G.R. No.
78909 June 30, 1989
MATERNITY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, represented by ANTERA L. DORADO
vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND THE REGIONAL
DlRECTOR OF LABOR, REGION X
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital derives its finances from the club itself
as well as from paying patients and partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government
Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living
allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is
deducted from their respective salaries
On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of
Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and
ECOLAS
After inspection of the records of the petitioner, the Labor Standard and Welfare
Officers submitted their report confirming that there was underpayment of wages
and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner
Based on this inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director
issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58,
representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's
employees
appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment - modifying
the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be computed only
from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Secretary of Labor
The matter of whether or not the decision states clearly and distinctly statement
of facts as well as the law upon which it is based, becomes relevant after the
issue on jurisdiction has been resolved.
ISSUE:
authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and ECOLAs to
private respondents arising from his visitorial and enforcement powers under
Article 128 of the Labor Code
RULING:
this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards all
persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint,
but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that time.
Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws,
rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance
and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and
health standards
A Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor
standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims,
provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings
of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned.
Prior to the promulgation of E.O. No. 111 on December 24, 1986, the Regional
Director's authority over money claims was unclear. The complaint in the
present case was filed on May 23, 1986 when E.O. No. 111 was not yet in effect,
and the prevailing view was that stated in the case of Antonio Ong, Sr. vs. Henry
M. Parel, et al., G.R. No. 76710, dated December 21, 1987, thus:
. . . the Regional Director, in the exercise of his visitorial and enforcement
powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, has no authority to award money
claims, properly falling within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. .
Prior to the promulgation of PD 850, labor standards cases were an exclusive
function of labor arbiters, under Article 216 of the then Labor Code (PD No. 442,
as amended by PD 570-a), which read in part:
Art. 216. Jurisdiction of the Commission. — The Commission shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Labor Arbiters and
compulsory arbitrators.
The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers whether agricultural or non-agricultural.
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 inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
xxx xxx xxx enforcement of their order.

(c) All money claims of workers, involving non-payment or underpayment xxx xxx xxx
of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay, maternity leave and other
money claims arising from employee-employer relations, except claims for Labor Arbiters, on the other hand, lost jurisdiction over labor standards cases.
workmen's compensation, social security and medicare benefits; Article 216, as then amended by PD 850, provided in part:

(d) Violations of labor standard laws; SEC. 22. Article 216 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx Art. 216. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The
Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
(Emphasis supplied) cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

The Regional Director exercised visitorial rights only under then Article 127 of
the Code as follows:
ART. 127. Visitorial Powers. — The Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives, including, but not restricted, to the labor
inspectorate, shall have access to employers' records and premises at any time
of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to
copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or
matter which may be necessary to determine violations or in aid in the
enforcement of this Title and of any Wage Order or regulation issued pursuant
to this Code.
Xxxxx
With the promulgation of PD 850, Regional Directors were given enforcement
powers, in addition to visitorial powers. Article 127, as amended, provided in
part:
SEC. 10. Article 127 of the Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 127. Visitorial and enforcement powers. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have
the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance
with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor
regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
xxx xxx xxx
(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or underpayment of
wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or service incentive
leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from employer-employee
relations, except claims for employee's compensation, social security and
medicare benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 127 of this Code.
Under the then Labor Code therefore (PD 442 as amended by PD 570-a, as
further amended by PD 850), there were three adjudicatory units: The Regional
Director, the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Arbiter. It became
necessary to clarify and consolidate all governing provisions on jurisdiction into
one document. 2 On April 23, 1976, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 6 was issued,
and provides in part (on labor standards cases) as follows:
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6
TO: All Concerned
SUBJECT: DISTRIBUTION OF JURISDICTION OVER LABOR CASES
xxx xxx xxx
1. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Director.
a) Labor standards cases arising from violations of labor standard laws
discovered in the course of inspection or complaints where employer-employee
relations still exist;

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 1. PD 1367 (5-1-78) — gave Labor Arbiters exclusive jurisdiction over
xxx xxx xxx unresolved issues in collective bargaining, etc., and those cases arising from
employer-employee relations duly indorsed by the Regional Directors. (It also
2. The following cases are under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the removed his jurisdiction over moral or other damages) In other words, the Labor
Conciliation Section of the Regional Office: Arbiter entertained cases certified to him. (Article 228, 1978 Labor Code.)

a) Labor standards cases where employer-employee relations no longer 2. PD 1391 (5-29-78) — all regional units of the National Labor Relations
exist; Commission (NLRC) were integrated into the Regional Offices Proper of the
Ministry of Labor; effectively transferring direct administrative control and
xxx xxx xxx supervision over the Arbitration Branch to the Director of the Regional Office of
the Ministry of Labor. "Conciliable cases" which were thus previously under the
6. The following cases are certifiable to the Labor Arbiters: jurisdiction of the defunct Conciliation Section of the Regional Office for
purposes of conciliation or amicable settlement, became immediately
a) Cases not settled by the Conciliation Section of the Regional Office, assignable to the Arbitration Branch for joint conciliation and compulsory
namely: arbitration. In addition, the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction even over termination
and labor-standards cases that may be assigned to them for compulsory
1) labor standard cases where employer-employee relations no longer arbitration by the Director of the Regional Office. PD 1391 merged conciliation
exist; and compulsory arbitration functions in the person of the Labor Arbiter. The
procedure governing the disposition of cases at the Arbitration Branch paralleled
POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 7 those in the Special Task Force and Field Services Division, with one major
exception: the Labor Arbiter exercised full and untrammelled authority in the
TO: All Regional Directors disposition of the case, particularly in the substantive aspect, his decisions and
orders subject to review only on appeal to the NLRC. 3
SUBJECT: LABOR STANDARDS CASES
3. MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37 — Because of the seemingly
Under PD 850, labor standards cases have been taken from the arbitration overlapping functions as a result of PD 1391, MOLE Policy Instructions No. 37
system and placed under the enforcement system, except where a) questions was issued on October 7, 1978, and provided in part:
of law are involved as determined by the Regional Director, b) the amount
involved exceeds P100,000.00 or over 40% of the equity of the employer, POLICY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 37
whichever is lower, c) the case requires evidentiary matters not disclosed or
verified in the normal course of inspection, or d) there is no more employer- TO: All Concerned
employee relationship.
SUBJECT: ASSIGNMENT OF CASES TO LABOR ARBITERS
Under the foregoing, a complaining employee who was denied his rights and
benefits due him under labor standards law need not litigate. The Regional Pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1391 and to insure speedy
Director, by virtue of his enforcement power, assured "expeditious delivery to disposition of labor cases, the following guidelines are hereby established for
him of his rights and benefits free of charge", provided of course, he was still in the information and guidance of all concerned.
the employ of the firm.
1. Conciliable Cases.
After PD 850, Article 216 underwent a series of amendments (aside from being
re-numbered as Article 217) and with it a corresponding change in the Cases which are conciliable per se i.e., (a) labor standards cases where
jurisdiction of, and supervision over, the Labor Arbiters: employer-employee relationship no longer exists; (b) cases involving deadlock
in collective bargaining, except those falling under P.D. 823, as amended; (c)

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unfair labor practice cases; and (d) overseas employment cases, except those
involving overseas seamen, shall be assigned by the Regional Director to the
Labor Arbiter for conciliation and arbitration without coursing them through the
conciliation section of the Regional Office.
2. Labor Standards Cases.
Cases involving violation of labor standards laws where employer- employee
relationship still exists shall be assigned to the Labor Arbiters where:
a) intricate questions of law are involved; or
b) evidentiary matters not disclosed or verified in the normal course of
inspection by labor regulations officers are required for their proper disposition.
3. Disposition of Cases.
When a case is assigned to a Labor Arbiter, all issues raised therein shall be
resolved by him including those which are originally cognizable by the Regional
Director to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In other words, the whole case, and
not merely issues involved therein, shall be assigned to and resolved by him.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
4. PD 1691(5-1-80) — original and exclusive jurisdiction over unresolved
issues in collective bargaining and money claims, which includes moral or other
damages.
Despite the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters over money
claims, however, the Regional Director nonetheless retained his enforcement
power, and remained empowered to adjudicate uncontested money claims.
5. BP 130 (8-21-8l) — strengthened voluntary arbitration. The decree also
returned the Labor Arbiters as part of the NLRC, operating as Arbitration Branch
thereof.
6. BP 227(6-1- 82) — original and exclusive jurisdiction over questions
involving legality of strikes and lock-outs.
On August 4, 1986, when the order was issued, Article 128(b) 4 read as follows:
(b) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representatives shall have
the power to order and administer, after due notice and hearing, compliance
with the labor standards provisions of this Code based on the findings of labor
regulation officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection, and to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their order, except in cases where the employer contests the
findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues which cannot be
resolved without considering evidentiary matters that are not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection. (Emphasis supplied)
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The
Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties
for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied)
EO 111 authorizes a Regional Director to order compliance by an employer with
labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other legislation.
Viewed in the light of PD 850 and read in coordination with MOLE Policy
Instructions Nos. 6, 7 and 37, it is clear that it has always been the intention of
our labor authorities to provide our workers immediate access (when still
feasible, as where an employer-employee relationship still exists) to their rights
and benefits, without being inconvenienced by arbitration/litigation processes
that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long
run.
Rule II on "Money Claims Arising from Complaint Routine Inspection",
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Section 2. Complaint inspection. — All such complaints shall immediately
be forwarded to the Regional Director who shall refer the case to the appropriate
unit in the Regional Office for assignment to a Labor Standards and Welfare
Officer (LSWO) for field inspection. When the field inspection does not produce
the desired results, the Regional Director shall summon the parties for summary
investigation to expedite the disposition of the case. . . .
Section 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually
exists. — Where employer-employee relationship no longer exists by reason of
the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of monetary
benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. . .
. (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Director correctly applied the award with respect to those
employees who signed the complaint, as well as those who did not sign the
complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint
was filed
The justification for the award to this group of employees who were not
signatories to the complaint is that the visitorial and enforcement powers given
to the Secretary of Labor is relevant to, and exercisable over establishments,
not over the individual members/employees, because what is sought to be
achieved by its exercise is the observance of, and/or compliance by, such
firm/establishment with the labor standards regulations. Necessarily, in case of
an award resulting from a violation of labor legislation by such establishment,
the entire members/employees should benefit therefrom.
The enforcement power of the Regional Director cannot legally be upheld in
cases of separated employees. Article 129 of the Labor Code, cited by petitioner
(p. 54, Rollo) is not applicable as said article is in aid of the enforcement power
of the Regional Director; hence, not applicable where the employee seeking to
be paid underpayment of wages is already separated from the service. His claim
is purely a money claim that has to be the subject of arbitration proceedings and
therefore within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for
short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male
and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"
it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise
to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative,
and not executive, in character.
PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended,
was passed in the absence of prior consultations.
ISSUE:
whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
RULING:
petition is DISMISSED
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare; it consists
of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good.
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does not owe its origin to the Charter.
it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
governance.
Plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection,
and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said
to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise,
and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that
has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the
Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there
is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have
been afflicted with an Identical predicament.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final
on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces
policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy,
or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the
laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the
judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his
subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them
enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar,
there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length
shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of
such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing
conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department
Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17
this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements
of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a
valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford
protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-
making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that
it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid
qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes
an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain
of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department
of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
28
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Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. 30
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane.
[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission;
Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor
of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
National Traffic Commission resolved to recommend to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing from a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic
ISSUE:
RULING:
the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with
the approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating
the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance
from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or
all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or
for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The
authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the
rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close
them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts
and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view
of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Locke’s
Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made
to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act
wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The
proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend
which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a
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subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental
powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of
greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but
also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was
said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169),
"the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful
today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare,
and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil.,
440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police
power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such
power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the
individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many questions
for regulation which formerly were not so considered."
The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL
MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
1. Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering Sub-
Department, Passenger Services Department of petitioner
2. On various occasions, several deductions were made from their salary.
The deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to them for
mishandling of company properties . . . which respondents resented. Such that
on August 21, 1984, individual respondents, represented by the union, made a
formal notice regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad,
Manager for Catering. . . .
3. As there was no action taken on said representation, private
respondents filed a formal grievance on November 4, 1984 pursuant to the
grievance machinery Step 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
petitioner and the union. . . . The topics which the union wanted to be discussed
in the said grievance were the illegal/questionable salary deductions and
inventory of bonded goods and merchandise being done by catering service
personnel which they believed should not be their duty.
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8. At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union
representatives, Mr. Abad resolved the grievance by denying the petition of
individual respondents and adopted the position that inventory of bonded goods
is part of their duty as catering service personnel, and as for the salary
deductions for losses, he rationalized:
1. It was only proper that employees are charged for the amount due to
mishandling of company property which resulted to losses. However, loss may
be cost price 1/10 selling price.
9. As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates, Mr.
Abad, on January 3, 1985 wrote by an inter-office memorandum addressed to
the grievants, individual respondents herein, for them to explain on (sic) why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for not conducting ramp
inventory. . . .
Mr. Abad found the same unsatisfactory. Thus, a penalty of suspension ranging
from 7 days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending on the number of
infractions committed. *
a complaint for illegal suspension was filed before the Arbitration Branch of the
Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, on March 17, 1986, ruled
in favor of petitioner by dismissing the complaint. . . .3
Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to respondent
commission which rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor
arbiter's order of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been
denied,
judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or its
determination, but is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion.4 It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to
perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the
exercise of a right to which it is entitled.
CBA
Sec. 2 — Processing of Grievances
xxx xxx xxx
STEP 1 — Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall
take the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is
justification for taking the matter up with the Company, he shall record the
grievance on the grievance form heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2)
copies of the grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be
presented to and discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The
division head shall answer the grievance within five (5) days from the date of
presentation by inserting his decision on the grievance form, signing and dating
same, and returning one copy to the shop steward. If the division head fails to
act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the grievance must be resolved
in favor of the aggrieved party. If the division head's decision is not appealed to
Step II, the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision
made, and shall not be eligible for further appeal.
petitioner further argues that respondent employees have the obligation, just as
management has, to settle all labor disputes through friendly negotiations. Thus,
Section 2 of the CBA should not be narrowly interpreted. 7 Before the
prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent requirements must
be met, i.e., presentment of the grievance and its discussion between the shop
steward and the division head who in this case is Mr. Abad. Section 2 is not self-
executing; the mere filing of the grievance does not trigger the tolling of the
prescriptive period.
the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only
because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided
relation between labor and capital.9 The constitutional mandate for the
promotion of labor is as explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the
workingman on an equal plane with management — with all its power and
influence — in negotiating for the advancement of his interests and the defense
of his rights.10 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward
to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification
that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 11
It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division head Reynaldo Abad was
then "on leave" when they filed their grievance which was received by Abad's
secretary.13 This knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the
CBA.
it is hard to believe that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand
still during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be expected that someone
has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Of course, this may be a product of
inadvertence on the part of PAL management, but certainly, complainants
should not be made to suffer the consequences. 14
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Contrary to petitioner's submission,15 the grievance of employees is not a
matter which requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be
delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look
into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad
If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for
management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the
workers in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on leave" to
avoid being caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be
allowed, the workingmen will suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at
the mercy of their employer. That could not have been the intendment of the
pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our
labor laws.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 85073 August 24, 1993
DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)
for in behalf of all the rank-and-file workers/employees of DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
QUIASON, J.:
petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), dismissing for lack of merit petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the Labor
respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU), for and in behalf of all the rank-
and-file workers and employees of petitioner, filed a complaint (NLRC Case No.
1791-MC-XI-82) before the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional
Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, against petitioner, for "Payment of the
Thirteenth-Month Pay Differentials." Respondent ALU sought to recover from
petitioner the thirteenth month pay differential for 1982
petitioner claimed that it erroneously included items subject of the complaint in
the computation of the thirteenth month pay for the years prior to 1982, upon a
doubtful and difficult question of law. According to petitioner, this mistake was
discovered only in 1981 after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision
in the case of San Miguel Corporation v. Inciong
Labor Arbiter in favor of respondent ALU
Petitioner appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which
affirmed the said decision accordingly dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
whether in the computation of the thirteenth month pay given by employers to
their employees under P.D. No. 851, payments for sick, vacation and maternity
leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for
regular holidays may be excluded in the computation and payment thereof,
regardless of long-standing company practice.
(a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary
of an employee within a calendar year.
(b) "Basic Salary" shall include all renumerations or earnings paid by an
employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost of living
allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of
Instructions No. 174, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic
salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975.
4. Overtime pay, earnings and other renumerations which are not part of
the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13th month pay.
Clearly, the term "basic salary" includes renumerations or earnings paid by the
employer to employee, but excludes cost-of-living allowances, profit-sharing
payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which have not been
considered as part of the basic salary of the employee as of December 16, 1975.
The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances and profit sharing payments shows
the intention to strip "basic salary" of payments which are otherwise considered
as "fringe" benefits
In other words, whatever compensation an employee receives for an eight-hour
work daily or the daily wage rate in the basic salary. Any compensation or
remuneration other than the daily wage rate is excluded. It follows therefore, that
payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on
rest days special holidays, as well as pay for regular holidays, are likewise
excluded in computing the basic salary for the purpose of determining the
thirteen month pay.
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The "Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851," which
put to rest all doubts in the computation of the thirteenth month pay, was issued
by the Secretary of Labor as early as January 16, 1976, barely one month after
the effectivity of P.D. No. 851 and its Implementing Rules. And yet, petitioner
computed and paid the thirteenth month pay, without excluding the subject items
therein until 1981. Petitioner continued its practice in December 1981, after
promulgation of the afore-quoted San Miguel decision on February 24, 1981,
when petitioner purportedly "discovered" its mistake.
From 1975 to 1981, petitioner had freely, voluntarily and continuously included
in the computation of its employees' thirteenth month pay, the payments for sick,
vacation and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special
holidays, and pay for regular holidays. The considerable length of time the
questioned items had been included by petitioner indicates a unilateral and
voluntary act on its part, sufficient in itself to negate any claim of mistake.
A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established
and the payments made pursuant thereto, ripened into benefits enjoyed by
them. And any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot
be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by virtue
of Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851, and
Article 100 of the labor of the Philippines, which prohibit the diminution or
elimination by the employer of the employees' existing benefits (Tiangco v.
Leogardo, Jr., 122 SCRA 267, [1983]).
petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the questioned decision of respondent
NLRC is AFFIRMED accordingly.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO vs. Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.,
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,2 to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to
national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly
limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary
either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" (subject clause).
Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in
that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and
denies them due process.
unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment x
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.6
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.7
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May 26, 1998.8
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March
19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26,
1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint9 against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits
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complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment.
Respondents appealed15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC
NLRC modified the LA Decision
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to
petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of
overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for
vacation leave pay."20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the subject clause.21 The NLRC denied the motion.22
CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.25
His Motion for Reconsideration26 having been denied by the CA,
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly
impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas
employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary
package.32 It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs
differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the
amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers
when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not
reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups;33 and
that it defeats Section 18,34 Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the
protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed
locally or overseas.35
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the
amount of backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally
dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving the
illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months unpaid
salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can be more
than three (3) months.38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause,
for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under
his fixed-period employment contract.39
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the
constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed
by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity,
which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of
the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must
necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements
that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local workers perform their
jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their jobs for foreign employers,
over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it
is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v.
National Labor Relations Commission43 and Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission,44 OFWs are contractual employees who can never
acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become
regular employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges
exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities
make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the
subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus,
the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article
II of the Constitution.45
the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of
the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view
of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed.61 Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the
people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those
already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and
legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.62
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
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To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.65
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1)
it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the
law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.66
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the
policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection
to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also
on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls
for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may
at least be approximated.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of
people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of
job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic
and financial need for the adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of the
Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services,
extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies
to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has
a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs
with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to
award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months’ salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only
when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired term" which
follows the words "salaries x x x for three months." To follow petitioners’ thinking
that private respondent is entitled to three (3) months salary only simply because
it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used
in the statute while giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established
rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is
presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have
used them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)
As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into
two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment
contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second
category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year
or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award
equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated
rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on
their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose
contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to
the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their
salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but
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all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every
year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a
limited or definite extent of time.105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of
an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must
be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for
such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original
term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the
unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more
decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is
not the length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the
length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause
applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least
one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more
than one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who
are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who
are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall
be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their
salaries for three months only.
the Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is
sought to be protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is
to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected.
There can never be a justification for any form of government action that
alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses
such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of
OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that
private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary
liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are
mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose
without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-
executing,132 there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one,133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature
of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,134 has
described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure
may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically
acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling legislation.
However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee
the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals
therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such
view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated.
The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of tenure", when
examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation
possible suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal
regardless of circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right
to continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion,
not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without
specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of
a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just
cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by
several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social justice require
legislative enactments for their enforceability.135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be
declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of
litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad
a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the
working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status
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of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or
legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an
impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the
judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class. And it was in fact
consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised
on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the
Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the
same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny
formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance
of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied
Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself,
without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its
own as elucidated in Agabon.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
G.R. No. 174585 October 19, 2007
FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC-SECOND DIVISION)
HONS. RAUL T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ANGELITA A.
GACUTAN ARE THE COMMISSIONERS, PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL TRAINING
INC., ATTY. HERNANI FABIA, RICKY TY, PABLO MANOLO, C. DE LEON and
TREENA CUEVA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal and ordering the private respondent
Philippine National Training Institute (PNTI) to reinstate petitioner to his former
position without loss of seniority rights.
On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by the
private respondent on probationary basis, as evidenced by his appointment.3
As such, he was required to report at private respondent’s training site in
Dasmariñas, Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo
Manolo de Leon (de Leon).4
petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority
as site administrator by using the private respondent’s vehicles and other
facilities for personal ends. In the same complaint, petitioner also accused de
Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondent’s
premises. A copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondent’s
Chief Accountant, Nita Azarcon (Azarcon).5
On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against the petitioner
addressed to private respondent’s Vice-President for Administration, Ricky Ty
(Ty), citing his suspected drug use.
In view of de Leon’s report, private respondent’s Human Resource Manager,
Trina Cueva (HR Manager Cueva), on 29 November 2000, served a copy of a
Notice to petitioner requiring him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary
action should be imposed on him for allegedly violating Section 14, Article IV of
the private respondent’s Code of Conduct.6
On 3 December 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private respondent’s main office
in España, Manila, on 29 November 2000. There, petitioner was served by HR
Manager Cueva a copy of the Notice to Explain together with the copy of de
Leon’s report citing his suspected drug use. After he was made to receive the
copies of the said notice and report, HR Manager Cueva went inside the office
of VP for Administration Ty. After a while, HR Manager Cueva came out of the
office with VP for Administration Ty. To petitioner’s surprise, HR Manager Cueva
took back the earlier Notice to Explain given to him and flatly declared that there
was no more need for the petitioner to explain since his drug test result revealed
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that he was positive for drugs. When petitioner, however, asked for a copy of
the said drug test result, HR Manager Cueva told him that it was with the
company’s president, but she would also later claim that the drug test result was
already with the proper authorities at Camp Crame.8
Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation letter and
also remarked that whether or not petitioner would resign willingly, he was no
longer considered an employee of private respondent. All these events
transpired in the presence of VP for Administration Ty, who even convinced
petitioner to just voluntarily resign with the assurance that he would still be given
separation pay. Petitioner did not yet sign the resignation letter replying that he
needed time to think over the offers. When petitioner went back to private
respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas, Cavite, to get his bicycle, he was no
longer allowed by the guard to enter the premises.9
On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center
for a drug test and he was found negative for any drug substance. With his drug
result on hand, petitioner went back to private respondent’s main office in Manila
to talk to VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them
his drug test result. Petitioner then told VP for Administration Ty and HR
Manager Cueva that since his drug test proved that he was not guilty of the drug
use charge against him, he decided to continue to work for the private
respondent.10
On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer allowed
to enter the training site for he was allegedly banned therefrom according to the
guard on duty. This incident prompted the petitioner to file the complaint for
illegal dismissal against the private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed
from employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why no disciplinary
action should be filed against him in view of his superior’s report that he was
suspected of using illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer to the said notice,
however, petitioner prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.11
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,13 in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal
his separation from employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order
petitioner’s reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and only
directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages
the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision.17 The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish the
fact of dismissal for his claim that he was banned from entering the training site
was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to subsequently claim his
salary and 13th month pay. Petitioner’s claim for reinstatement was, however,
granted by the NLRC
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and affirmed the NLRC
whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial
and quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be
supported by substantial evidence.28 Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.29
In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the
quantum of evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioner’s claim of
illegal dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated
and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and
contradictory.
Petitioner was only being given the option to either resign and receive his
separation pay or not to resign but face the possible disciplinary charges against
him. The final decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to continue
working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In fact, by petitoner’s own
admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty more time to think over
the offer.
that he was able to return to the said site on 3 December 2000, to claim his 16-
30 November 2000 salary, and again on 9 December 2000, to receive his 13th
month pay. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training site to claim
his salary and benefits raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.
further weakened with the presentation of private respondent’s payroll bearing
petitioner’s name proving that petitioner remained as private respondent’s
employee up to December 2000. Again, petitioner’s assertion that the payroll
was merely fabricated for the purpose of supporting private respondent’s case
before the NLRC cannot be given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries
in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130,
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24 January 2019
Section 43 of the Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim of fabrication and
to overcome such presumption of regularity.

While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal dismissal, the
employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause in the case at bar, however, the facts and the evidence did
not establish a prima facie case that the petitioner was dismissed from
employment.31 Before the private respondent must bear the burden of proving
that the dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by substantial
evidence the fact of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal,
then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law
tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent
economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance
the scales of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There
may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests
of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice
to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.36

instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 28 May 2005
and its Resolution dated 7 September 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724 are
hereby AFFIRMED

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