[AC-5365.

April 27, 2005] Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after
an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those
Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent.
places.[12]
DECISION
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and
PANGANIBAN, J.: Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent act of In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of any truth
respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB
had already been paid. checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases
against them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his
The Case
presence. He further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his
Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were not in any
deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his
way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions
Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his right
investigation, report and recommendation.
to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3]the parties were able to present their respective
witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from
petitioners Memorandum,[4] the case was considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered
Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:
The Facts
In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the Central Post Rizal respondent stated that:
Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x,
sorter, P6,000.[5]
personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.
the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank
Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
(PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans
Quezon City respondent stated that:
that might be obtained in the future.[6]
2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both LOURDES E. OLBES and
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and
surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7]herein quoted as follows:
then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.
August 31, 1999
The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony before this
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
Olbes.
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two
8-31-99 separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that
correct?
P10,000.00
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos.
correct?
0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August
15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.[9] A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first two
checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint
against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, COMM. DULAY:
around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he
Which are the first two checks?
immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint
for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243 and
in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.[11]
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon
City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily
 Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number 0046241
and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks have
been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig.
What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your
Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and
0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place of
your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants. As between his
version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has
blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place. Such
distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.
Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also obviously and
glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public prosecutors. Thus further
adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.
Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a loan
of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be
more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous
loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said
transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even
late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once
more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts
under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background of the previous
transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother
to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what businesses
they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of credibility of respondents version. These
circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the
public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the criminal cases.
Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in
the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions.[15]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character. [17] A lawyer is an
oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a
fearless crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the
legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such conduct
of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the
courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are
thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and
kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that they had
given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan
they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents assertion that they had filled up the checks
and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find
no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion.
Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes
testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the
pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed
abominable dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as
a member of the bar that made them trust him with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent
act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite
respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a
brazen act of falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had the
temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them
punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of
fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is
clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity
not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. It is
equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No moral qualification for bar membership
is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead
the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent to make it
appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of
Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used
falsified checks as bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective
immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
directed to append a copy to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court
decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of
filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be
abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on
November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003,
stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15]The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;
 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
integrity and reliability;
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly RESOLUTION
with their clients.[16]
CORONA, J.:
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to
again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their
later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of claims.4To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
Front
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained
from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous LAW OFFFICE
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.[21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by Fe Marie L. Labiano
the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Paralegal
Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his Tel: 362-7820
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and Fax: (632) 362-7821
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational Cel.: (0926)
Grace Park, Caloocan City
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership 2701719
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, Back
the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, SERVICES OFFERED:
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
dignity or standing of the profession.
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, ABROAD.
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may
1avvphi1
likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of
law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03
and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED (emphasis supplied)
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED Hence, this complaint.
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the card.7
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
SO ORDERED. for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,9 found that The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash
canons11of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence,
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may
the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire
heavier penalty.
devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
penalty. outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant’s professional practice in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct
themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules. As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective legal profession.
information or statement of facts.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients),
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill grossly incommensurate to its findings.
is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides: reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16 (a) lawyer’s name;
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides: (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any (c) address;
man’s cause.
(d) telephone number and
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.18 Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
Complainant presented substantial evidence19
(consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
well as profited from referrals’ suits.
place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
hearing. Labiano’s calling cards.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a more favorable result. Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the
practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
circulated to all courts.
fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his SO ORDERED.
office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation,
reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by
the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you
collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to
him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as
member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should
be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and
for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any
kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will
attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague
to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial
Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at
home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform
you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to
be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my
residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to
exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or
social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity
as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other
lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court
and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of
the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the
following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of
personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of
business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of
deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the
lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to
do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for
like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or
others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the
public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender
may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The
law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others
for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe
[1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in
incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is
to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only
reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of
suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular
instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be
dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and
is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929.
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR.,
ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which
contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres,
are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo).
This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with
grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his
official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff, in Civil
Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical
error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P.
Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which was
admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for
execution. Complainant, however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge
Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk Court,
enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the
temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary
injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for
the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing
the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment, and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she
should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the
name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told
respondent that she could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC
Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary injunction as threatened by the respondent despite the fact
that the MTC, Brach 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance of
the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation
that she was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the motion for the issuance of a
Temporary Retraining Order was duly served upon the parties, and that the application for injunctive relief was
heard before the temporary restraining order was issued. The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on
August 7, 1996.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the issuance of the
temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order
stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her
that the restraining order was only temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction would still be heard.
Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant went
back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that she wanted
to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig
and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her case. Respondent refused
as he was not connected with the law firm, although he was invited to join but he choose to remain in the judiciary.
Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ
of preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was
repeated but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this
administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee from the
premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complainant against him.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on
September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due notice.
The return of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still abroad. There being no
definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded with the
investigation by "conducting searching question" upon respondent based on the allegations in the complaint, and
asked for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on
October 22, 1997, to give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite
notice.
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his Comment, and submitted documentary
evidence consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to
show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued.
The investigating judge made the following findings:
For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she failed to
substantiate her allegations in the complaint, particularly that herein respondent gave her his
calling card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be
established with certainty that respondent indeed gave her his calling card even convinced her
to change her lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of the Civil Case No. Q-96-28187,
complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and
the subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's
lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative case could be an indication that her filing of
 the charge against the respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her failure to be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office
obtain a favorable decision from the Court. engaged in the private practice of law.
However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex SO ORDERED.
"B" of the complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was indeed include in the
BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is included therein
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,
which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not
vs.
be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
card as partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the
impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that respondent actually offered
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his
name included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against Francisco G.
which he must also be administratively sanctioned. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the preliminary investigation
he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has
15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from
committed.
the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by her
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in
failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was the respondent who gave her
said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito
calling card "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to convince her to
Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to
change counsels. We find however, that while the respondent vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he
death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme
does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into
penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which
the hands of the complainant. The respondent testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:
was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and
Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling card of the reiterated by the same trial court.
"Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The purpose of
Mariwasa building?
said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and
A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave her a investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people
calling card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to me during one of her and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and
follow-ups of the case before the court. She told me that a friend of hers sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
recommended such firm and she found out that my name is included in
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a reinvestigation of
that firm. I told her that I have not assumed any position in the law firm. And
the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who had investigated the
I am with the Judiciary since I passed the bar. It is impossible for me to enter
case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should
an appearance as her counsel in the very same court where I am the
take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by
Branch Clerk of Court.
the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name appears on the
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal
calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. 1 Respondent does not claim
supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated, such as the
that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent, and the calling card 2 carries his
confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others.
name primarily and the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220
By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and
Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left corner. The card clearly gives the
determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal
impression that he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the
Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was
professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act
based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee
No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and
of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A.
Employees" which declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:
Bernabe.
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz was
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before me in a
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo,
with official functions.
et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer
Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would
with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be characterized by propriety and decorum but preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the
above all else must be above suspicion. 3 jurisdiction of the committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the
fact that the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby
day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari
reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will
and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby stopping
the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent
Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind
in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar Castelo,
et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney
like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case
for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the
main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent
authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the latter's
oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own protection,
possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this
request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the
investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the
investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as he,
Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several
persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have
been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said
witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating,
modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the
investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend,
Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to
appear at the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee began
ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to respondent, two
government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the
case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions
and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of
the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his reinvestigation
because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the defendants named
Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested and was placed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had commenced, even after the
prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to
stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an
early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista
he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary,
presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions
sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by
conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing
of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and
co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of
the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by authorities,
the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to
protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting officers of
all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the
prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do
justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited
in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the scheduled
preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation since as was
already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the
affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said
preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there implies, and
was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva,
petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter
changed his mind and renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said
investigation, he could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended by
him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence involved in the
affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent,
could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much
less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not in
respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate the big
crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of microphones were
installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with
the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed
day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent
Salva, addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let
you do so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the
press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and
prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the
press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual
privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this
according to the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation, and
this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by the witnesses
as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It seemed as though the
criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the
lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of
which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error
and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard
went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue
publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest
of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the imposition of a
more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a public censure would,
for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary investigation
involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of preliminary injunction
issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify
at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the
subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part. Considering
the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly reprehended and censured for
the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition
of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the
practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009,
2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012.
Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's
compliance and received the following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof.
Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL
Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance periods:
First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)
a. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
b. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement on (sic)
January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE
Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report
and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE
Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods
covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in
law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January
2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor
complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish respondent with
complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days
from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the
5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not
be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE
Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged
to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the
province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50
years. He stated:
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON
C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme
Court but I refused the intended appointment because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to
the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the
1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national canvassing
before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other
counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and
COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now
SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national
elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of
the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief
Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate
in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when
Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the
country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables
and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5)
Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an
exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with
the MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application in
a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be
exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the
applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law."
The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings filed with
the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No.
1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for
Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out
of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of
notification to explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides
that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be
listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE
Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013.
The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed
against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number for
the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed
could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-
compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the
requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007
to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which
means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April
2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The
records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the
MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods.
Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the
requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to
convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed respondent,
through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's
MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was
sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His
application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated
7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his
secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the First
to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60
days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could
comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already registered with the MCLE
Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance
with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice
stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units
earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his
deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter
No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to
send the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for
exemption when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on
28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14
February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office
only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process"
in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption.
However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year
to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still
aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application
for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE
Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office
warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the
MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member,
there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his
listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice
law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of
Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend
him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-
compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate
attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had
already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid
the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.
PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney Fernando T.
Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of
V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The present
complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act within
reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual
issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of
sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no
action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of
absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit proof of real estate tax payment
and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special arrangement" between them, which was that V &
G should provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per
trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the 163 registrable
documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money for a round trip plane ticket
for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent imposed additional
registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on
May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24)
hours.
On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the
uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter.
On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a
sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo
Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, that the very same
documents of the same tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this
Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
(Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be
opinion, respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.
disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him. Respondent was further asked whether he ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp.
would submit his case on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation. 66-67).
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his action.
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the court" on whose shoulders rests the grave
against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation. Both parties submitted the case for responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an
resolution based on the pleadings. officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only
criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
ignorance of the law and procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated
observance of fiduciary responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously
requests and without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents
described as moral character.
involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party, absorbed the charges of
conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A
himself in connection with pending official transactions before him. lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for which he
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect
supplied.)
of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be
warned that a repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample evidence supports the directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave misconduct. and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to him for registration and,
forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
notwithstanding representations by the parties interested for expeditious action on the said documents,
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
he continued with his inaction.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the registration of the documents
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
involved; that he himself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator
(Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of
the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such resolution of the Administrator This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his
interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial. calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
xxx xxx xxx The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent claims that he neither touched
632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
nor received the money sent to him, on record remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece,
Ms. de la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The respondent had ample opportunity to clarify Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
or to countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but
SO ORDERED.
he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability.
His being so should have motivated him to be more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and
should have prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government
service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3,
1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
Adm. Case No. 4680 August 29, 2000
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross
misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their
duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then
City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator,
was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b),2 respondents tampered with the votes received by
him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to
1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio
Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the
number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101
precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes
from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC
despite respondents' knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach
of public trust and of their lawyers' oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the
12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors
pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding
of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election
returns was done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule
139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit.3Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case
No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed
complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this
Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents.
Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends
that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, §12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such
motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further
contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt
of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained
whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, §12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not
under Rule 139-B, §12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, §12(C) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its
history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a
party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an
opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or
misappreciation of the evidenced.7
On the question whether petitioner's present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B,
§12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner
received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would
appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent
to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999.
Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In
any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed
beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy
of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days.8 The delay may be
overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare.
The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with procedure like
verification of pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where
the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed
six,14 four,15and three16 days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents
had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were
given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the
canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the
general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt
with in R.A. No. 6646, §27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent
on the part of respondents.17
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear
preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability.18 As long as the evidence presented by complainant or
that taken judicial notice of by the Court1 9 is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto,20 the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified..
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig
City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to
honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who
prepared the SoVs.
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation and ordering
respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, §27(b), this Court said:
There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in
the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of she error, not only in the total number of votes
garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally
with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial
candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during
the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible
and simply unacceptable.22
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs23 but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete
disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals
that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who
actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were-tabulated twice. In addition, as
the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in
question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.24
Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the
variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these
documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs
as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.
Respondent Llorente's contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not
their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:
 WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ________ this _______
day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and
thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein.
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.26
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise
violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."
Nowhere is the-need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better
expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said:
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers to behave at all times in a manner consistent
with truth and honor it is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel
compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality . . .28
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe
this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.
Third. Respondents' participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on
lawyers in government in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than
the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension
were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long
public service.29 Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents
should be sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and
imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (complainants) against
herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales) and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo
Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a 58.0649-hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding
the acquisition of their landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and for a notice
to lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used exclusively for livestock pursuant to
DAR Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for exclusion, cancelled the
Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of
the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for exclusion from the
CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999
submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that said area sought to be excluded is principally devoted to
coconuts and not the raising of livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the implementation of the Order dated February
15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an
Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin directed the issuance and implementation of the Writ of
Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming that they were denied due process
as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for implementation. Florin denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in an Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). BARIBAG, on other hand,
filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.13 The Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the
execution would be premature in view of their pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a
Motion for the Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the Berenguers’ appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the Appointment of a Special
Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated April 8, 1999, arguing that: the
DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably filed an appeal before it; and that Florin
should have waited until the DARAB has decided the appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the
said motion prompting the Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to wit: (1) copy of the assailed order bears the words
"certified true copy" but the name and authority of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular
No. 3-96, and the signature therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners signed the certification on non-forum
shopping which is an insufficient compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3) there is non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director is not directly reviewable by the
CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,
which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999 issued by Florin. The petition was also
denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of respondents Florin, Jornales,
in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the commission of the following acts:
A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT,
ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND
SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER
FULLY KNOWING THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE RULES AND IN
CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST
FOR A COPY;
 C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU COUNSEL AND FAILING AND
REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD
THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND
LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF
ARREST WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY
OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION TO THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on the CLOAs issued by
the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that would require a certification of finality as
prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus (De Jesus), as Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with
a copy of the writ because it was not yet issued at the time when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide
the writ; (4) when the writ of possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and enforcement;
(4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers in view of the DAR’s denial of the
motion for a cease and desist order and because of the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR and the
issuance of the CLOAs remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her disbarred and
not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of possession is not
illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not participate in the issuance of the writ of
possession because he did not appear as the farmers’ counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no control or
influence over the DARAB; and (4) his presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to ascertain that no
violations against any law are committed by the person/s executing the writ.30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is not privy to the
issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which issued the writ; and (4) he has no
authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales admitted, however, that he was in the meeting
presided by the PNP Provincial Director of Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his capacity as Regional
Assistant Director for Operations of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint
against him is not only malicious for lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and intimidate DAR employees in
implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33
the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34 that Florin be "suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and
prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega be dismissed for
failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them.35
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings36 of the CA in its Decision dated
December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a petition for review
and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to pasture and livestock
and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the coverage of Republic Act 6657.
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award
(CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin who is exercising
delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’ Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s
Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No. 107022, 8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at
bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus – "Assuming that the
lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded them to members of respondent
Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec. 22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our observation on the actuations
of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ
of Possession in favor of respondent Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’
application for exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never
acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary from the Order of
Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion. Clearly, such order was not yet final
and executory when she issued the assailed writs of execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and
would be set aside."38
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying the recommended
penalty, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and prejudicial to the
interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. The
charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to
substantiate the charges against Respondents.39
In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time it filed a petition for
the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as
RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB; (4) the Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the
Berenguers never questioned the regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition
for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be imposed.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on
the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties
or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the three (3) respondents
as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the charges against the
respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless,
in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a government official also constitutes
a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of
the Bar.
xxxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 644 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they
should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-
constant scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at
all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in
his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to administrative cases against judges
considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.47
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions of a
RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be likened that of a judge whose
decision, including the manner of rendition, is made subject of an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of Appeals shall have
the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay the order
appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he may deem just, considering the
nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292 [1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly stayed the
implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999. Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary
who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal. Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR
Secretary directing execution of the Order dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the Berenguers’
appeal.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may be had, namely: (1)
after a decision or order has become final and executory;48 (2) pending appeal, only upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order after due hearing;49 and (3) execution of several, separate or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution or decision that
finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of course and upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order or decision has
been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, and has become final and
executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to
enforce the same. In appropriate cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct
the Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law
enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator pending appeal
shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient
bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event
that the final order or decision is reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement shall not apply if the
movant is a farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the Berenguers’
application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was seasonably appealed to the
DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the
Rules.
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious
and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of
execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15,
1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject
judgment or order has already become final and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin
ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court
finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be
administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made
administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts
complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the
Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in
judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead impose the
penalty of suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months
suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed
was not tainted with bad faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the finding of the IBP that
no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against them. Hence, the complaint against them
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is
DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991
PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and
Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise
of their legal profession committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original
owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land
dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses
since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the Ilocano
dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able
to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the
recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia
Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty.
Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this
purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of the
alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting to be a
sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition
was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has
already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was issued.
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining portion
she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).
On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against Atty.
Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.
On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.
On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa
Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos
and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17,
1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:
1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:
In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a deed
of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of
Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years before in
the year 1965.
2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:
In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de los
Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor
of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by the
supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and
declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.
A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal
(complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living
donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over the
property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property in
favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the
property).
On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and
notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's
approval.
Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal)
and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the
counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.
On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543) against
Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.
Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the Second
Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975,
Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were
ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.
On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.1âwphi1 When
Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred
the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Villasis,
Pangasinan, for further investigation.
In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of
complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala of
Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.
After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos
and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the suspension of
Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa
Definitiva."
The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:
I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or
through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part by
virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40
O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of
Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there
was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation
over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan Tingco
vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or
dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated
when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus,
purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.
The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-
2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This
charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than
negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan. 31, 1978).
When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334,
Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by
another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so
delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its
subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the expense
of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but
to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer
must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at
liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93
SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that
a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer
whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment,
therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and
reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293).
Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but she
never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She
eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him.1âwphi1 He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until
the contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded
this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.
In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be
dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso
factoresult in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA
448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to substantiate
the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information
furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay.
"Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand." (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391 was
not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in executing
the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.
Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors and
only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would
hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the
Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his house.
He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One of
the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in
the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive mightily but (they)
eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his
name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against Attorney Eduardo
Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986
GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), respondent.
Arturo M. de Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
ALAMPAY, J.:
The present case relates to an appeal by way of a Petition for Review of the decision promulgated on November 6,
1984, by the Sandiganbayan convicting the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate
violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
- Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867 of said Court. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11,
1985.
The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for violation of Section
3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 which is
hereunder quoted:
That on or about the month of July, 1980 and some time subsequent thereto, in the municipality
of Numancia, Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, being then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on
Award of the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the
funds of the municipality and whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal
funds, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have financial or pecuniary interest in a
business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part
in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the
purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator,
director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No. 211-90-10-174 in the amount
of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of said materials to Trigen Agro-
Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment thereof to said corporation in
violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.
except only as to the dates of the commission of the offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved.
Criminal Cases Nos. 6856, 6857, 6858, 6859, 6860. 6861, and 6862 were allegedly committed in July, 1980; Criminal
Cases Nos. 6863 and 6864, in August, 1980; and Criminal Cases Nos. C-865, 6866 and 6867 in October, 1980. The
separate vouchers involved in the twelve (12) cases are said to be the following:
Crim. Case #6856, Vchr #211-90-10-174 at P558.80
Crim. Case #6857, Vchr #211-80-10-187 at 943.60
Crim. Case #6858, Vchr #211-80-10-189 at 144.00
 Crim. Case #6859, Vchr #211-80-10-190 at 071.30
Crim. Case #6860, Vchr #211-80-10-191 at 270.00
Crim. Case #6861, Vchr #211-80-10-232 at 1,820.00
Crim. Case #6862, Vchr #211-80-10-239 at 1,085.80
Crim. Case #6863, Vchr #211-80-10-407 at 150.00
Crim. Case #6864, Vchr #211-80-12-494 at 500.00
Crim. Case #6865, Vchr #211-81-04-61 at 840.00
Crim. Case #6866, Vchr #211-81-04-62 at 787.00
Crim. Case #6867, Vchr #211-81-04-63 at 560.00
Total----
P7,730.50
(Consolidated Comment, pg. 4; Rollo, 325)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision dated November 6, 1984, convicting the
petitioner in all the twelve (12) criminal cases, (Rollo, pp. 324-325) and in each case he was sentenced,"...to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum, to SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum, to further suffer perpetual disqualification from the public office, and
to pay the cost of the action." (pp. 37-40, Decision; Rollo, 322).
After the petition for review was filed in this case and pending the submission by respondent of its comment to the
petition, herein petitioner presented to this Court on June 7, 1985, an urgent petition to lift the order of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 12, 1983, suspending him from Office as the elected Municipal Mayor of
Numancia, Aklan. His term was to expire in 1986. No objection to the petition for the lifting of the suspension order
was interposed by the Solicitor General. Accordingly, and pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated October 1,
1985, petitioner's preventive suspension was lifted and his reinstatement as Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan
was ordered to take effect immediately.
A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner's new counsel in collaboration with
the original counsel on record of petitioner. In this supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the
petitioner did not, in any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he
signed the voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal
Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously adverted to in the twelve
informations filed against herein petitioner because the transactions involved were emergency direct purchases by
personal canvass.
Upon leave of the Court given, the former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment dated November 4, 1984,
to the original petition filed in this case dated April 30, 1985 as well as on the supplemental petition dated October
10, 1985. He argued the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are,
therefore, non-reviewable (Consolidated Comment, pg. 20; Rollo, 341). The submission made by the Office of the
Solicitor General in the Consolidated Comment dated November 4, 1986, are hereunder quoted:
xxx xxx xxx
The impugned decision convicted petitioner for violation of Section 3 (h), paragraph (h) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in
which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The elements essential in the commission of the crime are:
a) The public officer has financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction;
b) In connection with which he intervenes in his official capacity.
Concurrence of both elements is necessary as the absence of one will not warrant conviction.
(Rollo, pp. 338-339).
The earlier view taken by the Solicitor General's Office was that petitioner's evidence of divestment of interest in
Trigen 'Corporation, which is said to have been effected on February 25, 1980, before the petitioner assumed the
Mayorship, should have been presented at the earliest opportunity before the Tanodbayan and because this was
not done by him the resolution of the Tanodbayan finding a prima facie case against petitioner should be
sustained. Furthermore, petitioner was faulted because the transfer of his interest in the corporate stock of Trigen
Corporation should have been recorded in the Securities and Exchange Commission but no evidence of this sort,
was presented. The consolidated comment also played up the advertisement of Trigen Corporation in the program
of the Rotary Club of Kalibo, Aklan, showing the printed name of petitioner as the President-Manager of the said
corporation. (Consolidated Comment; Rollo, pp. 340-341)
Petitioner filed a Reply controverting the allegations and arguments recited in the aforestated Consolidated
Comment of the Solicitor General.
After considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised in the petition and supplemental petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan, as well as the consolidated comment and the reply
thereto filed by petitioner's counsel, the Court in its resolution of January 16, 1986, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective briefs.
Petitioner's exhaustive and well-reasoned out Brief which was filed with the Court on April 14, 1986, raised the
following legal questions.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing recital of facts, the following legal questions arise:
1. Does the mere signing by a Municipal Mayor of municipal vouchers and other supporting
papers covering purchases of materials previously ordered by the Municipal Treasurer without
the knowledge and consent of the former, subsequently delivered by the supplier, and,
thereafter paid by the same Municipal Treasurer also without the knowledge and consent of the
Municipal Mayor, constitute a violation of the provisions of Section 3 (h) of Rep. Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
2. Does the mere signing of the mere documents above constitute the kind of intervention of
taking part in (his) official capacity within the context of the above-mentioned law?
3. Was damage or prejudice, as an element of the offense under Section 3 (h) of the said law,
caused to the Government or the Municipality of Numancia as a result of the contracts in
question and as a corollary thereto, was undue advantage and gained by the transacting
corporation?
4. Was there divestment on the part of the herein petitioner of his shares in Trigen Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation long before the questioned transactions? (Appellant's Brief, page 15)
It was then discus and argued by the petitioner that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of all the
elements of the offense, and more particularly to adduce proof that petitioner has, directly or indirectly, a financial
or pecuniary interest in the imputed business contracts or transactions.
Discussion of petitioner's arguments in this regard will not however, be recited anymore as this was obviated when a
new Solicitor General, after seeking and obtaining several extensions of time to file its Brief in this case at bar, filed
on October 7, 1986, a "Manifestation For Acquittal" (in lieu of the People's Brief). Rollo, 293).
The new Solicitor General's Office after adopting the statement of facts recited in the consolidated comment of the
former Solicitor General's Office moved for the acquittal of the petitioner, upon acknowledging and concluding
that:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen
Petitioner sought to establish that before he assumed office as mayor on March 3, 1980, he had
already sold his shares with Trigen to his sister Mrs. Rosene Trieste-Tuason. The sale was made by
corresponding indorsements to her stock certificate which was duly recorded in the stock and
transfer book of the corporation.
 Respondent Sandiganbayan however doubts the sale because the same was not reported to
the SEC. SEC records, as the prosecution evidence show, do not reflect the sale and petitioner
still appears as the firm's President.
The prosecution's evidence to establish non-divestment of petitioner's interest with Trigen is
weak. Anyway, Trigen has not updated its reports to the SEC since 1976. It have not even
submitted its financial annual report ever since. Absence of the sales report in the SEC does not
mean that the sale did not take place. Reporting the sale is not a mandatory requirement.
Sales of stocks need not be reported to SEC
In any event, the law only requires submission of annual financial reports, not sales or disposal of
stocks (Section 141, Corporation Code of the Philippines).
Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would necessarily
allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or transactions with
Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. (Rollo, pp. 299-300).
In the matter of the alleged intervention of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General itself subscribes to and on its
own volition place on record the following observations:
Prosecution failed to prove charges; evidence discloses absence of bidding and award
The prosecution's lone witness, Treasurer Aniceto Vega, testified that there never was a public
bidding conducted because all the transactions were made by direct purchases from Trigen.
Q. In other words, in all these transactions there never really was any public
bidding?
A. Yes, Sir. There was no public bidding.
Q. And these purchases were made by direct purchases from the
establishment of Trigen?
A. Yes, Sir. (pp. 36-37, Tsn., Oct. 26, 1983)
In the absence of a public bidding and as emphatically declared by the prosecution's sole
witness Vega that all the transactions were on direct purchases from Trigen, how can one ever
imagine that petitioner has awarded the supply and delivery of construction materials to Trigen
as specifically charged in the twelve (12) informations? The charges are of course baseless and
even contradict the evidence of the prosecution itself.
Even the respondent Court finally found that petitioner did not intervene during the bidding and
award, which of course is a false assumption because of Vega's testimony that there was no
public bidding at all. Respondent Court said:
. . . . In short, accused's intervention may not be present during the bidding and award, but his
liability may also come in when he took part in said transactions such as signing the vouchers
under certifications 1, 2 and 3 thereof, to make it appear that the transactions were regular and
proper. (Resolution dated March 11, 1985 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration/new
trial, page 7).
No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment
Now, did petitioner intervene by approving payments to Trigen as also charged in the
information? Can there be intervention after payment.
Vega testified that petitioner signed the twelve (12) municipal vouchers (Exhibits A to L) for the
purchase and payment of construction materials. It was sometime after delivery of the
construction materials that he (Vega) signed and paid the twelve (12) -municipal vouchers
(pages 5 to 7), decision of respondent Sandiganbayan dated November 2, 1984). The
prosecution has not presented evidence to show as to when petitioner signed the twelve (12)
municipal vouchers. But it can safely be assumed as a matter of procedure that petitioner had
signed the voucher after Treasurer Vega signed and paid them., (Rello, pp. 301-303)
xxx xxx xxx
Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment
Additional facts which respondent Court failed to consider and which could have altered the
outcome of the case in the following uncontroverted testimony of Josue Maravilla:
Q. When these municipal vouchers were prepared by the municipal
treasurer, as you said, and then presented to Mayor Trieste for his signature,
were the purchases in question already paid?
A. They had already been paid for, sir.
Q. Previously, prior to the signature of Mayor Trieste?
A. Yes, sir.
A.J. ESCAREAL:
Q. Under what authority were they paid?
A. Under official receipt issued by Trigen.
Q. Who authorized the payment?
A. The municipal treasurer who paid the materials.
ATTY. CONSULTA:
Q. You said they had already been paid for. Do you know of any receipts
issued by Trigen to indicate that at the time these municipal vouchers were
signed by Mayor Trieste, the materials had already been delivered and paid
by the municipality to Trigen?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir
Q. Now, what exhibits particularly do you know were issued
by Trigen to indicate that payments were made prior to the signing of the
municipal vouchers by Mayor Trieste?
A. Exhibits A, G, B, F, C, D, Exhibit I and Exhibit H.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, Mr. Maravilla, aside from these prosecution's exhibits which are
Trigen receipts showing payments long before the municipal vouchers were
prepared, what can you say about the other municipal vouchers in this
case in reference to payments made by Trigen to the municipality?
ESCAREAL:
Payment made by Trigen?
ATTY. CONSULTA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, made to Trigen by the municipality?
A. Official receipts issued by Trigen also indicate that when municipal
vouchers marked Exhibits E, B, C, D, F, G, H, I were prepared, they had
already been delivered and the amounts indicated therein were already
prepared by the municipal treasurer.
Q. Did you say already made by the municipal treasurer-the amounts were
already paid by the municipal treasurer?
A. Already paid.
Q. Who disbursed the funds evidenced by the Trigen official receipts?
A. The municipal treasurer, then Mr. Vega.
Q. Now, do you know why Mr. Vega asked that those municipal vouchers
be nevertheless signed in spite of the fact that he knew that the amounts
had already been disbursed and paid by him to Trigen?
 A. He said that the municipal vouchers for record purposes is necessary to
be signed by the mayor. (Tsn., Mar. 5, 1984, pp. 19-49).
Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were delivered,
petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind of intervention
contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
xxx xxx xxx
What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach.
(Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary of Justice). The
official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does not do anything for the
firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the don-tenant use of influence,
authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May 6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol.
11, page 603).
There is absolutely no evidence that petitioner had, in his capacity as Mayor, used his influence,
power, and authority in having the transactions given to Trigen. He didn't ask anyone-neither
Treasurer Vega nor Secretary Maravilla for that matter, to get the construction materials from
Trigen.
Trigen did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction
Petitioner should not be faulted for Trigen's transaction with the municipality, which by the way,
has been dealing with it even before petitioner had assumed the mayorship on March 3, 1980.
Personal canvasses conducted found that Trigen's offer was the lowest, most reasonable, and
advantageous to the municipality. . . . (Rollo, pp. 307-308; Emphasis supplied).
It is also an acknowledged fact that there was no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing
regarding any of the transactions.
Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the
reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar
view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and
thorough analysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as
the People's Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set
free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the
submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be
reversed and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan, dated November 2, 1984, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856 to
6867, finding the herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr. guilty of the violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic
Act 3019, as amended, is hereby set aside and reversing the appealed judgment, a new judgment is now rendered
ACQUITTING Generoso Trieste, Sr., of said offenses charged against him with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan issued in
Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in
the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case
and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others,
for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-
claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by
respondent Enrile.
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit:
The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is deferred until
after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable.
On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz, former
Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading them either under
Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to determine the
propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this
time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials
as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.
The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:
In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying
for leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid
Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim and
admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common, in
their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June
8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG officials Ramon
Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but,
considering these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution of these
motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as
provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court
assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the
counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice, recklessness, and
bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent
and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned from
excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG in filing
and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he
continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case.
He is sued in his personal and official capacities.
On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate President, Hon.
Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents left by then President and Mrs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US State
Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused
to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to prosecute Defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
 Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the
illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of
Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary
Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987.
Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal,
Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless
complaint against Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this
harassment suit against Defendant.
In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against Defendant, all the
aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess
of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded or impaired
the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor
General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957]
wherein we ruled:
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel
does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he
acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may
adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be
filed against persons who are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their individual
capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with
more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the
preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim
against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we
have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to
the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist
the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot
be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from
occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad
faith. We ruled in one case:
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back
salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not
applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the municipal
mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the
dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing
a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without
justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the governor,
vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and
provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity
damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions
because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also
extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges
being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to
point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the
Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity
from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by
Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the
immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to
recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for
damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same
manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at
pp. 581-582)
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended
merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof
may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of official duty, provided that such
member had acted in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that
the Sandiganbayanwould have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official
thereof may be held liable in damages to a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem
constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required
to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of
this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private
respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against
him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can
be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not
confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right
of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be
filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do
not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct
civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a
consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory
counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or
parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party
plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in
court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v.
Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA
529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards
his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General.1âwphi1 As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor
General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the
Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The
Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and
obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too
personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against
counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.
As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he
acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as
counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE
insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12817 April 29, 1960
JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act
No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public
corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced by the
Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage
and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and
those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19
September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for
the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery,
equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts
(51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed
Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our local
Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor
transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to
render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and
prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No.
1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the
waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding
that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an
action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court
to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel, and
appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956
the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its
contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the
Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No. 201 of the
municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his
offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall
commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his
professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the
termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become
final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the
appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of
the case in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel
and witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28
June 1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542,
Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth
in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the
complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting
reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial
attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer
forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24
June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500,
based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was
not disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal
council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the
refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the
petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the
Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13
September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal
opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal
government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for
decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. — The provincial fiscal
shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including district health officers,
and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such
he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any
such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in
cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality
or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the
various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is
disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the
services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when
original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province;1 and when in the
case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was
valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with
earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special
counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions
enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse
the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he
swore, among others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or
position upon which he is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the
Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal council could not do this because the
Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542,
Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd
position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable. Section 83 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further amended by
Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have
executive supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals.
In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as
follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a
provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law,
the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees. The
decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar,
respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments
allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for
the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to
the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there
was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non-
appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at
the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be
expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make
out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is
one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of
malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New
Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.
However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends
that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the
Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the
complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission
that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of
the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable
Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The
counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date,
the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for
postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again
called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who
was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When
asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared,
apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the
present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal
of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the
respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding
his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be
referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate
complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and
the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to
mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is
understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the
settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm
in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the
charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko
doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil
Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila
police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of
the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could
be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not
so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in
the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to
be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed.
Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts
and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not
worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been
duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.
A.C. No. 7430 February 15, 2012
MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 filed by Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the
disbarment of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross misconduct and violation of
lawyer’s oath.
On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment2 to the complaint.
In a Resolution3 dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and Recommendation4 dated September 19, 2008 of
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:
On September 5, 2006 a certain David Edward Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
International School, Manila. The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of
the respondent. Impleaded as among the party-respondents are the complainants in the instant case.
On September 7, 2006, David Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. The said Motion was set for hearing on September 12, 2006
at 10:00 in the morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006, the counsel for the complainants herein entered its
appearance and asked for additional time to oppose and make a comment to the Verified Motion for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze.
Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that directs the parties in the said case to
maintain the status quo ante. The complainants herein sought the reconsideration of the Order dated September
14, 200[6] x x x.
xxxx
On account of the Order dated September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was immediately reinstated and assumed
his former position as superintendent of the International School Manila.
The pending incidents with the above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were not resolved, however, the scheduled
hearing for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006 was postponed.
On January 19, 2007, the co-respondents of the complainants herein in the said illegal dismissal case filed a motion
for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, but the respondent instead issued an Order dated
February 6, 2007 requiring the parties to appear in his Office on February 27, 2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to
thresh out David Edward Toze’ claim of moral and exemplary damages.
xxxx
The respondent on the other maintains that the Order dated September 14, 2006 was issued by him on account of
[the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents that was filed by David Edward Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Additional Time
to File Comment that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the herein complainants in the illegal dismissal case
pending before the respondent.
The respondent maintains that in order to prevent irreparable damage on the person of David Edward Toze, and on
account of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that the counsel for respondents in the
illegal dismissal case have asked for a relatively long period of fifteen days for a resetting, he (respondent) found
merit in issuing the Order dated September 14, 2006 that requires the parties to maintain the status quo ante.
xxx
The respondent argues that [the] instant case should be dismissed for being premature since the aforementioned
illegal dismissal case is still pending before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission,
that the instant case is a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal
dismissal case because the complainants did not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006 before the Court of
Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to
justify his issuance of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the respondent does not
have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate
delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006 Order showed an
orchestrated effort to keep the status quo ante until the expiration of David Edward Toze’s employment contract.
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident will be dealt with more severe penalty.6
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-6447 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution further pointed out that the
Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three
years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.".
The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing disposition,8 but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.
The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should
be sanctioned.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice
of law, inter alia, for gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath. Thus:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilful appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis supplied)
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.9 Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct
on the part of a person concerned with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose.10
Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member
of the bar. However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the administrative charges against the
respondent are intrinsically connected with the discharge of the respondent’s quasi-judicial functions.
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve
labor controversies. It is well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the
practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.11
Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were based on his acts committed in the discharge of his
functions as a labor arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions against him.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers
"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer’s
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.12
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,13 we stressed that:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of
the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng
sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office.
The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court
and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a
lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she
ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration
for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
xxx
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be
more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.
For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the
trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a
keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.14 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,15 we ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his
capacity as provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform – Regional Arbitration Board may be
likened to administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our
government.
This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v. Bacatan16 where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are
akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of
judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders
him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for
error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an
injustice.17
While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is
also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for
every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.18
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.19
In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the
respondent issued the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo ante until the said
motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however, that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules
of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.
Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to
issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC provides that:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. – A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of
involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
If necessary, the Commission may require the petitioner to post a bond and writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order shall become effective only upon the approval of the bond which shall answer for any damage
that may be suffered by the party enjoined, if it is finally determined that the petitioner is not entitled thereto.
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor
disputes involving strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue
writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC, through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining orders. Thus:
Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary injunction or restraining order may be granted by the
Commission through its Divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as
amended, when it is established on the basis of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of
involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not restrained or performed forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
(emphasis supplied)
The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, at present, is limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus, Section 4, Rule X
of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:
Section 4. Reception of Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction
may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such places as
he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter submit his report and
recommendation to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from such delegation. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. However, the respondent, in violation of the said
rule, vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled that:
The respondent should, in the first place, not entertained Edward Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents. He should have denied it
outright on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission.
xxxx
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, should
have been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of procedure of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The first, states that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that may grant a preliminary injunction or
restraining order. While the second, states [that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings on the application of
preliminary injunction or restraining order only in a delegated capacity.20
What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the respondent in resolving the motion for
reconsideration of the September 14, 2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in
the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended
to cause prejudice to the complainants.
On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:
The Commission is very much disturbed with the effect of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and the delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in the illegal dismissal case before the respondent.
Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of Contract) of the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and
International School Manila provides that David Edward Toze will render work as a superintendent for the school
years August 2005-July 2006 and August 2006-July 2007.
The Order dated September 14, 2006 in effect reinstates David Edward Toze as superintendent of International
School of Manila until the resolution of the former’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the Respondents.
Since the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila is about to expire or
end on August 2007, prudence dictates that the respondent expediently resolved [sic] the merits of David Edward
Toze’s Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents because any delay in the resolution thereof would result to undue benefit in favor of David Edward
Toze and unwarranted prejudice to International School Manila.
xxxx
At the time the respondent inhibited himself from resolving the illegal dismissal case before him, there are barely four
(4) months left with the Employment Contract between David Edward Toze and International School Manila.
From the foregoing, there is an inordinate delay in the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of this Commission. There appears an orchestrated effort to
delay the resolution of the reconsideration of the Order dated September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante until
expiration of David Edward Toze’s Employment Contract with International School Manila come August 2007,
thereby rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and academic.
xxxx
Furthermore, the procrastination exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of [the] assailed Order x x x should not
be countenanced, specially, under the circumstance that is attendant with the term of the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International School Manila. The respondent’s lackadaisical attitude in sitting over
the pending incident before him for more than five (5) months only to thereafter inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondent’s disregard to settled rules and jurisprudence.1âwphi1 Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion
within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate x x x. The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin to judges, and enjoined to decide
a case with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition of cases undermine the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary x x x. 21
Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the
lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.
In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order contrary to the clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent violated Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes".
All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the
case below being inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the parties therein.
Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Under Rule 14022 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge,23 punishable by a fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00, suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.24
In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel cases,25 a judge found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law was meted the penalty of suspension for six months.
Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with more severe penalty. We
adopt the foregoing recommendation.
This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had previously recommended the respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled "Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.". This
case, however, is still pending.
It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy
burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should
not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.26
At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge
Caguioa,27 thus:
Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their hands. Their inexcusable
failure to observe basic laws and rules will render them administratively liable.1âwphi1 Where the law involved is
simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. "Verily, for transgressing
the elementary jurisdictional limits of his court, respondent should be administratively liable for gross ignorance of
the law."
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he
is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority."28 (citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his
lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the
future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the
record of the respondent as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged respondent
Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank with
violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during his
employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel
sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate
passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel
sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong
Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the
employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank
against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as
counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainant’s Asset Management Group, he
intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant
bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the
Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo
& Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with
respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation
of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he
never appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is
designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that
he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They
are only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners,
maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously fined by this Court
in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et
al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm
of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment
that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the
light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda
spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore,
during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being
the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty.
Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and confidential records and information are
exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and means to
attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal
weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum,
the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its
Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of
the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994,
respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In
resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the paramount
importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience
Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for
the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if
respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired by him as
counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership
of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute
over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for
physical injuries. This Court's remarks inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client,
inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship
should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry
case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of
public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper
professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery
and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in the case at
bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite
side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee
of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting
interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for
THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres
Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of
Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them
to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.
Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.5 When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an
act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact
that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to
the barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth
and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards
any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio
filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He
handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a
patent injustice against her.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required
the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.7
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation
proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however,
he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course
thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper
and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8
SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx
(emphasis supplied)
According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
 CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND,PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This was
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10
We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the
imposable penalty.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government Lawyers
Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded,
that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had
intervened while in said service."
Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he
was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The Practice of Profession of Elective Local
Government Officials
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the
private practice of their profession "unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as
local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special
law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and
employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.13
Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the
governor, the vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city
vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of
the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to
the performance of their official duties.
On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayanmay practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In
other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their
session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least
once a week.14Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any occupation
or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.
While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang
barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to
serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16
Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should
have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.
A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head
Of His Department
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the
government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those
officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of
the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not
impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the
discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.
The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and
importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession.
Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.19
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution.
He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent
Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS,
DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by
TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO,
MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,
BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC.,
MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO
REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar
to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable
to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid.5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated
by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG,
on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting
and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan
Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola,
William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied
Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco
Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the
liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedureto bring
about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to
disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b)
of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a
former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he
used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.13 The PCGG did not
seek any reconsideration of the ruling.14
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth
Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and
observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.17
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with
any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not
waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way
and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again,
the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and
fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times
intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to
explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had
broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in
England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern
attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The
standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only
three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial
and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.20
The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the
same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working
to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation
the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
— the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers
for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the
academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of
office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of
the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them
as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations
themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early
nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their
colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar
Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for
their members.22
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.26 On the other
hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former
government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts."29 The
rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients.30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.32
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study
the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the
proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed
that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for
negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA
adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format," where the
conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give
better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules."
The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter rules. The
Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.37 In
particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature.38
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court
promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts."
The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded,
has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of
respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.
Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest conflict"sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and, second,
the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while
he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40
The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed
Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the
closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:
1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated
March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the
state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the
assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case
at bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition
for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising
or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the
duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in
banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible
collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers
necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the
Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in
the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed
claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce
individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of
the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over
the functions of the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall,
with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only
if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or
injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section
and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the
Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of
the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by
the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the
Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the
amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or
plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance
and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter"contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear
as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term "matter" and
cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls
within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent
Mendoza which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil
Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same
nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves
the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are
ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the
dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the
alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to
respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene" means,
viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . .
4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)41
On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.42
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.43 Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do
not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law."
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase
"which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The
1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the
lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to
be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is
not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took account
of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its
end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause
a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to
match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that
situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is
have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher
income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a
technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated
to be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to
enter."47
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as
well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon
an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted "the
tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of
its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in large civil
cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary."48 Even the United States Supreme
Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous
game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.50 At the very least, the circumstances under which
the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be
caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.51 The client
with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter.52 The effects of
this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due
process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the security
of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom."53 He adds: "Any system
that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a
great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of
the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their
office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of
law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his
profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal
profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect.58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct59 and some courts have abandoned per sedisqualification based
on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the
defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public.60
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure
how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity
of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides
are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service.61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously.62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive."64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client –
the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the
ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates."65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central
Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed, he
continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of former
officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale
for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or authority
of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x."67 More, he contends
that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea that,
present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the present
officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that
does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in
order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism."68
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that
the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the
fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose
length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of
the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves
to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997:
(originals available).
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member
of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas
purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment
of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
 2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati,
MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January
17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R.
No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br.
150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never
set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he
had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered
by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting
reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith,
to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant
to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering
respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and
cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that
he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4
of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the
IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-
Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and
plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in
two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the
present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The
marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began
in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6
January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared
that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by
instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus,
was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after
Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation"
carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant
on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with
his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also
admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief,
I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and
declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the
"Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of
Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that
she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to
take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me
assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his
application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the
Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit
ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to
dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our
marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that
is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that
while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and
considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the
marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21)
years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant
not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a
full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court."According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-
hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been
indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose
the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage
was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting
parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and
that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He
could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that
Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to
substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the
various pleadings he had filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the
status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good
moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross
misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule
7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outrightfrom taking
the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his
pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was
void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his
marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in
connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter
No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of
which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor
General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is
only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page
which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative
Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case,
however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his
signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow
him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was
because it was "not in order from the beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its
very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the
beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant
and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which
otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic)
lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before
this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso
doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of
the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr.
Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers ofan attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
[1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120348. December 3, 1948.]
In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the 1948 Bar
Examinations.
Felixberto M. Serrano for Respondent.
Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the Philippine Lawyers’
Association) as amici curiæ.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J. Parazo, a
duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on the front page
of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters — "CLAIM ’LEAK’ IN LAST
BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School
Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the
news item in full:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who
took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests
were given, in the Philippine Normal School.
"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one
week before the tests.
"The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in
every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city.
"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court institute an
immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of
the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.
"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the
revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on
recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some
private technical schools."cralaw virtua1aw library
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla,
who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the
Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr.
Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme
Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has been, in
charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the
practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule,
this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of
the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the
practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath
and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news
item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he
knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to
reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have
their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of
the public in the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted
said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging
him to reveal the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the
necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties
responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make the
revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the
latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar
Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy
of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court
in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7, 1948, which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948,
regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in August 1948, Mr.
Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino
Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to
receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An
investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo,
and Mr. Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted
the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court.
"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and
refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his
news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperation, in order to
enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly, Resolved, to
authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State
demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and
to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court and penalized
accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of the result."cralaw virtua1aw library
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He
appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State demands and this court
requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious
matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular,
in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the
bar examiners who were appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon
and correct the examination papers; and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of
the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to
him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the
examination questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help,
specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary
data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which
to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be
punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if
he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the
Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to
October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer
of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court
Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take
action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public
hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably
argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said
publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or
committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and
important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of
the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state,
that is to say — that only when national security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to
reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact, the vote of the Justices is not
unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the Senate where
it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No.
6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by Senator Sotto provided
that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no
circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee,
however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of
section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."cralaw
virtua1aw library
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the
original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the court finds
that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the purpose of the bill.
This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already
referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc.,
many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the
Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee,
consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the
Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the
interest of the public or the interest of the state requires that the names of the informants be published or known. He
gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or
fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the
Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was
disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the
end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the
state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was
approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the
"security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by
Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved without much
discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the
phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For
instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator Cuenco, used the words "public
interest," when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase
"interest of the state" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and
discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest," Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the
phrase "interest of the state." This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion,
about the similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the state," may account
for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to
accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the plans of
fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state;"
it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the
phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state" can not be confined and limited
to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and
"public safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them.
The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that
"the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or
when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provides that
the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when
the public safety requires it.
The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, — Crimes
against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security. Then, more
recently, the phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security" was equally used in
section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People’s Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as
contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the
immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i.e., "national security" is involved, it
could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety," "national security,"
or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that
that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended
the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the
sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than
"security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most
anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and
maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the state"
even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in
which the whole state and nation, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or town, or a
part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like
administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of
law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three
coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under constitutional
provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of
members to the Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar
Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court
appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the
examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are
found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now
thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practising law or occupying important
Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes
several hundreds, are added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of
the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or
the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in
these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared
to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the
Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other
prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their
positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is
imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of
Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in
illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law,
when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent
and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into
disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person
contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular
lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and
adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in
getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his
legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious
preparation, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by
this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public,
they might be among those who had made use of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And,
incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and
later preparing for the Bar Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea
that there is no need of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies
of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit
of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the request and
designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or more of them — that through negligence, or
connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually
released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in
charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has the
overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the
confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and
believe, it still enjoys, might be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can
and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the
state," involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of
the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Commitee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with
said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and
independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the
inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to
adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of
their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their
officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court. (Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350;
21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his
informants, is essential and necessary to the investigation of the charge contained in the publication already
mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo’s news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, his informants, law
graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged leakage of
the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and
intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their
grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should
have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an
investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at least one
subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week before the
examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that
examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination
questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination
questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on
the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as
the university where they came from, was known; and even the law subjects to which the questions pertained are
not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo’s informants who
claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine
hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight
subjects, each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were
therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred
candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hands of
eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or identifications of their writers or
owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the books or papers are all corrected and
graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually
been committed, - evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions
prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects or subjects involved, the university
from which said persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly
and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of
finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or
conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings
and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under
these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an
investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those
informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to
further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news item, said charges are considered and held to
be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants,
it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to start an investigation
because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to
protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with the
members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the
examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence
of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of
law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those
found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of
the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that
he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It
merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court’s endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity
allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the
charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties
who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted
by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are unconsciously adopted on which to base the
passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination papers, it is found that
only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult
or hard to understand, or too long, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the other hand, if too many obtain a passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination
questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be
a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his
appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of
questions long before examination day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that
when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may
think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby
giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J.
Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news item or story in the
September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this decision, and that, in refusing to make
the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly
stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the
information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his
power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.) Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned
indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that cases like the present are not common
or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as
may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of
an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the
respondent, the majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate
arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to
this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
B.M. No. 59 February 10, 1989
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 624 February 10, 1989
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, complainants, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Alberto Concha for Eufrosina Yap Tan.
Nelbert Poculan for respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending administrative
complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to
the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Rollo of Attorneys. The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan,
Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D. Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.
In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983, respondent's petition was denied, the
Court finding, inter alia, that:
... the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's
infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326
where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified
his position only after the opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he
specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor"
(Exhibit "A-l"). He called himself "attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the
Bar. Oppositors evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
"attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent
cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily asked for rectification. ...
Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses testified as to
respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-8" and
"D-9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule
138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What
he did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander
of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients." when he could not but have known that he
could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is "dependent
or person under the protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is
puerile. (126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent on 23 January 1984, which was
opposed by Complainants, who stated that the "span of time was so short to determine with sufficient definiteness
whether or not respondent has reformed;" that "the testimonials are self-serving obviously prepared by respondent
himself and had them signed by the signatories who could not refuse him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court
denied reconsideration.
On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath, which was again opposed by Complainants, and which was denied by the Court on 16 July 1985,
with the Court stating that no other Motions of this kind would be entertained.
Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal for Mercy and
Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January 1986.
In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children echoed his appeal to the Court to allow him to take the
lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without action on 7 July 1987.
On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. Complainants were
required to comment but they have not done so to date.
In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court, respondent
asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the
Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.
Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of
the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper to
practice law.
In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria were considered:
the person appreciates the insignificance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now possesses the
requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law (Magat
vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active
involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the
favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens
of his community (In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of
his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984, 127
SCRA 802).
The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent's case. After the lapse of ten (10) years from the time
respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown contrition and willingness to reform. He has
also submitted several testimonials, including one from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath, with the Court binding
him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's
Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged
Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses
alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious
financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only
residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo
Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct
the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal
Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General
to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the
Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case
followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the
Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the
investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days
from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as
Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the
following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P
4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint,
p. 16, records).lâwphî1.ñèt In the said Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made
to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this
discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and
upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by
complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was
notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted
from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on
the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious interest for three months:
September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses.
In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document
on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot
3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum
indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per
annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent
was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the event
complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the
provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the
same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the
motive of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres
again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was
notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate
Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor
tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October
12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16,
Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial
sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad
Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see
Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having
known the legal implications of the provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they
had executed, complainants could not believe that title to their lot had already been
transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00
and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could
redeem their property, although three years had already lapsed from the date of the
mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of
paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness
had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in respondent's own handwriting.
Complainants went home with shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant
competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the
two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of
P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and
claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not
P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to
complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one
Regino Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a
total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted
usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that
complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only
proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the time complainants
obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants
had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants
knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in
question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that
he has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against
respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of
P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the
second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the
P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of
P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or
P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No.
Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 2).lâwphî1.ñèt
3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:
to respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00
indicated loan secured by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular
second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of
the respondent.
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present
can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases: beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the complainants and the respondent
so much so that respondent was even engaged as counsel of the complainants and it is but
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and
human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be
agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills. respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and intellectually.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the
To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled
supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily
complaint against the respondent because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the
signed by the complainants. The general rule is that when the parties have reduced their
respondent has done to them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to
agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have made the writing the only repository and
believe the version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have
respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants
been waived and abandoned.
and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited
exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money
case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to lenders during the time of the transactions in question'
sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their
respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.
counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their consent and received the
should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable settlement, without however, giving
real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in- to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
fact in the event of default in payments on the part of complainants. While it may be
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the
conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises complainants of the
consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not
go through the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to
the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that
jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between
he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able to pay
complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the
their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8,
complainants in this case, knew that complainants were merely interested in said recovery.
1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself,
Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case
returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering
amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then
that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the
the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and
indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would
accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants
already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
about this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.
was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to
encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any
respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all
encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first Real Estate Mortgage for the
about.
indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated
at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.). On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost
their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment
lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to
of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since
redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and
he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand
confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed
pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.
complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before
May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the
the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.
accumulated substantial interest for three years, as shown by his own computation in as own
 The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in
testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo
Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said
amount was given to the respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the
complainants were the private offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that
the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular
charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an
advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the
accused or the respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge
and consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received
it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is
it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the complainants
who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew
that the said amount was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve
respondent as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it
is really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable
settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that
they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their private
prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim of the
respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended. The
moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts
of respondent imply something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are
punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral
turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not
bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted
they did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not bother to have them
explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a
period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their
obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed
to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent.
Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings
out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under
Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after
their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also
testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the
administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation,
Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their
respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their
separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary
exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the
cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit
themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986
declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had become final and executory.
Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through
any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-
examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated,
Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants
had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that
respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose
affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by
asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation
proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation
proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances
where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice
on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to
declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his
order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity
to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties, we
agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to
complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended
to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing
them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before
effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had
already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property
within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are
punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which merely
avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one
penal statute — the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time
when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There
are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement
concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of the complainants;
the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to
inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants.
The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and
consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00
advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And
respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that
lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim, but the full amount in cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by
accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing
with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-
professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so
gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the
lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional
duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his
private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the
acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has
lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal
records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
A.C. No. 6313 September 7, 2006
CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close
scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof.1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting
versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer
to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with
complainant, respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of
the monthly child support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their
daughter would need for her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She
narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such
as the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit")
categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate4 of her daughter, he
was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would
agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public
document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for
the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money
intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil case
against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a
compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the
Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was
able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7.8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would
file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who
was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover,
Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He
learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things
the spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the
proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case.
After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly
offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the
same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he
gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a
former bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketing P58,000.00 of
the settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remaining P38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's
fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that
complainant very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He
points out that, first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of
hers. Second, they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife.
Subsequently, complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay
from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was
an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his
marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively
helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant
moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But
months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money
she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial
assistance and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he
also advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also
informed her that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the
Affidavit. He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly
financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated
only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June
when her alleged fiancé from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again
asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating
to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in
need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent.
According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file
with the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed,
respondent ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral
character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and
unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities
of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of
fiduciary responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described
as MORAL CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his
lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped
by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter
for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took
advantage of her seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic)
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he
be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding
the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering
Respondent's obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem
of his client and attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered
to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning18 ("Motion")
dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22
March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of
the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and
manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she
wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to
determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit
brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.24 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity
of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits
and in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the
affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like
herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into
sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took
advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which
the finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce
belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for
financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called
him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member
in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several
occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his
friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who
was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she
preferred "to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned
allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases.31 We are
left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with
respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force
her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that
her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to
respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing
without even reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit
consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed
it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not
give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of
Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with
Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to
show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college
graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without
any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous
to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is
the father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently
agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart.
Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement
of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence.34 Suspicion,
no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that
the respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter.
Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount
of P150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim
for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However,
complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting
to P58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact
more than P150,000.00 – but only P38,000.00 more – and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was
for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks
issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an
amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that
he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of
complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an
explanation. He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested
for it as she did not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in
this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the
parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in
whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further
reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA
test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges
as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and
women in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no
redress for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated
from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired.45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent
was found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding
from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual
lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However,
in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no
conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a
magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that
this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a
FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the
Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling; and Morton F.
Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the
Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R.
Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be
taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International.
Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for
 Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first
line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case
to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain the
following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation
and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the
"right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light
of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by Vicente L.
Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr. Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex parte preliminary
injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even
before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of
the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a
number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited are as
follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to adduce evidence
as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but — only served to delay respondent for the benefit of
the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but destroyed it, and
the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the Honorable
Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous decisions, and
the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the
Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has
greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by said decision —
without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation
through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and
Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor General were either
quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for
the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not plead such
thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief
Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter
what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity.
Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind
or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a
party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a
motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending
of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit
himself in judging a criminal case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence?
Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are
just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution of
November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of his
exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his explanations
made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of the
Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to inhibit.
While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but
three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial ethics and most of the
comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing
his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not agree with the filing
of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against
counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned statements he
made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He made the
admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that
Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the Supreme
Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt against a party
and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or witness", as required by law; and
that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a
supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in this case
was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one Morton F. Meads,
in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads inquired from him whether he
could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside his professional competence and
referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads
and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the
preparation or authorship of any pleading or any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any of the
court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of absence from
July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave his permission to have his
name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he was on leave of
absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty.
Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the following
paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case — which condition is prohibited by the
New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for
justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and
corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the
Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States
Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring
the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation
is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause
within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him to
accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did
not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion; that "the allegations
in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of the case
involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing
wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and the
true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the
same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be dealt with for
contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30
a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that one day
Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file another
motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon accompanied Meads to
Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the motion
and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to Atty.
Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago started to read the
motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second paragraph when Meads told him
that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads asked Santiago if he could
recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to
Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the document, Santiago
left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the same after his name was typed therein. The
motion was then filed. According to Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion
was filed, the period that elapsed was approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three
minutes and Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in
the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation is precisely
accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court
pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan to bring the case to the
World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral
argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second contempt
incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed, find
language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He
speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous and illegal" in
a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced
and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of
this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is
the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that "it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral
and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to
itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only
to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party."
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make
their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment.
He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for
the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has
already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we
cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does
not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6
describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in
all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained
by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from
their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an
issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality?
Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our
government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent MacArthur
and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited
by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning to this Court about loss of
confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or
principals, including the President", should also inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not
limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is
also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of
the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the president." The
absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President
and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this.
But why the unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney
to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much
from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create
an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become
common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that
'[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.'
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.'
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A
client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep
in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is
wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5As rightly
observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the
power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the
judiciary and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of
course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It
may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their
decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the
language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8—
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor
General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a
desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation".
He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to
case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing
of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that
these statements were taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in
any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language
should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted
of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a poor man and a son
of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes
a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of
seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial
mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was given to do the
forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in
this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power
of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with
a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under
Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore,
guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have
included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did Regala
insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in any way in the
pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this
case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne out by the
record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the
contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an
act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices;
who may take part. — ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part
in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and
adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the
time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices
were or were not present at the date of submission; however, only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with the clerk at the
date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out
was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid
nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule
quoted and that qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United States
government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision
of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in
the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to
more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of appeal
to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already
abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is
being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt
charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty
to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He cannot beg
off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion for
reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It goes against
the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced him to sign the motion,
who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of the case. Caling says that if not
for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that
Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even started to make changes thereon in pencil.
We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago
before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his
position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his
knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that "[a]
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer
himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a
judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults
of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a
cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no alternative
but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur
did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned
that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to
say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any
consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the result would have
been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of court,
and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and
Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling guilty
of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty.
Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action he may
deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as he may
deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito
M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of
the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to
pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme
Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious
that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter
of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of
the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion
for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed
no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a
notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did
not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected
out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on
May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of
the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of
May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court
concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid
down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which
was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from
the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as
its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from
him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that
this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September
28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this
Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them:
for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a
member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with
NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our
various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get
from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.
 xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in
good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is
to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their
duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not
one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has
been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court
but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to
state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful
thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours
meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The
rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed
562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons
for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in
effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively,
1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that
would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through
the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and
we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement.
They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions
of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to
be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion,
indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law
or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
 (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the
law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4
and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of
hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And
according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil.
866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets
the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made
sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the
liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that
it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such
right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's
actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on
them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their
official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who
Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and
officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose
the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like
the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always
been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They
have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the
judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen."
(Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as
no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State
Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
 tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26,
1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in
the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation
and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or
which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false
and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials.
As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it
is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch
the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless
insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v.
Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220,
40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times
of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the
end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity
and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from
the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such
drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and
said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the
proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the
courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of
the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing
of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and
was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse
of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an
affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted
and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other
citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the
power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show
a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against
him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons
announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of
their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are
criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
 I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners,
it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow
residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged
criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the
motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon
the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean
himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for
a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30
days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a
moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors
in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn
to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by
members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward
the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money
to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action
using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates,"
"colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was
ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to
his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or
umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for
the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the
Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only
effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers
so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such
an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no
redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous
matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief
Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have
said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public
policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here
sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation
which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but,
on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial
officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355,
20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between
the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers
or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of
judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and
well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial
officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it
in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of
official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to
compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult
by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office
under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided.
"An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct
and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The
same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it
common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of
the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
 The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as
the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge,
which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which
referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had
been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19
L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v.
Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make
it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to
others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter
in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court
in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for
courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to
attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of
the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should
do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for
him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and
respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's
client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty
and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session
of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt,
despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which
was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not
only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next
Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the
number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the
Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court
for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel
charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference
to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain
 import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of
perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the
"rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over
a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made
only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime,
this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People
vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in
a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case
closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the
effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to
destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the
all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from
any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision
which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court
itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as
much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we
have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve
the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental
power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys
towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys
to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of
the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and
disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or
not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary
sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious
tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf
and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to
the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the
public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his
vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of
legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public
attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is
not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion
of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the
quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding
at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as
a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members.
Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but.
only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very
real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for
his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish
the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day,
Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly,
we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is
no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen
to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from
the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use of
insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case
No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the
plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he
heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him
(complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable
to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that
what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant and
highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty.
Castillo referred to by respondent was:
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because
defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over the
phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any good
husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr.
with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and
there l would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b)
and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon
17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que
bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such cutting remark
while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but
also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time
that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the
preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by complainant’s own
manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when respondent
unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and
restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114,
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a
member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case (L-24114, PHHC
and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This
act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one year and eight months after
the decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court
to exhume this case from the archives. We thus considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his
unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He forthwith
came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services retained by the
respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in two
cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et
al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of
each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while
the present case was still pending and the date of hearing thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino
Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty.
Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a
letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases
in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the
two cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written
appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no justification if
Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the records
of which we are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19 hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the
property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final judgment,
besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court which pronounced
the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be
accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the
public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an officious
finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of the Bar must
needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the counsel
whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice to such lawyer of
the contemplated substitution.2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record"
for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the premier control over
the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with
Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to
this Court did he make mention of such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere
after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the respondents in
the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record in that case even prior
to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of our decision in the latter is a
prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the
respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the
befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another in a pending cause.3 He did not bother either to
comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before accepting the said case, something which is elementary
in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate in his actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a
final judgment in the present case. Further still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this
incident, that his clients complained to him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that
circumstance of itself should have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the
present case. Atty. Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still
pending with his Court — which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically denied
having given. What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members
of the legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and quickly
accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this office were
situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he could
have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as an
officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the practice of the law
profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake and the apology he made
to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is
further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as
chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the Bar
Division of this Court.
[ G.R. No. 3593, March 23, 1907 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF, VS. C. W. NEY AND JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, DEFENDANTS.
DECISION
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice
law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a
Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for admission to the bar (In re Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an order
was entered accordingly.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business
together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had established an office for the general
practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and
office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law Office Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto
español C. W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception,
occurring through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any
designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque C. W. Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider
petitions so signed with the names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on the 2d day of October,
1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he thereupon
instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed by the party or his
attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons, whether
agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing the name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a
compliance with this section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name
of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named
was a person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied admission to the bar. The papers in
question were irregular and were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of names
appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than those specified in the statute. A signature by agents
amounts to a signing by nonqualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of agency. (In re Cooper,
22 N. Y., 67.) We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a suitable firm designation by partners, all of
whom have been duly admitted to practice.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal of the defendant
Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the court, could not be proceeded
against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-General instituted this form of proceeding.
Should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or judge;
"2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions."
Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is restricted to punishment for acts so defined. (Ex
parte Robinson, 86 U. S., 505.)
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been disobeyed or resisted by
the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right
to practice law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its
review, and any hope on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been
entitled under the statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an application to it, yet
having voluntarily invoked its action, he was bound by its order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court,
while in force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his
authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth
the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an
assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would devote himself to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a
lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of other foreign countries, in regard to which
a skilled person might as a calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a
Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory
provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. One of the most eminent
American advocates was an alien barrister admitted to the bar after a contest in the court of New York State. (In
re Thomas Addis Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to
disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an
officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable
if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself
out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and
personally responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless
the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of
the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive character of certain papers recently filed
by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members
of the bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office
of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia),
both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty.
Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was
allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based
in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the
case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty.
Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia
convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an
affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary evidence,
Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel,
Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A.
Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case
and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty.
Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
public document and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification
of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a
Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to
a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6
which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of
Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted
standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information.
They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were
accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that
after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary
pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants
filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that
Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the
Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was
reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based
on the documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in
the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27
October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position
paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty.
Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the complaint filed
against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were signed by the secretary.
He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office were
found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon.
The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is
a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice
constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as
lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office,
failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed
to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law
up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law
Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law
firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration
dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to
Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty.
Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession.
Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of
a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature
to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the
document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim
of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law
partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he
gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had
an opportunity to maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty.
Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the
Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him.
Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find
proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds
that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right
hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed
to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May
3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya
of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a
bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all
her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal
Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and
that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
 And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there
was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights.
He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters
were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-
at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later
for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know
where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12]He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did
not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19,
1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to
(her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights,
and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of
the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized
by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of
conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected
that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should
be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there
are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
October 3, 2017
A.C. No. 11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador
Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law Office
through Atty. Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and,
consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month
pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of
₱674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay.3 Bonifacio and the
corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and
motions were decided against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution5 was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of
Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and April 16, 20138were
later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment award plus
interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this
Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two
years, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15,
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years
effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file
in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the
business establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He
attended the public auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the
same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees
who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but
eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling
out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation in his law
office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from ₱6 Million to
₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the
auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative
complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in
February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on
November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time.18 Hence, his allegations
of force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis.19 In his defense, Atty. Era further
argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his
clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that
with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the
alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension.
For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and
Bragas explained that the parties were still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own
computations, which they could respectively accept or otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a
pleading considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was
prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings.
There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading. Neither
the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era
was engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody,
not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using force,
threat, and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by
filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case23 dated December 18, 2013,
acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to
take possession of the remaining machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014,
wherein complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus
Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate
Case and release of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift
Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the
criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the
Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case
and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the implementation of
the said judgment, complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of the
judgment was improperly and unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside
the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering Atty.
Era's continuedengagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by admittedly participating in
the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest he acted as his clients advocate
instead as an agent in view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly
summoned the complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen
B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he
merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era
the authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include the
November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SP A
specifically stated that said payments should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus,
Atty. Era had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull
out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment award. At any rate, according to the
Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era
violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the
satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues being:
(1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another
disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty.
Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against
her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on
point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law
implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that
purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning
clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured
the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the
premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be
allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children
in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively
for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its
Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and
consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients
chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation
arising from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.42 Such trained legal mind is what his
clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter
into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer.43 It could
readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are one
with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not
engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SP A cunningly undermines the
suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision
dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December
2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27,44 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to
circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this Court's
lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey court
orders and processes.45 Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite being
suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from
the practice of law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in another
case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language of this Court's suspension
order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully
disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the
Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the
practice of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR,
specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such
duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found
duly qualified in education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence,
she should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or
the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the
one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation
of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful order
and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is
likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and
Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense will warrant
a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge
dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil
Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting
to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for
damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed
as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of
Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice,
petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A
decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for
the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed
by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring
him in default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary
to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The decision
appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration
was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and
the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent
Judge for execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by
respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his
discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar
and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being
confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. 5
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-
appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal
before the Court of Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by
respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this
Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial
stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of
the Bar 8 did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of
the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona
fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the
existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner
himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure
to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without
justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has
already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm
"Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain,
within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case
No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
eREGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount
as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not
impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are
important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this
Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is
also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as
such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for
air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing,
and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for
work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With
respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
to his home province to recuperate.
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as
1990 605.00 570.00
when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only
every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. 1991 165.00 2,300.00
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned ———— ———— ————
his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through vales or
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but
he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to
herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover
Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly
the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn
recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was
effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers. On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal
deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National
upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed
Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was
by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to
dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such
shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus
unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated,
we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal
hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will
evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to
be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they
December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their
wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a
jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that
practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution. On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing
before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization
grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and,
compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for
therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by
"boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to
deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public
make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in
respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent
the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.
Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows: actual payment thereof.
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits SO ORDERED.
from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools,
materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in
such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized
one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules
and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials
or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any
deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents
stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no
longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to
them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00