Utulo v.
Pasion Vda De Garcia appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may
Facts:
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and in the proceedings instituted in the
CFI Tarlac for the administration of his property, Leona Pasion Vda. De
Garcia (surviving spouse) was appointed judicial administratrix. Sanchez left
legitimate children, named Juan, Patrocinio and Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia
married Pablo Utulo and during the pendency of the administration
proceedings of her father, she died. Her only forced heirs were her mother
and husband. Pablo filed a petition, which stated the following:
1. That Luz’ only heirs were himself and his mother-in-law
2. That the only property left by Luz consisted in the share due her from
the intestate of her father, Juan Sanchez
3. That heshould be named administrator of the Luz’ property
Leona objected to the petition and alleged that inasmuch as the said
deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial
administration. However stated that should the court grant administration of
the property, she should be appointed the administratrix as she had a better
right than Pablo.
Issue:
1. Whether judicial administration of the property left by Luz Garcia lies with
the consequent appointment of an administrator
2. Whether Leona has a better right to the said office than Pablo
Held:
1. No. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property in the
Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established by law, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is
subject to the exceptions. First, when all the heirs are of lawful age
and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six
thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the
required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after
paying all he known obligations, to partition all the property constituting
the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.There is
no weight in the argument adduced by Pablo to the effect that his
have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan
Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the
right of representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of
his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased
wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and
necessary party if she were living. In order to intervene in said
intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased
wife be instituted an administration, which will take up time and
occasion inconveniences and unnecessary expenses.
2. Thus, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential
right to the office of administrator.
5. VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:]
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines,
passed away without a will
a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein
petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira
Nagac, the herein private respondent.
2. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira.
a. REASONS:
i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving
heirs of the deceased
ii. deceased left no will
iii. there are no creditors of the deceased
iv. deceased left several properties
v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London
as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary
forms part of the estate of the deceased.
b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative,
that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the
surviving spouse.
c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate
3. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate
estate

ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent
dies intestate without leaving any debts?
HELD:
1. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator
a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there
are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing
to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator.
2. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .
3. what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of
the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and
there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each
case.
a. questions as to what property belonged to the deceased
(and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the
partition proceedings, especially where such property is in
the hands of one heir.
b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking
such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain
transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved
in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration.
c. to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings
FACTS:
 Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No.
1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio
Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners in the CFI of Davao,
Branch I. Listed among the properties of the estate were parcels of
land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gil, and Claro M. Recto Streets,
Davao City.
 Administrator filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties. The
heirs opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the estate
had not yet been properly determined. The Court, however,
authorized the sale "in the interest of the parties" and since majority
of the heirs were in favor of the sale. The Court denied
reconsideration on February 20, 1967, and approved the sale on the
same date stating that "the sale sought to be approved was more
beneficial."
 The heirs filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of
Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L.
Angliongto. The Court denied rescission of the sale stating that the
relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and that the heirs
should file the necessary action before a competent Court — not
before this Court, and much less by mere motion.
 On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve
Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos and the Court
approved the same.
 The heirs then filed a Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell
and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction" (Rescission Case) in the CFI of Davao (raffled
to Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses. Petitioners allegedthe
failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price and that actually no
review of the actuations of a co-equal Branch of the Court is being
sought.
 The trial Courtdismissed the Rescission Case on the ground that it
could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court.
Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the
opinion of the trial Court that the latter was devoid of authority to review the
actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court.
HELD:
No.
As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be
Reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the
actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was
issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp
of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees on July
10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been
consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.
But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to
rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration
thereof, which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was
within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a
Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond
the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main
province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact, the Rescission
Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners’
cause of action was not within its authority to resolve but should be filed with
the competent Court. The cause of action in one is different from that
obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have taken
cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it
was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.

FIRST
[G.R. No. L-31979. August
FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR.,
LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G.
PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE
ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO, Petitioners, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G.
REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P. BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH
IV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L.
ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A.
CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA P. LADISLA and LYDIA
P. GUDANI, Respondents.
of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gil, and Claro
M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon
DIVISION agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of
said Court, as Administrator of the estate.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
6, 1980.]
library
On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador,
filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and
Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the estate initially
estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes. The heirs,
Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the
claims against the estate had not yet been properly determined and that
the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sq. ms. would be more than
sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which they claimed
were exaggerated.

DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R,
entitled Filomena Pizarro, Et. Al. v. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, Et Al.,
dismissing the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch III, dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case
No. 5762.
The controversy stemmed from the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio
Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-
Thelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn, all
surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P.
Gudani, are their children. Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special
Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado
C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I, presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties
The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in
the interest of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were in favor
of the sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of about P2,000.00
every month." 1 On February 8, 1867, the Administrator moved for the
approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property to Alfonso L.
Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00 payable in six
installments including the down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated
that the vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property
on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to
rescind the sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The
heirs filed a Motion, also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in
abeyance the Order authorizing the sale on the ground that they were
negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales, whose theatre
was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. 3
The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set
Aside" stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but
speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs moved for reconsideration
alleging that they were being deprived of the right to a more beneficial sale. 5
On February 11, 1967, a hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the
sale of the Agdao lot to Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their
objection on the grounds that 1) the sale would be improvident and greatly
prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or obligations of
the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very prejudicial to them.
The Court denied reconsideration on February 20, 1967, 7 and approved the
sale on the same date stating that "the sale sought to be approved was more
beneficial."cralaw virtua1aw library
On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for
Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds from
the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the obligations of
the estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was
unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court
on March 6, 1967. 8 Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a verified Complaint for
Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that
Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be removed for
having abused his powers and duties as such and that Letters of
Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also
terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, who had acted
likewise as counsel for the Administrator.
On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.
On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani,
filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale"
of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto reiterating that it was
unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot in Claro
M. Recto Street for P370,000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants,
not later than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay the last
four installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongto’s counsel
countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior ejectment of
squatters had not been complied with so that the vendee would hold in
abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price until all the squatters
were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated
July 3, 1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant,
and that the heirs "should file the necessary action before a competent Court
— not before this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The heirs
moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime, Judge Bullecer was
transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati, Davao Oriental.chanrobles
law library
On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final
Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtosstating that the latter had
paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same date, the Court approved
the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was
issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. 14
On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator. 15
Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order denying rescission of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and
"Cancellation of Authority to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of
Deed of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No.
5762, hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court of First
Instance of Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the Angliongto
spouses, Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer,
Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the
latter two having refused to join as plaintiffs.Petitioners contended inter alia
that despite all their efforts to block the sale "the Administrator taking
advantage of the name and influence of the presiding Judge" succeeded in
inducing Angliongto to purchase the lot at a price allegedly much higher than
the reported P12.00 per square meter; that the sale contained an impossible
condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that
there was connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the
knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they had
suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They also prayed
that since the vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements
thereon, that they be enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was
a letter 17 addressed to the surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty.
Raul Tolentino to the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso
Angliongto in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a
Court Order had been dishonored by the Bank because of a stop-payment
order of Angliongto.
All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion
to Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they all
adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs’ lack of legal
capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos
pleaded res judicata, the sale having been approved by the Court as far
back as February 20, 1967 and the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the
corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on July
10, 1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental
Opposition. 20
On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued
an Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives,
from further cutting and destroying coconuts, other fruits and improvements
on the property pending the final termination of the action or until a contrary
order is issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P25,000.00. 21
On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes
presiding) dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the
ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of
the Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still
pending resolution before the Probate Court. 22 Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was denied on October 10, 1968.
While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No.
5849 for Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.
On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of
Appeals on" Certiorari and Mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction,"
charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be required
to take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from
exercising rights of ownership over the property.
On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining
that the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its
discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp. Proc. No. 1421),
and even granting that it did, the proper remedy was appeal not Certiorari;
that the Court of First Instance, Branch III, neither abused its discretion in
dismissing the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought
to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch which is beyond its
judicial competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the proper
remedy was appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be
reviewed were not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings of
the Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of the
Agdao property should be rescinded for failure of the vendees to pay the
purchase price, and that actually no review of the actuations of a co-equal
Branch of the Court is being sought. We gave due course to the Petition on
June 8, 1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed
that the Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to the Development
Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation of the injunctive Order of
the lower Court, and after redeeming the same, caused the property to be
subdivided into three lots and titled in their names. Subsequently, they
allegedly sold the biggest portion containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai
and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on October 25, 1975. Title to said portion
has been allegedly transferred in favor of said vendees.
The primary point tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of
the Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the
latter was devoid of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate
Branch of the Court. Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy
of Certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.
Certiorari should lie.
While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an end
to litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the merits in the lower
Court, 24 so that Certiorari is ordinarily unavailable, that general rule allows
of exceptions, namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when
the broader interest of justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal would not
have afforded the heirs an effective and speedy recourse. It would have
entailed a protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs stood to suffer as a
consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt stoppage of that sale
was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy enough to bring about the
desired objective and to be of any utility to the heirs, their availment of
Certiorarimust be held to have been proper.
We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal
of the trial Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict
legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be
Reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in
the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the
sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court
gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of
the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore,
that sale had been consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.
But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to
rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration
thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was
within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a
Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was
beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV)
whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of
fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself
had stated that petitioners’ cause of action was not within its authority
to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of
action in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved
the trial Court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to have heard
the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the
Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.
In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the Order of April
10, 1968, sought to be reviewed, its concerned, there seems to have been
substantial compliance with section 1, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court since
the copy of the Order submitted is a duplicate copy of the original and bears
the seal of the Trial Court. Lawyers should bear in mind, however, that a
faithful compliance with the Rules is still the better practice.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
incumbent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, is
hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and decide Civil Case No.
5762 as expeditiously as possible.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS
G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
FACTS:
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine
children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed
administrator, and after filing an opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco,
assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria appointed
as administratrix of the estate & letters of administration of the estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after
posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and
to prepare the project of partition. In his Commissioner’s report dated July 29,
1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by
telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29,
1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for
a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs,
only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend. He
reported that those who were present agreed not to partition the properties of
the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 & divide
the proceeds equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed
Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate based on Gloria’s
absence & change of residence. The Court ordered the Administratrix to
execute the deed of sale afterthe payment of the sum ofP36,000 which shall
remain in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment of
necessary taxes.
Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land
in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Original
Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter.
In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed
with the CA a petition for annulment of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging
that the CFI’s order was null and void and of no effect, the same being based
on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that
such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share
of their father's estate, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be
deprived of their property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the
Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null &
void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
 WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient
ground to annul the CFI’s order.
HELD:
The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty.
Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed
order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for
annulment of judgment. — The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional
ground therefor.
The veracity of Atty. Taneo’s report was doubtful. There was no evidence
showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an
agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even
required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting.
The Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the
heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their
consent and conformity thereto. It was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to
protect their interests. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The
CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for
lack of due process.
The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the
respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling
the assailed order. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does
not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding
effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of
Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to
said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio.
The petition was denied
G.R. No. 171717 Dec.15, 2010
BRITO V. DIANALA.
FACTS:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba,
Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No.
1536-B, formerly known as Lot No. 591-B, originally owned by a certain
Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are
already deceased. On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by
her husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco
Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her
husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband,
Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband,
Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros
Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 12887.
Petitioner’s wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged
that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria,
Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one
Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban
and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death
Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in
turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate
leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance
of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention
claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a
certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five
children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are
the heirs of Esteban and Francisca’s children; that they are in open,
actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for
more than 30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over
those of petitioner and his co-heirs. On November 26, 1986, the trial court
issued an Order dismissing without prejudice respondents’ Answer-in-
Intervention. Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial. Subsequently, the
parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise
Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria
Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita,
Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said
agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot
to the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the RTC of Bacolod
City rendered a decision approving the said Compromise Agreement.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cadiz City in the name of Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed
another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time
against herein respondents. Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed
with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and
Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs. RTC dismissed both cases.
Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the
portion of the RTC Joint Orders dismissing their complaint be declared null
and void and that the case be decided on the merits. CA granted the
respondents’ appeal.
ISSUE: W/N respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their
complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the
discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs,
arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of real property
resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from
the discovery of the fraud
HELD: No. There is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the
subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed
a separate action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof.
Thus, owing to respondents’ possession of the disputed property, it
follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible.
As such, with more reason should respondents not be held guilty of laches
as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the
reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the
date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144
of the Civil Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must
be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates
this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. In the instant case, TCT
No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September
28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on
August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period
has not yet expired. Respondents are not guilty of laches simply because
they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to
assail the said judgment. Respondents’ act of filing their action for
reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting their right. Laches is recourse in
equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in
contravention, of statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the
property, prescription does not commence to run against him.
Rule 75
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER
(Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MAKATI
Facts :
Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a
petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. the probate
court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. On September 26,
1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters
testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr.
Nittscher’s surviving spouse Cynthia V. Nittscher, she moved for the
dismissal of the said petition. However, the court petitioner’s motion to
dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary. Motion for reconsideration denied for lack of merit. On appeal,
the CA dismissed the case. Furthermore, Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own will. In this
Cynthia contends that Nogales petition lacked a certification against connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
forum shopping. She adds, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter because Dr. Werner was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines.
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
Issue : WON Cynthia’s contentions are correct .
personally. – …
Held :

No. Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04- If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only
94 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory to his compulsory heirs.
pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of
the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence,
respondent’s failure to include a certification against forum-shopping in his In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly
dismissal of the said petition. notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even
appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She
likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides: testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced
petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore,
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is
petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
proceedings is without basis.
an alien,his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that
Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his
death.

Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC
of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for
the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.