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A Risk Management-Based Decision Analysis Framework for Resilience in

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Conference Paper · April 2009

DOI: 10.1109/SYSTEMS.2009.4815768 · Source: IEEE Xplore

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IEEE SysCon 2009 —3rd Annual IEEE International Systems Conference, 2009
Vancouver, Canada, March 23–26, 2009
A Risk Management-Based Decision Analysis
Framework for Resilience in Maritime Infrastructure
and Transportation Systems
Mo Mansouri Roshanak Nilchiani
Tel. 201-216-8644 Tel. 201.216.8542
mo.mansouri@stevens.edu roshanak.nilchiani@stevens.edu ali.mostashari@stevens.edu
Center for Complex Adaptive Socio-technological Systems, School of Systems and Enterprises,
Stevens Institute of Technology
Hoboken, NJ 07030, United States of America
!
Abstract - This research is an effort to develop a Risk
Management-based Decision Analysis (RMDA)
Framework based on the common fundamental
elements that define the nature of resilience in
Maritime Infrastructure and Transportation Systems
(MITS). While developing a systematic process for
making strategic and investment decisions, RMDA
enables the decision-makers to identify, analyze, and
prioritize risks involved in MITS operations; to define
ways for risk mitigation, plan for contingencies, and
devise mechanisms for continuously monitoring and
controlling risk factors and threats to the system. Our
suggested RMDA framework utilizes a Decision Tree
Analysis (DTA) methodology for assessing the cost-
effectiveness of the devised strategies.
Keywords: Risk Management; Decision Analysis;
Resilience; Maritime Infrastructure and
Transportation Systems.
1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
MITS are critical and costly engineering systems
that enable economic activity through the transfer of
goods and services between national and
international destinations. The United States can be
considered a maritime country [1]. Ports, as one of
the major components of MITS, play a key role in
creating jobs in the U.S. Total ports-related
employment in the U.S. was estimated at 8.4 million
people in 2006, while they were responsible for
bringing $2 Trillion, equivalent to almost 14% of the
country’s GDP, in the same year [2].
It takes a long time to design, construct, and
operationalize MITS. Moreover, they face a variety
of operational and environmental uncertainties that
can disrupt their service delivery, potentially
resulting in Billions of dollars of direct and indirect
9781-4244-3463-3/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEE
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Ali Mostashari
Tel. 201-216-8723
financial losses [3]. These threats can range from
natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes and
floods to man-made disasters like chemical and oil
spills and terrorist attacks [4]. There is therefore a
need for MITS to be designed and operated in such a
manner that they exhibit resilience in the face of
shocks throughout their lifecycle. Structure of such
an effective design and efficient operation is the
product of a complex network of decisions. Thus,
applying a systematic methodology to enhance and
improve the decision-making process can play an
essential role in increasing resilience of the MITS.
1.2 What is Resilience?
Resilience is one of the strategies that systems
might be planned to utilize in the face of major
disruptions. There are varieties of definitions
available in the literature that has defined the term in
the context of ecosystems, manufacturing, enterprise,
as well as infrastructure systems. In general,
resilience as a term is used in many areas and
industries with some similarities to several other
concepts such as robustness, flexibility, adaptability,
and even agility [5-7]. However, resilience of an
infrastructure system such as the MITS can be
defined as a function of system’s vulnerability
against potential disruption, and its adaptive capacity
in recovering to an acceptable level of service within
a reasonable timeframe after being affected [8-11].
This research considers the latter definition to make a
distinction between resilience and other strategies
applied by systems in face of change.
2. Methodology
While many of the important design aspects of
MITS address cost-effectiveness and functionality,
there is a need to assess the value of decisions in
regards to incorporating resilience as a prominent
long-term systems attribute. Resilience refers to
 capability of a system to provide and maintain an Figure 1. The first two phases mostly rely on a
acceptable level of service in the face of major standard risk analysis and management approach,
changes or disruption. In order to incorporate this including effective risk management (assessment and
concept into MITS in face of potential disruptions, it control). The Assessing Risk phase activities include
is necessary to define its value to the decision-makers identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing risks involved
and/or stakeholders. in MITS operations. The Devising Resilience
Strategies phase builds on the first phase and goes on
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for
to define ways to mitigate risk, plan for
instance, has defined homeland security values by
contingencies, and devise mechanisms for
categorizing the structure of system into three major
continuously monitoring and controlling risk factors
phases: shock prevention, vulnerability reduction,
as well as threats to the system. Finally, the Valuing
and response preparedness [12]. In this paper, we
Investment Strategies phase uses a DTA
consider the responsiveness of MITS in two
methodology to assess the cost-effectiveness of the
distinctive areas: before and after facing disruption.
devised strategies. In the following, we will explore
We refer to these areas as: prevention and recovery
the RMDA framework for MITS in more detail.
phases. A systematic approach for making better
decision can be used in both phases. However, Assessing Risks:
application of such decision-making approach - Step 1: Identify the critical risks to the
requires a good understanding of risks and infrastructure system
vulnerabilities of MITS in the prevention phase. In
this research, the authors suggest a new framework - Step 2: Select one or more of these risks to the
that utilizes the Risk Management (RM) and system based on the stake holders priorities
Decision Analysis (DA) techniques, such as risk - Step 3: Find the risk profile and the probability
assessment models and decision tree, as well as distribution of the selected disruptions
graphical tools like cause-and-effect diagrams, as
methodologies of analysis.
A framework is a basic conceptual structure,
which applies systems thinking, logic, and a variety
of tools to frame and potentially solve complex
issues. The proposed RMDA framework in this paper
addresses the process of decision-making for the Devising Resilience Strategies:
prevention phase on the basis of likelihood of
disruption as well as its consequences, which is Step 4:Brainstorm and generate a set of solutions
derived from a risk assessment analysis. We also and/or strategies that can possibly increase the
resilience of the MITS
propose the application of decision tree analysis
methodology for assessing cost-effectiveness of Step 5: Identify the costs associated with each
alternative strategies [13]. The framework builds on suggested solution and/or strategies
insights gained from the Six-element flexibility
framework adopted by Nilchiani [14] in assessing the
value of flexibility strategies in Space Systems.
3. The RMDA Framework
Since cost-effectiveness plays a key role in
making decisions during the process of system design Valuing Investment Strategies:
and infrastructure development, articulation of a
Step 6: Calculate the expected value of each
unified and comprehensive framework for measuring
strategy base on the data on risk profile of the
the multiple aspects of resiliency in MITS is essential
disruptive event and the cost of the strategy using
for better systems-level decision-making. At a DTA or real options
strategic level, such a framework can be applied as a
component of a Decision Support System (DSS) for Step 7: create a tradespace of the strategies for the
investment strategies in MITS. decision makers

The proposed RMDA framework in this Figure 1 – The RMDA Framework for a proactive
paper consists of three phases. These include: approach towards implementing resilience in
Assessing Risks, Devising Resilience Strategies, and MITS
Valuing Investment Strategies, as it is shown in

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 3.1. Phase I – Assessing Risks lockdowns. Finally, technological factors might
trigger by computer network failure, interface issues,
Decision makers need to have a clear
failure of control systems, maritime accidents, and
understanding of the sources of uncertainty and
interface issues.
consequences of the risks and threats to the system in
order to prevent disruptions and respond to It is possible to go forward in identifying more
disturbances, shocks, or incidents timely and details about the causal roots for each one of these
efficiently. Risk assessment is an approach that factors several layers deep. In fact, this methodology
enables decision makers to understand the nature of creates a powerful framework for identifying risk
risk in the decision-making environment and plan to factors in any large system. The Assessing Risk
deal with them in advance. The process of effective phase applies this technique mostly for the
risk assessment should involve identification, identification of the threats and risks MITS face. The
measurement, prioritization, management, and result has been illustrated in a cause-and-effect
mitigation of the risks. More importantly, it must be a diagram presented in Figure 2.
dynamic and continual process, reviewed regularly
with the purpose of meeting the required objectives
of the risk management plan [15].
In the context of MITS the process of Assess of
Risks includes the identification of risks and threats
associated with the infrastructure and development of
prevention as well as contingency and emergency
plans that enables the systems to upkeep its
functionality. The main objective is to prevent
disruptions in a preemptive way rather than to deal
with a crisis in a reactionary manner, and thus, to be
able to provide a certain level of service in the scope
of system’s lifecycle.
MITS do function in a complex socio-
technological environment in which a complex nexus
Figure 2 – Cause-and-Effect Diagram for
of human and organization factors interact with
physical infrastructure and equipment as well as a Disruption in MITS (adopted from [16])
natural environment to create the behavioral 3.2. Phase II - Devising Resilience Strategies
dynamics of the system. Based on a complex systems
perspective, we categorize the roots of uncertainty in Based on the existing literature on resilience
four major groups as follows: engineering, our proposed RMDA framework,
approaches MITS resilience through an embedded
• Natural disasters, two layered strategy: one that creates a set of barriers
• Organizational factors, with the purpose of buffering the system from major
• Technological factors, external and internal disruptions – absorbing shock
• Human factors. and reducing uncertainty; and one that provides the
system with applicable contingency and emergency
Each one of these uncertainties can have various
mechanisms and plans in order to minimize the
roots, either generated by outside perturbations or
adverse consequences of those disruptions that could
created by intrinsic characteristics of the
organizational and/or operational systems and within not be prevented – characterized as a mitigation or
the boundary of MITS. recovery plan. Inspired by a bowtie model [17], we
suggest a two layered approach increases the
In the case of a typical MITS, we have identified system’s resiliency.
some major threats under the aforementioned four
The boxes represented on the left side of our
categories. Human factors that might cause
bowtie model are called the Resiliency Barriers.
disruption in operations of MITS can be caused by
According to a black box model perspective, they are
several factors such as industry actions, terrorist
considered to be interconnected subsystems, each
attacks, and human errors. Natural factors include
with characteristics of an independent system.
hydrologic, geologic and seismic, and atmospheric
Therefore, each one of these so-called barriers may
hazards. Organizational factors might be expressed
include a monitoring system enabled with sensors,
by: bureaucracy, poor training systems,
organizational structure limitation, and security connections, feedback loops, action capabilities, etc.

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 The same is true about the depicted components of
the right side of the bowtie model, Resiliency
Contingencies. These blocks are representing a set of
actions or reactions in the form of procedures that can
be standardized as various policies. In fact, they can
also be considered as interconnected subsystems that
are supposed to run as independent systems.
Figure 3- The Two-Layered Resiliency Approach
for MITS (adopted from [16])
Therefore, the Devising Resilience Strategies
phase should concentrate on developing series of
independent system, which dynamically interact with
other components of the larger system in a higher
level, foresee or understand vulnerabilities of the
whole complex, and provides solutions in form of
preemptive and preventive actions. This, according to
the literature, can be defined as a methodology for
System of Systems (SoS) Management [18, 19]. The
choice of this approach is due to the large-scale
distributed set of complex systems that are dynamic
and work concurrently and in an interoperable
manner. As a result, strategies that are devised to
make MITS resilient should be applied in accordance
of SoS management techniques.
The core of efforts for making MITS a resilient
SoS is making the entire country’s economy less
susceptible to major fluctuations that cause large
amount of losses. Thus, the criteria we have chosen
in this paper for proposing resilience strategies
mostly rely on economic factors. Implementation of
such strategies requires financial investments with a
possibility of long-term time horizon. At the same
time, it will make the process of maritime
transportation faster and more efficient, which
ultimately contributes to the economy in a long run.
Consequently, it is quite reasonable to make
decisions based on the alternatives financial
outcomes. The following examples represent some of
the resilient strategies that may be considered in the
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case of MITS and the reason they should be
approached in a decision-making context.
As an example, investing on new container
origin-destination tracking technologies with higher
reliability and accuracy can be considered as a
strategy for resilience. Implementation of such a
strategy requires a complicated system design and a
sophisticated technology as well as multi-layered and
international legal agreements, which are both costly
and time consuming. However, the implementation
of this strategy can reduce losses for the stakeholders
of MITS in the long term. Obviously, the question
would be its feasibility and the point of time at which
the investment breaks even.
As another example of strategies for resiliency,
we can consider the design and construction of extra
facilities (such as wharfs and platforms), with the
required equipment storage for making them operable
(e.g., cranes and forklifts) in cases of emergency.
This strategy creates resilience through redundancy
in a system by providing slack capacity at a time that
the system faces a major disruption, such as a
hurricane, when extra capacity is needed due to
lockdown of other neighboring ports. In the case of
those ports that are unlikely to be affected by natural
factors, such facilities can be installed completely
and be ready to use at any time necessary. However,
keeping a plain platform that can become operable in
a short period of time might be a reasonable strategy,
given that all the necessary equipment for installation
and operation of the platform is stored nearby and
can be transported rapidly and cost-effectively.
Again, the deciding factor would be the cost-
effectiveness of each proposed strategy.
The RMDA suggests development of resilience
strategies based on the identified risk factors and
vulnerabilities of entire MITS, provided by the first
phase of the framework. This is very important as the
proposed strategies must address certain issues that
threaten MITS through organizational, technological,
natural, and human factors. The importance of this
relationship becomes clear in the third phase of the
RMDA framework, where decision-makers should
value the proposed investment strategies in order to
make the best decision. The process of valuing the
proposed resilience investment strategies is
meaningful only when it is based on risk assessments
of the first phase.
3.3. Phase III- Valuing Investment Strategies
The integration of resilience into the design and
operation of the MITS can potentially be costly.
However, the risk of losing the service capacity for a
period of time, in face of serious perturbations may
 well justify the effectiveness of the design-level
investment. Evaluation of cost-effectiveness in this
case requires cost analysis based on risk management
methodologies [20]. Within our RMDA framework,
we propose the application of decision analysis
techniques such as decision tree analysis or real
options based planning processes to identify cost-
effective alternatives justified at each point in
lifecycle of MITS with consideration of both layers
of resilience factors.
With respect to resiliency of the system, one way
of dealing with uncertainty and risks that threatens
the system is to have built-in resiliency in the initial
design, which can be expressed through strategies
devised in regards to resilience. In future, somewhere
down the line of system’s lifecycle, such built-in
resiliency enables the decision-makers to adopt
various effective alternatives efficiently and at
relatively low cost. However, the built-in resiliency
structure of MITS imposes a combination of fixed
and variable costs to the system that appear in forms
of investment and maintenance respectively. That is
why the Valuing Investment Strategies phase of
RMDA framework is essential for making decisions
in a systematic manner. As efforts in valuation of
other strategies such as flexibility shows, in most
cases, the advantage of certain investment options in
dealing with changes in the future outweighs the
expected value of performance loss [21].
In order to analyze the cost of investment
alternatives in MITS, we can apply decision analysis
methodologies such as DTA or the economic theory
of real options. In general, DA is a simple standard
approach for defining a wide range of alternatives
within a predetermined timeframe or over several
periods. It is important to know that DA is very
useful in situations where the probabilities and
frequencies of risks and uncertainties are identified,
understood, and known [22]. In the case of
application of RMDA for MITS, understanding the
nature of risks and uncertainties is a requirement that
is fulfilled in the first phase of the framework. Thus,
DA methodologies discussed in the following are
appropriate tools for analyzing the situation from the
perspective of the RMDA framework.
A decision tree is one of the DA tools that
support the process of decision-making by
representation of alternatives, uncertainties, and
outcomes. The value of each possible outcome can be
calculated, using the expected value function, which
in fact, incorporates the effect of risk into the
calculations indirectly [23]. DTA is a useful tool in
analyzing sequential complex decisions in which the
representation of uncertainty is discrete in time. It is
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also capable of recognizing the interdependencies
between initial and subsequent decisions. An optimal
decision in DTA is chosen based on optimization
criteria (that is usually in terms of financial loss
and/or gain of the branches) through calculating the
expected value of the alternatives, and working
backwards in the decision tree. However, applying
DTA has some limitations as well. For example, the
size of the tree expands geometrically with the
number of decision nodes. Thus, applying DTA to
real cases in which there are usually a lot of chance
nodes and subsequently many decisions can become
very complicated. The other limitation is that DTA is
not a methodology to be used for uncertainties of a
continuous nature [24].
Option analysis is another methodology that can
be used for analyzing decisions in a system. An
option is defined as the capability of a decision-
maker to take (or leave) some action at a certain time
in the future. In fact, although there is a value
assigned to each options that can be bought or
invested at some time in the past, the decision maker
is not obligated to use it in the future [25]. This
concept has had a huge impact on the approach to
project investment and moreover, it can be
incorporated in management of risk and analysis of
uncertainties that threaten the functionality of a large
system or an infrastructure. It has also been applied
to the management of flexibility in complex systems
[26]. The options analysis and its relevant evaluation
techniques were created in the field of finance, for
the first time [27]. However, the concept of options
can be used as a strong tool in analysis of decision in
the same way. Solving a real option problem is to
some extent more complicated in comparison to DTA
calculations and is usually possible through
application of numerical methods, using partial
differential equations or in some cases, Monte Carlo
simulation.
We suggest the application of DTA or real
options techniques in Valuing Investment Strategies
phase of RMDA framework. The first two phases of
RMDA framework help us to understand the nature
of uncertainties that may cause major disruptions in
MITS, and to develop strategies that can be devised
for and implemented in MITS to decrease
vulnerabilities of the system against threatening risks
and at the same time to facilitate the process of
bringing back the system to a satisfying level of
service. Now, the third phases is about valuing these
strategies based on either expected value or real
options pricing approaches and comparing the value
of each strategy with the alternative of avoiding
resilience investment.
 In order to do that, it is necessary to have We also developed a case study to show the
financial information about the cost of built-in application of RMDA framework in strategic
resiliency investment options as well as the economic decision-making regarding to resilience of MITS.
impacts of losing a portion or the whole capacity of Preliminary results show that strategies dealing with
MITS components due to facing a major disruption. reduction in vulnerability are far more cost-effective
Unfortunately, there are little documentations and feasible than strategies dealing with systems
available in this regard, which makes obtaining such recovery after being affected. Therefore, since facing
information very difficult. In fact, in the case of disruption in MITS is inevitable, integration of well-
MITS the aforementioned information either does not designed contingency plans for mitigation and
exist, or are not available due to the sensitivity of the recovery, as it is also suggested by others [28] is
issue. Therefore, we generated some information essential for increasing resiliency in such a complex
partly based on other available resources for similar system.
situations and partly through intuitive conclusions, so
Taking the sustainability of MITS into account,
that we can apply our proposed framework and
could be an interesting extension to this research.
observe the results. In the following, we develop a
According to the studies, by the end of 21st century,
case and use RMDA framework to analyze the
nearly two third of the national population in the
decision process of proposed resilient strategies in
United States will live along the coast, mostly in
MITS.
urban centers and along watercourses. Share of
4. Conclusion and Future Research MITS in economy will increase to 50% of the GNP
and thus, there should be an enormous investment in
There is a lack of an effective framework that
the coastal zone and maritime infrastructure,
incorporates the effects of risks involved in MITS for
especially where the existing coastal ecosystems are
making investment strategies decisions. Using the
in the critical thresholds of repair or even beyond
proposed RMDA framework we identify common
[29]. Considerations of inevitable environmental
elements of uncertainty in MITS, which shed light on
issues, caused by the ports in financial analysis of
the systems response to shock through data analysis.
investments as an important factor for the resilience
The RMDA framework also helps us evaluate the
of MITS should be addressed in future studies.
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