Studies in History

and Philosophy
of Science
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 1–4
www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

Introduction

The dual nature of technical artefacts

Peter Kroes, Anthonie Meijers
Delft University of Technology, Philosophy Department, Jaffalaan 5, NL-2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands

Philosophers of science are not known for showing an interest in the technological sci-
ences. Physics, biology and the social sciences have been their primary objects of study in
recent decades. This focus is partly due to the widespread belief that technology is basi-
cally applied science and not very interesting from a philosophical point of view. When
technology is taken into consideration it is largely because of its role in science (instru-
ments, experimentation) and not because it constitutes an interesting subject in its own
right. In this special issue The dual nature of technical artefacts we challenge the received
view, and take up one fundamental issue in the philosophy of the technological sciences by
focussing on the nature of the object of these sciences: technical artefacts.
Technical artefacts such as typewriters, hammers, copying machines or computers are
different from social artefacts such as laws or money in that the realization of their func-
tion crucially depends on their physical structure. They are also different from physical or
natural objects because they are intentionally produced and used by human beings to real-
ize certain goals. A proper interpretation of the meaning of ‘produced’ in the last sentence
contains a key for understanding the nature of these artefacts. On the one hand, they are
physically produced in the sense that the physical objects involved are typically designed
and made by human beings (this is certainly true for artefacts that are the result of modern
engineering). On the other hand, they are produced in the sense that it is only in relation to
human intentionality that physical objects become technical artefacts. These artefacts have
a purpose or function: they are objects to be used for doing things and are characterized by
a certain ‘for-ness’. It is this teleological element that sets technical artefacts apart from
physical objects. Physical objects, with the exclusion of biological entities, have, as phys-
ical objects, no function and exhibit no ‘for-ness’: they acquire a teleological element and
become technical artefacts only in relation to human intentionality. Thus in a twofold
sense, human beings produce technical artefacts: in a physical and in an intentional sense

E-mail addresses: p.a.kroes@tbm.tudelft.nl (P. A. Kroes), a.w.m.meijers@tbm.tudelft.nl (A. W. M. Meijers).

0039-3681/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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2 P. Kroes, A. Meijers / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 1–4

(where the physical sense always involves the intentional sense, but not the other way
around).
Seen from this perspective, technical artefacts can be said to have a dual nature: they are
(i) designed physical structures, which realize (ii) functions, which refer to human inten-
tionality. This conceptualisation of technical artefacts, as physical and as functional
objects, combines two fundamentally different ways of viewing our world. One, we can
conceive of the world as consisting of physical objects interacting through causal connec-
tions. Two, we can conceive of parts of it as consisting of agents, primarily human beings,
who intentionally represent the world and act in it on the basis of reasons. In so far as
technical artefacts are physical structures they fit into the physical conception of the world;
in so far as they have intentionality-related functions, they fit into the intentional concep-
tion. Both conceptualisations are necessary for characterizing technical artefacts. This
makes technical artefacts ‘hybrid’ objects that can only be described adequately in a
way that somehow combines the physical and intentional conceptualisations of the world.
Exactly how the physical and intentional conceptualisations of our world are related
remains a vexing problem to which the long history of the mind–body problem in philos-
ophy testifies. This situation also affects our understanding of technical artefacts: a con-
ceptual framework that combines the physical and intentional (functional) aspects of
technical artefacts is still lacking.1 If functions of technical artefacts are seen primarily
as realized in the physical objects involved, the question remains how these functions
are related to the mental states of human individuals, which, after all, form the core of
the intentional conceptualisation. If, alternatively, functions are seen primarily as patterns
of mental states, and exist, so to speak, in the heads of designers and users of technical
artefacts only, it becomes mysterious how a function relates to the physical substrate of
a particular artefact. Probably the best way to conceive of functions of artefacts, then,
is to regard the notion of a function as a bridging concept that relates the physical and
intentional domain.
The various contributions to this special issue mainly approach the problem of how to
conceptualise the dual nature of technical artefacts via the concept of technical function.
This all important notion, however, cannot be taken for granted. There is no generally
accepted theory of function available in the literature. Most theories of function, for exam-
ple Millikan’s and Neander’s, have been developed in the context of the philosophy of
biology, and their application to technical artefacts appears naı̈ve (Vermaas & Houkes,
2003). Mark Perlman, in a recent survey paper on function theories, maintains that arte-
fact functions are far less problematic than natural functions. They are the easy case,
whereas ‘biological functions, lacking a conscious designer are the ones that are difficult
to account for’ (Perlman, 2004, p. 44). We tend to disagree. The papers in this special issue
show the complexity of artefact functions and the difficulties faced when one tries to apply
biological function theories to technical artefacts. In the case of proper artefacts functions,
for example, an account in terms of social institutions seems necessary.
Of the existing function theories, the intentional and causal role theories of functions
are the most interesting for artefacts. Intentional theories take as their starting point that
agents ascribe functions to artefacts by embedding them in means–ends relations. Objects

1
The development of such a coherent framework is the aim of the research project The Dual Nature of
Technical Artefacts on which this special issue is based; for more information about this research project, see
http://www.dualnature.tudelft.nl.
 P. Kroes, A. Meijers / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 1–4 3

and their parts ‘have’ functions only insofar as they contribute to the realization of a goal.
According to the causal role theories functions correspond to actual physical capacities
that causally contribute to capacities of more encompassing systems. In this approach
there is no reference to agents or intentional action. Examples of the intentional approach
to functions are the theories of Searle and McLaughlin (Searle, 1995; McLaughlin, 2001).
According to the latter (p. 60) ‘[t]he function of an artefact is derivative from the purpose
of some agent in making or appropriating the object; it is conferred on the object by the
desires and beliefs of an agent. No agent, no purpose, no function’. Cummins’s theory of
functional analysis is the primary example of the causal role approach (Cummins, 1975). It
does not relate functions to intentional agents but to actual physical capacities of objects.
Alongside McLaughlin’s sweeping statement ‘No agent, no purpose, no function’ this
approach implies ‘No material object, no physical capacity, no technical function’.
The intentional and causal theories of functions suffer, each in their own way, from a
similar kind of problem in accounting for the dual nature of technical artefacts. The main
challenge for intentional theories is that the ascription of technical functions appears to
depend on intentional states of affairs only, for example, the expectations of a single (or
collective) agent. The structural features of the object involved seem to be irrelevant for
attributing a function: the relation between structure and intention (function) becomes
problematic. Causal role theories, in contrast, have the tendency to let functions coincide
with actual physical capacities: structure and function become almost identical. The main
drawback of this approach is that it cannot account for the malfunctioning of technical
artefacts: an artefact that lacks the actual capacity for performing its intended function
by definition does not have that function. The intentions associated with the artefact have
become irrelevant for attributing a function.
Therefore, within the framework of these function theories, functions will not be able to
play the intended intermediary role between the domains of the physical and the inten-
tional. Functions are either drawn into the domain of intentional action, loosing contact
with the physical domain, or they are drawn into the physical domain loosing contact with
the intentional domain. So the existing function theories seem to be inadequate for tech-
nical functions.
The various contributions to this special issue show that the search for a coherent con-
ceptual framework for understanding and describing the dual nature of technical artefacts
raises fundamental questions. Wybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas present an action-theo-
retic account of using and designing artefacts and present the ICE-theory of function
ascriptions to technical functions. This theory is intended to remedy the shortcomings
of existing function theories for technical artefacts. Marcel Scheele argues, in his contribu-
tion, that a viable account of the notion of proper functions of technical artefacts must be
based on the intentions of individual agents and on social factors. Starting from the obser-
vation that technical artefacts are subject to normative statements—‘this drill malfunc-
tions’—Maarten Franssen investigates how such judgements fit into the domain of the
normative in general and, in particular, looks at the grounds for their normativity. Pieter
Vermaas analyses the extent to which the ICE-theory of functions can reproduce the engi-
neering view that artefacts have their functions in virtue of their physical structure, irre-
spective of intentional aspects. Jeroen de Ridder addresses the issue of explaining how
artefacts work in terms of their physical structure, that is, of artefact explanations. He
offers an account of such explanations on the basis of the familiar notion of mechanistic
explanation. Wybo Houkes argues in his contribution that technical functions warrant
4 P. Kroes, A. Meijers / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 1–4

specific epistemological attention. Knowledge of functions involves standards of theoret-

ical reasoning, and of practical reasoning. He shows furthermore, that knowledge of func-
tions creates a rich normative context, manifested in notions such as improper use. Wybo
Houkes and Anthonie Meijers examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical
artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order
objects and their material basis. They present two criteria for an adequate ontology of
technical artefacts and come to the conclusion that neither the supervenience nor the con-
stitution view can account for the ontology of technical artefacts. Finally, Peter Kroes
analyses the coherence between structural and functional descriptions of technical arte-
facts in terms of the kind of inference patterns that make it possible to reason from struc-
tural claims to functional ones and vice versa.
This special issue obviously does not cover all philosophical issues concerning technical
artefacts; such artefacts also raise other philosophical questions. In what senses are they
ontologically different from social artefacts such as laws, universities and money? Do tech-
nical artefacts have functional part–whole relations that are different from structural ones?
Is the artefactuality and functionality of artefacts a relational property, and if so, what are
its relata? Are the relata individuals, social groups, other artefacts? What are the identity
criteria for technical artefacts, and what are the types of ontological commitments
involved in describing and using artefacts?
It is our strong conviction that technical artefacts deserve more attention from philos-
ophers than they have received to date. Technical artefacts raise problems that have been
addressed only marginally or not at all in philosophy in general and philosophy of science
and technology in particular. In order to draw wider philosophical attention to these issues
we have approached a number of outstanding philosophers to comment on the articles
presented in this issue. We have asked them to asses the contributions and to comment
on the wider philosophical significance of the topics addressed: Where do these topics
fit in the philosophical landscape? What new issues, if any, have been put on the philo-
sophical agenda? We hope that this special issue, which has been set up in such a way that
all contributions can be read more or less independently, will spark off a philosophical dis-
cussion about the nature of technical artefacts, objects that are as conceptually compli-
cated for us as philosophers, as they are familiar to us from everyday life.

References

Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 741–765.

McLaughlin, P. (2001). What functions explain. Functional explanation and self-reproducing systems. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Perlman, M. (2004). The modern philosophical resurrection of teleology. The Monist, 87, 3–51.
Searle, J. R. (1995). The construction of social reality. London: Penguin.
Vermaas, P. E., & Houkes, W. (2003). Ascribing functions to technical artefacts: A challenge to etiological
accounts of function. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 54, 261–289.