truck.

2.) Yes. The fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the private respondent and the herein
petitioners in which case the Court of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the
Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.

3.) The alleged fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was
something which could have been avoided considering the narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which
was not wide enough to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon
contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA Et Al. (1991)

FACTS:
On May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to
petitioner. The bus was at full stop when Pedrito Cudiamat alighted and fell from the platform of
the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward. He was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle.
The driver first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before
bringing Pedrito to Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa. RTC ruled in favor of
Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered
to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito. CA reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity,
moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit.

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD:
YES. Pedrito is already considered a passenger when he stepped and stood on the platform of
the bus. Hence, he is entitled to all rights pertaining to such contractual obligation, which duty
extends to boarding and alighting. It is then the duty of the driver not to make acts that would have
the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board the same. As it is the
duty of a common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting its passengers, its
failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. Consequently, in the computation of damages in torts,
actual damages is based on net earnings of the victim, and not on the gross income.
Aboitiz Shipping v. CA (G.R. No. 84458)

Facts:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner at the port at San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila and was
taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to unload the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant
to their MOA. An hour after the passengers and Viana had disembarked the vessel, the crane
operator began its unloading operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who had already
disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded there. He went back
and while he was pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him pinning him
between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting to his death. A complaint for damages was
filed against petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana ceased to
be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and that consequently his presence there was no
longer reasonable. CA affirmed the trial court’s order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana after the latter had already
disembarked the vessel.

Ruling:

YES. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. All persons who
remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for
his departure. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will
justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner’s vessel. In the instant case, there exists
such a justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner’s vessel. Hence, the victim Anacleto Viana is
still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
RAYNERA VS HICETAL PARDO

(G.R. No. 120027) (21 April 1999)

FACTS:

On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was riding his motorcycle
traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. An Isuzu truck was
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. At some point on the road, Reynaldo
Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail
lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and he was rushed to the hospital
where he was declared dead on arrival. The widow of Reynaldo, filed with the RTC a complaint for
damages against respondents, the owner and driver of the Isuzu truck. The trial court ruled that
respondent’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Raynera’s death. But CA ruled
that Reynaldo Raynera's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of
his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability.

ISSUE:

1. whether the negligence of respondents was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo
Raynera.

HELD:

The Supreme court ruled that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.
He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see
what was in front of him. Hence, an accident could have been easily avoided, unless the victim had
been driving too fast and did not exercise dues care and prudence demanded of him under the
circumstances. It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another vehicle" are
presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence". The rationale
behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Therefore, the responsibility to avoid the collision
with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
Maranan vs Perez

Facts:

Rogelio Corachea was a passenger in a taxi owned and operated by Pascual Perez, when he was
stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide. He
was found guilty. Maranan, Rogelio’s mother, filed an action to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-
defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Perez further claimed that
the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

Issue/s:

1. Whether Perez is liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.

2. Whether the dismissal of the claim against Valenzuela is correct.

Held:

1. YES. Unlike the old Civil Code, the New Civil Code expressly makes the common carrier liable
for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers (Art. 1759). The
carrier's liability is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was
done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders.
2. NO. Plaintiff’s action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the driver was not
a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by
final judgment.
 LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD
G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003
Vitug, J.

FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a
“token” as fare. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin,
the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad and an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment
that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.

A complaint for damages was then filed against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization Inc. and Prudent for the death of Navidad. The RTC then held that Prudent and Escartin
were liable and it ordered them to pay jointly and severally the damages for the death of Navidad. On
appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin and held that LRTA and Roman jointly and severally
liable. It ruled that the contract of carriage had already existed when Navidad entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRTA and Roman are liable for the death of Navidad.

RULING:
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier so obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises. Thus,
in this case, the foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be
made liable only for his own fault or negligence.