CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

PEOPLE VS. TUTIN

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully armed pirates. The
pirates including the accused Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr. detained the crew and completely
took over the vessel. The vessel was directed to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded transferred and
sold under the direct supervision of accused Cheong San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive vessel returned to the
Philippines. A series of arrests was thereafter effected and all the accused were charged with qualified piracy or violation
of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters). They were subsequently convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, this appeal. Meanwhile accused Cheong argues that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence.

ISSUE: WON the Philippines is without jurisdiction to try a crime committed outside the Philippine waters and territory?

RULING: We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement
nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532.
There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe
or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
"whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree
No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not
be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule
on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes
piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose
is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the
basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the
transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. KARAPATAN, Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to “close security surveillance by state
security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark windshields,” and their
offices monitored by “men with military build.” They likewise claim they have been branded as “enemies of the
State.”
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as
militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law.
Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.

2. WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine NO.
5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
NO.

HELD:

1. Petition for certiorari is improper.

 Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of
their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 The power of judicial review has 4 requisites: There must be an actual case or controversy; Petitioners must
possess locus standi; Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; The issue of
constitutionality must be the lismota of the case; The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most
essential.

2. Petitioners lack locus standi.

 Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete
adverseness.
 In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined as that requiring: That
the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND That the person sustained or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct inquiry as a result of the act being challenged.
 For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that: He has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury; The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND The injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
 RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the
requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
 The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its
members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts
against its constitutional rights and duties.
 Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of “political surveillance” also
lacks locus standi. The same is true for WigbertoTañada and Osmeña III, who cite their being a human rights
advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.

3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging.”

 Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites: matter must be one of common and general knowledge must
be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of accurate and ready determination
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court
 The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. It can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced by public records and (2) facts of general notoriety.
 A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.
 Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under
RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived
threat emanating from the so-called tagging. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.
 Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt the US and EU
classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to
declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organization under RA 9372.
 In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants: The character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; The lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised
 In the case at bar, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the
questions being raised.

4. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

 A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas
citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
 RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation,
while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation
of the law.
 Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence
of a direct and personal interest is key.
5. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
 Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy means an
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
 Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The pleadings must show: an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and a denial thereof
 However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices to
provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the presence of sufficient
facts.
 Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows
that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would be a
justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
 Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the implementation of RA
9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as “communist
fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to
render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.

6. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free
speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
 Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court nonetheless
proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense under the
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.
 The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada case: Allegations
that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed
to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected
speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. If
facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes.

7. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent
chargeagainst them.
 The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
 A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when: It lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in 2 ways: Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid Leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
 The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.
 A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.
 As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
 Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.
 Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.

8. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity.
 Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism: Offender commits an act
punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws; Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates
a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; The offender is actuated by the
desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
 Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be
transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not
persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
 Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle
of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of
offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter
neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct
and not speech.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS: Benito Astorga is the mayor of Daram, Western Samar. A group of people from Regional Special Operations
Group which includes Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources were sent to conduct an investigation together with SPO3
Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police as their escort, regarding possible illegal
logging activities. On September 1, 1997, at around 4:30 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the team found two boats
measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth. They found out that those boats belong to Mayor Astorga,
when Mayor Astorga found out about this, he went to the place and had a heated altercation with the team that lead to
Mayor Astorga calling for back ups, when he saw that they were outnumbered by the DENR team, ten armed men
arrived.
Mayor Astorga asked the DENR team to come with him to his house to have dinner, and it was 2:00 o’clock in the
morning when they let them leave his house. Mayor Astorga was charged with Arbitrary Detention for illegally detaining
the DENR team, where he was found Guilty by the trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Benito Astrorga was correctly charged with Arbitrary Detention.

HELD: No, Benito Astorga was wrongfully charged of Arbitrary Detention. The DENR team failed to prove that they were
illegally detained by Astorga against their will.
When Astorga invited them to his home, had dinner and even drank wine with them, converse with them and even
laughed with them, this creates reasonable doubt and clearly shows that fear did not exist in the minds of the DENR
team, and that they were not detained against their consent. Adding to the fact that it was raining that day which
prevented the DENR team to leave the island.
One of the requisites of Arbitrary Detention is when the offended party is placed in confinement or there is restraint
on his person or even if he could move freely, as long as he could not escape for fear of being apprehended again, which
is not present in this case.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
LAGMAN vs. MADIALDEA

FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao. In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on May 25, 2017,
submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which
only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in Marawi City;
established several checkpoints within the city; burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
several areas, thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to deprive
the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their powers and prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines
as a whole; and the possible tragic repercussions once it falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no compelling reason to
revoke Proclamation 216. The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme
Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation of martial law.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court;

2. A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts? B. Is the
President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the
President is required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if subsequent
events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?

3. Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken
by Congress jointly or separately;

4. W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters for review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the
threshold of evidence?

5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?

6. W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void: A. with its inclusion of
“other rebel groups; B. Since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire
Mindanao region;

7. W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to Congress are
sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
8. W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of public
safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;

9. W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016;
or B. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and
other parts of the Mindanao region.

RULING:

1) The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.
It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

2) A. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should
look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the
Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
situation. To require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.
B. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that
the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the
decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on the President
can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
C. As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the
exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to whether there is
sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to
the President at the time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on the situation
existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the
present depends on the President.

3) The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on
the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke
by Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they
have the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.

4) The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2)
public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of
either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable,
 most practical and most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or
non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. To require him to
satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.

5) The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which
among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into
the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with
the President.

6) A. Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel
groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it.
Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No. 55, which it
cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
B. Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines
will serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in
a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as
trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.

7) There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By
a review of the facts available to him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that
the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

8) Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which
has a broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by
which terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishment but likewise against civilians and their
properties. There were bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of
civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of medical services and delivery
of basic services, reinforcement of government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the
President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

9) A. The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s
 declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted
for that particular purpose.
B. Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the nullification of the acts of the President
done pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.

Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
DRILLON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d’etat, petitioner Drilon and his co-petitioners Trampe, Abesamis
and Mananquil being the head and members , respectively of the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested for the
investigation of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup attempt.
On February 27, 1990, the Team Prosecutors filed before the RTC of Quezon City on Information charging
respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Likewise, the team prosecutors filed
before the RTC of Makati City an Information, charging private respondent with the offense of obstruction of justice for
harboring an alleged felony under PD No. 1829.
The complaint basically accuses the petitioners of bad faith in filing the Information for rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder. On October 9, 1990, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint
to state a cause of action. They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of
any of the legal rights of private respondent. On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss and requiring petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a
full-blown trial inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does not appear to be indubitable. The
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was then denied.
Petitioners contend that the complaint being presented had no cause of action against them. They alleged good
faith, regularity in the performance of official duties and lack of ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. The
private respondent on the other hand, argues that a cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded and that the defense
of good faith and performance of official duties are best disposed in a judicial hearing. Private respondent likewise
maintains that the defense of good faith is irrelevant for the reason that the petitioners are sued under Article 32 of the
NCC where the defense of good faith is irrelevant.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not rebellion can be complexed with murder and frustrated murder.

2. Whether or not the allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold the petitioners liable for
damages

HELD:

1) No, the Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Hernandez that common crimes like murder, arson, etc. are
absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance
thereof. Thus, the fiscal filed an Information for rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of
committing the offense charged under second part of Article 48, RPC.

2) Yes, the alleged complaint fails to state a cause of action to hold the petitioners liable for malicious prosecution.
The complaint for damages was filed long before private respondent’s acquittal in the rebellion charge thereby
rendering the subject action premature. Moreover, there was no factual allegations in the complaint that can
support a finding that malice and bad faith motivated the petitioners in filing the information against private
respondent. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are
mere conclusions of law that are not deemed admitted in a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action.
Thus, lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismiss must appear on the face of the complaint
itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other. The infirmity
of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge’s attention. Paragraph 14 of
the complaint stating: “The malicious prosecution, nay prosecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime had
severely injured and besmirched plaintiff’s name…” is a conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation
of ultimate facts.
In order for a cause of action to exists, the following elements must be present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever means and under whatever la it arises or is created (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not t violet such right and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. In the case at bar, we feel to see
any right to of the private respondent supposedly violated by the petitioners.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy for a defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the Court for the reason that the
order does not terminate the proceeding, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. In its decision
affirming the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention. However,
as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the rule admits of an exception. Hence, where the denial of the motion
to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
as in the case at bar, the aggrieved party may assail the order of denial on certiorari. The petition is granted.
PEOPLE vs. ESTONILLO

FACTS: Accused-appellants are charged with the crime of murder with direct assault for having killed Floro Casas while
he was in the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor of public schools. The RTC and the CA found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
Records show that Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes of the
slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. Testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
Floro was killed while in the discharge of his official duties while in the Celera Elementary School by six men. After
committing the crime, they went to the vehicle of Mayor Carlos, Sr. and eventually left the scene of the crime. The
accused-appellants interposed alibi and denial as their defense.

ISSUE: Are the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with direct assault?

HELD: YES, the accused-appellants are proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with direct
assault. To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel,
Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as
treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was present
on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning to kill Floro. His categorical and straightforward
narration proves the existence of evident premeditation. Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be
present, two elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him.
In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about seven times – and the
victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all to
evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on
standby also holding their firearms to ensure the success of their “mission” without risk to themselves, and three
others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of treachery. Hence,
with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants’ guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
BATULANON vs. PEOPLE

FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May
1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the
cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.
It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans
to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were
granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never
received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance,
Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her
own use and benefit. Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed
against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk
whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of
Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. On April 15,
1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents,
Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in
the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the
information. As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to
ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification
of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the
Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the
Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the
cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did
was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does
not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that
she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The
essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to
whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her
liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty
of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.
NELSON LLUZ vs. COMELEC

FACTS: The 1 February 2006 resolution ruled that no probable cause exists to charge private respondent Caesar O.
Vicencio with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. 881), otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code

Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig, Samar in
the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his certificate of candidacy, private
respondent stated his profession or occupation as a certified public accountant (CPA). Private respondent won in the
elections. Sometime after private respondent's proclamation, petitioners charged him before the Law Department of the
COMELEC (Law Department) with violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881.

ISSUE: WON the alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation by petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy was
material in order to constitute an election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?

HELD: Negative. Profession or occupation is not a qualification for elective office, and therefore not a material
fact in a certificate of candidacy. No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines, requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including that of
punong barangay, Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of R.A. 7160 states:
Section 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation.
Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of
candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of
candidacy cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground.
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address
for all election purposes; his profession or occupation The penal coverage of Section 262 is limited. The
phraseology of this introductory clause alerts us that Section 262 itself possibly limits its coverage to only pertinent
portions of Section 74.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post
for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a
"material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of B.P. 881.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s]
to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a
candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Aside from the
requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.
GOMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 challenges the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the RTC which convicted petitioners, Laurinio Goma and Natalio Umale, of the crime of falsification of public document
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Three barangay councilors filed a complaint alleging Goma and
Umale, as barangay chairperson and secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution dated September 24, 1995,
allocating amount of PhP18, 000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials when in truth and in fact no meeting
was held as no quorum was mustered on the said date. On the face of the resolution appears the signatures of the
petitioners in their respective official capacities and it also bore the official seal of the barangay. After being convicted by
the RTC, the petitioners appealed to the CA alleging that the questioned resolution is not a public document, that they
did not violate Art. 171(2) of the RPC and that the penalty imposed is not proper. However, they urge their acquittal on
the theory that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the said resolution

ISSUE: WON the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party necessary to commit
the crime of falsification of a public document.

HELD: No. The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents are that the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public; that he takes advantage of his official position; that he falsifies a document by causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding; and that such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the proceeding. Thus, erring public officers’ failure to attain their objectives is not determinative of their
guilt or innocence.
In this case, petitioners contend that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the
resolution in question, it not having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar funds which is bereft of merit because
the simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true and genuine instrument,
thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of falsification. What is punished in falsification
of public document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly
proclaimed therein.
Hence, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party as a result of the
falsification, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public documents.
PEOPLE vs. LORIE VILLAHERMOSA

FACTS: Herein appellant Lorie Villahermosa was charged as guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5,3 114
and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in
three separate informations all dated 4 November 2002.
The she committed the following: Sell, distribute and transport shabu; not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, had possession, direct
custody and control of shabu; and unlawfully and feloniously use and possess drug paraphernalia of (1) improvised glass
tooter,(5) strips of aluminum foil, (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachets and (3) pieces disposable lighters.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all charges. The arrest was
made through a buy-bust operation, wherein the PDEA received a phonecall from a concerned citizen about the ilicit
activity of the respondent of the rampant selling of illegal drugs inside the Manila South Cemetery in Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Makati City. Upon arrest the results of appellant’s drug test yielded positive result while her physical examination
revealed that she has not been forced as there was no sign of bruises on her body. As regards the items seized from
appellant, they were all found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The trial court concluded that the prosecution has sufficiently proven all the elements of the offenses charged
against appellant. Thus, in its Decision dated 3 October 2006, the trial court held appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision dated 23 April 2008,
affirming in toto appellant’s conviction for violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
decretal portion reads:
Appellant appealed to this Court contending that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., as to when they received the information regarding the alleged selling of shabu inside
the Manila South Cemetery and whether surveillance was conducted prior to the actual buy-bust operation against
appellant, which are replete with material inconsistencies and discrepancies. As such, their testimonies should not be
given any weight or credit.
Essentially, in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu in this case, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor.44 The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller.45 Thus, what is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.46 Such proof is present
in this case. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, e.g., shabu, on the other hand, it must be shown
that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. These
circumstances of illegal possession are obtaining in the present case.49

The aforesaid elements were undeniably substantiated by the prosecution. Incident to her lawful arrest resulting from
the buy-bust operation, appellant was further found to have in her possession six (6) more small plastic sachets of shabu
with a total weight of 0.67 gram, which were the same kind of dangerous drug she was caught selling in flagrante delicto.
The said six (6) small plastic sachets of shabu were similarly presented in court, which Silverio and PO2 Tizon both
identified to be the same objects recovered from appellant while she was being frisked by PO2 Tizon on the occasion of
her arrest for illegally selling shabu.
In addition, the record is bereft of any evidence to show that appellant had the legal authority to possess the six (6)
small plastic sachets of shabu recovered from her. It has been jurisprudentially settled that possession of dangerous
drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.50 In this case, appellant miserably failed to explain her absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi of the shabu recovered from her. Thus, appellant’s guilt for the crime of illegal
possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, in clear violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, has also been
duly proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that on the occasion of her arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto
selling shabu, a plastic bag was also recovered in her possession containing the following drug paraphernalia.
Possession of the same was in clear violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. It bears stressing that
violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 was already consummated the moment appellant was found in
possession of the said articles without the necessary license or prescription. What is primordial is the proof of the illegal
drugs and paraphernalia recovered from the petitioner.

INCONSISTENCIES OF STATEMENTS OF ARRESTING OFFICERS. As the Court of Appeals had observed, the aforesaid
inconsistencies are more apparent than real. Such inconsistencies are merely trivial, minor and immaterial. They refer
only to irrelevant and collateral matters, which have nothing to do with the elements of the crime. It has been
established that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and
cannot have any bearing on the essential fact testified to. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to
minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses’ credibility. More so, an
inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction. Moreover,
there is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust operation can be undertaken.
Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or
textbook method for conducting one.56 It is enough that the elements of the crime are proven by credible witnesses and
other pieces of evidence.
In appellant’s effort to exonerate herself from the charges against her, she similarly claimed that the pieces of
evidence obtained from her were planted, bolstered by the fact that when she was brought to an office she was forced
to urinate or gave urine samples. This assertion cannot be accepted. Indeed, as noted by the Court of Appeals in its
decision, the result of appellant’s urine samples was not even considered by the trial court in determining her guilt for
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165. Otherwise stated, even without her urine samples, she can still be
convicted of the charges against her, i.e., illegal sale of shabu (violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165),
illegal possession of shabu (violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165) and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia (violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165). The result of appellant’s urine samples is not
an element of any of the offense charged against her. As such, the result of the same is not necessary for her conviction.

Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 explicitly provides the penalty for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like
shabu: SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute[,]
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

It is clear from the afore-quoted provision of law that the sale of any dangerous drug, like shabu, notwithstanding its
quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱500,000.00 to
₱10,000,000.00.61 In light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been
proscribed.62 Ergo, the penalty applicable to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine without eligibility for
parole. This Court, thus, sustains the penalty of imprisonment and fine imposed upon appellant by the trial court, which
later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals, in Criminal Case No. 02-3170 for illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs, like shabu, on the other hand, is penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, to wit: SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of
the degree of purity thereof:Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall
be graduated as follows: (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging
from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. [Emphasis supplied].

The afore-quoted provision unequivocally states that illegal possession of less than five grams of shabu, a dangerous
drug, is penalized with imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years and a fine ranging from ₱300,000.00 to
₱400,000.00. The evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 02-3171 established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant, without any legal authority, had in his possession 0.67 grams of shabu or less than five grams
thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the
minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law. With
this, the penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 1 day and fine of ₱300,000.00 imposed by the trial court and
affirmed by the appellate court is proper.

The penalty for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia is provided for under Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, thus: SEC 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. –
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to
carry such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof. On the basis of the foregoing provision, possession of drug
paraphernalia without any authority is punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a
fine of ₱10,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. Again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty of 6 months and 1 day to
4 years and a fine of ₱10,000.00 imposed upon appellant by both lower courts in Criminal Case No. 02-3172 is likewise
correct. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02598 dated 23
April 2008 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE vs. TRINIDAD

FACTS: On 22 October 2008, an Information was filed against accused Leo Dela Trinidad before the RTC, Naga City,
Camarines Sur for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A No. 9165. The above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in his possession, custody and control nine and one-half (9 ½)
bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 475 grams including its (sic) wrapper;
two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less 550 grams including its
(sic) wrapper; four (4) pieces of medium size cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 41.1
grams including its (sic) plastic containers; eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves with
fruiting tops weighing more or less 55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic container; and seventy[-]seven (77) pieces of
small empty transparent plastic sachet, with a total weight of more or less 1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous drug.

Version of the Prosecution: On 27 September 2008, the Office of the Intelligence Section of the Naga City Police
(Intelligence Section) received an information concerning a certain Leo De la Trinidad who was allegedly involved in
drug trafficking. Police Senior Inspector Benigno Albao, Sr. (PSI. Albao), Chief of the Intelligence Section, interviewed the
informant and after having been convinced that the information was true,3 he referred the matter to Senior Police Officer
1 Feliciano Aguilar (SPO1 Aguilar) and SPO1 Fersebal Abrantes (SPO1 Abrantes) for the conduct of a surveillance
operation for further details. The surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact location of appellant. The
police operatives also observed during the surveillance that some suspected drug pushers visited the residence of
appellant. After having verified the report that appellant is indeed involved in drug trade, a test-buy was conducted on
10 October 2008. After the initial test-buy, the informant was directed by the police operatives to continue monitoring
appellant because there was a report that the latter is in possession of quantities of marijuana by the kilo. The police
operatives applied for two search warrants from the RTC, Branch 25 in Naga City. One search warrant was applied for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 while the other one was for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
R.A. No. 8294 or for illegal possession of firearmsand ammunitions because during the second test-buy, the police asset
saw appellant with a gun which was tucked in his waist. Upon the execution of the warratns, when appellant was asked
to produce the items enumerated in the search warrant, if indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the
items which he took under his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half (9 ½) bricks of suspected dried marijuana
leaves sealed with packaging tape, two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape,
four (4) medium sizecubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic sachet, and
eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small transparent plastic
sachet. No firearm was found at the residence of appellant.

Version of the Defense: In the early morning of 21 October 2008, appellant was in his house located in Sabang, Naga
City together with his wife and children. Somebody knocked at their door, so he peeped through the window and asked
who was knocking. He noticed a lot of people outside and asked them who were they. Somebody answered that he was
Kapitan, so the witness opened the door. They entered appellant’s house and immediately took pictures of it. He was
told to just stay at the side and asked him to bring out the gun and the illegal drugs. When asked to bring out the illegal
drugs, he heard somebody shouted, "I have already found it." They went near the table, but he was not able to see
whatthey were doing because the table was surrounded by men. At that time, the appellant was seated on a bamboo
chair with his hands placed on his nape. Thereafter, he was called and asked to sign on a piece of paper. When he asked
what was that for, they told him that they were for the things found inhis house. A man approached him and read to him
the contents of the warrant. Then, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station.28

Ruling of the RTC: In a Decision dated 16 November 2009,the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of the appellant for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved all the elements of the offense.It held that
appellant, not being authorized by law, with full knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual and
exclusive possession, control and dominion over the drugs found in his house.29 It likewise held that the officers strictly
complied with the guidelines prescribed by law on how drug operations should be conducted by law enforcers and in
takingcustody and control of the seized drugs.30 On the other hand, accused failed to present any substantial evidence
to establish his defense of frame-up. The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, rather than the denials of the accused because positive testimonies are weightier than negative ones.31 With
the positive identification made by the government witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is
worthless.32 Since there was nothing in the record to show that the arresting team and the prosecution witnesses were
actuated by improper motives, their affirmative statements proving appellant’s culpability were respected by the trial
court.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. It found credible the statements of
prosecution witnesses about what transpired during and after the test-buy, service of search warrant, and arrest of the
accused. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise
upheld the findings of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the police officers enjoyed the presumption
of regularity, absent any showing of illmotive on the part of those who conducted the same.

ISSUE: WON the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: The appeal lacks merit. Appellant submits that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts of substance,
which if considered, could have altered the verdict. He maintains that he has no knowledge as to where the illegal drugs
were found as he was not in possession of the same, and alleged that the bricks of marijuana were merely planted by the
police operatives.34

In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements must beestablished: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. As correctly ruled by
the CA, these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is consistent in thatmere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facieevidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused
inthe absence of any satisfactory explanation. The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive. It held that
illegal possession ofregulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However,
the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under
the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is
in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists whenthe drug
is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found.Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right
to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to
convict. Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that
he was framed and had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence of any contrary
evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of the drugs found in his house. Accused-appellant argues
that the corpus delictihas not been clearly established. He points out that although SPO1 Aguilar allegedly placed his
markings on the confiscated items, no such marking was indicated in the certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of
the said specimens indicated thereon. He further argues that the markings allegedly placed on the specimens seized
were not even indicated in the return of the search warrant.41 Thus, he centers his argument on the contention that the
integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured and its identity was not established with moral integrity.

Relevant to appellant’s case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous
drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, which reads: The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165,
which states: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same inthe presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative orcounsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, thatthe physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long asthe integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.

As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of corpus delicto and the unbroken chain
of custody. Aptly noting the findings of the trial court: It was sufficiently established that representatives from the media
and Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present during the briefing and even until the
conduct of the inventory. And that immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same were
inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant and said persons, who even signed copies of the inventory.
The seized illegal drugs were marked at accused’s residence and in his presence. P/S Insp. Villalobos testified that the
seized items he received from Aguilar already contained the markings, "FBA". Besides, he also placed his own initials and
signatures in blue markings to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens. Thus, there was no cogent reason
why the court should doubt the trustworthiness and credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.43

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof
that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties.44 Accused-appellant in this case failed
to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the testimonies of the
apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.45 In fact, accusedappellant did not even question the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of frame-up and denial and on the alleged
broken chain of the custody of the seized drugs.

In sum, we find no reason to modify or set aside the decision of the CA. Accused-appellant was correctly found to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED
and the 24 March 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED SO
ORDERED.