IN THE NAME OF ­WOMEN’S RIGHTS

IN THE NAME OF ­WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Th Rise of Femonationalism

sara r. f ar r is

duke univers it y pr ess

Durham and London
2017
© 2017 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States
of Amer­i­ca on acid-­free paper ∞
Typeset in Minion Pro by Westchester Publishing Service

Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data

Names: Farris, Sara R., author.
Title: In the name of ­women’s rights : the rise of
­femonationalism / Sara R. Farris.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifie s: l c cn 2016047057 (print)
l c cn 2016049128 (ebook)
isbn 9780822369608 (hardcover : alk. paper)
isbn 9780822369745 (pbk. : alk. paper)
isbn 9780822372929 (ebook)
Subjects: l c sh : Europe—­Emigration and immigration. | ­
Women’s rights—­Religious aspects. | Islamophobia—­
Political aspects—­Europe. | Immigrants—­Europe—­Public
opinion. | ­Women immigrants—­Employment—­Europe. |
Feminism. | Nationalism.
Classifi ation: l c c jv7 590.f3 68 2017 (print) |
l c c jv7 590 (ebook) | dd c 323.3/4094—­dc23
lc rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2016047057

Cover art: Adji Baifall Minaret, 2004. © Maïmouna

Guerresi.
FOR MARIA AND ANTONIO,

MY PARENTS
 CONTENTS

abbr evi atio ns ​ix

a ckno wl ­ed gment s ​xi
Intr oductio n:  In the Name of ­Women’s Rights ​1
1 Figures of Femonationalism ​22
2 Femonationalism Is No Pop­u­lism ​57
3 Integration Policies and the Institutionalization of
Femonationalism ​78
4 Femonationalism, Neoliberalism, and Social Reproduction ​115
5 The Po­liti­cal Economy of Femonationalism ​146
no tes  ​183
biblio grap hy  ​229
ind ex  ​253
 ABBREVIATIONS

an Alleanza Nazionale (Italy) (National Alliance)

cai Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration (Contract for Reception
  and Integration)
cswp Commission Staff orking Paper
ec Eu­ro­pean Commission
eif Eu­ro­pean Fund for the Integration of Thi d-­Country
  Nationals
fn Front National (France) (National Front)
hci Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (High Council for Integration)
il o International ­Labor Organ­ization
lfs ­Labor Force Survey
ln Lega Nord (Italy) (Northern League)
oecd Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development
ofii Office rançais de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration
pavem Participatie van Vrouwen uit Etnische Minderheidsgroepen
  (Participation of Ethnic Minority ­Women)
pdl Il Popolo della Libertà (Italy) (­People of Freedom)
pvv Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands) (Party for Freedom)
tc n third-­country national
ump Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France)
(Union for a Popular Movement)
vvd Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demo­cratie (Netherlands)
  (­People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)
 ACKNOWL­E DGMENTS

Th s book is the fruit of many journeys. I began to think about writing it

at the end of 2010, in the ­middle of a very vivacious and productive conversa-
tion at the conference “States of Feminism/Matters of State: Gender and
the Politics of Exclusion,” which I had co-­organized as a fellow at the Jan
van Eyck Acad­emy (jve ) in Maastricht. The exchange with the other orga-
nizers, Avigail Moss, Rebecka Thor, and Kirsten Stakemeier, as well as with
some of the participants at the conference—­Rada Ivekovic, Chiara Bon­
fi lioli, Vincenza Perilli, and Neferti Tadiar—­encouraged me to develop my
ideas in a more coherent form. That conference and the challenging intel-
lectual climate itself could have not been pos­si­ble without the passionate
efforts of the advising researchers of the jve Theory Department—­Katja
Diefenbach, Dominiek Hoens, and Mladen Dolar—to keep a space for
critique alive in the midst of the neoliberal Netherlands. I thank also my
colleagues and friends for two memorable years (2009–2010) in that insti-
tutional context. Beyond ­those I mentioned above, I am grateful to Emiliano
Battista, Pietro Bianchi, Giuseppe Bianco, Nathaniel Boyd, Vanessa Brito,
Luisa Lorenza Corna, Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulic, Tzuchien Tho, Oxana
Timofeeva, and Samo Tomsic.
From the beginning of 2011u ­ ntil 2013, I was fortunate to be able to work
intensely on this book thanks to two generous fellowships, at the Center
for Excellence at the University of Konstanz (Germany) in 2011and at the
Institute for Advanced Study (ia s) in Prince­ton in 2012 and 2013. I would
like to thank Rita Casale, my colleague and friend in Konstanz, with whom
I discussed several parts of this book when they ­were still in an unshaped
and underdeveloped form. Her astute and always challenging comments
pushed me to clarify my concepts. I am thankful for her continuous support
and friendship.
I owe a special debt to Joan  W. Scott, with whom I had the pleasure
plea­sure to discuss all parts of this manuscript during my period of
research at the ia s in Prince­ton. She encouraged me to pursue this proj­ect
from the outset and provided always invaluable comments and impor­tant
criticisms throughout the vari­ous stages of its writing. Her rigor and com-
mitment to critical thinking have been a ­great inspiration. My colleague
and friend at the ia s in Prince­ton, Catherine Rottenberg, read most of
this book several times with incredible patience and passion, challenging
me to avoid inconsistencies and shortcuts. Her critical insights undoubt-
edly helped to make this book better than it might other­wise have been. I
am very grateful to Neve Gordon for reading parts of this book at vari­ous
phases of its development and for not only giving me helpful comments,
but also encouraging me to clarify the (often unnecessary) intricacies of
my arguments. Nicola Perugini, David Eng, and Moon-­Kie Jung also read
dif­fer­ent sections of this book and offered very useful criticisms. I could
not wish for better readers and friends. For their precious support with
bibliographical resources and other orga­nizational ­matters during my pe-
riod of research at the School of Social Science at the ia s, I thank Donne
Petito, Nancy Cotterman, and Marcia Tucker.
Between 2011and 2015 I was invited to pres­ent papers based on this book
at several universities: University of Vienna, University of Amsterdam, Aus-
tralian National University, University of Sydney, University of Queensland,
University of Paris Nanterre, University of Wuppertal, Barnard College
at Columbia University, the Gradu­ate Center at the City University of New
York, New York University, University of Glasgow, University of Munich,
Goldsmiths College University of London, University of Fudan in Shanghai,
and the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.
In all ­these places I was privileged to discuss with scholars and friends
who in vari­ous ways ­shaped my thinking: Alexandra Aidler, Danielle Allen,
Moritz Altenried, Cinzia Arruzza, Brenna Bandhar, Stella Magliani Belkacem,
Elizabeth Bern­stein, Gerd Blum, Saskia Bonjour, Svenja Bromberg, Sebastian
Chauvin, Sara de Jong, Ines Detmers, Leonardo Donnaloia, Hester Eisen-
stein, Felix Boggio Éwanjé-­Épée, Didier Fassin, Éric Fassin, Susan Ferguson,
Carole Ferrier, Bridget Fowler, Sara Garbagnoli, Enrico Gargiulo, Gaia
Giuliani, Camille Gourdeau, Elizabeth Humphrys, Christine Inglis, Fiona
Jenkins, Margaret Jolly, Nazima Kadir, Rosanne Kennedy, Vassiliki Kolo-
cotroni, Francesco Laganà, Bronwen Levy, Sabrina Marchetti, Patchen
Markell, Jamila Mascat, Sarah Mazouz, David McNally, Paul Mepschen,
Morgane Merteuil, Monika Mokre, Momo, Miriana Morokvasic, Petra

xii  Acknowl­e dgments

Neuhold, Anne Norton, Sara Picchi, Andrea ­Piper, Christian Poiret, Jan
Rehmann, Kim Rubenstein, Birgit Sauer, Paul Scheibelhofer, Bev Skeggs,
Anna Stach, Tad Tietze, Massimiliano Tomba, Alberto Toscano, Sonja
van Wickelen, Barbara Vinken, Alberto Violante, Katharina Walgenbach,
Michelle Boulous Walker, Jeff Webber, Deva Woodly-­Davis, and Rafeef
Ziadah.
I thank my colleagues in the Sociology Department at Goldsmiths.
Their commitment to a critical and interdisciplinary sociology that does
not shy away from difficult societal questions and challenges the main-
stream is a continuous source of motivation.
I thank the three anonymous reviewers at Duke University Press who
commented extensively on the manuscript, helping me to see how the ar-
gument could be strengthened. A special thank you to Ken Wissoker, who
believed in this proj­ect from the outset and helped me to improve this
book. His wide vision enlightened the path when it seemed unclear.
A much earlier version of sections from chapters 3 and 5 in a dif­fer­ent
form was published in Darkmatter, History of the Pres­ent, and So­cio­log­i­cal
Review.
My partner, Peter  D. Thomas, read the w ­ hole manuscript at vari­ous
stages of its elaboration and always responded with insightful criticisms and
provocations. For this as well as for his continuous patience, commitment,
and love I ­will be always extremely grateful. As I was fin shing this proj­ect
we ­were joined by our d ­ aughter, Mira Elizabeth. She taught me more than
a thousand books what care work and social reproduction actually mean. I
thank my ­sister Elisabetta and her partner, Luca, for their support and for
being role models of tenacity, vision, and talent.
Th s book is dedicated to my parents, Maria and Antonio, who continue
to inspire and encourage me in every­thing that I do.

Acknowl­e dgments  xiii

 Introduction
In the Name of ­Women’s Rights

I think we are dealing with very sick w

­ omen [i.e., full-­veiled Muslim w
­ omen] and I
do not think we have to be determined according to their pathology.
—­Éliz abe th b ad inter , a French feminist phi­los­o­pher

Islam . . . ​expels Jews and gays and flushes de­cades of ­women’s rights down the
toilet.
—­geer t wild ers, the leader of the Dutch far-­right Party for Freedom

­There cannot be a regularization for t­ hose [mi­grants] who entered illegally, for
­those who rape a ­woman or rob a villa, but certainly we w
­ ill take into account for
regularization all ­those situations that have a strong social impact, as in the case of
[female] mi­grant caregivers.
—­r ober t o mar oni, the ex-­leader of the Italian far-­right party Northern League

The success of the far right in the 2014 elections for the Eu­ro­pean Parlia-
ment attracted a ­great deal of international attention. Across the conti-
nent, nationalist right-­wing parties ­either won an unpre­ce­dented number
of seats or consolidated their signifi ant popu­lar support.1 ­These electoral
achievements, coupled with the harshness of the anti-­Islam slogans that
characterized the parties’ campaigns, triggered fears of a return of fascism.
Yet one of the striking features that distinguishes con­temporary Eu­ro­pean
nationalist parties from their older counter­parts is the invocation of gen-
der equality (and occasionally l gbt rights) within an other­wise xenophobic
rhe­toric. Indeed, despite their lack of concern with elaborating concrete
policies of gender equality and their masculinist po­liti­cal style, ­these par-
ties have increasingly advanced their anti-­Islam agendas in the name of
­women’s rights. From Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, to Marine Le Pen
in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy—­the key animators of the “brown
international” upon which this book focuses—­one of the central tropes
mobilized by t­ hese right-­wing nationalists is the profound danger that
Muslim males constitute for western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties, due, above all, to
their oppressive treatment of ­women.2
Some scholars have described the nationalists’ turn to themes of ­women’s
equality as an attempt to modernize their agenda and increase their female
constituencies.3 ­Others have drawn a link between Eu­rope and the United
States, where conservative politicians framed post-9/11imperialist wars in
the ­Middle East as missions to liberate Muslim ­women from Muslim men.4
And yet right-­wing nationalists are not the only forces waving the banner
of ­women’s equality in ways that seem to contradict their core ideologies
and policies. On the other side of the po­liti­cal spectrum some well-­known
and out­spoken feminists have also joined the anti-­Islam choir. Through-
out the 2000s, the internationally renowned French feminist phi­los­o­pher
Élizabeth Badinter, the Dutch feminist politician Ayan Hirsi Ali, and the
famous Italian “occasional feminist” Oriana Fallaci denounced ­Muslim
communities as exceptionally sexist, contrasting them to western countries
as sites of “superior” gender relations.5 Similarly, ­women’s organ­izations as
well as top-­ranking bureaucrats in state gender equality agencies—­often
termed femocrats—­all singled out Islamic religious practices as especially
patriarchal, arguing that they had no place in the western public sphere.6
Accordingly, they all endorsed ­legal proposals such as veil bans while
portraying Muslim ­women as passive victims who needed to be rescued
and emancipated. Th s heterogeneous anti-­Islam feminist front, thus,
presented sexism and patriarchy as the almost exclusive domains of the
Muslim Other.
The peculiar encounter between anti-­Islam agendas and the emancipa-
tory rhe­toric of ­women’s rights is not, however, restricted to nationalists and
feminists. Neoliberal advocates who are other­wise antinationalist have also
increasingly deployed anti-­Islam repre­sen­ta­tions in the name of ­women’s
rights.7 A good example of this are the civic integration programs for
“third-­country nationals,” programs that are, as I w ­ ill explain, a landmark
of neoliberalism. Designed to foster the inclusion of mi­grants into the fab-
ric of Eu­ro­pean socie­ties, ­these programs have made mi­grants’ long-­term
residency dependent upon a certifi d commitment to learn the language,
culture, and values of the destination country. They urge mi­grants both to

2 Introduction
acknowledge ­women’s rights as a central value of the West and to assimi-
late to western cultural practices, which are presented as more civilization-
ally advanced. What is striking ­here as well is that civic integration policies
tend to generalize claims regarding the inherent misogyny of Muslim com-
munities and apply them to all non-­western mi­grants.
Thus, three very dif­fer­ent po­liti­cal actors—­right-­wing nationalists, cer-
tain feminists and ­women’s equality agencies, and neoliberals—­invoke
­women’s rights to stigmatize Muslim men in order to advance their own po­
liti­cal objectives. But why are ­these dif­fer­ent movements invoking the same
trope and identifying Muslim men as one of the most dangerous threats
to western socie­ties? Are nationalist parties “betraying” their traditionally
antifeminist politics, feminists their emancipatory politics, and neoliberals
their antinationalist politics as they all deploy w ­ omen’s rights against Mus-
lim male subjects? Who exactly are the nationalist, feminist, and neoliberal
forces mobilizing gender equality against Islam, and what are their specific
arguments? Are we witnessing the rise of a new, unholy alliance, or is this
seeming consensus across the po­liti­cal spectrum merely coincidental and
contingent? And, fi­nally, why are Muslim ­women being presented with of-
fers of “rescue” in a context of rising Islamophobia and anti-­immigration
sentiments, particularly regarding employment and welfare?
As I discuss in the following sections, vari­ous scholars have explained
the new centrality of gender and sometimes gay equality within anti-­Islam
agendas as a consequence of the shift to the right and the war on terror that
marked the 2000s in Eu­rope and the United States—­particularly ­after 9/11.
They thus emphasize the securitarian logic of the con­temporary rescue
narratives targeting Muslim ­women as victims and read ­these narratives
mainly as po­liti­cal constellations that characterize the current neoliberal
and nationalist Zeitgeist.
Th s book argues instead that impor­tant political-­economic dimen-
sions under­lying ­these paradoxical intersections in western Eu­rope have,
for the most part, been overlooked. Furthermore, I claim that the ways in
which anti-­Islam campaigns in the name of gender equality feed on and
shape broader anti-­immigration and racist ideologies and institutions have
not received the sustained attention they deserve. In the Name of ­Women’s
Rights thus intends to propose new links, conceptualizations, and catego-
ries of analy­sis in order to decipher the reasons for the surprising intersec-
tion among nationalists, feminists, and neoliberals. In order to name this

Introduction  3
intersection and frame the political-­economic logic underpinning it, I in-
troduce the notion of femonationalism.
Short for “feminist and femocratic nationalism,” femonationalism refers
both to the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals
in anti-­Islam (but, as I w
­ ill show, also anti-­immigration) campaigns and to
the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatization of
Muslim men ­under the banner of gender equality. Femonationalism thus
describes, on the one hand, the attempts of western Eu­ro­pean right-­wing
parties and neoliberals to advance xenophobic and racist politics through
the touting of gender equality while, on the other hand, it captures the in-
volvement of vari­ous well-­known and quite vis­i­ble feminists and femocrats
in the current framing of Islam as a quintessentially misogynistic religion
and culture. In order to defi e and map out femonationalism, this book
focuses on three specific national contexts (the Netherlands, France, and
Italy during 2000–20 13) and three specific po­liti­cal actors and agendas:
(1) nationalist right-­wing parties (the Partij voor de Vrijheid [pvv ; Party
for Freedom] in the Netherlands, the Front National [fn; National Front]
in France, and the Lega Nord [ln; Northern League] in Italy); (2) a number
of prominent feminist intellectuals and politicians, ­women’s organ­izations,
and femocrats within ­these countries; (3) and neoliberal policies targeting
non-­western mi­grants within civic integration programs.
Two qualifi ations are needed at this point. First, I should stress that, un-
like the right-­wing nationalist parties that instrumentalize gender equal-
ity within broader anti-­immigration campaigns, the feminists, w ­ omen’s
organ­izations, and femocrats whom I foreground have directed their main
criticism at Muslims and not at mi­grants more generally. However, this
book details the involvement of some of t­ hese feminists, ­women’s organ­
izations, and femocrats in the elaboration and implementation of some
components of civic integration programs that target non-­western mi­grant
­women in general.8 I thus show how anti-­Islam rhe­toric has permeated
institutional mechanisms that target the non-­western mi­grant population
at large. In the Name of W ­ omen’s Rights attempts to unravel this complex
interweaving, claiming that while anti-­Muslim rhe­toric has become the
dominant anti-­Other rhe­toric, it dovetails at certain moments and in cer-
tain locations and discourses with anti-­immigration rhe­toric. I explain
this complexity by, on the one hand, pointing to how the slippage between

4 Introduction
anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration politics occurs through the assumption
of the Muslim man and w ­ oman as the main representatives of the binary
oppressor and victim. Th s binary is then projected and generalized to non-­
western mi­grants from the Global South more generally (as, for instance,
in the case of the civic integration policies). On the other hand, I discuss
how the binary of oppressor and victim used ­today to foreground Muslims
in par­tic­u­lar feeds on repre­sen­ta­tions and ste­reo­types that ­were deployed
during colonial times in all three countries and that are part and parcel of
more general racist repertoires.
Second, my critique of the western Eu­ro­pean portrayal of Muslim
­women as the quin­tes­sen­tial victims of non-­western patriarchy does not
in any way imply a denial of the in­equality or repression to which t­ hese
­women, like ­women from any other cultural/social/national background,
may potentially (and often factually) be subject within their socie­ties. Yet
this book is concerned above all with their repre­sen­ta­tions and conceptu-
alizations in the western Eu­ro­pean cultural imagery and with the ways
in which such repre­sen­ta­tions and conceptualizations are informed by
(and in turn inform) deeply rooted racist ste­reo­types as well as economic
interests and practices, which affect other non-­western (mi­grant) ­women
as well.
Ultimately, In the Name of W ­ omen’s Rights aims to introduce a more ro-
bust theoretical framework for analyzing the deployment of gender equal-
ity within xenophobic campaigns. It does so in a way that moves beyond
the “politicist” lenses that have largely dominated the analy­sis of ­these phe-
nomena. The weaving together of right-­wing nationalism, certain strains of
feminism, and neoliberalism in the name of ­women’s rights needs, I main-
tain, to be deciphered by disclosing its very concrete political-­economic
modes of operation. The introduction of the notion of femonationalism
therefore aims to provide a theoretical concept to capture the political-­
economic agenda informing the invocation of ­women’s rights by a range
of dif­fer­ent actors. Th s invocation, I argue, is intimately informed by a
profound fear of the Other and, given our current historical conjuncture,
by Islamophobia. Accordingly, I suggest that femonationalism must be un-
derstood as an ideology that springs from a specific mode of encounter, or
what I prefer to call a convergence, among dif­fer­ent po­liti­cal proj­ects, and
that is produced by, and productive of, a specifi ally economic logic. The

Introduction  5
next sections are thus devoted to clarifying three key theoretical dimensions
of femonationalism: femonationalism as convergence, as ideological forma-
tion, and as neoliberal po­liti­cal economy.

Femonationalism as Convergence

In the Name of W­ omen’s Rights proposes to analyze the intersection among

nationalist right-­wing parties, certain prominent feminists/femocrats, and
vari­ous neoliberal policies that seem to merge at the crossroad of anti-­Islam
and anti-­immigration campaigns in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, as
a case of convergence. The term describes the encounter between dif­fer­ent
actors and movements in a given space without them losing their relative
autonomy, and without the encounter itself (necessarily) producing iden-
tity or homogeneity. ­There is a large body of critical lit­er­a­ture documenting
the paradoxical endorsement of ­women’s and l gbt rights by right-­wing
and traditionally antifeminist/homophobic parties and neoliberals, as well
as the support, in recent years, by some feminists and queers of Islamopho-
bic agendas. Scholars have used two main approaches to explain the type of
encounter between nationalism, feminist/queer movements, and neoliber-
alism. The fi st approach refers to this encounter as “instrumentalization”
and “exploitation.” Such an approach has been put forward, for instance, by
the sociologist Éric Fassin and the critical race scholar Liz Fekete in the
context of their respective discussions of “sexual nationalism” and “en-
lightened fundamentalism.” They introduce t­ hese notions to defi e the de-
ployment of w ­ omen’s and l gbt rights in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration
campaigns in vari­ous western Eu­ro­pean contexts.9 The second perspective,
which focuses on notions of “collusion” or “alliance,” has been proposed
most prominently by the queer scholar Jasbir Puar in her study of “ho-
monationalism.”10 Th s concept foregrounds the ways in which gay rights
have been mobilized against Muslims and racialized ­Others within new
homonormative frameworks.
By proposing to understand femonationalism as the outcome of a con-
vergence, my aim is not to reject t­ hese analyses. Instead, I hope to provide
a conceptual framework that can better explicate the distinct and hetero-
geneous configur tions upon which this book focuses. Indeed, I argue that
the notion of convergence enables us to ask two impor­tant questions about
Dutch, French, and Italian nationalist right-­wing parties, neoliberals, and

6 Introduction
the composite feminist/femocratic camp I explore. First, what are the ide-
ological matrices that have encouraged ­these parties, actors, and move-
ments to advance anti-­Islam/anti-­immigration politics, in spite of the sig-
nifi ant differences among them? Second, what interest might right-­wing
nationalists, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats have in endorsing a type
of politics that is (or appears to be) at odds with at least certain aspects of
their po­liti­cal agendas?
I explore the fi st question by providing a critical genealogy of right-­
wing parties’ participation in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns
in the name of w ­ omen’s rights. Th s book accordingly charts the shifts that
have occurred within the nationalist right-­wing camp: from “ethnic nation-
alism” to “cultural nationalism” and “western supremacy”—­particularly in
Italy and France—or from “western supremacy” to “ethnic nationalism”
in the case of the Netherlands.11 In the Name of ­Women’s Rights thus criti-
cally addresses the tendency within the scholarly lit­er­a­ture to defi e far-­right
parties like the pvv, the fn, and the ln as “populists.” While this term is
employed to capture the demagogic nature of their embrace of themes
that did not previously figu e in their agendas, I argue that the concept of
populism—at least on its own—­fails to address the core ideological matrix
that leads ­these right-­wing parties to foreground gender equality within
xenophobic campaigns. As a modality of po­liti­cal mobilization centered
upon the binary “Us” versus “Them,” pop­u­lism can account for right-­wing
forces targeting Muslim and non-­western ­Others as enemies of western
socie­ties. However, it cannot explain the paradox according to which ­these
parties do not frame Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women as enemies
in the same way, or even how they offer to rescue t­ hese ­women. I thus con-
tend that if we want to decipher this seeming paradox, we need to draw on
theories of nationalism, particularly in the ways they are articulated within
postcolonial feminism and critical race studies.
Th s book also interrogates the arguments put forward by several
prominent and influential feminist intellectuals and politicians (including
of Muslim background), ­women’s organ­izations, as well as femocrats from
left to right in their anti-­Islam campaigns. I show that despite the many
po­liti­cal, theoretical, and biographical differences among t­ hese feminist
actors, the common denominator of their anti-­Islam stance is a fundamen-
tal agreement that gender relations in the West are more advanced and
must be taught to Muslim ­women who are other­wise taken to be agentless

Introduction  7
objects at the mercy of their patriarchal cultures. It is this fundamental
agreement, I argue, that brings feminists and femocrats of dif­fer­ent po­liti­
cal stripes to position gender equality and Islamic practices as opposed.
Th s western supremacist-­infl cted lens has also informed the civic
integration policies that are nationalist as well as neoliberal through and
through. By analyzing ­these policies, I show how they have become a key
site where the convergence between the anti-­Islam positions of feminists and
nationalists with neoliberalism occurs. ­These policies, as I explain below, are
informed by the neoliberal logic of workfare and individual responsibility
and have blended together with the right-­wing ideology of homogeneity
and superiority of the (western) nation as well as with the “westocentric”
feminist notion of emancipation through work.
The notion of convergence also helps us answer the second question
raised above: namely, what interests do right-­wing nationalists, neoliberals,
and feminists/femocrats have in endorsing a type of politics that is (or
appears to be) at odds with at least part of their own po­liti­cal agendas?
In asking this question, I draw on Derrick Bell’s “interest-­convergence
theory.”12 Th s theory posits that the dominant racial group w ­ ill support
the subaltern racial group’s fi ht for equal rights only if the former believes
it has something to gain in the pro­cess. Transposing Bell’s argument to
the understanding of the convergence among nationalists, neoliberals,
and feminists/femocrats on issues of gender in­equality and Islam in the
three countries upon which I focus, In the Name of ­Women’s Rights ex-
plores the strategic calculations, gains and losses, and benefits and costs for
nationalists and feminists, in par­tic­u­lar when endorsing a politics they had
not previously supported.
On the one hand, I maintain that by encouraging a rhe­toric of division,
or a Manichean splitting of the po­liti­cal and ideological debate into one
counterposing “Us” (white, Eu­ro­pean, western, Christian, civilized, “women-­
friendly”) to “Them” (nonwhite, non-­European, non-­western, Muslim, un-
civilized, misogynist O ­ thers), right-­wing nationalist parties have every­thing
to gain. In a historical conjuncture in which the theme of gender equality, like
that of h­ uman rights, has become the common currency in the name of
which new racist and imperialist configur tions of power become hege-
monic, a vague, mainstream idea of gender equality can quite easily be used
opportunistically by ­these parties to contribute to the consolidation of the
nationalist proj­ect. Indeed, ­these parties’ invocation of the lack of gender

8 Introduction
equality within immigrant and particularly Muslim communities has been
instrumental to generate and reinforce racist sentiments among western
Eu­ro­pe­ans.13 On the other hand, I argue that by converging with anti-­Islam
and racist voices in the name of w ­ omen’s rights, feminists and femocrats
effectively lose. That is, by suggesting that gender in­equality is an issue
affecting mostly non-­western ­women, the anti-­Islam feminists and femo-
crats have contributed to diverting attention away from the many forms of
in­equality that still affect western Eu­ro­pean ­women. Neoliberal govern-
ments have seized on the opportunity opened up by the identifi ation of
­women’s rights as a “migrant/Muslim woman-­only issue” to decrease funds
for more universal programs aimed at tackling gender injustice more gen-
erally.14 Instead of helping it to gain more visibility, the widespread resort
to the theme of w ­ omen’s rights as a “civilizational” ­battle demotes it from
the rubric of general societal prob­lems and dislocates it as a “non-­western
­women prob­lem” only—or as a prob­lem that affects western Eu­ro­pean
­women as potential victims of Muslim and non-­western/nonwhite men.
It is ­here that my notion of convergence departs from that of Bell. While
his interest-­convergence theory helps us to analyze the tactical intentions
(and manipulations) ­behind nonemancipatory po­liti­cal movements’ sud-
den endorsement of emancipatory proj­ects, Bell’s theory cannot account for
the reasons emancipatory movements or oppressed subjects might con-
verge with conservative parties. It also cannot explain why ­emancipatory
movements fail to question the sudden endorsement by conservatives of pre-
viously denied or contested rights. In other words, the interest-­convergence
theory, as framed by Bell, cannot explain the “self-­defeating” invocation by
some feminists and w ­ omen’s equality agencies of anti-­Islam arguments in
the name of w ­ omen’s rights. Even though some of the feminists and femo-
crats endorsing t­ hese arguments might think that their stance brings gender
equality back more prominently onto the public agenda, in this book I expli-
cate how and why the opposite is actually the case.
The convergence producing femonationalism thus can be seen as the
result of (and as producing) a fundamental tension and contradiction: that
between the nonemancipatory forces of Islamophobia and racism on one
side, and the emancipatory strug­gle against sexism and patriarchy, on the
other. Th s book maintains that it is precisely this tension that makes femo-
nationalism si­mul­ta­neously so strong and widespread, but also (at least
potentially) so fragile. The strength of femonationalism lies above all in

Introduction  9
the fact that the foregrounding of Muslim (and, to a lesser extent, non-­
western mi­grant) men and w ­ omen as respectively “oppressors” and “vic-
tims” is accomplished thanks to the participation of a range of prominent
feminists and femocrats as well as some female politicians/public figu es of
Muslim background. In the Name of ­Women’s Rights thus details how their
participation in the anti-­Islam discourse reinforces the stigmatizing op-
erations of the nationalists and mainstream media b ­ ecause it allows them
to invoke ­these feminists and femocrats as “privileged insiders” who have
fi sthand experience of gender in­equality. Si­mul­ta­neously, this book sug-
gests that this tension also makes femonationalism a fragile convergence
that may be weakened when its contradictory components are critically
confronted.
My notion of convergence thus acknowledges and emphasizes the con-
stitutive frictions and differences, gains and losses, that inhabit the femo-
nationalist camp. It stresses that the relationships among dif­fer­ent social
and po­liti­cal actors and agendas constituting the ideological space of fem-
onationalism are multiple, ambiguous, and potentially beyond the actors’
own intentions. As I intend to show, a deeper understanding of t­ hese
contradictions can help us to advance a radical critique of the negative ef-
fects of this convergence on gender justice in general.

Femonationalism as Ideological Formation

Dif­fer­ent names have been given to the po­liti­cal constellations emerging out
of the intersection among nationalist, neoliberal, and feminist or l gbt poli-
tics in a range of countries. Yet w ­ hether in terms of a Zeitgeist, a discursive
tactic, or a po­liti­cal proj­ect, scholars have mostly pointed to the political-­
conjunctural dimensions of this phenomenon.15 More specifi ally, they
have foregrounded the con­temporary temporal juncture in which ­these
encounters take place, yet they have paid insuffici t attention to their
histories. For this reason, I argue that the convergence among nationalist
right-­wing parties, neoliberal policies, and feminists/femocrats in the three
countries I examine is better captured in terms of an ideological formation.
­There are three impor­tant theoretical reasons for qualifying femonational-
ism as an ideological formation.
First, the notion of ideological formation allows us to examine the
philosophy underpinning femonationalism—­a philosophy that I previously

10 Introduction
identifi d as a common conviction regarding the supremacy of the West
over the Rest. But it also enables us to identify what is new and what is déjà
vu within this formation, or what I would term its “modularity.” By invok-
ing the concept of modularity to account for femonationalism’s seeming
ubiquity, I bring into play one dimension of Benedict Anderson’s theory
of nationalism. As I discuss at length in chapter 3, this concept refers to
the double character of the nation-­form (i.e., both universal and par­tic­u­
lar) and to its capacity to be transplanted across space and time. As Manu
Goswami argues in her discussion of Anderson’s concept of modularity,
“nationalist claims of particularity and the ­imagined singularity of national
formations only become intelligible against and within a global grid of for-
mally similar nations and nation-­states.”16 Accordingly, the notion of the
modularity of femonationalism foregrounds how the current positioning
of Muslim men and w ­ omen—­with the latter playing the role of the pas-
sive victims of non-­western male vio­lence who require protection—­can be
regarded as a con­temporary face of a well-­known western topos, namely,
that of the “white men [claiming to be] saving brown w ­ omen from brown
men,” to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s apposite formulation.17 ­Today,
Muslim ­women personify the homogenizing figu e of the non-­western
­woman as the victim par excellence of non-­western male vio­lence in the
western Eu­ro­pean imagery. I thus show that while current media and po­
liti­cal discourses focus on male Muslims as oppressors, in western Eu­rope
the male immigrant threat in the 1990s came from the East. The bad im-
migrant was then mostly embodied by eastern Eu­ro­pean men, usually por-
trayed as involved in criminal activities and sex trafficking, while ­women
from ­these countries ­were often depicted as victims of a backward culture
and/or of the sex industry.
Moreover, as postcolonial critics have compellingly shown, in colonial
times in the Netherlands, France, and Italy (among ­others), the insistence
upon unequal gender relations and the idea that colonized ­women ­were
victims of patriarchal vio­lence—­which ­were understood as markers of
indigenous populations’ “culture”—­was instrumental in strengthening
the technologies of domination over colonial subjects.18 Th s book thus
charts the historical recurrences and ideological premises underpinning
the con­temporary mobilization of gender equality as a tool to depict
male ­Others as sexual threats and female ­Others as sexual victims and
as the property of western “saviors.” It is this rearticulation of all ­these

Introduction  11
ideas, fragments, and traces from the recent past in the changed context
of neoliberalism and rising Islamophobia that defi es the modularity of
femonationalism.
Second, femonationalism operates “through discursive regularities”
that, as Stuart Hall put it, are at the core of ideological formations. For Hall,
ideological formations are t­ hose that “ ‘formulate’ their own objects of
knowledge and their own subjects; they have their own repertoire of con-
cepts, are driven by their own logics, operate their own enunciative modal-
ity, constitute their own way of acknowledging what is true and excluding
what is false within their own regime of truth. They establish through their
regularities a ‘space of formation’ in which certain statements can be enun-
ciated.”19 The notion of ideological formation thus allows us to conceptual-
ize more precisely the discursive plane that constitutes and consolidates
femonationalism. The con­temporary mobilization of feminism to promote
anti-­immigration and Islamophobia within an increasingly nationalist
framework would not be thinkable without the deployment of a massive
discursive media apparatus. One has only to think of the enormous media
display to which the West has been subjected, particularly since 9/11:the
bombing of Af­ghan­i­stan presented as necessary to liberate Muslim ­women
from the burqa; draconian immigration laws in the Netherlands passed to
purportedly avoid the “import” of brides from Morocco or Turkey; or, more
recently, the portrayal of Syrian male refugees as responsible en masse for
the sexual aggressions against and robberies of w ­ omen during the New
Year’s Eve festivities in Germany. Th s apparatus, then, has produced the
unquestionable and conclusive association between gender vio­lence and
Islam. Femonationalism, in other words, has been constituted and nour-
ished through the production and practice of meanings that have come to
saturate the western cultural imaginary: namely, through the condensation
of such meanings, symbols, images, and discursive regularities into the
senso comune (literally, “common sense”), to use Gramsci’s apt concept.20
Fi­nally, I conceptualize femonationalism as an ideological formation
­because I claim that the mobilization of gender equality by nationalist
parties, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats in ways that intensify xenopho-
bia also stems from very concrete economic interests. In his seminal text,
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Louis Althusser invited us to
think of the materiality of ideologies in terms of the ways in which they
serve the reproduction of the material conditions of production. That is,

12 Introduction
for Althusser, ideological state apparatuses (i.e., the ­family, the media, the
school, religion, ­etc.) play the role of guarantors in the reproduction of the
conditions that re-­create exploited ­labor power on a daily basis, both mate-
rially and psychologically. Althusser saw t­ hese apparatuses as functioning
in a way that ensured the maintenance of the conditions for the subjection
of the subaltern classes to (and their internationalization of ) the “domi-
nant ideology.”21 In its Althusserian articulation, the notion of ideological
formation thus urges us to explore femonationalism’s concrete materiality.
The notion of ideological formation, then, suggests that we must examine
the forms in which the convergence between a number of heterogeneous
po­liti­cal subjects on the notion that sexism is the exclusive domain of the
non-­western Other conceal the need to maintain and reproduce specific
political-­economic arrangements. Ultimately, as I ­will explain in the next
section, the notion of femonationalism as an ideological formation allows
us to demonstrate how the xenophobic mobilization of gender equality
reinforces the material chain of production and social reproduction.

Femonationalism as Neoliberal Po­liti­cal Economy

The few studies that have attempted to take into account the political-­
economic dimensions of the turn to gender and gay quality by conserva-
tive, neoliberal, or racist politics have referred mainly to neoliberalism as
a type of background force. For example, Sirma Bilge maintains that the
possibility for gender and sexuality to become the “operation fi ld of rac-
ist and imperialist nationalisms” is mainly due to their “fittingness” with
the neoliberal mode of hiding structural inequalities b ­ ehind cultural con-
fli ts. Similarly, Paul Mepschen and Jan Duyvendack have stressed how
22

neoliberalism has facilitated the encounter between l gbt and nationalist

politics not only by promoting the rise of a gay consumerist culture but
also by reaffirming the authority of the nation-­state over the production
of identities, while allowing for the (de)regulation of the economy.23 Th y
thus maintain that sexual nationalisms are consistent with neoliberal strat-
egies of market segmentation and the promotion of chauvinist politics.
­These previous studies, however, treat neoliberalism as the economic the-
ater of operation for the encounter between a dif­fer­ent array of forces, but
not as one of the main characters onstage. While agreeing that ­neoliberalism
is central for understanding ­t hese phenomena, this book argues that

Introduction  13
neoliberalism is not simply the contextual ground on which the femo-
nationalist convergence takes place, but it is itself constitutive of such a
convergence. The mobilization of ­women’s rights within xenophobic cam-
paigns, which has become prominent ­under neoliberalism, does not merely
divert attention away from growing economic inequalities by means of
“culturalist” modes of displacement. Nor has such mobilization operated
solely through making equal rights campaigns functional to consumer-
ist cultures. Rather, I understand neoliberalism to be a political-­economic
formation that “institutionalizes” the femonationalist ideology as part of
the functioning of the state apparatuses in order to (re)or­ga­nize the pro-
ductive and particularly the socially reproductive sphere.
In the Name of W­ omen’s Rights details the neoliberal institutionalization
of femonationalism by analyzing the economic components of the civic
integration programs for third-­country nationals. As I mentioned above,
­these programs require mi­grants to learn what are claimed to be the main
cultural tenets of the receiving Eu­ro­pean states in order to be granted resi-
dency. ­Here gender equality is presented as a pillar of the western Eu­ro­
pean nation, and the declaration of re­spect for ­women’s rights has been
turned into a condition for settlement. By reconstructing the history of the
implementation of ­these programs, and the po­liti­cal profile of their design-
ers and supporters as well as their gendered dimensions, I show how they
have incorporated the repre­sen­ta­tion of Muslim ­women and men—as, re-
spectively, victims and oppressors—­into the disciplinary apparatus of the
state’s policies on immigration. I thus demonstrate how ­these policies are
a specific and very concrete site in which we see a slippage between anti-­
Islam ste­reo­types and pro­cesses of Othering that involve and affect not
only Muslim w ­ omen but also non-­western mi­grant ­women more generally.
Furthermore, I detail how civic integration policies do not operate merely
at the “disciplinary” level of the state, framing Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant males as misogynist subjectivities in need of re-­education. Instead
I demonstrate how ­these policies also crucially operate at the economic
level.
Premised upon the idea that Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women
are backward individuals who are mostly confi ed to the home, from
2007 onward civic integration policies in the Netherlands, France, and
Italy have encouraged t­ hese ­women to integrate eco­nom­ically by seeking

14 Introduction
employment outside the ­house­hold.24 As I discuss in chapter 4, economic
integration for non-­western mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar (Muslim and
non-­Muslim alike) has effectively functioned through the application of
neoliberal workfare devices. W ­ omen’s organ­izations and gender equal-
ity state agencies have supported and been actively involved in imple-
menting ­these initiatives, which address the difficulties of the female
mi­grant population in the ­labor market of the country of destination.
An in-­depth analy­sis of ­these initiatives, however, underscores that non-­
western mi­grant ­women participating in civic integration programs have
been systematically directed ­toward a handful of job types: ­hotel clean-
ing, h ­ ouse­keeping, child minding, and caregiving for the el­derly and/or
the disabled. In spite of the g­ reat emphasis placed on the need for t­ hese
­women to emancipate themselves by entering the productive public sphere
by the vari­ous feminists, ­women’s organ­izations, and the femocrats that
I discuss in this book, in real­ity non-­western mi­grant ­women have been
confi ed to care and domestic work in the private sphere. ­There is thus a
contradiction when feminists and femocrats urge emancipation for Mus-
lim and non-­western mi­grant ­women while channeling them t­ oward the
very sphere (domestic, low-­paying, and precarious jobs) from which the
feminist movement had historically tried to liberate w ­ omen. Th s is not
merely a rhetorical contradiction but is concretely performed in action. In
order to understand the under­pinnings of this “performative contradic-
tion,” I reconstruct a critical genealogy of the notion of economic in­de­
pen­dence as it emerged in dif­fer­ent waves of the feminist movement, and
the related concepts of productive work as opposed to social reproduc-
tion. Th s critical genealogy suggests that it is precisely the tension between
­these two realms (i.e., production and social reproduction) and the devalu-
ation of social reproduction by many western Eu­ro­pean feminists that have
unwittingly contributed to the reconfigur tion of social reproduction as
a sector dominated by a very marginalized and vulnerable section of the
workforce, namely, Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women.
In the Name of ­Women’s Rights also documents the active role of right-­
wing governments and of some nationalist right-­wing parties in the early
2010s in directing t­ hese ­women into the care and domestic, or social re-
productive, sector. I highlight the role of the 2007–2011global fi ancial
crisis as the crucial backdrop against which the nationalist and neoliberal

Introduction  15
r­ he­toric of non-­western mi­grant men and ­women (Muslim and non-­
Muslim) as oppressors and victims needs to be understood. By document-
ing how pro­cesses of “commodifi ation of care” during the crisis have
impacted the expansion of the ­labor market of female mi­grant caregivers,
this book examines the complex ways in which Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women have become the main providers of social reproduction
in a context of growing demand for care. In addition, through a detailed
analy­sis of data on non-­western mi­grants’ economic per­for­mance in terms
of employment trends and sectors between 2007 and 2013, I demonstrate
that Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women ­were not only spared dur-
ing the crisis, but their employment and activity rates actually grew during
­these years. Unlike non-­western mi­grant men, who most often fi d work
in economic sectors in which relocation and closure of productive sites
can easily be used as “crisis-­management” devices to reduce the number
of laborers, non-­western mi­grant ­women are in fact mostly employed in
the care and domestic economy. Th s is the sector to which capital’s clas-
sic crisis-­management operations do not apply: social reproduction, quite
simply, cannot be relocated or shut down during times of economic crises.
Care work must continue even during periods of recession to guarantee
the daily functioning of our socie­ties. Indeed, in the pres­ent context of
western Eu­ro­pean ­women’s growing rates of employment, it is increas-
ingly Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women who are providing care
for ­children, the disabled, and the el­derly. Th s is occurring precisely at
a historical moment in which western Eu­rope both is privatizing welfare
ser­vices and is confronted with an ever-­larger aging population.
I argue that the emphasis on non-­western mi­grant ­women overall
as individuals to be helped in their integration and emancipation pro­cess,
including through job offers, is pos­si­ble ­because they, unlike male mi­grant
workers, currently occupy a strategic role in the social reproductive sector
of childcare, el­derly care, and cleaning. Rather than “job stealers,” “cultural
and social threats,” and “welfare system parasites”—­all designations regu-
larly used for Muslim and non-­western mi­grant men—­Muslim and non-­
western mi­grant ­women seem to be t­ hose who allow western Eu­ro­pean
men and particularly w ­ omen to work in the public sphere by providing
that care that neoliberal restructuring has commodifi d.
In the Name of ­Women’s Rights thus suggests that the double standard
applied to Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women in the public imagi-

16 Introduction
nary as individuals in need of special attention, and even “rescue,” oper-
ates as an ideological tool that is strictly connected to their key role in
the reproduction of the material conditions of social reproduction. Femo-
nationalism should be understood as part and parcel of the specifi ally
neoliberal reor­ga­ni­za­tion of welfare, ­labor, and state immigration policies
that have occurred in the context of the global fi ancial crisis and, more
generally, the western Eu­ro­pean crisis of social reproduction. The very
possibility that nationalists and neoliberals can exploit emancipatory ideals
of gender equality, as well as the convergence of feminists/femocrats with
anti-­emancipatory, xenophobic politics, springs in large part from the spe-
cifi ally neoliberal reconfigur tion of the western Eu­ro­pean economy in
the past thirty years.

A Note on Methodology

Th s book focuses on the Netherlands, France, and Italy as signifi ant

cases for the study of femonationalism. Since the early 2000s t­ hese three
national contexts have gained international prominence as leading Eu­
ro­pean laboratories for the convergence among the nationalist right,
neoliberal policies, and anti-­Islam feminists and femocrats. Despite the
obvious distinctions between the Dutch, French, and Italian contexts—
in terms of immigration histories, cultures of integration, nationalities,
and types of migration, as well as differences in the respective traditions
of nationalist and feminist movements, and application of neoliberal
agendas—­they have nonetheless exhibited a striking resemblance and
synchrony in the development of femonationalism. My objective is not to
provide a discrete assessment of each country, or even a comparative ty-
pology. Rather, this book attempts to highlight the parallels among ­these
national contexts and po­liti­cal actors and to disclose the transnational
character of femonationalism within the local. Albeit specific to t­ hese
national settings, the theorization I offer provides a conceptual frame-
work that may be useful for analyzing similar phenomena in dif­fer­ent
national settings across western Eu­rope in par­tic­u­lar and in the West
more generally.25
With this aim, I analyze the three most prominent right-­wing national-
ist parties in each of the three countries (i.e., the pvv in the Netherlands,
the fn in France, and the ln in Italy). While they do not represent the

Introduction  17
­ hole nationalist constellation in each context, they have played a crucial
w
role in each country’s po­liti­cal life since the mid-2000s. More impor­tant,
­these three parties have largely determined the right-­wing nationalist turn
that has characterized Dutch, French, and Italian politics in the second
de­cade of the millennium. Their emphasis on Muslims and non-­western
mi­grants’ alleged negation of the nation’s au­then­tic roots, culture, history,
and values, as well as their mobilization of ­women’s rights against non-­
western ­Others, have been widely covered by the mainstream media and
invoked in public debate.
Second, I analyze the claims made by feminists who have come to pub-
lic prominence from the early 2000s onward due to their resolute embrace
of anti-­Islam arguments. My exploration focuses on the most influential
and vocal group of actors in each country: prominent feminist intellectu-
als; feminist politicians from left to right, including some of North African
or Muslim background; ­women’s organ­izations; and key figu es in state
gender equality agencies, or femocrats.
Fi­nally, this book analyzes the deployment of gender equality themes in
anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns by examining the neoliberal
philosophy underpinning the new civic integration programs promoted
by the Eu­ro­pean Commission from the early 2000s onward. I detail the
ways in which the neoliberal agenda of workfare prioritizes “skilled mi-
gration” and frames mi­grants’ integration as a ­matter of both individual
responsibility and economic contribution, while showing how ­these agendas
intersect with the stigmatization of non-­western (unskilled) mi­grant males
in the name of ­women’s rights.
My analy­sis of the rise of femonationalism employs diverse methods, in-
cluding interviews with key respondents, participant observation, analy­sis
of statistical data, and critical discourse analy­sis (c da ). In par­tic­u­lar I have
examined party programs, po­liti­cal speeches and interviews, visual materi-
als (videos, posters, documentaries), offi al eu and national documents,
immigration and integration laws and policies, as well as data on ­labor and
migration from the ­Labor Force Survey, Organisation for Economic Co-­
operation and Development, and the International ­Labor Organ­ization.
The analyses and arguments I pres­ent are also informed by many years
of scholarly work on gendered migration, multiculturalism, and the gen-
dered division of mi­grant ­labor in all three contexts.

18 Introduction
Chapter Overview

Chapter 1, “Figures of Femonationalism,” reconstructs a critical genealogy

of the mobilization of w ­ omen’s rights in the Netherlands, France, and Italy
from 2000 to 2013. It provides a detailed account of the ways in which
three right-­wing nationalist parties have increasingly resorted to a rhe­toric
of gender equality in order to advance their anti-­Islam/anti-­immigration
po­liti­cal agendas. Th s chapter also traces the participation of several
prominent feminist intellectuals and politicians, ­women’s organ­izations,
and femocrats in the campaign against Islamic patriarchy and Muslim
­women’s “special exposure” to misogyny and gender vio­lence. The claim in
this chapter is that the constitution of a common space in which seemingly
oppositional forces such as feminism and right-­wing nationalism can voice
concerns about gender vio­lence as the exclusive domain of the Muslim
Other stems from a shared belief in the supremacy of western values.
Chapter 2, “Femonationalism Is No Pop­u­lism,” begins with a discussion
of how, in the past de­cade, sociologists and po­liti­cal scientists have under-
stood right-­wing parties’ exploitation of gender equality as a form of pop­
u­lism. Challenging this approach, it argues that the concept of pop­u­lism
fails to make sense of the centrality t­ hese parties assign to gender equality.
Instead, I contend that if we want to grasp the reasons for the sudden and
instrumental mobilization of feminist issues by ­these right-­wing parties,
we need to draw on the theories of nationalism developed in the context
of postcolonial feminism and critical race studies. To do this, I explore the
emergence of femonationalism within the historical context of decoloniza-
tion of non-­western countries and recolonization of non-­western subjects
in Eu­rope and the West. I thus link ­these discussions to notions of “racial-
ization of sexism” and “sexualization of racism.”
Chapter  3, “Integration Policies and the Institutionalization of Femo-
nationalism,” discusses the recent legislation on civic integration, imple-
mented in the Netherlands, France, and Italy between 2006 and 2013 by
neoliberal governments with the support of nationalist parties. Focusing
on civic integration programs, I show how gender equality and ­women’s
rights are among the most impor­tant values that mi­grants are expected
to internalize and re­spect. While influential interpretations of civic inte-
gration policies have claimed that the theme of gender equality conveyed

Introduction  19
by ­these policies demonstrates the liberal, as opposed to nationalist (and
racist), character of ­these programs, I demonstrate that the opposite is ac-
tually the case. I show that civic integration policies are arguably the most
concrete and insidious form of the institutionalization of femonationalism
as an ideological formation.
Chapter  4, “Femonationalism, Neoliberalism, and Social Reproduc-
tion,” focuses on one largely overlooked point of convergence between
anti-­Islam feminist, nationalist, and neoliberal politics: namely, the poli-
cies pertaining to non-­western mi­grant ­women’s “economic” integration. I
begin by showing that the demand that ­these ­women participate in work is
largely framed within a context of workfare. Second, I demonstrate that the
implementation of t­ hese policies, including by some prominent feminist
politicians, ­women’s organ­izations, and state gender equality agencies, has
functioned through actively directing non-­western mi­grant ­women (Mus-
lim and non-­Muslim alike) ­toward the care and domestic sectors (social
reproduction), which has traditionally been conceived as “feminine.” The
contradiction emerges when we recall that it is precisely against this gen-
dered division of l­abor—­men in the public sphere, w ­ omen in the private—­
that the feminist movement has historically strug­gled. To understand the
conditions of possibility for, and the trajectory of such a contradiction, I
propose that we reconstruct the complex feminist genealogy of economic
in­de­pen­dence, and the related concepts of productive work, which has his-
torically been placed in opposition to social reproduction. Th s critical re-
construction enables us to better grasp how some feminists and femocrats
have converged with the ideology of femonationalism.
Chapter 5, “The Po­liti­cal Economy of Femonationalism,” emphasizes that
the double standard applied t­ oday to non-­western mi­grant populations—­
according to which men are the “dangerous Other” while w ­ omen are the
“victims to be rescued”—­follows a political-­economic logic. I argue that we
need to rethink and challenge the prevalent assumption that immigrants
and w ­ omen constitute a “reserve army of ­labor.” Analyzing the strategic
role of non-­western mi­grant ­women (Muslim and non-­Muslim alike) in
the social reproductive sector of care and domestic work, in the context
of the state’s retreat from public care provisions, aging populations, and
growing participation of western Eu­ro­pean ­women in the l­abor market, I
show that the cheap l­abor of mi­grant ­women has become essential for the
reproduction of western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties and economies. Even during

20 Introduction
the recent economic crisis, the rate of employment of mi­grant ­women in
the care and domestic sector grew, unlike (male) mi­grant employment in
other sectors. Th s testifies to a fundamental difference between male and
female mi­grant ­labor in con­temporary western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties: un-
like their male counter­parts, immigrant ­women now belong to what can
be called a “regular army of l­abor.” Th s category enables us to lay bare the
economic rationale ­behind the repre­sen­ta­tion of Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women as “redeemable subjects.”
Ultimately the analyses provided in t­ hese pages underscore how the
mobilization of w ­ omen’s rights within xenophobic campaigns has not been
limited to po­liti­cal rhe­toric. A detailed analy­sis of the political-­economic
foundations of ­these developments is essential not only to strengthen our
critique but especially to help us fi d alternative po­liti­cal practices to con-
front their devastating consequences.

Introduction  21
 CHAPTER 1

Figures of Femonationalism

In this chapter I begin to lay out a critical genealogy of the mobilization

of ­women’s rights in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns in the
Netherlands, France, and Italy from the early 2000s u ­ ntil 2013. In par­tic­u­
lar, the next sections ­will provide a detailed account of the ways in which
three right-­wing nationalist parties—­the pvv in the Netherlands, the fn in
France, and the ln in Italy—­have increasingly resorted to a gender equal-
ity lexicon to advance their xenophobic po­liti­cal agendas.1 Th s chapter
also traces the participation of several feminist intellectuals and w ­ omen’s
organ­izations, female politicians (including some of Muslim descent), and
­women’s equality agencies (or femocrats) in the campaign against Islam’s
“patriarchy” and Muslim ­women’s alleged special exposure to misogyny
and gender vio­lence.2 However, before I begin to describe the contours
of ­these femonationalist fi ures, in what follows I ­will provide a brief his-
torical framing of the ways in which the ste­reo­types of the non-­western
mi­grant man as misogynist and of the non-­western mi­grant ­woman as
victim to be rescued have gained currency in the western Eu­ro­pean im-
agery. It is impor­tant to highlight that the current stigmatization of Mus-
lim men as enemies of gender equality and the foregrounding of Muslim
­women as oppressed victims both build on gendered prejudices that had
been applied to non-­western, colonized subjects more generally in all three
countries. As I mentioned in the introduction, the current positioning of
Muslim men and w ­ omen, with the latter playing the role of the passive ob-
ject of non-­western male congenital vio­lence who require protection, can
in fact be regarded as a con­temporary face of a well-­known western topos,
namely, that of the “white men [claiming to be] saving brown ­women from
brown men,” to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s apposite formulation.3
I thus contend that, in the pres­ent context, Muslim ­women play the role
of a synecdoche for the western Eu­ro­pean ste­reo­type of the female Other.
That is, Muslim w ­ omen currently personify in the western Eu­ro­pean im-
agery the homogenizing figu e of the non-­western ­woman as the victim
par excellence of non-­western male vio­lence. In this sense, the Muslim
­woman nowadays powerfully embodies the features of what Chandra Mo-
hanty already in the 1980s famously called the Thi d World ­woman: that
is, the repre­sen­ta­tion of w
­ omen from non-­western socie­ties as constituting
a homogeneous “powerless” group defi ed by their status of victimhood.4

Muslim ­Women as Synecdoche

The mobilization of issues of gender equality to stigmatize non-­western

mi­grant men in general has indeed a specific history and trajectory in
the western Eu­ro­pean context. ­After World War II, when western Eu­rope
began to recover from the devastations brought about by the horrific con-
fli t, millions of mi­grants, mostly male, migrated to and through the con-
tinent to fill the demand for ­labor power in the reconstruction industry.5 A
­whole business grew up around ­these new mi­grants, with bilateral agree-
ments signed between states and office across northern Eu­ro­pean coun-
tries that ­were specifi ally designed to attract young males to be employed
in manufacture and construction. ­Whether coming from the ex-­European
colonies (or from countries that w ­ ere still u
­ nder colonial rule), or from the
Mediterranean region (e.g., southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugo­
slavia, Turkey, and part of the Maghreb), ­these male mi­grants soon became
the victims of widespread xenophobia and racism.6 Despite their crucial
role in the reconstruction of western Eu­ro­pean economies, they ­were por-
trayed by the mainstream media and right-­wing parties, and perceived
­by many (northern) Eu­ro­pe­ans, in negative terms: lazy, uncivilized, aggres-
sive, backward, unambitious, and so forth.7 It was only from the mid-1970s
onward—­that is, ­after the 1973 oil crisis and the policies stopping further
immigration fl ws to the majority of northern Eu­ro­pean countries—­that
mi­grant ­women entered onto the stage of migration on an unpre­ce­dented
scale (on which more in chapter 5). Fearing that they would not be able
to come back to the “hosting” countries once they left, a number of t­ hese
male mi­grants deci­ded to ­settle in northern Eu­rope and bring in their
­family members: spouses, ­mothers, or ­daughters. From the 1970s onward
the geography of migrations also changed, whereby countries of emigration
became countries of immigration—as in the case of southern Europe—­and

Figures of Femonationalism  23
­ ere admitted to the western Eu­ro­pean ­family. The presence of mi­grant
w
­women from the ex-­colonies and the Global South in western Eu­rope thus,
at least in its initial stage, was largely the unexpected and paradoxical out-
come of policies that aimed to reduce, rather than to increase, the number
of mi­grants pres­ent in the continent.8 And it was not long before ­these
­women too became the object of po­liti­cal scrutiny and stereotyping. Typi-
cal orientalist gendered dichotomies began to be applied to them: if mi­
grant males w ­ ere usually depicted as brutes and uncivilized, w ­ omen ­were
portrayed as passive and submissive. In the Netherlands, Conny Rogge-
band and Mieke Verloo remind us that it was only at the beginning of the
2000s that Muslim w ­ omen started to attract increasing po­liti­cal and media
attention and to be used as the chief example of the non-­western ­woman as
victim of gendered oppression.9 Before then, ­women from minority groups
in general ­were referred to as “allochthonous” and discussed in denigratory
terms as retrograde—­without distinctions of nationality or religion—­when
compared to the “autochthonous” Dutch ­women.10 ­Until the late 1990s,
therefore, w­ omen from former Dutch colonies (Surinam, the Antilles, and
Indonesia), from eastern Eu­rope as well as from Turkey and Morocco (the
biggest mi­grant communities in the country), ­were all represented as back-
ward and victims.11 For instance, discussing the status of Rus­sians in the
Netherlands, Gudrun Willett points out that “the Dutch in par­tic­u­lar use
[sex] trafficking and mafia images in order to defi e them [the Rus­sians]
as ‘other’ in m
­ atters of migration, work, and crime.”12 Rus­sian ­women, and
eastern Eu­ro­pean ­women in general, have thus usually been thought of as
being “trafficking victims.” From the end of the 1990s onward, however,
the hierarchy of backwardness became more layered, with Turkish and
Moroccan ­women gradually being placed at the bottom of the emancipa-
tion scale, with Surinamese and Antillean w ­ omen being presented as less
backward in comparison. The relegation of Muslim ­women to the lower
13

echelons of the emancipation league ­table became more pronounced in the

early 2000s u ­ nder the center-­right Balkenende I (2002) and Balkenende
II (2003–2006) cabinets. In 2002 the appearance on the po­liti­cal scene of
the party named Pim Fortuyn List (on which more below), and its subse-
quent electoral success involving fie ce anti-­immigration and anti-­Islam
propaganda in the name of w ­ omen’s rights, redesigned the Dutch po­liti­cal
landscape as well as the ways in which non-­western mi­grant ­women, above
all Muslim w ­ omen, would be framed in subsequent years.14 As Minister

24 Chapter 1
for Integration and Immigration in the Balkenende cabinets, the right-­
wing nationalist Rita Verdonk has been another key figu e in the pub-
lic con­temporary construction of Muslim ­women as the principal victims
of backward and misogynist cultures. Verdonk’s interventions strongly
contributed to spreading the idea that Islam amounts to unequal gender
relations and vio­lence (with an emphasis on honor killings, domestic vio­
lence, and forced marriages).15 Thus, it was particularly in the 2000s that
“emancipation policies bec[a]me ‘ethnicized’ ” and addressed above all to
Muslim ­women.16
Unlike in the Netherlands, in France Muslim w ­ omen have played the
role of the synecdoche for the western Eu­ro­pean ste­reo­type of the female
Other from the outset, that is, from the beginning of mass immigration to
the country in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the fact that in the early 1980s—­
that is, when the presence of w ­ omen in migratory movements tripled due to
­family reunifi ation—­mi­grants from Portugal ­were as numerous as ­those
from Algeria, research and po­liti­cal discourses tended to focus on mi­grants
from the latter country.17 Masima Moujoud notes how, from the very outset
in the 1970s, so­cio­log­i­cal studies on gender and migration in France fo-
cused on the “effects” of migration on w ­ omen, particularly w
­ omen from
the Maghreb.18 The common denominator among ­these studies was the
assumption that migration was positive for ­these ­women since the transi-
tion from “traditional” to “modern” contexts would have an emancipatory
impact on them.19 The evolutionary paradigm that informed studies on
gender and migration also ­shaped the widespread conviction that reject-
ing the values of the society of origin was essential for w
­ omen’s integration
into France.20 Capucine Larzillière and Lisbeth Sal, for instance, remind us
that already in 1983—­long before the explosion of the controversy over the
wearing of the Muslim head­scarf in public schools, culminating in their
banning in 2004—­the journal Les cahiers du féminisme echoed this idea by
referring to the example of a young ­woman born in France to Moroccan
parents.21 The journal portrays the young ­woman as struggling in order to
continue her studies as an “escape” from the type of “traditional” life that
her f­ amily had planned for her. “School thus is established as a place of
liberation in which she does not experience ­either discrimination or rac-
ism.”22 Furthermore, ­there is a long history in France of applying a double
standard in the repre­sen­ta­tion of Muslim men and ­women. Whereas the
former are represented as violent and sexist, an image encapsulated in

Figures of Femonationalism  25
the concept of the Arab boy (garçon arabe), Muslim young veiled w ­ omen
( fil es voiles) stand for the submissive victims of traditional families and
patriarchal cultures; ­those who do not conform to this model, instead, are
called beurettes emancipées (emancipated girls of Maghreb origin) and re-
garded as the model that Muslim girls should follow.23 In this sense, then, in
France ­there is a fundamental continuity between past and pres­ent, where
Muslim ­women have consistently been identifi d as the quin­tes­sen­tial em-
bodiment of the non-­western ­woman as backward and traditional. Th s
notwithstanding, we should note that w ­ omen from postsocialist countries
in France too have been consistently identifi d as victims, as in the case
of discussions on sex trafficking. In 2009 for instance, Le Nouvelle Obser-
vateur devoted its November issue to the “explosion of sex traffic” with
several articles focusing upon w ­ omen from eastern Eu­rope as the most
numerous group in the sex industry ( filière).24
Fi­nally, non-­western mi­grant ­women in Italy started to become vis­i­ble—
particularly in academic work—at the beginning of the 1980s. Unlike in the
Netherlands and France, which have a longer history of being immigrants’
fi al destinations, and in which initially men had predominantly been
the bridgeheads of the migratory chain, in Italy single w ­ omen constituted
a signifi ant number of mi­grants from the outset. Th ­ ese ­women mostly
came from countries with majoritarian Catholic populations (such as the
Philippines, El Salvador, and Cape Verde) and tended to be employed as
domestic workers (colf ) and/or carers (badanti; sing. badante) in private
­house­holds. During the 1970s and 1980s, scholarly work that focused on
mi­grant ­women was dominated by the “tradition-­modernity” dichotomy.25
At the time, non-­western mi­grant ­women, no ­matter what their country of
origin, w ­ ere systematically considered backward when compared to Italian
­women, and immigration was cast in t­ hese scholarly texts as an opportu-
nity for them to enter a modern country and to acquire a more emanci-
pated model of womanhood. From the beginning of the 1990s up ­until the
pres­ent, however, the composition of mi­grants moving to Italy began to
change dramatically. Entry restrictions put in place in other western Eu­ro­
pean countries, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the geo­graph­i­cal location of
the peninsula, which makes it easily reachable from dif­fer­ent areas particu-
larly for temporary migration, w ­ ere all ­factors that made Italy increasingly
attractive for immigrants from eastern Eu­rope as well as from African and
Asian countries. Repre­sen­ta­tions of, and policies targeting, non-­western

26 Chapter 1
mi­grant ­women in the 1990s tended to concentrate on eastern Eu­ro­pean
and Nigerian ­women, as victims of trafficking in the sex industry. In 1998,
for instance, with the approval of the fi st law regulating immigration (Testo
Unico Immigrazione), an article was introduced (article 18) allowing mi­
grant ­women who w ­ ere forced into prostitution to obtain a special visa if they
denounced their exploiter. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s, therefore,
two main figu es dominated the public imagery regarding non-­western
female foreigners: the badante, which referred to both care and domestic
workers, and the trafficking victim. In the 2000s the ste­reo­type of victim-
hood associated with ­women of non-­western descent was “enriched” by a
new figu e: that of the Muslim ­woman qua victim of genital mutilations,
honor killings, forced veiling, and arranged marriages. The case of Sanaa
Dafani, the young ­woman of Moroccan origin murdered by her ­father in
2009, as well as similar cases of gendered vio­lence involving Muslim men
as perpetrators, monopolized media attention in the 2000s and began to
establish an equation between ­women’s oppression and Islam. Yet in ­those
same years the number of Italian ­women killed and assaulted by Italian
men (partners, f­ athers, relatives, e­ tc.) reached such heights that some com-
mentators began to speak of a femicide emergency.26
All in all, while mi­grant ­women from the postsocialist countries have
been foregrounded as sex-­trafficking victims, ­those coming from North
and Sub-­Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the ­Middle East have gained the
reputation of being victims of specific forms of gendered vio­lence (genital
mutilations and honor killings in par­tic­u­lar).27 In short, the repre­sen­ta­tion
of the non-­western mi­grant universe as one made of (male) masters and
(female) slaves has been somewhat of a cliché from early on in all three
western Eu­ro­pean countries. Th s notwithstanding, it is impor­tant to note
that in the 1980s and most of the 1990s it was still a repre­sen­ta­tion that
belonged to the rubric of ste­reo­types surrounding mi­grant communities
from the Global South and postsocialist countries, alongside other preju-
dices, such as the idea that non-­western mi­grant males w ­ ere on average
more prone to criminal activities than nonmigrant ones and w ­ ere para-
sitic on the welfare system or responsible for the low wages of non-
migrant workers. In other words, ­until relatively recently the ostensible
lesser status of ­women within mi­grant enclaves was not perceived, and used,
as a special reason for disliking non-­western mi­grants. In this sense, the con­
temporary emphasis upon gender inequalities and the obsessive invocation

Figures of Femonationalism  27
of the ­violation of ­women’s rights within mi­grant (especially Muslim)
communities particularly by the nationalist right, but also by several femi-
nists, ­women’s organ­izations, and neoliberal policy makers—or what I call
the femonationalist convergence—­might well constitute a novelty of the
new millennium. Since 9/11and the subsequent bombing of Af­ghan­i­stan
in par­tic­u­lar, which was justifi d—­among other t­ hings—by the claim that
the West was liberating Muslim ­women from the oppressive conditions to
which Islamic fundamentalists w ­ ere subjecting them, the issue of w
­ omen’s
rights as a central tool for Othering and stigmatizing non-­western popula-
tions has gained unpre­ce­dented currency.28

The New Centrality of Gender for Right-­Wing Nationalism

One of the novelties of the pres­ent neoliberal conjuncture is the central-

ity that gender issues seem to have acquired within right-­wing nationalist
parties’ agendas. Since the mid-2000s ­these parties have begun adopting
the language of ­women’s rights and gender equality in anti-­immigration
and anti-­Islam campaigns on an unpre­ce­dented scale. Seeking to cash in
on the general shift of the po­liti­cal spectrum to the right that character-
ized the beginning of the millennium and to normalize their public image
as “modernized” and trustworthy po­liti­cal forces, numerous right-­wing
parties in western Eu­rope have begun to show concern for the status of
­women’s rights, especially within Muslim and non-­western mi­grant com-
munities.29 Nationalist right-­wing parties’ newly found feminist “vocation”
is in fact in sharp contradiction with their traditional antifeminist politics
and ideology. While advocating w ­ omen’s emancipation as a central value
of the Eu­ro­pean (Christian) social fabric, which Muslims and non-­western
mi­grants allegedly lack, t­ hese parties also promote policies that encour-
age the maintenance of traditional roles for w ­ omen. Despite their strong
contradictions on the theme of gender issues, their exploitation of ­women’s
rights has paid off. As I w
­ ill show in the next pages, the stigmatization of
Muslim and non-­western mi­grant males as misogynists and backward has
helped ­these parties not only become more acceptable in the mainstream
but also obtain unpre­ce­dented success in recent elections. The following
three sections draw mainly on an analy­sis of the pvv’s , fn ’s, and ln ’s posi-
tions that w­ ere found on their offi al websites and in national newspapers
and magazines and electoral materials between (roughly) 2005 and 2013.

28 Chapter 1
Documents analyzed also included po­liti­cal posters, relevant parliamen-
tary discussions, and interviews with party leaders that appeared in the
national press.30

Geert Wilders and the PVV

The sociologist Sarah Bracke identifies three phases of what she calls the
“civilizational era” of Dutch politics, that is, the historical conjuncture in
which the clash of civilizations between supposedly progressive, liberal
western Eu­rope and the backward Islamic world has become a major topic
of the po­liti­cal and economic agenda. Within such a civilizational era, the
theme of gender equality has assumed a new centrality.31 The fi st phase
was inaugurated by the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demo­cratie (vvd;
­People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) with the center-­right politi-
cian Frits Bolkestein’s speech on the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.32
Th s is the phase during which multiculturalism began to be declared unviable
as a proj­ect or ideal for Dutch society. The growing number of immigrants,
particularly of Islamic faith, who deci­ded to reside in the Netherlands on
a stable basis, thereby changing the demographics of the country, was de-
clared to be a danger for liberal western values. The second phase between
2002 and 2004 was dominated by figu es such as the right-­wing politicians
Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Rita Verdonk and the film director Theo
van Gogh. During this phase, gender and gay equality ­were asserted as
mainstays of Dutch culture and its social contract, something that Mus-
lims’ alleged misogyny and homophobia w ­ ere seen to threaten. The third
phase lasted from 2004 to 2012; it was inaugurated by the murder of Theo
van Gogh in 2004 and the subsequent and dramatic shift of the po­liti­cal
axis ­toward the nationalist right, with the emergence of the right-­wing na-
tionalist and Islamophobic politician Geert Wilders. Given its centrality to
the consolidation of the femonationalist ideology in the Netherlands, in
what follows I thus concentrate on delineating Wilders’s politics and on his
mobilization of gay and gender equality in anti-­Islam/anti-­immigration
campaigns in this third phase.
Upon leaving the vvd in 2004 in protest against the party’s considering
admitting Turkey to the eu , Wilders in 2006 founded his own po­liti­cal plat-
form: the right-­wing nationalist pvv.33 Profoundly inspired and influenced
by Pim Fortuyn’s xenophobic politics, Wilders has made the mainstay of
his politics a campaign against non-­western immigrants and Muslims in

Figures of Femonationalism  29
the name of western values of freedom and gay and gender equality.34 Its
ideological manifesto—­“Een Nieuw-­Realistische Visie” (A new realistic
vision)—­pres­ents the main tenets of his nationalist, xenophobic, and (neo)
liberal ­recipe. Drawing on Hegel and Tocqueville, Hobbes, Fukuyama, and
Leo Strauss, Wilders’s manifesto proposes a conservative and nationalist
corrective that he conceives to be a cure to the excesses of liberal free-
dom, that is, to multiculturalism. His goal is to establish secure cultural
and moral foundations for the new neoliberal credo.35 In this document,
Islam was already identifi d as one of the main threats to the liberal west-
ern lineage of democracy and values. It was especially in subsequent years,
however, with Wilders increasingly moving ­toward what Vossen calls “na-
tional pop­u­lism,” that he obsessively presented Islam as a dangerous ide-
ology and way of life that threatens, above all, gay and gender equality.36
Th s theme had been pres­ent in Wilders’s agenda for a long time; in many
ways, it drew on and was reinforced by his po­liti­cal collaboration with the
Islamophobic, self-­proclaimed feminist politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali, with
whom he authored a 2003 document calling for a “liberal jihad” against
Islam.37 But it was ­after 2006, upon the foundation of his own party, that
Wilders’s mobilization of gay and gender equality according to an anti-­
Islam script clearly became central to his po­liti­cal strategy. In an attempt
to capitalize on the clamor that followed the release of the movie Submis-
sion I, and the subsequent murder of its director, Theo van Gogh, by a
Muslim fundamentalist in 2004 (on which more shortly), in 2008 Wilders
produced a short movie, Fitna. Like van Gogh’s film, Fitna also focuses on
the theme of gender in­equality and vio­lence as inherent, central features of
Islam. Th oughout the movie, suras of the Koran suggesting that Islam is
about the annihilation of the ­enemy (i.e., the infid l and the non-­Muslim)
are accompanied by images showing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, rallies of
Muslim fundamentalists celebrating Nazism and the killing of Jews, and
the murder of van Gogh. All of its scenes convey the message that Islam,
as a po­liti­cal ideology rather than simply a religious credo, wants to rule
the world. U ­ nder the title “The Netherlands u ­ nder the Spell of Islam,” the
second part of the movie portrays how the “Islamization of Eu­rope” is af-
fecting the Dutch nation. H ­ ere, images of veiled w
­ omen walking through
the streets of Dutch cities serve as the backdrop to Muslim fundamen-
talists’ declarations regarding the justness of punishing w ­ omen’s adultery
with death. The movie closes with projections of chilly scenarios if Islam

30 Chapter 1
­ ere to take over: gay p
w ­ eople killed, ­women stoned to death, and c­ hildren
turned into terrorists. The release of Fitna on the video website LiveLeak
in March 2008 sparked enormous controversies, including death threats
against Wilders and a boycott of Dutch products or­ga­nized by Muslim
organ­izations in several countries. At the 2010 Dutch general elections it
became clear that Wilders’s extreme po­liti­cal style had served to establish
him not only as the most discussed and controversial Dutch politician
but also as the leader of a po­liti­cal movement able to touch the sensitive,
Islamophobic nerves of Dutch society. Not surprisingly, the pvv ’s party
program for the June 9, 2010, elections was wholly directed against im-
migration, dual nationality, multiculturalism, and, of course, Islam and its
homophobia and misogyny. An example is this excerpt from his electoral
program:

Anyone who thinks that Islam is just one issue cannot count. Mass im-
migration has huge implications for all facets of our society. It is eco­
nom­ically a disaster, it affects the quality of our education, it increases
insecurity in the streets, leading to an exodus from our cities, it expels
Jews and gays and flushes de­cades of ­women’s rights down the toilet.38

In the 2010 elections, the pvv turned out to be the third party of the
Netherlands, with 15.4 ­percent of votes, almost 10 ­percent more than in the
previous 2006 elections, thereby becoming a key force in the constitution of
the new government. ­After two years of external backing for the conserva-
tive Rutte I government (formed by the vvd and Christen-­Democratisch
Appèl, c da ), in 2012 the pvv withdrew its support, which effectively led to
a new election. The pvv ’s po­liti­cal campaign for the 2012 general elections
again used the by-­then-­familiar anti-­Islam watchwords, but it now in-
cluded a stronger anti-­eu and anti-­immigration propaganda in which Eu­
ro­pean integration was depicted as the source of the economic and cultural
decline that had affected the Netherlands since the beginning of the eco-
nomic crisis in 2007 and immigrants from Eastern Eu­rope ­were declared
unwelcome. For instance, in 2012 the pvv established a website in which
Dutch citizens could send their complaints against immigrants from the
new eastern member countries of the eu ; Wilders depicted such immi-
grants as “criminals” and “rapists.”39 During the 2012 electoral campaign
the usual anti-­Islam motifs in the name of gay and gender equality w ­ ere
also maintained, while the party ridiculed the eu directive for quotas of

Figures of Femonationalism  31
­ omen in the upper echelons of companies, a clear lapse that showed the
w
pvv ’s ­actual ambiguities on gender issues.40 As Sarah De Lange and Liza
Mügge argue, the pvv is virtually ­silent on more traditional gender equal-
ity issues (like the gender pay gap or w ­ omen’s participation in the public
sphere). Its main interventions on the theme of w
41
­ omen’s equality, indeed,
surface when the pvv discusses immigration and Muslims. For instance,
in its 2012 program the pvv proposed to limit child benefits to families
who have no more than two ­children—­thereby attempting to exclude from
welfare benefits immigrant families who are on average larger than Dutch
ones—­and to tax Muslim w ­ omen wearing the head­scarf.42 At the general
elections in September 2012, the pvv was again confi med as the country’s
third party, although it did not garner the support from two years earlier,
losing almost five percentage points and nine seats.
The instrumentalization of a pro-­gay and especially pro-­women
agenda in his anti-­Muslim crusade intensifi d on the occasion of Inter-
national ­Women’s Day in 2013. On March 8 Wilders marked the party’s
cele­brations with the release of a document entirely devoted to vio­lence
against ­women ­under Islam (Geweld tegen Vrouwen binnen de Islam).43
Beside the usual references to the suras of the Koran concerning the in-
junction that w ­ omen submit to men, one section of the document was
entirely devoted to the occurrence of gendered vio­lence among Muslims
in the Netherlands. Statistical data on honor killings in Turkish and Mo-
roccan communities ­were accompanied by considerations on their dif-
ference from domestic vio­lence in Dutch ­house­holds: while domestic
vio­lence taking place among Dutch ­people was described as most often
“unpremeditated” (thereby making it less reprehensible though socially
unacceptable), the type of vio­lence that occurs among Muslims was defi ed
as inextricable from their culture.
All in all, albeit not initiating the stigmatization of Muslims in the
name of ­women’s rights, as the rest of this chapter w ­ ill discuss in more
detail, the pvv has been key in the consolidation and further intensifi a-
tion of the femonationalist ideological space in the Netherlands since the
mid-2000s. Its harsh Islamophobic lexicon was indeed instrumental to the
declaration of the end of multiculturalism—­a po­liti­cal and economic proj­
ect that worked through the provision of social ser­vices and policies for
minorities’ integration—­but also to the framing of mi­grants’ integration in

32 Chapter 1
general, and Muslims’ in par­tic­u­lar, as a ­matter of individual willingness
and “cultural affi ty,” in line with neoliberal conceptions of citizenship
and the state. As chapter 3 ­will discuss at length. Wilders’s pvv thus largely
contributed not only to the exploitation of feminist themes for racist and
chauvinistic purposes but also to the ratifi ation of the neoliberal agenda
that was to become the new dogma of Dutch economy and politics on
­matters of immigration.

Marine Le Pen and the FN

In France the 2002 victory of the fn over the Socialist Party, and its sub-
sequent appearance in the run-­off elections against the recently founded
center-­right party Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (ump), headed by
Jacques Chirac, marked a shift to the right and a dramatic growth of anti-­
immigration and Islamophobic politics. As in the Netherlands, throughout
the 2000s the question of w ­ omen’s rights became central to anti-­Islam and
anti-­immigration politics in France as well. Gender equality was recast as
a cornerstone of the French Republic, and the Muslim veil was subsumed
­under the rubric of backward, oppressive misogynistic practices. Unlike
in the Netherlands, however, where new nationalist-­populist formations
such as Wilders’s pvv appeared on the po­liti­cal scene and built their iden-
tity precisely on the issue of w ­ omen’s and gays’ rights vis-­à-­vis Islam,
in France this role was played by an older nationalist formation, such as
the fn . ­Toward the end of the 2000s in fact, the fn began to seize on the
hot-­button issue of ­women’s rights within the context of its xenophobic
po­liti­cal campaigns. The fn was founded in 1972 by Jean-­Marie Le Pen,
who remained its leader ­until the end of 2010. Given its links to fascist
organ­izations and its anti-­Semitic stance on the Holocaust, the party has
monopolized, and been confi ed within, the far-­right space of the French
po­liti­cal topography since its inception.44 With the stated goal of liberating
the party from its po­liti­cal confi ement and making it acceptable within
the mainstream, from 2002 onward, Marine Le Pen—­the ­daughter of the
party’s founder—­began what is now called the “de-­demonization” (dediab-
olisation) of the Front National, fi st in her role as coordinator of the fn ’s
electoral campaign and, since January 2011,as its new president. Le Pen’s
operation of de-­demonization has followed two paths: fi st, the adoption
of republican themes such as secularism and the Declaration of the Rights

Figures of Femonationalism  33
of Man and Citizen of 1789, once anathema to the party; second, the mobi-
lization of ­women’s rights and (less prominently) gay rights in the cause of
opposing Islam and non-­western mi­grants.45
Concerning the fi st path, although secularism (laïcité) had not pre-
viously been part of the fn ’s agenda—­since the party has always been
tied to the most conservative fringes of the Catholic Church—it was one
of the themes most used by Marine Le Pen during the 2012 presidential
campaign. On January 15, 2012, in Grand-­Quevilly, in the Rouen banlieue
(Seine-­Maritime), Marine Le Pen proposed the creation of a ministry of
immigration and secularism. According to Le Pen, secularism is currently
­under attack by immigrants, particularly by Muslims, who introduce com-
munitarianism into French society and thus threaten not only a pillar of
the republic, but also the unity of the nation. It is “mass immigration”
that is responsible for such threats and indeed, according to Le Pen, “it
­will be easier to apply secularism once we stop immigration.”46 In Le Pen’s
analy­sis, mass immigration itself is the result of globalization, which de-
nies “national identities” and “transforms e­ very area, ­every nation, ­every
­people into an empty globalized magma without identity, where trade
reigns.”47 In order to avoid mass immigration, Le Pen proposes drastically
reducing the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country to ten
thousand each year, the majority of whom should be students and asylum
seekers.48
Concerning the second path, already in 2007 when Marine Le Pen co-
ordinated the presidential campaign for her f­ ather, the mobilization of
­women’s rights as a means for opposing Islam and immigration more gen-
erally began entering the fn ’s agenda. ­Under the motto “They have bro-
ken every­thing” (Ils ont tout cassé) to refer to the French po­liti­cal class, in
2007 the fn began disseminating a number of posters, including one that
depicted a young w­ oman clearly of North African origin, dressed in mod-
ern French attire, showing her belly and fl wing hair.49 The image of the
beurette emancipée supporting the fn ’s electoral motto clearly aimed both
to reaffirm the republican position on the “right” attire for young w ­ omen
of Muslim background and, arguably, to reach a new female electorate that
had not been a target of fn campaigns before. However, it is only ­really
since her notorious 2010 statement that “in some areas, it is not good to
be a w
­ oman or gay or Jewish, or even French or white” that Marine Le Pen
has figu ed prominently in the right-­wing nationalist ­family that claims to

34 Chapter 1
defend w ­ omen’s rights.50 The “appearance” of an opening of the fn to the
theme of ­women’s rights in par­tic­u­lar has been further emphasized not only
by the fact that its new president is a ­woman, but also by the growth of the
female vote for the fn in the May 2012 presidential elections. On this oc-
casion, the fn obtained 17.9 ­percent of the vote, positioning the fn as the
third force in French politics. Marine Le Pen managed to obtain this result
within ­little more than a year of becoming the new president of the party.51
Yet Le Pen’s positions on ­women’s rights are ambivalent and rather
contradictory. When we look at the fn program and Le Pen’s statements
directly addressing w ­ omen’s issues, it becomes clear that she considers
­women primarily as ­mothers. Initially she claimed to be in ­favor of the
right to abortion but against abuses of this right, or what she calls “abor-
tion of con­ve­nience.” “From the beginning of my campaign, I clearly said,
against some ele­ments of my party, I was not ­going to challenge the law
[on abortion]. But ­there are excesses and abuses. ­Women use abortion as
a means of contraception.”52 Th fn presidential program for 2012 states
that “the ­free choice for ­women must be also that of choosing not to abort:
better prevention and information are essential, parents’ responsibility is
necessary, the possibility of prenatal adoption must be proposed, improved
­family benefits for large families must be established.”53 In a long interview
given to Elle in 2012Le Pen expressed her opposition to the idea of a special
ministry for ­women’s rights, explaining that ­women are not an “endangered
species.”54 Th s position is also refl cted in Le Pen’s attack against “positive
discrimination” in ­favor of meritocracy. Furthermore, Le Pen supports
pro-­natality policies, to be achieved by encouraging “French” w ­ omen to
have more than two ­children. ­These policies are of two types. First, the fn
­family policy calls for a parental income “intended to guarantee that . . . ​
­mothers or ­fathers can choose freely between the exercise of a profession
and the education of their ­children: income payments equivalent to 80%
of the minimum wage for three years from the second child for an ad-
ditional term of four years for the third child.”55 Th s also includes “­family
allowances, reserved for families with at least one French parent, [to] be ad-
justed and indexed to the cost of living.”56 As sociologist Francesca Scrinzi
notes, Marine Le Pen’s statements on w ­ omen’s rights are highly paradoxi-
cal, “alternating between defending w ­ omen’s liberation and defending the
traditional ­family, with the latter viewed as the basis of the nation. Asked
if she identifies herself as a feminist, Le Pen said that she could consider

Figures of Femonationalism  35
herself as such to the extent that she defends w ­ omen’s rights, which are
threatened by Islam.”57 According to Le Pen, indeed, France would not be a
sexist country if it ­were not for the mi­grants’ enclaves. In the Elle interview,
she in fact declared that sexism is a prob­lem only among non-­French com-
munities. As she put it,

­ ere is, that’s for sure, in a certain number of schools, a cultural work
Th
that needs to be done to teach that [i.e., gender equality] to the ­children
who ­were raised in a cultural environment where ­women are fi mly
inferior to men and who are presented as such. . . . ​(Public starts booing
her). Well what are you booing at now? Yes you are booing the fact that
you ­really know that. . . . ​Excuse me, but you refuse to see the real­ity!
Well in that case we w ­ ill never resolve the prob­lem! We know that the
girls in the banlieues. . . . ​Honestly ­there are places where sexism exists,
I agree. The girls in the banlieues cannot wear short skirts. Th ­ ere. The
girls in the banlieues are treated like objects. Therefore, yes, the best way
to solve our prob­lems is fi st to detect them, to be able to apply a diag-
nostic on the prob­lems in order to solve them where they need solving.
I ­don’t mind if you resolve prob­lems that do not exist [such as sexism in
French schools among French pupils], but that’s not helpful.58

In the end, as Scrinzi notes,

While the stigmatization of racialized men is still central in fn pro-

paganda, ­today racialized ­women have acquired a new visibility, being
exposed—by a female leader—as symbols of feminine oppression in the
debates about the burqa, the Muslim head­scarf, and sexual vio­lence. . . . ​
The figu e of the female Other thus seems to epitomize the paradoxes of
Marine Le Pen’s propaganda. On the one hand, mi­grant ­women are rep-
resented as victims of patriarchal practices, which are condemned by
the party. On the other, Marine Le Pen’s discourse and policy proposals
on ­women and the f­ amily echo fi dings on radical right organ­izations
from across the world, where female activists may f­ avor some rights
for the w
­ omen of their “community” (variously defi ed on the basis of
nationality, culture, religion, class . . . ​) while countering the same rights
for the female ­Others.59

As for the issue of gay rights, the fn has more recently attenuated its
traditional homophobic agenda. Presumably following the Wilders model,

36 Chapter 1
since becoming president of the party Marine Le Pen has made not more
than a few rhetorical openings to gay equality. Her general strategy, how-
ever, seems to be to keep a tactical silence on the issue in order to both
keep happy its most conservative internal areas and constituencies and to
gain some consensus from gay voters.60
Ultimately, by means of explic­itly equating sexual/gender vio­lence and
non-­western mi­grant cultures, Le Pen has thus followed the strategy of
other right-­wing nationalist parties for whom the mobilization of gender
equality is arguably instrumental to vilifying non-­western mi­grant men,
Muslim in par­tic­u­lar.

The Lega Nord

The dawn of the new millennium saw a dramatic shift to the right in Italy
as well. In 2001 Silvio Berlusconi’s right-­wing co­ali­tion Casa delle Libertà
(House of Freedoms), won the general elections and inaugurated almost
a de­cade of uninterrupted rule—­with the exception of a brief center-­left
cabinet between 2006 and 2008 (i.e., the Prodi II government). Relying on
neofascist and right-­wing nationalist and anti-­immigration parties like Al-
leanza Nazionale (an ; National Alliance) and the Lega Nord (ln ; Northern
League), Berlusconi’s governments marked a turning point with regard to
immigration and Islamophobic policies. In July 2002, it passed Law No. 177,
the so-­called Bossi-­Fini law, by decree introducing extremely severe sanc-
tions on immigrants and refugees. U ­ nder the new law, illegal immigration
became a criminal offense; all foreigners applying for a residence permit
­were required to be fi gerprinted; residency permits became strictly linked
to a work contract (in a country in which black-­market ­labor imposed by
employers is very widespread, particularly among mi­grant workers); and the
time limit for seclusion in detention centers while waiting for extradition
was extended from thirty to sixty days, with asylum seekers placed in deten-
tion while waiting for their asylum review, in contravention of the Eu­ro­pean
Convention on ­Human Rights. The law took its name from its two initial
proponents, Gianfranco Fini, the leader of an (a neofascist party founded
in 1994 and dissolved in 2009), and Umberto Bossi (the then leader of the
ln ). The ln in par­tic­u­lar has played a key role within Italian politics not
only in promoting harsh xenophobic policies but also in fomenting anti-­
immigration sentiments through the exploitation of the issue of w ­ omen’s
rights. The analy­sis that follows ­will thus concentrate on this party.

Figures of Femonationalism  37
 Upon its foundation in 1991 ln presented itself as the party of a new era
in Italian politics, denouncing the corrupt po­liti­cal elite and the theft of the
northern regions’ resources and autonomy by the central government. In
the 1990s, the ln was still bound to an ethnoregionalist ideology demand-
ing the in­de­pen­dence of Padania (roughly corresponding to the Italian re-
gions north of the Po River), based on the idea of it being a homogeneous
nation with a common history and ethnic identity. In the 1990s, the ln ’s
regional nationalism led it to position southern Italians as the inimical
Other. At the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s, particularly ­after its par-
ticipation in the Berlusconi government, and therefore its co-­optation into
national rather than regionalist politics, the ln moved from demanding
secession to encouraging fiscal federalism, and the Other was increasingly
identifi d as non-­Italian, non-­western mi­grants. From its entrance into
the government in 2001 onward, the ln distinguished itself with its harsh
anti-­immigration and increasingly anti-­Islam propaganda, as well as for
resorting to a strongly nationalist and masculinist rhe­toric opposed to the
integration of mi­grants into the Italian l­abor market and the welfare sys-
tem. Non-­western mi­grants in general ­were depicted as a threat to national
security, and Muslims in par­tic­u­lar ­were regarded as a danger not only
to Christian Italian culture but also to w ­ omen. Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant males w ­ ere constantly identifi d as violent and criminal and as
rapists u ­ nder the Berlusconi governments, with the support of the ln .61
The mobilization of the issue of gender equality against Muslim mi­grants
in par­tic­u­lar began—at least explic­itly and vocally—­with the ln ’s 2005
campaign against negotiations for a pos­si­ble entry of Turkey into the eu .
On that occasion the ln produced a poster, which was plastered on walls
throughout the peninsula for many months. The poster portrays three
­women: the one on the left is veiled and appears ­behind prison bars. She is
surrounded by darkness, but her state of suffering is clearly discernible.
On the righthand side are two w ­ omen with short hair and western clothes,
both sitting at an offic desk and seemingly discussing work issues in a
well-­lit environment. The caption on the left says “Them . . .”; the one on
the right, “Us . . .”. Beneath the image is an almost rhetorical question: “Are
you willing to take the risk? No to Turkey in Eu­rope.”62 The message is, of
course, very clear: admitting Turkey to the Eu­ro­pean Union would mean
allowing a country with an Islamic majoritarian culture into a tradition-

38 Chapter 1
ally Christian area and would therefore run the risk of exposing Eu­ro­pean
­women to a religion with po­liti­cal ambitions that subjugate the female sex.
Such a move was startling ­because of the decidedly scant attention the
party had paid to ­women’s rights ­until then. The ln , as I mentioned above,
utilizes a strongly masculinist po­liti­cal rhe­toric and is bound to a tradi-
tional model of the f­ amily. As Scrinzi notes, “Padanian masculinity is as-
sociated with sexual prowess and heterosexual normality. . . . ​The po­liti­cal
confli t tends to be described in military terms as the Padanian masculinity
is associated with strength, re­sis­tance and toughness in politics. Fi­nally, . . . ​
the gendered construction of Padania is associated with rationality, a mod-
ern work ethic, industriousness, honesty and individualism. . . . ​Padania is
constructed as a masculine nation.”63 From 2006 onward in par­tic­u­lar, the
ln has continued to position gender equality in opposition to migration
from the Global South in general and Islam in par­tic­u­lar in instrumental
and xenophobic ways. In February 2006 the then city counselor for the ln
in Milan, Matteo Salvini (now leader of the party) proposed a “Decalogo
delle libertà” (Decalogue of freedoms) to be presented to immigrants ap-
plying for Italian citizenship. Five out of ten questions focus on ­women’s
issues and are motivated by the clear idea that non-­western mi­grants—­
presumably Muslims in particular—do not re­spect w ­ omen’s rights. The
questions include the following:

1. Would you forbid your wife or ­daughter to dress like Italian

w
­ omen?
2. What do you think of the statement according to which a ­woman
must obey her husband, and that he can beat her in the case she
does not obey him?
3. Do you think it is acceptable that a man locks his wife or ­daughter
at home to avoid that she dishonors the ­family in public?
4. What would you do if your ­daughter or son wanted to marry a
person from another religion?
5. Would you allow a male doctor to examine you (if you are a ­woman)
or a female doctor to visit you (if you are a man)?64

In October  2009 the ln presented a bill to ban the burqa in public

spaces. The proposal was meant to modify a previous mea­sure from 1975
allowing certain categories of p
­ eople to keep their f­ aces covered if t­ here is

Figures of Femonationalism  39
a “justifi d motive.” Offi ally presented as being motivated by security rea-
sons, the antiburqa law was largely broadcasted in the mainstream media
as a proposal that would enable Muslim w ­ omen—­who, it was assumed,
­were coerced into wearing the integral veil—to f­ ree themselves from this
imposition.65 The campaign against the burqa in public spaces at the end
of the 2000s represented the main way in which the issue of gender in­
equality and vio­lence as the exclusive domain of the (Muslim) Other has
dominated the ln ’s Islamophobic propaganda. However, it is impor­tant to
highlight that it is not only Muslim men who are singled out as ­women’s
main enemies and it is not only Muslim ­women who are foregrounded as
victims. In the xenophobic campaign in which the issues of sexism and
gender vio­lence are strongly racialized, and where racism itself takes the
form of a distinction between non-­western mi­grant men as “bad” and non-­
western mi­grant ­women as “victims,” the ln openly identifies all men from
eastern Eu­rope and the Global South more generally as misogynists and
especially as potentially rapists and all ­women from ­these regions as pas-
sive victims. For instance, in April 2013 the current president of the ln , Mat-
teo Salvini, promoted on Twitter a new website called “Tutti i crimini degli
immigrati” (All the immigrants’ crimes). The site exclusively hosts journal
articles reporting cases of vio­lence in which an immigrant is the perpetra-
tor, with cases of rape emerging as the most common crime among non-­
Italian, non-­western citizens. Non-­western mi­grant men in general are
thus identifi d by the ln as a social threat that endangers the female sex.66
In spite of its rather disputable reputation and antifeminist policies con-
cerning gender equality, the ln , just like the pvv in the Netherlands and
the fn in France, has thus successfully instrumentalized w ­ omen’s rights
as a power­ful weapon in the campaign against Muslim and non-­western
mi­grants.

The Constitution of a Heterogeneous, Anti-­Islam,

Feminist Front?

Right-­wing nationalist parties such as the pvv, fn , and ln have not been
the only ones invoking w ­ omen’s rights against Muslim males in par­tic­u­lar.
Since the beginning of the 2000s in all three countries several well-­known
feminist intellectuals and some prominent feminist politicians (some with
a Muslim background) from both right and left, as well as ­women in gen-

40  Chapter 1
der equality agencies and organ­izations (within and outside state bureau-
cracies), have denounced Muslim religious practices as infringements of
­women’s freedom. Whereas I analyzed right-­wing nationalism’s endorse-
ment of a gender equality lexicon by focusing upon one single nationalist
party in each country, I chose not to pinpoint any specific feminist current/
figu es endorsing anti-­Islam positions in the name of ­women’s rights. My
reasons ­were the following. First, the interest of looking at dif­fer­ent femi-
nists’, femocrats’, and w ­ omen’s organ­izations’ arguments concerning their
embrace of anti-­Islam campaigns lies in the possibility of providing an
overview of the fi ld that has so far been missing. Second, what is note-
worthy in the embrace of anti-­Islam arguments by this array of w ­ omen
is precisely the similarities among them in spite of their divergent posi-
tions, and divisions, on other issues. It is also worth noting that the mul-
tifarious ways in which feminism as an emancipatory proj­ect dedicated to
­women’s liberation (­whether liberal, radical, or leftist) has increasingly
“converged” with nonemancipatory/Islamophobic and neoliberal po­liti­cal
and economic agendas makes the femonationalist ideological formation
all the more disconcerting. Thi d, the endorsement of anti-­Islam stances
by some feminists, femocrats, and ­women’s organ­izations across the po­
liti­cal spectrum is arguably what has contributed to consolidating the idea
that Muslim communities in par­tic­u­lar do not re­spect ­women’s rights and
to creating what I call the femonationalist ideological formation. However,
as I w ­ ill begin to show in the following sections and to explore more in
chapters 3 and 4, the temporal coincidence between nationalists and some
feminists voicing anti-­Islam slogans ­under the banner of gender equality
is a case in point of a convergence rather than of a conscious po­liti­cal al-
liance, or of the constitution of a homogeneous anti-­Islam, feminist front.
North American liberal po­liti­cal theorist Susan Moller Okin’s famous
essay “Is Multiculturalism Bad for ­Women?,” published in 1997, arguably
provided some of the main arguments that have been used by this rather
po­liti­cally heterogeneous feminist front in its convergence with anti-­Islam
campaigns. It is thus impor­tant to briefly turn to it. In a nutshell, in this
text Okin argued that certain minorities within western socie­ties do not
re­spect gender equality princi­ples. As examples she listed the wearing of
headscarves by Muslim girls in schools, genital mutilations among African
immigrants, and coerced marriages and honor killings among Asian and
­Middle Eastern immigrants in both Eu­rope and the United States. While

Figures of Femonationalism  41
she acknowledged that “virtually all of the world’s cultures have distinctly
patriarchal pasts,” she also maintained that “some mostly, though by no
means exclusively, western liberal cultures have departed far further from
them than ­others [i.e., Asian, ­Middle Eastern, and African cultures].”67
She thus proposed that female members with a non-­western background
“might be much better off if the culture into which they w ­ ere born ­were
­either to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated
into the less sexist surrounding culture) or, preferably, to be encouraged to
alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of w
­ omen at least to the degree to
which this value is upheld in the majority culture.”68 Okin’s position at the
beginning of the 2000s became widespread among sectors of second-­wave,
liberal, and left ­wing western Eu­ro­pean feminism.69 As the next sections
show, a rather heterogeneous feminist front in all three countries resorted
to some of Okin’s arguments in order to frame Islamic traditions as es-
pecially inimical for w ­ omen. Four main actors can be identifi d in each
country as constituting this front: (1) feminist intellectuals and (2) femi-
nist associations that champion secularism, (3) prominent feminist politi-
cians (in some cases of Muslim descent), and (4) representatives of gender
equality state-­funded agencies, or femocrats.

The Netherlands: Gender Equality Is a Mi­grant ­Women’s Issue

As I mentioned earlier, in 2002 the right-­wing politician Pim Fortuyn
forcefully initiated the mobilization of gender equality against the per-
ceived violent patriarchy of Islam.70 In a February 9, 2002, interview with
the Dutch national newspaper De Volkskrant, he declared the following:

I want a very strong emancipation policy for Islamic ­women in disad-

vantaged neighborhoods. In par­tic­u­lar the highly-­educated Turkish and
Moroccan girls get a sound thrashing from me. They leave their s­ isters
in the lurch. Take an example from our feminists in the seventies. My
­mother, who came from a posh milieu, became emancipated ­because of
­those ­women. I expect the same from ­those Muslim girls, instead of put-
ting on a head­scarf as some kind of protest. Take it off and make sure
your ­sisters do not have only one right of existence: the kitchen.71

Fortuyn’s framing of emancipation as an urgent prob­lem in the case of

Muslim ­women of Turkish and Moroccan descent was taken on by some
prominent feminists. In the May 2002 issue of the Dutch feminist maga-

42 Chapter 1
zine Opzji, the journal’s chief editor, Cisca Dresselhuys, devoted an edito-
rial to Fortuyn’s new attention to w ­ omen’s issues. Dresselhuys had already
sparked controversy a year earlier with the statement that she would not
hire a ­woman wearing a veil for her journal.72 Albeit noticing the rather
inconsistent rec­ord of Fortuyn in ­matters of ­women’s emancipation, Dres-
selhuys nonetheless called Fortuyn an “ally” of the feminist cause in the
Netherlands.73 Fortuyn, according to Dresselhuys, had underscored the
importance of promoting the emancipation of Muslim w ­ omen, whose
strug­gle, she maintained, should initiate the “third wave” of Dutch femi-
nism.74 Dresselhuys is a well-­known Dutch ­women’s rights public intellec-
tual, who advocates a white, middle-­class, and liberal feminism as well as
a rejection of multiculturalism in line with Okin’s position.75 Dresselhuys’s
declaration of a necessary, albeit counterintuitive, “alliance” with Fortuyn
on the issue of Muslim ­women’s emancipation was soon echoed by another
(self-­declared) feminist: the Dutch-­Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Be-
ginning in 2003 and ­after being elected as an mp for the center-­right party
vvd , Hirsi Ali regularly denounced Islam as a backward religion, the main
danger of which lay in its promotion of vio­lence against w ­ omen, includ-
ing female genital mutilations, forced marriage, and honor killing. The
fact that Hirsi Ali is herself an “allochthonous” ­woman—­according to the
Dutch defin tion, coming from a Muslim f­ amily—­has made her anti-­Islam
utterances in the name of gender equality all the more “credible.” As an “in-
sider,” she could claim “au­then­tic knowledge” and her “enunciation [was]
protected from critique.”76 ­After joining vvd in 2003, Hirsi Ali was assigned
the portfolio for emancipation issues. In 2004 she wrote the script for a
short movie directed by Theo van Gogh, Submission I, in which we are told
the story of four Muslim ­women who have been abused by men in vari­ous
ways. The ­women recite their monologues in see-­through chadors; their
naked bodies are covered with verses from the Koran that are deeply mi-
sogynist passages. The release of Submission I on the Dutch Public Broad-
casting Network on August 29, 2004, sparked enormous controversy, with
major protests from Muslim communities. Two months a­ fter the release of
the movie, van Gogh was murdered by a young Dutch-­Moroccan member
of an Islamic fundamentalist network. Hirsi Ali received death threats and
went into hiding.
Hirsi Ali’s interventions against Islam in the name of Muslim ­women’s
emancipation deeply divided Dutch feminists. Whereas her positions w ­ ere

Figures of Femonationalism  43
welcome by some sections of liberal/secular Dutch feminism (as in the
case of the feminist sociologist Jolande Withuis) and even Muslim fem-
inism (as in the case of the Dutch-­Egyptian writer and self-­proclaimed
Muslim feminist Nahed Selim), they ­were not well received by feminists
active in antiracist politics as well as by many of the Muslim ­women in
the name of whom they claimed to speak.77 Anja Meulenbelt, an icon of
second-­wave feminism and a politician in the Socialist Party, and Muslim
w
­ omen’s organ­izations like zami or Al Nisa, as well as renowned femi-
nist academics like Gloria Wekker, Rosi Braidotti, Baukje Prins, Sawitri
Saharso, and Haleh Ghorashi, only to mention some prominent examples,
strongly dissented from Hirsi Ali’s as well as Dresselhuys’s depictions of
Islam and from their version of feminism.78
Yet Hirsi Ali’s positions—­and also ­those of Dresselhuys—­became ­those
most echoed in the Dutch mainstream media. Both w ­ omen benefited from,
and signifi antly contributed to forming, the general climate of consensus
with re­spect to Islamophobia in the name of gender equality throughout
the 2000s. The support they enjoyed in the mainstream media also coin-
cided with, and benefited from a shift occurring within, the Dutch “state
feminist” apparatus in the fi st half of the 2000s whereby public attention
and funds ­were diverted from ­women’s rights in general to ethnic minority
­women’s rights in par­tic­u­lar. As Joyce Outshoorn and Jantine Oldersma
report, between 2004 and 2006 ­there was a general call for the abolition of
the main Dutch state feminist agency (i.e., the ­women’s policy network) “as
supposedly ­women’s equality policy [was] now well-­integrated into main-
stream policy.” As t­ hese authors continue, such a proposal to stop funds
for this state feminism agency occurred “in a context of the drastic shift
to the right in Dutch politics. . . . ​Toughness [was] advocated on all fronts,
gender discrimination and in­equality [­were] no longer issues which motivate
politicians. In this discourse, only mi­grant and minority w
­ omen, especially
when they [­were] from Muslim countries, are oppressed and need to be
aided, suggesting gender in­equality among ethnically white Dutch has
been eliminated.”79
Indeed, since the rightward turn in Dutch politics, most policies deal-
ing with gender equality have been ethnicized.80 For instance, in ­those
same years, the minister in charge of gender equality issues, Aart Jan De
Geus (c da ), together with Rita Verdonk, the Minister for Integration and
Immigration (vvd ), established a commission for the participation of

44 Chapter 1
ethnic minority ­women, Participatie van Vrouwen uit Etnische Minder-
heidsgroepen (pavem; Participation of Ethnic Minority ­Women), in order
to address issues related to mi­grant ­women’s cultural integration and par-
ticipation in the ­labor market. Between 2003 ­until 2005, pavem worked to
establish the main coordinates of what ­later in 2005 became the gender as-
pects of the integration package in the Netherlands, while subsidies for Dutch
­women’s organ­izations stopped. In 2005 pavem published a plan, “Emancipa-
tie: Vanzelfsprekend, maar het gaat niet vanzelf!” (Emancipation: Of course,
but it does not happen by itself!), according to which mi­grant ­women have
to catch up with Dutch w ­ omen, particularly in the area of work and social
participation. Consequently, state-­sponsored commissions for ­women’s
equality in the Netherlands w ­ ere no longer the institutional and govern-
mental apparatuses promoting equality between the sexes. Rather, as I ­will
discuss more at length in chapters 3 and 4, they have been increasingly
transformed into agencies for the education and assimilation of minor-
ity and non-­western mi­grant ­women into what are deemed to represent
proper Dutch models of womanhood.

France: Feminism and the Republic without Veils

The mobilization of gender equality in opposing Islam in France coincides
with the controversies on the veil and burqa that began at the end of the
1980s. 81 On October 3, 1989, three Muslim girls ­were expelled from their
school in Creil, ­after they refused to remove their veils. Th s event gen-
erated huge media coverage, triggered by the fact that Islam was already
­under the spotlight on account of the Salman Rushdie aff ir, but also due
to the fact that it was a way to remind the republic of one of its pillars,
that is, laïcité, during the year of cele­brations of the bicentennial of the
French Revolution. The issue was taken to the Council of State (the high-
est administrative court in France), which rejected the demand that the
veil should be banned from public schools. However, following the strong
success of the right in the Eu­ro­pean elections in 1994, the issue resurfaced
and a bill was presented by the right-­wing mp Eugene Chenier propos-
ing to ban “ostentatious” religious symbols from public schools.82 Again,
Chenier’s proposal enjoyed huge media coverage, but it too was rejected
by several courts across the country as well as by the Council of State. Al-
though in t­ hese earlier head­scarf controversies the question of laïcité had
been connected with equality between the sexes, it was still the supposed

Figures of Femonationalism  45
infringements of secularism that was in question. It was indeed not u ­ ntil
the beginning of the 2000s that gender equality took center stage in the
discussion. In July 2003 President Jacques Chirac appointed a commission
chaired by Bernard Stasi—­a former government minister and deputy—in
order to explore the possibility of introducing a law to ensure secularism
in public schools. A law was eventually approved in March 2004, apply-
ing the ban of ostentatious religious symbols to all of the country’s public
schools.83 Fi­nally, in 2009 the conservative Fillon government appointed a
special commission chaired by André Gérin to investigate the practice of
“full veiling” (voile integral). In September 2010 a law was fi­nally passed
banning the use of face-­covering garments in public spaces.84 As Joan Scott
notes, the chronology of the legislative mea­sures against the Islamic veil—
an instance of a more general Muslim question taking place in France, as
I have argued elsewhere—­coincides very closely with that of the fn ’s suc-
cesses.85 But the same chronology in recent French history also coincides
with another timeline: that of French feminists’ public interventions and
increasing internal divisions. On November 2, 1989, following the case of
the veiled students expelled from school in Creil, Le Nouvel Observateur
published a letter by five phi­los­o­phers, including the well-­known feminist
phi­los­o­pher Élisabeth Badinter, which was addressed to the then Minister
of Education Lionel Jospin. As they put it,

To tolerate the head­scarf is not to host a ­free agent (in this case a girl), it
is to open the door to ­those who have deci­ded once and for all, without
discussion, that she must cover up. Instead of giving this girl an area of
freedom, it signifies that ­there is no difference between the school and
the home of her ­father. If you allow the Islamic head­scarf as a symbol of
female submission, you give carte blanche to f­ athers and ­brothers, that
is to say the hardest in the world of patriarchy. Ultimately, it is no longer
re­spect for gender equality and f­ ree ­will that is law in France. In one
sentence, you have disarmed the thousands of young Muslim w ­ omen
who are everywhere fi hting for their dignity and freedom. 86

In December 2003, during the works of the Stasi commission that had

to provide a report on feasible mea­sures for implementing secularism in
public schools, the magazine Elle published an appeal to President Chirac
signed by sixty-­eight public figu es, again including Badinter, but also the
former socialist minister for the rights of ­women, Yvette Roudy, and the

46 Chapter 1
president of the organ­ization Ni Putes Ni Soumises (npns; Neither Whores,
nor Submissive), Fadela Amara. The appeal was to demand a law banning
the veil, “this vis­i­ble symbol of female submission,” from public schools, “a
place in which the state should be the guarantor of a strict equality between
the sexes.”87 Fi­nally, on the occasion of the appointment of the Gérin com-
mission to propose a law banning the burqa from public places, Badinter
and Amara ­were heard as “experts” and well-­informed members of civil so-
ciety, and some of their arguments ­were subsequently used in the 2010 law
offi ally banning the burqa from public spaces. Whereas Amara insisted on
the patriarchal nature of this practice and the lack of freedom experienced
by Muslim w ­ omen who are subjected to full veiling, Badinter invoked the
notion of pathology and perversion. According to Badinter, the practice of
full veiling is contrary not only to western civilization and its valorization
of the “face,” but also to the princi­ples of the republic—­freedom, equality,
and fraternity—­since it denies reciprocity in the relationship between the
unveiled person who allows his/her face to be seen, and the veiled one who
denies the other this option.88 She concluded: “In this possibility of being
looked at without being seen, and to look at the other without him/her
being able to see you, I see the satisfaction of a ­triple perverse enjoyment:
the enjoyment of one’s supremacy over the other, the enjoyment of the ex-
hibitionist, and the enjoyment of the voyeur. . . . ​I think we are dealing with
very sick ­women and I do not think we have to be determined according
to their pathology.”89 The relegation of fully covered ­women to insane and
perverted individuals reinforced the idea that the state had to intervene not
only to discipline Muslim ­women but also to “liberate” them from the false
consciousness of their distorted psyche. From 2004 onward, therefore, the
feminist antiveil and anti-­Islam front in France has become very vocal and
also very composite. Not only well-­known feminist secular intellectuals like
Badinter, Jeannette Bougrab, Caroline Fourest, and Fiammetta Venner—­
the latter two found­ers of the feminist magazine ProChoix, which accused
the opponents of the veil ban of “cultural relativism”—­but also feminists
within some left organ­izations, such as Lutte Ouvrière, (some members of
the) Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste, and, more recently, the Front de Gauche,
have endorsed antiveil arguments.90
It is impor­tant, however, to note that feminist opposition to the antiveil
law, as well as alternative feminist stances concerning the mobilization of
gender equality against Muslim citizens in France, has not been absent.

Figures of Femonationalism  47
On the contrary, it has been perhaps the most vigorous in Eu­rope. For
instance, the feminist sociologist Christine Delphy—­one of the found­ers,
together with Simone de Beauvoir, of the Nouvelles Questions Féministes
and of so-­called French materialist feminism—­denounced the dilemma
between antisexism and antiracism put forward by the pro-­law feminists as
false and misleading.91 In 2005, following the approval of the law against
headscarves in public schools and the huge media coverage and con-
troversies it provoked, the feminist phi­los­o­pher Elsa Dorlin authored a
manifesto against the appropriation of feminism by Islamophobes, racists,
and secular feminists: “Not in our name!” (Pas en notre nom!).92 Houria
Bouteldja, the founder of the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République
(Movement of the Indigenous of the Republic) called the ban of the veil
in public schools the “colonial and neo-­colonial instrumentalization of
­women’s rights,” accusing organ­izations such as npns of being part of the
“state apparatus,” a position soon echoed by the feminist sociologist Sylvie
Tissot and by feminist and antiracist activists and authors like Félix Boggio
Éwanjé-­Épée, Stella Magliani-­Belkacem, Capucine Larzillière, Lisbeth Sal,
and ­others.93
And yet, like in the Netherlands, Badinter’s and Amara’s positions
gained currency in the mainstream. The consensus for their anti-­Islam
stance was in fact reinforced in large part by the support they received
from the French state, both ideologically, but also fi ancially.94 Th npns,
for instance, has been funded with public monies since its foundation in
2002; its president, Fadela Amara, was made a ju­nior minister for urban
policy in François Fillon’s fi st conservative government ­under the Sarkozy
presidency in 2007, and inspector general for social aff irs in January 2011.
The presence within npns of w ­ omen of North African descent, such as
Amara herself and also Loubna Méliane, Chaddortt Djavann, and Jeannette
Bougrab, also helped to create the impression that they w ­ ere speaking for
Muslim ­women. Arguably, the public prominence accorded to ­women of
migratory background who joined the feminist secular front in denouncing
Islam’s alleged “exceptional” misogyny and the practice of veiling has con-
tributed to push into the shade the many w ­ omen and Muslim organ­izations
who protested the antiveil laws—­for instance, Mamans Toutes Égales, the
collective of ­mothers, which includes many Muslim ­women; the group Le
Collectif des Féministes pour l’Égalité; and Femmes dans la Mosquée, a col-
lective of Muslim ­women.95 In this context it is impor­tant to notice also

48 Chapter 1
the position taken by the most impor­tant representatives of French state
feminism—­that is, the offi al agencies/departments in charge of w ­ omen’s
rights at state level—on the legislative mea­sures against the Muslim veils
in par­tic­u­lar. During the discussions about banning the veil from public
schools in 2003, Nicole Ameline—­then a delegate for the Ministry for Par-
ity and Professional Equality between men and w ­ omen—­declared the veil
to be the “expression of sexist discrimination . . . ​and a confiscation of in-
dividual freedom.”96 In spite of Sarkozy’s numerous criticisms of Muslim and
immigrants’ communities in France as disrespectful of ­women’s rights and of
his campaign against face veils in public spaces—­eventually leading to the 2010
law mentioned earlier—­under his presidency the place of the delegate min-
istry in charge of gender equality issues remained vacant. A Ministry for the
Rights of ­Women with full rights was fi­nally reestablished in 2012 ­under the
center-­left presidency of François Hollande. The designated minister between
2012 and 2014—­the socialist Najat Vallaud-­Belkacem, of Moroccan and Al-
gerian origins and herself born in Morocco—­sparked controversy ­after she
intimated in 2013 that teachers at crèche (nursery) levels might also be banned
from wearing religious veils at work.97 The most prominent representatives
of state feminism at the governmental level thus—­regardless of their po­liti­
cal colors—­have consistently denounced Muslim religious practices as against
­women’s rights and have supported legislative mea­sures that forbid Muslim
­women from wearing the veil in public schools or the full veil in public spaces.
As Larzillière and Sal aptly note, although the stated goal of the French
feminist secular intelligent­sia from right to left was the promotion of a
“universalist” feminism, guaranteeing equal rights for men and ­women,
their positions on Muslim w ­ omen’s religious practices in France have been
marked by what Christelle Hamel calls the “racialization of sexism.”98
Th s is a discourse according to which “the enunciation by the majoritar-
ian group [French white ­people] of favorable discourses in the case of the
­daughters of mi­grants, but unfavorable ones in the case of their sons, is
often the sign of a form of racism that makes the denunciation of sexism a
tool of its domination and sexuality one of its forms of expression.”99

Italy: From Left to Right, United against Islam

Like in the Netherlands and France, in Italy too some feminist intellec-
tuals and organ­izations, feminist politicians of immigrant and Muslim
­backgrounds, as well as femocrats in charge of gender equality at state level

Figures of Femonationalism  49
have endorsed anti-­Islam positions in the name of ­women’s rights. On the
intellectual front, several well-­known feminist journalists have embarked
upon the journey of denouncing Islam’s oppression of ­women by invok-
ing secularism in par­tic­u­lar as the best antidote against fundamentalists’
antifeminism. The most well-­known example outside Italy is certainly
that of Oriana Fallaci. Though she did not call herself a feminist, Fallaci
supported some impor­tant feminist ­battles (for abortion and divorce) in
the 1970s and had been associated ever since with liberal feminism. Par-
ticularly in her two books The Rage and the Pride (2002) and The Force of
Reason (2006), Fallaci, though calling herself an atheist and secularist, de-
picted Islam as an inferior civilization as compared to western Chris­tian­
ity. She accused Muslims of turning Italian cities into “filthy kasbahs” and
denounced the treatment of Muslim w ­ omen by men as barbaric. Another
feminist journalist who denounced Islam in the name of secularism and
­women’s rights is Monica Lanfranco. A founder of the feminist magazine
Marea, Lanfranco in 2005 coauthored Senza velo: Donne nell’Islam contro
l’integralismo (Without the veil: ­Women in Islam against fundamentalism).
Not unlike ProChoix in France, Lanfranco’s critique of the condition of
­women in Islam particularly targets relativistic thought: “Cultural relativ-
ists go so far as to say that universal ­human rights are a western concept.
But why, then, when he uses a telephone or a car does the Mullah not
say that it is western stuff, incompatible with Islamic society?”100 In more
recent interventions, Lanfranco—­approvingly quoting the work of the Ira­
nian ­human rights activist Maryam Namazie—­has directly invoked secu-
larism as a “­human need,” which is especially urgent in Sharia-­dominated
countries where ­women are subjected to men.101 Still in 2003, the influ-
ential left ­liberal journalist and feminist Barbara Spinelli wrote, “The veil
does not have the same meaning as the cross or the kippah. In much of
the world it is a symbol of oppression and she who does not wear it is
considered by ­people of the same religion as an apostate, against whom
they decree the death penalty. . . . ​The veil means, most of the time, the
order established at school by families and clans, against the freedom of
the individual.”102 Another well-­known journalist associated with the com-
munist newspaper Il Manifesto, Giuliana Sgrena, published the book Il
prezzo del velo: La guerra dell’Islam contro le donne (The price of the veil:
Islam’s war against ­women) in 2008, which is entirely devoted to a debate
about the Muslim female garment. Repeating a familiar leitmotif con-

50 Chapter 1
cerning the nature of the Muslim veil as a symbol of oppression, Sgrena’s
campaign against Islam and Muslim w ­ omen’s alleged lack of right to self-­
determination greatly contributed to spreading the idea among the left that
Islam equals misogyny and gender vio­lence. Indeed, the same repertoire
was used by the Unione Donne in Italia (udi; Union of W ­ omen in Italy),
one of the most impor­tant organ­izations for w ­ omen’s rights founded a­ fter
World War II and traditionally associated with the left and the Communist
Party ­until the beginning of the 1980s. The udi openly supported the bill to
ban the burqa and niqab from public spaces, which was presented to Par-
liament by the right-­wing politician Souad Sbai in 2009. 103 Originally from
Morocco, with a past as a journalist for vari­ous Italian magazines, Sbai,
who calls herself a feminist, was elected in 2008 as a member of Parlia-
ment for Il Popolo della Libertà (pdl ; ­People of Freedom). As a right-­wing
deputy, Sbai was one of the sponsors of the 2009 bill proposing to ban the
burqa and niqab from public spaces and has since emerged as one of the
harshest critics of Islam and of gender in­equality in Islamic countries and
communities. In 2010 she published the book L’inganno: Vittime del multi-
culturalismo (The lie: Victims of multiculturalism), in which, clearly echo-
ing Okin’s famous essay, she accuses western multiculturalism of failing
to defend mi­grant and Muslim ­women’s rights. While considering ­these
prominent right-­wing self-­appointed feminists and rescuers of Muslim
­women in Italy, it is impossible not to mention Daniela Santanchè. As an
mp for the postfascist party an ­under Berlusconi’s government, Santanchè
in 2006 proposed to ban the veil in public schools. In 2007, she embarked
upon a harsh Islam-­hatred campaign ­after the murder of Hina Saleem by
Saleem’s Pakistani ­father and other ­family members, a case that shook the
country for months. As Ruba Salih puts it, “Hina was to become the em-
blem of a national campaign against what was represented in the media
as genetically-­based Islamic gendered vio­lence. Particularly striking ­were
the photo­graphs circulating in the media. One in par­tic­u­lar became the
offi al picture, and portrayed Hina wearing blue-­jeans and a very tight
green undershirt showing her belly, like ­those very fash­ion­able among Eu­
ro­pean teen­agers. Evidently the choice of that specific photo­graph was not
accidental, but part and parcel of the fabrication of the super-­empowered
Muslim ­woman, the heroine who pays the highest price for her desire to
challenge Islam and tradition and to be secularized, one of us.”104 Albeit
instrumentalizing the cause of Muslim ­women for her personal po­liti­cal

Figures of Femonationalism  51
­ attles inside her party, Santanchè’s positions gave her enormous popu-
b
larity, allowing her to run in the 2008 national elections for a postfascist
co­ali­tion for the position of prime minister. Th ough an analy­sis of some
of the main Italian w ­ omen’s magazines published between 2001 and 2008,
Simona Stano showed how Italian feminists predominantly associate the
Muslim veil with submission, vio­lence, passivity, and suffering.105
Th oughout the 2000s explicit anti-­Islam positions w ­ ere endorsed also
by most ministers and representatives of the main state feminism agency
in Italy, that is, the Ministry and the Department for Equal Opportunities
between Men and ­Women. In 2007, ­under the brief center-­left government
led by Prodi, Minister Barbara Pollastrini—­a member of the Demo­cratic
Party (pd) and former member of the Italian Communist Party—stated
that “the face veil is an offence against the dignity of ­women [and] . . . ​­there
should not be any ambiguity [on the burqa question]. Only a straight no!”106
Critical positions against Islam’s alleged backwardness vis-­à-­vis ­women’s
rights had been expressed a year earlier by Livia Turco—­then a minister
for health and a historical representative of ­women’s rights within the
center left. Intervening on the debate on the veil as a symbol of male op-
pression, Turco proposed to create a “pink lobby” in order to defend the
rights of autonomy for Muslim ­women. Her proposal was echoed by
the young ­women within the pd who urged Muslim ­women to “adapt to
the autonomy and freedom of western w ­ omen.”107 In 2010, the Berlusconi
government’s Minister for Equal Opportunities between ­Women and Men,
Mara Carfagna, a member of the right-­wing party pdl , commented on the
case of Sanaa Dafani—­a young ­woman of Moroccan origin murdered by
her ­father—­with the following words: “The story of Sanaa is not a pain-
ful exception, but represents the widespread plight of ­women in Islamic
countries: a condition of submission and segregation, which they are try-
ing to introduce into our country. In this way, the rights of freedom are
denied.”108 Again, the most prominent representative of state feminism in
the country, from both right and left, upheld the equation between Islam
and ­women’s lack of rights by linking gender vio­lence to ostensibly tradi-
tional Muslim practices.
All in all, the feminist anti-­Islam front in Italy thus appears rather het-
erogeneous but nevertheless univocal. Most voices associated with the
feminist movement have, indeed, a­ dopted a clear stance against the veil
and Islam as quintessentially patriarchal and opposed to western moder-

52 Chapter 1
nity. Critical voices have not been entirely absent, however, although they
have been marginalized in a mainstream dominated by t­ hese femonation-
alist convergences. For instance, young Muslim ­women of immigrant de-
scent, such as ­those associated with the organ­ization Giovani Musulmani
d’Italia (Young Muslims of Italy), have promoted initiatives to show how
Islam and w ­ omen’s rights are not incompatible.109 In 2008 Sumaya Abdel
Qader, who has Jordanian-­Palestinian parents, published a book titled
Porto il velo, adoro i Queen (I wear the veil, I adore Queen [the band]),
which was widely received as a challenge against repre­sen­ta­tions of Mus-
lim w­ omen as backward and passive objects at the hand of their oppressive
cultures.110 Furthermore, a younger generation of feminists has strongly
condemned the Eurocentric and Islamophobic character of the current
framing of positions on Muslim ­women. Well-­known antiracist feminists
like Vincenza Perilli, Chiara Bonfi lioli, Lidia Cirillo, and Sonia Sabelli, as
well as the scholar of Islam Anna Vanzan or Francesca Koch, the president
of the Casa Internazionale delle Donne (International House of ­Women),
have all attempted to break the hegemonic consensus around Islamopho-
bic antisexism that dominates among numerous Italian feminists, w ­ omen’s
organ­izations, and femocrats. In a context of diffused gendered vio­lence,
111

where the murders of ­women perpetrated by Italian men are described

in newspapers on a daily basis, the condemnation of Muslim men as the
repository of all misogyny and sexism—­these critical feminists maintain—­
amounts to nothing but plain racist instrumentalization.

Synchronicities of Femonationalism

To be sure, ­there are several differences between the three contexts ­under
examination and the ways in which nationalist right-­wing parties, femi-
nists, and femocrats have articulated this femonationalist convergence. To
begin with, when we look at the strategies ­adopted by right-­wing national-
ist parties, for instance, we see that whereas the pvv in the Netherlands has
endorsed a pro-­gay stance alongside a pro-­women agenda in its stigmati-
zation of non-­western mi­grant and especially Muslim communities, the
fn in France has very timidly and contradictorily begun to take distance
from its traditional antigay lexicon, and the ln in Italy continues to stick to
harshly homophobic language and politics. Furthermore, whereas both the
fn and the ln have developed plans and policy proposals on gender issues,

Figures of Femonationalism  53
albeit marginal ones with re­spect to their overall po­liti­cal agenda, and have
mostly remained conservative in ­matters of reproductive rights and sup-
portive of a traditional idea of the ­family and ­women’s role, the pvv does
not have a clear program on ­women’s issues. For the pvv, the lack of gender
equality concerns mainly ethnic minorities, a view that has gained increas-
ing currency among Dutch right-­wing and centrist politicians throughout
the 2000s. Fi­nally, whereas the fn and the ln have increasingly moved
from a strong nationalist lexicon to western supremacist slogans, which
are more acceptable in the mainstream media, the pvv ’s po­liti­cal rhe­toric
has shifted from strong westocentrism to a more explicit ethnic nation-
alism.112 Yet in spite of ­these disparities, the similarities and astonishing
synchrony among the three parties in their invocation of ­women’s rights
in anti-­Muslim campaigns seem to prevail. Dif­fer­ent interpretations have
been offered to shed some light on this phenomenon. While some scholars
consider the instrumentalization of gender equality as an electoral strategy
to gain the female vote (usually low for t­ hese parties), o ­ thers consider
the mainstream focus on the “clash” between cultures as a terrain that fa-
cilitates attention to gender issues.113 For ­others the centrality assigned to
Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women in discussions on mi­grants’ in-
tegration into western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties is the result of the general shift
of the po­liti­cal spectrum to the right and the latter’s strategic relocation
between neoliberal laissez-­faire programs on the economic side, and na-
tionalist anti-­immigration politics on the po­liti­cal side.114 Other scholars
maintain that the attention to ­women’s issues in anti-­immigration/anti-­
Islam campaigns demands that we update our understanding of t­ hese
parties’ new ideology as one dominated not by nationalism, or classical
right-­wing motives, but by pop­u­lism. All t­ hese interpretations certainly
provide impor­tant insights into the femonationalist turn. However, I be-
lieve they also tend to overlook the historical and ideological legacies and
material interests underpinning t­ hese parties’ framing of Muslim and
non-­western ­women as victims and redeemable subjects. As I ­will discuss
extensively in the next chapters, an examination of the role Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant ­women increasingly play within con­temporary west-
ern Eu­ro­pean socie­ties as “potential” cultural and social reproducers of the
nation enables us to shed light on the political-­economic dimensions of
femonationalism.

54 Chapter 1
 Concerning the feminist side, in all three countries as we have seen, the
femonationalist fi ld has been occupied by four main actors: some well-­
known feminist intellectuals and associations endorsing secularist argu-
ments; female right-­wing politicians, including self-­proclaimed feminists
of North African or Muslim background, some w ­ omen’s organ­izations and
key figu es within state w ­ omen’s equality agencies, or femocrats. From the
right to the left, thus, ­women within the femonationalist fi ld have become
particularly vocal in reinforcing the notion of sexism and misogyny as prob­
lems that primarily affect Muslim communities. It should be noted, how-
ever, that ­women’s voices in the 2000s have addressed their concerns about
Muslim practices in par­tic­u­lar, and not against mi­grants more ­generally—
as in the case of the right-­wing nationalist formations I analyzed. It is to
Muslim ­women in fact that t­ hese feminists, right-­wing politicians, and
femocrats have offered help, thereby engaging in what Sarah Bracke aptly
termed “rescue narratives.”115 In spite of the numerous differences among
them, what seems to unite all t­ hese feminists in a common b ­ attle against
Islam is the fundamental belief that western values of emancipation, in-
dividual rights, and secularism are best suited to guarantee gender equal-
ity. As the previous sections described, Dutch, French, or Italian feminists
such as Badinter, Lanfranco, and Dresselhuys; right-­wing feminist politi-
cians of Muslim background like Bougrab in France, Sbai in Italy, and Ali
in the Netherlands; or femocrats and equality agencies in all three coun-
tries thus share the idea of the supremacy of the western culture when it
comes to ­women’s rights. I further discuss this crucial point in chapter 4
when I analyze the concrete ways in which some figu es within this anti-­
Islam feminist front have e­ ither implemented, or supported, policies aimed
at the emancipation of Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women.
In conclusion, as the intention to save Muslim ­women from their seem-
ing barbaric culture seems to animate this heterogeneous anti-­Islam femi-
nist front, one should equally ask, “Do Muslim ­women need saving?,” to put
it in the anthropologist Lila Abu-­Lughod’s words.116 Did they demand this
kind of repre­sen­ta­tion from Dutch, French, and Italian feminists and fem-
ocrats? As I noted earlier, in all three countries, antiracist feminist activists
and scholars as well as several Muslim ­women’s organ­izations have begun
to question the legitimacy of t­ hose representing Islam as a homogeneous
misogynist entity as well as to challenge the widespread repre­sen­ta­tion that

Figures of Femonationalism  55
sees Muslim w ­ omen only as passive objects and victims. In this sense, the
fact that some feminists’ “patronizing” stances in western Eu­rope have now
been unveiled and are being exposed to the trenchant critique of Muslim
­women speaks to us of impor­tant transformations taking place within Eu­
ro­pean socie­ties in general and the feminist movement in par­tic­u­lar. The
growing presence, visibility, and public engagement of second-­and third-­
generation mi­grant (Muslim and non-­Muslim alike) ­women within ­these
socie­ties begins, indeed, to shake the westocentric and falsely universalist
foundations of some of the continent’s most dearly felt convictions, chal-
lenging feminists to articulate their critique of gender inequalities with
a critique of racial oppression and also class exploitation. In chapters  3
and 4, I further discuss how the participation of some feminists, ­women’s
organ­izations, and femocrats in the femonationalist ideological space can
be regarded as the expression of that westocentric paternalism that black,
antiracist, and non-­western feminists have denounced since the rise of the
feminist movement, especially in the Anglophone world. But I ­will also
show the deep contradictions that traverse this heterogeneous anti-­Islam
feminist front when it practically engages in, or supports, rescuing initia-
tives addressed to Muslim as well as non-­western mi­grant ­women.

56 Chapter 1
 CHAPTER 2

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u­lism

All nationalisms are gendered; all are in­ven­ted; and all are dangerous.
—­anne m c clint ock, “No Longer in a ­Future Heaven,” 89

In the second half of the 2000s sociologists and po­liti­cal scientists who
sought to understand why the pvv, fn , and ln began to mobilize issues of
­women’s rights in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns resorted to
theories of pop­u­lism.1 A number of ele­ments ­were noted as strikingly dis-
similar to traditional far-­right or fascist leitmotifs: the adoption of themes
such as gay and w ­ omen’s rights; the emphasis on not just the Christian but
also the Jewish roots of Eu­rope; the parties’ growing capacity to attract
voters who do not position themselves on the right, or who w ­ ere not a
traditional constituency (particularly w ­ omen); the appeal to the ­people
as the only legitimate sovereign; and an emphasis on the community rather
than the state. A turn to the conceptual apparatus of pop­u­lism was thus
regarded as necessary for a clearer understanding of t­ hese parties’ seem-
ingly philogynist agendas.2
­Whether comprehended as the primacy of the charismatic leader over
the po­liti­cal program, or the abandonment of classical and outdated ide-
ologies of the twentieth ­century, most theories of pop­u­lism have agreed on
a characterization of the populist party as one that attempts to foment the
­people against a challenger to their interests (the state, the po­liti­cal elite,
the immigrant, and so forth). In other words, although the term “pop­u­
lism” has been conceptualized in a variety of ways, all defin tions concur
in what I would call a “formalistic” understanding of pop­u­lism. According
to this perspective, pop­u­lism ultimately is the politics of dichotomizing
the po­liti­cal space into an “us” (the pure ­people) versus “them” (the cor-
rupt elite or the foreigner). Populist politics, that is, is not defi ed by its
content, but by its form. The instrumental mobilization of w ­ omen’s rights
in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns by the Dutch, French, and
Italian parties I examine in this book could thus be understood in terms of
­these parties’ identifi ation of a clear e­ nemy (the male Muslim and immi-
grant in this case) against whom the p ­ eople can articulate their anger and
demands. The Schmittian formalistic logic of friend/enemy, which defi es
politics as a battlefi ld between two supposedly internally homogeneous
and confli tual parties—­regardless of the nature of the demands of t­ hese
parties—is thus regarded as the core of the populist ideology. One should
note that it is precisely the formalism of the predominant defin tion of pop­
u­lism that enables both left w ­ ing and right-­wing parties and movements
to be labeled as populist. Ernesto Laclau—­particularly in his book On the
Populist Reason—­has played a central role in establishing and deepening
this formalistic approach to the study of pop­u­lism.3
In this chapter I aim to demonstrate that the concept of pop­u­lism is
unable to help us to analyze why right-­wing parties support ­women’s rights.
In order to lay out my argument, I fi st reconstruct some of the most in-
fluential interpretations of right-­wing pop­u­lism in western Eu­rope. ­Here
I pay par­tic­u­lar attention to Laclau’s impor­tant and influential contribu-
tion, arguing that its limitation becomes apparent when we consider right-­
wing parties’ sudden embrace of feminist-­friendly themes. On this basis I
show that theories of nationalism, particularly as developed by postcolonial
feminists and within critical race theories, are better suited to decipher both
the novelty of the way in which Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women
are represented as victims to be rescued, as well as the historical regularities
upon which such repre­sen­ta­tions draw. Ultimately, I contend, if we want to
grasp the reasons for the sudden and instrumental mobilization of gender
issues by ­these right-­wing parties—­that is, one fundamental dimension of
femonationalism—we need to understand pop­u­lism not as the master
signifier of con­temporary right-­wing politics vis-­à-­vis ­women and non-­
western mi­grants, but rather as a po­liti­cal style or a rhetorical device whose
conceptual signifier lies in nationalism and its historical (racist) institutions.

Pop­u­lism in Western Eu­rope

Following in the wake of the debate on western Eu­ro­pean pop­u­lism that

began in the 1990s, partly resulting from the appearance of new po­liti­cal
formations across the continent a­ fter the fall of the Soviet Union and the

58 Chapter 2
crisis of several po­liti­cal systems, the beginning of the new millennium
saw a renewed wave of discussions on pop­u­lism.4 Th s latter debate largely
responded to the growth of preexisting right-­wing formations (ln and fn )
or the rise of new ones (pvv ), in the context of the acceleration of the pro­
cess of integration and expansion of the Eu­ro­pean Union, but also particu-
larly a­ fter 9/11.5 From 2003 onward, it became common to read articles by
po­liti­cal analysts and well-­known public intellectuals in the main national
newspapers in the Netherlands, France, and Italy that promised to reveal
the secret populist ingredient in the success of right-­wing forces.6 Likewise,
the number of scholarly publications devoted to the populist phenomenon
multiplied. Alongside the astonishing number of defin tions referring to
pop­u­lism as the distinctive mark of an era—­populism as pathology of de-
mocracy, populist Zeitgeist, populist moment—­the label of pop­u­lism has
been used for the most varied phenomena, from the Michelin Guide to
Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology and the Internet.7 As Dézé pointed out, the
word seems to run the risk of falling into that list of terms that “by signify-
ing every­thing, end up signifying nothing at all.”8
Yet as Murray S. Davis might have remarked, it may be that it is pre-
cisely the vagueness and ambiguity of pop­u­lism that have nourished the
fascination for it among academics and public intellectuals.9 Sociologists
and po­liti­cal analysts in par­tic­u­lar have engaged in what is arguably an
overextension of the concept of pop­u­lism, proposing that it allows us to
understand the heterogeneity and yet uniqueness of the constellation of
western Eu­ro­pean parties and movements that do not have their roots in
traditional far-­right or fascist organ­izations (with an exception made for
the fn in France). Above all, it is the unmediated appeal to the p ­ eople in
a demagogic rather than demo­cratic manner that is presented as the main
feature of con­temporary populist propaganda, especially in the Netherlands,
France, and Italy. Not surprisingly, ­these countries in par­tic­u­lar have wit-
nessed a multiplication of publications on pop­u­lism since the beginning
of the 2000s, alongside the growing list of defin tions and interpretations.
Despite their heterogeneity, most of them can nevertheless be classifi d
according to four main types.
First, many scholars consider the identifi ation between the party, or
the po­liti­cal movement, and the charismatic leader to be the main fea-
ture of pop­u­lism. For t­ hese interpretations, the distinguishing mark of
con­temporary pop­u­lism is the figu e of the meneur des foules (leader of

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  59

crowds), which was pop­u­lar­ized by Gustave Le Bon at the end of the nine-
teenth ­century. According to Jacques Rancière, for instance, “The notion
of pop­u­lism restages an image of the ­people elaborated at the end of the
19th c­ entury by thinkers like Hippolyte Taine and Gustave Le Bon, scared
by the Paris Commune and by the growth of the workers’ movement: the
image of the ignorant crowds moved by the resounding words of the ‘lead-
ers.’ ”10 The meneur des foules is another name for the charismatic leaders
who are able to attract and mobilize the masses, to make them believe that
they speak through them, that their words are the echo of the vox populi.
The notion that the charismatic leader is the most impor­tant ele­ment of
con­temporary pop­u­lism seems to be confi med in the three examples in
this book. Without Matteo Salvini, Geert Wilders, and the Le Pen dynasty,
it would be hard to think in the same way of t­ hese three parties. Further-
more, not only are ­these parties strongly identifi d with their respective
po­liti­cal leaders, but they also pres­ent another classical feature of charis-
matic power, at least in its Weberian articulation: the claim to constitute a
rupture with the previous, dominant po­liti­cal and party system.11 For in-
stance, both the pvv and the ln are relatively recent po­liti­cal formations,
which arose in a moment of crisis of credibility of previous po­liti­cal parties
and of the legitimacy of the po­liti­cal system in general. The older fn , on
the other hand, has more recently coupled its traditional claims of break-
ing with the mainstream of the French po­liti­cal landscape with a pro­cess of
“self-­renovation,” ­under the leadership of Marine Le Pen.
The second cluster of defin tions argues that the main trait of pop­u­lism
consists in its antipo­liti­cal stance, namely, the denunciation of the bureau-
cratization of politics as the cause for the po­liti­cal system’s distance from the
real needs of the ­people. Populist parties pres­ent themselves as the true and
only representatives of the grievances that come from below, against betrayal
by the po­liti­cal elites. Yet as Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan ­McDonnell cor-
rectly point out, the antipo­liti­cal stance is not antisystemic. Populist parties
“do not promote values which are extraneous to the system. . . . ​What popu-
lists propose to establish is not a new po­liti­cal or economic order. On the
contrary, they pres­ent themselves as parties which w ­ ill restore an order that,
in their discourse at least, existed in the past and which the errors and mis-
deeds of the po­liti­cal class, trade ­unions, public bureaucrats, big business
and high fi ance have disrupted.”12 In this perspective, it is worth noting
that pop­u­lism operates through a precise temporal register. By calling for

60  Chapter 2
instant solutions and the restoration of the immediate connection with the
­ eople, pop­u­lism opposes the longue durée of politics and demands an ac-
p
celeration of the decisionist moment.13 The pro­cess of Eu­ro­pean integra-
tion at the beginning of the 2000s and its impact upon national economies
(particularly upon the ­middle and working classes, who ­were the most im-
mediately affected by the introduction of the common currency in terms
of a reduction of their purchasing power) is considered to be one of the
main reasons for the growth of pop­u­lism. Populist parties did indeed con-
demn the technocracy of the Eu­ro­pean Union and demanded re­spect for
national economies and national po­liti­cal rhythms. As Mabel Berezin puts
it, “By moving the centre of po­liti­cal gravity from the polity to the person,
from the State to the market, Eu­ro­pe­anization has compromised the bonds
of demo­cratic empathy and provided an opportunity for right-­wing popu-
lists to articulate a discourse of fear and insecurity.”14
Thi d, following from the previous characterization, some scholars de-
fi e pop­u­lism as an “ideological scheme,” which is dif­fer­ent from other
po­liti­cal ideologies such as Marxism, liberalism, socialism, fascism, and
anarchism.15 One of the main points of differentiation, then, would be
pop­u­lism’s lack of an elaborated po­liti­cal doctrine and especially of clear
(or at least, explicit) references to specific class interests. Albertazzi and
McDonnell, for instance, defi e pop­u­lism as “an ideology which pits a
virtuous and homogeneous ­people against a set of elites and dangerous
‘­others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to de-
prive) the sovereign p ­ eople of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and
voice. . . . ​Th s view deliberately avoids conceiving of pop­u­lism in terms
of specific social bases, economic programs, issues and electorates. . . . ​
[Thus] pop­u­lism should not just be seen against such backgrounds, but be-
yond them.”16 Similarly, Cas Mudde defi es pop­u­lism as “a thin-­centered
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two ho-
mogenous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure ­people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite.’ ”17 According to ­these interpretations, pop­u­lism’s ideological scheme
operates by blending individualism and collectivism together with “an
‘ambivalent’ interpretation of equality.”18 Authors who emphasize the ide-
ological nature of con­temporary pop­u­lism thus usually focus upon the
class heterogeneity of its electorate.19
Fi­nally, Laclau has famously attempted purely formalistic defin tions of
pop­u­lism. Accordingly, par­tic­u­lar parties or movements can be classifi d

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  61

as populist not on the basis of their specific po­liti­cal program and agenda,
but rather on the basis of the formal articulation of their demands. For this
approach, what makes the emergence of the “­people” pos­si­ble is the specific
way in which demands arising from dif­fer­ent subjects come to construct
a chain of equivalences. That is, a party or po­liti­cal movement qualifies
as populist insofar as it is able to foreground the similarities rather than
differences among apparently diverging demands and groups of p ­ eople. It
is through the unifi ation of such demands “into a stable system of sig-
nifi ation” that pop­u­lism can then blossom.20 Due to its widespread dif-
fusion and particularly its capacity for extension—to such a degree that
the three previous characterizations can easily be subsumed to it—­I ­will
devote more space to considering this formalistic approach to pop­u­lism.
A detailed analy­sis of its strengths and shortcomings ­will enable us to shed
light on the limitations of the category of pop­u­lism for understanding the
phenomenon of femonationalism.

The Limits of Populist Reason: On Ernesto Laclau

In his book On Populist Reason, Laclau developed a sophisticated theory

of pop­u­lism as a specific logic of the po­liti­cal. Reacting against the criti-
cisms leveled against pop­u­lism, as the irrationality of the masses or limbo
of po­liti­cal indeterminacy, Laclau attempted to demonstrate that pop­u­lism
possesses its own “reason.” Thus, it should not be treated ­either as a pa-
thology of democracy or as a marginal epiphenomenon that emerges in
determinate moments and that, therefore, is destined to dis­appear once
the normality of the po­liti­cal is reestablished. On the contrary, for Laclau,
pop­u­lism should be understood as a “po­liti­cal logic” that is distinct from a
“social logic.” As he put it,

By “pop­u­lism” we do not understand a type of movement—­identifiable

with ­either a special social base or a par­tic­u­lar ideological orientation—­
but a po­liti­cal logic. All the attempts at fi ding what is idiosyncratic in
pop­u­lism in ele­ments such as a peasant or small-­ownership constituency,
or re­sis­tance to economic modernization, or manipulation by margin-
alized elites are . . . ​essentially flawed: they ­will always be overwhelmed
by an avalanche of exceptions. What do we understand, however, by a
“po­liti­cal logic”? . . . ​While social logics consist in rule-­following, po­liti­cal

62 Chapter 2
 logics are related to the institution of the social. Such an institution,
however, as we already know, is not an arbitrary fiat but proceeds out
of social demands and is, in that sense, inherent to any pro­cess of social
change. Th s change, as we also know, takes place through the variable
articulation of equivalence and difference, and the equivalential mo-
ment presupposes the constitution of a global po­liti­cal subject bringing
together a plurality of social demands. Th s in turn involves, as we have
seen, the construction of internal frontiers and the identifi ation of an
institutionalized “other.”21

In its succinct way, this passage provides us with all the ingredients
of Laclau’s defin tion of pop­u­lism. First, pop­u­lism is not rooted in a de-
terminate sector of society, nor does it represent specific class interests.
Consequently, according to Laclau, an “economistic” Marxist framework
is unable to grasp its complexity. Second, pop­u­lism possesses its own logic,
which is dif­fer­ent from the logic of the social. While social logics follow
rules, po­liti­cal logics relate to the “institution of the social.” Thus, Laclau
seemed to suggest, the po­liti­cal logic establishes the rules that the social
must follow. The po­liti­cal, however, establishes the social through the ar-
ticulation of demands that are themselves primarily social; it does so ac-
cording to a chain of equivalences and differences. It is such an articulation
that brings about the constitution of a po­liti­cal subject: that is, the p ­ eople,
as the populist actor. The po­liti­cal, therefore, can be regarded as the organ­
izing princi­ple of the social. Fi­nally, the constitution of the po­liti­cal subject
through the moment of equivalence involves the construction of internal
frontiers and the identifi ation of an institutionalized “other.” Th s latter
point is crucial, insofar as for Laclau, “we only have pop­u­lism if t­ here is a
series of politico-­discursive practices constructing a popu­lar subject, and
the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is . . . ​the building up
of an internal frontier dividing the social space into two camps.”22 The di-
chotomization of the social space takes the form of an “us” counterposed
to a “them,” in which the “us” is homogenized and its internal differences
are neutralized, at least temporarily, ­because a logic of equivalence prevails
over a logic of difference. The dichotomization of the social space into two
camps is crucial, for “frontiers are the sine qua non of the emergence of the
‘­people.’ ”23 The latter ele­ment, namely the identifi ation of the Other, or
the ­enemy, against which the populist subject constructs its identity, was

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  63

not only a crucial component of Laclau’s theory but in many re­spects was
also a common denominator of all theories of pop­u­lism. Indeed, despite
the disagreement among scholars with regard to the precise features that
defi e pop­u­lism, the one ele­ment that all of them do identify is its extreme
simplifi ation of the social and po­liti­cal space. Accordingly, the simplifi a-
tion of the con­temporary po­liti­cal space operated by most right-­wing pop-
ulists in western Eu­rope, with immigrants and particularly Muslims called
upon to play the role of the Other against which the ­people are mobilized,
seems to provide evidence for all ­those theories that see the dichotomizing
strategies of populist parties as one of their most impor­tant ele­ments.
But can this characterization of pop­u­lism help us understand the mo-
bilization of feminist ideas by con­temporary populist parties? While the
identifi ation of an e­ nemy against which the populist subject coalesces
might seem to be able to describe accurately the con­temporary anti-­Islam
and anti-­immigrant campaigns that so strongly mark populists’ propaganda,
how do we then explain how Muslim ­women, and non-­western mi­grant
­women more generally, have come to constitute an exception? In other words,
on what basis are they seemingly subtracted from the ­enemy camp? If the
identity of the ­people, which is forged in the construction of the populist
moment, requires the identifi ation of the Other—­the ­enemy—­then ­under
what conditions can this ­enemy be split into two dif­fer­ent camps, that is, the
camp of the (male) ­enemy and the camp of the (female) victim?

The Schmittian Dimensions of Populist Reason

In order to answer the above questions or, more precisely, in order to

show how such questions cannot be adequately answered with formalis-
tic approaches, we can begin by noting that Laclau’s formal defin tion of
pop­u­lism as the politics of the constitution of the p ­ eople into a po­liti­cal
subject that homogenizes demands and forges its identity through the iden-
tifi ation of an e­ nemy is open to at least three main objections. First, the
idea that the ­people is constituted by means of an operation of homog-
enization through the chain of equivalential demands obfuscates differ-
ences and divisions—in par­tic­u­lar, gender differences, but also differences
of class, race, and sexual orientation—­that inhabit the supposedly uniform
po­liti­cal body called “the p
­ eople.” Second, the claim that it is pos­si­ble to
characterize the populist po­liti­cal proj­ect (or indeed any po­liti­cal proj­ect)

64 Chapter 2
in a formalistic fashion without analyzing its specific content or po­liti­cal
agenda—­namely, without engaging at the “ontic level,” in Laclau’s words—­
risks being profoundly misleading. As Slavoj Žižek duly noted, “The series
of formal conditions [Laclau] enumerates are not suffici t to justify call-
ing a phenomenon populist; one needs also to consider the way in which
populist discourse displaces the antagonism and constructs the e­ nemy.”24
The formalistic approach tends to abstract from the concrete determinations
in which ­these parties articulate their po­liti­cal action and to obscure the
specific complex of ideas, princi­ples, and myths by means of which they
express their societal vision. It is in fact only by examining the very specific
features around which populists attempt to mobilize and create a specifi
­people as a defin te po­liti­cal subject that it is pos­si­ble to shed light on their
recent emphasis on w ­ omen’s rights and on Muslim ­women as victims to
be rescued. Fi­nally, Laclau’s formal defin tion of pop­u­lism in terms of the
construction of the ­people by means of the creation of an internal frontier
separating it from an Other strongly recalls Carl Schmitt’s characterization
of the po­liti­cal as founded in the opposition of friend/enemy. According
to Schmitt, “The specific po­liti­cal distinction to which po­liti­cal actions and
motives can be reduced is that between friend and e­ nemy. Th s provides
a defin tion in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive defin tion
or one indicative of substantial content.”25 As I discussed above, for Laclau
pop­u­lism and the po­liti­cal coincide. Pop­u­lism, that is, seems to be a “kind
of transcendental-­formal po­liti­cal dispositif that can be incorporated into
dif­fer­ent po­liti­cal engagements,” in Žižek’s effective formulation.26 Just like
in Schmitt, the po­liti­cal for Laclau possesses its autonomous logic; it is
designated at the formal and not substantial level; above all, the friend/
enemy dichotomy that constitutes its defini g mode describes a type of
antagonism that is dif­fer­ent from the antagonism derived from economic
or class interests.27
But what is impor­tant ­here is that noting the Schmittian dimensions
of Laclau’s defin tion of pop­u­lism allows us to discern at least some of the
reasons I believe Laclau’s theory of populism—as well as most accounts
that stress the populist core of ­these parties—is inadequate to provide an
account of con­temporary right-­wing parties’ “treacherous sympathy for
Muslim ­women” (to borrow Leila Ahmed’s characterization of western
concerns for Muslim ­women).28 First of all, the shortcomings of Laclau’s
defin tion of pop­u­lism when it comes to explaining the parties’ xenophobic

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  65

mobilization of ­women’s rights become apparent when we recall Derrida’s
interpretation of the Schmittian concept of the po­liti­cal. For Derrida,
Schmitt’s vision of politics is a “full absolute desert teeming with p
­ eople,” a
desert where “no ­woman is in sight.”29 In other words, Derrida’s meta­phor
acutely points to the fact that the conceptualization of the po­liti­cal as the
space of antagonism between friend and e­ nemy (which we fi d in both
Schmitt and Laclau), in its clear resort to a military meta­phor, represents
a strong masculine-­muscular conception of politics from which w ­ omen
are arguably excluded from the outset. Th s is not surprising, for, as Tereza
Orozco has pointed out, Schmitt’s vitalistic concept of the po­liti­cal was
based upon “an authoritarian and repressive masculinity,” one that was
so interwoven with his overall model of politics as to make it “the inter-­
discourse of the po­liti­cal.”30 When politics is comprehended as muscular
antagonism—as in the friend/enemy metaphor—it seems that w ­ omen can
only enter onto the Kampfplatz in order to play the ancillary role of nurses
for injured soldiers, or to figu e as the victor’s spoils of war, whereby the
male winner humiliates his defeated male counterpart by taking posses-
sion of “his” w ­ omen. Laclau’s adoption of a Schmittian formalistic and
male-­centered dichotomy thus seems to me to limit our understanding as
to why right-­wing parties such as the pvv, fn , and ln mobilize ­women’s
rights in order both to depict foreign non-­western males as an (often sexual)
threat and foreign non-­western ­women (Muslim and non-­Muslim alike) as
victims. In other words, Laclau’s resort to masculinist meta­phors of the po­
liti­cal as a battlefi ld among (implicitly) male enemies does not lend itself
easily to decipher both the reasons “national” w ­ omen are enlisted in ­these
campaigns and the reasons the ­enemy’s ­women are addressed as casualties
to be rescued rather than merely as spoils of war.
In opposition to this formalism, I argue that it is only by analyzing
the concrete slogans and policies deployed by ­these parties—­that is, their
content and not simply their form—­that we can begin to comprehend the
above reasons. As I showed in chapter 1, the ­people that is called upon to
act against the Other is not, in fact, a shapeless demos, but a specific ethnos,
or natio. Accordingly, the ­enemy against which populists call on the p ­ eople
to forge their identity is not an empty signifier that could be filled by any
collectivity or group but, in the con­temporary context, a determinate po­
liti­cal, national, and economic signifie : namely, the non-­western mi­grant
and especially the Muslim.31 They are outsiders fi st and foremost b ­ ecause

66  Chapter 2
they are non-­nationals and ­bearers of differences (cultural, religious, histori-
cal, economic, and so forth) that interfere in the chain of equivalences that
constructs the ­people as one political-­national subject.
In order to make use of the concept of pop­u­lism in any meaningful way
to describe parties like the pvv, fn , and ln , therefore, it must be embedded
within the conceptual apparatus provided by theories of nationalism. On
the one hand, the nationalist perspective, as Alexandre Dézé notes, “of-
fers the possibility of highlighting two dimensions inherent in right wing
parties . . . ​their style and po­liti­cal rhe­toric, populist and contestational,”
and “their doctrine centered on the defense of national identity and on
the xenophobic, preferentialist or directly racist treatment of themes like
immigration.”32 Albeit sticking to the defin tion of pop­u­lism as key to de-
fini g radical right parties, Mudde also believes that the “populist radi-
cal right is a specific form of nationalism.”33 I thus propose to understand
pop­u­lism as a po­liti­cal style or a rhetorical device rather than as the main
conceptual signifier that explains the politics and ideas endorsed by right-­
wing parties.34
On the other hand, the identifi ation of the nationalist matrix under­
lying the politics of ­these parties enables us to understand the potent con-
structions of gender ­orders that nationalism entails. As Anne McClintock
puts it, “Despite nationalism’s ideological investment in the idea of popu­lar
unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutional-
ization of gender difference. . . . ​Rather than expressing the fl wering into
time of the organic essence of a timeless ­people, nations are contested sys-
tems of cultural repre­sen­ta­tion that limit and legitimize p ­ eople’s access to the
resources of the nation-­state.”35 A focus on the gendered side of nationalist
ideologies can thus help us comprehend the pvv ’s, fn ’s, and ln ’s increasing
attention to ­women’s issues and their proclaimed sympathy for the suffer-
ings of Muslim ­women in par­tic­u­lar.

“National” ­Women and the Long Shadow of Nationalism

As I discussed in chapter 1, the right-wing parties paid increasing attention

to ­women’s issues in the last de­cade while si­mul­ta­neously embarking upon
the denunciation of Muslim and immigrant males as sexual threats. Some
of the policies they proposed concerning gender—­particularly in the case
of the fn and the ln —­however, related to classical right-­wing concerns for

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  67

­ omen’s fertility rates. At the end of the 2000s, Italy witnessed the imple-
w
mentation of vari­ous mea­sures to increase “national” w ­ omen’s birthrates.
For instance, the Fondo Nuovi Nati (Fund for Newborns) scheme pioneered
by the Berlusconi government (which, it should be remembered, included
the participation of the ln ) entitled ­those who became ­mothers during
2009–2011to apply for subsidized bank loans and to access benefits aimed
at easing the fi ancial difficulties of parenthood. Immigrant parents with-
out Italian nationality, however, ­were excluded from some of ­these ben-
efits, which ­were explic­itly reserved for Italian citizens.36 In France, the fn
has begun campaigning for family-­oriented policies, supposedly as a re-
sponse to a dramatic drop in the fertility rate, particularly among “­women
of French nationality.” As they are e­ ager to report, “Of the 832,799 babies
born and registered in 2010, only 667,707 of them ­were born to parents
who ­were both of French nationality.”37 In the Netherlands, Wilders was
at the center of media—­and judicial—­attention for his characterization of
Muslims’ fertility rates and ­family reunifi ation as leading to a “tsunami
of Muslims” that threatens to overwhelm the country.38 As ­these examples
show, t­ hese parties’ alarm over the fall in western Eu­ro­pean ­women’s fer-
tility is strictly related to their privileging of national/ethnic criteria of in-
clusiveness as well as to their call for national w ­ omen “to reproduce” the
nation in a literal sense. The parties are all strong advocates of a type of na-
tionalism based on Volk and Kultur (i.e., ethnicity and culture), which pro-
motes an idea of the nation as an organic ­whole supposedly homogeneous
in religious, cultural, and racial/ethnic dimensions.39 Th
­ ese parties articulate
a po­liti­cal program that privileges national (or regional) economic inter-
ests versus Eu­ro­pean or international interests. Furthermore, they fabricate
references to common origins, ethnos, and culture in order to instantiate
the bonds of mythical, lost communities, thereby excluding immigrants
from this space. For instance, the slogan “Stopper l’immigration, renforcer
l’identité française!” (Stop immigration, strengthen French identity!), once
adorned the fn ’s web page, with a link to its program on immigration poli-
cies. Likewise, the pvv proposes to put an end to the entrance of newcom-
ers into the country, to prohibit dual nationality, and to establish national
control of state immigration policies: “We bestrijden de dubbele nationalit-
eit! Nederland moet zelf over het immigratiebeleid gaan, niet Brussel!” (We
oppose dual nationality! The Netherlands should decide on immigration

68 Chapter 2
policies, not Brussels!).40 Fi­nally, the ln , besides endorsing an Islamopho-
bic and anti-­immigration agenda, has also manufactured an entirely new
“nationality” by constructing a myth of the origins of northern Italians
(i  Padani), who are supposedly descended from the Celts and should
therefore worship pagan gods like the Dio Po (the God of the Po River).41
Recognizing that notions such as the Volksnation and Kulturnation
constitute the fundamental po­liti­cal substrate of ­these parties’ policies en-
ables us to address the gender dimensions of nationalism. They can already
be detected at the iconographic level. The repre­sen­ta­tion of the nation, or
the city, by means of a female body is found in numerous ancient cultures.
The tendency of Romance languages to attribute the female gender to both
nation and city is a further instance of the incipient sexualization of the
national community. It was only in the modern era and in the historical-­
political context of the rise of the modern nation-­state, however, that the
construction of nationalist ideologies coincided with the elaboration of
a specifi ally gendered imaginary.42 Marianne in France; a ­woman with a
crown modeled on the city walls in Italy; a virgin (Stedemaagd) as the per-
sonifi ation of the city of Amsterdam in the Netherlands: in all of ­these
countries ­women have come to embody, or to symbolize, the nation.43 But
which ­women and for what purpose? According to Massimo Leone, the
decline of the aristocracy and the rise of the bourgeoisie coincided with
the repre­sen­ta­tion of the modern nation with the body of a w ­ oman “from
the p­ eople,” rather than the traditional figu es of goddesses or queens.44
With the loss of the sacral aura that used to surround the monarchy, citi-
zens of the modern state could no longer identify with the power of roy-
alty. Instead, they now needed more mundane and popu­lar symbols.45
Th s, however, is not the only reason. The portrayal of the nation in the
guise of a ­woman enables the naturalization of the nationalist po­liti­cal
proj­ect. Unlike the modern state, which was conceived as an “artific al
product of an agreement between rational individuals for the tutelage of
their rights, the nation is presented as an almost natu­ral datum of his-
tory.”46 Though the nation is a social and historical determination—or
­imagined community, in Benedict Anderson’s power­ful defin tion—­its
naturalization allows and reinforces its legitimation since its supposed
naturalness entails its necessity, immutability, and entitlement to loyalty.47
As Tamar Pitch argues,

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  69

 Although from an historical viewpoint many modern nations are the
product rather than the presupposition of the state, they are lived as
what legitimizes the latter. In princi­ple, the state is inclusive: anybody
can enter the agreement, while the nation is exclusive. One belongs to
it by being born into it. The state disregards bodies, while the nation is
constituted of bodies. . . . ​The state does not have a body, while the na-
tion does. Which bodies and which body? The bodies of men who are
asked to die to defend it and the bodies of w ­ omen, on which its ­future
depends. The body of the nation is exclusively female, just as, obviously,
its mind is male.48

Therefore, the nation becomes a source of identity and an object of

dutiful commitment, on the one hand, due to its identifi ation with the
­mother, the s­ ister, the feminine familial princi­ple that must be safeguarded;
and, on the other hand, by means of its association with the natu­ral nuclear
­family, that is, the “­mother” and the “­father” conceived in their hierarchi-
cal roles, body and head, motherland and fatherland. Loyalty to the nation
equates to filial obedience, as in the image of soldiers and citizens as sons
of the nation, enfants de la patrie. In McClintock’s words, the ­family trope
“offers a ‘natu­ral’ figu e for sanctioning social hierarchy within a putative
organic unity of interests.”49 We could also note that the depiction of na-
tions through the iconography of the f­ amily entails their identifi ation with
the domestic space: home, Heimat, homeland, and so forth. Consequently,
non-­national citizens on national soil remain foreigners, not at home; fur-
ther, in t­ hose nation-­states where the bloodline is the condition for the
acquisition of nationality (jus sanguinis), like in Germany and Italy, they
are “guests”—as in the well-­known label for immigrants in 1960s Germany,
Gastarbeiter (guestworker)—­thus entailing their permanent foreignness to
the family-­nation.
The repre­sen­ta­tion of the nation as a female body also evokes notions
of “genesis,” “birth,” and the “ancestry,” thus operating as a power­ful per-
formative meta­phor for nationalism’s invocation of myths of common
origin, common blood, and kinship. Even when, as in settler socie­ties like
the United States and Australia, “common destiny” rather than “common
origin is the organ­izing princi­ple of nationalism,” as Nira Yuval-­Davis
argues, “­there would be an implicit, if not explicit, hierarchy of desirability
of ‘origin’ and culture which would underlie the nation building pro­cesses,

70 Chapter 2
including immigration and natal policies.”50 For instance, the infamous
“white Australia policy,” which extended in dif­fer­ent forms through at least
the second half of the twentieth ­century, and the Immigration Act of 1924
in the United States, including the National Origins Act and the Asian Ex-
clusion Act, all aimed at restricting the entrance of non-­European or non–­
north Eu­ro­pean immigrants.51
The iconographic and symbolic centrality of ­women to the nation,
however, is deceiving, for while it has constantly been affirmed, ­women
­were at the same time “relegated to the margins of the polity.”52 Th s is the
“paradox” lying “at the heart of most national narratives,” as McClintock
puts it, for the role of ­women within nationalist po­liti­cal proj­ects has his-
torically been a “meta­phoric” one, unlike the metonymic role accorded to
men.53 The symbolic importance attributed to w ­ omen by nationalist dis-
courses does not in fact refer to woman-­as-­singularity, but rather as part
of an organic ­whole whose subjectivity and social role are established on
the basis of the functions of the female body.54 For nationalist ideology and
its categorizing customs, w ­ omen “­were homogenized, considered not as
individuals but as types.”55 Th ideal type of femininity as an aestheticized
and social construction, whose chief function lies in reproduction, became
a power­ful normative ste­reo­type from the eigh­teenth ­century onward. It
coincided with the rise of the nation-­state and the development of nation-
alist rhe­toric, alongside the institution of the f­ amily as the center of the
national community and of the ­house­hold as the allegory of the private
sphere where w ­ omen allegedly fi d their appropriate role. The rise of mod-
ern nations and nationalisms in the eigh­teenth ­century went together with
the development of what Michel Foucault called the “po­liti­cal economy of
population.”56 The nation, its “­future and its fortune,” ­were strictly linked
to “the number and the uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules
and ­family organ­ization,” as well as to their sexual practices.57 Preoccupa-
tion with population control was the result of the construction of nation-­
states as sovereign entities whose wealth and power strictly depended
on the number and compliance of their citizens. In this context, ­women
have been linked to the nation in a twofold manner: qua members of the
collectivity, and therefore subjected to the duty of loyalty required from
all members, and qua w ­ omen, thus b­ earers of ascribed roles and distinct
tasks, above all that of reproducing the nation. Likewise, ­there are abun-
dant twentieth-­century examples of birthrate policies figu ing among the

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  71

chief concerns of nationalist movements. One of the most pressing tasks
of the Vichy Regime u ­ nder its “national revolution” was the creation of
the Commissariat General for the F ­ amily (1941), which aimed to increase
the birthrate and to establish the (large) ­family as the basic cell of soci-
ety.58 “The Nation is not a group of individuals, but a group of families!”
wrote Georges Pernot, president of the Fédération des Associations des
Familles Nombreuses in his “Note on F ­ amily Policy” in 1940. Similarly, in
fascist Italy the National Organ­ization for Maternity and Childhood was
instituted with the goal of promoting an increase in the birthrate. The ob-
session with birthrates u ­ nder Mussolini reached such an extent that un-
married ­people ­were heavi­ly taxed and strongly discriminated against in
the ­labor market, whereas families with at least seven ­children ­were tax
exempt.59
Yet the control of w
­ omen’s sexuality through the establishment of the
female role as that of ­mother, guardian of tradition and continuity, and
­bearer of the collective also marks the trajectories of nationalist proj­ects that
cannot be equated to the authoritarian and racist models of Pétain’s France
or Mussolini’s Italy. Even when nationalism has played the role of a liberat-
ing force, such as in the context of the decolonization movements, and the
issue of ­women’s rights has accompanied that of national in­de­pen­dence,
the results for ­women have often been disappointing. ­After in­de­pen­dence,
­women’s role has frequently been reaffirmed as that of biological reproducers
of the (new, liberated) nation. For instance, despite their key role during
the Algerian war of in­de­pen­dence in the National Liberation Front, at the
end of the confli t Algerian w ­ omen did not gain the equality and rights for
which they wished. One of the reasons for this limitation was, as Valentine
Moghadam argues, that the strug­gle was one for “national liberation, not
for social (class/gender) transformation.”60
The identifi ation of ­women not as individuals but rather as “­bearers
of the collective” and “biological reproducers of the nation” thus lies at
the very heart of nationalist proj­ects.61 It is precisely in this capacity that
the aforementioned con­temporary mea­sures to give benefits to “national”
families for newborns, as advocated by the pvv, the fn , and the ln should
be understood. They are designed to encourage “national” w ­ omen to be
­mothers for the nation’s f­ uture generations and thus to ensure the nation’s
ethnic homogeneity.

72 Chapter 2
Nationalism and Non-­National ­Women: Sexualization
of Racism and Racialization of Sexism

The questions that we still need to address are why t­ hese parties—­while
clearly aiming both to keep foreign males apart from “national” ­women and
to encourage the latter to reproduce the nation—­si­mul­ta­neously endorsed
arguments presenting Muslim and non-­western ­women as victims to be
saved? In other words, how can the femonationalist rhe­toric of rescuing
Muslim and other non-­western mi­grant ­women possibly combine with an
emphasis on defending “national” w ­ omen? If nationalist right-­wing parties
aim to preserve the purity of the nation along ethnic and racial lines, why
would they want to save non-­national ­women from non-­national men? Do
they limit themselves to evoking “rescuing” narratives, or do they propose
concrete rescuing policies as well? And ultimately, to what do ­these rescuing
discourses and policies amount? While I w ­ ill address the last two questions
fully in the next chapter, let me now try to answer the previous questions
by discussing how theories of nationalism can help us to explicate con­
temporary right-­wing parties’ portrayal of Muslim and non-­western mi­
grant ­women, unlike their male counter­parts, as redeemable subjects.
To make sense of the reasons right-­wing nationalist parties conceive
of Muslim and non-­western mi­grant men as oppressors and of ­women
as victims to be rescued, I argue that we need to foreground how racism
is squarely involved in this dichotomizing pro­cess. My claim ­here is that
racism—as both the pro­cess of categorization of certain groups of p ­ eople
as inferior according to phenotypical and/or cultural markers, and as the
practice of their exclusion—is the necessary corollary of the type of Volk
and Kulturnation nationalism that characterizes the parties.62 However,
the type of racism t­ hese parties exhibit, as I detailed in chapter 1, operates
si­mul­ta­neously and paradoxically through the exclusion of the male and
the (conditional) inclusion of the female Other. In order to decode this
type of racist double standard that nationalist right-­wing parties apply to
non-­western mi­grant men and w ­ omen, we can turn to two intertwined
conceptual tools developed by critical race scholars: the “sexualization of
racism” and the “racialization of sexism.” On the one hand, the notion of
sexualization of racism emphasizes that racism is sexed ­because it relies
on dif­fer­ent ste­reo­types of Othered men and ­women—as oppressors and

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  73

sexual threats, and as victims and sexual objects/property, respectively. But
it is also sexualized insofar as the racist imagery operates through power­ful
sexual meta­phors and desires. That is, racist ideologies express the desire
to dominate the Other through the fantasies of possessing the body of the
racialized ­woman and of sexually humiliating the racialized man. On the
other hand, the notion of racialization of sexism foregrounds the ways in
which racism operates through the portrayal of sexism and patriarchy as
the exclusive domains of the (non-­western and Muslim) Other. The racist
stigmatization of the Other thus depends on the description of the Other’s
culture as a sexist hell for ­women, thereby implying the danger of import-
ing such nefarious sexist practices and relations into the West if foreign
men are allowed to enter its borders.
It is particularly in the United States and France that scholars used ­these
notions explic­itly to describe the racist under­pinnings of nationalisms
(and colonial imperialism) in the way they portray the Othered man as the
“violent misogynist unredeemable Other” and the Othered ­woman as
the “submissive victim and physical property” of the white, western male
“master.”63 The American sociologist Calvin Hernton, for instance, was
the fi st to use the notion of sexualization of racism in Sex and Racism
in Amer­i­ca (1965) in order to describe sexual ste­reo­types and prejudices
about African American men and ­women, which he believed to be part
and parcel of racial relations in US history. The myth of African Ameri-
can men’s savagery, their alleged perverse desire for white w ­ omen, and
the vivid depiction of the large genitalia of black male bodies in order to
emphasize their bestial and dangerous nature ­were all functional, Hern-
ton stressed, to intensifying racist feelings among the white population.
Similarly, for Coramae Richey Mann and Lance Selva, “Sexualized racism
is not in­de­pen­dent of the issues of power and domination. The manifest
character of sexualized racism may best be understood within the context
of exploitation and control. To generate white hegemony, Black ­people
have been (and are still exploited), and to be the exploited they must be
controlled ­either by direct or indirect means. . . . ​One means of control-
ling the Black man has been the creation and perpetuation of the ‘Black as
rapist’ image, which has been most prone to erupt when the power rela-
tionship between Blacks and whites has been threatened.”64 The corollary
to the image of the black man’s sexualized body as one with incessant lust
for white w ­ omen’s fle h was the portrayal of the black w­ oman’s sexualized

74 Chapter 2
body as one endlessly accessible to the white man’s sexual desire, the black
­woman having no other function than to serve white needs. As Hernton
put it, “The racism of sex in the United States is but another aspect of the
unequal po­liti­cal and economic relations that exist between the races.”65
Or to put it differently, as the white man occupies a position of economic
and social power in relation to African American men and ­women, he
claims for himself the right of access to the body of the racialized ­woman,
which he regards as his property. Hernton also attempted to think of the
sexualization of racism as a phenomenon that transcends US borders, a
kind of “universal” pattern of racism.66 As he puts it, “If racism is a soci-
etal phenomenon, and sexual prejudice is a necessary aspect of racism,
then no m ­ atter when or where this phenomenon occurs ­there ­ought to
be, despite variations, certain identifiable characteristics which are always
pres­ent.”67
In his description of the French colonial brutality in Algeria, Frantz
Fanon also captured the sexualized character of racism, or the ways in which
images of the Othered sexualized body as a competitor (male) or a pos-
session (female) shape racist nationalist ideologies. Fanon foregrounded
in par­tic­u­lar the sexual meta­phor underpinning the obsession the French
colonizers had for unveiling the Muslim w ­ oman, which revealed itself
more vividly during the “emancipation strategy” that the French regime
carried out in the late 1950s. 68 One of the main features of the “emancipa-
tion strategy” was the unveiling of Muslim w ­ omen, which was also used by
psychological warfare experts to humiliate the Algerian liberation army.69
As Fanon put it, “­After each success the authorities w ­ ere strengthened in
their conviction that the Algerian w ­ oman would support western penetra-
tion into the native society. ­Every rejected veil disclosed to the eyes of the
colonialists horizons ­until then forbidden, and revealed to them, piece by
piece, the fle h of Algeria laid bare.”70 As noted by Meyda Yeğenoğlu, who
draws on Fanon, the sexual fantasy of penetrating the territory and myster-
ies of the colonies through the unveiling of the w­ omen was thus also a rape
fantasy. In the dreams of the Eu­ro­pean colonizer, the “rending of the veil”
of the Muslim ­woman—as Fanon puts it—­“was followed by her rape.”71 And
yet one of the most successful means of “repressing any acknowledgement
of rapacious intent,” writes Myra Macdonald, “was to construct colonial or
imperial interventions as missions to rescue ­women from the brutality and
oppression signifi d by the veil.”72

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  75

 The fix tion of some po­liti­cal forces in con­temporary western Eu­rope
with unveiling Muslim ­women in order to save them from their patriarchal
cultures, or with rescuing non-­western ­women from their “exceptional”
patriarchy, as I showed in chapter  1, could thus be seen as an instance
of sexualization of racism and racialization of sexism. As the previously
mentioned examples indicate, the arguments deployed to justify the need
for unveiling the Muslim ­woman, or to possess the body of the racialized
­woman as property of the male (white) master, are not novel. The history
of western Eu­ro­pean imperialism—­that is, one of the f­ aces and pages of
“offi al nationalism” in Anderson’s words—is replete with “civilizing and
emancipating missions” that purported to liberate colonized w ­ omen.73 In
the case of discussions on the veil, while its portrayal as a symbol of patri-
archal oppression is meant to convey the message that sexism is the exclu-
sive domain of the Muslim Other, the proposal (or ­actual laws) demanding
Muslim ­women take the veil off performs the “sex fantasy” of dominating
their bodies.74
In the French context, several scholars have linked the con­temporary
adoption of rescuing narratives aimed at Muslim w ­ omen in par­tic­u­lar to
the colonial and racist legacies and institutions of which they are reminis-
cent.75 When Marine Le Pen complains that immigrant neighborhoods are
not safe places for w ­ omen, she is explic­itly invoking the all too national-
ist and racist idea that sexism is primarily a prob­lem within non-­western
collectivities.76 In the Netherlands and Italy, also, scholars have linked the
current framing of Muslim ­women as victims to be saved to the po­liti­cal
rhe­toric that was used during colonial times to justify imperialism as a civ-
ilizing mission. The Dutch scholars Sarah Bracke and Sarah van Walsum, for
instance, commented on the way con­temporary nationalists framed non-­
western communities as enemies of western sexual freedoms by re-­evoking
the racist techniques of domination used by the Dutch regime in the colo-
nies.77 Another Dutch scholar even suggests that right-­wing nationalists
such as Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders might resort to this sexualized
colonial repertoire due to their personal connections with the Dutch East
Indies.78 In Italy, too, recently several analysts traced the con­temporary
foregrounding of the non-­western and Muslim man as a sexual predator to
similar repre­sen­ta­tions of colonial male subjects during fascism. Accord-
ingly, they explored the neglected history of Italian colonialism in Oriental
Africa and its sexualized tools of oppressing colonial subjects.79

76 Chapter 2
 Referring to the racist under­pinnings of the Dutch, French, and Ital-
ian right-­wing parties u­ nder focus in this book as well as to the colonial
legacies and sexual fantasies b ­ ehind their nationalist, xenophobic reper-
toire is thus key to understanding the foregrounding of Muslim and non-­
western mi­grant ­women as victims to be rescued. Above all, it enables us
to see how the legacy of ­those fantasies in the context of the metropoles
reenacts the unresolved confli t between ex-­colonial subjects and western
Eu­ro­pean nationalisms. As the next chapter ­will discuss at length, this is
a confli t that right-­wing nationalists in all three countries continue to ad-
dress by foregrounding male mi­grants as a sexual and sexist threat and
female mi­grants as passive objects to be assimilated to models of western
womanhood.

Femonationalism Is No Pop­u ­l ism  77

 CHAPTER 3

Integration Policies and the Institutionalization

of Femonationalism

To legislate culture, without transforming it into a state ideology, is impossible.

—­mar ka v alent a, “Pluralist Democracy or Scientistic Monocracy?,” 32

Nationalist claims of particularity and the i­ magined singularity of national forma-

tions only become intelligible against and within a global grid of formally similar
nations and nation states.
—­manu gosw ami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form,” 785

In chapter 2 I discussed the discursive appropriation and mobilization of

themes of gender equality by right-­wing nationalist parties, in terms of the
re-­proposition of the classic theme of w ­ omen and the nation. “National”
­women are meta­phor­ically central to the nationalist proj­ect, I argued,
­because they are identifi d as “­bearers of the collective” and “biological
reproducers of the nation.”1 Understanding the nationalist trope, I further
maintained, helps us also account for the narratives that identify Muslim
and non-­western mi­grant ­women as victims to be rescued ­because the type
of nationalism ­these parties exhibit operates through a specific gendered
and sexual racist binary. I thus drew on notions of sexualization of racism
and racialization of sexism to explicate how and why far-­right national-
ists apply dif­fer­ent ste­reo­types to male and female foreigners, and portray
sexism as the exclusive domain of the racialized Other. Some questions,
however, still remain to be answered: have right-­wing nationalist parties
in all three countries limited themselves to evoking rescuing narratives,
or do they propose concrete rescuing policies as well? And what do t­ hese
rescuing discourses and policies mean in practice? Th s chapter attempts
to respond to ­these questions. In par­tic­u­lar, I chart how the theme of gen-
der equality in the context of widespread discourses depicting Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant ­women as “redeemable subjects” has been discussed
and concretely implemented within the so-­called civic integration policies
for third-­country nationals (tc ns). Pioneered by the Netherlands at the end
of the 1990s and then ­adopted at both the Eu­ro­pean and member-­state lev-
els from the mid-2000s onward, civic integration policies have become in-
creasingly gendered.2 The main purpose of ­these policies has been to make
non-­eu /non-­western immigrants’ long-­term residence dependent upon
tested results, or a certifi d commitment to learn the language, culture, and
values of the destination country, in some cases already in the country of
origin.3 Practically, this has resulted in several member-­states elaborating in-
tegration and pre-­integration procedures that succinctly package what each
nation-­state regards as the institutional and moral pillars of their socie­ties,
all while led by right-­wing governments. H ­ ere, gender equality and w ­ omen’s
rights appear at the top of the list as the most impor­tant shared values of
the nation, ones that mi­grants should know and re­spect. Particularly in the
Netherlands—­which was the fi st country to introduce integration programs
effectively already in the mi­grants’ countries of origin, as well as to assert that
­women’s and gay rights are tenets of its i­magined community—­this aspect of
civic integration policies has received signifi ant attention within dif­fer­ent
strands of scholarly lit­er­a­ture.4
Influential analysts of civic integration policies, particularly in the fi lds
of the sociology of citizenship and multiculturalism, have read the theme
of gender equality conveyed by them as the demonstration of the liberal,
as opposed to nationalist, character of the new trend in eu member-­states.
The po­liti­cal sociologists Christian Joppke and Yasemin Soysal have been
among the most prominent supporters of this interpretation in recent years.
In a series of texts monitoring the development of new policies concern-
ing the integration of immigrants, ­adopted by the Eu­ro­pean Union and
its member-­states since the early 2000s, Joppke has provided impor­tant
analyses of what he termed a “seismic shift” from multiculturalism to civic
integration.5 Joppke maintains that the “civic integration turn” has repre-
sented above all “the weakening of national distinctiveness and a conver-
gence to the general direction and content of integration policy.”6 In the
place of the national models of immigrants’ incorporation to which we
­were accustomed up u ­ ntil the 1990s—­the “republican” model in France,
the “multicultural” model in the Netherlands, and so forth—­the 2000s,

INTEGRATION POLICIES  79
according to this author, marked the transition ­toward a postnational
model, driven above all by the pro­cess of Eu­ro­pe­anization.7 Joppke sees
the convergence ­toward the postnational model of integration, or civic in-
tegration, taking place chiefly in terms of a “cultural standardization” of
Eu­ro­pean integration policies. According to his reading, all t­ hese policies
require non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants to be familiar with and re­spect val-
ues that are not peculiar to a specific nation, but that are “the joint stock” of
liberalism: liberty, democracy, and ­human rights, including ­women’s rights
and the rights of c­ hildren, as well as the rule of law.8 Even though he recog-
nizes that the implementation of this Eu­ro­pean agenda at the national level
might be pursued by means of illiberal and even repressive means—as we
­shall see soon—­nevertheless Joppke insists that such policies “are not born
of sources extrinsic to liberalism, such as nationalism or racism, but are in-
herent in liberalism itself.”9 For Joppke, t­ here are two main considerations
that rule out the possibility that civic integration policies have any connec-
tion with nationalism. First, they allegedly pres­ent a cognitive rather than
a normative character, requiring immigrants to know, but not necessarily
to intimately share, such liberal values as w ­ omen’s and gay rights.10 Second,
­these policies, in his view, aim to enhance social inclusion within the l­abor
market, which “is a world apart from old notions of cultural assimilation
and nation-­building.”11 Similarly, Soysal argued in a recent article that

despite the symbolic status they command, current citizenship and

integration tests do not reveal anything distinctive about the particu-
larities of the nation (bar the questions about ordinary symbols such as
the flag, the national anthem, the national poet) or a nationally distinct
philosophy of integration. A systematic review of the content of ­these
tests fi ds that the largest thematic category addresses the notions of
individual rights and democracy. . . . ​The questions to appraise values
are primarily related to the rights of the individual, such as civic free-
doms, and the rights of the underprivileged sections of society such as
­women and the disabled.12

Thus, “integration, as conveyed by t­ hese national-­ and European-­level

frameworks,” she concludes, “is not a nation-­centered proj­ect.”13 Instead,
Soysal argues that civic integration policies both prescribe the individual,
rather than the state, as the main ­bearer of responsibility for social cohe-
sion and rely on his or her capacity to be a productive member in the polity.

80  Chapter 3
 In separate ways and through dif­fer­ent trajectories, both scholars thus
maintain that the shift ­toward emphasis on mi­grants’ individual responsi-
bilities and productive capacities is the landmark of the civic integration
turn. As a consequence, the focus on individuals’ ­human rights, among
which ­women’s rights figu e prominently, attests to the truly liberal soul
of t­ hese policies. To put it differently, ­these authors suggest that the issue of
­women’s rights, with which newcomers are asked by civic integration pol-
icies to acquaint themselves and to re­spect, is not peculiar to a national
proj­ect and does not mark a nationalist turn. The new civic integration
policies thus represent a further step t­ oward the consolidation of Eu­ro­pean
states’ liberal vocation and increasingly postnational character, as against
the resurgence of nationalism, which Joppke and Soysal regard as a po­liti­
cal proj­ect and ideology extrinsic to liberalism. Though their analyses have
received several criticisms, the importance of Joppke’s and Soysal’s posi-
tion lies, fi st, in the fact that they have established the terms of the debate
on the philosophy that underpins the civic integration turn, such that their
perspective stands as a point of reference even for t­ hose aiming to take a
distance from it.14 In par­tic­u­lar, their analyses have taken hold in arguing
that nation-­states’ idiosyncrasies no longer play a discretionary, distinctive
role in their policies ­toward the integration of immigrants. Second, and
more impor­tant in the context of this book, they managed to make a per-
suasive argument in locating the shift ­toward the postnational, liberal state
of the civic integration policies in the centrality that t­ hese policies assign
to the theme of ­women’s individual rights.
Th s chapter aims to challenge this influential interpretation and to
demonstrate instead that the opposite of what Joppke and Soysal maintain
is actually the case. In par­tic­u­lar, I contend that the concrete national ar-
ticulation of the themes of gender equality and ­women’s rights within the
civic integration national programs is precisely what attests to the per­sis­
tence and even strengthening, rather than the disappearance, of a nation-
alist (and racist) trope, which I conceive as intrinsic and not extrinsic to
liberalism.15 Nationalism and liberalism as well as neoliberalism are indeed
historically and socially related po­liti­cal ideologies and political-­economic
strategies, rather than being poles apart, as Joppke in par­tic­u­lar argues. In
order to begin unraveling how the complex interlocking between national-
ism, racism, and (neo)liberalism underwrites the resort to ­women’s rights
in both discourses and policies on the integration of non-­eu /non-­western

INTEGRATION POLICIES  81
mi­grants, this chapter interrogates in par­tic­u­lar the arguments regarding
the purely liberal telos and po­liti­cal vocation of t­ hese policies. Chapter 4
then explores in more detail the arguments concerning their economic
liberalism.
I ­will fi st reconstruct the recent Eu­ro­pean agenda on the integration
of tc ns, which has “ratifi d,” albeit not inaugurated, the civic integration
policies increasingly ­adopted by a number of member-­states.16 Second, I
­will illustrate the national translations of the Eu­ro­pean agenda on mi­grants’
integration in the Netherlands, France, and Italy and pay par­tic­u­lar atten-
tion to the ways in which the theme of gender equality has been mobilized in
integration materials within each of t­ hese countries. The evidence drawn
from an in-­depth analy­sis of the articulation of the theme of gender equal-
ity that appears in national-­level civic integration policies and materials, I
argue, is precisely what indicates the considerably nationalist (and racist)
po­liti­cal matrix of the civic integration turn, as against t­ hose interpretations
that deny the presence or per­sis­tence of such a matrix. Implemented by
right-­wing neoliberal governments with the direct support of right-­wing
nationalist parties (as in Italy) or strongly influenced by the rising national-
ist and xenophobic climate that intensifi d in the second half of the 2000s
(like in France and the Netherlands), civic integration policies are arguably
the most concrete and insidious form of the institutionalization of femona-
tionalism. Nowhere ­else as within ­these policies, in fact, is the femonation-
alist ideological formation more plainly presented as a narrative of rescue
targeting mi­grant ­women (Muslim and non-­Muslim alike) according to
a nationalist register. Furthermore, nowhere e­ lse does femonationalism
more concretely appear as a gendered and racialized interpellation of ­these
­women by the nation-­state apparatus.

Civic Integration in the Eu­ro­pean Agenda: ­Legal Immigration

and Formal Equality

Between 2005 and 2011the Eu­ro­pean Commission (ec ) issued three docu-
ments regarding the integration of tc ns that are of par­tic­u­lar importance
for reconstructing the recent Eu­ro­pean agenda on civic integration: (1) the
2005 and (2) 2011communications from the Commission to the E ­ u­ro­pean
Parliament, the Council, the Eu­ro­pean economic and social committee, and
the committee of the regions—­hereafter referred to, respectively, as the

82 Chapter 3
“2005 Communication” and “2011 Communication”—­and (3) the “Com-
mission Staff Working Paper 2011”that accompanies the 2011Communi-
cation and hereafter referred to as the “2011cswp.” Th ­ ese documents are
signifi ant ­because they both synthesize the decisions taken at the eu
level regarding mi­grants’ integration, and they outline the philosophy that
informs the new integration agenda across the continent. Due to its im-
portance for analyzing especially the fi st stages of the implementation of
integration policies in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, in this chapter
I concentrate mainly on the 2005 Communication, whereas in the next
chapter I w ­ ill document the changes introduced by the 2011Communica-
tion and the 2011cswp .
The 2005 Communication, entitled “A Common Agenda for Integration—­
Framework for the Integration of Thi d-­Country Nationals in the Eu­ro­pean
Union,” was the fi st step at the eu level t­ oward establishing a new strat-
egy on the integration of non-­European citizens, ­after the indications con-
tained in the Tampere Program of 1999. The 2005 Communication was
focused above all on instituting the common eu framework for integration
through the adoption of the so-­called common basic princi­ples (cbps), a
list of eleven general guidelines that ­were agreed upon by the Justice and
Home Aff irs ministers of the eu member-­states in the November 2004
Council of the Eu­ro­pean Union. Notably, the ministers who approved the
Eu­ro­pean Council Agreement of 2004 included the right-­wing nationalist
Rita Verdonk, minister for Integration and Immigration of the Netherlands
from 2003 ­until 2006. 17 Overall, the aim of the cbps was to “assist Member
States in formulating integration policies” and to be used to “set priori-
ties and further develop” member states’ own goals on integration.18 Th
eleven cbps all rest upon cbp 1, which frames integration as a “dynamic,
two-­way pro­cess of mutual accommodation by all Thi d-­Country Nation-
als and residents of member states.” Based on the two-­way princi­ple, the
remaining ten cbps articulate the ways in which the main actors involved
(i.e., mi­grants and receiving socie­ties) should enact the pro­cess of mutual
accommodation. On the one hand, the former are required to “re­spect the
basic values of the Eu­ro­pean Union” (cbp 2), to contribute to the “host so-
ciety” with their “employment” (cbp 3), and to acquire a “basic knowledge
of the host society’s language, history, and institutions” (cbp 4). On the
other hand, residents of the member-­states and especially institutions at
the member-­state level are invited to make “efforts in education” (cbp 5),

INTEGRATION POLICIES  83
to adopt antidiscriminatory policies in access to public and private insti-
tutions (cbp 6) and demo­cratic arenas (cbp 9), and to create moments of
cultural interaction (cbp 7). Freedom of religion should be guaranteed,
“­unless practices confli t with other inviolable Eu­ro­pean rights or with
national law” (cbp 8).19 In terms of the cbps that emphasize the role of
tc ns in the integration pro­cess, cbp 4 deserves par­tic­u­lar attention. The
requirement that mi­grants acquire “basic knowledge of the host society’s
language, history, and institutions” has in fact inspired the policies that
now inform a number of countries’ concrete arrangements for integration.
In terms of gender equality, what is noticeable in this initial document
is the relative paucity of references to it, when compared to the center-­
stage status gender equality w ­ ill acquire in subsequent eu documents (on
which more in chapter 4) and within national legislations, as I ­will argue
in the next sections. Indeed, t­ here are five mentions of gender in the 2005
Communication. Such references mainly occur in order to recommend
the gender mainstreaming of all initiatives aimed at the integration of
tc ns, particularly in terms of nondiscrimination in the ­labor market and
in terms of demo­cratic participation in public and private institutions. At
the eu level, in other words, gender equality for non-­eu mi­grant ­women is
conceived mainly in terms of equal opportunities and equal access to the
public sphere, particularly to the paid workforce.
In the following section I ­will illustrate how the Dutch, French, and
Italian governments have translated the eu guidelines into concrete provi-
sions. First, I ­will provide an overview of the main changes affecting the
Dutch, French, and Italian models of integration ­after the introduction of
the civic integration guidelines; second, I w ­ ill explore the gender dimen-
sions of each national program and analyze what they convey in terms of
ideas on gender equality and repre­sen­ta­tions of Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women.

National(ist) Translations of Civic Integration

Between 2005 and 2012, clearly inspired by the Eu­ro­pean guidelines, the
Netherlands, France, and Italy ­adopted new laws on non-­eu /non-­western
mi­grants’ integration. All of them, however, chose—­particularly at the
initial stages of the new laws’ implementation—to privilege the eu indi-
cations on cultural integration, in ways that mark a defin te turn ­toward

84 Chapter 3
cultural assimilation and the exclusion of cultural difference. In the Neth-
erlands from the 1990s onward, successive governments had already begun
to develop policies that defi ed integration as the mi­grant’s commitment
to acquiring knowledge of Dutch language and society. ­Until then ­there
­were no integration policies as such, since it was generally thought that
mi­grants would eventually return to their countries of origin. Programs
for familiarization with Dutch society and culture ­were developed only
for Dutch citizens who returned to the Netherlands from the Dutch colo-
nies. Ethnic Dutch ­women in par­tic­u­lar ­were given courses on domestic
arrangements and proper Dutch h ­ ouse­keeping.20 With the establishment
of “ethnic minorities policies” (Minderhedennota) in the early 1980s—­that
is, the policies at the basis of Dutch multiculturalism—­some ethnic minor-
ity groups ­were recognized and funded by the state to or­ga­nize schools and
recreational activities, thereby complying with the pillarization model.21 In
accordance with such a model, integration was conceived as a pro­cess of
“emancipation” taking place not within Dutch society but within separate
institutions like religious schools and ethnic-­minority broadcast networks
that ­were funded by the state. Though “ethnic minorities policies” regis-
tered the fact that the Dutch governments had begun regarding immi-
grants as nontemporary settlers, the maintenance of their native languages
was still considered as a way to facilitate their return to their homelands.22
Partly following the release of statistics on mi­grants’ unemployment and
social marginalization, and partly due to the international concern with
Islamic fundamentalism, in the 1990s multiculturalism was no longer
believed to be feasible and integration assumed new meanings, above all
that of learning the Dutch language.23 Individualized rather than collec-
tive/ethnic group–­based policies for inclusion began to be established by
stressing integration programs as ways for non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants
to achieve active citizenship and become autonomous individuals.
A number of events in the 2000s further contributed to spreading the
sense that multiculturalism had failed and that integration policies had
to become stricter and more selective. Beside the impact of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11,anti-­immigration sentiments w ­ ere also nourished by dra-
matic domestic events like the murders of the right-­wing anti-­immigration
politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and of the film director Theo van Gogh
in 2004, both related to their anti-­Islam statements (see chapter  1). The
assassination of Fortuyn, during the national election campaign in which

INTEGRATION POLICIES  85
he was r­ unning for a list taking his name, occurred in the context of
(and fueled) a general shift to the right. Playing a prominent role in the
­conservative governments that followed the 2002 elections was Verdonk.
In par­tic­u­lar, she was able not only to pass the most restrictive policies on
integration in the history of the country, but also to influence the Eu­ro­
pean and other member-­states’ agenda on immigrants’ integration policies.
Thus in December 2005, the Balkenende II cabinet, with Verdonk among
its ministers, passed the Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet inburgering
in het buitenland), which came into force in 2006. The new law required
non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants seeking to migrate to the Netherlands for
­family reunifi ation or for religious ser­vices to demonstrate a basic knowl-
edge of the Dutch language and of Dutch society prior to their arrival. Th s
was the fi st act of this type by an eu member-­state and set the pre­ce­dent
for its adoption in other countries. According to the new provision, pre-­
integration became a precondition for admission into the country, particu-
larly for certain types of mi­grants. As Saskia Bonjour and Doutje Lettinga
report, in the parliamentary discussions from 2004 onward, the govern-
ment referred to certain categories of f­ amily mi­grants as “unfit” for Dutch
society. “An impor­tant part of ­these [­family mi­grants] has characteristics
that are averse to a good integration into Dutch society. Most prominent
among ­these . . . ​is the group of marriage mi­grants from Turkey and
Morocco.”24 The selective intent of the policies was concretely implemented
by making the Civic Integration Abroad test compulsory for all except
­family members from western nations: eu /Eu­ro­pean Economic Area (eea )
citizens, and ­those from Australia, Canada, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand,
South ­Korea, the United States, and the Vatican City. Furthermore, f­ amily
members of persons holding a visa permit for high-­skilled work (a “blue
card”) ­were not required to take the exam abroad. In short, the restrictions
on ­family reunifi ation conveyed by t­ hese rules did not apply to western
nationals, “nor to mi­grants occupying a privileged position on the transna-
tional ­labor market.”25 The Civic Integration Exam abroad is divided into
three parts, aiming at examining knowledge of Dutch society (Kennis van
de Nederlandse Samenleving), language skills in spoken Dutch (Gespro-
ken Nederlands), and the understanding of written Dutch (Geletterdheid
en Begrijpend Lezen). In order to pass the pre-­integration test abroad,
applicants are invited to acquire a self-­study kit (which costs €110 at the
time of writing) containing self-­study materials aimed at enabling the ap-

86 Chapter 3
plicants to familiarize themselves with the exam requirements. Applicants
who pass the exam abroad and receive the machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf
(provisional residence permit) in their country of origin must pass the
Civic Integration test in the Netherlands within three and a half years of
arrival, in order to obtain a permanent residence permit.
In January 2007 a new law, that is, the Civic Integration Act (Wet in-
burgering), followed, regulating the integration procedure upon arrival
in the Netherlands. The new law aimed to strengthen the “civic integra-
tion” components of the previous 1998 law that had established mandatory
participation in language courses for newcomers, but without testing the
outcome. Instead, the 2007 law applied a new defin tion of integration (in-
burgering) in which participation in courses was no longer suffici t; in the
new legislation, integration (which was defi ed as knowledge of Dutch soci-
ety and language) needed to be demonstrated through an exam result.26 Th
Civic Integration exam in the Netherlands is compulsory for all foreigners,
with exceptions made for minors and the el­derly, eu citizens, and ­people
who had lived in the Netherlands for at least eight years before the age of
sixteen. The Civic Integration exam consists of two parts: a practical part
and a central part. The practical part evaluates the language skills of the ap-
plicant as well as his or her ability to arrange life in the Netherlands.27 Th
central part includes an electronic practical exam, an oral Dutch-­language
test, and a test of knowledge about Dutch society.28 The passing of the exam
is certifi d by an integration diploma, which enables the mi­grant to apply
for a permanent residence permit. Unlike in the case of the Civic Integra-
tion Abroad exam, ­there is no offi al self-­study package, so applicants must
rely on one of the many study kits available on the market at their own
expense.29 At this point, we should recall that the leader of the pvv, Geert
Wilders, was a member of Verdonk’s vvd party ­until 2004, that is, the po­
liti­cal force promoting civic integration in Eu­rope, before he founded his
own group (the pvv ) in 2006. Although advocating an even stricter turn
against immigration and demanding the closure of borders for non-­western
mi­grants, Wilders mostly supported the civic integration policies’ main pro-
visions for settled mi­grants. The new mea­sures ­were thus largely influenced
by a broad set of alliances within the Dutch nationalist right.
As in the Netherlands, in France too the adoption in 2006 of a new
law on immigration and integration required demonstration of mastery of
French and knowledge of the country’s history, institutions, and values in

INTEGRATION POLICIES  87
 order to acquire ­legal residence in the country.30 The new law, proposed by
the then–­Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy (ump), sought to redesign
French legislation concerning immigration and integration in three di-
rections: (1) to adopt the strategy of “selective immigration” (immigration
choisie) as opposed to “infli ted immigration” (immigration subie) and to
­favor the entry of high-­skilled mi­grants; (2) to promote mandatory “repub-
lican integration” (intégration républicaine) for potential long-­term resi-
dents through the establishment of the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration
(cai; Contract for Reception and Integration); and (3) to adopt the strategy
of codevelopment to achieve “true partnership” with the countries of ori-
gin in migration management. The main novelty introduced by the 2006
law is the mandatory signing of the cai . Already established in 2003 on
a voluntary basis, since 2006 tc ns who intend to ­settle in France have to
sign a contract with the state in order to obtain l­egal residency for up to
four years before they can be granted permanent residency and become
candidates for naturalization. The contract applies to all foreigners with the
exception of nationals of Eu­ro­pean Union states, of the eea , and of the Swiss
Confederation; of foreigners who have been educated for at least three
years in a French secondary education institution overseas; and of foreign-
ers between the ages of sixteen and eigh­teen born in France to foreign
parents who already live in France, or whose stable residence has been in
France for at least five years since the age of eleven. Th s law was supple-
mented in November 2007 with two new provisions: the fi st establishes an
integration contract for the ­family within the framework of ­family reunifi-
cation (Contract d’Accueil et d’Intégration pour la Famille; caif ), and the
second introduces mandatory civic integration in the country of origin for
f­ amily members.31 Th caif requires spouses and parents to sign a contract
in which they commit to attend a one-­day training session concerning the
rights and duties of parenthood in France. The Civic Integration Abroad
exam applies only to ­family members seeking to join their spouses, part-
ners, or parents who had lived in France for at least one year. The exam
consists of an assessment of their language skills and knowledge of repub-
lican values. If their language skills are deemed insuffici t, the applicant
is obliged to attend language courses, provided by the French state for ­free.
The establishment of the new law on mandatory integration in France
resulted from a number of ­factors. Partly, it followed the Eu­ro­pean direc-
tives on the rights of non-­eu mi­grants as long-­term residents, on ­family re-

88 Chapter 3
unifi ation, and on the f­ ree movement of persons; partly, it was influenced
by the indications contained in the 2005 Communication. However, it was
also rooted in domestic ­factors (po­liti­cal and institutional) and the history
of the French national model of citizenship and inclusion.32 On the one
hand, like in the Netherlands, the electoral success of the far right in the
2000s contributed to a general shift t­ oward more restrictive policies on im-
migration.33 On the other hand, the new discourse of “republican integra-
tion” in many re­spects represented the most recent configur tion in a longer
history of policies and approaches to immigrants’ inclusion in French so-
ciety marked by an always-­present republican assimilationist temptation.34
Though the term “assimilation” is not used in France—­becoming taboo in
the 1960s ­because it was considered too reminiscent of the colonial past,
and thus substituted by the less ideologically charged “insertion”—at the
end of the 1970s the term “integration” began to be regularly used by the
right to demand immigrants’ commitment to French society.35 By the end
of the 1980s, however, it extended from the right-­wing vocabulary to the
offi al lexicon of the socialists, who employed it in reference to settled
mi­grants, mostly of Maghreb origin. Between 1989 and 1991 a ­whole appa-
ratus on integration was constituted. Th s included a general secretary for
integration, the creation of an inter-­ministerial committee on integration,
and the Haut Conseil à l’intégration (hci ; High Council for Integration).
According to Françoise Gaspard, it was the Muslim head­scarf controversy
that provoked “the passage from the discourse to the institutionalization”
of integration.36 From the end of the 1980s onward, therefore, integration has
been advocated as the antidote against the alleged increasing “communal-
ism” of immigrants, particularly Muslims, of which the female head­scarf
was taken to be the most evident sign.37
In Italy too the integration of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants has be-
come a central component of policies and public discourses on migration,
particularly following the establishment of the fi st comprehensive law
regulating immigration, the Law N. 40 of March 6, 1998, known as the
Testo Unico Sull’Immigrazione (Single Text on Immigration), or “Legge
Turco-­Napolitano.” It would not be u ­ ntil the beginning of the 2000s, how-
ever, that the link between immigration management and integration
consolidated. On the one hand, this was due to the Italian po­liti­cal land-
scape shifting to the right. ­Here, as discussed in chapter 1, migration was
increasingly linked to securitarian concerns and Islamophobia.38 On the

INTEGRATION POLICIES  89
other hand, the definitive conflation of migration and integration policies
­toward the end of the 2000s was due to the late reception in Italy—­late
when compared to the Netherlands and France—of the Eu­ro­pean guidelines
on civic integration. Indeed, a decisive step was taken in the direction of the
adoption of civic integration policies u ­ nder Roberto Maroni, the Northern
League Minister of the Interior in the Berlusconi IV cabinet. In 2009 Ma-
roni passed law 94, part of a “security package” (pacchetto sicurezza), which
introduced the obligation for non-­eu mi­grants applying for a visa to sign
an “agreement of integration” (accordo di integrazione) with the Italian
state. All non-­eu mi­grants aged sixteen and older entering Italy for the fi st
time and applying for a residence permit of at least one year had to sign
the agreement of integration. The applicant then receives sixteen credits,
which attest to the signatory having a mastery of spoken Italian corre-
sponding to the a 1 level and suffici t knowledge of Italian culture and
society. The credits can be reduced if the applicant is accused of crimes
or administrative fraud. By signing the agreement, the mi­grant commits
to achieve an a 2-­level mastery of Italian and suffici t knowledge of the
“Italian constitution,” “public institutions,” and “civic life” (i.e., school and
health system, social ser­vices, ­labor market, and fiscal obligations) within
two years from the date of the signature. She or he also commits to send
­children (if any) to school, to achieve a total of thirty credits within two
years, and to adhere to the “charter of the values of citizenship and inte-
gration” (carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione). If the total
number of thirty credits is not reached by the second year, the authorities
can grant the applicant one more year to do so. If the signatory is believed
to have made no effort to achieve them and the number of credits is zero
(or below), the applicant ­will be denied the renewal of the permit and ­will
be expelled from the country.
With the establishment of the agreement, the philosophy under­lying
integration policies in Italy underwent a dramatic change. Integration was
now conceived as a “duty” rather than a “right.”39 Furthermore, the difference
between immigration and integration policy dis­appeared, and mi­grants had
to demonstrate being integrated in order to renew their stay in the country.
Italy had become a destination country for mass immigration particularly
in the 1990s, and, having established its fi st extensive law regulating mi-
gration issues only at the end of that de­cade, its integration policies have
tended to be rather erratic.40 As I mentioned above, it was only at the be-

90  Chapter 3
ginning of the 2000s that integration became a ­matter of debate and po­
liti­cal concern. The reception of the Eu­ro­pean civic integration guidelines
in a country with a “weak” tradition on the ­matter, and particularly in a
conjuncture dominated by the securitarian and racist agenda of right-­wing
nationalists, has thus turned integration policies into a discursively harsh but
also practically rather confused pro­cess. Whereas the “regulation concerning
the discipline of the agreement of integration between the foreigner and
the state” (regolamento concernente la disciplina dell’accordo di integrazione
tra lo straniero e lo stato), passed in March 2012, established the main pro-
cedures of the agreement of integration, the civic integration component
of the new law—­that is, the didactic material to be taught to mi­grants, the
courses to be followed in order to improve the Italian language, history, and
culture—­has been characterized by confusion and regional idiosyncrasies.

­ ere are signifi ant differences among the three countries in their leg-
Th
islation on integration. For instance, while the civic integration didactic
program in France is centralized and homogeneous, it is decentralized and
heterogeneous in the Netherlands and Italy. Similarly, the existence and se-
verity of the pre-­integration test to be undertaken in the country of origin
varies according to the par­tic­u­lar receiving country, as does the category of
mi­grants that are required to take the pre-­integration test abroad (exclud-
ing, for instance, western citizens in the case of the Netherlands). Never-
theless, they all share an under­lying guiding philosophy: namely, one that
establishes knowledge of the country’s language, institutions, history, and
“dominant” culture as the fundamental tenet of the ­whole new regulation’s
infrastructure. In other words, what­ever the concrete form taken by the civic
integration programs in ­these contexts, what is notable is that civic integra-
tion policies have an obligatory character, and their nonobservance can be
punished by e­ ither fi ancial penalties or denial of a l­egal residence permit.
Furthermore, the requirement that mi­grants possess the knowledge con-
sidered crucial to integration in the receiving country turns integration
into an a priori condition rather than a pro­cess that occurs over time.41 Th
new dogma of civic integration since the end of the 2000s in fact conceives
of it not as a pro­cess that begins in the country of destination and follows
a longue durée of ­trials and mediations—­that is, the natu­ral component
of any pro­cess of adjustment to a new societal order, the responsibility

INTEGRATION POLICIES  91
for which should fall, above all, on the shoulders of the receiving society’s
institutions. Instead, civic integration programs turn the state of “being
integrated” into an entirely individual aff ir as well as, paradoxically, into
a prerequisite that the mi­grant should possess before the ­actual contact
with the new society begins. Th s is the case in the Netherlands, where
non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants must familiarize themselves with the Dutch
language, history, and “culture” before they are allowed entry to the coun-
try, and in France and Italy, where newcomers’ integration becomes both a
pro­cess of assessing the possession of certain linguistic skills and commit-
ment to re­spect the nation’s values, and a mechanism of “republican indoc-
trination” whose pace and stages are standardized and monitored by means
of contractual obligations. The similarities among the three countries, in
other words, do not testify to a shift ­toward a cosmopolitan and nation-­
neutral system of acquaintance with standard, allegedly liberal rules equal
among all of them, as Joppke maintains. Rather, both the form (i.e., the
integration mechanism “as injunction” that is repeated in all contexts) and
the content (the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of each nation, taught to
newcomers through integration materials, as we s­ hall see in the following
sections) of the new civic integration devices only attest to the per­sis­tence
of a substantially nationalist motive. Th s latter is further demonstrated
when we look at the way in which the value of gender equality—­according
to Joppke and Soysal, the nation-­neutral ele­ment of the civic integration
turn par excellence—­has been concretely translated into ­actual policies
and didactic materials for integration.

The Gender Dimensions of Civic Integration

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the theme of gender

equality has become so central to new policies on civic integration that
influential po­liti­cal sociologists like Joppke and Soysal interpreted it as an
indicator and demonstration of the postnational and liberal (as opposed
to nationalist or assimilationist) character of the new turn in the Eu­ro­pean
integration agenda. But how is equality between w ­ omen and men concretely
discussed and implemented within t­ hese policies? What kind of equality is
put forward, and who are the ­women and men targeted by ­these programs
at the nation-­state level? For the purposes of an analy­sis of the gender as-
pects within the new civic integration programs in the three countries,

92 Chapter 3
I have employed a multimethod approach. In order to detect the main
ways in which w ­ omen’s rights have become an integral part of the new
provisions, I used critical discourse analy­sis (c da ) of relevant policies,
visual materials and didactic materials, in-­depth interviews with key re-
spondents, and participant observation at the introductory sessions that
are part of some of the civic integration programs.42 Given that visual ma-
terials, didactic materials, and integration sessions are the resources that
states have developed in order to portray what they regard as the shared
and most impor­tant values of their socie­ties to be shown or taught to
newcomers, they constitute the privileged locus for concretely disclos-
ing the ideas of gender equality, the repre­sen­ta­tions of mi­grant men and
­women principally targeted by ­these policies, and, ultimately, the self-­image
of the nation offered to the foreigner, as well as the (ste­reo­typical) image of
the foreigner held by the state policy makers.
In the Netherlands, the emphasis that the new civic integration pro-
grams have put upon gender equality as a pillar value of the Dutch social
contract is readily detectable in the materials used for not only the Civic
Integration Abroad exam but also for the exam required within three and a
half years of the mi­grant’s ac­cep­tance in the country. Concerning the exam
abroad, one of the most impor­tant documents for the preparation of the
exam is the movie Naar Nederland (­Going to the Netherlands). The movie
is included in the offi al self-­study package, which applicants abroad must
acquire in order to prepare for the examination.43 Naar Nederland deals
with dif­fer­ent aspects of life in the destination country—­history, customs,
health, work, childrearing, language, and the exam itself—­emphasizing
quite strongly the difficulties of integrating and, thus, the importance
of the mi­grant’s goodwill.44 Th oughout the movie, mentions of gender
equality as a key value of Dutch society are very frequent. For instance, the
movie shows topless ­women sunbathing on Dutch beaches, or pictures of
­women in bikinis, presumably in order to convey the message that Dutch
­women enjoy sexual freedom and that nudity is not taboo.45 In one scene
images of a man undertaking domestic chores in the kitchen are accom-
panied by the narration, “­Don’t be surprised if you see a man standing at the
cooker with an apron on ­because in many families men and ­women fulfill
the same roles.” In another section, the narrator stresses how be­hav­iors that
non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants might consider culture-­based (like genital
mutilations) or private business (like domestic vio­lence) are forbidden by

INTEGRATION POLICIES  93
Dutch law and severely sanctioned in the country. But the longest sec-
tions of the movie, conveying clear messages addressed to non-­eu /non-­
western mi­grant ­women, concern work and ­children’s education. While I
­will deal with the former in chapter 4, let me now briefly examine the latter.
The movie explains that the best upbringing comes from a ­mother—­and
it is especially ­mothers who are mentioned ­here—­who gets involved in
her c­ hildren’s education by ­going into the school, engaging in its activities,
and talking to the teachers. Th s ­whole message is expressed by showing
the example of a young ­mother of Moroccan origin who wears a scarf and
organizes playtime in her child’s school. The ­whole section on ­children’s
education is designed to communicate that “normal” families in the Neth-
erlands are nuclear ones, composed of two parents or sometimes just one,
but not enlarged families. Mi­grant ­mothers, thus, are put center stage as
essential vectors of integration.
The exam material’s focus on proper motherhood stems from the em-
phasis put by the Participatie van Vrouwen uit Etnische Minderheden
(pavem; Participation of Ethnic Minority W ­ omen) commission on priv-
ileging the mothering role as an antidote against the failures of multicul-
turalism. As already mentioned in chapter 1, the pavem commission was
established in 2003 by the right-­wing politician Rita Verdonk when she
was minister for Integration and Immigration. The stated goal of pavem
was to elaborate policies to tackle the alleged “isolated position of ­women
from ethnic minorities” in Dutch society. However, as Kate Kirk notes,
“The guiding philosophy ­behind the efforts of the commission was ‘If you
educate a m ­ other, you educate a ­family.’ ”46 The main target of pavem, and
of the civic integration policies, was in fact non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant
and ethnic minority w ­ omen qua ­mothers. Although the requirements for
­family reunifi ation set by Dutch law u ­ nder the Civic Integration Abroad
act had as one of their goals reducing the number of f­ amily members, the
pragmatic approach of the new provision on the integration of incoming
mi­grant ­women was to target them as key mediators in integrating the
second generations: that is, to teach them how to become good “Dutch-
ified” parents.47 The gendering of the civic integration turn by means
of the targeting of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women as ­mothers had
its roots in the conviction that second-­generation mi­grant ­children’s poor
educational and work outcomes ­were due to their ­mothers’ supposedly
poor societal integration and Muslim background.48 By the same token,

94 Chapter 3
f­ amily members applying for reunifi ation in the Netherlands had to be
obliged to acquire a certain degree of integration (translated as knowledge
of Dutch language and society) in order for the country to avoid importing
“bad ­mothers.”49 In this way, as Kate Kirk and Semin Suvarieriol note, the
“ ‘culturalization’ of the integration debate resulted in more emphasis being
placed on issues in the private realm, such as ­family, sexuality, dress, and
vio­lence against ­women.”50
The focus on the non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­mother as the key agent
of integration is clear also in the logic of the Dutch exam that newcom-
ers must undertake within three and a half years from their arrival in the
Netherlands. The practical part of the exam is of par­tic­u­lar interest ­here.
One of the ways this part can be passed is through evidence collection, that
is, through the preparation of a portfolio demonstrating the applicant’s
knowledge of Dutch language and society. Although in princi­ple applicants
can choose the subject on which they prepare their portfolio, they are often
directed down specific paths during the initial intake meeting at the mu-
nicipality where they are assigned for their exam.51 Interestingly, the port-
folio “Education, Health and Parenting,” or ogo (Onderwijs, Gezondheid
en Opvoeding), which covers topics illustrating good parenting models
and requires the collection of documents demonstrating the fulfillment
of good parenting tasks, is attended mostly by w ­ omen. “As such, not only
are the ogo tasks defi ed as ­women’s tasks, but the contents of this portfo-
lio mainly prepares mi­grant ­women to assume roles as ­mothers.”52 In the
Electronisch Praktijk Examen (epe; practical civic integration exam) many
of the same themes concerning good parenting are repeated and visually
represented by ­women, thereby supporting the idea that parenting is, in
the end, the w­ omen’s job. As Kate Kirk rightly emphasized, ultimately the
emancipation of mi­grant ­women

is understood as a means to improve the socio-­economic per­for­mance

of second generation immigrants through educated mothering and a way
to ameliorate social decay in mi­grant neighborhoods through ­women’s
participation in civil society. W
­ omen are thus addressed as m­ others . . . ​
not as individual po­liti­cal and social actors. The quality of a w
­ oman’s
citizenship is largely determined by her per­for­mance as a parent and as
a neighbor, while that of her husband is mea­sured by his ­labor market
participation.53

INTEGRATION POLICIES  95
Though presented as a tool to promote gender equality and the emancipa-
tion of mi­grant ­women, the Dutch civic integration infrastructure in fact
supports a traditional and rather unequal idea of the sexual division of ­labor
and, ultimately, womanhood. All in all, whereas equality between w ­ omen
and men is foregrounded as an achievement that belongs to the fabric of
Dutch society—­seemingly in opposition to non-­western cultures where it
is often explic­itly assumed to be neglected—­non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant
­women are also sent contradictory messages in which they are encouraged to
be both emancipated, nontraditional subjects and good m ­ others. Such an
ambivalence, as we ­will see further in chapter 4, traverses the ­whole civic
integration program.
In France, the emphasis upon re­spect for gender equality as a key com-
ponent for mi­grants’ successful integration was a foundational moment
in the design of the ­whole civic integration proj­ect from the outset. The
idea of establishing integration as a “contractual obligation” for non-­eu
mi­grants became operative ­after the release of the report entitled Le con-
trat et l’intégration (The contract and integration), which was prepared by
the hci in 2003.54 Crucially, in the report the hci addressed mainly the
youth from difficult neighborhoods and ­women with an immigrant back-
ground as the priority targets of the contract of integration. Although the
hci , unlike the pavem in the Netherlands, was not established specifi ally
to address non-­eu mi­grant ­women’s issues, the working group that elabo-
rated the long section of the 2003 report on gender equality was composed
mostly of w ­ omen. Furthermore, the president of the hci in that year was
the well-­known female phi­los­o­pher Blandine Kriegel, an advisor to Jacques
Chirac and a strong advocate for the French secularist feminist tradition.
The prominence assigned to the issue of mi­grant ­women’s rights in the
development of the guidelines on the contract of integration was partly the
result of the feminization of the issue of mi­grants’ integration dating from
the 1989 head­scarf controversy (see chapter 1); but it also emerged from
the mobilization of some French feminists who from the 1990s onward
endorsed the cause of secularism as the most impor­tant antidote against
what they regarded as the constitutively oppressive nature of Islam for
­women. Th oughout the hci report, the prob­lems of integrating ­women
from a migration background ( femmes issues de l’immigration) ­were mainly
identifi d with their lack of access to, or knowledge of, their civil rights in
relation to issues such as forced marriages, polygamy, and genital muti-

96 Chapter 3
lations. Non-­eu mi­grant ­women’s rights ­were thus strongly affirmed in
opposition to a ste­reo­typical image of non-­eu and non-­western ­women
more generally as victims of gender-­based vio­lence stemming from their
religious or cultural affiliations, as well as from what was represented as
their oppressive f­ amily life.
As article 5 of the 2006 law reads, “Civic education includes a pre­sen­ta­
tion of French institutions and values of the Republic, including equality
between men and ­women and secularism.”55 Gender equality is thus given
a prominent role as a pillar of France, alongside and even listed before
what has been defi ed as the quin­tes­sen­tial value of the French Republic,
namely, secularism (laïcité). As noted by Éric Fassin, French civic integra-
tion has become “no longer about equality between races, nor between
classes: republican equality has become equality between the sexes.”56
Accordingly, the ­whole integration infrastructure, from the introductory
meeting to the civic integration session, repeatedly and explic­itly mentions
equality between ­women and men as a key value of French society and
also implicitly conveys messages with strong gender dimensions. The in-
tegration materials available to mi­grants applying for a visa are mainly of
two types: a booklet with a range of general information on how to live in
France and a video, which is shown to newcomers during the integration
introductory session.
The booklet entitled Vivre en France (Living in France), which consti-
tutes the basis for the civic session, includes every­thing that applicants are
expected to follow as part of their contractual obligations.57 Divided into
seven main parts (France; work; ­family; school; health; social life; practical
life), equality between men and ­women appears in the very fi st part discuss-
ing the institutions of France, right ­after the introductory section recall-
ing the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
the Citizen. However, a specific interpretation of gender equality emerges
from the section devoted to this topic. Gender equality is, in fact, men-
tioned mainly in reference to the f­ amily. Husband and wife are equal, as
the booklet recites, and make impor­tant decisions as equal partners. For
instance, the booklet notes that even when the w ­ oman does not work, she
signs the ­couple’s tax declaration and she does not need her husband’s au-
thorization to work or to open a bank account. The booklet also refers to
parents’ joint authority over ­children and to their joint role in deciding about
education. The other parts of the section refer to freedom of marriage and

INTEGRATION POLICIES  97
 state that forced marriage and polygamy are illegal. The section concludes
with the following warning: “In general, remember that housing condi-
tions and resources of polygamous families in France are not conducive
to good integration in par­tic­u­lar for ­children.”58 The short video Vivre En-
semble, en France (Living together in France), which newcomers must view
during the integration introductory meeting at the integration offices or
the Offic Français de l’Immigration et de l’Intégration (ofii ), mainly re-
peats the booklet’s contents regarding gender equality in the f­ amily.59
Up ­until 2005 civic integration policies in France targeted especially
­family members, who constituted 50 ­percent of non-­eu mi­grants granted
a residence permit.60 Therefore, like in the Netherlands, while the tightening
of the entry criteria must be read in light of the new discourse on immigra-
tion established by right-­wing governments in the 2000s (one that aimed
to stop “infli ted immigration” [immigration subie] and to give priority to
“selective immigration” [immigration choisie]), the main goal ­behind the
establishment of new policies for integrating ­those who ­were allowed to
enter the country was to turn them into emancipated ­women and, above
all, good ­mothers.61 As I noted above, the cai was followed in 2007 by
an integration contract, the caif , for the f­ amily within the framework
of ­family reunifi ation. ­Those signing the latter must attend the one-­day
course on the rights and duties of parents; failure to do so can be sanc-
tioned with the cessation of f­ amily social benefits (allocations familiales) and
could lead to a refusal to renew their temporary visa (carte de séjour) or
to grant them a residence permit (carte de resident) and even to expulsion
from the country.62 As in the Netherlands, in France the increasing focus
upon the ­family as the central unit of integration stems from the idea that the
failures of “multiculturalism” began in the deviant mi­grant ­family.63 Th
2005 riots, for instance, which ­were invoked as one of the main indicators
of prob­lems in the integration of second-­ and third-­generation mi­grants
in French society, ­were explained in terms of a lack of discipline or clear
parental roles in non-­western mi­grants’ polygamous anomic families.64
Once again, non-­eu mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar are targeted in their role
as ­mothers, or cultural reproducers of the ­future generations. As could be
read on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, “­Women play an essen-
tial role within the pro­cess of integration, especially of their families and
c­ hildren.”65 However, the centrality attributed to m ­ others and their role in
the integration of ­children, and the portrayal of integration as an opportu-

98 Chapter 3
nity for them and the ­family, is not without strong ambiguities. Whereas
non-­eu mi­grant ­mothers, particularly Muslims, are called upon to take
responsibility for integrating their ­children, French schools have also be-
come fortresses that are not accessible to many of them, ­unless they accept
to also be “like French w ­ omen.” One of the consequences of the 2004 law
banning religious symbols from public schools has been that of turning
the school premises into spaces in which Muslim ­mothers in par­tic­u­lar are
not welcome. All across France t­ here have been numerous cases of Muslim
veiled ­women—­sometimes of French nationality—­who ­were not allowed
to enter schools ­because of their clothing. The gender equality rhe­toric that
informs the civic integration pro­cess in France is thus traversed by deep
contradictions: on the one hand, non-­eu mi­grant ­women are strongly en-
couraged to liberate themselves from the patriarchal cultures supposedly
preventing them from knowing their civil rights; on the other hand, they
are invited to be good ­mothers, whereby “good motherhood” means con-
forming to strictly sanctioned models of French parenthood and, above
all, womanhood.
The foregrounding of gender equality as a pillar of the national social
contract is pres­ent also in the Italian case, though the very recent imple-
mentation, as well as a certain confusion, of the civic component, makes
an in-­depth analy­sis of ­these materials more difficult and of a provisional
character. Though the law establishing the agreement of integration was
passed in 2009, it became operational only in March 2012. Furthermore,
the civic component of the agreement—­that is, the type of materials used
in order to make the signatories of the agreement acquainted with the lan-
guage, history, and culture of Italy—­has not been defi ed homogeneously,
often leading to very dif­fer­ent programs and visual devices being used
in dif­fer­ent regions and provinces throughout the country.66 Th s not-
withstanding, we can identify three main sites within which the theme
of equality between men and w ­ omen has thus far been operative in the
Italian integration agenda: (1) the “charter of the values of citizenship and
integration” (Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione), which
newcomers must commit to re­spect and to follow when signing the agree-
ment of integration; (2) the video on the institutions of Italy, which was
conceived as the offi al visual material to be shown to non-­eu mi­grants
during introductory sessions held in so-­called permanent territorial cen-
ters (centri territoriali permanenti) a­ fter signing the agreement;67 and (3) the

INTEGRATION POLICIES  99
i­ nitiatives funded by the Eu­ro­pean Fund on the Integration of Thi d Coun-
try Nationals regarding the insertion of mi­grant ­women into the ­labor
market. Whereas I ­will explore this third point in the following chapter,
­here I focus on the fi st two.
The charter puts special emphasis on gender equality in the private
realm. Accordingly, “Men and ­women have equal dignity and enjoy the
same rights within and outside the f­ amily,” but also “marriage is based on
the equality of rights and responsibilities between husband and wife, and
therefore it is a monogamist structure. Monogamy unites two lives and
makes them co-­responsible of what they realize together, starting from the
raising of the ­children. Italy prohibits polygamy as opposed to the rights
of ­women.”68 The prominence of the idea of gender equality in the charter
therefore seems to suggest that w ­ omen who come from non-­eu (and im-
plicitly non-­western) countries are subject to unequal treatment, especially
in the ­family. Th s assumption is further maintained in three other key
passages of the charter. The fi st concerns domestic vio­lence and forced
marriages, which are thereby implicitly assumed not to be unusual in the
non-­eu mi­grant ­family: “The Italian law forbids any form of coercion and
vio­lence within and outside the f­ amily; it protects the dignity of w ­ omen
in all its manifestations and in any moment of associative life. Freedom of
marriage is the foundation of conjugal ­union; it forbids coerced and forced
marriage, or marriage between minors.”69 The second concerns the princi­
ple that public areas are not gender-­segregated, thereby alluding to the fear
that mi­grants’ (especially Muslims’) backward conceptions might expect
the sexualization of space: “The princi­ple of equality cannot be reconciled
with the demands to separate, for religious reasons, ­women and men, boys
and girls in public ser­vices and at work.”70 The third point concerns the
freedom of dress, according to the idea that non-­eu mi­grant ­women, par-
ticularly ­those wearing the full veil, do not freely choose their attire. Th s
idea is implicitly contained in the following passage: “In Italy t­ here are no
restrictions on p­ eople’s dress, as long as the attire is freely chosen and does
not damage the dignity of the person. Forms of dress that cover the face
are not acceptable b ­ ecause they impede the recognition of the person and
prevent him/her entering into [a] relationship with other ­people.”71
The video on Italian institutions in the offi al material shown to mi­
grants during introductory sessions held at so-­called permanent territorial

100 Chapter 3
centers has the format of a civic education session on the Italian constitu-
tion, its fundamental princi­ples, and the civic and po­liti­cal rights of the
citizen.72 Though its content does not disclose anything specific about gen-
der equality, a visual semiotic analy­sis reveals impor­tant gendered patterns
of symbolism. The setting of the video is that of a tv news show: we see
one man and one w ­ oman standing ­behind a desk with a monitor in the
background that magnifies the key passages of their “lesson in integration.”
They are both of migratory background, speak fluent Italian, albeit with
a slightly detectable non-­Italian accent, and address directly an i­ magined
mi­grant audience. The man, Constantin, is a Bulgarian journalist who has
lived in Italy for a long time. He introduces himself to the public and pro-
ceeds for five long minutes to introduce the main goals and sections of
the session. Constantin also introduces the ­woman, Alison, who “­will sup-
port him” in the illustration of the main Italian institutions. We already
notice that whereas he introduced himself, she is introduced by him, as
an Eritrean “new Italian citizen” who is an expert on migration issues in
Italy. She does not say a word and silently waits for five minutes for her
turn to speak. Whereas he is dressed in a sober and rather anonymous
way, her casual and feminine clothing seemingly emphasizes her “exotic”
beauty. All in all, the script and setting of the video reproduce the pattern
of gender relations that is typical of the Italian public sphere, particularly
in the visual media, whereby the role of ­women is usually that of the tele­
vi­sion presenter’s assistant (valletta), rather than of an equal copresenter.
Furthermore, the emphasis upon the Eritrean w ­ oman’s beauty, enacted by
means of frequent close-­ups of her face as well as by the contrast between
his sober and her colorful clothes, seemingly performs the function of
pointing to the male Italian imaginary of the foreign ­woman (from the ex-­
colonies!) as a sexualized and exotic object of desire.
Although the still “in-­progress” status of the Italian civic integration pro­
cess does not allow us to infer more complex gender dimensions within its
materials and procedures, ­there seem to be at least two ele­ments emerging:
fi st, as in the Netherlands and in France, the idea of gender equality is
emphasized, particularly in the private sphere. Ideas of backward and
misogynistic practices (forced marriages, polygamy, ­etc.) are implicitly
attributed to mi­grants and contrasted with images of Italian and western
Eu­ro­pean socie­ties as ­bearers of egalitarian relations between the sexes.

INTEGRATION POLICIES  101

Second, the ­actual translation of portions of the civic integration com-
ponent into visual didactic materials betrays the per­sis­tence of rather
unequal gender relations within the Italian imaginary and society, as well
as of colonial repre­sen­ta­tions of foreign ­women as sexualized objects.

Non-­Western Mi­grant ­Women as Cultural Reproducers

of the Nation

From this survey of how gender equality has concretely been translated in
the civic integration materials of ­these three countries, I argue that civic
integration policies foreground non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women ac-
cording to the two complementary registers proper to nationalist (and as
we s­ hall see, colonialist) ideologies. First, non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant
­women are seen as victims to be rescued, injured and exotic subjects lack-
ing autonomy to whom western countries promise shelter and liberation.
Second, they are regarded also as the main carriers of the non-­western
mi­grant culture itself, the depositaries and reproducers par excellence of
its codes, especially on account of their role as m ­ others. It is on the basis
of this double nationalist register that current policies on mi­grants’ inte-
gration and the centrality they assign to w ­ omen become intelligible. In
par­tic­u­lar, by identifying non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women as si­mul­
ta­neously the victims and primary recipients of their “cultures,” integration
policies both take for granted their “permeability” to the rescue narratives
of the vari­ous Eu­ro­pean saviors and also pinpoint their key role in the po-
tential assimilation of mi­grant communities. Indeed, inasmuch as they are
regarded as recipients of culture, non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women,
­these policies arguably maintain, could become allies in the West’s strug­
gle against the oppressive practices of which non-­western communities are
deemed to be carriers, if only ­these ­women ­were educated in ­these western
Eu­ro­pean cultural values, which could then be transmitted to the second
generation. Bearing t­ hese assumptions in mind, we can understand why in
all three countries the centrality of ­women to the integration of the mi­grant
­family and community in general, and ­children in par­tic­u­lar, has principally
presented two antinomic tiers: one of exclusion and one of inclusion—an
antinomy that, as Foucault noted, characterizes any disciplinary norm.73
The tier of inclusion targets non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women as
victims, and it emphasizes the importance of gender equality in the ­family

102 Chapter 3
and of prioritizing the integration and inclusion of t­ hese ­women qua
­mothers. H ­ ere we can see that in spite of the ­great emphasis placed on in-
tegration as an individual responsibility, a m ­ atter of personal willingness to
integrate, as well as a viaticum for gender equality and w ­ omen’s individual
rights—­which Joppke maintains to mark the liberal (albeit repressive) reg-
ister of the new integration policies—­non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women
are not addressed as individuals. They are the “vectors” of integration, the
“­bearers” of the collective, and the “bridges” between the hosting and the
hosted communities: that is, they embody the mediating role that is as-
signed to ­women as cultural reproducers of the nation.74 The integration of
their ­children depends on them, and the willingness of the community to
integrate is mea­sured through them—­for instance, through their willing-
ness to get rid of the Muslim clothing regarded as a clear sign of difficult
inclusion.75
The tier of exclusion regards non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women as
the symbolic markers of their nation of origin. When civic integration pol-
icies demand that non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women adopt a western
Eu­ro­pean mothering style, ­these policies see ­these ­women as the embodi-
ment of the other nation. Immigrant w ­ omen, in other words, are seen as
the “Trojan h ­ orse” of other identities, other domestic arrangements, other
­children’s education, and other religious practices. The familiarization of
immigrants from non-­eu and non-­western countries with the codes of the
nation of “destination” must, therefore, proceed by way of the neutraliza-
tion of their nation of origin. All in all, the new integration policies thus
function as a mea­sure that aims si­mul­ta­neously at the de-­nationalization
and re-­nationalization of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women. By ad-
dressing ­these ­women not as individuals but as ­mothers, wives, and bridges
between the western society and the mi­grant community, their equality
and autonomy are predicated on recalling the “cultural,” or “national,” dif-
ference from which they have to divest themselves in order to comply with
the standard of womanhood established in western Eu­ro­pean countries.
As Alaoui notes in the French case,

The values, as they are presented in the cai , adopt the register of demo­
cratic citizenship but their translation in public discourse remains
strongly marked by culturalism. . . . ​The systematic confrontation between
“our Republic” and “­these customs” recalls implicitly a repre­sen­ta­tion of

INTEGRATION POLICIES  103

 two systems of values, two visions of the world that are radically dif­fer­
ent, incompatible. On the one hand, pure subjects of rights; on the other
hand, pure subjects of culture, ­bearers of a disquieting difference.76

­ ose interpretations that exclude nationalism from the matrix of

Th
the civic integration turn, particularly in light of the latter’s emphasis on
­women’s rights, thus clearly miss the point. Though in the pres­ent structur-
ing of the debate ­women are placed center stage, it is the very nationalist reg-
ister of this debate that in fact overwhelms and overshadows them; their
national idiosyncrasy and religion are the particularities that western Eu­ro­
pean states ask non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women—­especially Muslim
­women, in the pres­ent conjuncture—to overthrow in order to be consid-
ered qua ­women.77 In a sense the “­woman question” is thus strongly cul-
turalized, or nationalized. And its nationalization, which plays out through
the imposition of one national feminine identity over another suppos-
edly antipodal and inferior one, in the end means the racialization of the
“­woman question” (see chapter 2). To be sure, the centrality that ­women
seem to assume within the civic integration policy turn is therefore one
that further reveals both the instrumental nature of the foregrounding of
gender equality as well as the racializing dimensions of the femonationalist
convergence.

Resurrecting the Colonial Civilizing Missions

One of the arguments put forward by Joppke in par­tic­u­lar concerning the

liberal vocation of the civic integration turn is that, “in most instances,
civic integration is self-­limited to instilling and testing cognitive knowl-
edge, while abstaining from intervening in the inner sphere of morality.”78
Interestingly, he invokes one of the most commented-­upon cases of the
mobilization of the theme of w ­ omen’s rights as an illustrative example of
the “cognitive” rather than “normative” character of integration policies.
As he puts it, “Even the Dutch model—­arguably the harshest civic inte-
gration variant in Europe—­shares this self-­limitation: although it strongly
insists on re­spect for ‘Dutch norms and values,’ it does not demand adop-
tion of t­ hese same values. For example, when Muslim immigrants are con-
fronted with sexual libertinism in the notorious Dutch information video
that many newcomers watch, the gist is not that Muslims are being asked

104  Chapter 3
to undress at chilly Dutch beaches but that they are aware this is common
practice in this ‘liberal’ country.”79 Such a conviction in the fundamental
cognitive aim of ­these policies follows from Joppke’s prediction that, like in
the United States, the Eu­ro­pean model of immigrants’ inclusion is moving
­toward a form of Rawlsian po­liti­cal liberalism in which “the integration of
society can only occur in terms of a procedural consensus on what is ‘right,’
not in terms of a substantive consensus on what is ‘good.’ ”80
Excellent contributions have compellingly challenged Joppke’s claims
by pointing to the “assimilationist” rather than only “integrationist” inten-
tions of civic integration policies, especially in relation to the theme of
sexuality and ­women’s and gay rights. It is this theme in par­tic­u­lar that has
come to precipitate the “thick public moral,” as Thomas Spijkerboer called
it, which immigrants are not simply expected to know but also to share.81
Furthermore, we should note that the images of gender equality conveyed
in ­these materials are predicated on the basis of highly derogatory images
of non-­western immigrants’ cultural practices, particularly Muslim prac-
tices, thereby putting forward the value of gender equality not simply as
information that immigrants are required to know, but as an instance of
key western values that they must re­spect and to which they must pledge
allegiance. Whereas the language of contractualization, as in France and
Italy, or examination, as in the Netherlands, might be designed to speak
according to a juridical and civic register, asking for mere civic re­spect and
not love for the nation, the po­liti­cal language that has pushed ­these poli-
cies forward not only explic­itly demands love, but is also strongly marked
by “ideological culturalization” that endorses assimilation as the primary
requirement for successful integration.82 Joppke’s idea that t­ hese policies
are not leaning ­toward assimilation is thus highly contestable.
However, I would like to take this critique a step further and argue that
not only are t­ hese policies vectors of strong normative injunctions, and not
simply of cognitive demands, but also that their normative side is further
revealing of a nationalist and racializing repertoire, which can be traced
back to a colonial legacy. As I illustrated in both the French and the Dutch
cases in par­tic­u­lar, the content of the integration material regarding gen-
der equality and w ­ omen’s rights focuses above all on the ­family. In France
such a focus was strongly advocated by the hci in its 2003 report entitled
Le contrat et l’intégration, which as previously noted provided the guidelines
for the implementation of the integration contract (cai ). In a long section

INTEGRATION POLICIES  105

on the rights of mi­grant ­women, the hci stated that its main objective was
particularly to advise the legislature on how to enhance ­these w ­ omen’s
civil rights, namely, ­those “rules concerning the person (personality, sta-
tus, capacity), goods (property, owner­ship and transfer of property), ­family
(birth, marriage, patrimonial rights of the ­family).”83 According to the hci ,
one of the most pressing prob­lems that mi­grant ­women face in France is
the fact that

the application of the law of nationality in m ­ atters of personal status

and bilateral agreements limit ­women’s rights. The concept of “personal
status” [statut personnel] established by private international law is that
the person’s status cannot change even though s/he moves from one
country to another. . . . ​Th s rule, designed to facilitate the return to the
country of origin, is problematic when applied to persons permanently
settled in the country of immigration, or who have acquired citizenship
and do not want to return to their country of origin.84

For the hci this is particularly concerning ­because “the conception of

personal status is profoundly dif­fer­ent in Muslim countries as compared
to that of the French ­legal framework: being of religious inspiration, its
content is more extensive in Muslim legislation.”85 The “confli t between
foreign ­family law, the international agreement signed by France and the
fundamental values of the Republic” affects ­women in par­tic­u­lar. That is
­because “­women are placed at the heart of cultural confli ts that they have
to take on and overcome in order to achieve successful integration into
French society.”86 On this basis, the hci recommended, fi st, to privilege
the law of residence (loi du domicile) over the law of nationality for im-
migrants who reside in France on a stable basis; second, it advised that the
issue of ­women’s civil rights be assigned suffici t space in the contract of
integration so as to raise ­women’s awareness of their rights.
The position of the hci certainly refl cted a common trope in west-
ern discussions on ­legal pluralism and its consequences for minorities and
­women’s rights, one within which gender oppression and gender vio­lence
are related to religious law with the effect of producing, as Andrea Büchler
puts it, “a binary opposition between culture and religion on the one hand
and ­human rights and gender equality on the other, thereby positing cul-
ture and ­women’s rights as in competition and viewing ­human rights val-
ues and gender equality as external to culture.”87 However, I would like to

106 Chapter 3
propose that the centrality of f­ amily norms and w ­ omen’s civil rights should
be read also in light of the colonial legacy that strongly, albeit implicitly,
marks the repre­sen­ta­tions of mi­grant ­women pres­ent in the civic integration
materials. As Emmanuelle Andrez and Alexis Spire explain, the conception
­behind the issue of personal status in France is strongly related to its colonial
history.

A protective f­ actor for emigrants leaving to conquer distant lands, “per-

sonal status” has become at the same time an issue strongly marked
by colonial law. . . . ​The exclusion of colonized p ­ eoples from French
citizenship resulted in their retention of the personal religious status
to which they ­were subjected. . . . ​In the fi st years of colonization in
Algeria, in 1830, the native Algerians ­were not subjected to the civil
code and maintained their personal religious Muslim status. . . . ​­Under
colonial rule, ­there was therefore ­legal dualism but according to a hier-
archy unfavorable to personal status. The colonized certainly did have
the possibility to have access to French citizenship, but s/he had fi st to
renounce his/her Muslim personal status before engaging in a pro­cess
of naturalization that was rarely successful.88

The attempt to put an end to the per­sis­tence of Muslim personal reli-

gious status in Algeria developed in the late 1950s as part of the “emancipa-
tion” strategy, when a range of initiatives w­ ere taken with the intention of
extending ­legal rights and of “liberating” Muslim ­women. The initiatives
undertaken ­under the “emancipation” strategy included the “unveiling
campaigns, mobile female medical teams in the rural zones (emsi), im-
proved access to schooling and youth training, joint European-­Muslim
­women’s circles, extension of the vote, and a new f­ amily law.”89 The colonial
attempt to impose a new ­family law to regulate the personal status, therefore,
was a crucial part of the propaganda machine that legitimated “the civiliz-
ing mission through a cata­logue of supposed barbarism, vio­lence and
oppression infli ted on Muslim ­women.”90 Not unlike the recent ban of the
Muslim head­scarf from French public schools, whose fundamental racism
(as I discussed in chapter  2) has been traced back to its colonial legacy,
the fix tion on f­ amily norms as evident in integration policies seems to
be animated by a similar (neo)colonial anxiety.91 To be clear, the prob­lem
lies not in the attempt to address the issues arising from l­egal pluralism
and the maintenance of the personal status for mi­grant ­women. Rather, as

INTEGRATION POLICIES  107

Ticktin aptly noted, the prob­lem instead lies in the contradictory stance of
the French legislative framework in m ­ atters of gender vio­lence and gender
discrimination in the case of mi­grant ­women: while claiming to be work-
ing on ­legal devices to liberate them from the discriminatory laws of their
countries of origin, the French state—­among ­others—­continues to make
the visa for the (often female) ­family member migrating for reunifi ation
dependent upon that of the (often male) spouse. Th s situation makes it ex-
tremely hard for mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar to denounce cases of sexual
and/or domestic vio­lence ­because they fear expulsion from the country.92
In the Netherlands, where the interpellatory character of the contract is
substituted by the logic of assessment of the integration exam, the themes
of w­ omen’s rights and gender equality are evoked both through the de-
piction of non-­eu /non-­western ­women as victims of gendered vio­lence—­
with a clear emphasis on Muslims—­and through their identifi ation as
potential agents of integration once they are molded into properly Dutch
m
­ others.93 However, it should be emphasized that the molding pro­cess
that non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar are required to go
through regarding mothering roles applies to t­ hose ­women who have al-
ready gone through a se­lection pro­cess in the country of origin, namely,
through the compulsory language and civic integration exam. As a ­matter
of fact, t­ hese policies target mostly p­ eople applying for the purpose of
­family reunifi ation as the spouse, partner, parent, or child of a person who
resides in the Netherlands, whereby the majority of applicants are ­women.
Furthermore, ­these policies apply not simply to applicants from outside
the eu , but from non-­western countries, to t­ hose who are not following a
high-­skilled ­labor mi­grant and who are sponsored by a f­ amily member in
the Netherlands who has suffici t long-­term means of support.
Commenting on ­these policies, Sarah van Walsum recalled the words of
Rita Verdonk—­the main initiator of the civic integration turn in the coun-
try as well as in Europe—­who advertised t­ hese policies as aimed at defend-
ing Dutch progressive norms regarding sexuality and ­women’s rights from
backward ­family values.94 As van Walsum puts it, “In linking exotic ­family
norms and immigration to formulate a compound threat to the Dutch na-
tion, Minister Verdonk gave vent to anx­i­eties whose roots ran deeper than
the above named moments of religiously inspired vio­lence could account
for. Her words w ­ ere in fact strikingly reminiscent . . . ​of the discourse
used in colonial times to distinguish the Dutch, legally defi ed as ‘Eu­ro­

108 Chapter 3
pean,’ from the ‘native’ inhabitants of the former Dutch East Indies.”95 Van
Walsum’s compelling analy­sis shows in par­tic­u­lar that precisely now that
Dutch ­family norms are very dif­fer­ent from what they used to be during
colonial times, Dutch immigration policies are, conversely, justifi d in
terms that closely recall ­those times.96 Th s ele­ment is detectable in the fact
that the granting of visas as well as access to Dutch citizenship are regulated
through the application of national (racial), moral (sexual), and economic
(class) criteria that strongly evoke the “colonial technology of race” that
was used in the Dutch colonies to distinguish colonizers from colonized,
the members of the Dutch ­imagined community from the aliens.97
The colonial register that clearly marks French and Dutch integration
materials, particularly when it comes to regulating mi­grant ­family life and
­women’s rights, is thus a further demonstration of the strong nationalist di-
mensions of the civic integration turn—as well as of the current mobiliza-
tion of gender equality in anti-­Islam and anti-­immigration campaigns more
generally. Taking its lead from discourses and policies concretely elaborated
during colonial times, the attempt to “normalize” the non-­western ­family
and to turn non-­eu/non-­western ­women into “emancipated” subjects is
strictly tied to fundamentally racist conceptions of the Other as the uncivi-
lized, whose admission into the club of the western Eu­ro­pe­ans lies in his, and
particularly her, ac­cep­tance of the rules and customs of the allegedly more
civilized nations.98

“Civic Integration,” Gender Equality, and the Modularity

of Nationalism

As I sought to illustrate throughout this chapter, a number of ele­ments

demonstrate the nationalist and arguably racist features of civic integration
policies in general, and of their mobilization of ­women’s rights in par­tic­u­lar.
First, the portrayal of the Netherlands, France, and Italy as countries where
­women’s rights and sexual liberation are an everyday real­ity is developed
in seeming contrast to ste­reo­typical images of non-­western cultures and
socie­ties as patriarchal, misogynistic, and homophobic. Second, gender
equality is emphasized primarily in the private sphere, thereby both locat-
ing within the f­ amily the main locus of gender in­equality in non-­eu /non-­
western (particularly Muslim) socie­ties and addressing mi­grant ­women
as victims. Thi d, mi­grant ­women from outside the eu (and non-­western

INTEGRATION POLICIES  109

countries in some cases) are the main targets of integration policies in their
role as m­ others, an ele­ment that is particularly vis­i­ble in the Netherlands
and France. In the Netherlands, for instance, such a guiding philosophy
not only informed the work of the pavem commission, which set the terms
of the gender content of the civic integration programs, but was also prac-
tically implemented through the channeling of mi­grant ­women ­toward the
integration trajectory that expects them to forge and demonstrate good
mothering skills.
Whereas Eu­ro­pe­anization has certainly functioned as a pro­cess of
standardization leading to the adoption of similar policies in dif­fer­ent eu
countries, the branding of similar values and the articulation of similar
discursive devices, a crucial area of discrepancy between the eu guidelines
and their national translations exists precisely on the terrain of ­women’s
rights and gender equality. At the national level, gender equality is promoted
not predominantly in the ­labor market, or in the realm of po­liti­cal par-
ticipation, as the eu guidelines recommended. Rather, civic integration
policies in the Netherlands, France, and Italy have identifi d above all
the ­family as the main social unit within which w ­ omen, on the one hand,
allegedly need protection qua victims of backward cultures and, on the
other hand, are pushed to assimilate in order to promote their agency as
“proper” ­mothers. The ­family is the social “space” upon which nations
draw the bound­aries between the noncitizen and the citizen, the foreigner
and the “native,” ­those who must demonstrate their allegiance to the na-
tion and ­those whose allegiance is taken for granted by birthright or cul-
tural elective affi ties.99 In this sense, the articulation of integration as an
“injunction” to immigrants to familiarize themselves with the host nation’s
culture constitutes a power­ful moment for both the “renewal of the terms
of sovereignty,” in Fiona Jenkins’s words, and the renewal of the terms of
the nation as ­imagined community.100 By developing the civic education
material to be presented to t­ hose immigrants seeking to reside in their
territories, nation-­states have used this as an opportunity to revive, or to
reinstate, the imagining of their national communities in relation to t­ hose
­Others against whom con­temporary western Eu­ro­pean nationalisms have
been reconstituted and reinvigorated. As I discussed in chapter 2, ­women
are essential to the i­ magined community called the nation, since they are
the ­bearers of the collective, the cultural and biological reproducers of the

110 Chapter 3
nation.101 Moreover, the con­temporary femonationalist ideological forma-
tion, as already noted, has been constructed and nourished particularly
by the depiction of Islam as inherently misogynist, and of Muslim men as
fundamentally unable to re­spect ­women’s rights. It is l­ittle surprise, then,
that civic integration policies target non-­eu /non-­western ­women and
proj­ect onto them ste­reo­typical repre­sen­ta­tions of Muslim ­women in par­
tic­u­lar. Seeking to mold them into m ­ others who can perform their par-
enting role, or ­women who can embody femininity according to desirable
images of western Eu­ro­pean motherhood and womanhood, non-­eu /non-­
western mi­grant ­women are required to be the ­bearers of the collective
that “hosts” them and to become cultural, if not immediately biological,
reproducers of the western Eu­ro­pean nation. Civic integration is thus si­
mul­ta­neously a pro­cess of denationalization and renationalization, the way
to divert immigrant ­women’s loyalty away from the non-­western nation of
origin and ­toward the western nation of destination.
The question of the recurring nationalist and colonial trope of ­women
and the nation, as well as the similarities between the three countries in
the ways they address gender equality in their civic integration materials,
allows us to tackle also the prob­lem of w ­ hether such similarities can be
regarded as symptomatic of the fading of national models of immigrants’
inclusion and thus as demonstrating the fading of nationalism altogether
among the forces animating the civic integration turn. In other words, by
addressing such questions we have the opportunity to discuss one of the
most deep-­rooted and influential assumptions ­behind positions à la Joppke
and Soysal: if member-­states are adopting similar integration policies, then
what is specifi ally national, and thus nationalist, about t­ hese policies? ­Isn’t
the convergence between dif­fer­ent eu nation-­states on the issue of the inte-
gration of immigrants precisely the indicator of their loss of national par-
ticularism and sovereignty in ­favor of the adoption of the supra-­national
Eu­ro­pean universality and of a postnational governmentality?
First, we can begin by noting that the eu decision-­making pro­cess in
general and the standardization of integration policies for non-­eu /non-­
western mi­grants do not occur in a void lacking preexisting national proj­
ects. Rather, as already recalled above, some member-­states in par­tic­u­lar
bore enormous influence upon the formalization of civic integration as the
new strategy in the Eu­ro­pean agenda vis-­à-­vis non-­eu mi­grants. “The sine

INTEGRATION POLICIES  111

qua non for having ‘more Eu­rope’ in the area of immigration,” as Sergio
Carrera and Anja Wiesbrock demonstrate, “has been the incorporation of
ingredients from member states’ own public philosophies and domestic
policies on the integration of tc ns into Eu­ro­pean public responses. ­These
ingredients allow member states to have even wider discretion than that
already provided by ec directives when conferring rights and guarantees
to tc ns. They also constitute tools in the hands of the nation-­state to retain
sovereignty over the regulation of migration and identity.”102 Th s ele­ment
alone poses the question of ­whether we should understand the eu supra-­
national level as a po­liti­cal pro­cess that transcends singular nation-­states’
sovereignties in ­favor of a postnational super-­state that demo­cratically
synthesizes and represents the po­liti­cal traditions of each of its members,
as positions like Joppke’s suggest, or ­whether we should instead conceive of
the eu as an institution that is itself driven by t­ hose nation-­states that have
the power to push their po­liti­cal and economic agendas. Furthermore, we
should question ­whether the pro­cess of Eu­ro­pean integration itself, par-
ticularly in the area of migration and mi­grants’ integration—in which an
ostensible western Eu­ro­pean “core” is predicated and defi ed against non-­
European (and mostly non-­western) ­Others—­should not be considered as
an instantiation of the nation-­building pro­cess in general.
Second, we should question the assumption that nationalist proj­ects
entail some kind of distinctiveness in their mission and strategies, suppos-
edly grounded in the uniqueness and exceptionalism of their historical and
cultural roots. Rather, they have historically acted according to scripts that
are analogous to one another and are thereby condemned to the register of
repetition. With her discussion and rearticulation of Benedict Anderson’s
concept of the “modularity” of nationalism, or the “double character
of the nation form,” the historian Manu Goswami helps us address this
point.103 The modularity of the nation form and of nationalism refers to
its capacity to be “transplanted” across time and space. As Goswami aptly
argues,

Nationalist discourse works in and through the simultaneous asser-

tion of similarity with and difference from other nation-­states and
nations. . . . ​Nationalist movements and nation-­states claim the patri-
mony of a culturally singular territorially bounded national community
that, in turn, is represented as an instantiation of a universal po­liti­cal

112 Chapter 3
 and cultural form. The doubled character of the nation form as both
universal and par­tic­u­lar mirrors, in this re­spect, the spatial partitioning
of the modern inter-­state system into a series of mutually exclusive, for-
mally equivalent, sovereign states. Nationalist movements and nation-
alizing states pres­ent themselves as universalistic within the confi es of
the national community, but as particularistic without, that is, in rela-
tion to other nations and nation-­states. Likewise, nationalizing states
claim to represent the universal interest of a bounded citizenry within
a delimited national space. Yet ­these universal interests are configu ed
as par­tic­u­lar within the context of the inter-­state system. Nationalist
claims of particularity and the ­imagined singularity of national forma-
tions only become intelligible against and within a global grid of formally
similar nations and nation-­states.104

In this sense, femonationalism itself—as the recurring ideological trope

of ­women as “­bearers” of the nation across time, and as the con­temporary
mobilization of ­women’s rights and gender equality within a nationalist
po­liti­cal framework across the western Eu­ro­pean space—­can be regarded
as an instance of the modular character of the nation and nationalism. The
convergence among dif­fer­ent nation-­states’ civic integration materials on
the theme of ­women’s rights and gender equality is not, therefore, evidence
of the fading of nationalism, but rather it bears witness to the capacity of
nationalism and of one of its key leitmotifs, that is, the symbolic centrality
of ­women, to be transplanted across dif­fer­ent times, regions, and institu-
tional contexts.
One last but crucial question needs to be addressed. My identifi ation
of nationalism and racism as the animating forces of the civic integra-
tion turn does not amount to taking liberalism out of the picture. Instead,
we should question Joppke’s assumption according to which nationalism
and racism are forces extrinsic to liberalism (and neoliberalism) and ana-
lyze the complex conjuncture in which the “nationalization” of po­liti­cal life
emerges in a context of savage economic (neo)liberalism.105 One of the
arguments put forward by Joppke is that the focus of the eu civic integra-
tion turn on immigrants’ participation in the l­abor market attests to the
liberal character of such policies b
­ ecause the market is “a world apart from
old notions of cultural assimilation and nation-­building.”106 Part of this ar-
gument is motivated, as I mentioned above, by the idea that Eu­rope, like

INTEGRATION POLICIES  113

North Amer­i­ca, is subscribing to a Rawlsian model of po­liti­cal liberalism
in which consensus is sought on what is “right” rather than on what is
“good.”107 Th s idea fails to address the fact that in North Amer­i­ca too the
issue of immigrants’ “integration”—­mostly called “assimilation” in the so­
cio­log­i­cal lit­er­a­ture—­does not disavow the question of nation building
and national belonging. Rather, mi­grants’ integration (or assimilation) in
the United States is premised upon what Jung calls a “racial unconscious,”
which underwrites “the prominence and importance of race in the politics
of national belonging,” even though it is constantly repressed from de-
bate.108 Such an idea also poses the question of ­whether and in what ways
the globalizing forces of the market that animate civic integration policies’
focus on mi­grant ­labor at the eu level are connected with current national-
ist proj­ects in general, and the femonationalist ideology in par­tic­u­lar. As
I ­will show in the following two chapters, (neo)liberal policies regarding
mi­grants’ economic integration are heavi­ly entangled with the nationalist
mobilization of gender equality. Inasmuch as programs claiming to “save”
Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women from their backward culture
are also channeling w ­ omen into specific niches of the ­labor market, an
in-­depth analy­sis of the reasons ­behind this operation ­will enable us to
capture also the complex (and mostly overlooked) po­liti­cal economy of the
femonationalist ideological formation.

114 Chapter 3
 CHAPTER 4

Femonationalism, Neoliberalism, and Social

Reproduction

Marginalized though we have been as ­women, as white and western makers of

theory, we also marginalize ­others ­because our lived experience is thoughtlessly
white, ­because even our “­women’s cultures” are rooted in some western tradition.
—­ad r ienne r ich, “Notes ­toward a Politics of Location,” 219

The con­temporary mobilization of w ­ omen’s rights by nationalist parties

and within civic integration policies as a way of stigmatizing particularly
(though not exclusively) Muslim populations has been profoundly divi-
sive for feminists. Since 9/11 the non-­western mi­grant—­and specifi ally
Muslim—­woman question has indeed been the site of lively debates engag-
ing feminist intellectuals, politicians, and activists across western Eu­rope
(and the western world). As I began to discuss in chapter 1, in the Nether-
lands, France, and Italy some prominent feminist intellectuals and ­women’s
associations endorsing secularist arguments, female politicians (some of
Muslim background) from left to right, as well as femocrats in key gender
equality agencies have publicly denounced Islam as an exceptionally mi-
sogynist religion. According to them, Muslim practices—­above all veil
wearing—­should be condemned and banned from public spaces. On the
opposite side of the spectrum, well-­known feminist intellectuals, antiracist
female politicians, and ­women’s organ­izations in ­these same countries have
criticized such a characterization of Islam not only as an overgeneraliza-
tion, but as also a reason for increased Islamophobic and anti-­immigration
sentiments. In short, they regard ­these positions as ­running the risk, fun-
damentally, of aligning feminism with racism. It w ­ ill come as no surprise
to the readers of this book that my position is close to that of the second
group. Furthermore, I believe that we should not consider ­those feminists
and femocrats whose arguments converge with nationalists and neoliberals
in anti-­Islam campaigns as being “instrumentalized” by the latter—an
approach that is as patronizing to them as is the idea that Muslim ­women
are agentless victims to be rescued. In other words, while feminism—as
the general notion of w ­ omen’s liberation from patriarchy—­has certainly
been opportunistically appropriated by the pvv, fn , and ln in their strug­
gle against the non-­western and Muslim male Other, t­ hose feminists,
­women’s organ­izations, female politicians, and femocrats who have openly
supported policies repressive of Muslim religious and social practices in
the name of gender justice should not be considered as naïve po­liti­cal ac-
tors. Rather, they should be regarded as po­liti­cal subjects whose anti-­Islam
concerns are informed by specific theoretical paradigms and animated by
determined motivations and goals. What remains to be further clarifi d,
however, is the specific nature of such paradigms, motivations, and goals
and their concrete implications.
Feminist critical voices have proposed thoughtful interpretations of the
aforementioned phenomenon. In par­tic­u­lar, in all three countries ­under
scrutiny, they have emphasized the framing of feminism, or the partici-
pation of some feminists within anti-­Islam agendas, in terms of “new af-
fin ties between feminist and sexual politics,” “strategic opportunities” to
advance feminism, feminists’ “identifi ation” with a republican/secularist
proj­ect, or as a type of sacrific al convergence in which the fi ht against
Muslim patriarchy is placed in antagonism with antiracist b ­ attles.1 How-
ever, regardless of their par­tic­u­lar positions and characterizations of the
reasons for some feminists and femocrats converging with nationalist right-­
wing parties in the denunciation of Islam, most scholars have focused on
the realm of po­liti­cal rhe­toric. They thus have highlighted the arguments,
premises, and po­liti­cal implications of the feminist endorsement of anti-­
Islam agendas, but not their economic ramifi ations.2 While building upon
the above interpretations, this chapter demonstrates that the feminist and
femocratic convergence with anti-­Islam agendas is not limited to rhe­toric.
Rather, it also involves the economic realm and produces very concrete
consequences in the lives of the Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women
involved as well as for gender justice more generally. I thus propose to shed
light on a specific point of such a convergence taking place in the socioeco-
nomic sphere that has hitherto been widely overlooked: namely, the role
played by some w ­ omen’s organ­izations and femocrats in the development

116 Chapter 4
of the neoliberal economic aspects of the civic integration programs for
third-­country nationals (tc ns). In the previous chapter I discussed how civic
integration programs in all three countries have contradictorily addressed
non-­eu/non-­western mi­grant ­women as ­mothers to be educated into mod-
els of western Eu­ro­pean parenthood, but also as backward, victimized
subjects who require emancipation through subtraction from their alleged
segregation in the private sphere. Building upon this approach, the Dutch,
French, and Italian neoliberal governments since 2007 have activated
policies seeking to promote also non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women’s
employment. Th s chapter charts how the implementation of t­ hese poli-
cies, however, has functioned through directing mi­grant ­women under-
going civic integration programs ­toward the care and domestic sector, or
social reproduction.3 Non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women have been en-
couraged, that is, to undertake employment activities that have tradition-
ally been conceived as vocationally feminine and against which the western
Eu­ro­pean feminist movement engaged in historical ­battles. In other words,
even though the explicit intent of t­ hese policies was the promotion of the
economic integration and in­de­pen­dence of mi­grant ­women and their par-
ticipation in the public sphere, they have de facto contributed to locating
­these ­women in the private sphere. What I am interested in highlighting
­here is how ­these policies have been not only supported but in some cases
also designed and actively implemented by some of the female politicians,
­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats who have been prominent in de-
nouncing Islam in par­tic­u­lar for limiting Muslim w
­ omen’s opportunities in
the public arena.
Given ­these premises, this chapter aims to demonstrate that the cur-
rent convergence between the anti-­Islam feminist front and anti-­Islam and
anti-­immigration nationalist and neoliberal po­liti­cal agendas in the name
of ­women’s rights exposes a radical performative contradiction, whose ef-
fects are potentially disastrous for ­women’s strug­gles in general. A perfor-
mative contradiction occurs when t­ here is a mismatch between theory and
practice, proposition and per­for­mance, or, for instance, when the princi­
ples that guide po­liti­cal action are contradicted by that very action.4
Though radical performative contradictions can also be conducive to
progressive politics—as in Judith Butler’s compelling treatment of the
performative contradiction of the notion of universalism of rights in the
hands of oppressed subjects—­I ­here use this notion to emphasize above all

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  117

(though not exclusively, as I ­shall explain in the conclusions) their detri-
mental consequences.5 Specifi ally, I analyze the performative contradic-
tion of ­those feminists, ­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats supporting
economic integration policies for non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women in
the par­tic­u­lar Islamophobic and racist context in which this contradiction
has emerged. Th s is not the performative contradiction of oppressed sub-
jects (as in Butler’s analy­sis, for instance), but of po­liti­cal subjects who have
internalized (wittingly or unwittingly) the presuppositions and role of the
oppressors. Thus, I look at ­women’s organ­izations’ and femocrats’ imple-
mentation of policies concerning non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women’s
economic integration in the realm of social reproduction as a specific “per­
for­mance” that, while being presented as an instrument through which
mi­grant (and Muslim) ­women should be enabled to undo gender, instead
produces and intensifies both the conditions for racial discrimination and
for ­doing and perpetuating gender roles.6 In other words, the feminists,
­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats who endorse mea­sures proclaimed
to be the best means for achieving the goal of ­women’s liberation from as-
sumed patriarchal cultures do not simply sacrifice antiracism in f­ avor of
antisexism. Rather, they reinforce the conditions for the reproduction at
the societal level of Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women’s segrega-
tion, traditional gender roles, and the gender injustice they claim to be
combating. I thus demonstrate that the support accorded by some femi-
nists, ­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats to economic integration poli-
cies for non-­eu /non-­western ­women in the name of ­women’s rights ends
up (unwittingly) jeopardizing precisely the latter.
In order to understand the conditions of possibility for, and the tra-
jectory of, such performative contradiction, I fi st illustrate the neolib-
eral logic ­behind the economic aspects of civic integration programs at
the eu level. I thus chart the ways in which the focus on employment as
the main area of attention for mi­grants’ integration within the eu agenda
has concretely been translated in the case of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant
­women in the Netherlands, France, and Italy. ­Here, I show in par­tic­u­lar
how this focus has been supported by the gender equality agencies at the
eu level, and implemented by ­women’s organ­izations and femocrats in
all three countries ­under scrutiny. I ­will also discuss the specific narra-
tive concerning w ­ omen’s economic in­de­pen­dence that was mobilized in
the pro­cess and the concrete outcome of ­these policies in effectively chan-

118 Chapter 4
neling mi­grant ­women ­toward the social reproductive sector. Second, I
propose that we must reconstruct the complex feminist genealogy of the
notion of economic in­de­pen­dence, and the related concepts of productive
work and productivist ethics, as opposed to social reproduction. Th s criti-
cal reconstruction shows that the tension between t­ hese two realms, that
is, production and reproduction, and the devaluation of the latter by the
western Eu­ro­pean feminist movement, has unwittingly contributed to the
reconfigur tion of social reproduction as a sector occupied by the most
marginalized and fragile fringes of the workforce, that is, mi­grant and
Muslim racialized w­ omen. Fi­nally, I discuss how such a feminist performa-
tive contradiction is also rooted in what I call the western feminist teleol-
ogy of emancipation through productive work. I thus show the modalities
through which such a teleology of emancipation leads to the projection of
the experience of western Eu­ro­pean ­women’s strug­gle for emancipation as
representative of the experience, past and ­future, of all ­women.

Gendering Integration as Workfare

In the growing lit­er­a­ture on the gender dimensions of civic integration

policies across the eu , the fact that ­these policies “interpellate” non-­eu /
non-­western mi­grant ­women not only as cultural recipients and ­mothers
(as discussed in chapter 3), but also as waged workers has been, with very
few exceptions, entirely overlooked.7 Yet the economic integration of mi­
grant w ­ omen has been one of the primary goals of the Eu­ro­pean guidelines
on the integration of tc ns, particularly from 2011onward. As anticipated
in the previous chapter, in 2011the eu released two new documents regard-
ing the integration of mi­grants in Eu­rope: the 2011 Communication and
the 2011cswp (Commission Staff Working Paper). While still defini g “the
twin pro­cess of mutual accommodation” between mi­grants and receiving
socie­ties as the under­lying princi­ple of integration in Eu­rope, the new 2011
Communication registered two impor­tant developments as compared to
the 2005 Communication. On the one hand, the changing demographic
(i.e., aging) as well as “social, economic and po­liti­cal context” w
­ ere repeatedly
invoked as ele­ments that integration policies must consider a priority.8
On the other hand, more emphasis was placed on the “­will and commit-
ment of mi­grants to be part of the society that receives them.”9 In other
words, the 2011documents called attention to the context of the aging of

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  119

the Eu­ro­pean population and of the deep economic crisis at the time in
order to justify more selective criteria in immigration policies. That is, the
eu recommended that mi­grants should be allowed in on the basis of the
economic needs of Eu­ro­pean countries: thus, t­ hese documents invoked a
politics of stricter border control to limit entrance to only workers who
could contribute to l­abor shortages for certain eu member-­states. Hence,
the 2011Communication calls integration a “way of releasing the potential
of migration,” as the opening section of the new communication puts it. In
par­tic­u­lar, “­Legal migration can help to address ­these issues, in addition
to maximizing the use of the ­labor force and skills already available in the
eu and improving the productivity of the eu economy.”10 Furthermore, in
the changed social, economic, and po­liti­cal context, the two most pressing
challenges ­were identifi d as “the prevailing low employment levels of mi­
grants, especially for mi­grant ­women,” and the “rising unemployment and
high levels of ‘over-­qualifi ation.’ ”11 As the 2011 Communication further
emphasized,

Integration is an ever evolving pro­cess, which requires close monitor-

ing, constant efforts, innovative approaches and bold ideas. The solu-
tions are not easy to defi e but if mi­grants integrate successfully in the
eu , this ­will represent a signifi ant contribution to the achievement by
the eu of the targets it has set in the Eu­rope 2020 Strategy, namely to
raise the employment rate to 75% by 2020, to reduce school drop out
rates to less than 10%, to increase the share of the population having
completed tertiary education and to lift 20 million ­people out of pov-
erty or social exclusion.12

The centrality of mi­grants’ employment to the Eu­ro­pean agenda on the

integration of tc ns is thus clearly delineated. Against this backdrop, we
can understand better why throughout this document gender equality is
considered mostly in relation to employment. As the 2011Communication
states, “Employment rates of mi­grant ­women are substantially lower than
both the average employment rate and the employment rates of mi­grant
men. As participating in the l­abor market is one of the best and most con-
crete ways to integrate in society, efforts to reduce t­ hese gaps must target
both ­labor mi­grants and mi­grants who come to the eu in the context of
­family reunifi ation or as benefic aries of international protection.”13 Th

120 Chapter 4
document thus recommends that “introductory programs for newly ar-
rived mi­grants, including language and civic orientation courses[,] . . . ​
should address the specific needs of mi­grant ­women in order to promote
their participation in the l­abor market and strengthen their economic
in­de­pen­dence.”14
As the above quotations testify, the privileging of work as the main arena
of intervention for promoting equality between mi­grant men and w ­ omen
at the eu level thus stems from the strict linkage between recent integra-
tion/migration policies and the so-­called Eu­rope 2020 strategy. The latter
is the master plan elaborated in 2010 by the Eu­ro­pean Commission (ec ) to
set the par­ameters for fostering the Eu­ro­pean economy by increasing the
activity rate of the eu population to 75 ­percent by 2020. The Eu­rope 2020
strategy is the ratifi ation at the eu level of the “job fi st” princi­ple, which
began to be a­ dopted throughout the eu in the late 1990s and has since been
activated particularly during the 2007–2011 fi ancial crisis. Accordingly,
the solution prescribed by the ec in order to boost the sluggish Eu­ro­pean
national economies and to increase their competitiveness on the global
markets is to guarantee that three-­fourths of the working-­age population
is in some form of employment, that welfare states and public expenditures
are dramatically re-­dimensioned, and that social benefits are individually
tailored and made conditional upon demonstration of “genuine” unem-
ployment by their recipients, namely, of actively seeking a job, even if un-
successfully. By adopting the job fi st princi­ple and the 75 ­percent goal as
its organ­izing perspective, it has been argued that Eu­rope is increasingly
moving from a regime of welfare ­toward one of workfare. Rather than a
system based on forms of general solidarity linked to the rights of citizen-
ship, in other words, Eu­rope is turning t­ oward a system based on selective
and temporary contractual relationships, which discriminates between the
deserving and undeserving poor and de-­universalizes citizenship rights.15
Although as old as industrial capitalism itself, the current workfare system
coincides with con­temporary neoliberal cap­i­tal­ist ideology in a particu-
larly felicitous way; focus upon individual responsibility and commodi-
fi ation of all aspects of social life are, in fact, the landmark of workfare
policies.16 Welfare provisions are assessed against market princi­ples, and
social schemes—­like unemployment benefits—­are framed as contractual
obligations according to which benefic aries should demonstrate unremitting

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  121

commitment to becoming “useful” cogs in the productive machine in order
to receive social assistance.
The neoliberal ideology informing workfare policies is even harsher
when it comes to certain categories of mi­grants. Whereas “high-­skill”
mi­grants are in some countries exempted from civic integration assess-
ments, “low-­skill” mi­grants moving for f­ amily reunifi ation, or what French
ex-­president Nicolas Sarkozy famously termed “infli ted immigration” ’
(immigration subie), are subjected to severe workfare programs. In most
eu countries the participation of newcomers in training activities and
orientation courses aimed at speeding up the integration of (certain) mi­
grants into the l­abor market has thus become an obligatory requirement
for the granting of residency rights. However, if the ideological infrastruc-
ture informing the “cultural” requirements of the civic integration policies
is gendered (as I discussed at length in chapter 3), the presuppositions of
­these economic requirements, or workfare mea­sures attached to civic inte-
gration, are no less so. The need to promote non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant
­women’s employment as one of the best ways to facilitate their integration
is in fact recast as an opportunity that Eu­ro­pean policy makers (includ-
ing some ­women’s organ­izations as well as femocrats as we ­shall see) offer
­these ­women in order to facilitate their emancipation. The “Strategy for
Equality between ­Women and Men 2010–2015,” which represents the work
program of the ec on gender equality, states that “to reach the Eu­rope 2020
objective of a 75% employment rate for ­women and men, par­tic­u­lar atten-
tion needs to be given to the ­labor market participation of older ­women,
single parents, ­women with a disability, mi­grant ­women and ­women from
ethnic minorities.”17 Furthermore, the offi al documents of the ec outlining
the par­ameters for mi­grants’ integration pres­ent this notion very clearly;
accordingly, work becomes “one of the best and most concrete ways to
integrate in society.”18 Integration packages at the national level, therefore,
as already noted, “should address the specific needs of mi­grant ­women in
order to promote their participation in the ­labor market and strengthen
their economic in­de­pen­dence.”19
A proliferation of statistical data, cross-­national studies, and policy
documents have increasingly been deployed at the eu level in recent years,
highlighting mi­grant ­women’s lower employment and activity rates when
compared with t­ hose of mi­grant men.20 More or less explic­itly, the lower

122 Chapter 4
rates of participation of ­these ­women in the workforce are attributed to
their backward cultural backgrounds, which are deemed responsible for
keeping Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women in a state of subjection
and economic dependence and, therefore, not encouraging them to enter
the paid workforce.21
In light of this, it is impor­tant to note that in the case of non-­eu /non-­
western ­women who arrive in Eu­rope as ­family members, the emphasis on
work as an instantiation of integration is not only informed by the work-
fare strategy of the eu but also originates in the par­tic­u­lar interpretation
of gender equality that has been put forward by the gender mainstream-
ing agencies of the ec . In spite of the multiple recommendations provided
by an ad hoc committee on the gender dimensions of integration, which
pointed to the social-­economic, the cultural, and the po­liti­cal as spheres
deserving specific consideration when implementing gender equality poli-
cies for mi­grant ­women (recommendations that are, in themselves, not
unproblematic), the ec offi al documents list employment as the major
sphere in which gendered integration should be pursued.22 Focus upon
employment as the main terrain of gender equality for mi­grant ­women, in
other words, has been informed by a certain feminist perspective—­which
in the con­temporary conjuncture converges with certain dimensions of
neoliberalism, as I ­will argue below—­according to which it is work that
sets w ­ omen ­free; work outside the ­house­hold has thus been recast as
the litmus test for benchmarking the level of equality between men and
­women in society.23
Although not explic­itly presented as workfare, but rather as an instance
of gender justice through ­women’s economic in­de­pen­dence, emphasis
upon the need to mobilize the female workforce—­including its mi­grant
component—in order to achieve the goals set by the Eu­rope 2020 strategy
is one of the main points at which the paradoxical convergence of femi-
nism and neoliberal (as well as xenophobic) po­liti­cal agendas takes place.
The paradox arises, in the fi st place, b ­ ecause the neoliberal philosophy of
workfare informing the economic strategy of the ec arguably conceives of
work as a “duty” for citizens and as the sine qua non condition for nonciti-
zens to reside in Eu­rope, whereas some feminists’ and femocrats’ embrace
of the job fi st princi­ple for mi­grant ­women is still justifi d by concerns
for w­ omen’s economic autonomy and informed by a conception of work

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  123

as a “right.” In other words, work is foregrounded, on the one hand, as an
obligation and, on the other hand, as an entitlement. But what are this
paradox’s concrete consequences for the lives of mi­grant ­women at the
nation-­state level?

Integrating Gender (and Race) as Care Work

The promotion of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women’s participation

in the ­labor market has received more attention at the nation-­state level
since the establishment of the Eu­ro­pean Integration Fund for Thi d-­
Country Nationals (eif ) in 2007. The fund’s aim is “to support the efforts
made by the Member States in enabling third-­country nationals of dif­fer­
ent economic, social, cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic backgrounds
to fulfill the conditions of residence and to facilitate their integration into
the Eu­ro­pean socie­ties.”24 In this context, article 4, 2(c), of the same di-
rective (2007/435/ec ) identifies mi­grant ­women, alongside ­children, the
el­derly, the illiterate, or the disabled, as one par­tic­u­lar group whose inte-
gration the eif aims to enhance further. Following on from the Eu­ro­pean
directive and seeking to secure the resources provided by the integration
funds, since 2007 a number of programs have been a­ dopted to promote
the participation of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women in the national
­labor market. Noticeably, in all three countries on which this book focuses,
some ­women’s organ­izations and femocrats have been on the front line in
putting forward proposals to encourage mi­grant ­women’s integration into
the workforce.
The case of the Netherlands is particularly emblematic. As discussed
in chapter 3, in 2003 the then minister for Integration and Immigration,
Rita Verdonk, in cooperation with the minister for Equality Policies,
­promoted the creation of the Participatie van Vrouwen uit Etnische
Minderheden (pavem; Participation of Ethnic Minority ­Women) commis-
sion. It was composed of six politicians, including three w ­ omen from dif­fer­
ent po­liti­cal parties: Princess Máxima (now queen of the Netherlands), Lilian
Callender and Yasemin Tümer, two “well-­integrated” ­women of migration
descent originally from Surinam and Turkey, respectively.25 The main task
of pavem was to propose concrete policies to tackle the “isolated position
of ­women from ethnic minorities” in Dutch society.26 ­Under the motto “If
you educate a ­mother, you educate a f­ amily!” pavem elaborated the princi­

124 Chapter 4
ples ­behind the integration study materials and test, which w ­ ere meant
to assess mi­grant ­women’s parenting models and be­hav­ior according to
criteria informed by notions of “proper” Dutch motherhood (see chap-
ter 3). In 2007 the then minister of Education, Culture and Science, also
responsible for gender equality, launched the “Duizend en één kracht”
(A thousand and one force) proj­ect, which had been previously designed
by pavem. Th s time the proj­ect targeted mi­grant ­women as (potential)
workers. With orientalist overtones already in its very name, the program
sought to encourage ­women undergoing civic integration programs to
participate in civil society by inviting them to undertake volunteer work.27
In a bizarre twist of means and ends, unpaid volunteer work was presented
as the via maestra for reaching the goal of economic in­de­pen­dence. The
proj­ect thus stressed the opportunities provided by working as a volunteer
for ­those mi­grant ­women who wished to discover their strengths, to assess
their capabilities, and thus to be ready for ­future paid employment. As Kirk
and Suvarieriol note, the proj­ect was implemented despite the availability
of research results conducted by the Dutch Institute for Social Research
(scp ) that showed that most mi­grant ­women interviewed would not wel-
come unpaid volunteer work.28 In par­tic­u­lar, they would not wish to carry
out the specific type of volunteer work that the proj­ect mostly encouraged
them to take: that is, care work in hospitals and ­children’s facilities, or care-­
domestic work in homes for the el­derly and in the homes of the disabled.
As stated by some of the w ­ omen interviewed by the scp, “Why should I do
that if I w­ on’t get paid?” and “I also care for my h
­ ouse­hold and my c­ hildren,
and I also do that voluntarily, that is enough!” The proj­ect was not an iso-
29

lated initiative. Since 2007 in the Netherlands similar proj­ects have been
implemented thanks to the resources made available by the eif . For in-
stance, DonaDaria, a Rotterdam-­based organ­ization for promoting gender
equality, has carried out proj­ects initially targeting Moroccan and Turk-
ish ­women, aimed at encouraging their “emancipation” through volunteer
work. With a view to allowing them to leave their homes and to become
active participants in Dutch society by learning possibly marketable skills,
­these ­women ­were placed as volunteers in hospitals and home-­care facili-
ties to provide care and domestic help.30 In an interview I conducted with
a prominent member of the Dutch mi­grant ­women workers’ network
r e­s pect nl , she recounted the many stories of mi­grant and ethnic minor-
ity ­women receiving social benefits who are regularly requested to work

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  125

or to volunteer as care-­domestic workers.31 Similarly, the Dutch immigra-
tion expert Sarah van Walsum noted that “Dutch municipalities have been
pressuring unemployed ethnic minority ­women and ­house­wives to take up
low-­skilled work in the care sector.”32 In the Netherlands, then, neoliber-
als who are promoting workfare, state-­sponsored gender equality agencies
such as pavem, as well as some w ­ omen’s organ­izations have converged not
only in asking non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women to work for ­free but
also in encouraging them to enter the social reproductive sector. As the
Raad voor Werk en Inkomen (rw i; Council for Work and Income) stated,
mi­grant ­women in the Netherlands can be very impor­tant in alleviating
­labor shortages in the healthcare sector, which thus requires “more invest-
ments in order to overcome existing obstacles.”33
Although the request for mi­grant ­women to undertake volunteer work
in the care sector is not found e­ ither in France or in Italy—or at least not in
an offi al capacity—­the situation in ­these two countries is not dissimilar
from that of the Netherlands when it comes to implementing economic in-
tegration for w­ omen migrating from outside the eu and the Global South. In
France since 2009 the law on mi­grants’ integration has established a “pro-
fessional portfolio” (bilan de compétences professionnelles) as an obligatory
requirement for all signatories of the Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration
(cai ; Contract of Reception and Integration).34 Mi­grants who sign the cai
must take a three-­hour course, during which their scholastic certifi ates
and documents supporting their skills and work experience are assessed.
According to the offi al data released in 2011,58.7 ­percent of all signatories
of the cai ­were provided with a professional portfolio; 65 ­percent of them
w­ ere ­women.35 The implementation of the obligatory professional portfolio
was presented to the public as a way of promoting the integration of mi­
grants, according to the idea that “access to employment is one of the pri-
orities of the French government with the aim to facilitate the integration
of newcomers in French society.”36 Furthermore, it was envisaged as an
instrument for tackling the disadvantaged position of the mi­grant popula-
tion in the l­abor market, particularly of its female component. According
to a study conducted in 2009 by the Département des Statistiques, Études
et Documentation, ­under the auspices of a general inquiry promoted by the
French government, “Enquête Longitudinale sur l’Intégration des Primo-­
Arrivants,” ­women ­were the majority of incoming mi­grants during that
year (52.3 ­percent), mostly entering France for reasons of ­family reunifi a-

126 Chapter 4
tion (62.3 ­percent).37 Even though, on average, ­women ­were more edu-
cated than men, the inquiry showed that a­ fter two years in the country,
mi­grant ­women’s higher levels of education did not translate into success
in the ­labor market, where they experienced more difficulties than men
in fi ding a job. Moreover, the study also showed that the large major-
ity of the incoming ­women (64  ­percent) had been active in the ­labor
markets of their countries of origin before they moved to France, thereby
rebutting the widespread idea that ­women of non-­western (particularly
Muslim) countries are by defin tion confi ed to the home and lack economic
in­de­pen­dence. Indeed, it was in France that, ­after two years, they had be-
come h ­ ouse­wives and had stopped actively seeking employment. “Migra-
tion therefore,” the study concludes, “reduces the chances of participating
in the ­labor market, especially if you are a ­woman.”38 Vari­ous ­causes of
this phenomenon are identifi d: poor or insuffici t mastery of French,
difficulty in reconciling work and childcare, inadequate or unrecognized
educational qualifi ations, and so on. In other words, as Camille Gour-
deau notes, mi­grant ­women’s difficulties in the l­abor market are regarded
as their own fault, and reference is never made to the discrimination they
face in the job search, particularly if they wear a veil, as several studies
have demonstrated.39 In this context, the establishment of the profes-
sional portfolio as a tool for facilitating mi­grants’ integration in society
through work assumes new signifi ance. Although it was presented as a
way to assess the skills and attitudes of incoming mi­grants in order to help
them fi d the right job, the professional portfolio has instead become an
instrument to control the encounter between supply and demand in the
­labor market, with an eye mostly on the latter. The strategy for tackling
mi­grants’—­and particularly ­women’s—­lower rates of activity and employ-
ment has in fact directed them not t­ oward the sectors for which they have
educational qualifi ations and/or work experience, but ­toward sectors
that face ­labor shortages. Since the end of the 2000s, French governments
have signed agreements with the representatives of economic branches
that have difficulties in recruiting native-­born workers; t­ hese include the
Agence Nationale des Ser­vices à la Personne (ans p; National Agency for
­Human Ser­vices), the cleaning and social economy sector, and restaurants
and hospitality. In the words of an interministerial report on immigration,
­these are the “sectors that, despite the crisis, are in need of l­abor supply.”40
The channeling of mi­grant ­women undergoing civic integration ­toward

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  127

the care and cleaning/domestic sectors in France, like in the Netherlands,
is also implemented through specific programs fi anced by the eif .41 Since
2008 the Pôle Emploi (a French job center system)—­which coordinates
with several associations that have been benefic aries of the eif funds since
2008 like the Centre National d’Information sur les Droits des Femmes et
des Familles—­signed an agreement with the Ministry of Immigration and
the ans p in order to promote h ­ ouse­hold ser­vices as an employment op-
portunity for the mi­grant ­women undergoing the integration program.42
Furthermore, the eif has regularly funded an organ­ization based in Bor-
deaux, Promofemmes, to provide training to mi­grant ­women to help them
fi d jobs in the cleaning sector and ­hotel industry.43
All in all, the encouragement of mi­grant ­women to be active in the ­labor
market and the identifi ation of mechanisms (like the professional portfo-
lio) intended to help them overcome the obstacles they fi d have de facto
directed them ­toward ­those jobs that French ­women and men do not want
to take: ­house­keeping, cleaning, baby­sitting, nursing, and other care work.44
Despite their higher level of education and previous work experience—​as
the research results noted earlier demonstrated—­non-­eu /non-­western mi­
grant ­women in France, like in the Netherlands, are systematically chan-
neled ­toward the social reproductive sectors.45
The implementation of civic integration policies in Italy at the time of
writing is still in its initial stages. Its dynamics and effects, therefore, can-
not be fully assessed. Nevertheless, we can attempt an analy­sis of the gen-
der dimensions of the type of economic integration promoted herein by
looking at some trends and programs that are already in place. The Di-
partimento per le Pari Opportunità (Department for Equal Opportuni-
ties), which is the main state feminism agency in the country, has been
one of the main promoters of campaigns portraying mi­grant ­women as
particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of domestic vio­lence.46 Ac-
cordingly, the department’s mea­sures targeting non-­eu /non-­western mi­
grant ­women—­whether or not within the terms of civic integration—­have
been dominated by programs addressing gendered vio­lence as mainly a
prob­lem within mi­grant communities and thus as a primary fi ld of con-
cern in issues of ­women’s integration. In this context, the department has
implemented a number of policies in which the prospects of employment
for w­ omen with a migration background are increasingly emphasized. In
par­tic­u­lar, the Italian approach to ­women’s “economic integration” has so

128 Chapter 4
far been to institute programs and training courses with the aim of pro-
viding mi­grant ­women with the “right” skills to enter the l­abor market
successfully. When we look at the specific skills ­these programs teach, we
again fi d that many of them direct mi­grant ­women ­toward care work.
For instance, the department in 2013 funded the program “Io . . . ​lavoro!”
(“I . . . ​work!”), which aims to provide ­free professional training to mi­grant
­women so that they can work as carers for the el­derly (badanti).47 At the end
of the 2000s prominent Italian ­women’s equality agencies also outside state
bureaucracy—­though often cofunded by vari­ous ministries—­have designed
programs within the framework of the eif for mi­grants, in order to fos-
ter the economic inclusion of mi­grant ­women. ­Here the Crisalide Proj­ect
developed by Nosotras is of par­tic­u­lar signifi ance. Nosotras is the name
of a widely known organ­ization that was founded in 1998 in Florence by
a group of both mi­grant and Italian ­women in order to address issues of
emancipation and equality. In 2009 the organ­ization was granted by the
eif to carry out the Crisalide Proj­ect. “The name of the proj­ect [i.e., Chrys-
alis],” in the words of the organizers, “contains in itself the meta­phor of the
insect pupa that w ­ ill become butterfly and represents the dream of free-
dom and in­de­pen­dence that comes true and that we wish to all ­women.”48
The proj­ect’s objective was to foster the social and economic integration
of mi­grant ­women through personalized forms of support, potentially en-
abling them to become autonomous. In 2010 Nosotras made initial results
from the Crisalide Proj­ect available through a brochurelike publication,
which explains the proj­ect’s rationale as well as its main assets. Though
the ­whole proj­ect is presented as an example of best practices involving
mi­grant ­women both as users and (in some cases) as social workers them-
selves, the images, narrative, and concrete results shown and recounted
throughout the publication disclose the presence of specific gendered and
cultural ste­reo­types under­lying the repre­sen­ta­tion of mi­grant ­women.
First, throughout the publication the mi­grant ­woman targeted by the proj­
ect is exemplifi d as a veiled Muslim ­woman. The brochure thus shows
the journey ­toward autonomy through cartoons representing, initially, the
veiled ­woman with a baffled-­looking face while the (presumably) native
­woman helps her understand how to access social and health ser­vices, or
how to fi d a job and, in a fi al cartoon, the mi­grant ­woman alone with a
happy face as someone in the pro­cess of starting up a new life yet, this time,
without the veil. The journey of the mi­grant ­woman ­toward autonomy is

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  129

represented not only as a path through which she ­will eventually become
conscious of her rights, but also as a journey ­toward unveiling, or taking
off what in western Eu­ro­pean imagery has come to symbolize oppression
and lack of in­de­pen­dence. Second, the publication lists work placement
and professionalization as some of the key objectives of the proj­ect. The
main examples of professionalization courses included in the brochure,
however, are courses to become a nurse and/or a personal carer for dis-
abled or el­derly ­people. ­There is an interview with one of the organ­ization’s
social workers in the brochure. Commenting upon the majority of job of-
fers mi­grant ­women mostly fi d through the Crisalide Proj­ect, she says
they are “in almost all cases jobs as carers.” Fi­nally, I ­will briefly refer to the
Care Assistants Search Agency (ca sa ) pi­lot proj­ect, which was supported
by the eif in 2011and coordinated by the Italian social consortium c oi n.
It aims to address “the increasing need for long term and quality care of
older ­people and p ­ eople with disabilities by facilitating and supporting the
integration of third countries nationals in the eu .”49 ca sa is particularly
signifi ant not only for its scope—­involving Germany and Greece, as well
as Italy—­but also for its main objective: to establish an eu -­wide recruit-
ment agency that supplies care seekers with care givers from third coun-
tries. The proj­ect explic­itly names mi­grant ­women as a key audience to be
helped to “fi d better jobs and facilitate their social and economic inte-
gration into Eu­ro­pean Society.” Hence, ca sa listed (a) providing work for
“trained immigrants specialized in long term care: home nursing, home
help for older ­people, assistance to ­people with disabilities”; (b) promot-
ing “new opportunities for social and professional inclusion to immigrant
workers through appropriate vocational training”; and (c) enhancing im-
migrants’ “social and economic integration” as its main aims. Ultimately,
like in the Netherlands and in France, in Italy too this brief overview of
concrete proj­ects aimed at implementing integration mea­sures for non-
­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women undergoing integration programs shows
that economic integration for ­these ­women ends up confini g them to the
care and domestic sector.

In spite of the differences among the three contexts in terms of the articu-
lation of general civic integration policies with specific mea­sures aimed
at promoting non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women’s employment, the

130  Chapter 4
care and domestic, or social reproduction, sector appears to be the only
branch of the economy where ­these ­women are encouraged to work, even
to volunteer. In all three countries key state gender equality agencies and
­women’s organ­izations thus have implemented the recommendations of—­
and received funds from—­the ec requiring that ­women from outside the
eu and the Global South are in some form of employment, and have di-
rected them t­ oward care and domestic jobs. In so d ­ oing, however, they
have contributed (wittingly or unwittingly) to the reproduction of care and
domestic work as a gendered—­and increasingly racialized—­labor market.
In other words, by responding positively to civic integration policies’ call
for workfare and supporting the realization of programs that assign female
mi­grant workers to the care, cleaning, and domestic sector, ­these gender
equality organ­izations have de facto converged with neoliberal workfare
ideology, which claims that mi­grant ­women’s integration and emancipa-
tion require them to be active in the l­abor market. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that t­ hese gender equality organ­izations’ proposals, unlike ­those of
neoliberals, see mi­grant ­women’s work as an opportunity for them to gain
economic in­de­pen­dence and emancipation. In other words, according to
a well-­known theme from the history of feminism (on which more in the
following section), ­women’s emancipation is seen as resulting from partici-
pation in production.
The question that remains, then, is why is this same notion of ­women’s
emancipation through participation in production now being used to push
mi­grant ­women into social reproduction? I propose to shed light on this
dilemma by briefly revisiting the debates on economic in­de­pen­dence and
­women’s emancipation that have traversed the history of feminism from the
outset. In par­tic­u­lar, I ­will succinctly reconstruct a critical genealogy of the
notions of productive ­labor, productivist ethics, and social reproduction in
relation to the broader historical, social-­economic, and institutional shifts in
the context of which t­ hese notions emerged and ­were transformed.

Productive ­Labor, Productivist Ethics, and Social Reproduction:

A Critical Feminist Genealogy

Focus on ­women’s economic in­de­pen­dence and their equal access to the

­labor market was a mainstay of the feminist movement from the outset.
In 1792 Mary Wollstonecraft praised the virtues of work as compared with

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  131

the devitalizing domesticity imposed on bourgeois ­women by codes of
middle-­class femininity. Th ­ ese “trifli g employments,” she complained, had
“rendered ­woman a trifle .”50 Article XIII of Olympe de Gouges’s Declara-
tion of the Rights of W ­ omen and Citizen, dating from 1791,called for w ­ omen
to enjoy an equal share with men with re­spect to duties as well as painful
tasks, including “the distribution of positions, employment, offices hon-
ors, and jobs.”51 U ­ ntil the fi st half of the twentieth ­century, the demand for
­women’s access to the paid workforce was part of the broader package of
claims concerning ­women’s equality in all spheres of social life: po­liti­cal,
economic, and reproductive. It was the specific insistence on w ­ omen’s eco-
nomic equality, however, that divided liberal and socialist feminists more
than any other issue. Whereas liberal feminists fought for the inclusion
of ­women in the realm of economic production, thereby rebelling against
middle-­class ­women’s condition of seclusion in the private sphere, socialist
feminists ­were influenced by the strug­gles of peasant and working-­class
­women, who had already been incorporated into the l­abor market for a
long time.52 Though they endorsed w ­ omen’s full participation in the work-
force, socialist feminists thus did not regard work as the ultimate site of
­women’s emancipation and liberation. Rather, waged work—­albeit being
conceived as a precondition for ­women’s emancipation in some instances—­
was also regarded as the exploitative condition that equalized working-­class
men and ­women and positioned them against the same ­enemy, that is,
­capital.53 Work ­under capitalism was, therefore, something to refuse, reor­
ga­nize, and transform, rather than something for which to fi ht to have as a
good in itself. “Each new concession won by the bourgeois ­woman,” wrote
Alexandra Kollontai, “would give her yet another weapon for the exploita-
tion of her younger s­ ister and would go on increasing the division between
the w­ omen of the two opposite social camps. . . . ​Where, then, is that general
‘­woman question’? Where is that unity of tasks and aspirations about which
the feminists have so much to say? ”54 At this stage, when the rise of the
feminist movement across western Eu­rope coincided with the emergence
and consolidation of mass industrialized socie­ties and the harsh social in-
equalities that such industrialization generated, social class (but also race,
though in dif­fer­ent ways in dif­fer­ent countries) divided w ­ omen more than
gender could unite them.
It was the advent of Fordism in the twentieth c­ entury and the develop-
ment of the so-­called breadwinner model that fundamentally created the

132 Chapter 4
potential for the modifi ation of the sexual division of ­labor in a way that
created the potential for the modifi ation of the sexual division of l­abor
across social classes and thus offered one common ground for w ­ omen’s
solidarity. At dif­fer­ent stages and places in dif­fer­ent countries, Fordism—­
which began in the United States in the 1920s and was then applied to
western Eu­rope ­after World War II—­imposed a novel societal configur -
tion informing all domains of public and private life. Fordism was a regime
of “intensive accumulation” characterized by mass production, relatively
reduced working hours, high wages for the ­labor aristocracy, and mass con-
sumption made pos­si­ble by the ­family income of the male breadwinner.55
­Behind the male-­breadwinner model ­there ­were a number of assumptions
about gender roles, particularly concerning the division of l­abor between
men and ­women in the ­house­hold. Men’s responsibility was to provide
the main income for the f­ amily, whereas w ­ omen’s duty was to attend to
domestic chores as well as tasks such as caring for c­ hildren and often also
the el­derly. The strength of the model and of the gendered division of
­labor that went with it in the specifi ally western Eu­ro­pean context was
ensured by a number of welfare provisions that allowed the survival of the
mono-­income ­family, both middle-­ and working-­class: income stability,
benefits for the dependent spouse and school-­age ­children, tax reductions,
the wide availability of loans and mortgages for the purchase of durable
commodities and property, and so on. The nuclear, heterosexual, and tra-
ditional patriarchal ­family was the key social unit in which productivist
discipline was reinvigorated. Henry Ford himself was convinced that “a
stable and disciplined ­labor force was reproduced through the institution
of the traditional f­ amily, and he required that his employees adhere to the
model.”56 In short, female dependence was inscribed into both the notion
of the ­family wage and Fordism. A further assumption on which Ford-
ism and the breadwinner model w ­ ere based concerned the nature of care-­
domestic, or reproductive, work, as nonwork and nonproductive and, con-
sequently, as an activity that is not entitled to a wage. Though Fordism was
not in itself responsible for the devaluation of reproductive work—­which
had begun earlier on—it helped strengthen the gender division of l­abor
and further expand its impact upon the working classes.57 In other words,
in the aftermath of World War II, when Fordism became hegemonic across
western Eu­rope, the majority of both middle-­ and working-­class ­women
w ­ ere ­house­wives.58 U­ nder Fordism, thus, reproductive work came to signify

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  133

not only for middle-­class ­women but also for working-­class ­women the very
features of ­women’s ­dependence itself: a lack of social consideration, seg-
regation in the h ­ ouse­hold and isolation, the absence of skills, and servil-
ity. The defin tion of what constituted “proper” work was thus not only
a narrowly descriptive device basically coinciding with work outside the
­house­hold, but also a highly moral and normative one, its features, rhythm,
skills, and discipline being informed by, and in turn informing, what Max
Weber famously called the western cap­i­tal­ist work ethic (Arbeitsethik).59
The cap­i­tal­ist work ethic was a “productivist” ethic, strongly prescribing
what constituted valuable and nonvaluable activities and individuals in so-
ciety. The supposedly unproductive nature of reproductive work carried
out in ­house­holds, mostly by ­women, inevitably identifi d ­women as less
valuable. The division between waged, productive work and unwaged, un-
productive work was, therefore, fi st and foremost a gendered division. As
Kathi Weeks aptly puts it for the American case (in a way that can be easily
extended to western Eu­rope),

Unwaged ­women (and t­ hose waged w ­ omen who found themselves

judged in relation to this normative model), not subject to the morally
purifying and invigorating effects of work discipline, w­ ere a justifiably
dependent class. The work ethic could then be embraced as a mascu-
line ethic while non work—­a rather more expansive category including
every­thing from leisure practices and consumption work to unwaged
agricultural, ­house­hold, and caring ­labor—­was devalued by its associa-
tion with a degraded femininity.60

It is in the context of Fordism, with its leveling of ­women from dif­fer­

ent social backgrounds to the status of h ­ ouse­wives, and with its specific
mode of devaluation of social reproductive work, that I propose to under-
stand second-­wave feminism’s demand for equality in the economic realm
and for w ­ omen’s access to waged l­abor in western Eu­rope as a “tool” for their
emancipation. Th s was indeed a demand that cut across dif­fer­ent feminist
po­liti­cal currents.61 The defin tion of reproductive work in the h ­ ouse­hold
as disempowering for ­women and thus the indication of waged work as an
emancipating condition w ­ ere henceforth appropriated by most feminists.
On the fringes of Marxist feminism ­there ­were voices more critical of the
Fordist construction of domestic and care work as nonwork. They did not

134 Chapter 4
consider waged work as a site of emancipation, but instead advanced analy-
ses for recognizing the cap­i­tal­ist need for configu ing care-­domestic work
as an activity carried out within the nuclear f­ amily. However, the majority
of feminists tended to stigmatize it and emphasized the need to escape from
it.62 From the mid-1960s onward, the productivist ethic was shared by a large
range of w ­ omen’s organ­izations and intellectuals, not only liberal ones rep-
resenting the interests of middle-­class ­women, but also by then-­influential
­women’s organ­izations linked to the traditional parties of the working class,
for instance, the Unione Donne Italiane (Union of Italian W ­ omen) in Italy
and the Union des Femmes Françaises (Union of French ­Women) in France,
both associated with the communist parties in their respective countries.
With the advent of so-­called post-­Fordism and neoliberalism, since the
late 1970s and 1980s ­women’s widespread entrance into paid work has be-
come a real­ity. Albeit at dif­fer­ent paces and with dif­fer­ent percentages, the
majority of working-­age ­women across most of western Eu­rope have been
incorporated into the ­labor force. From the mid-1990s onward, for instance,
­women’s rate of employment in this book’s three focus countries has grown
at dramatic speed: 7.7 percentage points in France, reaching 59.7 ­percent
in 2011;16 percentage points in the Netherlands, reaching 69.9 ­percent in
2011; and 11.1  percentage points in Italy, reaching 46.5  ­percent in 2011.63
In spite of the differences concerning the characteristics of this growth
and the transformations involved in each country’s gender and welfare re-
gimes, ­women’s increasing employment has indeed constituted, in Maria
Karamessini and Jill Rubery’s terms, a case of “converging divergences”
between dif­fer­ent western Eu­ro­pean contexts.64 However, the conditions
in which this phenomenon has taken place are very dif­fer­ent from the ones
that ­were dominant ­under Fordism. If Fordism was the era of manufactur-
ing, relative stability in jobs and income, and of the availability of extensive
social welfare provisions, which allowed even the mono-­income working-­
class ­family to maintain decent living standards, post-­Fordism is the era
of the ser­vice sector, where job flex bility, part-­time or casual contracts,
and the erosion of welfare provisions have come to dominate the lives of
mono-­and dual-­income families. In a scenario dominated by a lack of job
security, uncertainty, and economic instability, w ­ omen’s wages have not
only become necessary and valuable, but in recent times and in some cases
have even become the only ones on which many families have been able to

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  135

rely. During the recent global economic crisis (2007–2011),female workers
(both mi­grant and nonmigrant) in western Eu­rope have been less affected
by the crisis than men, with the Netherlands, France, and Italy constituting
no exception (on which more in chapter  5).65 Some commentators have
gone so far as to call the recent recession the he-­cession.66 ­Under post-­
Fordism and neoliberalism the consequences of ­women’s incorporation in
the workforce for gender roles and for feminist demands themselves have
thus been dramatic. Strug­gles for ­women’s access to the workforce have
been increasingly replaced by campaigns for equal pay and equal opportu-
nities in the workplace; denunciations of the glass ceiling preventing many
­women from achieving positions of leadership have gone together with the
establishment of institutional rules that require companies to apply gender
quotas and affirmative action. Although the range, target, politics, and main
vision under­lying the notion of gender equality and consequently feminist
positions in this conjuncture have been diverse and fragmented, the vari-
ant of feminism that has come to dominate mainstream debates and insti-
tutional settings has undoubtedly been the liberal and now increasingly
“neoliberal” one.67 By privileging a defin tion of gender equality as “same-
ness” with men and as “equal opportunities” for w ­ omen to be included
in the public sphere, liberal and now neoliberal feminisms have a­ dopted
conservative strategies that do not challenge the fundamental tenets of the
neoliberal cap­i­tal­ist social formation. Campaigns for w­ omen’s attainment
of positions of power have thus increasingly dominated the mainstream
debate on gender equality. Although the fi ht to break through the glass
ceiling still represents a minority of the demands of the female workforce,
with most ­women instead being busy trying to avoid “falling through a
structurally unstable fl or,” the majority of ­women in western Eu­rope are
now effectively incorporated into the sphere of production.68 Yet social
reproduction has not dis­appeared. ­Either seeking a happy balance, or ne-
gotiating some kind of frustrating deal, ­women are still confronted with
the daily demands of reproductive tasks.69 Despite the signifi ant changes
in gender roles that have accompanied w ­ omen’s entrance in large num-
bers into the workforce, numerous studies show that working w ­ omen still
attend to social reproductive work more than men do. The dominance
of productivist ethics and the privileging of an equally productivist po­
liti­cal agenda among mainstream feminist and ­women’s circles have not
been matched by any similarly forceful campaigns for the provision of

136 Chapter 4
public care ser­vices for families, el­derly, and the disabled. Rather, even the
modest or insuffici t public care facilities provided in most western Eu­
ro­pean countries are increasingly being swept away by neoliberal politics
or commodifi d (on which more in chapter  5), leaving most families in
a situation in which the time available for social reproduction is shorter
and shorter and (increasingly often) redistributed onto the shoulders of
mi­grant ­women.

Western Productivist Ethics for Non-­Western

Reproductive Workers

Against this background, I propose to shed light on why it is that economic

integration policies targeting non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women have
ended up pushing ­these same ­women ­toward the care and domestic sec-
tor. In par­tic­u­lar, the critical genealogy of western feminism’s productivist
ethics I outlined earlier might help to unravel the paradox emerging from
the mismatch between, on the one hand, some ­women’s organ­izations’ and
femocrats’ calls for mi­grant ­women to enter the workforce in order to be-
come eco­nom­ically in­de­pen­dent and, on the other hand, the disconcert-
ing real­ity that mi­grant ­women are being pushed to work for ­free (like in
the Netherlands) or ­else systematically shunted into the private sphere, or
social reproduction. In other words, the work ­these ­women’s organ­izations
and femocrats ask mi­grant ­women to undertake is precisely the work from
which western Eu­ro­pean feminists wanted to escape: namely, social reproduc-
tive ­labor. Certainly, the fact that jobs in the reproductive sector, in which
mi­grant ­women fi d themselves confi ed, are now paid wages introduces
an impor­tant difference when compared with the situation that second-­
wave feminists denounced: namely, that of the Fordist ­house­wife who had
to perform social reproductive work “for f­ ree.”70 In a sense, the new config-
uration of social reproduction as waged work vindicates ­those feminists
who have always fought for the recognition of domestic work as produc-
tive work and, therefore, as entitled to a wage.71 However, the payment of
reproductive work in ­today’s western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties does not in any
sense amount to its social rehabilitation. On the contrary, care and do-
mestic work continues to be perceived as unskilled, low-­status, isolated,
servile, and dirty; it thus continues to be socially stigmatized, very poorly
paid, and undesired by most western Eu­ro­pean ­women.72 As I ­will analyze in

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  137

more detail in chapter 5, the latter’s unavailability for t­ hese jobs—­through
lack of time and/or w ­ ill—­has effectively meant that the reproductive sector
has become a mi­grant ­women’s niche. The conditions of the care and do-
mestic sector, with its antisocial working hours, low pay, and social stigma,
make it very unattractive to t­ hose “national” workers who still have a wider
range of employment choices and protection networks as compared with
“non-­native” mi­grant workers.
To be clear, I am not suggesting in any way that we should blame west-
ern Eu­ro­pean ­women, or western Eu­ro­pean feminists, for wishing to es-
cape the segregative condition of the h ­ ouse­wife, nor do I argue that they
are responsible for this condition now being “externalized” to mi­grant
­women. What I am proposing, instead, is that we critically reconsider the
notion of productive work as the site of, or tool for, ­women’s emancipa-
tion. Th s notion has played a signifi ant role in the stigmatization of social
reproduction in a way that has limited the possibility of thinking about
alternative scenarios for accomplishing this emancipation. In other words,
we need to revisit and interrogate the “productivist ethics” of western Eu­
ro­pean feminists and the understanding of social reproduction as a site of
­women’s subjection rather than work that needs to be reconceived as a so-
cial activity and a public good. Feminism’s productivist ethics in fact now
weighs on the shoulders not just of ­those ­women who uphold alternative
ideas of social reproduction and emancipation and are confronted with
the daily strug­gle to combine work and care, in the absence of public and
affordable care facilities. It also weighs heavi­ly on the shoulders of mi­grant
­women, who are called upon to “clean up” this ­whole mess—­literally.

The Western Feminist Teleology of Emancipation

On the occasion of welfare reform in the United States in 1996—­instituting

workfare that disproportionately affected black single ­mothers—­Gwendolyn
Mink noted that “if racism has permitted policy makers to negate poor single
­mothers as citizens and ­mothers, white middle-­class feminism has provided
policy makers with an excuse. White middle-­class feminists’ emphasis on
­women’s right to work outside the home—­accompanied by ­women’s in-
creased presence in the workforce—­gave cover to conservatives e­ ager to
require wage work of single ­mothers even as they championed the tradi-
tional ­family.”73 Th s is a strong stance, no doubt, and one that needs to

138 Chapter 4
be understood in the context of the debates among US feminists regard-
ing the effects of the welfare reforms of the 1990s on African American
w
­ omen.74 Nevertheless, Mink’s comment is useful for my attempt to explain
the paradoxical situation in which some feminists, femocrats, and w ­ omen’s
organ­izations promote the notion of productive work and economic in­de­
pen­dence as an instance of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women’s pos­si­ble
emancipation, while encouraging them to take—or silently pretending to
ignore that they take—­the jobs feminists historically considered the sym-
bolic and concrete markers of ­women’s dependence and subjection. Fol-
lowing in the vein of Mink’s apt comment, I contend that when feminism’s
productivist ethics converges with neoliberal workfare policies, which in-
evitably target the lives of poor ­women (mi­grant and nonmigrant alike),
forms of oppression and exploitation based in race, class, and gender are
the inevitable result.
When feminists, femocrats, and ­women’s organ­izations champion civic
integration policies encouraging non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women to
work with the promise that this w ­ ill enhance their integration and economic
in­de­pen­dence, they tacitly encourage them to adopt western feminists’ no-
tion of emancipation through productive ­labor. In other words, the call
for mi­grant ­women to work can be read as the recommendation that they
should pass through the same stages as ­those experienced by western Eu­
ro­pean ­women in the twentieth c­ entury in order to achieve the hard-­won
equality the latter allegedly enjoy. The productivist ethics that encourages
mi­grant ­women to work thus morphs into a teleological notion of emanci-
pation. Accordingly, ­women’s integration into the workforce is regarded as
a necessary stage in their journey ­toward the telos of full emancipation. Or,
to put it differently, work becomes that stage supposedly allowing ­women
to ­free themselves of the conditions of subordination, economic depen-
dence, and isolation that the reproductive, or private, sphere is deemed
to represent. The western Eu­ro­pean feminist teleology of emancipation is
based on two main implicit assumptions. The fi st assumption is that non-­
western ­women, and especially Muslim ­women—­who can be regarded, as I
previously noted, as the con­temporary embodiment of what Chandra Mo-
hanty called the “Thi d World W ­ oman”75—­are a homogeneous, monolithic
entity defi ed above all by backwardness and object status. According to
this still-­widespread and deeply rooted idea, the characteristics of the non-­
western ­woman are subordination, passivity, and victimhood; differences

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  139

of social class, religion, sexuality, and so on play a lesser role in terms of
the defin tion of her identity and concrete living conditions. Indeed we see
how, in spite of the variety of countries, regions, social backgrounds, lan-
guages, and religious traditions of the thousands of ­women ­going through
the requirements of “civic integration” in order to secure their visas, this
teleology of emancipation conceives mainly of one non-­western female
ideal-­type: the victimized object.76 It is to this ideal-­type of w
­ oman that
some ­women’s organ­izations and femocrats—­among ­others—­offer inte-
gration into the workforce as a way out of her assumed status of subjection.
The second implicit assumption is that emancipation is constituted by a set
of obligatory stages that must be the same for all w ­ omen. Waged l­abor thus
becomes the stage through which ­women must pass in order to enter into
the space of proper, western emancipation.
By grounding itself upon t­ hese assumptions, western feminism’s teleology
of emancipation through productive work recalls very closely the teleology
of development that informed modernization theories during the 1960s. 77
In the period following World War II and during the construction and
consolidation of the con­temporary global cap­i­tal­ist market, ­these theo-
ries proposed a geography of the world divided fundamentally between
developed (the West) and underdeveloped (the rest) countries. Complex
postulates ­were elaborated to account for the developed world’s “greater
prosperity” and ­recipes ­were offered to underdeveloped regions for them
to achieve economic success. In a nutshell, such ­recipes ­were based on a re-
construction of western social-­economic history as a sequence of stages—­
from feudalism, to modernity and industrialization, to the affirmation of
the cap­i­tal­ist mode of production on a global scale—­that non-­western
countries needed to complete in their race for development. Vari­ous criti-
cal schools (dependentistas, world-­systems theory, postcolonialism, and so
forth) subjected developmentalist and modernization theories to power­ful
criticisms, denouncing all their imperialist, Eurocentric, and racist presup-
positions.78 By assuming what Johannes Fabian called “temporal distanc-
ing,” ­these theories suggested in par­tic­u­lar that western and non-­western
countries had historically gone through dif­fer­ent temporal stages.79 Th
temporalization of the relationship between the two regions of the world
was founded on the idea that western and non-­western nations had been
historically autonomous and in­de­pen­dent from one another. In this way,
wealth and poverty, development and underdevelopment could be justified

140  Chapter 4
as the result of discrete histories: that is, as the outcome of the interplay
­ ere endogenous to each region. At the same time, the fact
of ­factors that w
of western Eu­rope’s prosperity as compared to the pauperism of the non-­
western nations also served to infuse the former with moral superiority
and entitlement to assume the role of the master for the “inferior” non-­
western nation. Modernization and development theorists thus mystifi d
underdevelopment (an obviously highly contested term) as an entirely “non-­
western” prob­lem, rather than as largely the result of western colonialism
and continuous exploitation of the resources of non-­western regions.
I contend that with its ste­reo­typical repre­sen­ta­tion of non-­western
and mi­grant (especially Muslim) w ­ omen as backward and dependent,
and its call for them to enter the workforce in order to become “eco­nom­
ically independent”—­namely, to follow the path western feminists claim
to have traveled on their own path to emancipation—­feminists, ­women’s
organ­izations, and femocrats endorsing economic integration policies
for mi­grant ­women are treating t­ hese ­women like developmentalist and
modernization theories treated underdeveloped nations: they are always
one (or more) steps ­behind and thus have to “catch up.” As in the case of
the non-­western nations, the conditions of relative poverty and exploita-
tion in which mi­grant ­women fi d themselves in western Eu­rope qua mi­
grants are presented as an instance of “temporal distance” and as the result
of their endogenous “cultural” deficie cy. However, not only do western
Eu­ro­pean nations bear a good share of the responsibility in creating the
historical conditions in non-­western countries that encourage mi­grants to
leave them, but ­these western Eu­ro­pean nations (and the West more gen-
erally) construct and also maintain domestically the very conditions that
keep mi­grants in general, and mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar, in a state of
precariousness: namely, insecure rights, institutional discrimination, and
economic segregation within racialized and gendered niches of the ­labor
market.80 Even more impor­tant, we should note that, just as the exploita-
tion of non-­western countries’ natu­ral resources permits the West to keep
its patterns of production and consumption, it is also mi­grant ­women’s
socially reproductive work that permits western Eu­ro­pean ­women and
men not only to have the “cheap” care that enables them to be active in the
­labor market, but also to retain the illusion that gender equality has been
achieved—at least for “them.” Arguably, then, the western feminist teleol-
ogy of emancipation through productive work stems from the projection

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  141

of the historically specific and geo­graph­i­cally circumscribed experience
of western Eu­ro­pean ­women as representative of the experience, past and
­future, of all ­women. The historical trajectory of western Eu­ro­pean ­women
is thus universalized as the criterion by which all w ­ omen’s emancipation
should be assessed. 81

Feminism’s Temporal Distancing and Temporal Disjunction

In this chapter I proposed that the nature of the con­temporary conver-

gence of feminists, femocrats, and ­women’s organ­izations in the Neth-
erlands, France, and Italy with anti-­Islam/anti-­immigration politics in the
name of ­women’s rights becomes more intelligible if we look at a specific
and mostly overlooked point of their encounter: that is, the call for non-
­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women to work. It is a point of convergence of
par­tic­u­lar salience for t­ hose western Eu­ro­pean feminists advocating anti-­
Islam mea­sures with the proclaimed objective of freeing Muslim ­women
from their segregation in the private sphere. Liberation from the private
sphere and integration into the public sphere constituted a historically uni-
fying ­battle for feminists in western Eu­rope. If we consider the so-­called
three waves of the feminist movement from the retrospective position
of the novelties—­socially, eco­nom­ically, and politically—­introduced by
the Fordist organ­ization of ­labor and the gendered societal model that it
helped consolidate, they can be seen as deeply embedded within (albeit
not exhausted by) the broader context of pre-­Fordist, Fordist, and post-­
Fordist socie­ties. Whereas fi st-­wave, western Eu­ro­pean feminism in the
pre-­Fordist period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was
largely divided along class lines, with middle-­class, peasant, and working-­
class ­women experiencing too much division to elaborate a common po­
liti­cal agenda around the “pro-­work” slogan, Fordism in many ways created
the conditions for second-­wave feminism at large to coalesce around such
a slogan, beyond class divisions. The h ­ ouse­wife constructed by Fordism
was, indeed, in western Eu­rope a figu e that existed across class bound­
aries. Second-­wave feminism’s largely common demand for ­women’s par-
ticipation in the workforce thus expressed the desire of a large majority
of w­ omen not to be confi ed to the sphere of social reproduction and to
enter the sphere of production. The debates in the so-­called third wave

142 Chapter 4
of feminism ­today take place in post-­Fordist times, in which a large por-
tion of western Eu­ro­pean ­women has entered the l­abor market. Within a
framework dominated by neoliberalism, however, this entrance occurs in
an increasingly unequal societal setting and in very unequal ways. Though
many ­women are now brought together by the experience of work, the con-
ditions of that work—in terms of salary, forms of contracts, c­ areer paths,
working hours, and economic sectors—­are internally very dif­fer­ent and
divisive. Alongside the class divisions that t­ hese differences inevitably re-
inforce, however, racial divisions also have to be taken into account. Non-­
western racialized ­women are now part of the western Eu­ro­pean workforce
and population more generally, in ways never experienced before in recent
western Eu­ro­pean history. And it is at this par­tic­u­lar juncture that the call
for non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women to join the workforce in order
to be better integrated and eco­nom­ically in­de­pen­dent is not a unifying
feminist demand. On the one hand, such a call reproposes an old Ford-
ist feminist register in a very dif­fer­ent, post-­Fordist context, and it targets
predominantly non-­western mi­grant ­women. It thus differentiates among
­women along fundamentally racializing lines. On the other hand, femi-
nists’, femocrats’, and ­women’s organ­izations’ invitation to mi­grant ­women
to enter employment has de facto been translated into concrete policies
directing ­these ­women ­toward jobs in the care and domestic sector. That
is, mi­grant ­women have come to occupy the spaces within the realm of so-
cial reproduction that western Eu­ro­pean feminists sought to leave ­behind
in their quest for emancipation. In a quasi-­“temporal disjunction”—­which
is predicated upon the temporal distancing between western and non-­
western ­women inscribed in the teleological narrative of emancipation
through productive work I discussed earlier—­several western feminists are
thus caught up in a radical performative contradiction. While they intend
to promote policies that can ­free non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women
from the gender constraints seemingly inscribed in their “cultures,” some
femocrats and ­women’s organ­izations in par­tic­u­lar implemented mea­sures
that instead maintain and further exacerbate the segregation of t­ hese same
­women into highly gendered and racialized l­abor markets. While sacrifi -
ing antiracism in the name of gender equality for all ­women, ­these western
Eu­ro­pean feminists, ­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats thus have en-
dorsed (wittingly or unwittingly) a neoliberal workfare agenda that heavi­ly

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  143

discriminates against mi­grant ­women and ultimately undermines gender
justice in general. The preservation of social reproduction as a socially stig-
matized and feminine activity in fact affects not only mi­grant, racialized
­women, but also the strug­gle against the maintenance of gender roles as
such.

Conclusion: Convergence Is Not Identity

I should like to conclude with a word of methodological caution, as well as of

hope. Convergence should not be mistaken for identity; nor should the merg-
ing of con­temporary feminist, femocratic, and w ­ omen’s organ­izations’ de-
mands for economic equality with neoliberal workfare for mi­grant ­women be
understood to herald a broader historical “elective affi ty” between feminism
and neoliberal capitalism.82 By pointing to the temporal disjunction accord-
ing to which many western Eu­ro­pean feminists, femocrats, and ­women’s
organ­izations invoke an older Fordist demand and offer it to non-­eu /non-­
western mi­grant ­women from a position of privilege and in the changed
conditions of post-­Fordism, I am attempting to stress the discontinuity be-
tween the two feminist moments. That is, I am arguing that second-­wave
feminist demands for ­women’s integration into the workforce, as they ­were
put forward in the 1960s and 1970s, need to be understood in the historical
context in which they ­were elaborated, as I have repeatedly emphasized.83
­Today’s feminists’, femocrats’, and w­ omen’s organ­izations’ reiterations of
that same set of demands for non-­western mi­grant ­women, and in a con-
text in which neoliberal workfare politics makes ­those demands entirely
compatible with an Islamophobic and gender-­biased po­liti­cal agenda, are
thus a case not of temporal continuity but of disjunction. To be sure, it is
a temporal disjunction grounded in a fundamentally, and not new, west-
ern supremacist perspective, one that assumes that non-­western mi­grant
­women are fundamentally backward and victimized objects, whose hope
for emancipation is assumed to lie in them committing to catch up with
their western ­sisters. But the conditions of re-­production and, above all,
the implications of such a western supremacist position need to be ana-
lyzed in the current conjuncture in order to reveal their contradictory con­
temporary results. The understanding of the convergence of feminism and
neoliberalism on economic integration policies for mi­grant ­women—­that
is, one crucial facet of femonationalism—in terms of a performative con-

144 Chapter 4
tradiction enables us to advance a radical critique that shows the negative
consequences of ­these policies for gender justice in general. By exposing
this performative contradiction, that is, by pointing to the countereman-
cipatory pro­cesses that are set in motion when racial discrimination is
justifi d in the name of emancipatory goals such as gender justice, we place
ourselves in a position that allows us to think theoretically and po­liti­cally
about how to move beyond this contradiction.84

FEMONATIONALISM AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION  145

 CHAPTER 5

The Po­liti­cal Economy of Femonationalism

All industrial and commercial centres in ­England now have a working class divided
into two hostile camps, En­glish proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary
En­glish worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who forces down the stan-
dard of life. In relation to the Irish worker, he feels himself to be a member of the
ruling nation and, therefore, makes himself a tool of his aristocrats and cap­i­tal­ists
against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He harbours
religious, social and national prejudices against him. His attitude t­ owards him
is roughly that of the “poor whites” to the “niggers” in the former slave states of the
American Union. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money.
He sees in the En­glish worker both the accomplice and the stupid tool of En­glish
rule in Ireland. Th s antagonism is kept artific ally alive and intensifi d by the press,
the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling
class. Th s antagonism is the secret of the En­glish working class’s impotence, de-
spite its organisation. It is the secret of the maintenance of power by the cap­i­tal­ist
class. And the latter is fully aware of this.
—­k ar l mar x, “Letter to Sigfrid Meyer and Karl Vogt,” 475

In their introduction to Global ­Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers

in the New Economy (2003), Barbara Ehrenreich and Russell Arlie Hochs­
child describe the role of the First World like that of the “old-­fashioned
male in the ­family—­pampered, entitled, unable to cook, clean, or fi d his
socks.” On the other hand, they continue, “poor countries take on a role
like that of the traditional ­woman within the ­family—­patient, nurturing
and self-­denying.”1 Th s depiction of the relation between the Global North
and the Global South in terms of the sexual division of ­labor within the
­house­hold should not be understood as merely a meta­phor for the power
relations and uneven development engendered by neoliberal globalization.
100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

U.K.
Greece

EU-15
Austria
Denmark

Germany

France

Italy

Netherlands*
Ireland

Portugal

Sweden
Spain

Luxembourg

Finland
Belgium

Women Men

Figure 5.1 ​Foreign-­born immigrant population by sex in the eu-15 in 2010.

sour ce: cal cul atio ns based o n eur ost at (o nline d at a c ode: [migr_i mm1c t z]).
*dat a fo r 20 10 ar e no t a vail able fo r the ne ther l ands.

Rather, it should be taken quite literally: poor countries increasingly pro-

vide the nannies, maids, and sex workers for rich countries.
Particularly from the 1990s onward, western Eu­rope has become one of
the continents—­along with Latin Amer­i­ca and Oceania—­registering the
largest increase in ­women’s presence in immigration infl ws.2 According
to Eurostat, in 2010 “foreign-­born” ­women outnumbered men among im-
migrants in Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, and Denmark, whereas they are
close to half in all other countries (figu e 5.1).3
In so­cio­log­i­cal terms, the growth of female migration to western
Europe—­which began in the mid-1970s—­represents the unintended con-
sequence of the guestworker systems established in northern Eu­rope ­after
World War II. While the policies of stopping new migration infl ws and
the return programs for resident mi­grants in the aftermath of the 1973 re-
cession had the goal of lessening the number of mi­grant workers and of
using them as “safety valves” to reduce unemployment among native-­born

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  147

workers, a number of mi­grants deci­ded to ­settle and to bring their spouses
and ­family members with them.4 Furthermore, the difficulty of acquiring
work permits in northern Eu­ro­pean destination countries re­oriented ­labor
fl ws ­toward southern Eu­rope, which had ­until then been sending waves
of emigrants and had not yet, therefore, developed clear immigration poli-
cies.5 To alter slightly a saying well known among Italian sociologists of
migration, “Northern Eu­ro­pean states wanted only hands, instead ­human
beings (and their wives and ­children) arrived.” Although ­women had al-
ways been pres­ent in migration fl ws (and even in predominant numbers,
depending on the sending country, as in the case of the Philippines, and on
the type of move, as in short-­distance migration), from the mid-1970s on-
ward the number of them making long-­distance moves increased dramati-
cally.6 ­After an initial gender blindness in the 1970s and 1980s, t­ here has
been a growing body of lit­er­a­ture focusing on the presence of w ­ omen in
international migration to western Eu­rope and on the plurality of their mi-
gratory patterns and motives (see chapter 1).7 ­Family reunifi ation remains
the main “offi al” motivation b ­ ehind a signifi ant proportion of female
migration to the continent, although this does not prevent w ­ omen who
have entered as spouses or ­family members from participating in the ­labor
market, often in the shadow economy.8 Despite Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women’s growing numbers and the variety and richness of their
migratory patterns, their job opportunities are in fact largely confi ed to a
limited number of occupations. As previously noted, the majority of ­those
who actively participate in the western Eu­ro­pean ­labor market are em-
ployed in one single branch of the economy, namely, the social reproduc-
tive sector (cleaning, care domestic, and health care work).9 As a number
of scholars have emphasized, the demand for ­labor in this sector has grown
so much over the past twenty years that it is now regarded as the main rea-
son for the feminization of international migration.10
In chapter 4 I illustrated how femonationalist policies on civic integra-
tion depict non-­western ­women (and Muslims in par­tic­u­lar) as individu-
als in need of economic in­de­pen­dence and emancipation, yet push them
to work in poorly paid (or wholly unpaid) and highly feminized ­labor
markets such as care and domestic work. We should ask, then, is t­ here a
pos­si­ble connection between Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women’s
segregation in the social reproductive sector and the femonationalist ide-
ological formation? Why do femonationalists declare solidarity ­toward

148 Chapter 5
t­ hese ­women as supposedly “oppressed” subjects, while concealing the fact
that a large number of them are required to work, or are already exploited,
in the care and cleaning economy? As I have discussed throughout this
book, both offi al discourses and public policies concerning the integra-
tion of immigrants are highly gendered. Accordingly, it is men and not
so much ­women who create trou­bles for the integration pro­cess.11 Con-
sidered to be the makers and ultimate guardians of what western Eu­ro­
pe­ans regard as backward and misogynistic cultural codes, Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant men are indicted as the real obstacle to “social and
cultural integration,” thereby representing a cultural threat to the western
Eu­ro­pean ­whole. Even when it is the veiled Muslim w ­ oman, for instance,
who seems to be targeted as a cultural danger when she refuses to take off
the hijab or the burqa and therefore to adapt to secular cultural norms,
she is depicted as if she does so not on the basis of a personal choice—­
since ­these accounts deny Muslim w ­ omen’s agency—­but ­because she is
oppressed by men.12 However, as I discussed in chapter  4 in par­tic­u­lar,
we should note that Muslim and non-­western mi­grant men and w ­ omen
are perceived and depicted in dif­fer­ent and often opposed ways also at the
level of economic integration. Hence, right-­wing nationalist slogans that
call for “jobs for ‘nationals’ ” (which are impor­tant for the electoral success
of ­these parties) should be read, I argue, “jobs for ‘national’ men.” Whereas
the “sexualization of racism,” that is, the singling out of mi­grant men and
­women according to racialized gendered ste­reo­types, has been widely ana-
lyzed both in terms of the “culturalization” of xenophobic tropes concern-
ing supposed unbridgeable differences between western and non-­western
cultures (or civilizations), and in terms of the colonial legacy deeply rooted
in the ste­reo­typical repre­sen­ta­tions in the western Eu­ro­pean imaginary of
Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women, the political-­economic logic
underpinning femonationalism has been largely overlooked. However, a
closer look at the differences between Muslim and non-­western mi­grant
men and w ­ omen in the western Eu­ro­pean economic arena can enable us
to shed further light on some equally crucial reasons for the double (gen-
dered) standard applied by western Eu­ro­pean nationalists and neoliberal
governments to the mi­grant population.
To this end, the chapter is or­ga­nized as follows: fi st, I analyze the spe-
cific role of non-­western mi­grant workers in con­temporary western Eu­
ro­pean economies by drawing upon the theoretical insights provided by

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  149

the concept of the “reserve army of l­abor.” Developed particularly by Karl
Marx in volume 1 of Capital, and subsequently taken up by economic soci-
ologists and sociologists of migration from the 1970s onward, the framing
of mi­grant ­labor in terms of a “reserve army” is of ­great use in deciphering
both the economic and the po­liti­cal status of this peculiar type of l­abor
in its current configur tion. Second, I concentrate on an analy­sis of non-­
western female mi­grant ­labor, which is overrepresented in the care and do-
mestic sector, in order to ask w ­ hether its specific ties in western Eu­ro­pean
economies tell us something about the special status enjoyed by Muslim
and non-­western mi­grant ­women in the anti-­immigration campaigns qua
“redeemable subjects” deserving defense and even “salvation.”
Ultimately, as ­these discussions ­shall demonstrate, the double standard
applied to Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women in the public imagi-
nary as a section of the mi­grant population in need of special attention
and even “rescue” cannot be understood solely through the lenses offered
by analyses focused largely on the culturalization of racism, the securitar-
ian agendas of neoliberal states, and the colonial heritage of the sexualiza-
tion of racism. Albeit crucial, ­these lenses need to be supplemented with a
specific understanding of Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women’s eco-
nomic role within the context of the neoliberal reforms in welfare regimes
in the direction of the so-­called commodifi ation of care, the feminization
and racialization of specific ­labor markets, the management of migration by
western Eu­ro­pean states, and the current reconfigur tion of gender o ­ rders.
All ­these ­factors contribute, I ­will argue, to configu ing female mi­grant
­labor employed in the reproductive sector as a “regular” rather than a “reserve
army of l­abor.”

Mi­grants as a Reserve Army of ­Labor

Mi­grant workers in western economies play the role of what Marx famously,
albeit not exclusively, called a “reserve army of ­labor,” namely, “a mass of
­human material always ready for exploitation.”13 In Marx’s analy­sis, (a) the
increase in the magnitude of social capital, that is, the ensemble of indi-
vidual capitals; (b) the enlargement of the scale of production; and ­(c) the
growth of the productivity of an increasing number of workers brought
about by capital accumulation create a situation in which the greater “at-
traction of laborers by capital is accompanied by their greater repulsion.”14

150  Chapter 5
­ ese three interrelated pro­cesses, for Marx, set the conditions according
Th
to which the laboring population gives rise, “along with the accumulation
of capital produced by it, [also to] the means by which it itself is made
relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population; and it
does this to an always increasing extent.”15 Marx describes this as a law of
population, which is peculiar to the cap­i­tal­ist mode of production just as
other modes of production have their own corresponding population laws.
The paradox of the creation of the surplus laboring population u ­ nder the
cap­i­tal­ist mode of production is that while it is “a necessary product of
accumulation,” this surplus population is also the lever of such accumula-
tion; namely, it is that which “forms a disposable industrial reserve army,
that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its
own cost.”16
The discussion about the creation of the reserve army of ­labor is strictly
related to Marx’s analy­sis of the organic composition of capital and the ten-
dency of cap­i­tal­ist accumulation to encourage the increase “of its constant,
at the expense of its variable constituent.”17 In other words, the creation of
a pool of unemployed and underemployed (or what Marx calls the three
forms of the reserve army of l­abor: fl ating, stagnant, and latent) is due to
capital’s need to increase the mass and value of the means of production
(i.e., machines), at the cost of the decrease of the mass and value of living
­labor (i.e., wages and workers). Indeed, a crucial ele­ment in the reduction
of wages and workers, or variable capital, is technical development and
mechanization, which alongside other f­ actors leads to the expulsion of a
number of laborers from the productive pro­cess and therefore to the cre-
ation of a surplus of workers who are no longer needed. Th s notwithstand-
ing, Marx saw an inescapable limit to mechanization, for l­abor power is
the main source of surplus value and, therefore, it is that component of the
­labor pro­cess that cannot be entirely replaced by machines. Th s is one of
the reasons why in order to guarantee and increase capital’s accumulation,
the history of capitalism has seen the development of a number of strate-
gies all aimed at decreasing the mass and value of variable capital, but also
at limiting the pitfalls of complete mechanization. Some of t­ hese strategies
have been (a) relocation of production in areas with cheap ­labor, instead
of investments in costly technological innovation to maintain productive
sites in areas with “pricey” l­abor power and (b) a resort to the supply of
cheap ­labor usually provided by mi­grant workers, particularly in the case

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  151

of nonrelocatable productive sectors (like construction and the ser­vice
industry, for instance), thereby giving rise to forms of competition between
“native” and “non-­native” workers for the jobs available. For this set of rea-
sons, as the passage at the beginning of this chapter testifies, already in
Marx’s time mi­grants occupied a special place within the cap­i­tal­ist repro-
duction of surplus laboring populations, a situation that enabled cap­i­tal­
ists to maintain wage discipline and to inhibit working-­class solidarity by
means of the application of a divide et impera logic. In nineteenth-­century
and early twentieth-­century western Eu­rope they ­were usually rural work-
ers forced to move to the cities or to neighboring regions/nations due
to land dispossession and the pro­cess of industrialization as well as due to
state policies aimed at providing l­abor power for the growing urban manu-
facturing industries.18 From the mid-­twentieth ­century onward, the stock
of mi­grant laborers to western Eu­rope, especially northern Eu­rope, was
increasingly composed of southern Eu­ro­pean and non-­European subjects
(mostly male) seeking to fi d work in richer cities, often coinciding with
the metropoles that had dominated and impoverished their countries of
origin ­under colonialism.
In spite of its analytical power, the concept of the reserve army of l­abor
has not always enjoyed much fortune. Particularly in the 1960s, the hege-
mony in the sociology of migration of rational-­choice approaches explaining
population movements as the result of individual decisions contributed
to marginalize and discredit this classically Marxian concept within the
mainstream. It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that a new generation of
scholars began to employ again the notion of a reserve army of ­labor to
describe mi­grants as specific divisions of ­labor power.19 Th ough this no-
tion, they tried in par­tic­u­lar to understand mi­grant ­labor and the growth
of international migrations within the broader framework of uneven de-
velopment, of cap­i­tal­ist expansion in pre­industrial socie­ties, and of the
erosion of rural economies as well as of agreements between states. Thus,
they sought to highlight the ele­ments of overdetermination and multi-
directionality implied in such phenomena. In their groundbreaking 1973
work Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Eu­rope, Stephen
­Castles and Gudula Kosack defi ed “the unemployed masses of the less
developed areas . . . ​[as] a new type of industrial reserve army—an exter-
nal one consisting of desperate, impoverished men who can be recruited
or sent away as the employers’ interests dictate.”20 Between the 1950s and

152 Chapter 5
the end of the 1960s, the employment of mi­grants from poorer areas of
western Eu­rope allowed industries to maintain low wages in key driving
sectors of the economy (mostly manufacturing and construction), thus
contributing to high profit rates and supporting gdp growth. By subject-
ing mi­grants to working longer hours, greater ­labor intensity, the least
safe conditions, and the most job insecurity, employers could save on the
costs of the organ­ization of work and social reproduction.21 Savings in the
costs of social reproduction w ­ ere pos­si­ble also thanks to the recruitment of
young and more productive (i.e., healthy) mi­grants, thus allowing compa-
nies to avoid paying “the costs of ‘rearing’ the worker and the maintenance
costs a­ fter his/her working life” ended.22 Furthermore, as ­these workers
­were often unmarried or ­else lived with their families in conditions signifi-
cantly below the standard of nonmigrant units, employers did not bear the
costs of reproduction for them and their families. The “disposability” of
the reserve army of mi­grant ­labor became particularly evident in the after-
math of the 1973 crisis. Th s was the fi st international crisis of capitalism
in western Eu­rope to occur in coincidence with the massive presence of
international, extra-­European mi­grants. Between 1973 and 1974 the entry
of foreign workers was restricted, mi­grant workers’ rate of unemploy-
ment increased dramatically, and return paths w ­ ere established in order
to encourage resident mi­grants to go back to their sending countries.23
Furthermore, the rising climate of xenophobia, exasperated by the growth
of unemployment during the crisis, contributed to their identifi ation as
“competitors” to the native-­born workforce, thereby jeopardizing forms of
class solidarity and u­ nionization.24 Since the 1973 crisis in par­tic­u­lar, the
association between economic downturns, mi­grant workers’ rising rates of
unemployment, and restrictions to entry and to rights has become com-
monplace in the scholarly lit­er­a­ture.25 Although continuing to employ the
concept of a “reserve army” to describe the condition of mi­grant work-
ers, more recent approaches have tended to reinterpret it, particularly in
the attempt to tackle the increased complexity of mi­grant ­labor and inter-
national migration fl ws in the twenty-­fi st ­century. Accordingly, we can
identify three main tendencies in the specialized lit­er­a­ture, which seek to
problematize and/or reformulate the concept of a reserve army of ­labor in
the changed conditions of the post-­Fordist neoliberal conjuncture.
On the one hand, several migration scholars have interrogated the reserve
army of l­abor theory in terms of the emphasis it puts upon the antagonism

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  153

among workers for wages, brought about by capital’s constant tendency to
reduce them. Hence, mi­grant ­labor in western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties in par­tic­
u­lar has been analyzed in terms of w ­ hether it plays the role of “competitor”
or “complement” to the native workforce.26 As numerous studies all across
Eu­rope have shown, mi­grants are employed in par­tic­u­lar in the informal
sector, ­doing ­those jobs—­the famous three D jobs (dirty, dangerous, and
demanding)—­that “national” workers tend to refuse, due in large part to
their extremely low salaries and severe working conditions.27 Th s approach
has thus effectively highlighted the fact that mi­grants often do not compete
with native workers for the same jobs; rather, they are employed in t­ hose
sectors that have been “abandoned” by the latter. In this light, it has been
questioned ­whether mi­grant ­labor should still be described as a reserve
army, a label that points to a role—­that of “competitor”—­that mi­grant
workers do not play. While this ­perspective has had the salutary effect
of neutralizing, or at least of problematizing, the most po­liti­cally pressing
(and false) accusation against mi­grant workers “stealing jobs,” arguably it
has also tended to reduce the category of the reserve army to that of com-
petition for jobs. One pos­si­ble po­liti­cal effect of the creation of a reserve
army—­namely, its enforced antagonism with native-­born employees—­has
thus been treated as a cause, or an ele­ment that defi es w ­ hether or not a
fraction of the workforce belongs to the surplus laboring population.
Other scholars, on the other hand, argue that the concept of a reserve
army of ­labor should not be used for mi­grant workers alone. According to
this perspective, the neoliberal restructuring of the economy in western
Eu­rope has established the conditions to turn all workers into ­actual or
potential reserve soldiers of the l­abor market. Decentralization of wage
bargaining, the increasing individualization of contractual conditions, and
the growth of fi ed-­term contracts that put a larger number of workers
in a state of extreme precarity are the main r­ ecipes of the so-­called post-­
Fordist reor­ga­ni­za­tion of ­labor. In their discussion of the “segmentation
of the wage-­earning class,” for instance, Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello,
quoting Christophe Dejours, consider “the constitution of a ‘reserve army’
of workers condemned to permanent insecurity, to underpayment and to a
staggering job flex bility” as a generalized condition that affects low-­skilled
workers in par­tic­u­lar.28 Th s argument identifies an impor­tant trend affect-
ing the status of ­labor in con­temporary western Eu­rope. Furthermore, it

154 Chapter 5
highlights the fact that the creation of a reserve army is not restricted to
the case of mi­grant workers but is a structural outcome of the current eco-
nomic system. Nonetheless, the limits of this approach, in my view, lie in its
unbridled extension and consequent dilution of the notion of the reserve
army, thereby undermining its analytic value. In par­tic­u­lar, by classifying
national and mi­grant workers alike as indiscriminately ranked troops of
the global reserve army of ­labor ­under neoliberalism, we miss fundamen-
tal differences: namely, the deprivation of po­liti­cal and social rights that
mi­grant workers suffer and their consequently worse working and living
conditions.29 As noncitizens and often “illegal” residents and/or workers,
mi­grants still constitute the most disposable and fragile workforce in west-
ern socie­ties. Though mi­grant ­labor has become much more complex in
the last twenty years, with forms of informal and self-­employment in so-­
called mi­grants’ or “ethnic enclaves” and the creation of multiple layers of
segmented ­labor markets on the rise, mi­grant workers have continued to
be at the sharp end of unemployment.30
Still other scholars place more emphasis on the role of the state in help-
ing create reserve armies of ­labor through market deregulation, welfare re-
forms, and “managed migration.” Rather than providing forms of social pro-
tection for the growing number of unemployed and underemployed, state
policies in the last fi een years have acted to exacerbate forms of individu-
alization of l­abor contracts, which are responsible for the precarization and
unemployment of large masses of working ­people. Furthermore, the closure
of state borders and the reforms in immigration controls in the direction of
promoting temporary (or circular) migration, have de facto contributed to
turn many mi­grants into underemployed or unemployed reserve soldiers of
the national army of l­abor, once the job contract and visa have expired. As a
consequence, as it has been argued for the British case in a way that could be
easily extended to other western Eu­ro­pean contexts, the concept of a reserve
army of l­abor accurately captures the recent direction of immigration policy,
“in which mi­grant workers are treated less as potential citizens than units
of l­abor, the supply of which can (in theory at least) be turned on and off.”31
Accordingly, the formation of surplus laboring populations is not merely the
outcome of the intrinsic logic of accumulation of the cap­i­tal­ist mode of pro-
duction, but also of the active role of the state as the most impor­tant media-
tor of cap­i­tal­ists’ interests ­under neoliberal capitalism.

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  155

 Following particularly on this latter approach, I would like to suggest
that the Marxian notion of the reserve army of l­abor, together with t­ hose
theories that highlight the operations of the nation-­state in helping pro-
duce and reproduce such reserve, is an essential tool for describing the
conditions of mi­grant ­labor in the pres­ent conjuncture. In par­tic­u­lar, it
enables us to decipher both the economic and the po­liti­cal pro­cess of the
construction of mi­grant workers as a new global class of dispossessed in
several ways. It highlights how the role of the “disposable” and “replaceable”
workforce played by mi­grants within the global economy is a structural
outcome of cap­i­tal­ist accumulation and not a phenomenon brought about
by international migrations themselves. Mi­grants are often unemployed
workers who, due to the failures of structural adjustment programs and
land dispossession, w ­ ere expelled from production pro­cesses in their own
countries as part of a “surplus-­working population”; furthermore, they are
among the fi st to lose their jobs and to fill the ranks of the stagnant west-
ern Eu­ro­pean reserve army when a crisis occurs, as the 1973 oil crisis dem-
onstrated and as the recent global economic crisis confi med.32 While in
periods of economic boom and low unemployment rates employers usu-
ally profit from mi­grant workers and use them in order to impose wage
discipline, during periods of economic downturn or stagnation ­these same
workers are turned into scapegoats for the bad economic situation. Nowa-
days, all across Eu­rope mi­grants are frequently presented as constituting a
reserve of cheap ­labor whose presence threatens “national” workers with
job losses, a lowering of their incomes, and a worsening of welfare provi-
sions (schools, health system ser­vices, housing, ­etc.). High rates of unem-
ployment, the consequences of the recent dramatic economic crisis, and
the continuous erosion of workers’ rights are all ele­ments that intensify
the idea of competition between “national” and “non-­national” laborers.
In this context, the signifi ant rise of right-­wing nationalist parties cam-
paigning ­under the banner of opposition to immigration, and to Muslim
mi­grants in par­tic­u­lar, as an economic and social threat suggests how t­ hese
parties have benefited from, and further exacerbated, a climate of fear of
the foreigner that seems to constitute the regular off pring of times of crisis.
Th s notwithstanding, I argued earlier that Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women in con­temporary western Eu­rope are neither presented nor
perceived in the same way as mi­grant men. Not only are they spared from
being characterized as an economic and social danger to western Eu­ro­

156 Chapter 5
pean populations like the men are, but they are also foregrounded as sub-
jects whom seemingly benevolent nationalists and neoliberals want to in-
tegrate and emancipate. Moreover, the role ­these ­women play within the
con­temporary cap­i­tal­ist economy, as a fraction of mi­grant ­labor segregated
in a newly commodifi d sector such as care and domestic work, is arguably
also dif­fer­ent. Why is this the case?

Female Migration and the Commodification of Care

and Domestic ­Labor

As I began to illustrate in the introduction to this chapter, Muslim and

non-­western ­women are highly concentrated in very few occupations, with
42 ­percent of them in western Eu­rope working in three sectors alone: the care
and domestic sector in private h ­ ouse­holds, the care sector in hospitals, and
residential care and home care and cleaning activities (­table 5.1).Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant ­women are thus mostly employed in so-­called social
reproduction, with the care and domestic occupations in private ­house­holds
absorbing almost a quarter of them on average and between a half and a
third of them in the Mediterranean countries (50 ­percent in Italy, 38 ­percent
in Greece, 36 ­percent in Spain, and 29 ­percent in Portugal).33 Whereas of-
fic al statistics count 22 ­percent of “foreign-­born” ­women as being employed
in care and domestic work in the western Eu­ro­pean countries, only 5 ­percent
of “native-­born” ­women are found in the same sector.
The difference between foreign-­born and native-­born ­women even
reaches 11  ­percent as compared to 1  ­percent if we consider only t­ hose
­women occupied in “activities of ­house­holds as employers of domestic per-
sonnel,” which includes mostly low-­skilled, low-­paid domestic work hired
by individual families. Though offi al statistics emphasize the importance
of foreign-­born ­women in the sector, ­these data tend to be mostly “con-
servative” ­because a reliable estimate of the share of mi­grants employed
as care and domestic workers is difficult to provide. Th s is due both to
differences in data collection in dif­fer­ent countries and above all to the fact
that a large part of this work is carried out by undocumented mi­grants, or
in the shadow economy.34 Mi­grant care workers and domestic workers in
private ­house­holds face dif­fer­ent employment conditions, depending upon
the country’s management of the migration of unskilled ­labor and of care
provision, as well as upon the specific culture of care. Thus, mi­grants can

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  157

Table 5.1  Top Five Sectors for Employment of Foreign-­Born ­Women in the EU-15 in 2012 (in Percentages)

Care–­domestic Residential care and Ser­vices to

work in private ­human health and Food and beverage buildings (cleaning
­house­holds other care ser­vices ser­vice activities Retail trade activities)
Country (Nace2 97–88)* (Nace2 86, 87, 96) (Nace2 56) (Nace2 47) (Nace2 81) All sectors

Austria 3 15 12 12 11 100
Belgium 12 13 8 6 24 100
Germany 7 15 10 12 10 100
Denmark 14 15 7 7 9 100
Spain 36 8 15 9 6 100
Finland 8** 24 6 15 11 100
France 24 18 6 9 10 100
Greece 38 8 15 10 7 100
Ireland 7 20 12 17 6 100
Italy 50 10 9 4 6 100
Luxembourg 17 6 6 2 8 100
Netherlands 9.3** 16 9 13 11 100
Portugal 29 14 20 8 10 100
Sweden 8.6** 19 9 6 11 100
United Kingdom 5 19 7 9 6 100
EU-15 22 14 10 9 8 100

Source: Calculations are based on the ­Labor Force Survey. Extraction data provided by Eurostat upon request on May 31, 2013.
*Nace is the statistical classication of economic activities in the Eu­ro­pean Community. The details of the classifi ation are available at: http://­ec​.­europa​
.­eu​/­eurostat​/­ramon​/i­ ndex​.c­ fm​?­TargetUrl​=­DSP​_P
­ UB​_W
­ ELC&StrLanguageCode​=­EN.
**Data are not available for “Activities on ­house­holds as employers of domestic personnel” (Nace2 97).
be hired on an hourly (and often informal) basis, as is prevalently the case
in France and the Netherlands or as live-in workers, as in Italy and Spain.35
In order to understand the exception constituted by Muslim and non-­
western mi­grant ­women in con­temporary western Eu­rope as a mi­grant
workforce that seems to be spared from accusations of posing an economic,
social, or cultural threat, we thus need to look more closely at care and do-
mestic work. In other words, if we want to decipher the materiality of the
femonationalist ideology in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, we should
pay close attention to the current institutional and informal arrangements
that t­ hese nation-­states make when dealing with care and domestic ­labor
and female mi­grant workers. What is it that distinguishes the care and do-
mestic sector, where Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women are mostly
employed, or directed to fi d employment, from other sectors that employ
mostly male mi­grants?

The Netherlands
As one of the Dutch leading scholars on mi­grant domestic workers, Sarah
van Walsum, has argued, “Dutch mainstream and policy-­oriented re-
searchers on ­labor migration have systematically overlooked the fact that
many mi­grants are (illegally) employed in Dutch homes, while the few
quantitative researchers who have investigated the Dutch market in (un-
declared) domestic ser­vices have remained equally ­silent on the role that
mi­grants and ethnic minorities play in this sector.”36 And yet, as several
sources (research institutes and trade u ­ nion reports, postgraduate disser-
tations, and domestic workers’ organ­izations) have demonstrated, not only
are non-­western mi­grants (often undocumented and female) and ethnic
minority ­women a signifi ant presence in Dutch h ­ ouse­holds, particularly
as ­house­keepers and child-­minders, but this presence is also likely to grow
in the near f­ uture. Institutional rearrangements occurring in the el­derly
care system and changes affecting w ­ omen’s employment patterns in par­tic­
u­lar point in this direction. A brief overview of the Dutch welfare regime in
historical perspective, therefore, ­will help shed light on this phenomenon.
The demand for mi­grant workers in the care and particularly domestic
sector in the Netherlands has been slowly mounting since the early 1980s.
It has gone hand in hand with the establishment of laws aimed at increas-
ing the participation of Dutch w ­ omen in the l­ abor market and through
the creation of semiprofessional figu es, like that of the “alpha-­helper”

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  159

(alphahulp), with precarious and un­regu­la­ted working conditions. The role
of the alpha-­helper, an individual caregiver who works directly with the el­
derly or dependent person at home, was initially introduced in 1977. Such
a figu e was explic­itly promoted as a mea­sure to increase Dutch ­women’s
rates of activity (among the lowest in Eu­rope at that time), on the basis of
the assumption that, since their income was only meant to complement
their husbands’, they could well work u ­ nder inferior conditions.37 Thus, the
figu e of the alpha-­helper was made tax-­exempt, with no guaranteed mini-
mum wage and no unemployment and illness-­insurance benefits. Since
2007, with the decentralization of the provision of subsidized ­house­hold
ser­vices to municipalities (wmo—­Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning), the
hiring of alpha-­helpers has again been on the rise, but nowadays many of
them are likely to be mi­grants. According to the new regulation, private
employers who hire a domestic worker, including so-­called alpha-­helpers,
for no more than three days a week, are tax-­exempt and are not required
to pay social security contributions or to register the employment relation-
ship. Since the introduction of the wmo “a marked increase in the per-
centage of alpha-­helpers engaged in the provision of subsidized ­house­hold
ser­vices from 20 to 80 ­percent” has been recorded, alongside a “growth in
the recruitment of personnel via commercial cleaning companies, a seg-
ment of the Dutch l­abor market in which ethnic minorities are strongly
over-­represented.”38 Though it is not yet clear what the current share of
“allochthonous” workers in this new decentralized scenario is, we also
know that Dutch municipalities are putting pressure on unemployed eth-
nic minority (often Muslim) ­women to accept work in the care and do-
mestic sector, frequently through civic integration programs in the case
of non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant ­women (see chapter 4). The new regula-
tions have thus greatly encouraged the reproduction of care and domestic
work as an informal and hidden sector where undocumented and unpro-
tected mi­grants, or ethnic minority ­women, are increasingly likely to be
employed. Studies conducted at the local level by research institutes, trade
­unions and scholars working in the fi ld speak of more than one million
mi­grants (often undocumented) who are employed as domestic helpers
(house­keepers and sometimes babysitters) working on an hourly basis in
private ­house­holds.39 Though Dutch immigration policies are very restric-
tive, making it “practically impossible to obtain a work-­permit for private
domestic or care ser­vices,” they have contributed to increasing the demand

160 Chapter 5
for foreign-­born ­women in the sector.40 As for social care for el­derly and
dependent persons in “public” institutions, offi al statistics talk of a mod-
est rise in the number of allochthonous workers between 1999 and 2004
when compared to other branches of the economy.41 The relatively low
number of fi st-­generation immigrant workers in the el­derly care sector in
public institutions has largely resulted from the fact that this branch of the
economy offers relatively good working conditions, with the possibility for
part-­time work and ­career development within it.42
In the Netherlands, therefore, Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women
are frequently relegated to the low-­skill, low-­paid, un­regu­la­ted jobs of the
private care and domestic economy. Although their importance to this sector
goes entirely unrecognized by offi al statistics, the new state regulations
on decentralized recruitment in social care as well as the management of
migration and integration programs are pushing more and more mi­grant
­women to work in this economic niche, for which the supply of native-­
born ­labor is scarce.

France
Like in the Netherlands and other eu countries, in France Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant ­women, as well as ­women from other minority groups,
are overrepresented in the social care and domestic sector (ser­vices à la
personne).43 Th s is related both to the economic dynamism of social care
professions and domestic work (due to the aging of the population and the
higher rates of l­abor activity of French w ­ omen) and to the possibility of
working in this sector without certifi ates or diplomas. France is one of the
eu countries with the highest rates of w­ omen’s economic activity and ­women
working in full-­time positions. However, this has not translated into a fair
44

division of care and domestic work between the sexes. In order to tackle
this prob­lem, since the beginning of the 1990s a number of schemes have
been introduced with the main aim of simplifying the procedures and re-
ducing the costs related to the outsourcing of care and domestic work to
paid employees. In 2006 the French government introduced the chèque
emploi-­service universel (ces u; universal ser­vice of employment through
checks), presented as a mea­sure aimed at “giving French citizens the ‘means
[to] better articulate their f­ amily and professional lives’ by freeing them
from the constraints of everyday life and to extend the use of paid domes-
tic ser­vice to the ‘largest number of ­people pos­si­ble.’ ”45 U
­ nder the ces u

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  161

scheme, a ­family can hire a domestic worker by paying him or her with
checks that can be purchased at the local bank. Employers can benefit from
this scheme as they can claim an income-­tax reduction of 50 ­percent on
­these costs, whereas the employee is paid at the national minimum wage.
Furthermore, companies can contribute to the costs their employees face
in purchasing the checks and claim a tax reduction of 25 ­percent on this
expenditure. The employment of domestic workers takes place not only
through direct hiring by a private employer, but also through other ac-
tors such as private companies that offer cleaning, gardening, and home
maintenance ser­vices and nonprofit associations that provide care for the
el­derly and the ­children. In all cases, however, the new ces u policies have
become the main generator of jobs in the care and domestic sector. “While
contributing to the normalization of undeclared employment in the sec-
tor,” as Scrinzi argues, “­these policies did not challenge the association
of ­these jobs with feminine unpaid domestic work.”46 Furthermore, they
strengthened “class and ethnicity/nationality divisions, based on families’
differential access to commodifi d care ser­vice” and “have also resulted
in an increased segmentation of the ­labor market on the basis of a racial-
ized and gendered organ­ization of work.”47 Despite evidence suggesting
that Muslim and non-­western ­women make up the lion’s share of supply in
care and domestic jobs, for which the demand is on the rise, French govern-
ments, like their Dutch counter­parts, have been reluctant to acknowledge
that such work is a highly signifi ant economic sector for mi­grants. As a
result, no specific work permit is issued for mi­grant domestic workers. Fur-
thermore, in France statistics very rarely refer to “ethnic categories” with the
result that t­ here is l­ittle data concerning the nationality or the country of ori-
gin of t­ hese workers. Th s notwithstanding, a study of the patterns of el­derly
care shows that it has become a refuge job for Muslim w ­ omen who are faced
with discrimination and racism in other types of employment.48

Italy
The growing demand for social care by Italian families in the last twenty
years in par­tic­u­lar is the reason for the mounting numbers of mi­grants
employed by private ­house­holds as ­house­keepers and especially caregivers
(badanti; sing., badante). Th s situation has not only received increasing
media attention, but also prompted sociologists, migration scholars, and

162 Chapter 5
feminists to speak of a fundamental transition occurring in Italian society
from a “­family model of care” to a “mi­grant in the ­family model of care.”49
In Italy the f­ amily is the main actor providing care for the el­derly, disabled,
and ­children. The recognition of the crucial role played by families, how-
ever, has not translated into policies that support their members in their
caring activities (such as public provisions or public/affordable care ser­
vices). For instance, in the case of el­derly or dependent persons, the main
form of long-­term care (lt c ) in Italy is the cash attendance allowance (in-
dennità di accompagnamento, i.e., a needs-­tested mea­sure that can be spent
at the complete discretion of the benefic ary). The cash attendance allow-
ance was established in 1980 in order to cope with the demand for care
by “the citizen who is unable to work and does not have the necessary
means for survival.”50 According to offi al data, in 2011circa five million
persons ­were provided with a form of social pension or attendance allow-
ance.51 As for childcare, particularly for c­ hildren from zero to three years
old, care ser­vices are mostly private and the number of caregivers is insuffi-
cient to respond to the needs of working families. Indeed, public childcare
(scuola materna) in Italy is provided for ­children aged three to six. It is
due to this void and/or insuffici cy of public and affordable care ser­vices
for the el­derly and for c­ hildren that non-­western mi­grant workers occupy
a crucial role. In 2010 the National Institute for Social Insurance (inps)
counted 871,834 contracts for caregivers and h ­ ouse­keepers (domestiche, colf e
badanti), whereas estimates speak of more than one million workers being
employed in this sector, often informally, a large number of whom are mi­
grants.52 The majority of non-­Italian ­women employed in this sector come
from eastern Eu­rope, although studies at the local levels show that ­women
from all regions of the Global South are well represented—­particularly as
­these are the only job opportunities they have in this country.53 No doubt,
the reasons non-­western mi­grant ­women in par­tic­u­lar have become so
impor­tant in Italian families, and why their number has grown so much
over the last twenty years, are both the lack of public care ser­vices and the
high costs of private ones, and the fact that outsourcing care work to mi­grant
­women allows Italian families to maintain a f­ amily model and a gendered
division of tasks, as well as to save money, since mi­grants work longer hours
for very low salaries.54 The “mi­grant in the f­ amily model,” therefore, rep-
resents above all a cost-­effective and gender-­acceptable solution.55 Fi­nally,

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  163

it is of crucial importance in the context of this study to note the role
played by immigration policies in encouraging the recruitment of Mus-
lim and non-­western mi­grant ­women as care and domestic workers. In
2002 a new tough immigration law, the so-­called Bossi-­Fini Act—­taking
its name from the then leaders of the ln and Alleanza Nazionale (National
Alliance), respectively, that is, the most vocal anti-­immigration parties in
the government—­was soon followed by regularization for care and do-
mestic workers. Despite the harsh restrictions on immigration included
in the new law, tellingly the ln declared its support for the regularization
of “all ­these extra-­communitarians, the majority of whom are ­women,
who carry out activities of high social importance for families.”56 In 2005,
­under Berlusconi’s neoliberal government, specific immigration quotas for
domestic and care workers ­were issued for the fi st time, allowing 15,000
domestic and care workers to enter the country: that is, the same number
established for all other occupations combined. In 2006 the same govern-
ment “allowed the entrance of another 45,000 domestic and care workers,
which was even more than the total (33,500) set for other occupations.”57
The tougher anti-­immigration agenda of the new Berlusconi government
in 2008 resulted in a suspension of quotas for immigration, which was
presented as a response to the global economic crisis that had seemingly
made the recourse to mi­grant workers unnecessary. However, an excep-
tion was made for domestic and care workers, for whom a rec­ord quota of
105,400 was established. In 2009 the government therefore granted an am-
nesty only for illegal mi­grants working as carers (badanti), since that was
considered the only sector where the demand for l­abor could not meet the
national supply. On this occasion, Roberto Maroni from the ln (then min-
ister of the Interior) again declared, “­There cannot be a regularization for
­those who entered illegally, for ­those who rape a ­woman or rob a villa, but
certainly we ­will take into account all ­those situations that have a strong
social impact, as in the case of [female] mi­grant care-­givers.”58 Right-­wing
anti-­immigration parties such as the ln , thus, seem to be willing to close
an eye to undocumented mi­grants when they are ­women working in the
care and domestic sector.

As this brief overview of the situation in the three countries shows, the aging
of the population and the increasing participation of “native-­born” ­women

164 Chapter 5
in the ­labor market in the last twenty years, which w ­ ere followed neither
by a growth of public care ser­vices nor by changes in the sexual division of
­labor within the ­house­hold, have certainly been among the most impor­
tant reasons for the growing demand for private carers and h ­ ouse­workers,
and a power­ful impetus for the feminization of con­temporary migration
fl ws. Even in the case of Muslim ­women who are Eu­ro­pean citizens—as is
more often the case in France and the Netherlands than in Italy—­care and
domestic work has become the main employing sector. While being more
often discriminated against and invited to take the veil off, Muslim w ­ omen
are also increasingly pushed to take on jobs in social reproduction both
in order to fulfill the growing demand for carers and h ­ ouse­keepers and in
order to reduce their reliance on unemployment benefits. Yet beside this
set of phenomena Fiona Williams and Anna Gavanas also note that “it is
not simply the lack of public provision that shapes the demand for child-
care, but the very nature of state support that is available.”59 As we have
seen, state-­arranged forms of cash provision or tax credits in the Nether-
lands, France, and Italy have been introduced in order to assist ­house­holds
in buying help for el­derly care, domestic work, and childcare. Both cash
provisions and tax credits have had the effect of encouraging the develop-
ment of the “commodifi ation of care” and of domestic ser­vices, which are
generally sought privately on the market, where Muslim and non-­western
mi­grant ­women provide the lion’s share of supply.60
In the current demographic and societal conjuncture, the role of the
state in the privatization of care ser­vices (which pushes families to look
for cost-­effective solutions on the market), as well as the higher rates of
native-­born ­women’s participation in paid employment—­which often in-
volves them being obliged to fi d “gender-­acceptable” replacements for
themselves in the household—­are thus very impor­tant ­factors that can
help us explain why Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women do not re-
ceive the same treatment as their male counter­parts. Rather than “stealing
jobs,” “clashing culturally” and “parasitizing” on welfare provision, t­ hese
­women are in fact the maids who help maintain the well-­being of west-
ern Eu­ro­pean families and individuals. They are the providers of jobs and
welfare: they are ­those who, by helping western Eu­ro­pean ­women to undo
gender by substituting for them in the h­ ouse­hold, allow t­ hese “national”
­women to become workers in the “productive” ­labor market. Furthermore,
it is they who contribute to the education of ­children and to the bodily

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  165

reproduction and emotional life of the el­derly and disabled, thus provid-
ing the welfare goods from whose provision states increasingly retreat. It is
against this background that I propose that we can understand why Mus-
lim and non-­western mi­grant ­women employed (or encouraged to be em-
ployed) in socially reproductive work are even offered exceptional help in
regularization pro­cesses (like in Italy) by nationalist parties that are other­
wise harsh opponents of the influx of mi­grants.
However, in order to fully understand the role of female mi­grant ­labor
within con­temporary neoliberal western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties, that is, in
order to explicate how its connotations as “socially reproductive” ­labor
enable us to shed light on the materiality or political-­economic logic of
the femonationalist ideology, it is impor­tant to analyze what it is that dif-
ferentiates the care and domestic sector from other sectors that employ
mostly male mi­grants. In other words, we need to ask: Is ­there something
specific to care and domestic work that can account both for its current
feminized and racialized configur tion and for the subtraction of Mus-
lim and non-­western mi­grant ­women from the ­enemy camp constituted
mainly of mi­grant men? 61 Is the foregrounding of t­ hese ­women as a tol-
erable component of the immigrant workforce qua (­actual or potential)
care and domestic workers simply a contingent phenomenon, or is t­ here
something more stable and structural about their location in this newly
commodifi d sector of the economy? Do Muslim and non-­western mi­grant
­women employed in the domestic and care sector constitute a “reserve
army of l­ abor” in the same way as mi­grant men do in western Eu­ro­pean
economies?

Peculiarities of Care and Domestic ­Labor, or Social

Reproduction: The Debate

Mainstream economists defi e care and domestic work, w ­ hether per-

formed in private h ­ ouse­holds or in public institutions, as pertaining to the
ser­vice economy and therefore as labor-­intensive and low in productiv-
ity.62 Like all ­human ser­vices, thus, care and domestic work is said to suffer
from William Baumol’s “costs disease,” which means that wages are in­de­
pen­dent of productivity and that profit margins are low.63 On the other
hand, most Marxist economists consider care and domestic work as re-­

166 Chapter 5
productive ­labor—­and thus as unproductive from a cap­i­tal­ist viewpoint—­
inasmuch as it pertains to the sphere of production of “beings” and not of
“­things,” or of “use values” rather than “exchange values.” But in spite of its
characterization by economists of dif­fer­ent tendencies as a form of ­labor
that can be of greater or lesser signifi ance from a cap­i­tal­ist perspective,
care and domestic work is a type of activity that socie­ties simply cannot
do without. As reproductive ­labor, care and domestic work involves not
only the physical and emotional preservation and maintenance of work-
ers, el­derly and the new generations, but also it is that type of l­ abor that is
fundamentally “constitutive of society’s reproduction” as a ­whole.64 Yet it
is precisely its status as socially reproductive ­labor that largely contributes
to the defin tion and societal perception of care and domestic work as
not being properly cap­i­tal­ist, that is, as fundamentally outside of market
relations.65 As Encarnación Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez put it, the odd status of
social reproduction within industrial-­dominated socie­ties “has led not
only to the lack of its societal recognition and fair remuneration, but also
to the silencing of its societal contribution as ‘expanded reproduction’ ”
of capital.66 Against such a devaluation of domestic and care l­ abor, Marx-
ist feminists in the 1970s and 1980s in par­tic­u­lar engaged in a “domestic
­labor debate” and offered sophisticated critiques of orthodox economic
positions, seeking to demonstrate the key role of the h ­ ouse­keeper and the
caregiver for the perpetuation of cap­i­tal­ist social relations.67 As Mariarosa
Dalla Costa and Selma James argued in a famous intervention in 1972,
“Domestic ­labour is not essentially ‘feminine work’; a w ­ oman ­doesn’t fulfill
herself more or get less exhausted than a man from washing and clean-
ing. ­These are social ser­vices inasmuch as they serve the reproduction
of l­ abour power. And capital, precisely by instituting its f­ amily structure,
has ‘liberated’ the man from t­ hese functions so that he is completely ‘­free’
for direct exploitation; so that he is ­free to ‘earn’ enough for a ­woman
to reproduce him as ­labour power.”68 In the 1980s the German feminist
group known as the Bielefelderinnen further elaborated on the notion of
reproductive ­labor as essential for cap­i­tal­ist accumulation.69 They sought
in par­tic­u­lar to compare domestic and care work in the Global North and
subsistence agricultural work in the Global South in order to point to
­these activities as the sources of the continuing original accumulation of
capital. Furthermore, they analyzed the relationship between the North

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  167

and the South, or the First and the Thi d World, in terms of the relation
between man and ­woman: “It is not ­women who have a colonial status,
but the colonies that have a ­woman’s status. In other words, the relation-
ship between the First and the Thi d World corresponds to the relationship
between man and ­woman.”70
All ­these contributions have been extremely impor­tant for an analy­sis
of the role of domestic and care ­labor in cap­i­tal­ist socie­ties. They brought
to light the crucial economic and social importance of unpaid socially re-
productive work and the profoundly gendered essentialist assumptions that
underpinned it, thus demonstrating a central facet of the relation between
capitalism and patriarchy. Nonetheless, they ­were largely focused on the
­house­wife model in Fordist breadwinner systems, that is, on a model of
­labor and social organ­ization in which reproductive tasks ­were mostly done
by native-­born ­women for ­free. Furthermore, the fundamental agreement
on the idea that unpaid care and domestic work was, strictly speaking, not
productive from a cap­i­tal­ist viewpoint (despite its importance for cap­i­tal­ist
reproduction at large) led to ­women in general being considered a privi-
leged source for the industrial reserve army of ­labor. As a category of ­labor
that did not depend entirely on a wage for its reproduction—­insofar as the
assumption was that it could rely upon the male wage—­married ­women in
par­tic­u­lar in industrial western socie­ties ­were automatically located among
the ranks of ­those sectors of the population that cap­i­tal­ists could call on
and off according to their needs.71 Fi­nally, “the use of ‘­woman’ as an undif-
ferentiated, essentialist, ahistorical and decontextualized identity category,”
as Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez argues, following on Mohanty’s critique, tended
to omit “not only the inequalities between ­women, but also the dynamics
of an interlocking system of oppression.”72 What happens, then, when we
shift our focus to socially reproductive ­labor that is undertaken in a paid
form and by migrant/non-­western ­women? Can we apply to it the same
categories used to analyze socially reproductive ­labor undertaken in un-
paid form by non-­migrant/western ­women at home? And how does this
shift help us further clarify that “state of exception” enjoyed by Muslim and
non-­western mi­grant ­women as “redeemable subjects” in the landscape of
other­wise stigmatized and undesired Muslim and mi­grant male workers in
the pres­ent conjuncture?

168 Chapter 5
The Affectivity, Spatial Fixity, and Noncyclical Nature of Paid,
Socially Reproductive Work

Even in its paid form, the care and domestic sector remains perhaps the
most “gendered l­abor market.” Not only b ­ ecause the bulk of the workforce
employed in the sector is female, but also b ­ ecause specifi ally female con-
structions of femininity have been enduringly associated with it and, there-
fore, have been constitutive ele­ments in the formation of its skills, working
culture, and identity.73 Furthermore, as Helma Lutz argues, domestic and
care work “is not just another ­labour market.”74 Namely, it is not

merely work, but a par­tic­u­lar gendered activity. As a gendered activity

it is emotionally and morally linked to meanings and interpretations of
who we are as w­ omen and men and who we wish to be. In other words,
domestic work as a core activity of ­doing gender, helps perpetuate the
existing social order of the genders. . . . ​Outsourcing ­house­hold and
care work to another ­woman is widely accepted ­because it follows and
perpetuates the logic of gender display in accordance with institutional-
ized genderisms.75

Besides being historically and culturally constructed as a gendered ac-

tivity that strongly relies on “interpellating and performing ‘femininity,’ ”
a fundamental, albeit not exclusive, component of care and domestic, or
socially reproductive, l­abor is also affectivity.76 To grasp this aspect, some
authors have proposed a distinction in the set of tasks characterizing care
and domestic work between “caring for”—­which includes more physical
chores such as cooking, cleaning, and washing—­and “caring about,” which
entails the relational side of child-­minding and el­derly care.77 In this vein,
feminist scholars in diverse fi lds of the social sciences and the humanities
coined new categories to account for the distinctive affective components
so strongly constitutive of paid social reproduction: that is, “sex/affective
­labor,” “emotional surplus value,” “maternal ­labor,” and so forth.78 Each
category in its own way points to the incapacity of orthodox economics
and mainstream quantitative frameworks in the fi lds of migration stud-
ies, economics, and sociology to comprehend the complex interlocking of
cultural, ideological, and po­liti­cal signifi ations that contribute to the con-
struction and preservation of care and domestic work as a peculiar type
of gendered and affective ­labor, even in its commodifi d form. However,

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  169

the recognition of the highly emotional character of some of the tasks in-
volved in care and domestic work should not mislead us into thinking that
­here we are always necessarily dealing with “positive” affects. The affects
involved in the context of care and domestic ­labor performed at home
in paid form may assume dif­fer­ent meanings for the employee and the
­employer. For the former (the mi­grant ­women in this case), feelings such
as love for the c­ hildren she looks a­ fter, affection for the el­derly person she
cares for, or sympathy for a good employer she might be lucky to have,
can go hand in hand with “disgust,” “unhappiness,” and “servility.” Th s re-
minds us that, as Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez puts it, “affects are not free-­fl ating
energies. They emerge in a space delimited by a concrete historical and
geopo­liti­cal context, bearing traces of the materiality that they transcend
through their energy, but in which they remain embedded through their
context of emergence. The expression and transmission of affects, thus,
occur in a space marked by historically produced, socially configu ed and
culturally located power relations.”79 On the other hand, the feelings the
employer might attach to care and domestic work can be of a completely
dif­fer­ent sort. Particularly for the female employer, the outsourcing of care
and domestic work to another w ­ oman means above all “relief ” from tasks
that would other­wise be likely to fall upon her shoulders. “As feminised
subjects, both ­women . . . ​are objects of the social revulsion projected onto
domestic work. . . . ​Nonetheless, the employment of another ­woman to do
the work releases the female employers from negative affect so they have
the opportunity to feel happy within their own four walls.”80
The reliance of ­house­holds upon work imbued with such impor­tant
affects—­especially from the employer’s viewpoint—­and the very fact that
this work is linked to ­family necessities that cannot be suspended, have
impor­tant implications for explaining why the state abstains from punish-
ing the hiring of irregular mi­grants in private ­house­holds and even makes
exceptions for its regularization. In some cases, it can also explain why
mi­grant ­women employed as domestic workers might sometimes have
bargaining power over their wages—in spite of the terrible working condi-
tions that characterize this sector. The intimate nature of the context in
which it is performed (the ­house­hold), the highly emotional character of
the tasks involved (caring for c­ hildren and/or the el­derly, cooking, looking
­after the home, i.e., the employer’s nest of intimacy par excellence), and

170 Chapter 5
therefore the importance of trust in the relationship, are all aspects that
have been reported to make it difficult for employers to replace the worker
once a relation of reliance is in place. For instance, empirical qualitative re-
search carried out in the Netherlands shows that it is not infrequent to fi d
undocumented mi­grants working in the ­house­hold ser­vices sector who
have bargaining power in setting the terms of their employment.81 Like-
wise, some of the mi­grant ­women employed as care and domestic workers
whom I interviewed in Rome in 2003 and 2005 spoke of how they could
recommend their own replacement, ­either temporarily or permanently, on
the basis of the relation of trust that they had created.82
Crucially, the affective character of care and domestic l­abor is also one
of the core difficulties encountered by attempts to automate it. Research
carried out in several eu member-­states shows that while public spending
starts to be directed more and more ­toward assistive technology in the
form of devices provided to the el­derly and dependent persons for f­ ree,
with the aim of saving on hospitalization and national health ­labor costs,
many el­derly ­people nonetheless prefer ­either to buy costly equipment
privately or to avoid it altogether. In recent years vari­ous tech companies,
including French, Italian, and Dutch ones (Aldebaran Robotics, ArTec
Domotica, Frog ag v Systems), have e­ ither invested in or developed so-­
called nursebots, that is, robotic assistance for the el­derly and disabled.
Nevertheless, research shows that robotic devices cannot substitute for
­human interaction and care. On the contrary, the deployment of ­these ro-
bots in nursing homes has had detrimental effects on the psychological
state of dependent persons, particularly as such devices have been often
perceived as signs of a lack of care.83 Th s is ultimately due to the fact that,
as Silvia Federici points out,

unlike commodity production, the reproduction of h ­ uman beings is to

a ­great extent irreducible to mechanization, being the satisfaction of
complex needs, in which physical and affective ele­ments are inextri-
cably combined, requiring a high degree of ­human interaction and a
most labor-­intensive pro­cess. Th s is most evident in the reproduction
of ­children and the el­derly that even in its most physical component in-
volves providing a sense of security, anticipating fears and desires. None
of t­ hese activities is purely “material” or “immaterial,” nor can they be

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  171

 broken down in ways making it pos­si­ble for them to be mechanized or
replaced by the virtual world of online communication.84

Two further ele­ments should be considered in addressing the differ-

ences between (paid and unpaid) care and domestic work and other sec-
tors employing male mi­grants. First, the need for proximity between the
producer and consumer of care and domestic ser­vices, or what I call their
spatial fix ty, the impossibility of suspending them, or their noncyclical na-
ture, as well as the fact that ­these ser­vices must be consumed immediately
­after, or during, their production make the interruption and “the physical
relocation of production away from the site of fi al consumption (as in
commodity production) (practically) impossible.”85 Second, the fact that
a signifi ant portion of care and domestic mi­grant workers are employed
by private h ­ ouse­holds that pay the worker ­either through cash provisions
made available by the state or through their own savings means that we are
not in the presence of a typical cap­i­tal­ist ­labor relation. At least in princi­
ple, the employer does not extract surplus value from the worker’s surplus
­labor in order to invest it in fi ed capital or make a profit.86 By pointing to
this peculiarity I aim to show that ­labor relations between employer and
employee in the context of care and domestic work in private h ­ ouse­holds
might not always be best described in terms of cap­i­tal­ist ­labor relations, as
might instead be the case for other sectors that tend to employ male mi­
grants (above all, manufacturing).
All in all, the fact that the affective character of the work involved in
labor-­intensive ser­vices such as the care and domestic sector makes it dif-
fi ult to automate, together with its spatial fix ty, noncyclical character,
and “relative” subtraction from pure cap­i­tal­ist relations, is an impor­tant
dimension helping account for both its dissimilarity from unpaid social
reproduction and its peculiarity as compared to sectors employing mostly
mi­grant men. Combined with all the f­ actors mentioned above—­that is,
the aging of the population, the increasing participation of native-­born
­women in paid employment outside the h ­ ouse­hold, and the commodifi-
cation and privatization of care as the preferred response of most west-
ern Eu­ro­pean states facing increasing demands for lt c provision—­these
ele­ments peculiar to paid care and domestic work can further enable us
to understand why the demand for mi­grant ­women as care and domestic
workers is on the rise.

172 Chapter 5
Are Muslim and Non-­Western Mi­grant ­Women a Regular
Army of ­Labor?

One of the consequences deriving from the peculiarities of commodifi d

care and domestic work that I illustrated above is not only that it has been
mostly redistributed onto the shoulders of mi­grant ­women, but also that it is
one of t­ hose sectors where the Marxian notion of the reserve army of l­abor
needs amending. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the discussion
of the creation of a surplus-­laboring population, or reserve army, is strictly
related to Marx’s analy­sis of the organic composition of capital and the ten-
dency of cap­i­tal­ist accumulation to encourage the increase “of its constant,
at the expense of its variable constituent,” namely, the increase of the mass
and value of the means of production at the cost of the mass and value of
living l­abor employed in the production pro­cess.87 The reduction of variable
capital can be achieved ­either through automation, which reduces the mass
of workers and, therefore, leads to their expulsion from the productive pro­
cess, or through the reduction of the value of variable capital (that is, wages),
which can result ­either in cap­i­tal­ists hiring layers of the unemployed and
underemployed populations who work for lower wages, or in the relocation
of production to poorer areas with cheap ­labor and poor ­labor regulation.
However, none of t­ hese conditions seem to apply to the paid care and
domestic work undertaken by female mi­grant workers in con­temporary
western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties. The re­sis­tance of care and domestic ­labor to
automation, its “spatial fix ty,” noncyclical nature, and very poor working
conditions, coupled with the societal and demographic trends I illustrated
in the previous section, mean that (1) only a small amount of commodifi d
care and domestic l­abor can be decommodifi d through re­distribution
onto the shoulders of f­ amily members; (2) competition—­whether real or
virtual—­between national and non-­national laborers for ­these jobs is not
signifi ant; and (3) care and domestic work cannot be replaced by fi ed
capital (machines) or relocated.
First, the possibility of resorting to members of ­family ­house­holds for
­free care and domestic l­abor, and thus of decommodifying it by returning to
the male breadwinner and ­house­wife model typical of Fordism, is increas-
ingly ruled out by impor­tant developments that have taken place in the struc-
ture of western Eu­ro­pean economies particularly since the 1990s. Whereas
­women ­were traditionally the ­family members in charge of reproductive

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  173

 tasks in the h ­ ouse­hold, their increased participation in the l­abor market
in the last twenty years has led to impor­tant changes in traditional gender
roles and ­family structures, and consequently in w ­ omen’s availability to
provide care and domestic work in the same conditions. Data from Euro-
stat show an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the activity rate of native-­
born western Eu­ro­pean ­women between 2000 and 2012, from a share of
61.8  ­percent ­women active in the ­labor market in the second quarter of
2000 to 69.4 ­percent in the third quarter of 2012. As shown in figu e 5.2
and as a recent study on the impact of the global economic crisis on native-­
born ­women confi ms, ­these ­women have also been less affected by the
crisis than native-­born men.88
­Women’s increasing integration in paid work has been reinforced both
by changes in ­family models and by the increasing importance of ­women’s
wages in ­family bud­gets. Most important, data show that native-­born
“­women’s response to the demand downturn has been primarily to rein-
force their commitment to the ­labor market through added worker effects.
­Women are thus not acting as a buffer ­either in protecting men against
job loss or acting as a l­abour reserve in voluntarily withdrawing from the
l­abour market.”89 Th s testifies to a societal shift that has been taking place
across western Eu­ro­pean countries—­although at dif­fer­ent speeds in each
country—­toward a growing member of the female working-­aged popula-
tion being active in the workforce. Such a shift has meant that w ­ omen have
less time, availability, and (often) willingness to accomplish the care and
domestic tasks that traditionally awaited them at home.
Second, the poor working conditions, low wages and low status, unso-
cial working hours, and often irregular situations prevalent in the care and
domestic sector make this work unattractive for nonmigrant ­women. Fur-
thermore, research shows that employers themselves often prefer to hire
mi­grants as care and domestic workers. Not only are they seen as being
more available for low-­status and low-­paid jobs than native-­born workers,
but also when the latter do accept jobs as in-­home nannies, for instance,
they are discussed in negative terms as representing poor “national” role mod-
els for the c­ hildren due to their (often) low education levels, unlike mi­grant
­women who frequently have high-­level qualifi ations.90 Additionally, the
creation of niches within the care and domestic sectors—­for instance,
between live-in and live-­out jobs—­divided according to nationality, cou-
pled with the rising demand for care and domestic workers even in times

174 Chapter 5
Extra-EU15 5.5

8.1

2.7
EU-15

3.4

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Women Men variation 2007–2011(%)

Figure 5.2 ​Difference in unemployment rates between 2007 and 2011 by sex

and country of birth in the eu -15. so ur ce: cal cul atio ns ba sed o n eur os t at ,
­l ab our fo r ce s ur ve y (o nline d at a c ode: [lfsa_ur ga c ob]).

of economic crisis and austerity, seems to have created a certain equilib-

rium between female mi­grant workers themselves, so that they tend not to
compete for the same jobs.
Thi d, as I explained earlier, the attempts to automate care and domestic
work, or replace workers with fi ed capital (machines), are made par-
ticularly difficult by the strong affective dimensions of this work, thereby
rendering certain tasks impossible to mechanize. Relocation to sites with
cheaper ­labor is also impossible due to the very nature of care and do-
mestic ser­vices, which have to be produced and consumed in situ, most
often at home. Th s is the case not only ­because the home is obviously the
site of ­house­keeping, but also ­because the expectations and preferences of
families and dependent persons with regard to care—as well as t­ hose of
the state—­are not shifting away from a largely “care-­at-­home” model. Most
p
­ eople requiring lt c ser­vices receive and prefer to receive care at home.91
For instance, a 2007 Eurobarometer survey examining public opinion re-
garding care provision across Eu­rope found that the large majority of in-
terviewees expressed the expectation of and preference for home care if
they ­were to become dependent.92 However, the increased participation
of native-­born ­women in the workforce and the fact that they have been
less affected by unemployment than native-­born men (in other words, the
fact that the crisis has not created a supply of native-­born ­women for the
care and domestic sector, at least in the richer regions of these countries)
have meant that ­these expectations and preferences can less and less be met

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  175

by a native-­born female workforce that is increasingly active outside the
­house­hold, determined to remain so, and unavailable (or undesirable) for
care and domestic work even in paid form, due above all to the very severe,
un­regu­la­ted, stigmatized, and poor working conditions of this sector.
It is thus not by chance that the 2007–2011economic downturn hit par-
ticularly hard the sectors that employ mi­grant men, whereas t­ hose em-
ploying mi­grant ­women have even grown during the crisis. As the 2012
Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (oecd ) Inter-
national Migration Outlook reports, in the eu the crisis was felt in very se-
vere ways by t­ hose sectors that are highly exposed to the fluctuations of the
economy. In contrast, noncyclical sectors registered signifi ant growth with
occupations like “residential care activities” and “activities of h­ ouse­holds
as employers of domestic personnel” registering thousands of new jobs for
foreign-­born workers, most of them for ­women. In light of this evidence,
the oecd did not fail to emphasize that in most countries mi­grant ­women
have been less affected by the economic crisis than mi­grant men.93 For in-
stance, data on the effects of the global economic crisis in the Netherlands
in 2012 show that while employment in the construction and manufactur-
ing industries decreased by 4 ­percent and 13 ­percent, respectively, thereby
affecting foreign-­born (young) males in par­tic­u­lar, it grew by 40 ­percent
in the care and welfare sector, which is envisaged to be one of the faster-­
growing sectors in the Dutch economy in the coming years.94 In France
too, manufacturing and construction ­were the sectors that most suffered
from the economic downturn, with losses between 2008 and 2011amount-
ing to 44,400 jobs in the construction sector and 267,600 in manufacturing
and extractive industries.95 On the other hand, according to the Conseil
National de l’Information Statistique (cnis ; National Council for Statisti-
cal Information), the number of ­people employed ­under the ces u scheme
grew from 770,000 persons in 2008 to 835,000 in 2010.96 Although ­there
are not detailed statistics on the nationality or country of birth of ­these
workers, estimates calculate that more than one in four care and domestic
workers are of foreign nationality and 35 ­percent are immigrants.97 Fi­nally,
in Italy, given the crucial role that mi­grant ­women working as caregivers
and ­house­keepers are playing in the Italian ­family system (particularly in
the north of the country and in the big cities), it is ­little surprise to dis-
cover that the global economic crisis has impacted males dramatically, but
not so much female mi­grant workers. Not only has the care and domes-

176 Chapter 5
tic sector been spared from the devastating effects of the crisis, but it has
even grown during it, although we should bear in mind that such growth
has also meant an expansion of the gray economy and worsening working
conditions in the sector.98 As all available data clearly show, thus, the global
economic crisis has had specific gender dimensions, particularly for mi­
grant workers. As previously noted, some commentators have gone so far
as to call it the “he-­cession.”99
In light of t­ hese ele­ments, I argue that the female mi­grant workforce
employed in the care and domestic sector in western Eu­rope amounts not
to a reserve army that is depicted (and perceived) as an economic threat
to native-­born workers, constantly exposed to unemployment and used in
order to maintain wage discipline, but to a “regular” army of ­labor. Rather
than being competitors with native ­women in the low-­skilled jobs market,
mi­grant ­women employed as care and domestic workers thus have both al-
lowed a number of native-­born ­women to work outside the ­house­hold, and
created entirely new professional figu es, such as that of the paid personal
badante, which in Italy, for instance, had not previously existed. Rather
than inspiring campaigns for their exclusion from the ­labor market, or
from western Eu­rope altogether, non-­western mi­grant ­women undergo
exceptional pro­cesses of regularization and even receive offers of “salva-
tion” from their allegedly backward cultures.
The proposal that mi­grant ­women employed as care and domestic
workers could be characterized as a regular army of ­labor thus appears to
run ­counter to the so-­called domestic ­labor debate initiated by feminists in
the late 1970s and 1980s. As noted above, in this context the concept of the
reserve army of l­abor was used in order to account for the structural in-
come biases and precarious working and contractual conditions of w ­ omen
who ­were then entering the ­labor market as waged workers in increasing
numbers.100 As Floya Anthias noted, it had become “an almost unproblem-
atic reference to depict w ­ omen as a ral [reserve army of l­abor],” particu-
larly in Marxist feminist discussions.101 However, rather than challenging
the idea that w ­ omen in general are likely to be counted in the ranks of the
(latent) reserve army of l­abor—­a hypothesis that at any rate would need to
be empirically verifi d in each country and at dif­fer­ent times and stages of
cap­i­tal­ist development—­I propose instead that we employ the notion of
the regular army to describe what happens to mi­grant w ­ omen engaged in
commodified socially reproductive l­abor. The focus on a specific category

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  177

of “­women” in the context of con­temporary neoliberal western Eu­ro­pean
socie­ties as well as on a determined (and highly peculiar) sector of the
economy enables us to see that the w ­ omen to whom the two concepts
refer—­reserve army in the 1970s and regular army in the 2000s—do not
belong to the same supposedly homogeneous universal called woman-
hood. Rather, they inhabit diverse worlds of experience strongly marked
by class and (increasingly) racial differences. Insofar as the w ­ omen who
are employed in the care and domestic sector are mi­grants mainly coming
from the Global South and former state-­socialist countries, the most ap-
propriate term for understanding their working conditions is arguably nei-
ther the indeterminate abstraction of wage ­labor in general, nor of ­women’s
work in par­tic­u­lar, but rather the determinate abstraction of commodifi d
socially reproductive work carried out by the mi­grant workforce.
Mi­grant ­labor in con­temporary Eu­rope and western socie­ties, as I
have previously argued, is configu ed in specific forms: it is “­labor on the
move,” as a result of the uneven development brought about by what David
Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession,” and it is “disposable l­abor,”
with a distinctive economic as well as po­liti­cal status.102 However, in the
world of mi­grant workers, mi­grant ­women’s ­labor seems to obey its own
rules. It follows the rules of genderism and the “sexual contract” within the
­house­hold, which establishes that ­women are still the subjects in charge
of reproduction and care.103 But it also follows the rules of the “racial con-
tract,” according to which ethnic minorities and p ­ eople of color are still
­those who perform the least desirable and valued tasks in a society.104 Th
concept of a regular army of ­labor as applied to mi­grant ­women employed
in commodifi d socially reproductive work in con­temporary western Eu­
ro­pean socie­ties thus aims to contribute to the Marxist theory of the re-
serve army of l­abor, which, as I argued above, is still of enormous value
for understanding the place of mi­grant ­labor in con­temporary western Eu­
ro­pean socie­ties. Hence, I regard the concept of the regular army of ­labor
as a pos­si­ble supplement to the Marxian theory of surplus populations, a
supplement potentially enabling that theory not only to take into account
the notoriously neglected fi ld of socially reproductive l­abor, but also to
understand its changing forms ­under neoliberal capitalism.
The term “regular,” however, can be misleading if it is taken to mean sta-
bility and security. I should thus clarify that by using such a term I do not
intend to assert that female mi­grants could not in princi­ple belong to a re-

178 Chapter 5
serve army of ­labor or that they are immune from unemployment and the
loss of social and po­liti­cal rights. On the contrary, mi­grant ­women from
the Global South often go through a pro­cess of incorporation into and
expulsion from wage ­labor in their sending countries before they move to
richer regions in the North.105 In other words, they may well belong to their
national reserve army of ­labor as rural mi­grants or as a cheaper workforce
alternatively hired and fi ed by industries in their own country as cap­i­
tal­ist needs demand. Furthermore, we could imagine a f­ uture scenario in
which for dif­fer­ent reasons native-­born ­women ­will become available for
paid reproductive work, thereby potentially turning mi­grant ­women em-
ployed in the sector into reserve rather than regular workers. Likewise, I
do not mean to suggest that mi­grant ­women employed in the care and do-
mestic sector have more regulated, secure, or simply better working con-
ditions than their male counter­parts employed in other sectors. As most
studies on this par­tic­u­lar segment of the ­labor market demonstrate, care
and domestic jobs are often performed in unsafe contexts, without con-
tract regulations or health and social benefits and in very abusive working
conditions.106
By employing the term “regular army,” I seek to show how the Marxist
tradition’s use of the power­ful meta­phor of an “army” to describe the pool
of workers and surplus populations in industrialized socie­ties has a con­
temporary relevance and explanatory power. But I also seek to underline
the antipodal position occupied by the female segment of mi­grant workers
active in this specific economic sector as contrasted to the “reserve” char-
acter of the army of l­abor in which the male segment is mostly employed.
My proposal, in this re­spect, might be seen as close to the perspective more
recently a­ dopted by Saskia Sassen, who has characterized low-­waged do-
mestic workers as “strategic infrastructure maintenance workers.”107 As
Sassen highlights, though research on the subject has focused on the “poor
working conditions, exploitation, and multiple vulnerabilities of t­ hese
­ ouse­hold workers,” what ­matters analytically “is the strategic importance
h
of well-­functioning professional ­house­holds for the leading globalized
sectors in [the] cities and, hence, the importance of this new type of serv-
ing class,” which is mostly composed of ­women.108
Furthermore, by introducing the concept of a regular army of l­abor for
mi­grant ­women employed in the care and domestic sector in western
Eu­rope, I also seek to rethink and to interrogate established categories

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  179

inherited from past debates, such as the assumption that both w ­ omen and
mi­grants constitute, almost by defin tion, a reserve army of l­abor.109 By
showing the epochal shifts ­under way in impor­tant societal domains (par-
ticularly the ­family and the gender patterns traditionally associated with
it), in their intersections with the changes taking place in ­labor markets
(where ­women, both native and foreign-­born, have been hit by the crisis
less than men), migration regimes, and state policies regarding care (which
fuel the demand for mi­grant ­women in the care sector), we can appreciate
how such shifts have come to overturn our expectations and how they can
push us to update our analytical toolbox.

Notes ­toward a Critique of the Po­liti­cal Economy

of Femonationalism

As this long discussion has sought to demonstrate, a critique of the po­liti­

cal economy of femonationalism entails an in-­depth analy­sis of the wider
economic interests that have contributed to shape femonationalism into
one of the most puzzling and power­ful ideological formations of our times.
The materiality of discourses and ideologies is linked to the ways in which
they operate through dif­fer­ent (state) apparatuses in order to guarantee the
reproduction of the material conditions of production on a daily basis. I
thus contend that the materiality of femonationalism is strictly connected
to the ways in which the foregrounding of Muslim and non-­western mi­grant
­women as redeemable, even within campaigns dominated by other­wise
harsh anti-­immigration slogans, is related to their key role in the repro-
duction of the material conditions of social reproduction. The “useful” role
that female mi­grant ­labor plays in the con­temporary restructuring of wel-
fare regimes and the feminization of key sectors of the ser­vice economy
thus accounts signifi antly for the dif­fer­ent ways in which neoliberal gov-
ernments and nationalist parties relate to Muslim and non-­western mi­grant
­women and men.
We could further note that, besides being extremely useful “reproductive
workers,” Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women are also “reproductive
bodies” whose birthrate is more than double that of national ­women.110
Despite the attempts “to re-­establish the demographic advantage of one
nationality”—as Judith Butler put it—­that have been made in the last few
years by several eu countries (see chapter 2), calls for assimilation addressed

180 Chapter 5
to non-­western mi­grant ­women (Muslim and non-­Muslim alike) identify a
specific role they play within con­temporary western Eu­ro­pean socie­ties.111In-
sofar as they are regarded as prolific bodies of ­future generations, as ­mothers
who play a crucial role in the pro­cess of transmission of “societal values,” as a
useful replacement in the socially reproductive sector for “national” ­women,
mi­grant ­women seem to become the target of a deceptively benevolent cam-
paign in which they are “needed” as workers, “tolerated” as mi­grants, and
“encouraged” as w ­ omen to conform to western values.
Two further ele­ments should be considered in t­ hese concluding re-
marks, albeit briefly. Attending to ­women’s specific positioning within the
cir­cuit of the market economy is impor­tant for a critique of femonationalism
not only in terms of the role of w ­ omen as producers and reproducers, but
also when we consider them as consumers and even as commodities. As
Hester Eisenstein argues, “If the goal of globalization is to create invest-
ment and marketing opportunities, and therefore ac­cep­tance of western
products along with western norms, then in this context an image of a
liberated western ­woman becomes part of the sale. . . . ​Feminism, defi ed
as ­women’s liberation from patriarchal constraints, is made the equivalent
of participating in the market as a liberated individual.”112 Continuous
cap­i­tal­ist expansion in the Global South as well as the full incorporation
of all individuals into its logic in the richer North involves an extension
and rearticulation of the ideology that Crawford Macpherson famously
called “possessive individualism.”113 As possessive individuals, mi­grants
integrated into western socie­ties—­and particularly female mi­grants—­are
invited to conceive of their freedom in terms of their in­de­pen­dence from
communitarian bound­aries and of their capacity for endless western pat-
terns of consumption.
Mi­grant ­women, however, are also commodities. H ­ ere, by considering
con­temporary femonationalism as an ideological formation that needs to be
understood also on the basis of the commodifi ation of Muslim and non-­
western w ­ omen as such, I am arguing that we need to pursue the line of rea-
soning famously proposed by Alain Badiou more than a de­cade ago. ­After
the 2004 law against the hijab in public schools was approved in France—­a
law that has come to epitomize the entire debate about the equation be-
tween Islam and w ­ omen’s oppression—­the French phi­los­o­pher defi ed it
as a “pure cap­i­tal­ist law.” For femininity to operate according to its function
­under capitalism, the female body has to be exposed in order to circulate

The Po­l iti­c al Economy of Femonationalism  181

“according to the market paradigm.”114 The Muslim girl therefore has to
show “what she’s got to sell.” In other words, she needs to accept and to en-
dorse actively the commodifi ation of her female body. The emphasis on the
need of assimilating mi­grant ­women in general to norms of Eu­ro­pean femi-
ninity, or on the unveiling of Muslim ­women in par­tic­u­lar, therefore com-
bines both the western male’s enduring dream of “uncovering” the w ­ oman
of the e­ nemy, or of the colonized, and the demand to end the incongru-
ence of hidden female bodies as exceptions to the general law according to
which they should circulate like “sound currency.”115
We can thus argue that the current mobilization of gender equality and
feminism as tools in the ser­vice of the strengthening of nationalist and
racist discourses should be regarded not simply as “ideological cover,” in a
negative and limited sense, as a distortion or lie. The rise of femonational-
ism needs to be deciphered also as symptomatic of the distinctive position
of western and non-­western ­women in the economic, po­liti­cal, and sensu
lato material chain of production and reproduction. The possibility of the
attempted appropriation by nationalist and neoliberal discourses of central
feminist ideals of equality and freedom, and the convergence of feminists/
femocrats with anti-­immigration and racist politics, has emerged from the
very specific reconfigur tion of the l­abor market, migration, and work-
force movements as well as the nationalization of po­liti­cal life produced by
the dynamics of neoliberal globalization of the last thirty years. Confront-
ing femonationalism thus requires not only ideological refutation but also
a concrete analy­sis of its political-­economic foundations.

182 Chapter 5
 NOTES

Introduction

1 Th ee far-­right nationalist parties came fi st in their respective countries:

the Danish ­People’s Party obtaining 25 ­percent (+18.7) of the vote; the fn
obtaining 26.6 ­percent (+11.8) of the vote; and the United Kingdom In­de­pen­
dence Party with 27.5 ­percent (+11.4). In general, far-­right parties obtained
their highest results in western Eu­ro­pean countries (with the exception
of Hungary). For a more extensive commentary on ­these results, see Cas
Mudde’s analy­sis, “The Far Right in the 2014 Eu­ro­pean Elections: Of Earth-
quakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists,” May 30, 2014, in the Washington Post:
https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­news​/­monkey​-­cage​/­wp​/­2014​/­0 5​/­30​/­the​-­far​
-­right​-­in​-­the​-­2014​-­european​-­elections​-o ­ f​-e­ arthquakes​-c­ artels​-a­ nd​-­designer​
-­fascists/ (accessed March 3, 2015).
2 See the article “The ‘Brown International’ of the Eu­ro­pean Far Right” by
Thanasis Kampagiannis in Left lank, January 12, 2014, available at http://­left​
-­flank​.­org​/­2014​/­0 1​/­12​/­brown​-i­ nternational​-e­ uropean​-f­ ar​-­right/ (accessed
January 2, 2016).
3 Bartlett et al., “Pop­u­lism in Eu­rope”; Mayer, “From Jean-­Marie to Marine
Le Pen”; Akkerman and Hagelund, “ ‘­Women and ­Children First!’ ”; Towns
et al., “Equality Conundrum.”
4 The invasion of Af­ghan­i­stan that followed the terrorist attacks on the Twin
Towers in New York was presented to, and endorsed by, the international
public as a mission to liberate Afghan ­women from their oppression ­under
Taliban rule just as much as an act of defense and retaliation against the
perpetrators of the attacks. From then onward, images of veiled Muslim
­women as imprisoned bodies have entered our western collective uncon-
scious alongside ­those of Muslim bearded men seemingly plotting terrorist
onslaughts against western targets. All across the West, not only right-­wing
nationalist and conservative forces but also some leftist and feminist organ­
izations and public figu es have endorsed the portrayal of Muslim ­women as
victims to be saved. In the United States, the Feminist Majority Foundation,
one of the leading feminist voices in the country, effectively supported the
invasion of Af­ghan­i­stan as necessary to liberate Afghan ­women from “gen-
der apartheid” (Russo, “Feminist Majority Foundation’s Campaign to Stop
 Gender Apartheid”). On the other side of the Atlantic, the German feminist
icon Alice Schwarzer has been one of the most vocal opponents of Islam as
a misogynist religion and culture, and she was echoed by a wide array of po­
liti­cal forces from left o right. Th s attitude is so widespread in the country
that according to a survey conducted by the polling agency Allensbach in
2012, 83 ­percent of Germans associate the word “Islam” with “oppression of
­women.” In Sweden and Norway, a convergence between feminists and right-­
wing/anti-­immigration parties such as the Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden
Demo­crats) and the Fremskrittspartiet (Pro­gress Party) has taken place in
the name of gender equality against non-­western immigrant communities
(Roma and Muslims in par­tic­u­lar). If we turn to other western countries, the
situation is not all that dissimilar. ­After the 2005 racist “Cronulla riots” in
Sydney, when white Australians assaulted men of color for days while accus-
ing them of being rapists, mp Carl Scully declared he was “concerned a small
number of ­Middle Eastern males appear to have a prob­lem with respecting
­women” (Ho, “Muslim ­Women’s New Defenders”).
5 Oriana Fallaci did not defi e herself as a feminist, although she was associ-
ated with liberal feminism due to her endorsement of ­battles for the rights
for abortion and divorce in the 1970s.
6 I ­here use the defin tion of femocrats in Inside Agitators by Hester Eisenstein
as “feminists in state bureaucracy.” For a comprehensive discussion on the
notion of femocrat and state feminism in transnational perspective, see
Haussman and Sauer, Gendering the State in the Age of Globalization. See also
McBride and Mazur, Politics of State Feminism.
7 Neoliberalism is generally associated with political-­economic doctrines
promoting globalization. It is thus assumed to transcend national bound­
aries and to reject nationalist ideologies. Chapter 3 challenges this wide-
spread view. For an overview of ­these debates, particularly within the fi ld
of international po­liti­cal economy, see Harmes, “The Rise of Neoliberal
Nationalism.”
8 Some of the arguments most recently deployed by some feminists and femo-
crats to stigmatize Muslim males and to portray Muslim ­women as victims
to be saved replicate ste­reo­typical repre­sen­ta­tions of the alleged victimhood
of non-­western ­women that characterized western Eu­ro­pean accounts of mi­
grant ­women at least from the 1970s onward. Moreover, the civic integration
policies that some feminists, ­women’s organ­izations, and femocrats sup-
ported, or directly implemented on the basis of their anti-­Islam perspective,
apply not only to mi­grants from the ­Middle East, North Africa, and South
Asia, but also to Africans in general, Albanians, Rus­sians, Serbians, Chinese,
and so forth (in short, to non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants). For this reason,
throughout this book I refer to Muslim and non-­western mi­grant men and
­women, ­unless the context requires reference to specific ationalities and/or
religious affiliations. In par­tic­u­lar, I ­will highlight how the majority of Muslim

184 Notes to Introduction
 ­ omen (mi­grants and nonmigrants alike) and of ­women migrating to
w
western Eu­rope from the Global South and from some of the countries of the
postsocialist bloc are affected by at least some of the policies and pro­cesses I
outline in this book.
9 Éric Fassin examines the ways in which in both France and the United
States themes of sex and sexuality, gender equality, and gay rights have been
displaced from the private to the public/po­liti­cal sphere. The foregrounding
of sexual freedoms as ­matters of open, public discussion, and thus, “democ­
ratization,” however, has been accomplished through the identifi ation of
mi­grants, and particularly Muslims, as aliens to ­those same pro­cesses. Sexual
democracy, or the sexualization of democracy, has thus been instrumental-
ized in the ser­vice of sexual nationalism, whereby mi­grants’ and Muslims’
integration and loyalty to their hosting western nations are tested by means
of their commitment to the sexual values of ­these nations (É. Fassin, “Sexual
Democracy and the New Racialization of Eu­rope”). Drawing on the notion
of “cultural fundamentalism” to describe the dogmatic and exclusionary
ways western culture has been rebranded by the right wing as a tool for
Othering mi­grants, in a famous 2006 article Liz Fekete coined the term
“enlightened fundamentalism.” Th s term describes the power­ful deploy-
ment of ­women’s rights and gay rights by right-­wing parties in con­temporary
xenophobic campaigns across Eu­rope and their resort to the Enlightenment
tradition as the foundation of western Eu­ro­pean culture, aimed against
Muslims and mi­grants more generally. According to Fekete, what has made
enlightened fundamentalism so strong in the aftermath of 9/11 si the way in
which many “self-­proclaimed feminists” jumped on the right-­wing “band
wagon” (Fekete, “Enlightened Fundamentalism?,” 12). Accordingly, Fekete
accuses ­these feminists of “paternalism” and points to their contradictions
when they support repressive policies like Muslim veil bans in the name of
­women’s freedom of choice. For Fekete, both the right wing and feminists
are “exploiting” the theme of gender equality within cultural fundamentalist
campaigns. Similarly to Fassin, the Dutch sociologists Paul Mepschen and Jan
Willem Duyvendak also use the notion of “sexual nationalism” to discuss con­
temporary public repre­sen­ta­tions of Muslims as a threat to sexual freedoms in
the Netherlands. Specifi ally, they explicate the sexualization of nationalism
in terms of the “culturalization” and “sexualization” of citizenship, that is, the
ways in which Dutch citizenship is understood more and more in terms of
cultural and moral identifi ations. Accordingly, they show how Muslims and
other non-­western mi­grants are criticized for their supposed lack of loyalty
to certain Eu­ro­pean cultural constellations and sexual liberties, which are
now recast as the foundation of western history. Mepschen and Duyvendak
also see the foregrounding of sexual freedoms in anti-­Muslim agendas as an
instance of “instrumentalization,” particularly in the case of the “populist
right.” What facilitates this instrumentalization, they further maintain, is the

Notes to Introduction  185

 neoliberal context, understood as a “proj­ect to reinforce or restore the au-
thority of state institutions over the production of (national) citizenship and
po­liti­cal subjectivity and the regulation of ­labor markets and urban margin-
ality” (Mepschen, Duyvendack, and Tonkens, “Sexual Politics, Orientalism
and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands”). See also Mepschen and
Duyvendack, “Eu­ro­pean Sexual Nationalisms.”
10 Centering her attention on the intersection between gay politics and US na-
tionalists ­after 9/11, Jasbir Puar emphasizes the exclusionary state as the mas-
ter signifier f the con­temporary focus on male ­Others as misogynistic and
xenophobic enemies of western civilization. More specifi ally, Puar discusses
the encounter between US nationalism and queer sexual politics in terms of
“collusions,” which she sees as productive of a “homonationalist” formation.
Puar’s “homonationalism” thus both describes the mobilization of gay rights
against Muslims and racialized ­Others within the American nationalist
framework, but also refers to the integration of “homonormativity”—­that
is, domesticated homosexual politics—­within the US agenda of the war on
terror. As Puar puts it, homonationalism is a “discursive tactic that disaggre-
gates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual ­others, foreground-
ing a collusion between homo­sexuality and American nationalism that is
generated both by national rhe­torics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and
queer subjects themselves” (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 39). Puar has drawn
attention to the manifold ways in which the US state of exceptionalism and
exception has co-­opted impor­tant sections of the gay movement. Rather
than a mere instrumentalization, or tactical exploitation of the theme of gay
rights by nationalism, Puar thus highlights the active involvement—­and
responsibilities—of the queer movements themselves that have supported
(wittingly or unwittingly) this new racist configur tion. Puar’s work has
been greatly influential in setting the terms of the debate among scholars.
Discussing the deployment of gender and l gbt equality in the Québécois
and Dutch public debate on Muslim patriarchy, Sirma Bilge and Sarah
Bracke, respectively, adopt Puar’s concept of homonationalism as the new
hegemonic form of sexual nationalism. While the former stresses the col-
lusive role of Québécois “state feminism” in par­tic­u­lar in the establishment
of the governmental rhe­toric positing Muslims as a peril to ­women and gay
rights, the latter explores both the “alliance” between Dutch feminism and
right-­wing xenophobic politics seeking to “rescue” Muslim ­women from
their alleged oppression, as well as the application of such rescue narratives
to queer movements. Bilge also gestures ­toward a materialist understand-
ing of the collusion between feminism, l gbt, and anti-­Islam rhe­toric by
foregrounding neoliberalism as the backdrop of Québécois con­temporary
sexual nationalism, which enables the marketization of feminist and l gbt
movements. See Bilge, “Mapping Québécois Sexual Nationalism in Times of
‘Crisis of Reasonable Accommodations’ ”; and Bracke, “Subjects of Debate.”

186 Notes to Introduction
 11 While holding to a nationalist agenda, since the early 2000s t he ln and
fn have progressively ­adopted a “western supremacist” vocabulary, which
enabled them to enter—­and to be heard within—­the mainstream public
debate. Instead, the pvv began its campaign against the alleged illiberalism
and misogyny of Islam in the name of the “superior” liberal values of the
West, only to progressively move to a more chauvinist, nationalist repertoire.
For a discussion of the notion of western supremacy—­which I provide in
chapter 1—­see particularly Bessis, Western Supremacy; and Bonnett, “From
the Crisis of Whiteness to Western Supremacism.”
12 In a famous 1980 article Derrick Bell described the US Supreme Court’s
1954 verdict to declare public schools’ racial segregation as unconstitutional
as a case of “converging interests.” According to Bell, the Supreme Court’s
decision to support the ­battle for civil rights of African Americans at school
was motivated by the fact that whites saw po­liti­cal as well as economic gains
in ending (at least on the ­legal front) school segregation. According to Bell,
such a decision, fi st, “helped to provide immediate credibility to Amer­i­ca’s
strug­gle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging
third world ­peoples”; second, it “offered much needed reassurance to Ameri-
can blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during
World War II might yet be given meaning at home”; fi­nally, “segregation was
viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the South” (Bell, “Brown ver-
sus Board of Education and the Interest-­Convergence Dilemma,” 524–525).
13 Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced; Perugini and Gordon, ­Human Right to
Dominate.
14 Outshoorm and Oldersma, “Dutch Decay.”
15 Zeitgeist: Mepschen and Duyvendack, “Eu­ro­pean Sexual Nationalisms”; dis-
cursive tactic: Puar, Terrorist Assemblages; po­liti­cal proj­ect: Fekete, “Enlight-
ened Fundamentalism?”
16 Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form,” 785.
17 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”
18 MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation’ ”; Stoler, Race and the Education of
Desire.
19 Hall, “Toad in the Garden,” 51.
20 The concept of senso comune in Gramsci describes an idea that in a given
epoch and society has become dominant through its fabrication and uncriti-
cal and often largely unconscious perception and internalization, regardless
of its status as true or false. For an extensive treatment of this concept and
problematic in Gramsci’s work, see Thomas, Gramscian Moment.
21 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” While I take from
Althusser’s theorization the importance of understanding ideology within
the broader context of production and reproduction of capital, my reading
of femonationalism through ­these theoretical lenses runs against a certain
tendency in Althusser to focus on ideology in general. Partially following the

Notes to Introduction  187

 insights of Michel Pêcheux, I speak of ideological “formation” rather than
ideology as such, in order to emphasize that femonationalism is historically
determinate and requires broader theoretical tools and historical contextu-
alizations to be properly decoded. See Pêcheux, “Mechanism of Ideological
(Mis)recognition.” In contrast to a certain tendency in Althusser to think of
ideologies as internally uniform, however, I stress the internal inconsisten-
cies, fragmentation, and contradictions of femonationalism as a specific id -
ological formation of the twenty-­fi st ­century. Althusser tended to conceive
of ideologies as almost direct functions of state deliberations and ultimately
productive only of subaltern subjects—­insofar as ideological interpellation,
for Althusser, is what produces individuals as subjects, in a way that seems
not to leave room for the emergence of critical, antagonistic subjectivities.
For a critique of this ele­ment in Althusserian ideology theory, see Rehmann,
Theories of Ideology.
22 Bilge, “Mapping Québécois Sexual Nationalism,” 306. Bilge understands
neoliberalism as the logic that merges equal rights agendas and business
rationalities by means of marketizing equality social movements such as
feminism and l gbt and turning ­these movements’ supporters into consum-
ers and neoliberal subjectivities. The end of “neo-­liberal equity politics,”
accordingly, is the reduction of “social justice to a question of rights and
[the concealment of] harsh operations of global capitalism and under­lying
systems of structural injustice” (306).
23 Mepschen and Duyvendack, “Eu­ro­pean Sexual Nationalisms.”
24 The Eu­ro­pean Integration Fund was established in 2007. Chapter 4 discusses
at length how this fund has been used by vari­ous organ­izations, including
­women’s equality agencies within and outside state bureaucracy, to promote
the economic integration of non-­western mi­grant ­women. I thus show the
contradictions opened up for feminists in par­tic­u­lar by the concrete imple-
mentation of ­these economic integration policies.
25 By “western Eu­rope” I am referring to the area comprising the fi een
member-­states of the Eu­ro­pean Union prior to the accession of ten can-
didate countries—­mostly from eastern Europe—in 2004, alongside the
non-­eu countries Switzerland and Norway. The restriction of my analy­sis
to western Eu­rope, rather than to Eu­rope, or to the Eu­ro­pean Union as a
­whole, is due to two main reasons. First, despite the recent incorporation
of most eastern Eu­ro­pean countries into the Eu­ro­pean Union, western and
eastern Eu­rope still constitute, and are perceived by the population at large,
as two distinct po­liti­cal, social, and economic blocs. In terms of migra-
tion fl ws, for instance (a key area of interest of this study), whereas most
western Eu­ro­pean countries are mostly areas of immigration—­including of
eastern Europeans—­eastern Eu­ro­pean countries are areas of emigration to
the western regions. Furthermore, at the level of ideological construction,
whereas western Eu­ro­pean countries are depicted (and depict themselves

188 Notes to Introduction
 as) “occidental,” modern, ­free, demo­cratic, and rich, eastern Eu­ro­pean, or
postsocialist, countries, instead are portrayed as “oriental,” authoritarian,
undemo­cratic, and poor. Th s also explains pro­cesses of “racialization” of
eastern Eu­ro­pe­ans by western Eu­ro­pe­ans, which lead to most eastern Eu­ro­
pe­ans being depicted as a homogeneous and inferior group. ­There are, to be
sure, impor­tant differences in the ways western Eu­ro­pe­ans portray dif­fer­ent
eastern Eu­ro­pean countries. For instance, in the western Eu­ro­pean imag-
ery some central and eastern Eu­ro­pean countries/populations are not as
“backward” as ­others (as in the case of the Baltic populations, due to their
par­tic­u­lar history in the context of the Soviet Union). On the other hand,
populations from southern Eu­ro­pean countries (as in the case of Italians,
Greeks, Spaniards, and Portuguese) have been subjected to stereotyping
and Othering at dif­fer­ent times in history, despite the fact that ­today they
are widely acknowledged as belonging to western Eu­rope. Yet in spite of
­these differences, what I stress h ­ ere are the under­lying similarities in the
western Eu­ro­pean imaginary regarding eastern Eu­ro­pean countries, which
account for the ways in which pro­cesses of racialization ­toward eastern
Eu­ro­pe­ans take place. Furthermore, as I discuss throughout this book,
eastern Eu­ro­pean ­women and men—­like other non-­western subjects in the
western Eu­ro­pean imagery—­are framed according to categories derived
from pro­cesses of “racialization of sexism” and “sexualization of racism.”
Not only are eastern Eu­ro­pean men therefore portrayed as oppressors and
­women as victims, but also sexism is considered as a prob­lem that trou­bles
eastern Eu­ro­pean communities more than it does western Eu­ro­pean ones
(see chapter 1). The second reason that I refer to western Eu­rope, rather
than Eu­rope, is to avoid making generalizations that pertain only to western
Eu­rope and not to eastern Eu­rope. For a discussion of the construction of
eastern Eu­rope as “Other,” see Kideckel, “Utter Otherness”; Wolff, Inventing
Eastern Eu­rope; Bakic-­Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms.” For a discussion on
the repre­sen­ta­tions of the eastern Eu­ro­pean ­woman in the West, see Lutz,
“Limits of European-­ness”; Suchland, “Is Postsocialism Transnational?”;
Andrijasevic, “Difference Borders Make”; and Andrijasevic, “Beautiful Dead
Bodies.”

1. Figures of Femonationalism

1 Th oughout this book I use the notion of right-­wing nationalism to describe

the politics of the pvv, fn , and ln . As I explain at length in chapter 2, I de-
liberately avoid the term “pop­u­lism” to describe ­these parties’ ideologies, as I
consider such a concept imprecise and misleading.
2 I ­here use the defin tion of femocrats by Hester Eisenstein as “feminists in
state bureaucracy” (Eisenstein, Inside Agitators).
3 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”

Notes to chapter 1  189

 4 Mohanty, “­Under Western Eyes.” Muslim and non-­western mi­grant ­women
have been represented, of course, not only as victims. In the western Eu­ro­
pean media one can also fi d depictions of Muslim ­women as parasitic on
public benefits, or as terrorists, or of eastern Eu­ro­pean ­women as sexually
aggressive. However, as noted also by Jacobsen and Stenvoll, “alternative
accounts are constituted in relation” to the dominant portrayal of them as
victims. See Jacobsen and Stenvoll, “Muslim ­Women and Foreign Prosti-
tutes,” 276.
5 ­Castles and Miller, Age of Migration.
6 Freeman, Immigrant ­Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Socie­ties; Miles,
“­Labour Migration.”
7 ­Castles and Miller, Age of Migration.
8 Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Eu­rope.
9 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem.”
10 The Dutch Statistics Office ses “allochtoon” to refer to a person who
has at least one parent born abroad, whereas an “autochtoon” is someone
whose parents ­were both born in the Netherlands. See, e.g., the 1977 report
produced by the Werkgroep Buitenlandse Vrouwen (Foreign ­Women
Study Group) that invites the government to develop policies specifi ally
addressing the needs of mi­grant ­women. See Prins and Saharso, “In the
Spotlight,” 374.
11 On the stigmatization of eastern Eu­ro­pe­ans and the foregrounding of eastern
Eu­ro­pean ­women as “victims” in the Netherlands, see Willett, “Crises of Self
and Other.”
12 Willett, “Crises of Self and Other,” 33.
13 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem.”
14 Pim Fortuyn was, along with Frits Bolkestein, among the fi st right-­wing
politicians in the country to establish a clear connection between the
feminist and the anti-­Islam strug­gle, thereby paving the way for the con­
temporary forms of femonationalist ideology in the Netherlands. His murder
in May 2002 by a white Dutch animal rights and environmentalist activist,
immediately ­after the enormous success achieved by Fortuyn’s campaign,
only contributed to giving more resonance to his anti-­Islam and anti-­
immigration propaganda in the name of ­women’s rights. Pim Fortuyn’s mur-
derer, Volkert van der Graaf, aged thirty-­three, confessed to having killed the
Islamophobic politician in order to protect Muslims from persecution.
15 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem.”
16 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem,” 280.

190  Notes to chapter 1

 17 Undoubtedly, the fact that many of them came from former French colonies
in North Africa contributed to the identifi ation of immigration with Islam,
and therefore of mi­grant ­women with Muslim ­women.
18 Moujoud, “Effets de la migration sur le femmes et sur les rapports sociaux de
sexe.”
19 Condon, “L’activité des femmes immigrées du Portugal à l’arrivée en France.”
20 In a classic ethnographic study on ­women of Maghreb origin in France, for
example, Camille Lacoste-­Dujardin’s claims that “the highest of all par­
ameters of the disposition to integration is clearly the depreciation, that is
the rejection, of the conditions of life in the Maghreb” (quoted in Moujoud,
“Effets de la migration sur le femmes et sur les rapports sociaux de sexe,” 59).
21 Cahiers du féminisme, no. 26 (Autumn 1983): 16–19.
22 Quoted in Larzillière and Sal, “Comprendre l’instrumentalisation du
féminisme à des fi s racistes pour resister.”
23 Guénif and Macé, Les féministes et le garçon arabe. See also Geisser, “La répu-
diation médiatique.”
24 For a reconstruction of the debate on sex trafficking and eastern Eu­ro­pean
­women in France, see Mathieu, “Genèse et logiques des politiques de prosti-
tution en France.”
25 Favaro, Donne migranti; Tognetti Bordogna, Donne dal mondo; Vicarelli,
Mani invisibili; Campani, Genere, etnia e classe.
26 McRobie, “Unsafe House of Italy.”
27 We should note, however, that the (mostly unconscious) reasons ­behind the
repre­sen­ta­tion in the western Eu­ro­pean imagery of ­women from postsocial-
ist countries and the Global South as victims of gendered vio­lence are dif­fer­
ent. Whereas I discuss some of the reasons ­behind the portrayal of Muslim
­women as “victims to be saved” in chapter 2, ­here I ­will refer briefly to one
of the few interpretations that attempted to understand the specific lo ic of
victimhood applied to eastern Eu­ro­pean ­women. According to Suchland, for
instance, the diffused western Eu­ro­pean ste­reo­type of the eastern Eu­ro­pean
­woman as a sex-­trafficking victim “refl cts deeper beliefs in the western
imaginary about the downfall of state socialism” (Suchland, “Double Fram-
ing in Lilya 4-­Ever,” 2).
28 Abu-­Lughod, “Do Muslim ­Women ­Really Need Saving?”; Abu-­Lughod,
Do Muslim ­Women Need Saving?; Hirschkind and Mahmood, “Feminism,
the Taliban, and the Politics of Counter-­Insurgency”; Eisenstein, Feminism
Seduced; Puar, Terrorist Assemblages; Rostami-­Povey, Afghan ­Women.
29 Akkerman and Hagelund, “ ‘­Women and ­Children First!’ ”; Towns, Karls-
son, and Eyre, “Equality Conundrum”; Farris and Scrinzi, “Gender and the
Racialization of Mi­grant ­Women in the Lega Nord Ideology and Politics.”
30 The textual analy­sis was conducted by means of critical discourse analy­sis
(c da ) methodology. The concept of “discourse” within c da refers to a “social

Notes to chapter 1  191

 practice” that produces meanings by linking the linguistic and the societal
level (institutions and social structures). In par­tic­u­lar, c da is interested in
identifying the linkages between (po­liti­cal) discourse and the ways in which
such discourse produces and reproduces power hierarchies, ideologies,
and forms of domination. See Fairclough and Wodak, “Critical Discourse
Analy­sis.”
31 Bracke, “From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays.’ ”
32 ­Here is an excerpt from Bolkestein’s speech, on September 6, 1991, “On
the Collapse of the Soviet Union”: “The pressure in The Netherlands from
­people who want to ­settle ­there is also growing inexorably. Prominent
among recent immigrants in The Netherlands are p ­ eople from Morocco
and from Turkey. Many of them settled in my country in the sixties when
­labour was scarce. ­These two communities have continued to grow through
national increase and also ­because marriage partners are brought in from
the countries of origin. In a few years’ time The Netherlands w ­ ill harbour
some 400.000 M uslims. It is an influx such as we have never before had to
absorb. ­Here I come to the theme of this congress. What should govern-
ment policy be t­ owards ­these ­people who come from a dif­fer­ent culture
and of whom many speak ­little or no Dutch? Our offi al policy used to be:
‘Integration without prejudice to every­one’s own identity.’ It is now recog-
nized that this slogan was a bit too easy. If every­one’s cultural identity is
allowed to persist unimpaired, integration w ­ ill suffer. And integration ­there
must be, ­because the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are ­here to stay.
That is now recognized by all. If integration is offi ally declared govern-
ment policy, which cultural values must prevail: t­ hose of the non-­Muslim
majority or ­those of the Muslim minority? ­Here we must go back to our
roots. Liberalism has produced some fundamental po­liti­cal princi­ples, such
as: the separation of church and state, the freedom of expression, toler-
ance and non-­discrimination. We maintain that ­these princi­ples hold good
not only in Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca but all over the world. Liberalism
claims universal value and worth for ­these princi­ples. That is its po­liti­cal
vision. H ­ ere ­there can be no compromise and no truck. In many parts of
the Muslim world the princi­ples I have mentioned are not honoured. Islam
is not only a religion, it is a way of life. In this, its vision goes ­counter to the
liberal separation of church and state. In many Islamic countries t­ here is
­little freedom of expression. The case of Salman Rushdie may be extreme
but still indicates how far apart we are on this issue. The same goes for
tolerance and non-­discrimination. The way ­women are treated in the world
of Islam is a stain on the reputation of that ­great religion. I repeat that on
­these essential points ­there can be no compromise. ­These princi­ples have a
value that is not relative but of the essence. . . . ​Every­one in The Netherlands
may do and say as he pleases, and eat the food, wear the clothes and profess
the religion of his choice. Muslim girls may wear a scarf if they wish, even

192 Notes to chapter 1
 though that scarf stands for much more than just a head-­dress. But Muslim
girls of school-­going age must attend class, even though they have reached
puberty. H ­ ere again our law must take pre­ce­dence over their custom. ­These
are no more than cursory remarks about a ­great and knotty prob­lem. Our
relations with ­these new immigrants from a dif­fer­ent culture ­will feature
very high on the list of po­liti­cal priorities in the years to come. Maximum
flex bility is called for on all sides. A pragmatic approach is needed but we
must also hold on to liberal princi­ples that are of the essence.” Available at
http://­www​.­liberal​-­international​.­org​/­contentFiles​/­files​/­Bolkestein%201991​
.­pdf (accessed October 1, 2013).
33 Geert Wilders’s new party does not operate through membership. He is the
only offi al affiliate.
34 According to Pantti and Wieten, Pim Fortuyn’s death “marks the re-­
affirmation of the nation through mourning, but his death as national
event marks also the end of Dutch multiculturalism. . . . ​The construction
of Fortuyn’s death and funeral as national events bears the marks of the
unacknowledged rift etween the discontent below the surface of Dutch
society and the offi al ideology of the ­free, open and tolerant multicultural
society. Defini g the tragedy as national can be perceived as a way of reduc-
ing tension and forging a sense of emotional unity; that is, constructing a
nationwide feeling of community” (Pantti and Wieten, “Mourning Becomes
the Nation,” 312).
35 Wilders, Een Nieuw-­Realistische Visie.
36 Vossen, “Classifying Wilders,” 184.
37 Hirsi Ali and Wilders, “Het is tijd voor een liberale jihad.”
38 pvv, De agenda van hoop en optimisme, 6. My translation from Dutch.
39 The website has now been removed. But it is pos­si­ble to see still some ex-
cerpts from bbc ’s reports in “Dutch Gripped by ‘Shop a Mi­grant’ Website,”
February 18, 2012, available at http://­www​.­bbc​.­co​.­uk​/­news​/­world​-­europe​
-­17078239 (accessed March 12, 2015).
40 pvv, Hún Brussel, óns Nederland.
41 De Lange and Mügge, “Gender and Right-­Wing Pop­u­lism in the Low
Countries.”
42 pvv, Hún Brussel, óns Nederland.
43 pvv, Geweld tegen Vrouwen binnen de Islam.
44 On several occasions the founder of the fn , Jean-­Marie Le Pen, has called
the gas chambers used by the Nazi during World War II to kill Jews a “detail
of history.” More recently, in August 2015, Marine Le Pen expelled him from
the fn ­after he made similar Holocaust denial declarations.
45 Shields, “Marine Le Pen and the ‘New’ fn.”
46 The interview, “Marine Le Pen prend pour cible les ‘intégristes’ au nom de
la laïcité,” January 5, 2012, is available at http://­www​.­lemonde​.­fr​/­election​
-­presidentielle​-­2012​/­article​/­2012​/­0 1​/­15​/m
­ arine​-l­e​-p
­ en​-p
­ rend​-­pour​-­cible​-­les​

Notes to chapter 1  193

 -­integristes​-­au​-­nom​-­de​-­la​-­laicite​_1­ 629953​_1­ 471069​.h ­ tml (accessed Febru-
ary 5, 2014).
47 “Marine Le Pen prend pour cible les ‘intégristes’ au nom de la laïcité.”
48 Interview with Marine Le Pen available at http://­www​.­rue89​.­com​/­rue89​
-­presidentielle​/­2012​/­0 1​/­25​/­marine​-­le​-p ­ en​-v­ eut​-m ­ ettre​-a­ u​-­pas​-­le​-­planning​
-­familial​-­228731(accessed November 5, 2013).
49 The poster can be seen in Hugo Passarello Luna, “2007, le fn s’affiche avec
une jeune métisse,” Slate, April 16, 2012, available at http://­www​.­slate​.­fr​/­story​
/­52465​/­photos​-­campagne​-­2007​-­le​-­pen​-a­ ffiche (accessed May 17, 2016).
50 See Marine Le Pen’s speech on December 11, 2010, in Lyon. É. Fassin,
Démocratie précaire; Mayer, “From Jean-­Marie to Marine Le Pen”; Lestrade,
Pourquoi les gays sont passés à droite.
51 Sylvain Crépon and Nonna Mayer, long-­term experts on the fn , empha-
size how both the handover from ­father to ­daughter and the fact of being a
­woman and ­mother made Marine Le Pen more appealing to female voters.
See Crépon, Enquête au coeur du nouveau Front National; Mayer, “From
Jean-­Marie to Marine Le Pen.”
52 The interview is available at http://­videos​.­elle​.­fr​/­video​.­php​?­video​
=­30b5fc74441s. See also “Marine Le Pen répond à Elle: L’ivg en danger,”
February 10, 2012, available at http://­www​.­elle​.­fr​/­Societe​/­News​/­Marine​-­Le​
-­Pen​-­repond​-­a-​ ­ELLE​-­l-​ ­IVG​-e­ n​-d
­ anger​-­1902970 (accessed March 2, 2013).
My translation from French.
53 Program of the fn on the ­family, available at http://­www​.­frontnational​
.­com​/­le​-­projet​-­de​-­marine​-­le​-p
­ en​/a­ venir​-­de​-­la​-­nation​/­famille/ (accessed
March 16, 2014).
54 The interview is available at http://­videos​.­elle​.­fr​/­video​.­php​?­video​
=­30b5fc74441s (accessed March 16, 2014).
55 Program of the fn on the ­family, available at http://­www​.­frontnational​
.­com​/­le​-­projet​-­de​-­marine​-­le​-p
­ en​/a­ venir​-­de​-­la​-­nation​/­famille/ (accessed
March 16, 2014). My translation from French.
56 Le Pen, Mon Projet Pour la France et les Français, available at http://­www​
.­frontnational​.­com​/­pdf​/­projet​_­mlp2012​.­pdf (accessed November 3, 2013).
57 Scrinzi, “A ‘New’ National Front?”
58 Interview available at http://­videos​.­elle​.­fr​/­video​.­php​?­video​=­30b5fc74441s (ac-
cessed March 5, 2013). My translation from French.
59 Scrinzi, “A ‘New’ National Front?”
60 Since 2014 some l gbt activists have joined the fn (as in the case of Sèbastien
Chenu) and prominent members of the fn ­were outed as homosexuals (as
in the case of the fn vice president Florian Philippot). See Rachel Hallibur-
ton, “How Marine Le Pen Is Winning France’s Gay Vote,” January 2015, avail-
able at http://­www​.­spectator​.­co​.­uk​/­2015​/­0 1​/­how​-­marine​-­le​-­pen​-­is​-­winning​
-­frances​-­gay​-­vote/ (accessed January 30, 2015).

194 Notes to chapter 1
 61 Sabelli, “Sessualità, razza, classe e migrazioni nella costruzione
dell’italianità.”
62 See the analy­sis of the poster in Chiara Bonfi lioli, “Intersections of Racism
and Sexism in Con­temporary Italy: A Critical Cartography of Recent Femi-
nist Debates,” October 10, 2010, available at http://­www​.­darkmatter101​.­org​
/­site​/­2010​/­10​/­10​/­intersections​-­of​-r­ acism​-a­ nd​-s­ exism​-i­ n​-­contemporary​-­italy​
-­a-​ ­critical​-­cartography​-­of​-­recent​-­feminist​-d ­ ebates/ (accessed May 17, 2016).
63 Scrinzi, “­Women’s Activism and Gender Relations,” available online at
https://­www​.­academia​.­edu​/­4201607​/­Women​_­s​_­Activism​_­and​_­Gender​
_­Relations​_­in​_­the​_­Northern​_L ­ eague​_L ­ ega​_­Nord​_­party (accessed
May 17, 2016).
64 The proposal is available at http://­www​.­padaniaoffi ​.­org​/­pdf​/­giustizia​
_­immigraz​/­enti​_­locali​/­salvini​_­cittadinanza​.­pdf (accessed October 3, 2012).
My translation from Italian.
65 Information is available on the ln website: http://­www​.­leganord​.­org​/­index​
.­php​/­notizie2​/­7743​-­Pdl​_­leghista​_­per​_r­ endere​_i­ llegale​_i­ l​_v­ elo​_­islamico​
_­integrale​_­(accessed March 16, 2014).
66 Sabelli, “Sessualità, razza, classe e migrazioni nella costruzione
dell’italianità.”
67 Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for ­Women?,” 16.
68 Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for ­Women?,” 22–23. For a brilliant cri-
tique of Okin’s argument, see in par­tic­u­lar Volpp, “Feminism versus
Multiculturalism.”
69 Hirsi Ali explic­itly and approvingly refers to Okin in her book The Caged
Virgin: A Muslim ­Woman’s Cry for Reason (2006). Monica Lanfranco pub-
lished Okin’s article in Italian on October 9, 2014, in the pages of her journal
Marea (http://­riforma​.­it​/­it​/­articolo​/­2014​/­10​/0­ 9​/l­urgenza​-d ­ ella​-l­aicita). On
the connections between Badinter and Okin, see Bassel, Unveiling Agency.
70 Bracke, “From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays.’ ”
71 “De Islam is een achterlijke cultuur,” De Volkskrant, February 9, 2002. The
translation is by Sarah Bracke, in “From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays,’ ”
35.
72 Bracke, “Subjects of Debate,” 35.
73 As Sarah Bracke remarks, “It should be noted that this issue of Opzij was the
last one before the 2002 national elections, and hence, Dresselhuys’ decision
to dedicate her editorial column to clarify to her feminist readership why
Fortuyn could be a po­liti­cal ally is quite a strong po­liti­cal statement in itself ”
(“From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays,’ ” 238–239).
74 Dresselhuys, “Derde golf.”
75 Lutz, “Zonder blikken of blozen”; Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for
­Women?”
76 Bracke, “From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays,’ ” 242.

Notes to chapter 1  195

 77 Jolande Withuis is the author of numerous articles in Opzij on Muslim
­women’s lack of emancipation. Nahed Selim is the author of the 2003 book
De vrouwen van de profeet: Hoe vrouw(on)vriendelijk is de islam? (The wives
of the Prophet: How misogynistic is Islam?). See Prins and Saharso, “In the
Spotlight”; De Leeuw and Van Wichelen, “ ‘Please, Go Wake Up!’ ”
78 zami is a platform for black, mi­grant, and refugee ­women (see www​.­zami​
.­nl). Al Nisa is an organ­ization for “self-­conscious Muslim ­women” as
described on the website (www​.­alnisa​.­nl). Both zami and Al Nisa have or­
ga­nized and sponsored numerous initiatives debating the role of Muslim
­women in Dutch society.
79 Outshoorn and Oldersma, “Dutch Decay,” 182–183.
80 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem.”
81 Of course, the mobilization of gender equality against Islam dates back at
least to the occupation of Algeria and then to the involvement of French
feminist suffragettes in the civilizing mission in the colonies. See Scott, Poli-
tics of the Veil; Boggio Éwanjé-­Épée and Magliani-­Belkacem, Les féministes
blanches et l’empire; MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation.’ ”
82 It is worth noting that Chenier was the director of the Creil school that
expelled the girls in 1989. See Scott, Politics of the Veil.
83 Although the law bans all religious symbols, it has been widely interpreted
and discussed as a ­legal mea­sure meant to prevent Muslim girls in par­tic­u­lar
from wearing the veil. See Scott, Politics of the Veil.
84 Tissot, “Excluding Muslim ­Women.”
85 Farris, “From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question”; Scott, Politics of
the Veil. As Shield notes, it is insuffici tly acknowledged “that Le Pen voters
have been critical in determining the outcome of ­every presidential election
in France since 1988” (Shields, “Marine Le Pen and the ‘New’ fn ,” 184). On
the other hand, Scott argues that “it would be a ­mistake to blame the hostil-
ity to headscarves entirely on the influence of Jean-­Marie Le Pen. While
­there is no doubt that the popularity of his anti-­immigrant stance has forced
the mainstream parties of the right and left o try to coopt his message, t­ here
is also no doubt that Le Pen taps into a set of racist attitudes with deep roots
in French history. What some have referred to as ‘Islamophobia’ antedates
not only the attacks of September 11 and the war on terrorism but also the
Algerian War” (Scott, Politics of the Veil, 410).
86 “Profs, ne capitulons pas!,” Le Nouvel Observateur, November 2, 1989. My
translation from French.
87 “Le magazine Elle lance un appel contre le voile,” Elle, December 5, 2003.
Other signatories include Julia Kristeva, Élisabeth Roudinesco, Isabelle
Adjani, Sonia Rykiel, Isabelle Huppert, and Emmanuelle Béart.
88 Gerin Report, “Assemblée Nationale, N. 2262.”

196 Notes to chapter 1
 89 Gerin Report, “Assemblée Nationale, N. 2262,” 335. My translation from
French.
90 See page 21 of the pdf, “La revue du droit de choisir,” available at http://­www​
.­prochoix​.­org​/­pdf​/­prochoix​.­25​.­interieur​.­pdf (accessed January 15, 2014). In
an interview with the magazine Marianne, the leader of the Front de Gauche,
Jean-­Luc Mélenchon, criticized the candidacy for the far-­left ouveau Parti
Anticapitaliste in the 2010 regional elections of Ilham Moussaid, a Muslim
­woman who wears a head­scarf. In his words, “Po­liti­cal debate ­mustn’t take place
on religious ground. Someone who takes part in an election must represent
every­body and not only ­those whose religious convictions she shares.” See
“Mélenchon: La candidate voilée du npa relève du racolage,” February 4,
2010, available at http://­www​.­marianne​.­net​/­Melenchon​-­la​-­candidate​-­voilee​
-­du​-­NPA​-­releve​-­du​-­racolage​_­a184635​.­html (accessed October 25, 2013).
91 Delphy, Classer, dominer.
92 Dorlin, “Pas en notre nom!,” available at http://­www​.­genreenaction​.­net​/­Pas​
-­en​-­notre​-­nom​.­html (accessed August 22, 2016).
93 Bouteldja, “De la cérémonie du dévoilement à Alger (1958) à Ni Putes Ni
Soumises,” June 20, 2007, available at http://­lmsi​.­net​/­De​-­la​-­ceremonie​-­du​
-­devoilement​-­a; Tissot, “Bilan d’un féminisme d’État,” February 1, 2008,
available at http://­lmsi​.­net​/­Bilan​-­d​-­un​-­feminisme​-­d​-­Etat (accessed Octo-
ber 25, 2013); Boggio Éwanjé-­Épée and Magliani-­Belkacem, Les féministes
blanches et l’empire; Larzillière and Sal, “Comprendre l’instrumentalisation
du féminisme à des fi s racistes pour resister.”
94 Mazur, “­Women’s Policy Agencies, ­Women’s Movements and a Shifting Po­
liti­cal Context.”
95 See the websites for Mamans Toutes Égales, available at http://­www​.­mamans​
-­toutes​-­egales​.­com/ (accessed October 20, 2014), and for Collectif Féministes
pour l’Égalité, available at http://­www​.­cfpe2004​.­fr​/­intervention​-­de​-­hanane​
-­karimi​-­en​-­tant​-­que​-­porte​-­parole​-d ­ e​-f­ emmes​-d ­ ans​-l­a​-­mosquee​-­lors​-­de​-­l​
-­atelier​-­femmes​-­religion​-­et​-­emancipation/ (accessed October 23, 2014).
96 See the November 14, 2003, declaration on the application of the princi­ple
of secularism in France by Nicole Ameline: http://­discours​.­vie​-­publique​.­fr​
/­notices​/­0 4300000 7​.­html (accessed October 21, 2015).
97 ­After the news about the court victory of Fatima Afi , a Muslim ­woman who
had been sacked in 2008 by the “Baby Loup” crèche in the Paris suburb of Yve-
lines when she refused to take off er Muslim veil at work, Minister of W ­ omen’s
Rights Najat Vallaud-­Belkacem commented that “the princi­ple of secularism
­doesn’t stop at the door of a crèche.” She suggested that a new law was necessary
to uphold veil bans in private workplaces. See “Vallaud-­Belkacem: ‘La laïcité ne
doit pas s’arrêter à la porte des creches,’ ” March 20, 2013, available at http://­www​
.­liberation​.f­ r​/­societe​/2­ 013​/0­ 3​/­20​/­baby​-l­oup​-­la​-­laicite​-­ne​-­doit​-p
­ as​-­s-​ ­arreter​-­a​-­la​
-­porte​-­des​-c­ reches​_­889944 (accessed January 15, 2015).

Notes to chapter 1  197

 98 Larzillière and Sal, “Comprendre l’instrumentalisation du féminisme à des
fi s racistes pour resister.”
99 Hamel, “De la racialization du sexisme au sexisme identitaire,” 98.
100 Lanfranco and Di Rienzo, Senza velo, 19.
101 See “Laicità e fondamentalismo,” available at http://­www​.­iniziativalaica​.­it​/­​?­p​
=­22095 (accessed November 1, 2015).
102 Barbara Spinelli, “Il velo della discordia,” La Stampa, October 26, 2003, avail-
able at http://­www​.­archiviolastampa​.­it​/­component​/­option,com​_­lastampa​
/­task,search​/­mod,perdata​/­action,viewer​/­Itemid,3​/­page,1​/­articleid,0174​_0­ 1​
_­2003​_­0294​_­000 1​_­1225314/ (accessed November 18, 2013).
103 See http://­www​.­udinazionale​.­org​/­2009​/­113​-­burqa​-­e​-­patriarcato​-­da​-­una​-­legge​
-­italiana​-­ad​-­oxford​.­html (accessed November 17, 2013).
104 Salih, “Muslim ­Women.”
105 Stano, Sotto il velo dei media.
106 See Pollastrini’s declarations in “Bufera sul burqa,” Corriere della Sera, Octo-
ber 9, 2007, available at http://­www​.­corriere​.­it​/­politica​/­0 7​_­ottobre​_­09​/­burqa​
_­reazioni​.­shtml (accessed January 7, 2015).
107 See Pollastrini, “Bufera sul burqa.”
108 See http://­pariopportunita​.­gov​.­it​/­index​.­php​/­primo​-­piano​/­1230​-­carfagna​
-­lnelle​-­moschee​-­si​-­predichi​-­in​-­italianor (accessed December 10, 2012).
109 See the Giovani Musulmani d’Italia website, available at http://­
giovanimusulmani​.­it/ (accessed December 10, 2012).
110 See the ordering page for the Qader book, available at http://­www​.­sonzogno​
editori​.­it​/­component​/­marsilio​/­libro​/­4541460​-­porto​-­il​-­velo​-­adoro​-­i​-­queen
(accessed December 10, 2014).
111 See Bonfi lioli et al., La Straniera Lidia, Sabelli, “Sessualità, razza, classe e
migrazioni nella costruzione dell’italianità”; Vanzan, La storia velata.
112 Western supremacy defi es the perspective according to which “western
princi­ples” and the “western civilization” constitute a type of universal
truth that marks the superiority of the West over the rest of the world.
Most recently and prominently, this perspective was put forward by Samuel
Huntington in his 1996 book The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of
the World Order. Bessis defi es western supremacy as the “ability to produce
universals, to raise them to the level of absolutes, and to violate in an ex-
traordinarily systematic way the princi­ples that it derives from them, while
still feeling the need to develop theoretical justifi ations for t­ hose violations.
The planetary rich of its hegemony, together with the dogged attempt to
justify itself over the centuries by means of a sophisticated cultural apparatus
in which universality is constantly evoked, constitutes a twofold specific ty”
(Bessis, Western Supremacy, 5). According to Bonnett, western suprema-
cism emerged in the context of the crisis of whiteness at the beginning of the
twentieth ­century in Australia and Britain. See Bonnett, “From the Crisis of
Whiteness to Western Supremacism.”

198 Notes to chapter 1
 113 Female vote: Bartlett et al., “Pop­u­lism in Eu­rope”; Mayer, “From Jean-­Marie
to Marine Le Pen”; Akkerman and Hagelund, “ ‘­Women and ­Children
First!’ ”; Towns et al., “Equality Conundrum.” Culture “clash”: Roggeband
and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are a Prob­lem,”
285.
114 Roggeband and Verloo, “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated, Mi­grant ­Women Are
a Prob­lem,” 285.
115 I borrow the notion of “rescue narratives” from Bracke’s work on the simi-
larities and differences between feminist and gay politics in the context of
discussions on post-1989 multiculturalism in the Netherlands. See Bracke,
“From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays.’ ”
116 Abu-­Lughod, Do Muslim ­Women Need Saving?

2. Femonationalism Is No Pop­u­lism

1 For instance, Albertazzi and McDonnell, in Twenty-­First ­Century Pop­u­lism,

consider so-­called populist parties’ emphasis on the values of equality as one
of the ele­ments that differentiate them from fascist parties. A prominent ex-
ample ­here is usually the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands. Its insistence
on ­women and gay rights alongside anti-­immigration slogans is regarded as
an instance of con­temporary populist politics.
2 Tarchi, “Pop­u­lism Italian Style”; Taguieff, L’illusion populiste; Vossen, “Pop­u­
lism in the Netherlands ­after Fortuyn”; Albertazzi and McDonnell, Twenty-­
First ­Century Pop­u­lism; Zaslove, Re-­Invention of the Eu­ro­pean Radical Right.
3 Albeit stemming from an analy­sis of left ­wing pop­u­lism in Latin Amer­i­ca,
Laclau explic­itly applied his defin tion of pop­u­lism also to right-­wing parties
in Eu­rope such as the fn and the pvv. See Laermans, “On Populist Politics
and Parliamentary Paralysis.”
4 Betz, Radical Right-­Wing Pop­u­lism in Western Eu­rope; P. Norris, Radical
Right.
5 Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, 26.
6 Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.
7 Betz, Radical Right-­Wing Pop­u­lism in Western Eu­rope; Mudde, “Populist
Zeitgeist”; Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times; Dézé, “Le pop­u­lisme
ou l’introuvable Cendrillon,” 185.
8 Dézé, “Le pop­u­lisme ou l’introuvable Cendrillon,” 179. My translation from
French.
9 In the 1970s and 1980s Murray Davis published two articles—­“That’s In­ter­
est­ing!” (1971) and “ ‘That’s Classic!’ ” (1986)—in which he illustrated the
“­recipe” for a successful social theory. The work of Davis has been recently
used by Kathy Davis to account for the fortunes of the open-­ended concept
of intersectionality in gender studies. Cf. K. Davis, “Intersectionality as
Buzzword.”

Notes to chapter 2  199

 10 Jacques Rancière, “Non, le peuple n’est pas une masse brutale et ignorante,”
Liberation, January 3, 2011. My translation from French. On the centrality of
charisma to con­temporary populist parties, see also Van Herwaarden, For-
tuyn, chaos en charisma; Eatwell, “Charisma and the Revival of the Eu­ro­pean
Extreme Right.” See also Remo Bodei, “Pop­u­lismo lo spettro che si aggira per
il mondo,” La Repubblica, November 12, 2003.
11 Weber characterized charisma as a type of “extraordinary and revolutionary”
force that questions and breaks with bureaucratic forces. Cf. Weber, Economy
and Society.
12 Albertazzi and McDonnell, Twenty-­First ­Century Pop­u­lism, 33.
13 Hermet, Les pop­u­lismes dans le monde.
14 Berezin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, 8.
15 Mény and Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge.
16 Albertazzi and McDonnell, Twenty-­First ­Century Pop­u­lism, 3.
17 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Eu­rope.
18 Albertazzi and McDonnell, Twenty-­First ­Century Pop­u­lism, 123.
19 Albertazzi, “Switzerland.”
20 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 74.
21 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 117.
22 Laclau, “Pop­u­lism: What’s in a Name?”, 43.
23 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 231.
24 Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” 555.
25 Schmitt, Concept of the Po­liti­cal, 26. For a reading of the Schmittian dimen-
sions of Laclau, see A. Norris, “Ernesto Laclau and the Logic of the Po­liti­cal.”
26 Žižek, “Against the Populist Temptation,” 553.
27 Laclau articulates this issue as follows: “The po­liti­cal is linked to what could
be called contingent articulation, another name for the dialectic between dif-
ferential and equivalential logics. In this sense, all antagonism is essentially
po­liti­cal. In that case, however, the po­liti­cal is not linked to a regional type of
confli t dif­fer­ent from, for instance, the economic one. Why? For two main
reasons. The fi st is that demands that put a state of aff irs into question do
not grow spontaneously out of the logic of the latter, but consist in a break
with it. A demand for higher wages does not derive from the logic of cap­i­
tal­ist relations, but interrupts that logic in terms that are alien to it, ­those of
a discourse concerning justice, for example. So any demand presupposes a
constitutive heterogeneity—it is an event that breaks with the logic of a situ-
ation. Th s is what makes such a demand a po­liti­cal one. In the second place,
however, this heterogeneity of the demand vis-­à-­vis the existing situation
­will rarely be confi ed to a specific c ntent; it ­will, from the very beginning,
be highly overdetermined. The request for a higher level of wages in terms of
justice ­will be rooted in a wider sense of justice linked to a variety of other
situations. In other words, ­there are no pure subjects of change; they are
always overdetermined through equivalential logics. Th s means that po­liti­

200  Notes to chapter 2

 cal subjects are always, in one way or another, popu­lar subjects. And ­under
the conditions of globalized capitalism, the space of this overdetermination
clearly expands” (Laclau, On Populist Reason, 231–232).
28 Ahmed, “Feminism, Colonialism and Islamophobia.”
29 “What could, then, be massively evident in . . . ​this philosophy of merciless
war, in this staging of ‘physical’ killing, in this implacable logic of absolute
hostility, what should be massively evident but goes as unnoticed as absence
itself, what dis­appears in becoming indiscernible in the ­middle of the desert,
is the ­woman or the ­sister. . . . ​If the ­woman does not even appear in the
theory of the partisan—­that is, in the theory of the absolute ­enemy—if she
never leaves a forced clandestinity, such an invisibility, such a blindness,
gives food for thought: what if the ­woman ­were the absolute partisan? And
what if she ­were the absolute ­enemy of this theory of the absolute ­enemy,
the spectre of hostility to be conjured up for the sake of the sworn b ­ rothers,
or the other of the absolute ­enemy who has become the absolute ­enemy that
would not even be recognized in a regular war?” (Derrida, Politics of Friend-
ship, 155–157).
30 Orozco, “ ‘Der totale Staat aus Schwäche,’ ” 81. My translation from German.
A similar reading of Schmitt’s concept of the po­liti­cal in relation to his con-
struction of masculinity was proposed by Nicolaus Sombart (Sombart, Die
deutsche Männer und ihre Feinde) within a psychoanalytical framework. For
a distinctive refl ction on the masculine foundation of modern politics, see
Brown, Manhood and Politics.
31 For an analy­sis of the economic dimension of the depiction of Muslims and
immigrants as enemies in con­temporary western Eu­rope, see in par­tic­u­lar
Basso, Razze schiave e razze signore, and Basso, Razzismo di stato.
32 Dézé, “Le pop­u­lisme ou l’introuvable Cendrillon,” 189, my emphasis and my
translation from French.
33 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Eu­rope, 30.
34 Th s is something that Balibar also alluded to when arguing that nationalism,
in its emphasis upon the commonality of interests within a national body
and therefore in its denial of difference and social inequalities, possesses a
populist ele­ment. See Balibar, “Is ­There a ‘Neo-­Racism’?”
35 McClintock, “No Longer in a ­Future Heaven,” 89.
36 Cf. Comma 18, art. 19 of the law 2/2009, available at http://­www​.­parlamento​
.­it​/­parlam​/­leggi​/­0900 21​.­htm (accessed March 2, 2013).
37 See the website of the Front National: http://­www​.­frontnational​.­com​/­le​
-­projet​-­de​-­marine​-­le​-­pen​/­avenir​-­de​-­la​-­nation​/­famille/ (accessed August 23,
2014).
38 See the interview with the Dutch newspaper Volkskrant in which he calls for
a halt to the “Muslim tsunami”: http://­www​.­volkskrant​.­nl​/­vk​/­nl​/­2844​/­Archief​
/­archief​/­article​/­detail​/­795840​/­2006​/­11​/1­ 8​/G
­ EERT​-­WILDERS​-­PVV​-­lsquo​-­De​
-­tsunami​-­van​-­de​-­islamisering​-­stoppen​-­rsquo​.­dhtml (accessed August 23,

Notes to chapter 2  201

 2014). ­After an extended trial in which he was denounced for promoting reli-
gious hatred against Muslims, a Dutch court acquitted the charges in 2011.
39 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation.
40 Reported as a slogan in the pvv ’s 2010–2015 program “De agenda van hoop
en optimism: Een tijd om te kiezen: pvv 2010–2015,” available at http://­www​
.­ans​-­online​.­nl​/­wp​-­content​/­themes​/­mimbo​/­images​/­vppvv​.­pdf (accessed Janu-
ary 10, 2014).
41 See the fn website: http://­www​.­frontnational​.­com​/­le​-­projet​-­de​-­marine​
-­le​-­pen​/­autorite​-­de​-­letat​/­immigration/ (accessed February 3, 2012).
See the pvv website: http://­www​.­pvv​.­nl​/­images​/­stories​/­Webversie​
_­VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV​.­pdf (accessed February 3, 2012).
42 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation; Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality.
43 See Cusack and Breathnach-­Lynch, Art, Nation and Gender; Leone, “È di
scena l’Italia”; Landes, Visualizing the Nation.
44 Leone, “È di scena l’Italia.”
45 Though widespread, this interpretation is not, however, unanimously shared.
For instance, George Mosse argues that w ­ omen as national symbols embodied
“the motherly qualities of the nation, and pointed to its traditions and history.
Such feminine images usually wore ancient dress, looking backward, like Ger-
mania, Britannia, or even Marianne, who ­after the revolution was for the most
part matronly in appearance. They ­were not usually dependent upon changes
in the nation itself, monarchical or republican, and represented through their
constant visual presence the ancient values that the nation was supposed to
hold dear. Thus even if Marianne was rejected for a short time ­because of her
association with revolution, she was soon back in ­favor. To be sure, ­woman as
a public symbol also exemplifi d normative social values through her sedate
appearance and passive posture. . . . ​­Woman as a public symbol was a reminder
of the past, of innocence and chastity” (Mosse, Image of Man, 8–9).
46 See Tamar Pitch, “Il corpo delle donne non è della Nazione,” Il Manifesto,
February 26, 2011.
47 B. Anderson, ­Imagined Communities.
48 Pitch, “Il corpo delle donne non è della Nazione.” My translation from
Italian.
49 McClintock, “No Longer in a ­Future Heaven,” 91 (emphasis in the ­original).
50 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation, 27.
51 Affeldt, “Paroxysm of Whiteness”; Eckerson, “Immigration and National
Origins.”
52 Kandiyoti, “Identity and Its Discontents,” 429.
53 McClintock, “No Longer in a ­Future Heaven.”
54 Pitch, “Il corpo delle donne non è della Nazione.”
55 Mosse, Image of Man, 6.
56 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 26.

202 Notes to chapter 2
 57 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 26.
58 Muel-­Dreyfus, Vichy and the Eternal Feminine.
59 Ipsen, Dictating Demography.
60 Moghadam, Gender and National Identity, 12. For an overview of dif­fer­ent
interpretations of the theme of ­women and the nation, see Jayawardena,
Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World; Ivekovic, “­Women, National-
ism and War”; and Kaplan, Alarcon, and Moallem, Between ­Woman and
Nation.
61 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation.
62 Though the idea that nationalist ideologies based on ideas of Volksnation
are racist is uncontroversial, I agree with Nira Yuval-­Davis when she claims
that any type of nationalism, insofar as it entails a delineation of bound­aries
between dif­fer­ent ­peoples, contains ele­ments of racism. For a discussion on
dif­fer­ent types of nationalism and racism, see Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation.
63 Hernton, Sex and Racism in Amer­i­ca; A. Davis, ­Women, Race and Class;
Braxton, ­Women, Sex and Race; Hamel, “De la racialization du sexisme au
sexisme identitaire”; Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks.
64 Mann and Selva, “Sexualization of Racism,” 170.
65 Hernton, Sex and Racism, 150.
66 See also Braxton, ­Women, Sex and Race.
67 Hernton, Sex and Racism, 9.
68 MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation’ ”; Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled.”
69 See MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation’ ”; Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled.”
70 Fanon, ­Dying Colonialism, 42.
71 Fanon, ­Dying Colonialism, 45.
72 Macdonald, “Muslim ­Women and the Veil,” 9.
73 B. Anderson, ­Imagined Communities.
74 Kovel, White Racism, 68.
75 Boggio Éwanjé-­Épée and Magliani-­Belkacem, Les féministes blanches et
l’empire; Scott, The Politics of the Veil; Hamel, “De la racialization du sexisme
au sexisme identitaire.” I also address some of ­these issues in my article
“From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question.”
76 In a speech on December 11, 2010, in Lyon, Marine Le Pen declared that “in
some areas, it is not good to be a ­woman or gay or Jewish, or even French or
white.”
77 Van Walsum, ­Family and the Nation; Bracke, “Subjects of Debate.”
78 Gert Oostindie argues that Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders ­were the only
politicians to oppose Afro-­Caribbean strug­gles for recognition ­because of
their links to the Dutch East Indies through their parents. See Oostindie,
Postcolonial Netherlands, 127.
79 See Stefani, Colonia per maschi; Spadaro, “Italian Empire ‘at Home’ ”; Papa,
Sotto altri cieli; Sòrgoni, Parole e corpi.

Notes to chapter 2  203

3. Integration Policies and the Institutionalization
of Femonationalism

1 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation.

2 In this and the next chapter I use the term “Eu­ro­pean” rather than “western
Eu­ro­pean” to refer to pro­cesses initiated by the Eu­ro­pean Commission at the
level of the Eu­ro­pean Union (eu). The eu has been the agent and context of
the civic integration policies. Furthermore, t­ hese policies have been imple-
mented at the eu level and apply to non-­eu citizens. Th s notwithstanding, the
focus of my analy­sis remains western Europe—­the Netherlands, France, and
Italy—as the context in which the application of civic integration policies takes
place. Furthermore, it could be argued that key western Eu­ropean countries
(Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) have been the driving
forces ­behind the pro­cess leading to the establishment of the civic integra-
tion policies across the eu . On this latter point, see Carrera and Wiesbrock,
“Civic Integration of Thi d-­Country Nationals.”
3 Th oughout this chapter I use the term “non-­eu /non-­western mi­grants”
to refer to mi­grants who are affected by civic integration policies. While in
all eu countries civic integration mea­sures are addressed to mi­grants from
outside the Eu­ro­pean Union, in some countries like the Netherlands ­these
policies explic­itly targeted non-­western mi­grants, that is, mi­grants who come
from outside the eu and the western world. Citizens from Australia, Canada,
Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, South ­Korea, the United States, and the Vati-
can City are in fact exempted from the Dutch Civic Integration Abroad exam
at the time of writing.
4 For the Netherlands, see, for instance, Kirk, “Embodied Enlightenment”;
Suvarieriol, “Nation-­Freezing”; Roggeband, “Victim‐Agent Dilemma”; Wilton,
“Promoting Equality?”; Bonjour and Hart, “Proper Wife, a Proper Marriage”;
Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?”; Van Den Berg and
Duyvendak, “Paternalizing ­Mothers”; Mepschen et al., “Sexual Politics, Ori-
entalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands.” For France, see
Bonjour and Lettinga, “Po­liti­cal Debates on Islamic Headscarves”; Mullally,
“Civic Integration, Mi­grant ­Women and the Veil”; Alaoui, “L’integration sous
condition”; Fassin and Mazouz, “Qu’est-ce que devenir français?”; É. Fassin,
“La démocratie sexuelle et le confl t des civilisations”; Lochak, “L’intégration
comme injonction.” For Italy, see Farris and Scrinzi, “Gender and the Racial-
ization of Mi­grant ­Women in the Lega Nord Ideology and Politics.”
5 Joppke, “Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 249.
6 Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 1–2.
7 Bertossi and Duyvendak, “National Models of Immigrant Integration”; Joppke,
“Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Eu­rope.”
8 Joppke, “Beyond National Models.”
9 Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 14.

204  Notes to chapter 3

 10 As Joppke puts it, “It would be misleading to interpret civic integration
­toward immigrants as a rebirth of nationalism or racism. ­These policies are
carefully observing the dividing line between ‘integration,’ which leaves the
ethical orientation of the mi­grant intact, and ‘assimilation,’ which does not”
(Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 14).
11 Joppke, “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Eu­rope,” 25.
12 Soysal, “Citizenship, Immigration, and the Eu­ro­pean Social Proj­ect,” 11.
13 Soysal, “Citizenship, Immigration, and the Eu­ro­pean Social Proj­ect.”
14 See, in par­tic­u­lar, Carrera and Wiesbrock, “Civic Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals”; Suvarieriol, “Nation-­Freezing”; Koopmans, “Post-­
Nationalization of Immigrant Rights”; Schain, “State Strikes Back.”
15 For a reading of the interconnections between nationalism and liberalism,
see Wallerstein, Modern World-­System IV. On this point see also the classical
study by Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class.
16 The term “third-­country national” denotes an individual who is neither from
the eu country in which he or she resides nor from an eu member-­state.
17 As Carrera and Wiesbrock demonstrate, certain member-­states, among them
the Netherlands, signifi antly influenced the discussion that took place in
the 2004 Council of the Eu­ro­pean Union. More specifi ally, “Austria, Ger-
many and the Netherlands managed to transfer to the eu level integration
policies and ­legal mea­sures existing in their respective national immigration
laws (or which ­were being debated in their parliaments) at the time of the
negotiations” (Carrera and Wiesbrock, “Civic Integration of Thi d-­Country
Nationals,” 9).
18 Council of the Eu­ro­pean Union, 2004, press release, available at http://­www​
.­consilium​.­europa​.­eu​/­uedocs​/­cms​_­data​/d
­ ocs​/p
­ ressdata​/e­ n​/j­ha​/­82745​.­pdf (ac-
cessed March 30, 2014).
19 cbp 10 and 11 are conceived as heuristics to better the coordination, realiza-
tion, mainstreaming, and evaluation of the overall framework.
20 Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands.”
21 They included postcolonial ethnic-­minority groups like Surinamese, Moluc-
cans, and Antilleans as well as groups that had settled during the post–­WWII
labor-­recruitment period like Moroccans and Turks.
22 Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands.”
23 Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands”; Entzinger, “Parallel
Decline of Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in the Netherlands.”
24 Bonjour and Lettinga, “Po­liti­cal Debates on Islamic Headscarves,” 269.
25 Van Walsum, ­Family and the Nation.
26 As Kirk explains, “­After 1998, the scope of inburgering policies ­were ex-
panded to include resident immigrants, in par­tic­u­lar the unemployed and
‘caring parents’ (i.e. ­mothers). ­Mothers and clergy (i.e. imams)—­who ­were
brought ­under the Win in 2001—­were seen as impor­tant target groups
­because of their role in integrating ­others. Just as immigrant related policies

Notes to chapter 3  205

 prior to the 1980s had been dif­fer­ent for dif­fer­ent ethnic groups, inburgering
came to mean dif­fer­ent ­things for dif­fer­ent social groups: immigrant cat-
egorisation was no longer based on ethnicity but on societal function” (Kirk,
“Gender and Integration in the Netherlands,” 102).
27 In order to prepare for the fi al exam mi­grants have to follow civic integra-
tion courses on the Dutch language and Dutch society. Th s part constitutes
half of the content of the course and is common to all applicants. The other
half instead is more personalized and consists in choosing a “portfolio” dur-
ing registration. ­There are four portfolios available: work; education, health,
and upbringing; societal participation; and entrepreneurship. According to
Kirk and Suvarieriol, the fi st two are the most popu­lar (“Emancipating Mi­
grant ­Women?”).
28 The electronic practical exam consists of an interview with a computer in
which the immigrant is asked questions about Dutch society. Usually it
consists of forty-­three questions that have to be completed in one hour.
Seventy-­three ­percent have to be answered correctly. The civic component of
the test is also done through a computer. In forty-­five minutes applicants are
shown a number of short films, ­after which they have to answer 62 ­percent of
around forty-­three questions correctly in order to pass.
29 Kirk and Suvarierol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?”
30 Law of July 24, 2006, concerning immigration and integration.
31 Law N. 2007–1631, of November 20, 2007, on immigration, integration and
asylum, 270.
32 Chou and Baygert, “2006 French Immigration and Integration Law”; Bon-
jour and Lettinga, “Po­liti­cal Debates on Islamic Headscarves.”
33 In the French presidential elections of 2002 the candidate of the far-­right
National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, won over the socialist Lionel Jospin in
the fi st round, thereby making it to the run-­off lections together with the
candidate of the “Rally for the Republic,” Jacques Chirac. Though Chirac
eventually won the elections, the fact that a right-­wing nationalist party
like the National Front—­famous for its anti-­Semitic and racist propaganda
as well as for its dubious links with fascist organ­izations—­could reach the
second round was a ­great shock and marked the beginning of the rise of the
right in the country.
34 Fassin and Fassin, De la question sociale à la question raciale.
35 Gaspard, “Assimilation, Insertion, Intégration”; Sayad, “Qu’est ce que
l’intégration?”; Lochak, “L’intégration comme injonction.”
36 Scott, Politics of the Veil; Gaspard, “Assimilation, Insertion, Intégration.”
37 Scott, Politics of the Veil; Farris, “From the Jewish Question to the Muslim
Question.”
38 Einaudi, Le politiche dell’immigrazione in Italia dall’Unità a oggi.
39 Biondi Dal Monte and Vrenna, “L’accordo di integrazione ovvero
l’integrazione per legge.”

206  Notes to chapter 3

 40 Zincone, Secondo Rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia; Ambro-
sini and Colasanto, L’integrazione invisibile.
41 The concrete translation of ­these policies into national legislations thus
clearly reveals the fundamental asymmetry and “improbability” (Joppke,
“Beyond National Models,” 3) of assessing integration as a “two-­way” pro­cess
that inaugurates an (albeit imperfectly) inclusive turn in the eu ’s approach to
immigrants. Although the receiving society is in princi­ple asked to “accom-
modate” mi­grants, “The idea that something as complex and extensive as
the receiving society, a ‘society’ ­after all and not just ‘­people,’ should change
in response to the arrival of by nature numerically inferior ‘mi­grants’ is
unheard of ” (Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 3).
42 The concept of discourse within c da methodology refers to a “social practice”
that produces meanings by linking the linguistic and the societal level (in-
stitutions and social structures) (Fairclough and Wodak, “Critical Discourse
Analy­sis,” 258). In par­tic­u­lar, c da is interested in identifying the linkages
between (po­liti­cal) discourse and the ways in which such discourse produces
and reproduces power hierarchies, ideologies, and forms of domination.
43 Information on the procedure for the examination abroad and the self-­study
material is available at an apposite website: http://­www​.­naarnederland​.­nl​/­en​
/­the​-­examination​-­package (accessed March 18, 2014).
44 On ­these aspects, see Suvarierol, “Nation-­Freezing.”
45 Since in some countries it is illegal to possess movies showing scenes of nu-
dity, the movie Naar Nederland is also available in edited versions (without
the scenes but with full descriptions) in Dari, Moroccan Arabic, Pashto, Rus­
sian, Somali, Standard Arabic, Riff erber, Thai, Urdu, and Viet­nam­ese.
46 Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands,” 158.
47 In the 2000s w hen second-­generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants
married ­women from the countries of origin of their parents, rather than
Dutch ­women, this phenomenon was called “import brides,” as already men-
tioned in chapter 2. ­These ­unions ­were depicted as arranged marriages, and
­women ­were thus portrayed as victims of unwanted relationships.
48 Bonjour and de Hart, “Proper Wife, a Proper Marriage.”
49 Bonjour and de Hart, “Proper Wife, a Proper Marriage.”
50 Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?,” 8.
51 Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?”
52 Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?,” 24.
53 Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands,” 15; Van Den Berg and
Duyvendak, “Paternalizing ­Mothers.”
54 Lochak, “L’intégration comme injonction,” 7.
55 Law N. 2006–911 of July 24, 2006. The text of the law is available at
http://­w ww​.­legifrance​.­gouv​.­f r​/­affichTexte​.­do​?­cidTexte​=­JORFTEXT​
000000 266495&dateTexte​=­&categorieLien​=­id (accessed March 18,
2014).

Notes to chapter 3  207

 56 É. Fassin, “La démocratie sexuelle et le confl t des civilisations,” 128.
57 As of 2011 the booklet is no longer used; its content, however, is replicated in
a video, which is still used as introductory material, shown to newcomers at
ofii office
58 Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et des Migrations, Vivre en-
semble, en France, available at http://­www​.­ofi ​.­fr​/­s​_­integrer​_­en​_­france​_­47​
/­vivre​_­ensemble​_e­ n​_f­ rance​_4­ 99​.h
­ tml (accessed October 20, 2013).
59 I had the chance to watch this video during my participant observation at
the ofii office in ue de la Roquette in Paris in March 2013.
60 Chou and Baygert, “2006 French Immigration and Integration Law.”
61 Unlike in the Netherlands, however, training sessions and courses are pro-
vided to mi­grants for ­free and the residence permit is issued on the basis of
signing of the contract and attending the courses and sessions, rather than
through an evaluative exam. Nonattendance or noncompliance with the
contractual obligations (attending the sessions and, if needed, the language
course) can lead to the termination of the contract and to sanctions includ-
ing the mi­grant not being granted a permanent residence permit, or the
nonrenewal of the temporary permit and hence expulsion from the country.
During my participant observation at the Paris ofii office in ue de la
Roquette (March 2013), I was able to witness the functioning of the cai . The
contract is presented to immigrants during a half-­day session, which is held
in one of the ofii offices. uring the session, mi­grants are informed about
the purpose of the cai and the half-­day schedule and are shown a video
about French values and lifestyle, Vivre ensemble, en France. ­After the video,
a meeting takes place in which each mi­grant individually receives further
information on the contract, his or her language skills are evaluated through
a fi een-­minute multiple-­choice exam, his or her needs are assessed in terms
of skills and employability, and he or she is informed about the dates of the
courses and sessions (language courses, if applicable, a civic session, and a
session on life in France). Signing the contract binds the mi­grant to re­spect
the fundamental values of French society and to attend the language course
and the sessions. While the civic training course lasts six hours and consists
of a pre­sen­ta­tion regarding French institutions and values, the session con-
cerning life in France has the objective of equipping the cai signatory with
“suffici t knowledge” of practical life in terms of access to authorities and
ser­vices, particularly training, employment, housing, health, education, and
community life. Attendance at both civic training and the session about life
in France is confi med by means of attendance certifi ates released by the
ofii . At the end of the duration period of the cai , the ofii issues a certifi-
cate attesting to compliance or noncompliance with the cai requirements,
including evaluation and grades. The certifi ate is sent to the prefect of the
signatory mi­grant’s place of residence.

208 Notes to chapter 3
 62 In France, the immigrant ­family was initially the only target of the reception
platforms (plates-­formes d’accueil) developed in the 1990s. As I show, it is
now the object of a specific c ntractual formula (caif ).
63 Bonjour and de Hart, “Proper Wife, a Proper Marriage.”
64 See Elaine Sciolino, “Citing of Polygamy as a Cause of French Riots ­Causes
Uproar,” New York Times, November 17, 2005, available at http://­www​
.­nytimes​.­com​/­2005​/­11/​ ­17​/­international​/e­ urope​/1­ 7cnd​-f­ rance​.­html​?­​_­r​=­0 (ac-
cessed March 20, 2014).
65 See the website of the French Ministry of the Interior: http://­www​
.­immigration​.­interieur​.­gouv​.­fr​/­Accueil​-­et​-­accompagnement​/­Les​-­femmes​
-­immigrees​/­La​-­politique​-­d-​ ­integration​-­des​-f­ emmes​-i­ mmigrees (accessed
March 20, 2014).
66 Information drawn from an interview on October 3, 2013, with key respon-
dents in Piedmont—­that is, teachers in the “permanent territorial centers”
(centri territoriali permanenti)—in Turin.
67 Though this has been presented as the offi al video for the civic integra-
tion courses, some provinces and regions use other materials. For instance,
the Initiatives and Studies on Multi-­ethnicities Foundation (ismu), based in
Milan, prepared a series of specific ower­Point slides and materials.
68 Points 4 and 17 in the charter. My translation from Italian.
69 Point 18 in the charter. My translation from Italian.
70 Point 19 in the charter. My translation from Italian.
71 Point 26 in the charter. My translation from Italian.
72 Some provinces, however, refused to show it and used instead other materi-
als. See note 67.
73 As Foucault puts it, in the regime of disciplinary power, punishing is not
aimed at expiation or repression, but rather at normalization. “It refers
individual action to a ­whole that is at once a fi ld of comparison, a space of
differentiation and the princi­ple of a rule to be followed. . . . ​It mea­sures in
quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level,
the ‘nature’ of individuals. It introduces through this ‘value-­giving’ mea­
sure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces
the limit that ­will defi e difference in relation to all other differences. . . . ​In
short, it normalizes” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 182–183).
74 Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Eu­rope; Yuval-­Davis,
Gender and Nation; Moraga and Anzaldúa, This Bridge Called My Back.
75 For an analy­sis of the civic integration dimensions in the case of Muslim
­women, particularly in the French context, see Farris, “From the Jewish
Question to the Muslim Question.” It should also be noted that policies
targeting non-­eu /non-­western mi­grant families, and especially ­women,
expect them to comply with rules (dress codes, above all) whose obser-
vance is presented as the necessary road ­toward good integration and even

Notes to chapter 3  209

 ­ omen’s emancipation. By ­doing so, however, ­these policies require mi­grant
w
­women (Muslim in par­tic­u­lar) to be more equal than all other ­women; in
other words, as Morondo argues in “­Women’s Oppression and Face Veil
Bans,” ­these policies oblige them to adopt higher standards of compliance
with the princi­ple of gender equality than any other group of ­women equally
subjected to (western) patriarchal practices.
76 Alaoui, “L’intégration sous condition,” 130. My translation from French.
77 On the difference between race and gender as operators of po­liti­cal dis-
courses based on toleration and equality, see the illuminating essay by
Brown, “Tolerance and/or Equality?”
78 Joppke, “Role of the State in the Cultural Integration,” 4. The distinction
Joppke makes between cognitive and moral demands is related to his idea
that civic integration programs are fundamentally respecting the tenets of
Rawlsian liberalism, albeit being at risk of falling into a kind of Foucaldian
depiction of liberalism as repressive. Yet even when Joppke recognizes the
Foucaldian repressive dimensions of civic integration, he still maintains that
repression itself belongs to the history of liberalism, and therefore ­there is
no need to invoke nationalism and racism.
79 Joppke, “Role of the State in the Cultural Integration,” 4.
80 Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 3.
81 Spijkerboer, Inburgering en de fundamenten van het Nederlandse politieke
bestel; Kirk, “Gender and Integration in the Netherlands.”
82 In 2006 when he was the minister of Interior in de Villepin’s government,
Nicholas Sarkozy declared: “The fi st of mi­grants’ duty is to love the country
that welcomes them, and to re­spect its values and its laws. Other­wise, they
are not obliged to stay!” See Catherine Coroller, “Sarkozy s’addresse à ‘nos
compatriotes,’ ” Liberation, May 3, 2006, available at http://­www​.­liberation​
.­fr​/­politiques​/­0 10146981​-­sarkozy​-­s-​ ­adresse​-a­ ​-n
­ os​-c­ ompatriotes (accessed
March 20, 2014). See also Alaoui, “L’intégration sous condition.”
83 hci , “Le contrat et l’integration,” 43. My translation from French.
84 hci , “Le contrat et l’integration,” 46. My translation from French.
85 hci , “Le contrat et l’integration,” 46. My translation from French.
86 hci , “Le contrat et l’integration,” 45. My translation from French.
87 Büchler, “Islamic ­Family Law in Eu­rope?,” 208. In an article on sectarian
confli t and ­family law in Egypt, Saba Mahmood, for instance, questions
some well-­rooted assumptions regarding the genealogy of ­family codes in post-
colonial settings (in the ­Middle East in par­tic­u­lar). According to Mahmood,
the per­sis­tence of religious-­based ­family law in countries with majoritarian
Muslim populations has been considered mostly a sign of t­ hese populations’
backwardness and incomplete secularization, as well as the result of colonial
policies’ incapacity to interfere “in the religious aff irs of colonized p ­ eoples”
(“Sectarian Confli t and ­Family Law in Con­temporary Egypt,” 57). Yet,
she continues, ­these assumptions are fundamentally flawed. Indeed, it was

210 Notes to chapter 3
 precisely ­under colonization that religion, ­family issues, and sexuality ­were
relegated by colonial powers in the private sphere. “The privatization of t­ hese
aspects of social life . . . ​[meant that] they came to be increasingly regulated
by the centralized state and its vari­ous po­liti­cal rationalities (no longer
administered by local muftis, qadis, customary norms, and parochial moral
knowledges)” (58). In other words, ­under the modern colonial state, ­family
law became “one of the techniques of modern governance and sexual regula-
tion. ­Family law as a distinct ­legal domain is a modern invention that did not
exist in its pres­ent form in the premodern period” (58).
88 Andrez and Spire, “Droits des étrangers et statut personnel,” available at
http://­www​.­gisti​.­org​/­doc​/­plein​-­droit​/­51​/­statut​.­html (accessed March 3, 2014).
89 MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation,’ ” 94.
90 MacMaster, “Colonial ‘Emancipation,’ ” 106.
91 Scott, Politics of the Veil; Delphy, Classer, dominer.
92 Miriam Ticktin, in “Sexual Vio­lence as the Language of Border Control,” has
analyzed the growing focus on sexual vio­lence and ­women’s rights within
French mi­grant communities throughout the 2000s, c laiming that this focus
is the expression of the nation-­state’s desire to reinforce its bound­aries by
reframing issues of gender and sexuality as prob­lems of security. Within
this frame, ­women’s rights are treated as the litmus test for defini g who is
excluded from the nation—­namely, non-­French, Arab males—­and for justi-
fying a stricter politics of border controls.
93 Roggeband, “Victim‐Agent Dilemma.”
94 In Rita Verdonk’s words, “Failed integration can lead to marginalisation and
segregation as a result of which ­people can turn their back on society and
fall back on antiquated norms and values, making them susceptible to the
influence of a small group inclined to extremism and terrorism. . . . ​Ongoing
radicalization implies the real risk that non-­integrated aliens ­will take an
anti-­western stance and ­will assail fundamental values and norms generally
accepted in western Society such as equality of men and ­women, non-­
discrimination of homosexuals and freedom of expression” (quoted in van
Walsum, ­Family and the Nation, 6).
95 Van Walsum, ­Family and the Nation, 6.
96 Van Walsum, ­Family and the Nation, 7.
97 Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire.
98 It should be noted that during colonial times some Eu­ro­pean feminists ac-
tively took part in the civilizing missions aiming at “emancipating” colonized
­women from their seemingly backward practices. Their involvement in t­ hese
civilizing campaigns was due both to Eu­ro­pean suffragettes fundamentally
sharing some of the most racist and sexist preconceptions about non-­
European cultures as primitive and patriarchal. However, ­these feminists
also embraced the civilizing campaigns ­because in this way they expected to
benefit from the contradictions that the mobilization of gender equality in

Notes to chapter 3  211

 the colonies opened up in the metropoles, where ­women ­were still denied
the right to vote. Famously, in 1908 the British feminist Christabel Pankhurst
argued that British ­women’s disenfranchised status was the sign of imperial
decay: only the concession of the vote to British ­women before its conces-
sion to the “less civilized ­people” in the colonies would prove the greatness
and enlightenment of British society (Burton, “White ­Woman’s Burden,”
304). Similarly, in France the suffragettes around the feminist newspaper
La Française in the 1930s demanded “the vote as compensation for [French
­women’s] good deeds in the colonial setting” (Boittin, “Feminist Mediations
of the Exotic,” 137).
99 For a compelling treatment of the theme of allegiance pledging and national-
ity law, specifi ally applied to the Australian case, but with strong transna-
tional signifi ance, see Jenkins, “Pledging Allegiance.”
1 00 Lochak, “L’intégration comme injonction”; Jenkins, “Pledging Allegiance.”
101 Yuval-­Davis, Gender and Nation.
102 Carrera and Wiesbrock, “Civic Integration of Thi d-­Country Nationals,” 1.
103 Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form.”
104 Goswami, “Rethinking the Modular Nation Form,” 785 (my emphasis).
105 In this, I share Neil Davidson’s impor­tant argument according to which “na-
tionalism is the necessary ideological corollary of capitalism. The cap­i­tal­ist
class in its constituent parts has a continuing need to retain territorial home
bases for their operations. Why? Capitalism is based on competition, but
cap­i­tal­ists want competition to take place on their terms; they do not want
to suffer the consequences if they lose. In one sense then, they want a state to
ensure that they are protected from ­these consequences—in other words,
they require from a state more than simply providing an infrastructure; they
need it to ensure that effects of competition are experienced as far as pos­si­ble
by someone ­else. A global state could not do this; indeed, in this re­spect it
would be the same as having no state at all. For if every­one is protected then
no-­one is: unrestricted market relations would prevail, with all the risks that
entails. The state therefore has to have limits, has to be able to distinguish
between ­those who ­will receive its protection and ­those who ­will not.” See
Davidson, “Nationalism and Neoliberalism.”
106 Joppke, “Immigrants and Civic Integration in Western Eu­rope,” 25.
107 Joppke, “Beyond National Models,” 3.
108 Jung, “Racial Unconscious of Assimilation Theory,” 391.

4. Femonationalism, Neoliberalism, and Social Reproduction

1 Bracke, “From ‘Saving ­Women’ to ‘Saving Gays,’ ” 248. See Boggio Éwanjé-­
Épée and Magliani-­Belkacem, Les féministes blanches et l’empire, 15, for
France; and Salih, “Muslim W
­ omen, Fragmented Secularism and the Construc-
tion of Interconnected ‘Publics’ in Italy.” According to Boggio Éwanjé-­Épée

212 Notes to chapter 3
 and Magliani-­Belkacem, authors of a compelling critique that places what
they call French feminism’s “white supremacy” in historical perspective, the
convergence between some feminists and con­temporary anti-­Islam positions
is a strategic one: “If some feminists can contribute to a racist or imperial-
ist politics, that is ­because they have captured the strategic opportunities to
advance their demands by taking advantage of an opening offered by the
racist system” (15). Joan W. Scott’s detailed critical reconstruction of French
feminists’ positions in the affair du voile outlines the contours of the conver-
gence between feminists and anti-­Islam po­liti­cal forces as one based on their
endorsement of French republicanism: “It is the power of their unconscious
identifi ation with the republican proj­ect—­their own ac­cep­tance of the
psy­chol­ogy of denial—­that led many [feminists] to unequivocally condemn
the headscarf/veil as a violation of ­women’s rights and to talk as if the status
of ­women in France ­were not a prob­lem at all” (Scott, Politics of the Veil,
172–173). Christine Delphy describes the convergence between feminists
in ­favor of the antiveil law and French racist politics as what I take to be a
type of sacrific al alignment. By contrasting antisexism and antiracism, and
positioning them as strug­gles that cannot be reconciled, Delphy argues,
certain feminists have chosen the former at the expense of the latter: “raciste
peut-­être, mais ne pas oublier les femmes,” ­these feminists seemingly utter
(Delphy, Classer, domineer, 193). Fi­nally, the sociologist Sylvie Tissot points
to what could be called a conjunctural convergence between the xenophobic
turn of French immigration policies in the years following the antiveil law
and what she calls “state feminism,” that is, anti-­Islam feminist organ­izations
that have been integrated into the state apparatuses as the offi al voices of
­women’s rights. She takes stock of a rather gloomy situation, arguing that
“feminism has thus become one of the ‘meta­phors for racism’: it feeds racist
repre­sen­ta­tions and practices, but in a euphemized way that make racism
‘respectable’ ” (Tissot, “Bilan d’un féminisme d’État,” 16).
2 A few exceptions are works by Hester Eisenstein and Elizabeth Bern­stein,
though focused on the United States. With an eye on the global context
in which ­women’s rights have become the new lingua franca of neoliberal
and conservative politics, the US socialist feminist scholar Hester Eisen-
stein details both the endorsement by US “mainstream feminists” of racist
and Islamophobic agendas, and the ways in which US neoliberalism used
a feminist rhe­toric to further capital accumulation in the Global South.
First, Eisenstein understands mainstream feminists’ support for racist
and Islamophobic platforms in terms of the re-­proposition of “imperial
feminism”: that is, a form of feminism that serves the American empire by
participating in its neo­co­lo­nial logic. Second, she attempts to decipher the
appropriation of feminist themes by neoliberals and conservatives in their
crusades against Muslims and mi­grants in terms of their cap­i­tal­ist interests:
“Feminist inspired gender ideology is used to enforce the idea of western

Notes to chapter 4  213

 cultural superiority, and thus to facilitate the penetration of multinational
corporations into the pre­industrial areas of the world” (Eisenstein, Femi-
nism Seduced, 196). Eisenstein thus connects the deployment of mainstream
feminism—­understood as an individualist/liberal ideology—as a “solvent
of traditional cultures.” That is, neoliberals brandish feminist ideas in the
Global South in order to destabilize previous gender ­orders, create pos-
sessive individualist subjects, and thus make the penetration of cap­i­tal­ist
production and consumption patterns easier to establish. With a specifi
focus on the encounter between abolitionist feminists, evangelical Chris-
tians, and conservative as well as liberal government offi als in the United
States who fi ht sex trafficking in the name of w ­ omen’s rights, Elizabeth
Bern­stein coined the term “carceral feminism.” Th s term describes anti-
trafficking feminists’ transmutation of gender justice into criminal justice
and conservative Christians’ deployment of a feminist-­friendly rhe­toric
against sex work. According to Bern­stein, the convergence of feminism and
conservative religious groups on the theme of sex work as “modern-­day
slavery” has been pos­si­ble thanks to two con­temporary shifts aking place
in each camp: “the feminist shift rom a focus on bad men inside the home
to bad men outside the home, and the shift f a new generation of evangeli-
cal Christians from a focus on sexually improper w ­ omen (as prior concerns
with abortion suggest) to a focus on sexually dangerous men” (Bern­stein,
Temporarily Yours, 66). Just as abolitionist feminists claim to rescue female
victims of gender vio­lence and trafficking by demanding stricter penalties
and prison for perpetrators, evangelical Christians claim to save w ­ omen
from “modern-­day slavery” by adopting the language of ­women’s rights and
a distorted idea of social justice as law and order. In both cases, the rescue
of w
­ omen amounts to the commitment to a state-­sponsored agenda of mass
incarcerations and criminalization of (often non-­white/non-­western) “dan-
gerous” males. Similar to Eisenstein in certain ways, Bern­stein also links
evangelical Christian groups’ antitrafficking obsession to their business in
the Global South. In countries like Thailand and China, Bern­stein notices,
evangelical Christians have put the “rescued” ­women to work in jewelry-­
making proj­ects where they are micromanaged and forced to convert to and
to practice Chris­tian­ity in order to retain their salary.
3 Though in this book I concentrate on care, domestic, and cleaning work, I
endorse the defin tion of social reproduction proposed by Barbara Laslett
and Johanna Brenner to refer to the “activities and attitudes, be­hav­iors and
emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the main-
tenance of life on a daily basis, and intergen­er­a­tion­ally.” See Laslett and
Brenner, “Gender and Social Reproduction,” 383. ­These activities can be paid
or unpaid. Since the end of the 2000s ­there has been a growing interest in
theories of social reproduction, both among a new generation of Marxist
feminists, and among migration and care scholars. For a reconstruction of

214 Notes to chapter 4
 the debate in Marxist feminism, see Arruzza, “Functionalist, Determinist,
Reductionist”; S. Ferguson, “Canadian Contributions to Social Reproduc-
tion Feminism”; and Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of ­Women. For a
discussion of the notion of social reproduction within gender and migration
studies, see Kofman and Raghuram, Gendered Migrations and Global Social
Reproduction.
4 For a discussion on the dif­fer­ent uses of the concept of “performative contra-
diction,” see Habermas, “Discourse Ethics”; Jay, “Debate over Performative
Contradiction”; and Butler, “Competing Universalities.”
5 Butler, “Competing Universalities.”
6 Black feminist thought associated with intersectionality in par­tic­u­lar has
elaborated at length on the forms of racial discrimination that w ­ omen of
color face in the public sphere and work market. On intersectionality theory,
see Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”; Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought;
hooks, Feminist Theory.
7 Exceptions are constituted by the work of Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipat-
ing Mi­grant ­Women?,” on the neoliberal features of civic integration pro-
grams in the Netherlands and by the work of Camille Gourdeau, “Des usages
contradictoires du Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration,” in France.
8 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 2.
9 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 2.
10 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­Country
Nationals,” 2.
11 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 3. The other pressing challenges include increasing risks
of social exclusion; gaps in educational achievement; and public concerns
about the lack of integration of mi­grants. It is impor­tant to note also that in
the 2011 Communication more emphasis is placed on shared responsibility
among the eu , member-­states, and mi­grants’ countries of origin. “Countries
of origin can have a role to play in support of the integration pro­cess in three
ways: to prepare the integration already before the mi­grants’ departure; 2) to
support the mi­grants while in the eu , e.g. through support via the Embas-
sies; 3) to prepare the mi­grant’s temporary or defin tive return with acquired
experience and knowledge” (Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for
the Integration of Thi d-­Country Nationals,” 10).
12 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 4.
13 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 5.
14 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 7 (my emphasis).

Notes to chapter 4  215

 15 Wacquant, “Crafting the Neoliberal State”; Handler, “Social Citizenship and
Workfare in the US and Western Eu­rope.”
16 Engels, Condition of the Working Class in ­England; Marx, Capital. Volume I;
Polanyi, ­Great Transformation.
17 Strategy for Equality between ­Women and Men 2010–2015, 12 (my emphasis).
18 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 5.
19 Eu­ro­pean Commission, “Eu­ro­pean Agenda for the Integration of Thi d-­
Country Nationals,” 7 (my emphasis).
20 See Rubin et al., Mi­grant ­Women in the Eu­ro­pean ­Labour Force.
21 In a study on mi­grant ­women in the Eu­ro­pean ­labor market, which was
prepared by the rand Corporation for the Eu­ro­pean Commission, Director-
ate General for Employment, Social Aff irs and Equal Opportunity, one can
read, “In the case of ­women mi­grants, gender theories suggest that cultural
values and perceptions often restrict the extent to which ­women can partici-
pate in the ­labour force, and determine what kinds of work are acceptable to
them. Unfavourable cultural attitudes to ­women’s labour-­force participation
may be pres­ent in the mi­grant’s country or culture of origin and may also
prevail in the receiving country” (Rubin et al., Mi­grant ­Women in the Eu­ro­
pean L ­ abour Force, 20).
22 See “Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for ­Women and Men:
Opinion on the Gender Dimension of Integration of Mi­grants,” available
at http://­ec​.­europa​.­eu​/­justice​/­gender​-­equality​/­files​/­opinions​_­advisory​
_­committee​/­opinion​_­integration​_­migrants​_­en​.­pdf (accessed May 13, 2014).
23 The vice president of the ec on Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship,
Viviane Reding, for instance, came into the spotlight in 2011 for her proposal
to have 60 ­percent of ­women in corporate boardrooms and to adopt a
­women’s charter. Thus, ­there has been a tendency among the policy makers
of gender mainstreaming to prioritize gender equality in terms of “equal
opportunities” in access to employment and to positions of power. Though
­these are undoubtedly impor­tant ­battles, their foregrounding has arguably
operated at the expense of other interpretations of equality between men
and ­women. Other claims related to gender mainstreaming have accordingly
received much less attention: for instance, demands for public and ­free care
ser­vices, for guaranteed maternity and paternity leave, and for income for
working ­mothers, and so on.
24 Eu­ro­pean Council, “Establishing the Eu­ro­pean Fund for the Integration of
Thi d-­Country Nationals,” art. 2 (1).
25 Lilian Callender was the director of the School of Economics at inho ll and
University in Rotterdam, Haarlem, and Gravenhage (2002–2006), and Yas-
emin Tümer was the managing director of the tax ser­vice com­pany kpmg.
26 pavem, available at http://­www​.­ageplus​.­nl​/­downloads​/­AGEplusworkshop​
PAVEMcommission​.p ­ pt (accessed June 13, 2013).

216 Notes to chapter 4
 27 As Kirk and Suvarieriol note, “The name of the programme seems to be a
play on the collection of Arabic short stories ‘A Thousand and One Nights’ ”
(“Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?,” 36). See http://­www​.­duizendeneenkracht​
.­nl​/­eCache​/­DEF​/­1/​ ­21​/­227​.­html (accessed August 1, 2013).
28 Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?”; Snelders et al.,
Doorpakken met Duizend en één Kracht.
29 Quoted in Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?,” 254.
30 See the DonaDaria website, available at http://­donadaria​.­nl​/­succes​-­met​
-­actieve​-­vrouwen​-­in​-­het​-­vrijwilligerswerk​-­2​/#­ ​.U
­ T9C​_-­ ­​ s​-­vxN (accessed
March 20, 2014).
31 One of the stories involved a ­woman who was denied social benefits ­because
she was wearing a burqa and, thus, according to the municipality, not show-
ing a real willingness to integrate.
32 Van Walsum, “Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands,” 146.
33 Quoted in Kirk and Suvarieriol, “Emancipating Mi­grant ­Women?,” 254.
34 The professional portfolio concerns all signatories of the cai except minors,
foreigners who are fi y-­five or older, and ­those who have a professional
activity or who declare that they cannot work.
35 A brief report on the fi st results of the implementation of the profes-
sional portfolio is available at http://­www​.­immigration​.­interieur​.­gouv​.­fr​
/­Integration​/­Emploi​-­et​-­promotion​-­de​-­la​-d ­ iversite​/L
­ e​-b ­ ilan​-d ­ e​-­competences​
-­professionnelles (accessed May 29, 2013).
36 Page 14 of “Rapport d’activité 2012 de l’Office rançais de l’Immigration et
de l’Intégration,” available at http://­www​.­ofi ​.­fr​/­tests​_­197​/­rapport​_­d​_­activite​
_­2011_​ ­de​_­1 _office rancais_de_1 _immigration_et_de_1 _​ ­integration​_­1294​
.­html​?­preview​=­oui (accessed August 2, 2013).
37 Jourdan, “Les femmes immigrées signataires du cai en 2009”.
38 Jourdan, “Les femmes immigrées signataires du cai en 2009,” 3.
39 Gourdeau, “Des usages contradictoires du Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration”;
Amnesty International, Choice and Prejudice.
40 Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel de Contrôle de l’Immigration,
Rapport au parlement, 171.
41 See the list of benefic aries at http://­www​.­immigration​.­interieur​.­gouv​.­fr​/­Info​
-­ressources​/­Fonds​-­europeens​/­Le​-­Fonds​-­europeen​-d ­ ​-i­ ntegration​-F ­ EI​/L
­ es​
-­benefic aires​-­du​-­Fonds​-­europeen​-­d-​ ­integration​-F ­ EI (accessed October 23,
2014).
42 See the International ­Labour Organ­ization’s executive summary on “pro-
moting integration for mi­grant domestic workers in France”: http://­www​.­ilo​
.­org​/­wcmsp5​/­groups​/­public​/­—ed​_­protect​/— ­ protrav​/— ­ migrant​/d ­ ocuments​
/­publication​/­wcms​_­232518​.­pdf (accessed October 23, 2014).
43 See the PromoFemmes website, available at http://­www​.­promofemmes​.­org​
/­projet​-­insertion​-­pro/ (accessed October 23, 2014).
44 Leroi and Thévenot, “Emploi peu qualifi .”

Notes to chapter 4  217

 45 The prominent role in the western Eu­ro­pean landscape of French republican
well-­known feminists like Élizabeth Badinter and Caroline Fouret, of some
gender equality organ­izations like npns (see chapter 1) or Promofemme, as
well as femocrats like Jeannette Bougrab in the stigmatization of Muslim
cultures and religious practices as a privileged site of misogyny and obsta-
cles to integration comes to seem rather contradictory. Rather than empow-
ering mi­grant ­women, the institutional discourse and practice of French
intégration républicaine embraced by several feminists and femocrats have
thus far appeared to work (wittingly or unwittingly) to strengthen the very
forms of gendered and racial discrimination that many French feminists
have been vocal in denouncing. The implementation of civic integration
policies that seek to “activate” mi­grant ­women in the ­labor market in fact
further exacerbates the construction of care and domestic work as a highly
feminized and racialized economic sector. See, for instance, Gourdeau,
“Des usages contradictoires du Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration”; Scrinzi,
“Gender, Migration and the Ambiguous Enterprise of Professionalizing
Domestic Ser­vice.”
46 The department gave par­tic­u­lar prominence to the case of Saana Dafani, a
young girl of Moroccan descent who was murdered by her ­father in what
was called a case of “honor killing,” by bringing its own civil case in the trial
against the murderer. Since then, with increasing intensity, the Department
for Equal Opportunities has engaged in a campaign denouncing gender
vio­lence, strongly associated with non-­western (especially Muslim) mi­grant
communities.
47 See the proj­ect’s website at http://­www​.­integrazionemigranti​.­gov​.­it​
/­esperienze​-­territorio​/­pariopportunita​/­Pagine​/­io​-­lavoro​.­aspx (accessed
August 3, 2013).
48 The Crisalide Proj­ect brochure is available at http://­www​.­cnel​.­it​/­application​
/­xmanager​/­projects​/­cnel​/­attachments​/­shadow​_­documentazioni​_a­ ttachment​
/­file​_­allegatos​/­000 ​/­142​/­580​/­Quaderno​_­Crisalide​_­web​.­pdf (accessed January 2,
2016).
49 See the proj­ect’s website at http://­www​.­casa​-­project​.­eu​/­index​.­php (accessed
August 3, 2013).
50 Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of ­Woman, 77.
51 De Gouge, Declaration of the Rights of ­Women and Citizen.
52 Tilly and Scott, ­Women, Work, and ­Family.
53 See, for instance, Clara Zetkin’s insistence on the right of ­women to work
and to equal pay (Clara Zetkin: Selected Writings). For a discussion of social-
ist feminist positions on emancipation through work, see Arruzza, Danger-
ous Liaisons.
54 Kollontai, “Social Basis of the ­Woman Question,” 61.
55 McDowell, “Life without ­Father and Ford.”
56 Weeks, Prob­lem with Work, 64.

218 Notes to chapter 4
 57 Federici, Caliban and the Witch.
58 In France, the mechanism through which married ­women of all social ranks
­were encouraged to stay at home was through the allocation to the ­family
with more than two ­children of the allocation de salaire unique (single salary
alliance), which was implemented in 1946 and abolished in 1978. See
J. Martin, “Politique familiale et travail des femmes mariées en France.” In the
Netherlands, the rates of labor-­market participation of ­women ­were among
the lowest in Eu­rope ­until the end of the 1970s. According to Hettie Pott-­
Buter, the breadwinner model dominated the Netherlands for so long both
­because of the high standards of living of Dutch families and ­because of the
social structure of Dutch society in which the bourgeois f­ amily with the full-­
time ­house­wife imposed itself as a ­family ideal already in the seventeenth
­century (Pott-­Buter, Facts and Fairy Tales about Female ­Labour, ­Family and
Fertility). In Italy the sociologist Chiara Saraceno mapped the impact of
industrialism on Italian welfare and the ways in which state intervention in
areas related to ­family, gender relations and access to the ­labor market ­were
closely linked and aimed to build the working-­class ­family centered on the
male breadwinner. See Saraceno, “­Women, ­Family, and the Law”; Saraceno,
“Trent’anni di storia della famiglia Italiana.”
59 Weber, Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
60 Weeks, Prob­lem with Work, 63. See also Skeggs, Formations.
61 Simone de Beauvoir, in Th Second Sex, argued that “as long as the man has
economic responsibility for the ­couple, [the impression of perfect equality],
it is just an illusion” (589).
62 Dalla Costa and James, Power of ­Women and the Subversion of the
Community.
63 Labor-­market statistics: ­Labor force statistics by sex and age: indicators,
oecd Employment and ­Labor Market Statistics (database). See http://­stats​
.­oecd​.­org​/­BrandedView​.­aspx​?­oecd​_­bv​_­id​=l­fs​-d
­ ata​-e­ n&doi​=d
­ ata​-0­ 0310​-e­ n#
(last extracted June 12, 2013).
64 Karamessini and Rubery, ­Women and Austerity.
65 Farris, “Mi­grants’ Regular Army of ­Labor.”
66 Karamessini and Rubery, ­Women and Austerity.
67 Rottenberg, “Rise of Neoliberal Feminism.” As Rottenberg puts it, “Unlike
classic liberal feminism whose raison d’être was to pose an immanent critique
of liberalism, revealing the gendered exclusions within liberal democracy’s
proclamation of universal equality, particularly with re­spect to the law, insti-
tutional access, and the full incorporation of ­women into the public sphere,
this new feminism seems perfectly in sync with the evolving neoliberal
order. Neoliberal feminism, in other words, offers no critique—­immanent or
other­wise—of neoliberalism” (2).
68 Weeks, Prob­lem with Work, 151.
69 Rottenberg, “Happiness and the Liberal Imagination.”

Notes to chapter 4  219

 70 We should note at this point that within western Eu­rope ­women from post-
socialist countries that have recently entered the Eu­ro­pean Union are also
mostly confi ed within the care and domestic sector.
71 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero; Dalla Costa and James, Power of ­Women
and the Subversion of the Community.
72 For a discussion of ­these features of domestic care work and female migra-
tion in western Eu­rope, see Bridget Anderson, ­Doing the Dirty Work; Cox,
Servant Prob­lem; Lutz, New Maids.
73 Mink, Welfare’s End, 23–24.
74 Fraser and Gordon, “Genealogy of De­pen­den­cy.”
75 Mohanty, “­Under Western Eyes.”
76 Though civic integration policies target only non-­eu citizens/women and the
current nationalist frame identifies uslim ­women above all as the quintes-
sentially victimized objects, I should emphasize that female mi­grants from
eastern Eu­rope as well—­including from current eu member-­states—­have
been foregrounded in similar ways. While some of the ste­reo­types mobi-
lized in order to promote the economic integration of non-­eu /non-­western
mi­grant ­women—­such as the idea that they are sexually and eco­nom­ically
oppressed and therefore need to be emancipated through unveiling and par-
ticipation in the productive ­labor market—­have drawn on widespread and
clichéd repre­sen­ta­tions of Muslim ­women in par­tic­u­lar, the ste­reo­types sur-
rounding eastern Eu­ro­pean ­women are not all that dissimilar. In the western
Eu­ro­pean imaginary the portrayal of mi­grant ­women from eastern Eu­rope
(both eu and non-­eu ) as victims of sex trafficking—­which is very pervasive
in western Europe—­does not in fact convey an image of ­these ­women as
sexually liberated and eco­nom­ically in­de­pen­dent. Rather, antitrafficking
discourses emphasize that they are sexually oppressed (indeed, enslaved)
and eco­nom­ically dependent on (and exploited by) eastern Eu­ro­pean male
pimps. That is why antitrafficking policy makers and activists—­who also in-
clude feminists and neoliberals—­have increasingly supported ­legal proposals
that call for the integration of victims of sex trafficking into the “legitimate”
­labor market. Interestingly, this “legitimate” ­labor market often coincides
with the care and domestic sector—­just as in the case of Muslim and non-­
western mi­grant ­women from the Global South who are pushed to become
cleaners and carers in order to be “eco­nom­ically integrated.” See Ministero
per le Pari Opportunità, “Progetti sull’inserimento socio-­lavorativo delle
vittime della tratta fi anziati dal Fondo Sociale Europeo.” The same pattern
of inclusion for trafficking victims in the care and domestic sector appears in
a more recent report from the Piedmont region in Italy: “Report di ricerca
sulle esperienze di formazione e inserimento lavorativo delle donne vittime
di tratta realizzate in Piemonte a valere sul Fondo Sociale Europeo,” avail-
able at http://­www​.­regione​.­piemonte​.­it​/­europa​/­notizie​/­dwd​/­16052011​/­sintesi​
_­ricerca​_­tratta​.­pdf (accessed February 22, 2015).

220 Notes to chapter 4
 77 Hoselitz, So­cio­log­i­cal ­Factors in Economic Development; Rostow, Stages of
Economic Development.
78 Frank, Latin Amer­i­ca; Wallerstein, “Concept of National Development,
1917–1989.”
79 Fabian, Time and the Other.
80 Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced.
81 As Roggeband and Verloo report, Verdonk, who launched the pavem com-
mission, argued that “mi­grant ­women must reproduce the steps taken by
autochthonous ­women to emancipate” (see “Dutch ­Women Are Liberated,
Mi­grant ­Women Are a Prob­lem,” 282). As they further note, “Th s repre­sen­ta­
tion of Dutch autochthonous ­women as having emancipated themselves,
neglects the extensive state support for this group since the 1970s. Implicitly,
the achievement of autochthonous ­women is attributed to individual efforts
rather than to any active intervention by the state. Th s allows allocating a
duty to allochthonous ­women to emancipate themselves also, without any
duty on the state to support them. The state thereby withdraws its responsi-
bility to solve the prob­lem” (282).
82 Most recently this argument was put forward by Fraser in her impor­tant text
“Feminism, Capitalism, and the Cunning of History.”
83 For a refl ction on the historicity of the category of ­woman and feminist
demands, see, in par­tic­u­lar, Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: “History accounts
not only for the variety of positions one fi ds in feminist writing, but also for
the dif­fer­ent ways in which the social and individual identity of ‘­woman’ was
conceived” (13).
84 In other words, following on Rehmann’s ideology-­critique approach, I
contend that if we want to pursue a materialist understanding of the femo-
nationalist ideological formation, and thus of the participation of feminism
within it, we should then “focus on what is dynamic, moving, contradictory
and precarious in the relationships among dif­fer­ent factions, not least in
order to reveal the potential points where oppositional movements might be
able to intervene” (Rehmann, Theories of Ideology, 34).

5.The Po­liti­cal Economy of Femonationalism

1 Ehrenreich and Hochschild, Global ­Woman, 11–12.

2 United Nations, State of World Populations, figu e 5.
3 Eurostat uses the term “foreign-­born” to refer to citizens whose country
of birth is dif­fer­ent from the one in which the survey is conducted. In this
case, my analy­sis of Eurostat’s ­Labor Force Survey data employs the term
“foreign-­born citizens” to refer to ­those who ­were born outside the eu -15 (or
western Eu­ro­pean) area. Th oughout this chapter “non-­western mi­grant,”
“mi­grant,” and “foreign-­born” are thus used as synonyms. Information about
the country of birth of the responding mi­grant in the ­Labor Force Survey is

Notes to chapter 5  221

 in fact more relevant to questions about migration than information about
nationality: fi st, ­because nationality can change over time; second, ­because
the ­children of mi­grants who ­were born in the country of destination can be
foreign nationals, particularly in countries where citizenship laws are based
on the princi­ple of jus sanguinis; and third, ­because mi­grants are more likely
to respond in a reliable way to questions about country of birth rather than
nationality (Cangiano, “Immigration Policy and Mi­grant ­Labour Market
Outcomes in the Eu­ro­pean Union”).
4 ­Castles, “Guest-­Worker in Western Eu­rope”; ­Castles and Vezzoli, “Global
Economic Crisis and Migration.”
5 Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Eu­rope.
6 Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Eu­rope; Boyd and
Grieco, ­Women and Migration; Sinke, “Gender and Migration”; Schiff et al.,
International Migration of W ­ omen; Donato et al., “Variations in the Gender
Composition of Immigrant Populations.”
7 Morokvasic, “Birds of Passage Are Also ­Women . . .”; Phizacklea, One Way
Ticket; Simon and Brettell, International Migration; Parreñas, Servants of
Globalization; Kofman et al., Gender and International Migration in Eu­rope;
George, When ­Women Come First; Oishi, ­Women in Motion.
8 Eurostat, Mi­grants in Eu­rope, figu e 1.8. See also Bridget Anderson, ­Doing the
Dirty Work; Parreñas, Servants of Globalization; Ehrenreich and Hochschild,
Global ­Woman; Cox, Servant Prob­lem; Lutz, “When Home Becomes a Work
Place”; and Lutz, New Maids.
9 It should be noted that the other sector in which mi­grant ­women are
heavi­ly overrepresented is the sex industry. See in par­tic­u­lar Bern­stein,
Temporarily Yours; Andrijasevic, Migration, Agency and Citizenship in Sex
Trafficking.
10 Parreñas, Servants of Globalization; Tyner, Made in the Philippines; Oishi,
­Women in Motion; Schiff et al., International Migration of W ­ omen; Rubin
et al., Mi­grant ­Women in the Eu­ro­pean ­Labour Force; International ­Labour
Organ­ization, Domestic Workers across the World.
11 Th s differential treatment of male and female mi­grants in the Eu­ro­pean
media has been highlighted in several studies. For instance, for France,
see Deltombe and Rigouste, “L’ennemi intérieur”; for Italy, see Bonfi lioli,
“Intersections of Racism and Sexism in Con­temporary Italy”; and for the
Netherlands, see De Ridder, De witte Media.
12 Fekete, “Enlightened Fundamentalism?,” 18.
13 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 626. As Michael Denning argues, this is a concept
“often taken to be distinctively Marxist since it appears in Capital’s discus-
sion of capitalism’s relative surplus population. However, Marx was simply
adopting the rhe­toric of the British ­labor movement. Radicals, particularly
the Chartists and Fourierist associationists, ­imagined the new factory
workers as ­great industrial armies, and this common trope led the Chartist

222 Notes to chapter 5
 leader Bronterre O’Brien to write of a reserve army of ­labor in the Northern
Star in 1839. The young Engels picked up on this image in The Condition of
the Working Class in ­England in 1844, and Marx would invoke the meta­
phor occasionally, distinguishing between the active and reserve armies of
the working class. By the end of the nineteenth ­century, it was part of the
commonsense understanding of unemployment: by 1911, even the Mas­sa­chu­
setts Bureau of Statistics of ­Labor could conclude that, ‘however prosperous
conditions may be, ­there is always a “reserve army” of the unemployed’ ”
(Denning, “Wageless Life,” 84).
14 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 625.
15 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 625.
16 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 626.
17 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 623.
18 Burawoy, “Functions and Reproduction of Mi­grant ­Labor”; Brox, Po­liti­cal
Economy of Rural Development.
19 ­Castles and Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western
Eu­rope; Castells, “Immigrant Workers and Class Strug­gles in Advanced
Capitalism”; Phizaklea and Miles, ­Labour and Racism; Moulier-­Boutang
et al., Economie politique des migrations clandestines de main-­d’oeuvre; Brox,
Po­liti­cal Economy of Rural Development.
20 ­Castles and Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western
Eu­rope, 377 (my emphasis).
21 Castells, “Immigrant Workers and Class Strug­gles in Advanced Capitalism,”
46.
22 Castells, “Immigrant Workers and Class Strug­gles in Advanced Capitalism,”
47.
23 Between 1973 and 1974, most Eu­ro­pean countries that had established
guestworker systems in the post–­World War II reconstruction period
responded to the recession with mea­sures to stop the entry of workers and,
in some cases, also of their dependents. The Federal Republic of Germany
banned the entry of non–­European Economic Community (eec ) workers in
November 1973. In France, a ban on ­labor migration was announced by the
Giscard D’Estaing government in July 1974. In the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Switzerland, recruitment of foreign workers from non-­eec countries stopped
in 1974 (see ­Castles, “Guest-­Worker in Western Eu­rope”).
24 Castells, “Immigrant Workers and Class Strug­gles in Advanced Capitalism”;
­Castles, “Guest-­Worker in Western Eu­rope.”
25 Koser, “Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on International Migration”;
Tilly, “Impact of the Economic Crisis on International Migration.”
26 Reyneri and Baganha, “Migration and the ­Labor Market in Southern Eu­
rope”; Harris, New Untouchables.
27 Somerwille and Sumption, “Immigration and the ­Labor Market.”
28 Boltanski and Chiapello, New Spirit of Capitalism, 231.

Notes to chapter 5  223

 29 In the best-­case scenario, namely, when they are legally residents and legally
employed, the permit of mi­grant workers across western Eu­rope is increas-
ingly made dependent on the duration of the work contract, thus re-creating
a Gastarbeiter system. Other­wise, they can be ­either legally resident and ille-
gally employed in the informal sector or ­else entirely illegal and thus subject
to harsh regulations and even deportation.
30 Portes and Sensenbrenner, “Embeddedness and Immigration”; Zhou, China-
town; Piore, Birds of Passage.
31 May et al., “Keeping London Working,” 162.
32 The 1973 oil crisis is conventionally considered the date ­after which policies
to stop immigration infl ws in western Eu­rope began and ­after which many
mi­grant workers—­particularly ­those from southern Europe—­had to go back
to their countries of origin, ­whether ­because of job losses or ­because of the
restrictions on residency rights.
33 International ­Labour Organ­ization, Domestic Workers across the World. The
organ­ization’s International Standard Classifi ation of Occupations defi es
a “domestic worker,” “house­hold worker,” and “domestic helper” as a person
employed full-­time or part-­time in a ­house­hold or private residence. Do-
mestic workers may be, for example, cooks, servants, nurses, child minders,
or carers for the el­derly or disabled ­people. As the dimension of care is an
integral part of the tasks of domestic workers, the term “care and domestic
workers” ­will be used throughout this text to refer to all workers who are
employed in private ­house­holds.
34 For instance, a recent study by Schwenken and Heimeschoff c ntends that
in Eu­rope “rough estimations for female irregular mi­grant domestic workers
alone arrive at one million” (Schwenken and Heimeschoff, Domestic Workers
Count, 9). On irregular mi­grant domestic workers, see also Triandafyllidou,
Irregular Mi­grant Domestic Workers in Eu­rope.
35 Scrinzi, “Gender, Migration and the Ambiguous Enterprise of Professionalizing
Domestic Ser­vice”; van Walsum, “Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in
the Netherlands”; Finotelli and Arango, “Regularisation of Unauthorised Im-
migrants in Italy and Spain”; Ambrosini, “Surviving Underground.”
36 Van Walsum, “Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands,” 142.
37 Van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Welfare Regimes”; van Walsum,
“Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands.” According to
van Walsum, “Where before domestic workers ­were typifi d as ­house­wives
who only earned money on the side and could fall back on the income
of their breadwinner husbands, now they ­were being depicted as (quasi)
self-­employed workers who ­were taking on the risks of illness, economic
setbacks, and other calamities on their own” (145).
38 Van Walsum, “Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands,” 147.
39 Botman, “Gewoon Schoonmaken.”

224 Notes to chapter 5
 40 Van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Welfare Regimes,” 145; Glendin-
ning and Moran, “Reforming Long-­Term Care”; van Walsum, “Regulating
Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands,” 147.
41 Van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Welfare Regimes.”
42 Pijl and Ramakers, “Contracting One’s ­Family Members.”
43 Jolly et al., “L’emploi et les metiers des immigrées,” 27–28.
44 Windebank, “Outsourcing ­Women’s Domestic ­Labour.”
45 Windebank, “Outsourcing ­Women’s Domestic ­Labour,” 258.
46 Scrinzi, “Gender, Migration and the Ambiguous Enterprise of Professional-
izing Domestic Ser­vice,” 156.
47 Scrinzi, “Gender, Migration and the Ambiguous Enterprise of Professional-
izing Domestic Ser­vice,” 156.
48 Avril, “Aide à domicile pour personnes âgées.”
49 Bettio et al., “Change in Care Regimes and Female Migration.”
50 National Institute for Social Insurance, Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza
Sociale (inps): http://­www​.­inps​.­it​/­portale​/­default​.­aspx​?­itemdir​=­10034, 2012.
51 inps, “Osservatorio sulle pensioni,” January 17, 2012, available at http://­www​
.­inps​.­it​/­portale​/­default​.­aspx​?­sID​=­0;7719;&lastmenu​=­7719&iIDDataset​=3­ 5
(accessed October 9, 2012).
52 Sergio Pasquinelli, “Badanti,” available at http://­www​.­qualifi are​.­info​/­home​
.­php​?­id​=­585#​_ft­ n1 (accessed October 9, 2012).
53 In my own research on mi­grant care and domestic workers in the city of
Rome, I found that whereas mi­grants from eastern Eu­rope tend more often
to be employed as live-in carers, mi­grants from North Africa and Ban-
gladesh, for instance, tend more often to work part-­time and as live-­out
employees (Farris, “Le donne nei pro­cessi di integrazione”).
54 Th s holds particularly in the case of live-in workers, that is, care and domes-
tic workers who work and live in employers’ homes. As live-in workers they
are usually on-­call twenty-­four hours a day and are paid lower wages ­because
lodging and meals are provided by the employer.
55 Van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Welfare Regimes,” 59.
56 Roberto Maroni, cited in van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Wel-
fare Regimes,” 67.
57 Van Hooren, “Caring Mi­grants in Eu­ro­pean Welfare Regimes,” 68.
58 Interview (“Maroni: ‘No sanatoria immigrati’ ”) from May 17, 2008, available
at http://­www​.­repubblica​.­it​/­2008​/­0 5​/­sezioni​/­cronaca​/­sicurezza​-­politica4​
/­bossi​-­spagna​/­bossi​-­spagna​.­html (accessed February 20, 2015).
59 Williams and Gavanas, “Intersection of Child Care Regimes and Migration
Regimes,” 14 (my emphasis).
60 Ungerson, “Commodifi d Care Work in Eu­ro­pean ­Labor Markets”; Pavolini
and Ranci, “Restructuring the Welfare State.”
61 On the employment of the concept of the “­enemy camp,” see chapter 2.

Notes to chapter 5  225

 62 Yeates, “Global Care Chains.”
63 Baumol, “Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth.”
64 Bridget Anderson, “Reproductive ­Labour and Migration”; Bakker and
Gill, Power, Production and Social Reproduction; Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migra-
tion, Domestic Work and Aff ct, 95; Ferguson, “Intersectionality and Social
Reproduction Feminisms.”
65 Yeates, “Global Care Chains.”
66 Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic Work and Aff ct, 94.
67 For an overview of some of this debate, see Vogel, “Domestic ­Labour
Debate.”
68 Dalla Costa and James, Power of ­Women and the Subversion of the Commu-
nity, 43.
69 Mies et al., ­Women the Last Colony.
70 Mies et al., ­Women the Last Colony, 25.
71 Beechey, “Some Notes on Female Wage ­Labour.”
72 Mohanty, “­Under Western Eyes”; Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic
Work and Aff ct, 96.
73 Beechey, “Rethinking the Defin tion of Work.”
74 Lutz, Migration and Domestic Work, 1.
75 Lutz, “When Home Becomes a Work Place,” 48.
76 Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic Work and Aff ct, 107.
77 Hooyman and Gonyea, Feminist Perspectives on ­Family Care. Th s distinc-
tion has been widely criticized both for a certain rigidity and particularly
for undermining the affective component involved also in more physical-­
mechanical tasks (see Bridget Anderson, ­Doing the Dirty Work; Lutz, “When
Home Becomes a Work Place”).
78 Ferguson, Sexual Democracy; Hochschild, “Global Care Chains and Emo-
tional Surplus Value”; Sandford, “What Is Maternal ­Labour?”
79 Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic Work and Aff ct, 132.
80 Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic Work and Aff ct, 133.
81 Van Walsum, “Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands,”
151–152.
82 ­These interviews ­were carried out in the context of empirical research proj­
ects on the specific orking conditions of mi­grant domestic workers in the
city of Rome and their strategy of survival. The results are published in Far-
ris, “Le donne nei pro­cessi di integrazione.”
83 Taggart et al., “Interactive Robot in a Nursing Home”; Folbre, Warm Hands
in a Cold Age; Folbre, “Nursebots to the Rescue?”; Federici, “On Elder Care.”
84 Federici, “Reproduction of Labor-­Power in the Global Economy.”
85 Following Reyneri (“Immigration and the Economic Crisis in Western Eu­
rope”) and Schain (“State Strikes Back”), I ­here defi e cyclical and noncycli-
cal occupations and sectors as ­those that are more or less exposed to the

226 Notes to chapter 5
 fluctuations of the economy, depending on the following variables: the type
of industry (e.g., construction and tourism-­related industries are more cycli-
cal than education and health care); the size of the fi m and type of com­pany
(e.g., small, private companies are more sensitive to economic fluctuations
than big, public companies); and the relevant skill level and contractual
conditions (e.g., low-­skilled or unskilled manual ­labor and fi ed-­term jobs
are usually more exposed to economic cycles). See also Yeates, “Global Care
Chains,” 376.
86 On the other hand, one might argue that the employers are able to go to
work and generate a higher income for the ­family thanks to the (usually)
underpaid ­labor of a mi­grant care and domestic worker. Furthermore, the
situation in which the care and domestic worker is employed through the
mediation of a ­middle man (domestic placement agencies, for instance)
introduces more classically cap­i­tal­ist ele­ments into the employment relation
since the agency may own the “means of production” used by the care and
domestic worker and extract surplus value from her.
87 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 623.
88 Karamessini and Rubery, ­Women and Austerity.
89 Karamessini and Rubery, ­Women and Austerity (my emphasis).
90 Farris, “Le donne nei pro­cessi di integrazione.”
91 Colombo et al., Health Wanted?; A. Anderson, “Eu­rope’s Care Regimes and
the Role of Mi­grant Care Workers within Them.”
92 Eurobarometer, Health and Long-­Term Care in the Eu­ro­pean Union, 95.
93 oecd , International Migration Outlook, 67.
94 uwv Report, Arbeidsmarktprognose 2012–2013, figu e 5.2.1.
95 Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (ins ee ), 2011.
Available at: http://­www​.­insee​.­fr​/­fr​/­themes​/­document​.­asp​?­reg​_­id​=0­ &ref​_i­ d​
=­ECOFRA11f​_f­ i hthem (accessed August 23, 2016).
96 Colin, Ser­vices à la personne, 32.
97 Alberola et al., Les ser­vices à la personne, 36–37.
98 Picchi, “Le badanti invisibili anche alla crisi?”; Sacchetto and Vianello,
“La diffusione del lavoratore povero”; Bonifazi and Marini, “Il lavoro degli
stranieri in Italia in tempo di crisi”; Fullin, “Immigrati e mercato del lavoro
italiano”; Perocco and Cillo, “L’impatto della crisi sulle condizioni lavorative
degli immigrati”; Reyneri, “Immigration and the Economic Crisis in West-
ern Eu­rope.”
99 Karamessini and Rubery, ­Women and Austerity.
100 Beechey, “Some Notes on Female Wage ­Labour”; Anthias, “­Women and the
Reserve Army of ­Labour.”
101 Anthias, “­Women and the Reserve Army of ­Labour,” 50.
102 Harvey, “ ‘New’ Imperialism.”
103 Pateman, Sexual Contract.

Notes to chapter 5  227

 104 Mills, Racial Contract.
105 Sassen, “Notes on the Incorporation of Thi d World ­Women”; Eisenstein,
Feminism Seduced.
106 Bridget Anderson, ­Doing the Dirty Work; Parreñas, Servants of Globaliza-
tion; Cox, Servant Prob­lem; Lutz, “When Home Becomes a Work Place”;
Gutiérrez-­Rodríguez, Migration, Domestic Work and Aff ct; van Walsum,
“Regulating Mi­grant Domestic Work in the Netherlands.”
107 Sassen, “Two Stops in ­Today’s New Global Geographies,” 488.
108 Sassen, “Two Stops in ­Today’s New Global Geographies,” 465.
109 Beechey, “Some Notes on Female Wage ­Labour”; Anthias, “­Women and the
Reserve Army of ­Labour”; ­Castles and Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class
Structure in Western Eu­rope.
110 Westoff nd Frejka, “Religiousness and Fertility among Eu­ro­pean Muslims.”
111 Butler, “Feminism Should Not Resign in the Face of Such Instrumentaliza-
tion.” For instance, in 2007 the German government approved the Elterngeld
scheme to encourage ­couples to become parents (see http://­www​.­elterngeld​
.­com​/­) (accessed April 30, 2014). In Italy, the Fondo Nuovi Nati (Fund for
Newborns) allowed ­those who became ­mothers in the triennium 2009–2011
to request a bank loan (see http://­www​.­fondonuovinati​.­it) (accessed April 30,
2014).
112 Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced, 195.
113 Macpherson, Po­liti­cal Theory of Possessive Individualism.
114 Badiou, “Derrière la Loi foulardière, la peur”; Available at http://­www​
.­lemonde​.­fr​/­archives​/­article​/­2004​/­02​/­21​/­derriere​-­la​-­loi​-­foulardiere​-­la​-­peur​
-­par​-­alain​-­badiou​_­353904​_­1819218​.­html (accessed August 23, 2016).
115 Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled,” 167.

228 Notes to chapter 5
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 INDEX
9/11,2–3, 196n85. See also September 11
Abu-­Lughod, Lila, 55
Accordo d’integrazione, 90–91
aff ctivity, 169
Af­ghan­i­stan, 183; Afghan ­women,
183
Alleanza Nazionale (an ), 37, 164
Althusser, Louis, 12–13, 187–88
Amara, Fadela, 47–48
Anderson, Benedict, 11, 69, 76, 112
antiveil, law, 47–48, 213; politics, 47
assimilation, 45, 80, 85, 89, 102, 105,
113–14, 180, 205; assimilationist, 89,
92, 105
Badinter, Élizabeth, 1–2, 46–48, 55
banlieues, 34, 36
­bearer of the collective, ­woman as, 72,
79, 103, 110–11
Bell, Derrick, 8, 187n12
Berlusconi government, 37–38, 51–52,
68, 90, 164
Bern­stein, Elizabeth, 213–14n2
biological reproduction, ­women’s role
as, 72, 78, 110–11
Black feminism, 215n6
Boltanski, Luc, 154
borders, 74–75, 87, 120, 155, 211n92
Bougrab, Jeannette, 47–48, 55,
218n45
Bouteldja, Houria, 48
Brown, Wendy, 201n30, 210n77
Butler, Judith, 117–18
cai (Contrat d’Accueil et d’Intégration),
88, 98, 103, 105, 126, 208n61,
217n34
caif (Contract d’Accueil et d’Intégration
pour la Famille), 88, 98, 209n62
capital, accumulation of, 150–51,
167, 213n2; variable, 173; fi ed,
173, 175
capitalism, 121, 132, 151, 168, 181, 188n22,
201n27, 212n105, 222n13; crisis of,
153; neoliberal, 144, 155, 178
care and domestic sector, 20–21, 117,
130, 137–38, 143, 150, 157, 159–62,
164, 166, 169, 172, 174–75, 177–79,
220n70, 220n76
Carfagna, Mara, 52
­Castles, Stephen, 152
Chiapello, Ève, 154
civic integration, 2–5, 8, 14–15, 18–20,
79–82, 84, 86–88, 90–98, 101–5,
110–15, 117–19, 122, 125, 127–28,
130–31, 139–40, 148, 160, 184n8,
204nn2–3, 205n10, 206n27, 209n67,
209n75, 210n78, 215n7, 218n45,
220n76
civilization, clash of, 29, 198n112; west-
ern, 47, 186n10, 198n112
civilizing missions, 76, 104, 107, 196n81,
211n98
collusion, 6, 186n10
colonialism, colonial, 23, 48, 74–76, 89,
102, 104, 107–9, 111, 141, 152; colonial
legacy, 76–77, 105, 107
commodifi ation of care, 157, 162,
165–66, 172–73, 177–178
contradiction, 9–10, 15, 20, 28, 56, 99,
185n9, 188n21; 211n98, 215n4; as
performative, 15, 117–19, 143, 145
convergence, 5–6, 8–10, 13–14, 17, 20,
28, 41, 53, 79–80, 104, 111, 113, 116–17,
123, 142, 144, 182, 184n4, 213n1, 214n2
crisis, economic, 16, 17, 21, 23, 31, 120–21,
127, 136, 153, 156, 164, 174–77, 180,
224n32
cultural reproduction, ­women’s role as,
98, 102–3
de Beauvoir, Simone, 48, 219n61
de Gouges, Olympe, 132
Delphy, Christine, 48, 213n1
Department for Equal Opportunities
(Italy), 52, 128, 218n46
Derrida, Jacques, 66, 201n29
discrimination, 127, 141, 144, 162, 165;
gendered, 218n45; racial, 118, 145,
215n6, 218n45
dispossession, dispossessed, 152, 156;
accumulation by, 178
domestic ­labor debate, 167, 177
Dresselhuys, Cisca, 43–44, 55, 195n73
Eastern Eu­rope, 24, 26, 31, 40, 163,
188n25
ec (Eu­ro­pean Commission), 18, 82, 121,
214n2, 216n21
eif (Eu­ro­pean Fund for the Integra-
tion of Thi d-­Country Nationals),
124–25, 128–30
Eisenstein, Hester, 181, 184n6, 189n2,
213n2
enlightened fundamentalism, 6, 185n9
emancipation, 8, 15–16, 24–25, 28, 42–43,
45, 55, 75, 85, 95–96, 107, 117, 125,
129, 131–32, 134, 138–44, 148, 196n77,
210n75, 218n53; teleology of, 119,
138–41; emancipation strategy, 75, 107
254 INDEX
Engels, Friedrick, 223n13
Eu­ro­pe­anization, 61, 80, 110
exclusion, 73, 85, 102–3, 107, 120, 177,
215n11, 219n67
exploitation, 4, 6, 19, 28, 186n10; eco-
nomic, 56, 74, 132, 139, 141, 150, 167, 179
Fallaci, Oriana, 2, 50, 184n5
Fanon, Frantz, 75
Federici, Silvia, 171
Feminist Majority Foundation, 183n4
femonationalism, 4, 6, 9–14, 17–19, 22,
53, 54, 57–58, 62, 78, 82, 113, 115, 144,
146, 149, 180–82, 187n21; defin tion
of, 4–21
fn (Front National), 4, 7, 17, 22, 28,
33–36, 40, 46, 53–54, 57, 59–60,
66–68, 72, 116, 183n1, 187n11,189n1,
193n44, 194n51, 194n53, 194n55,
194n60, 199n3
Fordism, 132–36, 142, 173; post-­
Fordism, 135–36, 142–44, 153–54
Fortuyn, Pim, 24, 29, 42–43, 85, 190n14,
193n34, 195n73, 199n1
Foucault, Michel, 71, 102, 209n73
Fourest, Caroline, 47
fundamentalism, Islamic, 85
gender, justice, 10, 116, 123, 144–45,
214n2; gender mainstreaming, 84,
123, 216n23; gender roles, 118, 133,
136, 144, 174
genital mutilations, 27, 41, 43, 93, 96
Global North, 147, 167
Global South, 5, 24, 27, 39–40, 126,
131, 146, 163, 167, 178–79, 181, 185n8,
191n27, 213–14n2, 220n76
Hamel, Christelle, 49
hci (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration), 89,
96, 105–6
Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, 2, 29–30, 43–44,
195n69
homonationalism, 6, 186n10
homonormativity, 186n10
homophobia, homophobic, 6, 29, 31,
36, 53, 109
honor killings, 25, 27, 32, 41, 43,
218n46
­human rights, 8, 50, 80–81, 106
­human ser­vices, 166
ideology, 5, 8, 13, 28, 30, 38, 54, 58, 61,
71, 78, 81, 114, 121–22, 131, 181, 187–
88n21, 213–14n2, 221n84; femona-
tionalist, 14, 20, 29, 159, 166, 190n14,
193n34; ideological formation, 6, 10,
12–13, 20, 41, 82, 111, 114, 148, 180–81,
188n21, 221n84
illegal immigration, 37
immigration, mass, 25, 31, 34, 90;
infli ted, 88, 98, 122; selective, 85, 88,
98, 120; anti-­immigration, 3–7, 12,
18–19, 22, 24, 28–29, 31, 33, 37–38, 54,
58, 64, 69, 85, 109, 115, 117, 142, 150,
164, 180, 182, 184n4, 196n85, 199n1
inclusion, 2, 73, 80, 85, 89, 102–3, 105,
111, 129–30, 132, 186n10, 220n76
Indigènes de la République, 48
instrumentalization, 6, 32, 48, 54,
185n9, 186n10
intersectionality, 199n9, 215n6
Islam, 22, 25, 27, 30–34, 36, 39, 42–45,
48–55, 96, 111, 115–17, 142, 181, 184n4,
187n11,191n17, 192n32, 196n81
Islamophobia, Islamophobic, 3, 5–6, 9,
12, 29, 30–33, 37, 40–41, 44, 48, 53,
69, 89, 115, 118, 144, 190n14, 196n85,
213n2; anti-­Islam, 1, 3–10, 14, 17–20,
22, 24, 28–31, 33, 38, 40–41, 43, 47–
48, 50, 52, 54–58, 64, 85, 109, 116–17,
142, 184n8, 186n10, 190n14, 213n1
job fi st princi­ple, 121
Joppke, Christian, 79–81, 92, 103–5,
111–13, 205n10, 210n78
Kollontai, Alexandra, 132
Laclau, Ernesto, 58, 61–66, 199n3,
200n27
Lanfranco, Monica, 50, 55
Le Pen, Jean Marie, 33, 193n44, 196n85,
206n33
Le Pen, Marine, 1, 33–37, 60, 76,
193n44, 203n76
Lega Nord (ln ), 4, 7, 17, 22, 28, 37–40,
53–54, 57, 59–60, 66–69, 72, 116, 164,
187n11
lfs (­Labor Force Survey), 18, 158, 175,
221n3
l gbt rights, 1, 10, 13, 186n10, 188n22,
194n60
liberal feminism, 43, 50, 132, 136;
neoliberal feminism, 136, 184n5,
219n67
liberalism, 61, 80–82, 105, 113–14,
192n32, 205n15, 210n78, 219n67
Maroni, Roberto, 1, 90, 164
Marx, Karl, 146, 150–52, 156, 173
Marxist, feminism, feminists, 134, 167,
214–15n3
mechanization, 151, 171; automation,
173
mi­grant ­women, immigrant ­women,
21, 73, 103, 107, 111, 117, 119, 128–29,
177, 184n8; mi­grant men, mi­grant
males, 24, 58, 67, 172, 176
misogyny, 3, 19, 22, 29, 31, 48, 51, 53, 55,
187n11,218n45
modernization theory(ies), 140–41
modularity, of nationalism, 11, 109,
112; of femonationalism, 11–12, 109,
112
Mohanty, Chandra, 23, 139
Moller Okin, Susan, 41–43, 51
motherhood, 94, 99, 111, 125
multiculturalism, 18, 29–32, 43, 51, 79,
85, 94, 98, 193, 199n115
INDEX  255
Muslim ­women, 1–3, 5, 7, 11–12, 14, 19,
22–26, 28, 32, 40, 42–44, 46–56,
64–65, 67, 75–76, 104, 107, 111,
116–18, 139, 141–42, 149, 160, 162,
165, 182, 183n4, 184n8, 186n10,
190n4, 191n17, 191n27, 196n77,
196n78, 209n75, 220n76
nation building, 70, 80, 112–14
nation, iconography of, 69–71
nation, w
­ omen and the, 78, 111,
203n60; national w ­ omen, 66–68,
72–73, 78, 165, 180–81; non-­national
­women, 73
nationalism, 80–82, 104, 110–13
nation-­state, 11, 13, 67, 69–71, 79, 81–82,
92, 110–13, 124, 156, 159, 211n92
neoliberalism, 2, 5–6, 8, 12–14, 20,
81, 113, 115, 123, 135–36, 143–44,
155, 184n7, 186n10, 188n22, 213n2,
219n67
noncyclical, 169, 172–73, 176, 226n85
npns (Ni Putes Ni Soumises), 47–48,
218n45
oecd (Organisation for Economic Co-­
operation and Development), 176
ofii (Office rançais de l’Immigration
et de l’Intégration), 98, 208n57,
208n59, 208n61
oppression, of w­ omen, 27, 36, 50–52,
75–76, 107, 130, 139, 168, 181, 183–84n4,
186n10; gendered, 24, 106; racial, 56
Orientalist, 24, 125
pavem (Participatie van Vrouwen uit
Etnische Minderheidsgroepen), 45,
94, 96, 110, 124–26, 221n26
pdl (Il Popolo della Libertà), 51–52
personal status, 106–7
pillarization model, 85
polygamy, 96, 98, 100–101
256 INDEX
po­liti­cal economy, political-­economic,
3–5, 13–14, 20–21, 54, 81, 149, 166,
182, 184n7
Pollastrini, Barbara, 52
pop­u­lism, populist, 7, 59, 63–65, 67,
185n9, 201n34; as ideology, 58;
populist parties, 7, 33, 58, 60–64, 66,
199n1, 200n10
postcolonialism, postcolonial,
11, 140; postcolonial feminism, 7,
19, 58
productivist ethics, 119, 131, 133–34,
135–39
Puar, Jasbir, 6, 186n10
pvv (Partij voor de Vrijheid), 4, 7,
17, 22, 28–29, 31–33, 40, 53–54, 57,
59–60, 66–68, 72, 87, 116, 187n11,
189n1, 199n3, 202n40
racialization of sexism, 19, 49, 73–74,
76, 78, 104, 189n25
racism, 9, 19, 23, 25, 40, 49, 73–76, 78,
80–81, 107, 113, 115, 138, 149–50, 162,
189n25, 203n62, 205n10, 210n78,
213n1
regular army of ­labor, 21, 173, 177–79
Republicanism, 33–34, 79, 88–89, 92,
97, 116, 202n45, 218n45, 231n1
rescue, 2–3, 7, 17, 20, 22, 51, 55–56, 58,
65–66, 73, 75–78, 82, 116, 150, 186n10,
214n2; rescue narratives, 3, 55, 102,
186n10, 199n115
reserve army of ­labor, 20, 150–56, 166,
168, 173, 177–80, 223n13
Rottenberg, Catherine, 219n67
Salvini, Matteo, 2, 39–40, 60
Santanchè, Daniela, 51–52
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 48–49, 88, 122,
210n82
Sbai, Souad, 51, 55
Schmitt, Carl, 65
Scott, Joan W., 46, 196n85, 213n1,
221n83
second-­wave feminism, 42, 44, 134, 137;
third-­wave feminism, 43
secularism, 33–34, 42, 46, 50, 55, 96–97,
197n97
September 11, 2–3, 196n85
sex industry, 11, 26–27, 222n9
sexism, 2, 9, 13, 19, 36, 40, 49, 53, 55,
73–74, 76, 78, 189n25
sexual nationalism, 6, 13, 185n9,
186n10
sexuality, 13, 49, 72, 95, 105, 108, 140,
185n9, 211n87,211n92
sexualization of racism, 19, 69, 73–76,
78, 149–50, 185n9, 189n25
Sgrena, Giuliana, 50–51
social reproduction, 13, 15–17, 20, 115,
117, 119, 126, 128, 131, 134, 136–38,
142–44, 148, 153, 157, 165–67, 169, 172,
180, 214n3
Soysal, Yasemin, 79–81, 92, 111
spatial fix ty, 169
Spinelli, Barbara, 50
Stasi commission, 46
state feminism, 44, 49, 52, 128, 184n6,
186n10, 213n1; femocrat, 2, 4, 6–10,
12, 15, 17–20, 22, 41–42, 44, 49,
52–53, 55–56, 115–18, 122–24, 137,
139–44, 182, 184n6, 184n8, 189n2,
218n45
state apparatus(es), 14, 48, 82, 180, 213n1;
ideological state apparatus(es),
12–14, 187n21
Submission I (the movie), 30, 43
surplus population, 151, 178–79,
222n13
synecdoche, Muslim ­women as,
22–23, 25
tc n (third-­country national), 79, 82,
84, 88, 112, 117, 119–20
temporal distancing, 140, 142–43
temporal disjunction, 142–44
terror, war on, 3, 186n10, 196n85
terrorism, Islamic, 30, 85, 183n4, 190n4,
196n85, 211n94
Turco, Livia, 52, 89
udi (Unione Donne in Italia), 51
ump (Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire), 33, 88
Vallaud-­Belkacem, Najat, 49, 197n97
value, economic, 151, 167, 172–73,
227n86
values, western, 2–3, 18–19, 25,
28–30, 42, 55, 79–80, 83, 87–88,
90, 92–93, 97, 99, 102–6, 181, 185n9,
187n11,192n32, 208n61, 210n82,
211n94
van Gogh, Theo, 29–30, 43, 85
Van Walsum, Sarah, 76, 108–9, 126, 159,
224n37
veil, veiled ­women, 2, 26, 30, 33, 38,
45–53, 75–76, 99, 115, 127, 129, 149,
165, 196n83, 197n97, 213n1; hijab,
149, 181; burqa, 12, 36, 39–40, 45,
47, 51–52, 149; niqab, 51; full veil,
integral veil, 1, 40, 100; unveiling,
75–76, 107, 130, 182, 183n4, 185n9,
220n76
Verdonk, Rita, 25, 29, 44, 76, 83,
86–87, 94, 108, 124, 203n78,
211n94, 221n81
victim, non-­western ­woman as,
2–3, 5, 9–11, 14, 16, 20, 22–27, 36,
40, 54, 56, 58, 64–66, 73–74, 76–78,
97, 102, 108–10, 116–17, 128, 139–40,
144, 183n4, 184n8, 189n25, 190n4,
190n11, 191n27, 207n47, 214n2,
220n76
vvd (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Demo­cratie), 29, 31, 43–44, 87
INDEX  257
Weber, Max, 134, 200n11 Wollstonecraft, ary, 131
welfare state, welfare policies, 3, 16–17, 27, womanhood, western model of, 26, 45,
32, 38, 121, 133, 135, 138–39, 150, 155–56, 77, 103, 111
159, 165–66, 176–77, 180, 219n58 workfare, 8, 15, 18, 20, 119, 121–23, 126,
western Eu­rope, 147, 204n2, 220n76 131, 138–39, 143–44
western supremacism, 54, 187n11,
198n112; westocentrism, westocen- xenophobia, 12, 23, 153
tric, 8, 54, 56
Wilders, Geert, 1, 29–33, 36, 60, 68, 76, Zetkin, Clara, 218n53
87, 193n33, 203n78 Žižek, Slavoj, 65

258 INDEX