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Author(s): J. N. MOHANTY
Source: Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 14 (1984), pp. 35-55
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24654401
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Phenomenology
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Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
J. Ν. MOHANTY
University of Oklahoma
35
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36 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
propose to take up this vast problem. Instead of dealing with each such
philosopher and his method separately, I propose to consider certain
questions of vital importance to any conception of descriptive philosophy—
no matter whether such a philosophy remains a mere phenomenology or
claims to be a metaphysics. In his 1967 book Phenomenology and
Existence, Marvin Farber writes that "the question of the range and
varieties of description" is "at present still in need of scholarly
exploration."
More specifically, the questions with which I shall be concerned here
are the following:
1. How is philosophical description different from a description that
is not philosophical?
2. How is a genuine philosophical description different from a
philosophical statement which only purports to be descriptive but is not
really so?
3. How are the descriptive and the speculative components of a
philosophical doctrine, or of a system, related to each other?
These questions are intended to lead to a clarification of the meaning
and nature of description as a philosophical activity and to an appreciation
of its relation to that speculative endeavor which has traditionally been
regarded as the very core of philosophizing. I shall also, in the concluding
part of this paper, draw attention to the several different types of
description undertaken by different philosophers and shall add a few
critical comments with a view toward throwing some light on this method
of doing philosophy, as I understand it.
Some preliminary observations about the concept of description may
be in order at this stage. There does not seem to be complete unanimity
about what exactly is mean by 'description,' to say nothing of the question
of the possibility of a purely descriptive philosophy. Philosophers have
used the concept of description in many different ways, of which the
following are the most important:
i. Positivist pholosophers of science (notably Mach) have held the view
that the task of science is to describe sensory observations, and not to
interpret them. Scientific laws, according to Mach, are abridged
descriptions and allow us to make predictions. This predictive power is
gained by making our primitive descriptions more comprehensive and by
restricting the terms of description to the fewest possible common
elements. Mach was assuming a sort of one-to-one correlation among the
elements of description and elements of the phenomenon being described.
ii. In modem logic and epistemology, Russell has familiarised the
contrast between 'names' and 'descriptions.' Descriptive phrases or
sentences are about something, and ascribe properties to that which they
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 37
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38 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 39
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40 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
Ill
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 41
IV
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42 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
add another. Not any and every essence would seem to be the subject
matter for philosophical description. The essences, 'dog,' 'tree,' and
'dirt' surely are not Consider a tree, the one I see here before me as I look
out the window. Its description surely is not a philosophical task. Nor is it
a philosophical task to determine what precisely is the essence 'tree.' But
this tree is also a physical object an individual here before me, a Dies-da,
an object of outer perception, a subject of predications, a substance to
which various sensible properties may truly be ascribed, an effect of a
multitude of causal conditions belonging to 'nature' or the world as a
whole, a possible object of aesthetic enjoyment, etc. It is as any one of
these and a host of other things that this tree here before me enters into
philosophical discourse. The philosopher who adopts a descriptive
program may seek to describe the essence of being a physical object,
the essence of being a spatio-temporal individual, the essence of outer
perception, or any of the other essences involved. In doing any of these,
he would of course be, in a very oblique sense, also describing this tree.
What I am trying to bring out may be stated thus: individuals as met
with in pre-philosophical experience are not directly the subject matter of
philosophical description (though the modes of encounter are). The
material essences ('tree', 'dog,' 'man') are also not objects of philosophical
description—excepting the very general ones, those which may be called
categories. I am aware of the facts: (i) that it is difficult to draw a strict
line of demarcation between material essences and material categories;
and (ii) that some material essences, like those of values, do constitute
the subject matter of philosophical description, e.g., of what Scheler calls
a "material ethics of values." However, what is worth noticing in the
present context is the following: a real or ideal individual (this tree over
there; number '2'), by the very sense of its individuality, exists
independently of our consciousness of it, of its modes of givenness as
well as of any actual or possible mode of liguistically referring to it In the
case of the essences of these individuals, we may of course say that their
essences are; but the sense of their being is already quasi-ontological,
though still separable, by an act of abstraction, from the correlative
linguistic meaning and from the corresponding eidetic intuitions and
their possible fulfillment. As we move on from the material essences to
the categories, the sense of the being of the latter becomes less and less
ontological and exhibits far closer relationship with both language and
consciousness. This tree exists, no matter whether it is referred to by the
words "this tree" and no matter whether I or someone else perceives it or
not (This "no matter whether..." belongs to the sense of its existence as
a real individual. At the same time, its existence as a real individual
implies the possibility of identifiability, etc.) The essence 'tree,' on the
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 43
other hand, is, but is also the meaning of the common name 'tree' and is
the correlate of an act of idealisation exercised upon the appropriate
empirical type; however, it nevertheless is, so that it is conceivable that
the essence 'tree' is not referred to by any expression or that it belongs
really to a Platonic world of subsistent entities needing no act of idealiza
tion on the part of us human beings for its subsistence. The categories
'objectivity,' 'intentionality,' 'identity,' 'individuality,' 'universality,' on
the other hand, are essences which are such that only by an act of abstrac
tion of a more violent nature is it possible to regard them as independent
of language and consciousness. It is precisely with such entities that
philosophical description is concerned.
Keeping the above considerations in mind, we may venture the
following characterization: Philosophical description in the strict sense
is concerned with, or describes, facts—let us call these philosophical
facts—which are such that they can by their very nature be looked upon
from three different points of view. These facts may be regarded as
linguistic or meaning-structures; or again, they may be regarded as
ontological structures; or again, as structures of subjectivity or conscious
ness. Let me elucidate with the help of an example, which is but one of the
descriptive philosophical statements given above:
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44 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 45
Thus the Humean statement owes its seeming obviousness to the fact
that its presuppositions have an air of deceptiveness about them. For
example, the statement quoted above presupposes, among other things,
an atomistic psychology and a theory of meaning which has been laid
down by Hume in section II of the Enquiry, a theory which for its own
part pretends to be descriptive but is in fact a recommendation.
In contrast to this, the Husserlian statement exhibits a sustained effort
to delineate the actual process of external perception as given to the
perceiving consciousness without allowing scientific or any other
theoretical preconceptions to interfere. Contrast with it the sense-datum
theory of perception, a theory which no doubt purports to be faithful to
the given but whose conception of the given is vitiated by scientific,
psychological, and epistemological preconceptions. It presupposes, for
example, the reality of sensations which for its part is based on a
psychological atomism, a notion of psycho-physical causality, and the
constancy hypothesis, but which is not warranted by the evidence of
consciousness.
I need not emphasize how relevant and in fact necessary is the method
of phenomenological epoche for the very possibility of genuine description
in philosophy. It was Husserl's genius that he both revitalized the descrip
tive method for philosophy and brought to the forefront the method of
epoche, without which one cannot really get down to the job. The pre
conceptions have to be placed within brackets, beliefs suspended, before
philosophy can begin to confront phenomena as phenomena. This again
is not an instantaneous act of suspending belief in the world or of
directing one's glance towards the phenomena as phenomena, but
involves a strenuous effort at recognizing preconceptions as preconcep
tions, at unravelling sedimented interpretations, at getting at presupposi
tions which may pretend to be self-evident truths, and through such
processes aiming asymptotically at the pre-reflective experience.
It is no valid objection to say that this ideal can never be reached, and
that therefore no description in this sense can ever be possible. For we
can only lay down the task to be achieved and the path to be followed. But
to guarantee that any particular philosopher or any statement achieves
this task, fulfills the ideal, is not our present purpose. One may at best
distinguish between good and bad descriptions, between more or less
adequate ones. The situation is not unlike that in the natural sciences.
In a Beilage to the Second Volume of the Erste Philosophie (p. 477),
we find a note from Husserl which shows a clear awareness of the
problem with which we are faced. There is no other way, he warns us,
than beginning with a description based on naive evidence, and then
reflecting on it in order to satisfy ourselves regarding the presuppositions
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46 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
VI
I may now take up the question: How are the descriptive and the
speculative components of a philosophical system related to each other?
It may be possible to find in most philosophical systems some descriptive
core which not only furnishes the springboard for speculative flights but
itself gets transformed beyond recognition in the course of such flights.
Thus, for example, the Platonic two-world theory is surely based on the
mutual irreducibility of sense-perception and eidetic thought (of which
another transformation is the Kantian two-faculty theory). That Kant's
transcendental idealism contains a large descriptive core has recently
been shown by Strawson, but had been pointed out by Nicolai Hartmann
much earlier.12 One may try to do the same in connection with
Whitehead's grand system of metaphysics.
My concern now is to detect the various ways in which the descriptive
find is or may be used for speculative purposes, that is, the various modes
of speculative flight from the descriptive springboard. If we could find all
the various ways in which this is or can be done, we would have a
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 47
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48 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
satisfied with such dualisms, philosophers have tried to reduce the one to
the other by showing its origin—which involves filling in gaps, reducing
the heterogeneity of phenomena to a homogeneity, and denying discon
tinuity among phenomena. A recent example of such an attempt is to be
found in Ludwig Landgrebe's effort to 'supersede' {aufheben) the
distinction between facts and essences in the life of transcendental
subjectivity.15 Most varieties of monism, ontological or epistemological,
exhibit this sort of move.
3. The speculative metaphysician collects descriptive cases, and is
too eager to bring them under a generic concept Thus, starting with the
descriptive thesis that there are material bodies, living organisms, and
minds (constituting the real world), and the ideal entities, he seeks a
generic concept of Being common to all these. A descriptive philosopher,
on the other hand, would remain satisfied with a concept of Being which
is analogical and not generic. In order to make this point clearer, it is
necessary to explain briefly the distinction between generic concept and
analogical concept as I understand it here. If G is a generic concept with
a, b, c, and d as its instances, then of course a, b, c, and d are different Gs
(Plato and Aristotle are different men) insofar as each of them contains a
common generic property of manhood. But suppose Ν to be an
analogical concept of which u, v, w, and χ are instances; then it is not only
the case that u, v, w, and χ are different Ns, but they are as Ν different In
other words, they are radically different. Material bodies and minds are
not only different real entities, but are as real different Acts and noema
are not only different entities, but are as entities different. In such cases,
the search for generic concepts is futile and the imposition of one a
speculative construction.
Let us take another example. Intentional directedness is to be found
in mental states and in bodily behavior. The speculative philosopher
would search for the common source of both, or would regard the one as
an epiphenomenon of the other. He may regard bodily intentionality as
the basic intentionality, and conscious intentionality as its appearance.
Or he may regard conscius intentionality as the basic phenomenon and
intentionality as its bodily expression. The descriptive philosopher,
satisfied with the radical difference evidenced by phenomena, would
prefer to treat the concept of intentionality as an analogical concept such
that its various types are as intentionalies different and not merely different
intentionalities.
4. It has already been emphasized that philosophical facts are such
that they demand three alternative and yet mutually complementary
modes of description: the linguistic, the ontological, and the subjective.
Now philosophers, more often than not, largely under the influence of
their ontological and epistemological preconceptions, are prone to
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 49
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50 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
VII
Let me now draw your attention to the great variety of descriptive work
in philosophy. First, it is useful to bear in mind that to be a good
description, a statement need not represent the fact being described as a
photograph describes the original or as Wittgenstein used to take a
sentence to picture a fact. To describe is not to picture. Here again
Wittgenstein warns us well enough: "Thinking of a description as a
word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it ",6
Husserl, who laid so much emphasis on the descriptive method in
philosophy, did not quite discuss the problem of the logical relation in
which a descriptive statement stands to the fact being described. However,
he did explicitly reject the picture theory of meaning as also the
correspondence theory of truth. For him, I should think, a sentence is
truly descriptive if the meaning intention expressed in it is fulfilled in
appropriate intuition, where the intention and fulfilling experience
coincide. To restrict oneself to a descriptive method of philosophizing
means, for him, to restrict oneself to making assertions which are
supported by appropriate intuitive validation.
Now obviously, description in philosophy may be of various kinds. It
may be direct description, as, for example, Brentano's intentionality
thesis seems to be. It may be description by negation, which is an attempt
to focus on the distinctive peculiarity of a region of phenomena through a
series of negations rather than through some positive characterization. In
other words one may seek to describe an X by saying that X is not ρ, X is
not q, etc. Such descriptions, in order to be useful in uniquely identifying,
must make use of the premise, e.g., that p, q, r exhaust all characters save
one within the given universe of discourse.
One may also describe a thing by arranging phenomena with which
one is better acquainted or whose descriptions are already at hand in
such a manner that they all form a series which points toward the thing to
be described as its limit. Whitehead's method of extensive abstraction
may be regarded as description in this sense. It may be that when he is
seeking to define a point in terms of extensive connections, he is giving a
description in terms of elements which are themselves phenomena.
I am less sure of the descriptive character of classification. Nicolai
Hartmann, for example, builds up a phenomenological ontology by
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 51
classifying beings into several regions: the real, the ideal, and the hybrid.
It is necessary to be aware that, in this kind of descriptive venture, there
may be unrecognized presuppositions.
The most perplexing is the claim of Heidegger's method of hermeneutic
description. Heidegger calls it'Auslegung.' He writes: "the methodological
significance of phenomenological description is interpretation." This is
indeed a most puzzling statement, in view of the fact that one would
ordinarily regard interpretation as being opposed to description. Harald
Delius, in a brilliant paper,18 has questioned the validity of this
Heideggerian method as a phenomenological method, and I
endorse his conclusions in principle, where Delius writes:
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52 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
VIII
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 53
direct linkage with the immediacy of experience; and yet without such a
linkage, pure description is not possible.
b. It is also argued, in a rather Kantian spirit, that all description
involves conceptualization of the data, and all conceptualization is, to
some degree, interpretation. It involves interpretation in at least two very
different, though not entirely disconnected, senses: first, conceptualiza
tion means idealization; and second, concepts form a systematic frame
work, however implicitly, so that any conceptualization presupposes an
implicit or explicit system of concepts.
c. It is often pointed out, by phenomenologists, that all experience
including thinking and reflection—is perspectival, contextual, and
historically situated. The perceiver, the experiencer, the knower, and the
philosopher are not timeless, supra-historical, transcendental conscious
nesses but concrete, context-bound, historically conditioned persons.
The attitude of description therefore does not suit them. All intention is
also interpretation; all description has to be hermeneutics.
d. A particularly strong version of the argument stated immediately
above may restrict itself to the human sciences, where, as Charles Τ aylor
has recently well argued, there is no brute data identification, where the
data themselves are subjective meanings constituted by self-interpretations
by persons and communities. The human sciences therefore must be
hermeneutic and cannot be descriptive.
I would like to respond briefly to these arguments.
First, it may be pointed out that every language is no doubt
convention-laden, but not necessarily theory-laden. It is only a certain
view of language which opposes the given to its linguistic expression, and
assigns to the latter the function of interpreting, conceptualizing, and
idealizing the former. However, a more truly phenomenological approach to
language and experience may support the view that language itself serves
as a condition of the givenness of things in the precise manner in which
they are given, so that in perceptual judgments, for example, as Husserl
rightly emphasized, there is a sort of phenomenal identity of the
expression and the experience.
Secondly, by defending the conception of a descriptive philosophy, we
are not necessarily obliged to defend a positivistic conception of
knowledge according to which knowledge consists in bare reception of
data. There is no doubt that idealizations are involved in predicative
thinking, to say nothing of higher order reflections, scientific theory
building, etc. But the-conception of a phenomenological philosophy
requires that the phenomenologist himself, qua phenomenologist, refrain
from idealizing, for it is precisely the process of idealization involved in
thinking and in cognitive processes (as well as the noematic products of
such idealizations, i.e., the ideal noemata) that he may have to describe.
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54 J. Ν. Mohanty Philosophical Description and Descriptive Philosophy
Likewise, it may be, and indeed seems very much to be, the case that
all perception, experience, thinking, and reflection are perspectival in
character. It is far from the truth that the perceiver qua perceiver, the
experiencer qua experiencer, the scientist qua scientist, is a transcendental
ego, a timeless supra-historical consciousness. However, the description
of this very essential structure of perspectivity, historicity, and contextuality
of the empirical subject requires that the descriptive philosopher, qua
descriptive philosopher, be neither an experiencer, perceiver, historical
agent, nor scientist, but a transcendentally purified meditating philosopher.
Thus all philosophical descriptions are to be from the point of view of the
transcendental ego; if this 'point of view' itself imposes a perspectivity, a
methodological presupposition, then that may be so indeed. The
descriptive philosopher as occupying the position of a transcendental ego
is not the same as an omniscient constituting consciousness. For the
descriptive philosopher, all truths are not transparent; he does not intuit
all that he has to describe, nor are all his descriptions supported by the
same degree of intuitive backing. However, he refrains from interpreting
inasmuch as he wants to catch hold of the process of interpretation and
idealization that is involved in human cognitive endeavor.
This would indicate the way I would like the point about the
hermeneutic character of the human sciences to be dealt with. There is no
doubt in my mind that, in a very important sense, the human sciences are
to be hermeneutic in character; but phenomenology is not a human
science, not one of the Geisteswissenschaften. In its effort to lay the
foundation and to clarify the basic concepts and activities of any science,
natural or human, phenomenology has to describe, bring to intuitive
clarity, the processes involved in their concept and theory formation.
This activity is descriptive, and not itself interpretive, as the activities of
those sciences surely are.
NOTES
'Whitehead, Α. Ν. Process and Reality, (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1941 ),
pp. 15-16.
tibid, p. 19.
'Wittgenstein, L Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 47.
'ibid, p. 49.
'Strawson, P. F. Individuals, An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, (Anchor
Books, 1963), p. xiii.
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Research In Phenomenology Volume XIV 55
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