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Karl Marx's Theory of Science

Author(s): Michael Perelman


Source: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), pp. 859-870
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Journal of Economic Issues

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J eI JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
Vol. XII No. 4 December 1978

Karl Marx's Theory of Science

Michael Perelman

Science, in the works of Karl Marx, is a major force in shaping the


economy as well as the theory used to describe it. Marx emphasized the
importance of scientific progress in an address celebrating the revolution
of 1848 [Marx 1856, pp. 500-501].1 He passed over the role of the re-
knowned revolutionaries of that uprising, choosing instead to analyze
"steam, electricity, and the self-acting mule ... revolutionists of a rather
more dangerous character" [ibid., p. 500].2
Marx's theory of scientific development overlaps with the analysis
popularized by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn pictures science as a process of
developing and then casting aside a succession of mutually incompatible
paradigms. One paradigm is as good as another, providing that it stimu-
lates useful results. Eventually, the paradigm contains an unwieldy
number of anomalies. Since these cannot be cleared away like so many
barnacles on a ship's hull, the validity of the paradigm is called into
question. A crisis exists until a new paradigm is held out as the truth.
Truth as such is all but excluded from Kuhn's world. Although science
helps society to manipulate the environment more effectively, we have
no grounds to claim that the models of modern physics are closer to the
truth than those of Copernicus. The material world remains an un-
knowable Kantian thing-in-itself.

The author is Associate Professor of Economics, California State University,


Chico.

859

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860 Michael Perelman

Marx would certainly have taken issue with Kuhn. No doubt, he


would have felt comfortable with the view of Friedrich Engels, who saw
the "history of science [as] . . . the history of the gradual clearing away
of ... nonsense or rather its replacement by fresh but less absurd non-
sense" [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 401].3
Marx certainly believed that each successive paradigm would come
closer to the truth than the last. His most striking example of a creation
of a new paradigm concerns Rene Descartes, who "anticipated an al-
teration in the form of production" in which nature would be systemati-
cally subjugated [Marx 1906, p. 426n.]. Animals, according to Descartes,
should no longer be seen as assistants to mankind, but as machines
[ibid.; see also Engels 1888, p. 607]. Fundamental to this new perspec-
tive was Descartes's ability to see the world "with the eyes of the manu-
facturing period" [Marx 1906, p. 426].4 His efforts in "clearing away ...
nonsense" stimulated progress in economics as well as science. His friend
William Petty not only saw the "mysterious and complicated engineery"
of living organisms as the key to future mechanical progress, but also
went on to pen The Political Anatomy of Ireland [Petty 1927, p. 172].
Marx finds further evidence [Marx 1906, p. 426n.] for the simultaneous
impact of Descartes's vision of natural science and economics in the
Preface to Sir Dudley North's Discourses upon Trade, which states that
"Descartes' method had begun to free political economy from the old
fables and superstitious notions of gold, trade, etc."5
Marx realizes that the advance inherent in Descartes's new paradigm
cannot be charted with the tools of common sense. In fact, the develop-
ment of science is necessarily counterintuitive.6 For Marx, scientific
truth must necessarily remain paradoxical [Marx 1865, p. 209]. Progress
can only be measured in terms of its practice.
Mao Tse-Tung accurately reflected the Marxian position in "On Prac-
tice": "Social practice alone is the criterion of truth of ... knowledge
of the external world" [Mao Tse-Tung 1937, p. 283]. He continued: "In
reality ... knowledge becomes verified only when, in the process of
social practices (in the process of material production, of class struggle,
and of scientific experiment) . . . the anticipated results" are achieved
[ibid.; see also Avineri 1971].

A Digression on the Science of Economics

Both Kuhn and Marx dispute the existence of an objective boundary


between science and economics. Marx asserts that the boundary is non-
existent; all science is inseparable [Marx and Engels 1845-1846, p. 408;

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Marx's Theory of Science 861

see also Easton and Guddat 1967, pp. 17, 2


to be arbitrary because neither discipline is truly scientific. Each follows
the same procedure of creating a paradigm and then researching the con-
sequences. The two men agree that the paradigm must be judged ac-
cording to empirical results instead of inherent value.7
For Marx, both science and economics develop by continually pene-
trating more deeply into the essence of reality. Marx compares his
method of abstraction with the use of microscopes or chemical reagents
[Marx 1906, p. 12]. Engels points to the similarities between Antoine
Lavoisier's work on oxygen and the labors of Marx in grasping the nature
of surplus value [Marx 1967, vol. 2, Introduction].
In the Preface to the second edition of Capital, Marx bemoans the
decline of classical economics. In a sense, his description of the fate of
classical economics bears some resemblance to a Kuhnian paradigm
increasingly burdened with anomalies. However, where Kuhn would see
the ground being prepared for a fresh new advance, Marx discovers a
retreat. He writes: "The more economic theory is perfected, that is, the
deeper it penetrates its subject-matter and the more it develops as a
contradictory system, the more is it confronted by its own increasingly
independent, vulgar element, enriched by material which it dresses up
in its own way until finally it finds its most apt expression in academically
syncretic and unprincipled eclectic compilations" [Marx 1968 and 1971,
Part 3, p. 501]. Nor does Marx expect any recovery in bourgeois
economics.
The science of economics had regressed to the point where its prac-
titioners no longer felt "the urge ... to grasp the inner connection of
the phenomena" [Marx 1968 and 1971, Part 3, p. 453]. They were no
more than "hired pugilists" for the ruling class [Marx 1906, pp. 18-19;
see also Meek 1967, pp. 51-52].
Natural science is not immune from similar reverses. Charles Darwin's
theory, which Marx compared to his own [Marx and Engels 1942, p.
125; also Engels 1883, p. 434; see also Avineri 1967], was banned from
parts of the United States during the early part of this century and con-
tinues to be excluded in South Africa today [Luria 1977].
Because few scientific theories have as many social, political, and
economic implications as economics, modern science in general would
not be expected to be as susceptible to regression.8 "During feudal times,
however, when science was enmeshed in theology" [Engels 1875-1876,
p. 346], it was "thoroughly revolutionary ... it had to fight for and win
the right of its existence. . . it provided its martyrs for the stake and
the prisons of the Inquisition" [ibid., p. 343].

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862 Michael Perelman

Modem science eventually triumphed because it was allied to the


progressive bourgeoisie. Socialist economics will similarly win out be-
cause it is allied with the proletariat, whose claims can no longer be
ignored [Marx 1906, p. 19].

Science and Economic Development

The economies of the ancient world languished even though they had
access to the two major components of the Industrial Revolution-the
mill and the clock [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 142; Marx 1906, p. 382].
Even though the feudal epoch saw the introduction of many new inven-
tions, machinery continued to be used sporadically [Marx 1906, p. 382].
In part, the high value put on social stability explains the slow develop-
ment of new methods of production [see George 1972, chapter 2]. Legal
prohibitions, as well as the threat of outright violence, added further
inhibitions to the application of machinery [Marx 1906, chapter 51,
section 5].
The more extensive harnessing of the potential of science could only
commence after capitalism emerged from feudal society. Once this new
social formation was complete, capitalism could look back to technical
victories such as "machinery, application of chemistry to industry and
agriculture, steam-navigation, clearing of whole continents for cultiva-
tion, [and] canalization of rivers" [Marx and Engels 1848, p. 40]. In
short, science and industry combined to realize the great historic destiny
of capital, the creation of surplus value [Marx 1974, p. 325].
The enormous development of productive capacity under capitalism
was not just the simple application of scientific principles. As Marx
cautioned us, "one can only speak of the productivity of capital if one
regards it as the embodiment of definite social relations of production"
[Marx 1968 and 1971, Part 3, p. 265]. If we accept this point of view,
Marx adds, "the historically transitory character of ... [capitalist pro-
ductivity] becomes at once evident" [ibid.].
Not only must productivity be grasped in terms of social relations,
but also science must be seen in such a light. In Marx's view, science
"becomes a force distinct from labour and press[ed] into the service of
capital" [Marx 1906, p. 397; and Marx 1969, p. 81]. Under capitalism,
"invention then becomes a business, and its application to science be-
comes a prospect which determines and solicits it" [Marx 1974, p. 704;
see also Smith 1937, p. 10].
Marx went so far as to say that "from 1825 onwards, almost all new

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Marx's Theory of Science 863

inventions were the results of collisions between the worker and the
employer who sought at all cost to depreciate the worker's specialized
ability. After each new strike of importance, there appeared a new
machine" [Marx 1963, p. 140; Marx and Engels 1942, p. 10; and simi-
larly Marx 1906, p. 476].
As long as science remains dominated by capital, "intellectual and
material activity" remain separated as "thoughtless activity and inactive
thought" [Marx and Engels 1845-1846, p. 423]. Although workers'
intellectual facilities atrophy in the factories [Marx 1906, pp. 395-404;
and Marx 1964, p. 149], the same factories teach the workers political
skills and discipline. Factory trained workers eventually develop the
ability to cooperate with each other while resisting the authority of
capital [Marx 1906, p. 383; and Marx 1967, vol. 3, p. 383]. Their class
consciousness is finally awakened.
A very different view of Marx's theory of science has been proposed
in a pair of articles by Nathan Rosenberg [1974; 1976], who argues that
science basically develops as a response to economic demands. Because
Rosenberg glosses over the class interests underlying the development
and application of science, he seriously misrepresents Marx's views on
the subject. Whereas Marx writes that technology can increase the pro-
ductivity of labor, Rosenberg's Marx believes that science responds to
"man's changing needs" or "the economic needs of society" [Rosenberg
1974, pp. 715 and 728].
Rosenberg's Marx ignores the social consequences of mechanization.
Instead, he generally writes as if economic development were a purely
technical matter. For example, Rosenberg describes Marx's interpreta-
tion of the shift from the hand-operated to the machine-operated process
as "momentous" [ibid., p. 721], but what Rosenberg sees as "momen-
tous" is only the potential for technical improvement; what Marx
described in the passage also included the destruction of the inde-
pendence of the worker during industrialization [Marx 1974, p. 702].
For Rosenberg's Marx, technology overcomes human frailties [Rosen-
berg 1974, p. 719]; for Marx it is used to overcome the economic
strength of workers.9
While Marx described the countless material sufferings of the workers,
Rosenberg, who is elsewhere so materialistic in his interpretation of
Marx, also cites the psychological damage suffered by them [ibid.].
Rosenberg even fails to differentiate between existence as machinery
and existence as capital when he discusses new technology [see Marx
1974, p. 699]. As a result, Marx's description of the new bourgeois

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864 Michael Perelman

economists who confuse "exploitation of the workman by the ma-


chine... [and] the exploitation of the machine by the workman" seems
to be apt for Rosenberg [Marx 1906, p. 482].
Rosenberg damages his own case of the primacy of demand factors
when he discusses agriculture. Had he inquired as to the causes of the
difference between agriculture and industry, however, he would have had
no reason to suggest that science took an independent course with respect
to agriculture. In fact, he would have found an excellent example of
the relationship between the production of scientific knowledge and the
intensity of economic incentives, a subject discussed throughout his
article.
Agriculture and industry differ in two ways, according to Marx. First,
capitalism began in industry earlier than in agriculture [Marx 1974, p.
715; and Marx 1968 and 1971, Part 3, p. 99]. Second, natural elements
which cost nothing assist in agricultural production: "In agriculture, the
soil itself with its chemical etc. action is already a machine which makes
direct labour more productive" [Marx 1974, p. 488; see also Marx 1967,
vol. 3, pp. 360-61, and Marx 1968 and 1971, Part 2, p. 109]. In in-
dustry, "nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric
telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc." [Marx 1974, p. 706]. Following the
logic of monetary incentives, there is a lag in the need to modernize
agricultural production. However, in the course of development, "since
a larger output is demanded than that which can be supplied with the
help of natural power, i.e.... a new additional element enters into
capital. A relatively larger investment of capital is thus required in
order to secure the same output" [Marx 1967, vol. 3, p. 745]. At that
point, the need to develop modern technology arises. Thus, science in
agriculture follows the requirements of capital just as is the case in manu-
facturing. (For further discussion along these lines see Perelman [1973;
1974; 1975; and 1978].)
Certainly, many examples of induced innovations are found in the
work of Marx. In fact, even developments in the more theoretical realms
of science are attributed to the need for technical improvements. In
Engels's words, "if society has a technical need, that helps science more
than ten universities" [Marxs and Engels 1942, p. 517; and Easton and
Guddat 1967, p. 135]. Moreover, if universities were lax in servicing
the needs of capital, capital could create new ones. Perhaps the most
notable example was Gresham College, endowed in the late sixteenth
century because of the dismal performance of Oxford and Cambridge
[Hill 1965]. The needs of industry so thoroughly pervaded science that
many of the advances in such abstract realms as mathematical theory

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Marx's Theory of Science 865

owe their origins to problems of applied industrial production [Marx


1906, p. 383; Marx and Engels 1942, p. 143; Marcus 1975, p. 92; Roll
1953, p. 88n.; and Meek 1967, pp. 93, 94].
Rosenberg should be commended for cataloging some of these in-
stances. On the other hand, presenting this catalog as Marx's theory of
science distorts Marx's analysis to the point where we could expect to
read Karl Marx as well as Nathan Rosenberg in the Journal of Political
Economy.

The Obsolescence of Capitalism

During the infancy of capitalism, wages were a relatively larger part


of the cost of production. As a result, maximization of investable surplus
was approximated by a policy of harsh discipline at the workplace [Marx
1906, p. 388]. As scientific progress fosters a finer articulation of the
division of labor, any given commodity "ceases to be the product of
isolated direct labor, and the combination of social activity appears,
rather, as the producer" [Marx 1974, p. 709]. This increasing "social
intertwining of different capitals" [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 709] conflicts
with the capitalistic mode of production based upon atomistic decision
making. Furthermore, individualistic competition creates waste [Marx
1967, vol. 2, p. 172]. Social control of production becomes imperative.
To reduce the uncertainties of atomistic competition, capitalists de-
veloped monopolies and trusts. To minimize the risk of being unpre-
pared for technical improvements which destroyed the value of invested
capital, capitalists scrupulously avoided longer term investments when-
ever possible [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 270; and Marx 1967, vol. 2,
pp. 214-617]. These policies reduced the ability of capitalism to take
full advantage of modern scientific production methods.
A further contradiction in the capitalist mode of production concerns
the role of labor. The quantities of use value produced under capitalism
no longer depend on the sheer mass of labor set in motion. Instead, pro-
duction is limited by the need for "general scientific labor, technological
application of natural science, on natural science, on the one side and
to the general production force arising from social combination in total
production on the other side-a combination which appears as the
natural fruit of social labour" [Marx 1974, p. 700].
The dual requirements of modern scientific industry are thus general
scientific labor and a coordination of social efforts which are inconsistent
with the uncertainties of a market economy. Note that Marx does not
write of skilled labor, which usually refers to the development of a par-

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866 Michael Perelman

ticular job skill, but rather "general scientific labour" or "the free de-
velopment of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary
labour time so as to deposit surplus labour, but rather the general re-
duction of the necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then
corresponds to the artistic, scientific, etc., development of individuals
in the time set free" [ibid., p. 706].
Capitalism sets the stage for these possibilities by minimizing the
labor time used for production. "It presses to reduce labour time to a
minimum while it posits labour time, on the other side as sole measure
and source of wealth" [ibid.]. As a result, "capital itself is the moving
contradiction," since "it diminishes labour time in the necessary form
so as to increase it in the superfluous form; hence it posits the superfluous
in growing measure as a condition-question of life or death for the
necessary" [ibid.]. In short, capitalism is incapable of realizing the possi-
bilities of the scientific progress it fosters. Thus, Marx concludes, capi-
talism "works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating
production" [ibid., p. 700]. In Marx's words, not only is labor rendered
"superfluous," but also the positions of the capitalists become "super-
fluous" as they live off their "outdated and inappropriate privileges"
[Marx 1976, vol. 3, p. 314; see also Marx 1974, pp. 651 and 749]. Marx
looks to the development of the full potential of labor as much more than
a technical requirement of industry; it is the actual purpose of human
activity [Marx 1968 and 1971, Part 2, p. 117].

The Future of Science

Marx not only looked to science to improve society, but also called
for a social improvement of science.'0 This point should be understood
in light of Marx's notion that science is developed within a particular
mode of production. Only with the decline of superstition which ema-
nated from precapitalist modes of production could a man such as
Descartes see animals as machines. Later, with the advance of capi-
talism, human beings also came to be seen as machines [Engels 1888,
p. 349]. Any science grounded on such a limited vision of human facul-
ties must remain a limited science. Similarly, industries based on such a
science must be seen as an expression of a limited vision of human
faculties.
Once the blinders of capitalism are removed, "natural science will lose
its abstractly material-or rather, its idealistic-tendency and will be-
come the emphasis of human science, as it has already become the basis
of actual life" [Marx 1964, pp. 142-43; see also commentaries on this

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Marx's Theory of Science 867

passage in McLellan 1973, p. 122, and Meszaros 1972, p. 101]. Only


when science, as well as man's other forces, is recognized as a social
force will such liberation of man be possible [Easton and Guddat 1967,
p. 241]. Science will then begin to contribute to the creation of industry
based on a fuller appreciation of human potentialities. Human activity
in that industry will reveal still more about the potential for furthering
the process. Because of this mutual reinforcement between science and
the mode of production, science will flourish under socialism more than
ever before [Engels 1875-1876, p. 354].

Notes

1. Marx's talk was actually given at an anniversary celebration for the


Chartist People's Paper. However, he had turned down an invitation to
address a banquet to celebrate the revolutions of 1848 only a few months
earlier. The content of Marx's address indicates that it was most likely
prepared for the earlier occasion. See David McLellan [1973, pp. 261-
62].
2. Although the developments listed above are usually classified as tech-
nology rather than science, Marx does not make such a distinction. To
separate one from the other would not improve the analytical precision
of his vocabulary. Both science and technology are part of a type of
practical thinking in which theory and practice are merged. On the
other hand, Marx did give some thought to the need to distinguish be-
tween tools and machines. He speculated that this differentiation might
be "very important... [in] proving the connection between the social
relations of men and the development of these material modes of pro-
duction" [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 142].
I am not aware of any subsequent work along these lines. The im-
portance of Marx's concern is limited to its illustration of the care with
which his analysis, including even his terminology, was tailored to
facilitate understanding questions which were of particular interest to
him.
3. Although Engels is actually referring to superstition here, the use of the
citation in this context does not do violence to his thought. On this, see
also Adam Smith [1937, p. 748].
4. Engels was annoyed by a critic of Marx who claimed that he could not
find other examples of the materialistic basis of philosophy in Marx's
written work [Marx and Engels 1942, p. 393].
5. For more on the relationship between Descartes and economic thought,
see the appendix on the evolution of economic categories in Perelman
[in progress].
6. "All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the
essence of things directly coincided" [Marx 1967, vol. 3, p. 817]. Schum-
peter's defense of Say's Law appealed to the identical analogy used by
Marx to amplify on this position [Schumpeter 1954, p. 624].

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868 Michael Perelman

7. For these reasons, Kuhn's interpretation closely parallels the methodo-


logical leanings of Milton Friedman [1953].
8. Marx never explicitly makes this distinction, although he did write that
"political economy can remain a science only so long as the class strug-
gle is latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic phenomena"
[Marx 1906, p. 17]. We should also add the obvious caveat that Marx
restricted his assertion to bourgeois economics.
9. In a sense, however, Rosenberg's interpretation is correct, since machines
were designed for the employment of women and children, who were
more tractable to the demands of capital [Marx 1906, p. 431; and Marx
1964, p. 149].
10. Marx wrote that "only the working class can ... convert science from
an instrument of class rule into a popular force, convert men of science
themselves from panderers of class prejudice, place-hunting parasites,
and allies of capital into free agents of thought!" He concludes that
"science can only then play its genuine part in the Republic of Labour"
[Marx 1871, p. 162; see also the comment attributed to him in Ollman
1971, p. 45].

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