PERSONS Case Digests Batch 3

PERSONS Case Digests Batch 3 - EH 303 (2017)
# CASE
1 REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
ACEDILLO, VENUS
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE:
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
2 SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC
ALIPAR, RUBY AMOR
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Article 376, 407, 408 and 413 of the Civil Code, RA 9048
FACTS:
On November 26, 2002, Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition (SP Case No. 02-105207) for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in RTC Manila, Branch 8. The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" and as a “male” in his birth certificate. He underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand on January 27,
2001. He also had a plastic reconstruction under Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr. He lived as a female and was engaged to his American fiancé, Richard P.
Edel. He then sought to change his name and sex. During the trial, he testified for himself and presented his fiancé and Dr. Reysio-Cruz, as witnesses.
The RTC Manila, Branch 8 ruled in favor of the petitioner. The court ordered the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate
of Birth of petitioner, specifically for petitioner's first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner's gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition
and petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not a person can petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.
RULING:
NO, a person cannot petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.
A PERSON'S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
RA 9048 now governs the change of first names. It is intended to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court. The petitioner’s true and official name does not prejudice him at
all. Under Section 4 of RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), grounds for allowed change of names are the person’s name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, and
avoid confusion. His basis for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment and intended to make his name compatible with the sex he
transformed into through surgery. Changing the petitioner’s first name may only create grave complications in the civil registry and public interest. Also,
under Article 376, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law)
and Section 1 of RA 9048 vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. Assuming it could be legally done, petitioner could have filed the petition with the local civil registrar since this petition is not within the court’s
primary jurisdiction.
NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Under Article 407 and 408 of the Civil Code, only acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such
as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name) contemplated
in the provisions can justify corrections in the birth certificate. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413
of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth. For these reasons, while petitioner may
have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
The petition was DENIED.
*Notes:
Though not stated in the case, Article 1 and Section 1 of Article 2 is applicable to this case. Let’s not forget that the petitioner has an American fiance. His
petition to change his first name and sex may affect the mentioned provisions. Marriage contracted in the Philippines should only be done between a man
and a woman or male and female.
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (52a)
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
● (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female
3 REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
BANAAG, CREADILYN
Marriage for the purpose of convenience, NOT void ab initio.
FACTS:
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On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her
pre-trial brief..At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. On April 25, 2008 RTC declared the marriage void ab initio.
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a
real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE(S):
W/N a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent.
RULING:
NO.
In Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that
the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
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defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious
purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the
very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into
the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage
may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence,
though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be
valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under
Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud
may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into
the sham marriage.
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4 ARAES VS JUDGE OCCIANO
BILAGANTOL, ANGELIQUE MHAR
Article 3 - requisite for marriage license.
Jurisdiction of the judge to solemnize marriage

FACTS:
Mercedita Mata Araes charges Judge Salvador Occiano, the presiding judge of MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the Law. She
alleges that on February 17, 2000 the said judge solemnize her marriage to her late groom Dominador Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
the judge’s jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.
They lived together as married couple until his husband died. She was then denied of the right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and she was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia who was a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy because their marriage was void.
The case was referred to Office of the Court Administrator and the judge was required to comment.
Judge Salvador averred that he was requested by Juan Arroyo on February 15, 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on February 17, 2000.
Having been assured that all documents were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the MTC at Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not travel to Balatan thus he requested if the judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua and into which he accepted. Moreover, he avers that before he started the ceremony he examined the documents of the petitioner and
when he discovered that the parties did not have the requisite marriage license he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested to reset it to another
date. But due to petitioner’s earnest pleas he proceeded with the solemnization. After the marriage, he reiterated to the parties the necessity of the
marriage license and the failure to comply with it may render their marriage void.
Araes confirmed the comment of the judge and attested that she only filed the administrative case out of rage.
Records show that the petitioner and Orobia filed an application for marriage license but neither of them claimed it. There was also no record of such
marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar and in the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for Orobia failed to submit the Death certificate of his
previous spouse.
The Office of Administrator found that the said judge was guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and for doing so outside his
jurisdiction.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and for doing so outside his jurisdiction.
RULING:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or BP 129, the authority of the regional trial court and inferior courts’ judges to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In this case, respondent judge was suspended for six months on the grounds of
solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction for his territorial jurisdiction is limited to municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. He should also be faulted
for solemnizing the marriage without the marriage license for it is the marriage license which grants the solemnizing authority the authority to solemnize a
marriage hence respondent judge did not possess the authority to solemnize the said marriage. Therefore, the respondent judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
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In sum, Judge Occiano is fined 5,000 pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt more severely.
5 ENGRACE NINAL VS NORMA BADAYOG

BORGA, JANZEL ROQUETTE
Article 76, Civil Code (the Court applied the Civil Code because the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of the marriage between Pepito and
Badayog)
Article 34, Family Code
FACTS:
Pepito Niñal married Teodulfa Bellones. They had five children, the petitioners of this case. On April 24, 1985, Pepito shot Teodulfa to death. On
December 11, 1986, Pepito married Norma Badayog. They did not acquire a marriage license, but instead presented an affidavit stating that they have
cohabited for at least 5 years, and therefore, they were exempt from the marriage license requirement (Article 76 of Civil Code, Article 34 of Family Code).
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Shortly thereafter, his children under his previous marriage filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his subsequent marriage to Badayog. Badayog then argued that the petitioners do not have the standing to ask for the nullity of the marriage under Article
47 of the Family Code.
The RTC of Toledo, Cebu found that the law was silent on this matter. Nevertheless, it ruled that the petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. The case was brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether or not the 5-year cohabitation between two parties, exempting them from the marriage license requirement, should be without legal
impediment.
(2) Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the 5-year cohabitation should be without legal impediment. This means that the two parties should actually have been living as husband and
wife, minus the actual marriage. This would not be possible if there was a subsisting marriage.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In the present case, Pepito and Bayadog could not have possibly complied with the 5-year requirement specified in Article 76, exempting them from the
requirement of a marriage license. They were wed one year and eight months after the dissolution of Pepito’s first marriage (upon the death of Teodulfa
Bellones, the first wife). Even if they did cohabit for 5 years, this 5-year cohabitation is not the one contemplated by the law. The law requires that the
cohabitation be without legal impediment (a subsisting marriage is a legal impediment).
Yes, the petitioners can file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage. Contrary to respondent’s claims, Article 47 does not apply to
the present case because this provision pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Notes:
5
Void Marriage
- considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights
- can never be ratified
- can be attacked collaterally
- can be questioned even after the death of either party
- any proper interested party may attack a void marriage
- have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as
Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code
Voidable Marriage
- valid until otherwise declared by the court
- can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
- cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding
- can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
- only the parties can assail it
- the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate
6 MANZANO VS SANCHEZ
CAPUNO MARY SHANE
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Articles 34 and 63(1) of the Family Code
FACTS:
Herminiana Borja-Cruz filed a complaint against Judge Roque R. Sanchez of the Municipal Trial Court of Infanta Pangasinan for solemnizing the marriage
of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao in year 1993. Complainant contends that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano being married to
him on May 21, 1966.
Respondent judge contends that he has no knowledge that Manzano was legally married. What he knows is that Manzano and Payao had been living
together for 7 years without being married. Had he known that Manzano has been married, he would have advised them not to marry as Manzano could
be charged for bigamy. He therefore wished for the petition to be dismissed.
After evaluation, the court administrator finds respondent to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was asked to pay a fine of 2000 pesos with a
warning that such repetition of the error would be dealt with severely.
On October 25, 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative. Judge Cruz however reiterated his plea for dismissal presenting the affidavits of both Manzano and
Payao stating that they were indeed married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos respectively but has affirmed that they have not cohabitated nor
communicate with their spouses as their relationships are marked with constant quarrels. Judge Cruz cited Article 34 of the Family Code as a justification
of solemnizing their marriage.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Judge Roque Cruz committed gross negligence and ignorance of the law?
RULING:
Not all requirements under the stated provision of the code were fulfilled (specifically the second requirement). The court further states that Judge ought
to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment. He also cannot deny the knowledge about their prior marriage as being indicated in
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the affidavits both Manzano and Payao swore before him. The fact that they have been living separately from their spouses for a long time is immaterial
because as stated in Article 63(1) of the family code, it is allowed for spouses to obtain a decree of legal separation and are allowed to live separately but
this does not mean that marriage bonds are severed.
Judge Roque Sanchez could also not use what has been indicated in the affidavits of both Manzano and Payao that they have been living together for 7
years. Free and voluntary cohabitation with other person for at least 5 years does not severe marriage bonds. Article 34 of the Family code only talks
about the grounds for exemption of taking a marriage license; not a justification to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.
Recommendation of Court Administrator is therefore adopted with the amount of fine increased to 20,000.
7 REP. VS JOSE DAYOT

COLE, DANICA ROSE
Article 76 - No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age maturity and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Article 53 - No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties
2. Their consent, freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage and
4. A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
FACTS:
November 24, 1986- Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall and was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit attesting both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years.
July 07, 1993 - Jose filed Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with RTC Binan, Laguna, Branch 25 and contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least 5 years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
Jose’s version that Felisa requested to accompany her to Pasay City Hall for she could claim package sent to her brother from Saudi Arabia. Felisa
cajoled him, and he alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he peruse the same, he discovered
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.
Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She expounded that while her marriage with Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose and Rufina with the Office of the Ombudsman since they were both employees of
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct and meted out to him
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the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson-Dayot marriage be declared Void Ab Initio?
RULING:
Yes. According Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of the marriage as a contract:
Article 53 - No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
1. Legal Capacity of the contracting parties;
2. Their consent freely given;
3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
4. A marriage licence, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without license without a licence being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.
Article 80 (3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than
the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,
whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage licence under the
Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official as inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72-79. To wit, these marriages are: 1.)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace of war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages and (6) mixed marriages.
Therefore, the petition was denied and the amended decision from CA was declared void ab initio without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any.
NOTE: Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto, that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority and that being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife of at least 5 years.
8 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS JUDGE ANATALIO NECESSARIO, et al

CORREOS, ZAYRA BLANCHE
Main:
● Article 3, Family Code - Formal Requisites of Marriage
● Article 4(3), Family Code - “An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.”
Supplement:
● Article 7, Family Code - Authority of the Solemnizing Officer/Persons Authorized to Solemnize Marriages
● Article 9 and 20, Family Code - Issuance of Marriage License and Life of a Marriage License, respectively
● Article 21, Family Code - Certificate of Legal Capacity Required for Foreigners
● Article 34, Family Code - Ratification of Marital Cohabitation
FACTS:
The current case is an administrative case that stemmed from the July 6, 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). A judicial
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audit team was created by the OCA to investigate on alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. It was alleged that certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers"
or "facilitators" for instant marriages.
The Court treated the Memorandum as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales of Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of the MTCC in Cebu City to submit their respective
comments and suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them.
The judicial audit team found a lot of irregularities, such as:

● Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team and out of the 643 marriage certificates examined,
280 marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
● The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts'
custody.
● There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.
● There were even marriages solemnized with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
In their supplemental report dated August 24, 2007, they reported the following, among others:
● Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who would go over the
couples' documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign
nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of
Barili. Those anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis.
● Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the solemnization
fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter.
● Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local
civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples' attendance in the family planning
seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside
the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for
gasoline expenses if the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers.
● Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples
wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the
entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated"
marriage certificates.
● Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article
34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (P10).
● Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage applications. Couples who are non-Barili
residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.
The Court also ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving
the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil
Registrar of Liloan, Cebu.
Respondent judges’ counterarguments (Comments and/or Answers to the OCA Memorandum and its Supplemental Report) were:
● Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by contracting parties. He claims
that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation.
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● Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether the license was obtained
from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage
license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents.
● Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an
"entrapment". She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with
the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided. As to the pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts.
● Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents
submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. It is only when there is no marriage license given that he
ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there
is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro forma.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross
inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
RULING:
Yes and No. (Yes in the sense that all judges and clerk personnel were found guilty of violating the said charges; and no, because not all of them were
dismissed from service. All four judges were dismissed while some of the personnel were only suspended and admonished with a warning.)
The SC upheld findings of the OCA that respondent judges solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and
had visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. The judges were also found
to have solemnized marriages where a contracting party was a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her
embassy, as required by Article 21 of the Family Code. Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis was also found to have solemnized marriages where a
party was a minor during cohabitation period which violates Article 34 of the Family Code. And lastly, judges were found to have solemnized marriages
even without a prior license issued and solemnized marriages with an expired marriage license, contrary to Article 3 and Article 20 of the Family Code.
Marriage documents examined by the OCA audit team also showed that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fees were missing which the
Court deemed as negligence in the part of the respondent judges’ duties.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of
the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the
presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded
laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice. The Court agrees with the OCA in finding Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing
jurisprudence.
The respondent judges were ordered dismissed from the judicial service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
holding any government post. The Court also penalized six court personnel from the MTCC branches for their involvement in the anomalous
solemnization of marriages. Court interpreter Helen Mongaya and administrative officer Rhona Rodriguez were dismissed from the service, process
server Desiderio Aranas and court interpreter Rebecca Alesna were suspended for six months without pay, while court clerk Celeste Retuya and
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stenographer Emma Valencia were admonished with a warning.
9 REPUBLIC VS OBRECIDO
DAHAN, LEAH EDEN
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
11
10 BAYOT VS COURT OF APPEALS
DELA TORRE, CHELSEA ANNE
FACTS:
On, April 20, 1979 petitioner Rebecca, an American Citizen and respondent Vicente were married. On November 27, 1982, Rebecca gave birth to their
child, Alix. Their marriage turned sour which prompted Rebecca to initiate divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court ordered
the dissolution of the couple’s marriage, but giving them joint custody over Alix. The same court issued an order settling the couple's conjugal property.
On 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. Rebecca filed a petition, before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity and also sought for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. But, Rebecca insists on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the (DOJ), and that there is no valid divorce to speak of. Meanwhile, Vicente had already contracted another marriage
which commenced their criminal complaints against each other. The RTC denies Vicente’s motion to dismiss and grant’s Rebecca’s application for
support pendente. CA dismissed Civil Case and set aside RTC’s incidental orders.
Two petitions were brought to the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the divorce is valid.
RULING:
(1) Yes because at the time she secured a divorce in the Dominican Republic, she has represented herself as an American Citizen who is bound by the
National Law of the United States, a country which allows divorce.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Likewise, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is no more marriage to be dissolved or
nullified and pursuant to Article 26, they are both capacitated to remarry.
12
11 GERBERT CORPUZ VS DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
DIMAPINTO, SAMSON NIHAR
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
12 MINORU FUJIKI VS MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

ECHICA, EDNA ISABEL
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
13 DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO
ESPAÑA, LOREBETH
Article 40 (Family Code) - The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage on the basis solely of a final
judgement declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
FACTS:
Petitioner, Reinel Anthony B. De Castro and Respondent, Annabelle Assidao- De Castro met and became sweethearts in 1991.They applied for a
marriage license in Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with
the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective
homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the child’s birth, the mother has been the one supporting her
out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice; thus, resulting for the respondent to file a complaint for support against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City on 4 June 1998. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the marriage is void ab initio
because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to The Court of Appeals but was denied. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial
declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In
addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioner’s “forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him
of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible.”
Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate
father of the child. The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
13
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the marriage between the respondent and petitioner is valid.
RULING: NO. The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of
a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the
essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not
have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than
five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the
affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case,
there was no “scandalous cohabitation” to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed
so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license
requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
NOTE: Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
14 CHI MING TSOI VS CA

GARCIA, SUZEYNE KIM
Art. 36 Psychological Incapacity
FACTS
Gina Lao-Tsoi and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on May 22, 1988. After the marriage they went home to Chi Ming Tsoi’s mother’s house and they slept in
the same room for the first night of their married life but didn’t fuck. This happened again even until they left to have their honeymoon. During their
honeymoon, Chi Ming Tsoi invited his Mom and nephew, Gina’s Mom, and an uncle. Still no sex happened. Gina says Chi Ming kept avoiding her during
the trip. They didn’t have sex during the 10 months that they have cohabitated after their marriage. Gina claims they underwent medical examinations and
she was found to be healthy. Chi Ming, on the other hand, was prescribed medications and was asked to return. The details of his examination were
confidential and kept from her. Gina claims that Chi Ming is impotent and a closet homosexual. She observed that he would use an eyebrow pencil and
the cleansing cream of his mother. She alleges further that Chi Ming only married her to keep is residency status and maintain the image of a
heterosexual man. Gina wants to annul the marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming claims that if it were to be annulled on the grounds of psychological incapacity, it would be Gina’s fault. According to him, it was Gina who
resisted his sexual advances. However, he doesn’t want the marriage to be annulled because he loved her, he had no physical or psychological defect,
and their differences could still be mended because they’re still very young. And if there was a medical defect, it can be cured by medical science. Chi
Ming submitted himself to a medical examination and the doctors found that he was not impotent. His penis was capable of being fully erect and thus he
14
is fully capable to have sex.
RTC declared the marriage as void. Reluctance/unwillingness to fuck despite the fact that he’s physically fit to do so is indicative of a serious personality
disorder which results to an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code. And the CA affirmed their decision.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not refusal to have sexual communion is a psychological incapacity.
Whether or not the marriage can be declared void on the grounds of Chi Ming’s psychological incapacity, Art. 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes. Reluctance/unwillingness to have sex, even though he/she is fit to do so, is considered by Catholic marriage tribunals as equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Procreation is an essential marital obligation under the Family Code. Non-fulfillment will result to a destruction of the basic integrity and
wholeness of the marriage. Evidence is against Chi Ming. Because, according to the court, even if she was the one consistently refusing him, “he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked”…… And, if indeed it was the wife who was incapacitated, he should
have gone to court and sought nullity but he did not. Because the Filipina woman is modest, it’s hard to believe she would expose her private life willy-nilly
if it were not necessary. Furthermore, the Court finds it hard to believe that the issue can still be fixed considering they have not had sex for the entire 10
months of being married and living together. Thus, on grounds of psychological incapacity, on the part of Chi Ming, the marriage is declared void. The
petition is dismissed. The Court sustains the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
15 LESTER BENJAMIN HALILI VS

CHONA SANTOS-HALILI
GO, SARAH JANE
Article 36 Psychological incapacity as a ground to render the marriage null and void.
It is not insanity or mental illness. It is the condition of a person who does not have the mind, will and heart for the performance of marriage obligations
(Article 68 - Essential Marriage Obligations).
The existence of psychological incapacity depends on a case-to-case basis.
3 Requisites of Psychological Incapacity:
1) Juridical Antecedent - It must already be existing at the time of celebration of marriage
2) Gravity - It must be a very serious defect
3) Incurability - It is not curable
FACTS:
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations in marriage in the RTC. Petitioner alleged that he wed Chona in civil rites thinking it was a
joke. They never lived together and started fighting constantly a year later. For this reason, petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and dated other
women. He then received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only then that he asked and found
out that the marriage which he thought was only a joke was not fake.
The RTC granted the petition and declared petitioner psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and held that, taken in totality, the evidence for petitioner failed to establish his psychological
15
incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.|
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity which effectively prevented
him from complying with his essential marital obligations
RULING:
YES. The Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, findings of
experts and researchers and by decisions of church tribunals. In this case, Dr. Dayan revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent personality
disorder brought about by a dysfunctional family that the petitioner had and from partner relational problem during his marriage with Chona as it was full of
fights. Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner's dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions. Petitioner's mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take
upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.
The Supreme Court gave much weight to the testimony of the expert witness, Dr. Dayan, and thereby recognized the sufficient establishment of the
petitioner’s psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is declared null and void.
16 LEONILO ANTONIO VS MARIE IVONNE REYES, 2006

GORGONIO, KIM CATHRYN
Molina Guidelines, 1997
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5
months later. Antonio separated from Reyes in August 1991 due to her constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him. He attempted reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another
man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. As manifestations of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income and educational attainment among others. In support of his petition, Antonio presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist who observed
that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to the petitioner was pathological. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy which reached
the point of paranoia was pathological. They concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
Respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in
the 1997 Molina case had not been satisfied. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(S):
16
WON Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC owing to the evidence presented by the petitioner and the refusal of the CA to dispute
the veracity of the facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

(1) Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
(2) The root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was
clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
(3) That respondent fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological incapacity has existed even before
the celebration of marriage;
(4) That the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent to contract another marriage without the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal’s consent;
(5) That respondent’s being a pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust,
and respect as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code;
(6) That the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is
the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court; and
(7) That Reyes' case is clinically permanent or incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
SC: Decision of RTC declaring petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED.
Notes:
-Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. The spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of
fulfilling such rights and obligations.
-Molina guidelines is not set in stone and the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception
17 VALERIO KALAW VS MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

LABBAY, DOREEN
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Republic vs CA - guidelines to prove psychological incapacity
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and
17
duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in
keeping with their means;
(2) . . .
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their
interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from
bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
FACTS : On September 19, 2011, the petitioner, Valerio Kalaw, failed to prove that his wife ,Ma. Elena Fernandez, suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of 2 supposed expert witness who only relied on his allegations. The petitioner alleged that respondent had constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
habits constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD (Narcissistic psychological disorder). But these were not actually proven.
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a
wife. Contrary to the allegation of the petitioner that respondent played 4 to 5 times a week, she maintained that it was only 2 to 3 times a week with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children. The children corroborated this. The witness, Mario, also testified that respondent
appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man,
that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. There was no testimony
whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties.
Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA's reversal of the trial court's ruling that there was
psychological incapacity. What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the
best of themselves to each other and to their children. The petition is DENIED. The Supreme court affirmed the decision of the CA.
However, In his Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent,
if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the September 2011 decision should be reversed
RULING: YES.
I. It was not proper for the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by the psychologists on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the
witnesses’ version of events. The trial court’s findings of facts should be given weight. The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the
RTC when the SC reviewed the case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence
because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge
in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
18
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."
Republic vs CA on guidelines for psychological incapacity:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
II. The frequency of the respondent's mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made
her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities. Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions are indicative of her psychological
incapacity. it was shown that Elena was too addicted to mahjong that she would even bring her children to her mahjong sessions which were so frequent
and would last from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact that the Elena brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only
point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the
culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the
Family Code.
III. The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the
respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. Although the petitioner, as the
plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of
her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was
afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage
between the parties.
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES
the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
18 AZCUETA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS

LARENA, REHNE GIBB
19
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Molina Doctrine. Set guidelines for the interpretation and application of Art 36.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993 after less than two months of acquaintance, who were 23 and 28 years
of age respectively. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage rearing no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC-Antipolo City Branch 72 a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He is
said to be emotionally immature, irresponsible, unemployed, dependent on his mother for financial assistance, would become violent when drunk, and did
not even want to have a child. Florida de Ramos, a first cousin on Rodolfo corroborated the testimony with regards to the latter’s unemployment and
dependence to his mother. An expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia Villegas was likewise presented concluding that Rodolfo was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings. Dr. Villegas further stressed the incurability of such
a disorder as it started in early development and is deeply ingrained into Rodolfo’s personality.
RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, declaring their marriage as null and void ab initio. The Solicitor General appealed the decision objecting on (a) the
psychiatric report basing solely on the information provided by petitioner and not based on an examination of Rodolfo, and (b) there was no showing that
the alleged psychological defects were present at the inception of marriage. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Thus, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE(S):
W/n the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner has adequately presented evidence that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to carry out his marital obligations. Thus, the Court laid
down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of her husband. In Marcos v. Marcos, 17 it was held that there is
no requirement that the defendant/ respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non.
20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by
expert testimony, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. Third, Rodolfo's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the
time of and even before the celebration of marriage. The manifestations of Rodolfo's dependent personality disorder must have existed even prior to the
marriage being rooted in his early development and a by product of his upbringing and family life. Fourth, Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has been
shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo's condition which has been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED reinstating the declaration of nullity of marriage.
19 JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS VS FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

LLAMASARES, DANI JOEY
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
20 VALDES VS RTC
MAÑUS, MARIA VICTORIA
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Article 147 of the family code, Articles 50, 51 and 52, provision on co-ownership
FACTS: Antonio Valdes, petitioner, and Consuelo Gomez-Valdes were married for 21 years but on June 22, 1992 Valdes sought for nullity of their
marriage in pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The Trial Court, respondent, gave judgement and rendered.
1.The marriage of both parties hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential martial obligations.
2.The three older children would choose which parent they would want to stay with and the remaining two shall be placed under custody of the mother,
Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. The petitioner and the respondent would have visiting right over the children who are in custody of the other.
3.The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification regarding the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code where she asserted
that the Family code contained no provisions on the procedure for liquidation of common property in “union without marriage”. On May 05, 1995 the trial
court made the following clarification.
“Article 147 of the Family Code provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union are presumed to be obtained through joint efforts
and will be owned by them in equal shares. In liquidation and partition of properties owned by both parties, the provision on co-ownership found in the
Civil Code shall apply. Since the marriage of both parties were declared null and void ab initio in pursuant to Article 147, it shall be governed by the rules
of co-ownership. The provisions of Articles 102, where it refers to procedure for liquidation of the conjugal partnership property, Article 129, where it refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of absolute community of property, finds no application.”
On October 30, 1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order but was denied. As recourse, petitioner submitted that Article 50, 51 and 52 should
be controlling.
1. Article 147 of the Family Code doesn’t apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.
2. Articles 50, 51, 52 in relation to Article 102 and 109 of the Family Code governs marriage declared ab initio that includes marriage under
psychological incapacity.
3. It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.
The trial court correctly applied the correct provision and that it did not acted neither imprudently nor precipitately.
21
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Trial Court applied the correct provision on May 05, 1995 and October 30, 1995 on the Civil case no. Q-92-12539 where
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez-Valdes marriage was declared void ab initio and that the liquidation of their common properties were properly given
the right provision.
RULING: Yes. The Trial Court correctly applied the law and that in void marriages the property of the petitioner during the period of cohabitation is
governed by Article 147 or 148 and that property acquired by both spouses through the work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Wherefore the questioned orders dated May 05, 1995 and October 30, 1995 of the Trial Court are affirmed.
21 MERCADO VS TAN
MARTEL, ALDWIN DHON
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Article 40 of the Family Code (Absolute nullity of a previous marriage), Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code (Bigamy)
FACTS: Dr. Vincent Mercado (petitioner) and Ma. Consuelo Tan (respondent) got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City, Branch 7, being
solemnized by Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez. By reason of which, a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. There is no dispute either
that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with the respondent, petitioner was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued
in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart
Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between the petitioner and respondent was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City.
　　On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by Consuelo Tan through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which
eventually resulted in the institution of the present case against Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
　　On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, Dr. Mercado filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on his first marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993, the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
　　Dr. Mercado is charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first
marriage having been legally dissolved.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not Dr. Vincent Mercado can be convicted guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code in spite of filing the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office.
RULING:
　　YES. Dr. Vincent Mercadi Petitioner was convicted guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code in spite of filing the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office.
　 He was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
　　The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
　　The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code;
22
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
　　When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G.
Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with respondent Ma. Consuelo
Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
　　In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article
40 of the Family Code. In fact, he instituted the petition to have the first marriage declared void only after Ma. Consuelo Tan had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
　　Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: "The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
　　A declaration of nullity of marriage is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, one may be charged with
and convicted of bigamy. Such declaration is also necessary even if the earlier marriage is characterized by statute "void." Under Article 40 of the Family
Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that
declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.
　　In the case at bar, Dr. Mercado was already married to Consuelo Tan but did not file a declaration of nullity of previous marriage (with Thelma G.
Oliva) until Consuelo Tan filed bigamy case. The crime had already been consummated by then. To file a petition to have his first marriage void after
Consuelo Tan charged him with bigamy is not a defense in a bigamy charge.
　　Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
22 TE VS CA
ORCULLO, JUNE IREKKA
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Article 40 of the Family Code: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Arthur Te, and the private respondent, Liliana Choa, were married in 1988. Although they were not living together after the marriage,
they would still see each other regularly. Liliana later gave birth to a girl and, thereafter, the petitioner stopped visiting the private respondent. In 1990, the
petitioner contracted marriage to Julieta Santella while his marriage to Choa was still subsisting. Choa then filed in the RTC a bigamy case against the
petitioner, meanwhile, the private respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage against the private respondent on the ground that he was forced to
marry her and he claimed that he was deceived by the private respondent who was pregnant with another man’s child.
Subsequently, the private respondent filed in the Professional Regulatory Commission a petition which sought to revoke the engineering licences of
Te and Santella on the grounds that they were committing acts of immorality by living together.
The petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence and motion to inhibit the trial judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner's counsel;
yet, those were denied by the RTC. It was ruled that the prosecution were able to establish a prima facie case against the accused; and that his second
motion lacks legal basis. He then filed in the CA a petition of certiorari by alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner filed a motion before the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC to suspend the proceedings of the administrative case in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and the criminal case for bigamy. Such petition, however, is denied by the
PRC which prompted the petitioner to file before the CA a petition of certiorari by alleging that the board committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The CA consolidated the two petitions because they bear the same set of facts. It upheld the decision of the RTC and also ruled that the board did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. The CA held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature,
and the other action involved is a civil case. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but it was
denied.
23
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question and has to be resolved first before the criminal and administrative cases
can be rendered judgement.
RULING: NO, the annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is defined as one based on a fact which is distinct from crime,
but maybe so intimately related with that crime, could possibly determine the innocence or guilt of the accused. The CA did not err in its judgement by
holding that the annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question. The outcome of the annulment
case will not determine whether the petitioner is innocent in the criminal case for bigamy because the only requisite of such case is that the first marriage
is still valid when the second marriage was contracted. The petitioner had argued that the issue of the nullity of his first marriage must be first resolved in
the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue; and such argument, according to the Court, is untenable. Nullity of the marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage, unless such there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Marriage, even if it is void or voidable,
could still be considered valid, unless it is declared as invalid in a judicial proceeding. Due to the absence of a judicial decree declaring the marriage
between Te and Choa as invalid; then, under the eyes of law, the marriage is still valid. Moreover, prejudicial question involves a criminal and civil case;
not a civil and administrative case.
23 CARINO VS CARINO
PARADERO, MARIA FATIMA
Article 53 of the Civil Code / Article 2 of the Family Code: Requisites of Marriage (marriage license)
Article 40 of the Family Code: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void (the need for judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage)
Article 147 of the Family Code: Property Regime of Unions without Marriage (w/o legal impediment)
Article 148 of the Family Code: Property Regime of Bigamous or Polygamous Marriages, Adulterous or Concubinage Relationships
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño, with whom he had two offsprings, and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children
in their almost ten (10) years of cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial
(GSIS) and burial (SSS).”
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits”.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration
24
of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE(S):
1.) Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license required under the Civil Code.
2.) Whether or not the marriage of the deceased and Susan Yee is valid without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage as required under
Article 40 of the Family Code.
3.) Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
1.) The answer is in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage
void ab initio.
The marriage between Nicdao and the deceased is null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. However, Nicdao can claim the death
benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.” creates
a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can
claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession (their 2 children).
2.) It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.
3.) No, Yee cannot claim half of the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy.
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. She is only
entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution.
The disputed P146,000.00 are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer.
Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has
no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
25
24 MORIGO VS PEOPLE
PEPITO ARVIE
Article 3 - The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Article 4 - The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
Article 40 - The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at Tagbilaran City, Bohol, for a period of four (4) years. They re-established contact in 1984 and
became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia went to Canada for work while they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines
and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8 of the same year, Lucia went back to Canada to get back to her work leaving Lucio behind.
In 1991, Lucia filed a divorce against appellant with the Ontario Court and was granted and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On Oct. 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran, Bohol.
On Sept. 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC Bohol alleging that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in RTC Bohol. The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
26
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. During the pendency of his appeal, Civil Case No. 6020 was decided in his favour. In that case, the RTC
ruled that there was no valid marriage ceremony that took place since the parties merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of the
solemnising officer. The trial court held that the marriage was therefore void, in accordance with Articles 3 and 15 of the Family Code. His motion for
reconsideration denied by the CA, he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Lucio is liable for bigamy in view of the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage that his first marriage was void for having been no valid
marriage ceremony
RULING:
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid. The petitioner
submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent
is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in
se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount
to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor
General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,⁠ which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was
aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present
in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) The offender has been legally married;
(2) The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) He contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) The subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down
27
the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired
was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab
initio, in accordance with Articles 3⁠ and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means
that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married.”
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
“void.”⁠
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor
of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
28
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as
well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.
25 TENEBRO VS CA
PO, DUANE MICHAELS
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
26 JARILLO VS PEOPLE
QUENIAHAN, JOSEPH THADDEUS
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
27 LAVADIA VS HERIS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

SALANG, DONALD
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
28 DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA VS MICHIYUKI KOIKE

SALUBRE, BLANCHE ANNE
Article 26 of the N.C.C.
FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla Medina (Doreen), a filipino Citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike(Michiyuki), a japanese National were married on June
6, 20 05 in Quezon City Philippines. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki , pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Japan.
29
Seeking to have said Divorce Certificate annotated on her certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign of divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry on February 7, 2013. On the hearing Doreen presented several
foreign documents., namey, “Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce and “Family Register of Michiyuki Koike” issued by the Mayor
of Ichinomiya and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, certified machine copy of a document entitled “Divorce
Certificate” issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila and was authenticated by the DFA, Certification issued by the City Civil Registry
Office in Manila and the books of “The Civil Code of Japan 2000 and “The Civil Code of Japan 2009”.
The RTC denied Doreen’s petition.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce pursuant to Article 26 of the N.C.C.?
RULING:
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code states that where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the filipino spouse shall likewise have a capacity to remarry under Philippine law.Under this article, the law confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.
In Garcia v. Recto, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are
essentially factual that calls for re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of
fact that is beyond the ambit of a rule 45 petition for review.
The case is hereby referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues in accordance with the decision.
Notes: Revised Rules on Evidence: Sections 24 and 25
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information
was necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice
given by him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the
30
court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
2. Testimonial Privilege
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants. (20a)
Section 6, paragraph 2 on Rules of Court:
Section 6. Disposition of improper appeal. — Except as provided in section 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed.
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for
decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.
29 EDELINA ANDO VS DFA

SERVACIO, ROLAND RHEY
Article 13, 35(4), 40
FACTS:
On September 2001, Edilina Tungul married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National in Pampanga. On September 2004, Kobayashi sought for divorce
in Japan and was validly granted under Japanese laws. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she reverted
to her single status, petitioner remarried in 2005. Kobayashi remarried someone else too.
Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Ando but she was told by the DFA that the
same cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until
otherwise declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Releif. She prayed for the court to:
a. Declare her marriage with Masatomi Ando as valid and subsisting until otherwise declared by a competent court;
b. Declare that she be issued a passport under the name EDELINA ANDO Y TUNGOL;
c. Direct the DFA to honor the marriage and to issue the said passport
On 2010, RTC dismissed the petition because although the divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, there is no showing that petitioner herein
complied with the requirements set forth in Art 13 of the Familiy Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in
our country. Later, she again petitioned for Reconsideration but was dismissed.
On 2011, she filed a petition for Review, raising the sole issue whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the petition for Declaratory Relief should prosper
RULING:
1. First, with respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport
- Edelina Ando incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC.
- She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (to follow Sec 9 of RA 8239), since her ultimate entreaty was to question the
DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.
31
2. Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid
- Edelina Ando should have filed a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband instead for praying the recognition
of her second marriage as valid.
- A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Note:
It is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the following:
(1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof;
(2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and
(3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place
where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
30 RENATO CASTILLO VS LEA DE LEON CASTILLO

SARDAN, JELLY
FACTS:Respondent Lea De leon contracted 2 marriages. The first marriage was with Benjamin Bautista on 25 May 1972|while the second marriage was
contracted with herein petitioner, Renato Castillo on 6 January 1979.Both marriages was contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code.Thus the
Law applicable in this case( with regards to the requirement of ensuring the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage) was that of the Civil Code which
does not requires it otherwise to render the prior marriage void.
Petitioner filed before RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, praying the marriage between him and respondent declared void due to the
subsisting prior marriage of respondent to Bautista. Respondent on the other hand contended and opposed the petition stating that her prior marriage
with Bautista is Void since they weren’t able to secure marriage license .
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage CA reversed the
decision and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage.
In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. CA denied
the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence this petition,
ISSUE(S):Whether or not there is a need to secure Judicial decree of Nullity of marriage to declare prior marriage void ?
RULING:
32
31 LEONILA SANTIAGO VS PEOPLE
VILLACORTA, CHARMAINE
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: ARTICLE 34 OF THE FAMILY CODE; CRIME OF BIGAMY UNDER ARTICLE 349
FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner
pleaded "not guilty," while her husband escaped the criminal suit. The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela
Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." Petitioner
asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by
the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years
prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal
from bigamy.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Santiago is liable for the crime of bigamy? 2. W/N her marriage is void under Article 34?
RULING: 1. Yes. Santiago is liable for the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. In Montañez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy
as follows: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved . . .; (c) that
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. The crime of bigamy does not
necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in
Nepomuceno:
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that
she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil
status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
||| 2. Yes, the marriage would have been void HOWEVER here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves
perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that
they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner
married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
33
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.|||
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime.
For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.|||
In short, the marriage is supposedly void. But because of the fraudulent representation of accused, rendering her marriage void would mean her
acquittal in the bigamy case.
34
32 NORBERTO VITANGCOL VS PEOPLE
TAALA, DEIRDRE
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE ARTICLE: Article 53 of the family code; Article 349 of the RPC
FACTS:
Prosecution Side:
Dec. 4, 1994 - Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo
- after some time, Alice began hearing rumors that Norberto was previously married to another woman
(July 17, 1987 - Norberto married Gina M. Gaerlan)
- Alice filed a complaint for bigamy against Norberto
Defense Side:
- Alice and Norberto was romantically involved sometime in 1987
- Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a fake marriage w/his college friend (Gina)
Sometime in 2007 - Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair w/a married man
RTC Ruling: Convicted Norberto of Bigamy (Art. 349, RPC)

CA: Sustained the guilty verdict of the RTC
- Norberto filed a petition for review on Certiorari before this court

- He argues that the 1st element of bigamy is absent
- 2nd, he argues that w/ no proof of existence of an essential requirement (marriage license) prosecution fails to establish the legality of
His 1st marriage
- He also claims that the legal dissolution of the 1st marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy
Prosecution counters - it has proven the existence of Norberto's prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed.
- The prosecution likewise proved that the 1rst marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved
- 1rst marriage was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice;
- and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the 1rst.
- Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of bigamy
ISSUE(S): issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Offce of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued
to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner's 1rst marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.
RULING:
The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not
categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For
more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a
nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.
Supreme Court’s answers to Norberto’s contentions

I
Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
35
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of
the following elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.
Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of
the Philippines became effective on August 3, 1988. Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines govern the validity of his first marriage.
Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of
any of which renders the marriage void from the beginning:
Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
The fourth requisite — the marriage license — is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides. The
marriage license represents the state's "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested." To
prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties."
Petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract
between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage. This "should be given greater credence than
documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]"
II
Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's
first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. The second element
of the crime of bigamyis, therefore, present in this case.
III
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty
within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered.
36
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
37

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PERSONS Case Digests Batch 3 - EH 303 (2017)

A PERSON'S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

The petition was DENIED.

Jurisdiction of the judge to solemnize marriage

5 ENGRACE NINAL VS NORMA BADAYOG

Article 34, Family Code

7 REP. VS JOSE DAYOT

8 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS JUDGE ANATALIO NECESSARIO, et al

The judicial audit team found a lot of irregularities, such as:

12 MINORU FUJIKI VS MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY

14 CHI MING TSOI VS CA

15 LESTER BENJAMIN HALILI VS

16 LEONILO ANTONIO VS MARIE IVONNE REYES, 2006

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

17 VALERIO KALAW VS MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

ISSUE(S):​ ​Whether or not the September 2011 decision should be reversed

Republic vs CA​ on guidelines for psychological incapacity:

18 AZCUETA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND COURT OF APPEALS

19 JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS VS FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

Article 3 - ​The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(1) The offender has been legally married;

(3) He contracts a subsequent marriage; and

27 LAVADIA VS HERIS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA

28 DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA VS MICHIYUKI KOIKE

Notes:​ Revised Rules on Evidence: Sections 24 and 25

Section 6, paragraph 2 on Rules of Court:

29 EDELINA ANDO VS DFA

30 RENATO CASTILLO VS LEA DE LEON CASTILLO

RTC Ruling: Convicted Norberto of Bigamy (Art. 349, RPC)

- Norberto filed a petition for review on Certiorari before this court

Supreme Court’s answers to Norberto’s contentions

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ISSUE(S): Whether or not the September 2011 decision should be reversed

Republic vs CA on guidelines for psychological incapacity:

Article 3 - The formal requisites of marriage are:

Notes: Revised Rules on Evidence: Sections 24 and 25