G.R. No.

226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which
provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The
Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and
under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as
VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in
his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of
powers among the three equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the
motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the
Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a
Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph
3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.]
9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining,
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It
is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-
making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows
plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law,
R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible
in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with
traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent
application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law,
that is, to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power
of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme
Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions.
Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165
unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the
prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016;
hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
 I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA

BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT

ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE
RULES OF PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E.

LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that
the petition should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1)
the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should
have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the
RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review
because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no
actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the
lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless,
without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make
exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive
ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of
substantial and transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the
Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing"
proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young
citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the
drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the
rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on
the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the
gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the
Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally
eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters
should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone
else depends for enlightenment and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may
brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure
as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla
discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain
and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the
history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular
trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it
was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article
VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and
are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a
passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951
and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now,
for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of
law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to
"repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the
judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the
Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others,
it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a
power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered
the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers
debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There
was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached
wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to
withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The
changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing
consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their
inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts
on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court
(Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The

Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29
Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-
Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket
Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the
GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by
Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of

R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
Our institutional independence.34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940,
when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the
fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained
under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January
1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116
provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party
and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial.
Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained,
Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a]
conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes
of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other
matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial
conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial,
the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea
of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful
defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of
the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon.
Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in
nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are
procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are
substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in another.
It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great
difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is
taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction
of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such
as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive
rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional
dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so
that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43
Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or
two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State
to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners
failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved
by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and
the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of
trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the
accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases
were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or
because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges
to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his
favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to
disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity
of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded.
Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from
justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or
reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject
him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and
disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or
their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity
to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
the accused only.44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules,
which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive
rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted
accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that
forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This
provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay
arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a
way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to
be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the
administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty
and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional
processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State
there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt
may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial
issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its
burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition
of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during
pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release;
and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a
trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt
start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors
conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those
charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49
There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement
is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create
a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right
by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a
lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a
waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be
heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by
trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go
to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for
judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition
to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible
and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide
how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot
accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been
"properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the
accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a
lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining
or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the
trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it
arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's
evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of
the defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary
to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified
version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining
on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017

TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court, equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for
violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous
drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of
said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power

of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon
this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress,
in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the
provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided
in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule
14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal
Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v.
Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation
from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al.
– Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section
14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the
legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate
rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our
institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary
to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version
thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on
drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of
the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule
really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as
the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights.
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way
of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
“important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of
justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.”
There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is
that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed,
economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither
create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an
existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying
him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent
to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty
is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence
on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the
prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion
should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty
could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. The ruling on the motion
must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is
improper and irregular.
 G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN,

Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S.
BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially

acknowledged so to be[.]"1 ChanRo blesVirtua lawlibrary

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by
petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of
public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private
respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of
the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively
suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA,
ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8
(WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive
suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of
Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and
construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct

a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the
1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them
with six (6) administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities
attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building
project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in
the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2)
P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4)
P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6)
P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract32
on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and
approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97
on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on
December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on
October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati
Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract41
on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,43
and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and
P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining
balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking
Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and
architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P429,011.48.49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special
Panel).50 Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of
the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive
suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the
requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the
evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of
the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the
Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids;
and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and
(b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if
proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective
positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases
filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to
immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of
the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City
Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the
issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that
he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the
five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first
term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned
his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong,
maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold
public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of
the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the
preventive suspension order through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director,
Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati
City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the
Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C.
Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr.
(Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay,
Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier
that day.67 Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more
prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness
of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the
administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying
the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being
restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already been served and
implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police,
and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or
degrading the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary
Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s
filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March
19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for
willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension
order.77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay,
Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases
were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman
filed the present petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015
Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which
states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83
and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt
is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and
therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this
case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that
it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as
this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant
the issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the
CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear and
unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively
liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a
condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.88
As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay,
Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty
of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact
that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power
to punish contempt.89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it
were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of
the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right
to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view
of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-
election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this
regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay,
Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94
corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor
Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely
effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there
was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3,
4, and 24, 2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation
doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes
of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the
condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before
it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties.
Thereafter, they were required to file their respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the
Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his
Memorandum the following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on
each other's memoranda, and the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda.106
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply
stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its
Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her
Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among
others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution. chanrobleslaw

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted
before this Court, the main issues to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the
assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; cralawlawlibrary

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453; cralawlawlibrary

III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman; cralawlawlibrary

IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and
eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay,
Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious. chanrobleslaw

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court
prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or
agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case.110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of
the lower court or agency, x x x."111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a
petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely
of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first
time, the question on the authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put
to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of
key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no
less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the
propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer
who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to
certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior
reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No.
139504 before the CA, is justified. chanrobleslaw

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless
proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale
is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority
of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be
preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings
relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this
Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his
comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no
reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the
Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or
proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."120
Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the
main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer
to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers,
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to
investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122
Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or
application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with
the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to
conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is
unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does
not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken
only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory
construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought
in the words employed to express it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If
the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary to
look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was
enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was
meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation,
and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if
followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true
expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not
conclusive."124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a
statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be
adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the
Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on
the matter of judicial review of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the
following Senate deliberations:127

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase
"petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So
that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition
for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more
difficult to reverse the decision under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of
facts of the Ombudsman would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will
be a very strict appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive
remedies available to a respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme
Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential
appointee who is the respondent, if there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the
right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate
action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law
principle that before one can go to court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx
available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.
xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method
of appeal from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari ?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the
effect that the finding of facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I
concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a
matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the
Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to
make it harder to have a judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have
enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a
petition for review and a petition for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935 Constitution
appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But
under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the
court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will
not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a
determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or
committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment,
Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated,
Mr. President.

xxxx
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should
it be the Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and
has to be the Supreme Court to make the final determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to
introduce an appropriate change during the period of Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word
CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the
provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the
exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes
after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the
"review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for
review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then
dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a
petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the
amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was
approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari"
are nowhere to be found in the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that
this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural
remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that
the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even
commented upon during the oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or
clarification made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited
deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the
CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another
Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually
reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's
decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph),
and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if
supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of
the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on
any of the following grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; cralawlawlibrary

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided,
That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest
of justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition
for certiorari" should be taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-
known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed
by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was
passed way back in 1989130 and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27,
RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly
explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari ,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for
reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a
copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning
of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any
appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ; cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of
remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any
decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the
exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a
generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive
"or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal,
following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be
understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also
separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding
made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the
specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy
taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of
Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters
involved, the assignment of errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the
allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought
to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the
petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of
judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no
record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon
admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole
record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

 RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during
its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a
suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65
petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications
of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In
fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65
petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the
lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile
systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony,
and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no
other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies
against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule
45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on
remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of
procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of
lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated
upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a
Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the
remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also
increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent
to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA
6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of
the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of
"judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and
ruling in Fabian were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme
Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we
invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other
rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45
from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments
or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law." We pointedly said: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck
down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA
under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or
findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are
in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the
manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed,
the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This
procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a
party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall
explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the
government and the judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to
overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a
statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to
declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in
the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a
court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are
ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court
is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where
that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction
in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr.
before the CA in order to nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an
interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari
against unappelable issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not
directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension
order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule
65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here
being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly
imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari assailing a final and unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in
this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation,
it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed
with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the
Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy
against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case
was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16,
2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over
the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the
objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and
WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no
jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive
suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in
conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea
that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it
from judicial intervention,"157 particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from
the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or
political pressure would."159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of
the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each
for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may
likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical
underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to
serve as the people's medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and
misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize their
objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their
function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-
mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate.
Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint
or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979,
the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan
himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the
prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by
constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article
II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read: chanRobles virtualLawlibrary

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in
correlation, the impetus behind its independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision
of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly
check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13
(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further
realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress,
and the Judiciary.ChanRo blesVirtua lawlibrary

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions,
although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by
RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with
the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key
Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it
fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom
and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office, x x x.

xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful
government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling
investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate ,
with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court
observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal
autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"163;cralawlawlibrary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices
allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire
fabric of our constitutional system is based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for
independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935
Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of
one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions
geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from
control or supervision of the Executive Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to
be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At
least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we
emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the
Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they
discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the
President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the
[Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the
tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be
placed under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior -
but is similar in degree and kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution
to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a
republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a]
Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially
unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of
the President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8
(2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since
said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is,
hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law,
unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made; cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its]
freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its
budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so
as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the
ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from
political harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that
is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the
concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains

that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending
provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites
the following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I
would just like to inquire for the record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood
that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary
to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction
against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest
constitutional bodies, is to subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an
injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be
allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code
where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources.
Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary
mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over
matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the
CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional
writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this
provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings.173
More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."176 The
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly
known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.
(Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when
one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another."178 In particular, "there
is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department's functions."179

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the
Supreme Court and all such lower courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may
be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of
Appeals,181 the Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183 were established. Later, through the passage of RA
1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of Tax Appeals, and the
Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all
courts, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxxx ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter
of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction
was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of
this Court (subject to the aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and
the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the
Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the
concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of

the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals.189

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law,
said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial
power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been
defined as the "totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears
and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the
1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is
a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has
acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of
procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within
which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court
elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power
or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To
be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter."194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-
making authority, which, under the 1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected
to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules,
thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision
of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show200 that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with
Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of
powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the
former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed
by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's
proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual
reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra.
The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure,
among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate
procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled
that the sole object of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case
can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial
controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause
of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a
TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section
3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207
thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
under certain procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent
power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its
acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the
exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit
of the said law or rules.
Chan RoblesV irtualawlib rary

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or

jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the
Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to
give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the
efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of
its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter
jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to
enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any
attempted thwarting of such process.

xxxx cralawlawlibrary

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers
are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional
principle, articulated way back in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is
conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts
deal with diverse matters over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural
[rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of
inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the
specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to
accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which

prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage
license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e
said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that
". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution
carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the
administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an

exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of
Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28
Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having
obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of
power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the
case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or
preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its
judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the
principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is
exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the
purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the
legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power
may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature
to interfere with or to inhibit the performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided
judicial functions, x x x

xxxx

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of
a cause of action, has, as incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things
reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This includes the
inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute
does not necessarily mean that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right
to encroach upon the constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative
action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to control
a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature,
provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are
matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of
implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the
applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending
litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its
legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment
of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments
exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing
fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was,
nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional
independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create
statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5),
Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally
separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress
creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is
exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227
because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act
on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the
relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court
under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent
to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription,
as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through
an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if
no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly,
the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered
nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot
be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As
earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been
acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial
power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of
procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy
against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of
procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay)
mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under
the rubric of what is called provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is
not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section
5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. This is the power, the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already
been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation
in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be
rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the
supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of
procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that
was created by Congress. In the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special
agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular
court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A
rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a
particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is
through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and
defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which
all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws
that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.230

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not
oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well
as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure,
deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme
Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the
authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were
merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9
(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction
in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order
is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court
first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In
Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction, stating that its
purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers
and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure

and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions,
is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is
considered to be a preventive measure. (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV
provides:chanRoblesv irtualLawlibrary

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under
preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension
imposed upon the employee found guilty.232 (Emphases supplied) ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA
6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in
office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition
of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance
of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233 ChanRoblesV irtualawlibrary
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the
Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the
basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based
on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court
emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative
complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled
jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating
the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it
would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of
the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari
petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was
based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that
Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati
condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there
were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged
payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA -
still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied
by the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the
payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the
condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which should have been raised and passed
upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court
agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling
in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since
condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA
did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the
evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it
appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient
to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant
with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that
the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior
term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In
other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative
defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against
him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the
Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the
condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness
of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of
liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential
creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his
second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative
charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and
usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on
December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for
the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and
therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as
well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and
when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel
issue - that is, whether or not an elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to
American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably,
to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views
with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the
prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it
proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove
one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no
established weight of authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation,
which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to remove
him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral
arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation
doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as
literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly
applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from
his current term or office for misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office
is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a
particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas
statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present
term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed
prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission, omission, or
neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's
resolution was contingent upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the
Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase "misfeasance
of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language
making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged
against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga
County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that
the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of
removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the
taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the
Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office
resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him unfit to continue in
office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense
(see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate
Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular
term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in
enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making
body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for misconduct
for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in
the same office for which he has been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory,"
which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is premised on
the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather,
regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are
grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see
Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand
Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in
cases where the condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the
public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of condonation
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected
during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the
Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine
since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon
defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex
rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery
and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the
defendant to make restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and
neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there
is a "weight of authority" in the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent
exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate on
condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-
making. "[They] are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore,
the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and
carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As
adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful
countervailing considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an
intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As
the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal
abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within
which it thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide,
we can undecide."271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the
legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino People under
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course,
the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's
judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer
was elected for each term is separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and
disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell,
40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of
Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67;
State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby

cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs.
Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273 (emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and
character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50
LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the
people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of
his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation
doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the
condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is
different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as
a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace
of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President
who may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987
Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor
Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the
proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the
condonation doctrine by stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy."
According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by
administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to
defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the
administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and the
incidents related therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the
doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively
charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City,
executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding
the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's
background and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the
determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine should be the time when the
contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a
prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding
term, do not negate the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective
official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein
the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The
condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the
reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days
before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior
term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation
doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to
disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked
that it would have been prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary
restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia,
and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015
Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for
condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted
for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as
jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which
was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state
laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation -
that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative
offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence
largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in
the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the
adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in
order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of
condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;284
thus, the unbending rule is that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.285
Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation
must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the
political branches of government.286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided
within the context of the 1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states
that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service."287 Perhaps owing
to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of
jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there
was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that
originated from select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent
a significant change. The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public
officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and
declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and
shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the
1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article
II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled
power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on
the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy.
More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the
people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Chan RoblesV irtualawlibra ry

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
"public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of
government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil
Service Commission,290 and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.291

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an
elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292
otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on
October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following grounds: chanRo blesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; cralawlawlibrary

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; cralawlawlibrary

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; cralawlawlibrary

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary

(e) Abuse of authority; cralawlawlibrary

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and
sangguniang barangay; cralawlawlibrary

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from
office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from
service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public
office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of

retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar
from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he
meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only pertains to
the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that
the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period
of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this
Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term
of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the
notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability
arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative
offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised
by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for
the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline
enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the
penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions
wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a
constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a
misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office
does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one
case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section
40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed
that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in
this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability.
There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only
invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the
official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299 Hence, owing to
either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued
adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension
beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said
official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an
officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as
previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative
liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts
would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to
be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency
chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say
that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation
of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction,
then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it
be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether
in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence,
it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are
assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human
experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The
Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded
in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is
easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their
votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge
of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown.
As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done
in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe
to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in
the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which
one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in
this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of
US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation
doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as
Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should
be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.305
Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council.306

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must
control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-
bound to enforce obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general
rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein
it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions
form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not
backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a
law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract
and hence, is unconstitutional.310
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and
rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is
barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of
time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the
condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of
discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law
or existing jurisprudence."312

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the
assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To
recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on
the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the
subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor
Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at
that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a
grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the
Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and
imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him,
the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive
suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the
Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce,
dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant
administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding
the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its
foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As
explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise
moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain
in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it
were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As
extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that
public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all
times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a
defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional
character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local
officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve
an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal
discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes
it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and
now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public
office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials
against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman
has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from
the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct -
involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct
- were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315
Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not
evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As
mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to
uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the
subject of discussion moot. chanrobleslaw

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the
final issue on whether or not the CA's Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot
be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and
the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office.318 However, a reading of
the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to
contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive
for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s
contempt petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon.
Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and
Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and
Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of
three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she
may properly raise her objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an
impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to
give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put,
absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would
then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this
score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the
Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs
by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the
Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued therefor; cralawlawlibrary

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in

effect;
cralawlawlibrary

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s
(Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the
Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay,
Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-
0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and
OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is
DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with
utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015

(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14,
RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually
prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted
by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by
any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part
of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s constitutional rule-
making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that
was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both
integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to
the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation
of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional
injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the
constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no
provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or
findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also
unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should
squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they
“cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the
existence of the CA’s subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed,
the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily
rejected unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in
which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu
may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed.
The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
 RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO and EVA
DAMASO Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22,
2003, and the Resolution2 dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment (Civil Case No. 93-2588) against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City, Branch 73. Petitioner is also the private complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 92-
8157 and 92-8158 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with respondent Generoso Damaso
as accused. Upon motion of respondents, said civil and criminal cases were consolidated and
jointly tried.

On February 21, 2003, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 dated January 16, 2003, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED

in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of evidence.

As for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is hereby rendered
against the plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is
further ordered to pay to the defendants the following:

A. P50,000.00 as moral damages

b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and

c. the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.4

On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated Match 4, 2003, stating that
he received a duplicate original copy of the decision on February 21, 2003. Respondents opposed
said motion. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, on May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 28,
2003, stating instead that he received a copy of the decision dated January 16, 2003 only on
March 8, 2003 and of the Order dated May 9, 2003 denying his motion for reconsideration on
May 19, 2003.
On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for having
been filed out of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in
the presence of both parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have
received a copy of the decision on said date of promulgation, the RTC ruled that since petitioner
had filed a motion for reconsideration on the 13th day (March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the
notice of appeal when he filed it ten (10) days after allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003
on May 19, 2003. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner on June 20, 2003, but the
same was denied by the RTC on October 1, 2003.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA found the petition
unmeritorious and dismissed the same in its Decision dated December 22, 2003. Ruling that
petitioner was bound by his judicial admission that he received the Decision of the RTC when it
was promulgated on February 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner's period within which to file
an appeal had lapsed by the time the Notice of Appeal was filed on May 29, 2003. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated February 20,
2004.

Hence, this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner's period to
appeal had lapsed, as such ruling was premised on misapprehension of facts and contradicted by
evidence on record. The CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the
particular evidence upon which the same was based; and there were supposedly some facts that,
if properly noticed and considered, would justify a different conclusion.

The petition deserves some consideration.

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals5 that by virtue
of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all
courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the
Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of
the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final
order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.6

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,7 to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005 while

the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x

xxx
With the advent of the "fresh period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of
motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the
denial of that motion.

The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that the appeal shall be taken "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from." The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of
the "final order," x x x.

xxx

The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted - from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of "final order"
appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a
notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-
day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the
therein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a
party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the
original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of "fresh period rule,"
expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes. The "fresh period rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in
which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can be
made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger
of violating anyone else's rights. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the
date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in
Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,8 stating thus:
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general
rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing.

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the
quested retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order
that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues ―
they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which
an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be
applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to injustice, if
not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or
in the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were
issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and
final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period rule" while those
later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not.9

Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then,
ineluctably, the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner is
entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days − counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner's
receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision − within
which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only
ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to
appeal had not yet lapsed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution dated
February 20, 2004, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated June 2, 2003 in Civil Case No. 93-2588, and its Order
dated October 1, 2003, reiterating the June 2, 2003 Order, are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, is DIRECTED to give due course to
petitioner's Notice of Appeal dated May 28, 2003. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

APPEALS: CAN THE FRESH PERIOD

RULE (NEYPES DOCTRINE) BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE EFFECT? OTHERWISE
STATED, DOES IT APPLY TO ALL CASES
PENDING AT THE TIME OF
ITS PASSAGE?
YES. The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had
lapsed prior to the date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained
by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, June 25,
2008, stating thus:

“The determinative issue is whether the fresh period rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the general
rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure” (emphasis
supplied).

Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not

create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

In Sumiran vs. Damaso, the Supreme Court stated that since this case was already
pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the Court must
also apply the ruling to the present case. Ergo, petitioner is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days −
counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioners receipt of the Order denying his motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Decision − within which to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when
he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his
motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed (SUMIRAN vs. DAMASO,
G.R. No. 162518, August, 19, 2009, Third Division, Peralta, J.).
JUDITH YU, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge
Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Judith Yu, et al."1

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties’ pleadings, are briefly summarized below.

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa
against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a
penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of ₱3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same
amount as the fine.2

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the
RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the
crime for which she was convicted.3

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for
lack of merit.4

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18,
2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.6

On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes
for his guidance.7

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10
days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.8

On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.9
On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.

On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC
from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.10

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she
filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the
evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the
Rules.11

In view of the OSG’s manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the
petition.12

In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to
extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the
interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases,
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.13

Issue

The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.

The Court’s Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege
and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.14 The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the
judgment appealed from.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within
which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from
the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.16

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that
constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the
Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP
129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section
6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean
exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal
results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new
trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases
under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely
civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal
cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists
why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in
civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case
– a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We
must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over
time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is
not allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18

Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal
on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the
date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa
Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over
the prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent
Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-
01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the
appealed decision on the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Judith Yu vs Samson-Tatad
 GR No. 170979 February 9, 2011

Facts:
An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with the RTC which
convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial
with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of
the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for
new trial for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15 days
from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal.
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a Motion for
execution of the decision.

Issue:
Does the fresh period rule apply to appeals in criminal cases?

Ruling:
Yes, to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, litigants today
need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the
15-day period is now counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
 G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS;
AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the reconsideration1 of the resolution
promulgated on August 19, 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court due to its non-compliance with the
provisions of Rule 64, particularly for: (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission
of the proof of service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents.3chanRobles virtualLawlibrary

Antecedents

Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a

memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay
secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium payment,
and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-
audit.4 The latter office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its appeal was denied.

Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the COA.5 On November 15,
2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and
Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are expressly
vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for barangay workers; and noting the
LGU’s failure to comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act).

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012,7 and filed its motion
for reconsideration on January 14, 2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial
being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014.10 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the petition for
certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014
for (a) the late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of service and verified
declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. cralawred

Issues

In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed the petition for certiorari
within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals;11 and that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in compliance with
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having overlooked the submission of a
verified declaration; and prays that the declaration attached to the motion for reconsideration be
admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by
previously submitting a compact disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes.
It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COA in issuing the assailed decision. cralawred

Ruling

We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.

I
Petitioner did not comply with
the rule on proof of service

The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the petition for certiorari complied
with the requirement on proof of service.

The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt,
viz:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made
by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card
shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.

Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall
consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which
must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that
there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.13 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service executed by one Marcelino
T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by registered mail “under
Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to the appropriate spaces
found on pages 64-65 of the petition.”14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of
what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered matters, not the registry
receipts themselves. The rule requires to be appended the registry receipts, not their
reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This was the
reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply
with the requirement of proof of service.15 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

II
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes
did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a
petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the
fresh period rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of
the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the motion for new trial.16 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioner’s position cannot be sustained.

There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64.

As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is
on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is given due course
only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law
warranting the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final order.17 In contrast,
the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the
Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction,
not errors of judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the
COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved
party is allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or
final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.19 In the
latter, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under
the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the
motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which
shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of denial.20 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was 31 days after
receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012.21 Pursuant to Section 3
of Rule 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to
file the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only
until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which
was 25 days too late.

We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the
recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed
that the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to
relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason for liberality, the petition
cannot be allowed to prosper.
 III
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit

The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.

The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion,
to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took
almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4) the matter
involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the Local
Government Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and
Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local Government Code better than former
Senator Aquilino Pimentel who offered an opinion on the matter.25 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so
patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.26 chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not sufficiently disclose how the COA
committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not
approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed delays taken by the COA in
deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in demonstrating an abuse of
discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of
the Local Government Code in the Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from
the COA Commissioners’ own did not matter, for it was the latter’s adjudication that had any
value and decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally officials
entrusted with the authority for that purpose.

It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner for the
further reason of lack of sufficient publication as required by the Government Procurement Act.
In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the petitioner’s claim.

IV
Petitioner and its counsel
exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members

The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner’s non-compliance with
the requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even “a perfunctory scrutiny” of the petition
for certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it had attached an affidavit of service
to the petition. It goes on to make the following statements, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the PETITION and its annexes
up to its last page, thus, the erroneous finding that there was non-submission of the proof of
service;

26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this Honorable Court who
took the observation from the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in
truth and in fact, it is not;27

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill
consequences of their own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily
lay blame on others like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed harsh and
disrespectful language that accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and recklessness in
the performance of their function of adjudication.

We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the Court and its
Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive because it was unfounded
and undeserved. As this resolution earlier clarifies, the petition for certiorari did not contain a
proper affidavit of service. We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and its
counsel been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and more contrite, they would have
desisted from their harshness and disrespect towards the Court and its Members. Although we
are not beyond error, we assure the petitioner and its counsel that our resolutions and
determinations are arrived at or reached with much care and caution, aware that the lives,
properties and rights of the litigants are always at stake. If there be errors, they would be
unintended, and would be the result of human oversight. But in this instance the Court and its
Members committed no error. The petition bore only cut reproductions of the supposed registry
receipts, which even a mere “perfunctory scrutiny” would not pass as the original registry
receipts required by the Rules of Court.

Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully explain in
writing why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and
disrespectful language towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case, Atty. Fortaleza
should further show cause why he should not be disbarred. chanrobles law

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit;
ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing
within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court;
and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same period why he should not
be disbarred.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Fortune Life Insurance Company v. COA &

Province of Antique, 2015
Petitioner received the copy of the COA decision on Dec. 14, 2012. It filed an MR which was denied,
the denial being received on July 14, 2014. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
SC on August 13, 2014.
Petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for
review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period rule,
the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the MR
or the motion for new trial.
SC held that petitioner's position cannot be sustained. Under Rule 64, if the motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than 5 days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial. Thus, petitioner had only until July 19, 2014 to file the petition. However, it
filed the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late. #barops 9
 [G.R. NO. 184915 : June 30, 2009]

NILO T. PATES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMELITA B.

ALMIRANTE, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 dismissed the petition in caption pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.' The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial
or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is
denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not
be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

taking into account the following material antecedents:

A. February 1, 2008 - The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the
petition);

b. February 4, 2008 - The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates (Petitioner) received a copy of the
February 1, 2008 Resolution;

c. February 8, 2008 - The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration (MR) of the February 1,
2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)

d. September 18, 2008 - The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying the petitioner's
MR (also assailed in the petition).

e. September 22, 2008 - The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution of
September 18, 2008

Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari, i.e., 30 days from
notice of the final COMELEC Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the
petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in
preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was
October 20, 2008 - the following Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The
petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution
of dismissal of November 11, 2008.

The Motion for Reconsideration

The petitioner asks us in his "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order" to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that
the petition was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in
a number of cases decided beginning the year 2005. The "fresh period" refers to the original
period provided under the Rules of Court counted from notice of the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration by the tribunal below, without deducting the period for the preparation and filing
of the motion for reconsideration.

He claims that, historically, the fresh period rule was the prevailing rule in filing petitions for
certiorari. This Court, he continues, changed this rule when it promulgated the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and Circular No. 39-98, which both provided for the filing of petitions within the
remainder of the original period, the "remainder" being the original period less the days used up
in preparing and filing a motion for reconsideration. He then points out that on September 1,
2000 or only three years after, this Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC bringing back the
fresh period rule. According to the petitioner, the reason for the change, which we supposedly
articulated in Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission,1 was the tremendous confusion
generated by Circular No. 39-98.

The fresh period rule, the petitioner further asserts, was subsequently applied by this Court in the
following cases:

(1) Neypes v. Court of Appeals2 which thenceforth applied the fresh

eriod rule to ordinary appeals of decisions of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals;

(2) Spouses de los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat3 reiterating Neypes;

(3) Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez4 which, following Neypes, applied
the fresh period rule to ordinary appeals from the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court to the
Regional Trial Court; and cralawlibrary

(4) Romero v. Court of Appeals5 which emphasized that A.M. No. 00-02-03-SC is a curative
statute that may be applied retroactively.

A reading of the ruling in these cases, the petitioner argues, shows that this Court has
consistently held that the order or resolution denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial
is considered as the final order finally disposing of the case, and the date of its receipt by a party
is the correct reckoning point for counting the period for appellate review.

The Respondent's Comment

We asked the respondents to comment on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and its related
cases, asked via a "Manifestation and Motion" that it be excused from filing a separate comment.
We granted the OSG's manifestation and motion.
For her part, respondent Emelita B. Almirante (respondent Almirante) filed a comment stating
that: (1) we are absolutely correct in concluding that the petition was filed out of time; and (2)
the petitioner's reliance on Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No.
00-02-03-SC) is totally misplaced, as Rule 64, not Rule 65, is the vehicle for review of
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC. Respondent Almirante points out
that Rule 64 and Rule 65 are different; Rule 65 provides for a 60-day period for filing petitions
for certiorari, while Rule 64 provides for 30 days.

OUR RULING

We do not find the motion for reconsideration meritorious.

A. As a Matter of Law

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this
reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a Petition for Certiorari, subject to the exception clause -
"except as hereinafter provided."6

Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has not
challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside the period required by Section 3,
Rule 64; he merely insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule
64.

Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter
rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two - i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to - is
Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision
or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the
filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead
of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).

Thus, as a matter of law, our ruling of November 11, 2008 to dismiss the petition for late filing
cannot but be correct. This ruling is not without its precedent; we have previously ordered a
similar dismissal in the earlier case of Domingo v. Commission on Elections.7 The Court, too,
has countless times in the past stressed that the Rules of Court must be followed. Thus, we had
this to say in Fortich v. Corona:8

Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since they
are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in
the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in
pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons
shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies," the adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances wherein
this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal
interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

As emphasized above, exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons may have existed in the
past when we either suspended the operation of the Rules or exempted a particular case from
their application.9 But, these instances were the exceptions rather than the rule, and we invariably
took this course of action only upon a meritorious plea for the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court based on attendant exceptional circumstances. These uncommon exceptions allowed us to
maintain the stability of our rulings, while allowing for the unusual cases when the dictates of
justice demand a correspondingly different treatment.

Under this unique nature of the exceptions, a party asking for the suspension of the Rules of
Court comes to us with the heavy burden of proving that he deserves to be accorded exceptional
treatment. Every plea for a liberal construction of the Rules must at least be accompanied by an
explanation of why the party-litigant failed to comply with the rules and by a justification for the
requested liberal construction.10

Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any compelling reason to

warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his petition. He failed to explain why his
filing was late. Other than his appeal to history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain
why we should adopt and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.

To us, the petitioner's omissions are fatal, as his motion does not provide us any reason specific
to his case why we should act as he advocates.

B. As a Matter of Policy

In harking back to the history of the fresh period rule, what the petitioner apparently wants - for
reasons of uniformity and convenience - is the simultaneous amendment of Section 3, Rule 64
and the application of his proposed new rule to his case. To state the obvious, any amendment of
this provision is an exercise in the power of this Court to promulgate rules on practice and
procedure as provided by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Our rulemaking, as every
lawyer should know, is different from our adjudicatory function. Rulemaking is an act of
legislation, directly assigned to us by the Constitution, that requires the formulation of policies
rather than the determination of the legal rights and obligations of litigants before us. As a rule,
rulemaking requires that we consult with our own constituencies, not necessarily with the parties
directly affected in their individual cases, in order to ensure that the rule and the policy that it
enunciates are the most reasonable that we can promulgate under the circumstances, taking into
account the interests of everyone - not the least of which are the constitutional parameters and
guidelines for our actions. We point these out as our adjudicatory powers should not be confused
with our rulemaking prerogative. ςηα ñrοblεš νιr†υα l lα ω lι brαrÿ

We acknowledge that the avoidance of confusion through the use of uniform standards is not
without its merits. We are not unmindful, too, that no less than the Constitution requires that
"motions for reconsideration of [division] decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc."11 Thus, the ruling of the Commission en banc on reconsideration is effectively a new
ruling rendered separately and independently from that made by a division.

Counterbalanced against these reasons, however, are other considerations no less weighty, the
most significant of which is the importance the Constitution and this Court, in obedience to the
Constitution, accord to elections and the prompt determination of their results. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υα l lα ω lιbrαrÿ

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly requires that the COMELEC's rules of
procedure should expedite the disposition of election cases. This Court labors under the same
command, as our proceedings are in fact the constitutional extension of cases that start with the
COMELEC.

Based on these considerations, we do not find convenience and uniformity to be reasons

sufficiently compelling to modify the required period for the filing of petitions for certiorari
under Rule 64. While the petitioner is correct in his historical data about the Court's treatment of
the periods for the filing of the different modes of review, he misses out on the reason why the
period under Section 3, Rule 64 has been retained. The reason, as made clear above, is
constitutionally-based and is no less than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt
determination of election results. This reason far outweighs convenience and uniformity. We
significantly note that the present petition itself, through its plea for the grant of a restraining
order, recognizes the need for haste in deciding election cases.

C. Our Liberal Approach

Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to suspend the rules to
come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has blundered by reading the wrong applicable
provision. The Rules of Court are with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice;
litigants cannot, after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of
these rules.12 Our ruling in Lapid v. Laurea13 succinctly emphasized this point when we said:

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure,
rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly
disposition of cases and, thus, effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard
of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
[Emphasis supplied.]
We add that even for this Court, liberality does not signify an unbridled exercise of discretion. It
has its limits; to serve its purpose and to preserve its true worth, it must be exercised only in the
most appropriate cases.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 is hereby declared FINAL. Let entry of judgment be
made in due course.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 162144-54 November 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, HON. MA. NATIVIDAD M. DIZON, in
her capacity as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, PANFILO M.
LACSON, JEWEL F. CANSON, ROMEO M. ACOP, FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,
MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO, CEZAR O. MANCAO II, ZOROBABEL S. LAURELES,
GLENN G. DUMLAO, ALMARIO A. HILARIO, JOSE ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, GIL
C. MENESES, ROLANDO ANDUYAN, JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, RICARDO G.
DANDAN, CEASAR TANNAGAN, VICENTE P. ARNADO, ROBERTO T.
LANGCAUON, ANGELITO N. CAISIP, ANTONIO FRIAS, CICERO S. BACOLOD,
WILLY NUAS, JUANITO B. MANAOIS, VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, CECILIO T. MORITO, REYNALDO C. LAS PINAS, WILFREDO G
CUARTERO, ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, OSMUNDO B. CARINO, NORBERTO
LASAGA, LEONARDO GLORIA, ALEJANDRO G LIWANAG, ELMER FERRER and
ROMY CRUZ, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected members of the Kuratong
Bale/eng Gang, is once again before this Court this time questioning, among other things, the
trial qmrt's determination of the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal
actions.1

The Facts and the Case

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police's
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force
Habagat (then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management
Command ([TMC] led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal
Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo M. Acop ), and
National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Jewel F.
Canson) killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang2 along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City.

Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press
that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain.
After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved, including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson, Romeo M. Acop,
Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O. Mancao II, and 28 others
(collectively, the respondents).3 On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the
finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of respondents Zubia,
Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to mere accessory. On arraignment, Lacson
pleaded not guilty.

Upon respondents’ motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank
of Chief Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic Act
(R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction by deleting the word "principal"
from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all pending cases where trial had not begun. As a
result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder
cases.

Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R. 1280964 but this Court
upheld its validity. Nonetheless, the Court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC
of Quezon City since the amended informations contained no allegations that respondents
committed the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions as
required by R.A. 8249.

Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr.,
could arraign respondents in the re-docketed Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2
Delos Reyes and the other prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits. Some of the victims’
heirs also executed affidavits of desistance. These prompted the respondents to file separate
motions for the determination of probable cause before the issuance of warrants of arrests.

On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for
lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza sought to revive the
cases against respondents by requesting the Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another
preliminary investigation in their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu
and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos. In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez constituted a
panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested investigation.

Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his co-accused filed a
petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Manila in Civil Case 01-100933. In an Order dated June 5, 2001,
that court denied the plea for temporary restraining order. Thus, on June 6, 2001 the panel of
prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-accused liable as principals for 11
counts of murder, resulting in the filing of separate informations against them in Criminal Cases
01-101102 to 12 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by respondent
Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.

On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA), assailing the RTC of Manila’s order which allowed the renewed preliminary investigation
of the murder charges against him and his co-accused. Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. But on June 13, 2001 he sought the
suspension of the proceedings in that court.

In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Quezon City
from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before it. On August 24, 2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the
ground of double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89
was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years after when they were not revived.

Upon the prosecution’s appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,5 the Court ruled that, based on the
record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117
governing provisional dismissals. The records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion
for provisional dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause. Nowhere did he agree to some proposal for a
provisional dismissal of the cases. Furthermore, the heirs of the victims had no notice of any
motion for such provisional dismissal.

The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed the RTC of Quezon
City to try the cases with dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the
Court ordered the re-raffle of the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle,
however, the cases still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided over by
Judge Yadao.

On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth certificates showing that
they were minors. Apparently reacting to this, the prosecution amended the informations to show
such minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court. The request for recall
was denied.

On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before Branch 81, praying for the
re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the family courts in view of the changes in the two
informations. On October 24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-
abundanti cautela on the motions to determine probable cause.

On November 12, 20036 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for re-
raffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors.
She also granted the motions for determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases against
the respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those
they submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or disqualify Judge
Yadao and for reconsideration of her order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her
for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.7 On January 14, 2004, the prosecution filed an urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with motion for cancellation of the hearing
on motion for reconsideration.

On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to recuse her, prompting
the prosecution to appeal from that order. Further, on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued
another order, denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2003 that dismissed the action against the respondents. In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same. Finally, on January 26, 2004 Judge Yadao
issued an order, denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of its January 16, 2004
Order not only for lack of merit but also for having become moot and academic.

On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the notices of appeal that it
filed in the cases. Subsequently, on March 3, 2004 it filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The prosecution presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in allowing
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to other than among the RTC of Quezon
City’s family courts.

2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took cognizance
of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the prosecution’s view that such cases fell
under the jurisdiction of family courts.

3. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she did not inhibit
and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the cases.

4. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the
criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause and barred the presentation of
additional evidence in support of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

5. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she adopted certain
policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her court.

The Court’s Rulings

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents’ contention that the
prosecution’s resort to special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Since the trial
court dismissed the criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution’s remedy was to appeal
to the CA from that order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal.8 Here, the
prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject cases. But it
reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective,
speedy, and adequate remedy.9 In other words, the prosecution’s move was not a case of
forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief that respondent Judge Yadao
gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was
the proper and all-encompassing remedy for the prosecution. The Court is not prepared to say
that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its action directly with this
Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the
CA, and the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence
does not give the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.10 In any case, the
immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of time that has passed since the
crime took place, and the numerous times these cases have come before this Court probably
warrant a waiver of such procedural lapse.

1. Raffle of the Cases

The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge gravely abused her
discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 under a separate category which did
not restrict their raffle to the city’s special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC
Administrative Order 36-96. Further, the prosecution points out that she violated Administrative
Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the raffle. The presiding judges of
these two branches, both heinous crimes courts eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been
appointed to the CA.

The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle of the subject cases.
The raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and civil cases. Criminal cases cognizable by
special criminal courts were separately listed. Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a
separate heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely indicated
that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.

The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from raffle since these
branches remained without regularly appointed judges. Although the pairing judges of these
branches had authority to act on incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean
that such branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.

Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did not then object to the
manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution raised the question only when it filed this
petition, a clear afterthought.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court’s October 7, 2003 Resolution directed a re-
raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the prosecution in the meantime amended the
informations to reflect the fact that two of the murder victims were minors. For this reason, the
Executive Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5 of R.A.
8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family
courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the
victim is a minor. Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not
less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall
promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent may have incurred.
(Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason,
when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule. In
several cases,11 for instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with
the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a
family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder
cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would
appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents
who had become the real private offended parties.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. – A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;

xxxx

(e) the judge knows the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding. In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide for the compulsory
disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his
voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge since he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would
unfairly affect his attitude towards the parties or their cases. The mere imputation of bias,
partiality, and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing evidence that can
overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his duties according to law without fear or
favor. The Court will not disqualify a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse
nature of the judge’s rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.12

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited herself for improperly
submitting to a public interview on the day following her dismissal of the criminal cases against
the respondents. But the Court finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview. Judge
Yadao’s dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and stirred the
media into frenzy for correct information. Judge Yadao simply accommodated, not sought, the
requests for such an interview to clarify the basis of her order. There is no allegation that she
gave out false information. To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making public
disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao’s statement that a very close
relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondents. But
this statement merely shows that she cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her.
How can this constitute bias? Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she referred to
was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for reconsideration when
she said in her comment to the administrative complaint against her that such motion was merely
the prosecution’s stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the respondents.
The comment could of course not be regarded as a prejudgment of the issue since she had
precisely already issued an order holding that the complainant’s evidence failed to establish
probable cause against the respondents. And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a
motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who filed it. Judge Yadao
did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified at the time she filed her comment.

4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions
for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and
allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The prosecution stresses that under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause
for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of the investigating prosecutor’s
resolution as well as the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she had some
doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the investigating
prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the finding of probable cause within five
days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted the
Ombudsman’s findings when the latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of
robbery in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary
investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the trial of the cases. The
prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes
reasonably explained the prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it
is supported by substantial evidence.13

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new
affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable
cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records.
Besides, she received no new evidence from the respondents.14

The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents along with the criminal
informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine the presence of probable cause against the
respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu’s affidavit of March 24, 200115 in which he said that on May
17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered him to form two teams that
would go after suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the
Superville Subdivision in Parañaque City. Yu headed the assault team while Marlon
Sapla headed the perimeter defense. After the police team apprehended eight men inside
the safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit. The following day, Yu just
learned that the men and three others were killed in a shoot-out with the police in
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos’ affidavit of March 24, 200116 in which he said that he was
part of the perimeter defense during the Superville operation. After the assault team
apprehended eight male suspects, it brought them to Camp Crame in two vans. Ramos
then went to the office of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents
Lacson, Acop, Laureles, Villacorte and other police officers.

According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought to
Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this action had been
cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson nodded as a sign of approval.
Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa
diyan." Ramos then boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the
early morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the suspects. A
few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men arrived and claimed
responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes’ affidavit of April 24, 200117 in which he corroborated

Ramos’ statements. Medes said that he belonged to the same team that arrested the eight
male suspects. He drove the L-300 van in going to Commonwealth Avenue where the
suspects were killed.

4. Mario C. Enad’s affidavit of August 8, 199518 in which he claimed having served as

TMC civilian agent. At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to Superville Subdivision
together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and Nuas. Dumlao told Enad to stay in the
car and observe what went on in the house under surveillance. Later that night, other
police officers arrived and apprehended the men in the house. Enad went in and saw six
men lying on the floor while the others were handcuffed. Enad and his companions left
Sucat in the early morning of May 18, 1995. He fell asleep along the way but was
awaken by gunshots. He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire their guns at the L-
300 van containing the apprehended suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno’s affidavit of May 31, 200119 in which he corroborated what
Ramos said. Seno claimed that he was part of the advance party in Superville Subdivision
and was also in Commonwealth Avenue when the suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang were killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 199520 which narrated the
events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995. This report was submitted by Lacson,
Zubia, Acop and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports21 which stated that the suspected members of the
Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.
The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports, taken together with the
other documents of record, fail to establish probable cause against the respondents.

First. Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of Ramos, corroborated by
those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly heard the commanders of the various units
plan the killing of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue
in Quezon City and actually execute such plan. Yu’s testimony is limited to the capture of the
gang members and goes no further. He did not see them killed.

Second. Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the prosecution’s own
evidence—the PNP ABRITG’s After Operations Report of May 31, 1995—shows that these men
took no part in the operations against the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members. The report included
a comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson), Traffic
Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command (Acop), and National Capital
Region Command (Canson) who were involved. The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno
were not on that list. Notably, only Yu’s name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that list.
Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations and promotions, any
omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third. Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence against the respondents,
submitted in the course of the preliminary investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted in a related robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit. He
claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville Subdivision nor
Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng operations since he was in Bulacan on
May 17, 1995 and at his home on May 18.22 Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit
that he was on duty at the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.23

Fourth. The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and giving credence to
Ramos and Medes’ statements, dismissed the robbery case. More, it excluded Ramos from the
group of officers that it charged with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang. Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less skeptical than Judge Yadao
was in doubting the sudden reversal after six years of testimony of these witnesses.

Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he narrated, his role was
limited to cornering and arresting the suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe
house in Superville Subdivision. After his team turned the suspects over to an investigating unit,
he no longer knew what happened to them.

Fifth. True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong Baleleng Gang members
tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. But this finding cannot have any legal significance for
the purpose of the preliminary investigation of the murder cases against the respondents absent
sufficient proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao
should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when
the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30)
days from the filing of the complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause.24

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The
court’s first option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice. But that is not the case
here. Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record
that presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP
Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001, six years after it happened. It
would have been ridiculous to entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in
the five days required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they
should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.25

5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one public prosecutor and
one private prosecutor for all the offended parties but allowed each of the counsels representing
the individual respondents to be heard during the proceedings before it. She also unjustifiably
prohibited the prosecution’s use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample inherent and
administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its proceedings. Thus:

Sec. 5. Inherent powers of court. — Every court shall have power:

xxxx
(b) To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons empowered to
conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

xxxx

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

xxxx

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice;

xxxx

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor
and one private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable
cause but permitting counsels representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.26 The burden of establishing
probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose
interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private prosecutors
take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is
entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution’s private recording of the proceedings, courts
usually disallows such recordings because they create an unnecessary distraction and if allowed,
could prompt every lawyer, party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to
insist on being given the same privilege. Since the prosecution makes no claim that the official
recording of the proceedings by the court’s stenographer has been insufficient, the Court finds no
grave abuse of discretion in Judge Yadao’s policy against such extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the following assailed Orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:

1. the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-raffle, granted the
motions for determination of probable cause, and dismissed the criminal cases;

2. the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the respondents for the
immediate resolution of the three pending incidents before the court;

3. the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse and the urgent
supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification;

4. the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated November 12, 2003; and
 5. the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
January 16, 2004 Order.

SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, et al.

G.R. No. 162144-54 ; 13 November 2012

PONENTE: Del Abad

FACTS:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force
Habagat, then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press
that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain.
After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed
charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29,
1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack

of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution
witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s
petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to
try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the
murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.On March 3, 2004
the prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions
on the ground of lack of probable cause

HELD:

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the
motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of
arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The general rule of course
is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new
affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable
cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and
related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC
held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

The prosecution The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action
outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if
it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above
is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause
against the respondents.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder,
they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter.
After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old
job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told
her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he went
to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no longer
residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light
of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be
affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody.
The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without
legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation
would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of
“exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare
of children.
FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIÑAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for custody of
the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and heart-rending affair.
Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of jurisdiction became emotionally
charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
1993 in Parañaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Parañaque City.

Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January 30, 1994;
Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann,
born on December 12, 2000.

After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took
their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and
petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo in the
Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the
court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.

Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed
that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however,
had a change of heart1 and decided to file a memorandum.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent was unfit to
take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at
night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected
her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent
who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where
he worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila
Elementary School in Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
(otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was
driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and
drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing
him to commit acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by
the fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their
personal problems.4

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals5 rendered a decision6 asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court
in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence,
this recourse.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus
and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He
invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner is wrong.

In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369
that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions
for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.8 (emphases supplied)

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to
Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of
its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region
where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the
merits.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of
minors is involved.9 (emphases supplied)1avvphi1

We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque residence on May 18, 2002, he twice
transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what the
Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed:

[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue writs of habeas corpus] will
result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in
obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs
are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a
habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have
been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369].10

Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested
with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas
corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain
to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely
ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the
same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability.

The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it
does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.

Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR

No. 159374, July 12, 2007
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the
conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to
Laguna subsequently.

Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons
on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s
care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their
children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b)
of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition
for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling,
that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas
corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of
minors.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals
should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving
the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in
said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides
that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
 PIO C. GRANDE, RUFINO C. GRANDE, AIDA C. GRANDE, FLORENCIA GRANDE-
SANTOS, TERESITA GRANDE-VIOLA, JOSEPHINE GRANDE DOMINGO
(representing the heirs of Crisanta Grande-Domingo), and ESTANISLAO QUIBAL
(representing the heirs of Rosita Grande-Quibal),* Petitioners, v. UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the "Petition for Annulment of Judgment" that seeks the annulment of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA - G.R. CV No. 44411 promulgated on 14 December 1999 and the
Resolution issued on 24 February 2000 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals in its Decision1 dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioners from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dismissing their complaint for
recovery of ownership and reconveyance of the subject property on the ground of lack of cause
of action. The RTC Decision2 concluded that the subject property was covered by a Torrens title
as early as 1914 and it was only in 1984, or 70 years after the issuance of the title, that petitioners
filed their action for recovery of ownership and reconveyance. During the interregnum,
ownership of the property was acquired by respondent University of the Philippines as an
innocent purchaser for value, so the RTC found and the appellate court upheld.

Petitioners, through their former counsel, received a copy of the Court of Appeals' Decision on
28 December 1998, and a copy of the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on 17
March 2000. However, petitioners failed to elevate the rulings of the Court of Appeals to this
Court. They claim that their former counsel had neglected to inform them of the receipt of the
Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.3 As a result, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 14 December 1999 became final and executory as of 12 April 2000, with the
corresponding entry of judgment duly issued.4

It was only on 29 June 2001, more than a year after the appellate court's rulings had become
final, that petitioners filed with this Court the present "Petition for Annulment of Judgment,"
seeking the nullification of the rulings. Respondent points out that the procedure undertaken by
petitioners finds no sanction under the Rules of Court.

We agree, and add more. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition.

The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional

cases, as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.5 It is generally governed by Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule "shall
govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in
civil action of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."6 Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments rendered
by regional trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not pertain to the nullification of
decisions of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners argue that although Rule 47 is a newly-established rule, the procedure of annulment
of judgments has long been recognized in this jurisdiction. That may be so, but this Court has no
authority to take cognizance of an original action for annulment of judgment of any lower court.
The only original cases cognizable before this Court are "petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the
judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls."7
Petitions for annulment of judgment are not among the cases originally cognizable by this Court.

Moreover, if what is desired is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which
petitioners could have been entitled to under ordinary circumstances, the only mode of appeal
cognizable by this Court is "a Petition for Review on Certiorari ."8 That is governed by and
disposed of in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, Rules 45; 48;
Sections 1, 2, and 5 to 11 of Rules 51; 52; and 56.9 Notably, Rule 47 on annulment of judgments
has nothing to do with the provisions which govern Petitions for Review on Certiorari . Thus, it
is totally inappropriate to extend Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. Then
too, appeals by certiorari to this Court must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or the final order or resolution appealed from.10 Even if we were to treat the petition
for annulment of judgment as an appeal by certiorari, the same could not be given due course as
it had been filed several months after the Court of Appeals decision had already lapsed to
finality.

Admittedly, this Court has discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition over which it
ordinarily has no jurisdiction "if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction."11 Hence, in Del Mar v. Phil.
Amusement and Gaming Corp.,12 the Court took cognizance of an original petition for injunction
after determining that the allegations therein revealed that it was actually one for prohibition.
We, however, cannot adopt that tack for purposes of this case. Ostensibly, even if the averments
in the present petition sufficiently present the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and on that basis it could be treated as a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, still it could not be given due course since it was filed way beyond the
period for filing such special civil action. Moreover, certiorari can only lie if there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Our ruling in Alabanzas v. Intermediate Appellate Court13 bears citation. Counsel for private
respondent therein failed to file the appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals. The lapse led to
the dismissal of the appeal and the subsequent finality of the lower court judgment. Disallowing
the annulment of judgment sought by private respondent on the ground of negligence of her
lawyer, this Court held:

It is well-settled that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power
or jurisdiction of the Court which rendered it to further amend, much less revoke it (Turquieza v.
Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, 124 SCRA 410 [1983]; Javier v.
Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA 495 [1989]; Galindez v. Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc., 175 SCRA 132
[1989]; Olympia International, Inc. v. CA, 180 SCRA 353 [1989]). Decisions which have long
become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts (United CMC Textile Workers Union v.
Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 [1987]) and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter
the trial court's final judgment (Carbonel v. CA, 147 SCRA 656 [1987]; Republic v. Reyes, 155
SCRA 313 [1987]).

The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public and

sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final
at some definite date set by law (Turquieza v. Hernando, supra; H[e]irs of Patriaca v. CA,
supra; Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344 [1989]). Reopening of a case which
has become final and executory is disallowed (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, 148
SCRA, [sic] 433 [1987]; Edra v. Intermediate Court, supra.). The subsequent filing of a motion
for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of a judgment and restore jurisdiction which had
already been lost (Pfleider v. Victorino, 98 SCRA 491 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).

After the judgment has become final, no addition can be made thereto and nothing can be done
therewith except its execution; otherwise, there can be no end to litigation, thus setting at naught
the main role of Courts of Justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable controversies with finality (Farescal Vda.
de Emnas v. Emnas, 95 SCRA 470 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).

Moreover, it is an equally well-settled rule that the client is bound by his counsel's conduct,
negligence and mistake in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the
result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently (Vivero v. Santos, 52 O.G.
1424; Tupas v. CA, 193 SCRA 597).

It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and
accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. (Legarda v. CA, 195 SCRA 418). In the present
case, the private respondents have not shown such carelessness or negligence in their lawyer's
discharge of his duties to them as to justify a deviation from the rule that "clients should be
bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes."14

Petitioners cite quite a few cases in support of their claim that the purported negligence of their
former counsel sufficiently justifies the annulment of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We
are not impressed. Only Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals15 involved a petition for
annulment of judgment but the petition therein was regular and in order, assailing as it did a
decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals. Unlike in Apex, the present
petition is bereft of mooring under procedural law. Hence, Apex is not a governing precedent in
this case.

It is also worthy of note that the challenge to the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC
ultimately involve questions of fact, even necessitating an examination of the boundaries of the
subject property. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals arrived at common findings on all
decisive factual issues, and the Court is not wont to engage in another factual review. The
original complaint was filed in 1984 and the judgment dismissing the complaint became final
and executory in 2001. There is a need to lay the matter to rest once and for all. Entertaining the
present petition, which bears no approbation under the Rules of Court in the first place, defeats
the ends of justice and the principle of finality of judgment.

A last note. Since the filing of the petition, a collateral issue has arisen between the counsel who
originally filed the petition in behalf of petitioners and the new counsel who subsequently
entered his appearance allegedly in behalf of all petitioners. The former counsel had sought to
record a contingent contract she had earlier forged with petitioners, assuring her of around one-
third (1/3) of the value of the "recovery by petitioners in this case" as her contingent fee. This
motion was opposed by the new counsel. No action need be taken on the motion, it having been
mooted by this Decision. With the dismissal of the petition and reaffirmance of the final and
executory judgment against petitioners, any inquiry into the contingent fee agreement has
become a purely theoretical exercise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.