CANON 21 AND CANON 22

(Cases 88 to 94)

[Adm. Case No. 1890. August 7, 2002.]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, Respondent.

DECISION

This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G.
Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all
his legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because
of politics and respondent’s overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing
complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while
their attorney-client relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case No.
4306-M 1 for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," where
respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent had
previously helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No. 4726-M, 2 "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in
1970 where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract
between the parties likewise involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously
helped to administer; (c) Civil Case No. 112764, 3 "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for
damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno
Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving complainant’s same testimony subject of the complaint for
damages in Civil Case No. 112764.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for
violation of PD No. 296 4 for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing complainant’s
fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that respondent’s possession
and examination of the TCT and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for
complainant provided him with the information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the
fishpond, and that since respondent helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to
know that the two (2) creeks had disappeared.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His
Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or
intelligence" gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly
used against complainant when the relationship terminated. Complainant filed his Comments
thereon as required in our Resolution of 26 July 1978. Thereafter this case was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation in our Resolution
dated 23 October 1978.

After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October
1982 enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish two
counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer
relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct.

1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case for
false testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).

The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976, before the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why Magno Dinglasan had
testified against him in that case, complainant stated that he once declined the demand of Magno
Dinglasan, a former official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for
the destruction of complainant’s record in the Bureau.

On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977 with the
crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During the preliminary
investigation of the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, respondent acted as
counsel for Magno Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan and it was elevated to the Ministry of Justice on appeal, respondent continued to be the
lawyer of Magno Dinglasan.

Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was then
his counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for P150,000.00 as
consideration for the destruction of complainant’s record in the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Respondent’s advice was for complainant to disregard the demand as it was improper. Later, when
Magno Dinglasan reduced the amount to P50,000.00, complainant again consulted Respondent.
Respondent likewise advised complainant not to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).

Respondent’s representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes malpractice

(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the lawyer of complainant and
respondent was consulted by complainant regarding the very matter which was the subject of the
case. By serving as the lawyer of Magno Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented
an interest which conflicted with the interest of his former client.

2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan in

Civil Case No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant
based, among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on December 21, 1976 before
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M.

For the same reasons set forth above, respondent’s representation of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case
No. 112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting interests.

3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent
violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship.
In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the following
functions:
"Witness

"A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in 1964 and
my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.

"ATTY. AQUINO:

"Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing Officer
what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?

"A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel in the
Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He used to help me manage
my fishpond. He is our legal adviser on legal matters. He is our confidant. We have no secrets
between us. He has complete access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)

Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two creeks, Sapang
Malalim and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the certificate of title and the
blue print plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the fishpond is bounded on the north and
northeast by Sapang Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).

In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two creeks to the
authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the Public Works to conduct a re-
survey. (Exhibit 6).

In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The relocation
survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond. Sapang Malalim and
Sapang Caluang had disappeared.

Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 74-193.
(Exhibit 6)

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he gained while he
was the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building of illegal dikes. His
possession and examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674 and the blueprint plan
provided him the information that there used to be two creeks traversing the fishpond covered by
the title. Since he helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two
creeks had disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he
was a lawyer and part administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of
professional confidence.
4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for
serving as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez . . . and for himself filing criminal charges against
complainant which were later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as lawyer for the
adversary of complainant or filed by respondent himself against complainant are the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos,
Bulacan;

2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos, Bulacan;

3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan;

4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila; and

5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.

While there may be validity to respondent’s contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file a
case against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended several years
before, yet under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said that respondent
acted ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of Respondent. He is an uncle and a political
benefactor. The parties for whom respondent filed cases against complainant were former friends
or associates of complainant whom respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general
adviser of complainant. The cases filed by respondent were about properties which respondent had
something to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant.

x x x

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes
commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer
relationship and engaging in unethical conduct . . . 5

Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and Recommendation in
view of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor General; Motion to
Disqualify Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer
dated 18 January 1983 filed by respondent principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having
given unwarranted advantage and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.

After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel, the
Court in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent’s motion to disqualify Solicitor
Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the investigation of this case. However, no further
proceedings were conducted by the OSG until the records of the case together with other cases were
turned over to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-
169 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
finding respondent guilty as charged. The IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for immoral conduct. In so recommending the
Investigating Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG in its Report and
Recommendation dated 14 October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we noted the
foregoing IBP Resolution. However, in view of the penalty involved, this case was referred to the
Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our Resolution dated 18 January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in
A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC. 6

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well taken.
As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay
acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been
previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer
as the latter’s counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-
M respondent acted as counsel for estranged business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos
Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of which were the two (2) fishponds which
respondent had previously helped to administer.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) official, regarding whose alleged demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in
exchange for the destruction of the latter’s record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised
complainant to disregard. Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against
complainant because the latter had previously testified on the alleged demand made by Dinglasan.
Although respondent denied that there was ever such a demand made by Dinglasan, the point is
that his word on the matter, i.e., whether there was in fact such a demand, would carry much weight
against complainant considering that he was the latter’s counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged
demand was made. In addition, respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-
193 for violation of P.D. No. 296 7 for the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang
Malalim and Sapang Caluang, previously traversing complainant’s fishpond in Bulacan covered by
TCT No. T-15674 by using information obtained while he was in possession of the certificate of title
and the blueprint plan of the property.

As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 21.01. — A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.

Rule 21.01. — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the
attorney-client relation. 8 As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed
to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help
respondent’s cause for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David —9

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity
of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant’s cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be
sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation.
The condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has
received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in
consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an
investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney’s inaccurate version of the facts that
came to him . . .

Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, on
good taste . . . [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the
attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April 2001 is
adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for
unethical conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years effective upon the finality hereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
MA. LUISA HADJULA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, respondent.

DECISION

Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma.
Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.

The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT1 bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with
violation of Article 2092 of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they
both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer
while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed
that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a
baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer
the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the
later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant's
account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's promotion.

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two
charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the
basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted
against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.

Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of
disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking
respondent's legal advice.

In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to
file her answer to the complaint.

In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,5 respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and
sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant
portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her
AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from
me regarding her PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to
me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is because I
never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as
a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it
might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL
MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the
same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.

9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her
AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal
and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD
SUPPORT case against her lover … where she has a child ….

Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all
part of public records ….

Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to
force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER since she knows that she will
certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY
CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.

On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came
out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the
respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended
that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles

Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.

On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information
given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.

We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to
bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to
seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one
is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little
moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the
relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,6 -

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment,
it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation, then the professional employments is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship

between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.

Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived.7

With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the
confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and
the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning
to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even
the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she
was violating the rule on confidentiality.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client
relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4078 July 14, 2003

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L.
Silapan, complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space
in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced
respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer, who accommodated
respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant's cases. Hence, the start of
the legal relationship between complainant and respondent.

The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a
new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of
P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to
complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the
subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.

With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the
document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name and financed through City Trust
Company.

In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero

likewise wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and,
from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant
used the commission to pay respondent's arrears with the car financing firm.

Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent
demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the
drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account therein was already closed.

Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy
and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases
pending in court;

xxx xxx xxx

Complainant denied respondent's charges and claimed that respondent's allegation is libelous and
not privilege as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph
12 of respondent's Answer, thus:

12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993,
defendant Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership
of the car to him but the latter said that he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case
at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant)
wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the
review committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for
review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the
above-mentioned Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant
Essex L. Silapan all refused to do not only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also
because the complainant confided to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime
that was charged of in the above-mentioned case. (emphasis supplied)

Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is
guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively
liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an
administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.

When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained1 that it was complainant who
offered him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed
with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case2 filed against complainant. Respondent insisted that there
was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his
revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal
case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his
case and discredit complainant's credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud,
tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client
relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.

Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant
without consideration and only as a "formal requirement" so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan
and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.

Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but
only: (a) to serve as "some kind of acknowledgment" that he already received in advance a portion
of his attorney's fees from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of
assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.

Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero's loan which he
allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorney's fees,
the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On
January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a
deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he
would transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which
respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the
amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant
who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating
commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases
pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not for us to sanction respondent for his
issuance of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court where his case
is pending.

The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged
intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-
established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.3 The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change
of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.4

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope
of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud.5 If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant's
alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not
covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the
profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun
for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment
in the strict sense.

Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in
his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they
were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the
complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and
respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent's allegations and
disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recommended penalty of one (1) year
suspension of respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his breach of
duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative
complaint against him.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005

ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.

DECISION

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously
instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on
confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.

Let us first hearken to the facts.

Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office
of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED).1

Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C. Francisco,"
for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. This annulment
case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and executory on July 15,
1992.2

In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7, 1994,
respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.3

On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,4 informing the RTC of
Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty. de
Leon.

It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F.
Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification
of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically,
complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she
is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.

Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other name
than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April 11, 1978,
to Ruben G. Mercado.

In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending before or
decided upon by other tribunals – (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6
(2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by
Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"
before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before the
Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
one month suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan.9
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document (I.S.
No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for
annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant
Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for
falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.

Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that the
complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations
leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed that the
pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent
until proven otherwise.10 He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of
misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on
appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct,
which he committed in good faith.11

In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which
are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of
respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel
only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification
of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the
Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.12

In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.13

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in
both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondent's motion to file his
memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the
parties.14

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner
Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation,
wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so
many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged her.

At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and
administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases are
pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by
the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon
respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.

We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against his
former client.

A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on
attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation
is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his
confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which
is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this
purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or
confidence and not to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets and
confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,19 and continues even after
the client's death.20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be
depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or
supposed rights in any litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever
disclosing it.21 With full disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate
legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution
or defense of the client's cause.

Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to
establish the existence of the privilege, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived.22

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it

is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment.23 The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective
client.24

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other
than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive is the case
of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a
specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would
be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of
payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client
relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however,
states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the parties, he
furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client
delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing
between them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the
confidence that accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil
wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.26 The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.27

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.28

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,29
an offer and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity,31 are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being
present.32

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.33

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but
for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.34

If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or personal assistance,36 and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general
terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment
then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the
merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts
which the complainant must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent without
her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert
the attorney-client privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the
party asserting the privilege.38

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4215 May 21, 2001

FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant, vs. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES and

Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.
In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complaint Felicisimo M. Montano
charged Atty. Juan Dealca with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with
administratively." The complaint1 is summarized as follows:

1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 3767 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.

2. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent (50%) of which
was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the
case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the
attorney's fee.

3. Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to
their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty.
Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant obliged by paying the amount of
P4,000.00.

4. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the
remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer
withdraw his appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.
Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February
28, 1993,2 stating:

28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill
your end of the bargain, here's your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your
papers.
Johnny

Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of
the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later
on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.

After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August
1, 1994, referred the case of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and
recommended that he be "severely reprimanded." However, in a Resolution 3 by the IBP Board of
Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the penalty recommended by the Investigating
Commissioner meted to respondent be amended to "three (3) months suspension from the practice
of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his
duty as a lawyer."
Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging
that the latter misapprehended the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty
imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following.

1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal;

2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare and submit
complainant's appellant's brief on time;

3. Complainant wen to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellant's
brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion;

4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its
deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the
remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay
the P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date." Please take note that, at this
juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant's part.

5. When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came, respondent, thru a messenger,
requested the complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will
again pay "tomorrow" or on a "later date." This promise-non-payment cycle went on
repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note again that it was not
the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet he fails to pay as
promised;

6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed
complainant's brief on time;

7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining
balance of P3,500.00, but the latter made himself scare. As the records would show, such
P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now;

8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case
folder to the complainant, hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to
settle the matter between them;

9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;

10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of
this case to avoid further misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellant's
brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of record. Such withdrawal was accordingly
granted by the appellate court;

xxx xxx xxx.4

Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees,
measly as it was, was deliberate and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical
and proper." Respondent counsel concluded that not only was the penalty of suspension harsh for
his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish
his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with
cancer.

In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca's motion for
reconsideration, to wit:

xxx

RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca's Motion For Reconsideration of the Board's Decision in
the above-entitled case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein.
Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the remedy of the respondent is to file the
appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice
of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B. 5

On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint,

(a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
reprimand to three (3) months suspension of respondent from the practice of law for having
been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a
lawyer;

(a) complainant's motion praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment;

(b) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution of July 26, 1997;

(c) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the
maximum penalty be denied;

(d) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension from
the practice of law as recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to
resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier penalty;

(e) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be

disbarred; and

(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless. 6

and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.

In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the
above-entitled case to Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation "in view of
the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the Supreme Court."

The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original
recommendation of the imposition of the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that
respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon Chapter. 7 Accordingly, on
February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution:
 RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48

xxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty of
REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed
on Atty. Juan S. Dealca.8

Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied. 9

On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection
with Administrative Case No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP
Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution
and granted respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He claimed
that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had
already become final and executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final
and executory judgment shall be null and void.

When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in
the present complaint, it should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet
reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the records of the case was
Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months
suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution,
the Court was not aware that the IBP had already disposed of the motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent counsel.

Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting
Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the
case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25, 1997 was already considered by this Court
when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it.

Hence, on the strength of this Court's resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP
conducted a re-evaluation of the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be
reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to the IBP. It is regrettable that the
procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which was
attributable to neither party.

Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services
of respondent lawyer only for the preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the
attorney's fees was payable upon the completion and submission of the appellant's brief and not
upon the termination of the case.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. AS
agreed upon, complainant paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the
case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due as it was agreed to be paid only upon the
completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to respondent lawyer
P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance
simply because of complainant's failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00 which does not
appear to be deliberate. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to complainant
withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language. 10

Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper?

We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause
and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the
client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, 11 under the circumstances of the present
case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him
the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's
contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount
owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.

The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the maximum penalty of
disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would
accomplish the end desired.12 In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a
warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5485 March 16, 2005

ELMER CANOY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent.

DECISION
There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the cause of the client in
the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of desertion. That the
lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher calling, election
to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from the practice
is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case.

A Complaint1 dated 10 April 2001 was filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant by Elmer Canoy
(Canoy) accusing Atty. Jose Max Ortiz (Atty. Ortiz) of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged
that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca Cola Bottlers
Philippines. The complaint was filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Regional Arbitration Board VI in Bacolod City.2 Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this
proceeding. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing the complaint ordered the parties to submit their
respective position papers. Canoy submitted all the necessary documents and records to Atty. Ortiz
for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of
Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. After a final visit at the office of Atty. Ortiz in April
of 2000, during which Canoy was told to come back as his lawyer was not present, Canoy decided to
follow-up the case himself with the NLRC. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually
dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position
papers.3 The dismissal was without prejudice. Canoy alleged that Atty. Ortiz had never
communicated to him about the status of the case, much less the fact that he failed to submit the
position paper.

The Comment4 filed by Atty. Ortiz is the epitome of self-hagiography. He informs the Court that
since commencing his law practice in 1987, he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income
clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz claims that for more than ten years,
his law office was a virtual adjunct of the Public Attorney's Office with its steady stream of non-
paying clients in the "hundreds or thousands."5 At the same time, he hosted a legal assistance show
on the radio, catering to far-flung municipalities and reaching "the people who need legal advice
and assistance."6 Atty. Ortiz pursued on with this lifestyle until his election as Councilor of Bacolod
City, a victory which he generously attributes to the help "of the same people whom he had helped
by way of legal assistance before."7

Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. The lawyer was
apparently confident that the illegal dismissal case would eventually be resolved by way of
compromise. He claims having prepared the position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the
same, the Labor Arbiter had already issued the order dismissing the case.8 Atty. Ortiz admits though
that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure
to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, "he
was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing
lawyer." Eventually, "his desire to help was beyond physical limitations," and he withdrew from his
other cases and his "free legal services."9

According to Atty. Ortiz, "Mr. Canoy should have at least understood that during all that time, he was
free to visit or call the office and be entertained by the secretary as [he] would normally report to
the office in the afternoon as he had to attend to court trials and report to the Sanggunian office."10
He states that it was his policy to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases
with his office, as it would be "too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with
hundreds of clients, mostly indigents" with only two office personnel.11

Nonetheless, Atty. Ortiz notes that the dismissal of Canoy's complaint was without prejudice, thus
the prescriptive period had been tolled. He claims not being able to remember whether he
immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case, though as far as he could recall, Canoy had
conveyed a message to him that he had a lawyer to handle the case, thus his office did not insist on
refiling the same.12

The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 Canoy eventually submitted a motion withdrawing the complaint, but this was
not favorably acted upon by the IBP in view of the rule that the investigation of a case shall not be
interrupted or terminated by reason of withdrawal of the charges.14 Eventually, the investigating
commissioner concluded that "clearly, the records show that [Atty. Ortiz] failed to exercise that
degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his clients' (sic) claim," and
recommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded.15 The IBP Commission on Discipline adopted the
recommendation, with the slight modification that Atty. Ortiz be likewise warned that a repetition
of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Court is sensitive to the difficulties in obtaining legal representation for indigent or low-income
litigants. Apart from the heroic efforts of government entities such as the Public Attorney's Office,
groups such as the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid and the Office of Legal Aid of the UP
College of Law have likewise been at the forefront in the quest to provide legal representation for
those who could not otherwise afford the services of lawyers. The efforts of private practitioners
who assist in this goal are especially commendable, owing to their sacrifice in time and resources
beyond the call of duty and without expectation of pecuniary reward.

Yet, the problem of under-representation of indigent or low-income clients is just as grievous as

that of non-representation. Admirable as the apparent focus of Atty. Ortiz's legal practice may have
been, his particular representation of Canoy in the latter's illegal dismissal case leaves much to be
desired.

Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of
conduct displayed by Atty. Ortiz with respect to the handling of Canoy's case.

CANON 17–A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18–A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

...

Rule 18.03–A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04–A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
...

CANON 22–A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

...

Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately
turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.

Atty. Ortiz should have filed the position paper on time, owing to his duty as counsel of Canoy to
attend to this legal matter entrusted to him. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence
and diligence and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that
nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of
his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of
the community to the legal profession.16

If indeed Atty. Ortiz's schedule, workload, or physical condition was such that he would not be able
to make a timely filing, he should have informed Canoy of such fact. The relationship of lawyer-
client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and
fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark as to the mode and
manner in which his/her interests are being defended.17

There could have been remedies undertaken to this inability of Atty. Ortiz to file on time the
position paper had Canoy been told of such fact, such as a request for more time to file the position
paper, or maybe even the hiring of collaborating counsel or substitution of Atty. Ortiz as counsel.
Since Atty. Ortiz did not exercise the necessary degree of care by either filing the position paper on
time or informing Canoy that the paper could not be submitted seasonably, the ignominy of having
the complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute could not be avoided.

That the case was dismissed without prejudice, thus allowing Canoy to refile the case, hardly serves
to mitigate the liability of Atty. Ortiz, as the failure to file the position paper is per se a violation of
Rule 18.03.18
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City Councilor of
Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent
behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw his legal services
if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.19 Statutes expressly prohibit the occupant of
particular public offices from engaging in the practice of law, such as governors and mayors,20 and
in such instance, the attorney-client relationship is terminated.21 However, city councilors are
allowed to practice their profession or engage in any occupation except during session hours, and in
the case of lawyers such as Atty. Ortiz, subject to certain prohibitions which are not relevant to this
case.22 In such case, the lawyer nevertheless has the choice to withdraw his/her services.23 Still,
the severance of the relation of attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the
client or a manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a
copy thereof served upon the adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in
the case.24

Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so
and leave complainant in the cold unprotected.25 Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who
withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was
informed that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there
was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.

In fact, it took nearly two years before Canoy had learned that the position paper had not been filed
and that the case had been dismissed. This was highly irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz, much more so
considering that Canoy was one of the indigent clients whom Atty. Ortiz proudly claims as his
favored clientele. It does not escape the Court's attention that Atty. Ortiz faults Canoy for not
adequately following up the case with his office.26 He cannot now shift the blame to complainant
for failing to inquire about the status of the case, since, as stated above, it was his duty as lawyer to
inform his clients of the status of cases entrusted to him.27

The appropriate sanction is within the sound discretion of this Court. In cases of similar nature, the
penalty imposed by the Court consisted of either a reprimand, a fine of five hundred pesos with
warning, suspension of three months, six months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases.28
Given the circumstances, the Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP too lenient and
instead suspends Atty. Ortiz from the practice of law for one (1) month. The graver penalty of
suspension is warranted in lieu of an admonition or a reprimand considering that Atty. Ortiz's
undisputed negligence in failing to timely file the position paper was compounded by his failure to
inform Canoy of such fact, and the successive dismissal of the complaint.

Lawyers who devote their professional practice in representing litigants who could ill afford legal
services deserve commendation. However, this mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer,
no matter how well-meaning, from the consequences of negligent acts. It is not enough to say that
all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation. They deserve quality representation
as well.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose Max S. Ortiz is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) month from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same negligence will be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6155. March 14, 2006.]

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, complainants, vs.
ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL,respondent.
DECISION

TINGA, J p:

Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint 1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime
Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, gross misconduct, and gross
negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C.
Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose
behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.

The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned
petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners
therein.

The facts are as follows:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin
(eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were
involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury
of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder
and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the
Sandiganbayan 2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a
Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration. 3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.

Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls
they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went
to respondent's last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding
address. ETIHCa

More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify
the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor
knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a
Resolution 4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest 5
had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained
unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.

In his Comment, 6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was
not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of
attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the
accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only
because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer's Oath did he file the Motion for
Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal
but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan
who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the
case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done
without proper and adequate remuneration.

As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the
last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, 7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to
file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the
corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused
for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that
it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on
his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration
for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional
opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to
PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and
complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to
Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the
letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for
the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed
the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3
Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who
would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the
reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner
Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only
complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two
complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP
proceedings. 8

The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005,
Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility 9 and recommended the imposition of penalty
ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. 10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of
Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolid's recommendation to
find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether
respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which
eventually led to the ad cautelam petition's dismissal with finality.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended
by the IBP proper.

In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher
duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which
stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v.
Sandiganbayan: 11

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest . . . .

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
profession in society. . . . 12

At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time.
Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known
that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading 13 and it rests on the sound
discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the
reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to
appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say
he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants
that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7
February 2002. This respondent does not dispute. ECaScD

As to respondent's conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of
the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his
clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his
dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to
the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings 14
he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to
complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondent's office would have received the Court's
Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at
least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondent's office
to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he
opted not to return their calls.
Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about
the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However,
though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and
complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal
himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the
appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to
go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so
doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to
Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them
instructions on how to go about respondent's withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should
have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his
representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case.
Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the
receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot
lend credence to respondent's naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in
their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam
petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written
conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules
of Court. 15

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental
rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's
written consent or from a good cause. 16

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily
due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil 17 that:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession. 18

Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without
adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim
when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in
the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account
number 7186509273. 19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the
deposited amount.

The Court also rejects respondent's claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties
and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the
words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta: 20

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. 21

Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. . . . 22

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his
obligation embodied in the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains
unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor
cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.

Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting
incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police
officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the 'salvage' of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M.
Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato." 23 Rule 14.01 24 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the
latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the
culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the
most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such
penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which
resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon
the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months' suspension. 25 The Court finds it fit to impose
the same in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.