EN BANC On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No.
2001-
G.R. No. 147066 26 March 2001
AKBAYAN - Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II - Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA
Q. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA,
ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO,
RICHARD M. VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION, respondents.
G.R. No. 147179 26 March 2001
MICHELLE D. BETITO, petitioner,
vs.
CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONER MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER,
LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO TUASON and
RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Election (COMELEC), respondents.
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 147066 and G.R.
147179.) before us is the exercise of a right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not
utmost reverence, no less than by the fundamental law - the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four million youth
failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC
under Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration Act of 1996).
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if the
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People's Participation, through a Letter dated
January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the
extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register before
the COMELEC deadline.1âwphi1.nêt
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant
Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Pasay
City.
027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only,
excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
"Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by
the Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage and People's Participation
presided by the Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the
Senate, new GSIS Headquarters Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is
the request by youth organizations to hold additional two days of registration.
Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with Comelec
Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day
additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and
18, 2001 nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration under
R.A. 8189 is December 27, 2000.
"To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for 'hakot system,'
certain restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve
as safeguard against fraudulent applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be
registering for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and,
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records
"Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the
actual registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec filed officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters
enumerator's list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and,
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest political awareness
and interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political
events in the country among our youth. considering that they failed to register on
December 27, 2000 deadline, they approved for special registration days.
"In viewing of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects
regarding this request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD)
to submit certified available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive
Director for Operations (DEDO) for estimated costs of additional two days of
registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical side and
logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at 1:30 p.m. at
the Office of ED.
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives, and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr., of
the ASD, to disapproved the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section
8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more
time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution N. 3584, the decretal portion:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17, and 18 2001."
Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the students'
request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH)
et. al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R.
NO. 147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to
declare Section 8 of R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration
of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to
qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the Philippines,
likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying that this Court direct
the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the continuing registration
provision under the Election code.
On March 13, 2001, this court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further required
respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring at 10:00 A.M. of
March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated cases for oral arguments on
March 16, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment,
recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at the soonest
possible time "in order to accommodate the disfranchised voters for purposes of the May 14, 2001
elections."
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to resolve a two-
pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution dated
February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have undermined their
constitutional right to vote on the May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the
disenfranchisement of around for four million Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before
the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001.
b. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001
general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime
niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitutions and must properly yield to pertinent laws
skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and purposes, are crafted to
effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the democratic
institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery
and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needles to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect, Section 1, Article V of the
Constitutions provides:
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT
LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN
THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF
SUFFRAGE."
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically,
a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996."
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election
process. Thus, contrary to petitioners' argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated
to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of
registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of
its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the
duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not indifferent and so
far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations bear great
weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8 or R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing registration, is
explicit, to wit:
"SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. - The Personal filing of
application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election," (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R. A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voter's list, provides:
"SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List - Any registered voter,
representative of a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100)
days prior to a regular election x x x."
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
"x x x. The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it
is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters,
non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand
serves the purpose of securing the voter's substantive right to be included in the
list of voters.
"In real-world terms, this means that if a special voter's registration is conducted,
then the prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be
adjusted to a later date. If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voter's list
since we would already be well into the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from
being a flagrant breach of the principles of due process, this would open the
registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the integrity of the
voter's list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
"x x x. The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process
of registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters,
some of whom might not even be qualified to vote, x x x the very possibility that
we shall be conducting elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to
cast a cloud of doubt over the results of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving
public will disown the results of the elections, regardless of who wins, and
regardless of how many courts validate our own results. x x x"
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called "standby" powers or
"residual" powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29,
Republic Act No. 6646 (An act introducing additional reforms in the electoral system and for other
purposes) and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436 (An act authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local electoral
exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes), thus:
"SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - if it should
no longer be possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for
certain pre-election acts, the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in
order to ensure accomplishments of the activities so voters shall not be deprived
of their right to suffrage."
On this matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under
Section 3(a) of R. A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition, precise
meaning and coverage, thus:
"a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn
application for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the
city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in the book of
registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board."
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provision of Section 29 R.A. 8436 invoked by herein
petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both provisions,
although at first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in more circumspect,
perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in the
form of amendments to a stature should be given effect, together with other parts of the
amendment act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was
indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which should
be ascertained and given effect.
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if
they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is that which
makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, Courts of justice, when confronted with
apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring outright the
invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize them, if this is possible, because they
are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case,
for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions,
considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may validly
and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter of Section 28
of RA 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, RA 8436 would come into play in cases
where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior to
election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A 8436 is, to our mind, anchored on
the sound premise that these certain "pre-election acts" are still capable of being reasonably
performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other
related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELEC- which is the constitutional body tasked by no less that the
fundamental charter (Sec 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including registration of voters
painstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the "operational impossibility of conducting a special
registration, which in its own language, "can no longer be accomplished within the time left to (us)
the Commission."
Hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a
walk in the park for the COMELEC. Allow us to outline what the Commission has
yet to do, and the time to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The
Projects of Precincts indicate the total number of established precincts and the
number of registered voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the
final Project of Precincts, we cannot even determine the proper allocation of
official ballots, election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia. More
succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts, we won't know how many forms
to print and so we're liable to come up short.
21) More importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be
impossible to complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to
the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before
the 4th of March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI - including the
precinct where they are assigned and the barangay where the precinct is located
must be furnished by the Election Officer to all the candidates and political
candidates not later that 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration
Records of registered voters in particular precinct must be inspected, verified,
and sealed beginning March 30 until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters' List must be finalized and printed out of use
on election day; and finally
25.) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the voters
Information sheet must be completed on or before April 15.
26.) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the COMELEC will
have roughly a month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen
occurrences that might delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom
behind setting the 120-day prohibitive period. After all , preparing for an election
is no easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not- contrary to popular opinion-
refer only to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down.
Registration is. In fact a long process that takes about three weeks to complete,
not even counting how long it would take to prepare for the registration in the first
place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the COMELEC, the other
Commissioners, prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the
superimposition of special registration would affect the on-going preparation for
the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special
registration on April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it
takes in account the fact that we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration
Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5 million potential registrants, and it
would take about 14 days - if we were to declare special registrations today - to
print up the difference and to verify these accountable forms. After printing and
verification, the forms would have to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up a
further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the application for registration
with the Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is
then set for hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or
municipal bulletin board for at least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations
on the 16th and the 17th, the posting requirement would be completed by the
24th. Considering that time must be allowed for the filling of oppositions, the
earliest that the Election Registration Board can be convened for hearing would
be the May 1st and 2nd.
 32) Assuming - and this is a big assumption - that there are rift challenges to the
applicant's right to register, the Election Registration Board can immediately rule
on the applicant's registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the
7th of May. By the 10th, copies of the notice of the action taken by the board will
have already been furnished to the applicants and the heads of the registered
political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once against focus on the
business of getting ready for the elections. Once the results of the special
registration are finalized, they can be encoded and a new Computerized Voters'
List generated - at the earliest, by May 11, after which the new CVL would be
posted. Incidentally, if we were to follow the letter of the law strictly, a May 11
posting date for the new CVL would be improper since the R.A. 8189 provides
that the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification,
and sealing of the Book of Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the
May 14 election date, and still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots,
Election Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for
the new registrants. Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be
awarded, the various forms printed, delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to
the different municipalities. All told, this process would take approximately 26
days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
XXX XXX XXX
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as
to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight
considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the
best position to know what they can possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad
impossible. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla
obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally ..., it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all
intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed from the realm of the possible.
Truly, the interpretation of statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in
accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the
considered view that they "stand-by power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A.
8436, presupposed the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disfranchised when respondent COMELEC
pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of the day before the prohibitive
period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On
this matter, there is no allegation in the two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of
any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed an application to be registered as a voter
which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the respondent COMELEC
alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between the
period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed
or barred by respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true
that respondent COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of
the firm view that petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing
registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are
not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they failed to register, for whatever
reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its protective mantle
not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let
no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights. Vigilanties sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this Court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not commit an
abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some patent,
whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No, 3584 which, in respondent's own terms,
resolved "to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on
February 17 and 18, 2001."
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
laws.1âwphi1.nêt
Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to
hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the
matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC simply
performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently,
respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which
squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally mandated powers. Hence, whatever
action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters
involving voters' registration, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly,
in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion on the part of respondent
COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively
within the province of respondent COMELEC - a body accorded by no less than the fundamental
law with independence.
As to the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court
cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without transgressing
the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.

Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the
present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of
whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within
the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the exercise of discretion and
thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, we enunciated that the Court's
function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is "merely [to] check, whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutionally limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing ...[of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power...It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 18, 2001, to allow the
conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No., 12930 has been filed before the
Lower House, which bills seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period provided
for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 was filed before the Senate, with the same
intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of special registration before
the May 14, 2001 General Elections.This Court views the foregoing factual circumstances as a
clear intimation on the part of both the executive and legislative departments that a legal obstacle
indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the Commission on Elections of a special registration
before May 14, 2001 General Elections.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150477 February 28, 2005
LAZARO C. GAYO, petitioner,
vs.
VIOLETA G. VERCELES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in EPC A-07, dismissing a petition for quo warranto filed by petitioner
Lazaro C. Gayo to declare as null and void the proclamation of respondent Violeta G. Verceles as
Mayor of the Municipality of Tubao, La Union, during the May 14, 2001 elections.
This case proceeded from the following antecedents:
Sometime in 1977, the respondent migrated to the United States of America (U.S.A.) with her
family to look for greener pastures. Although her husband was granted American citizenship, she
retained her citizenship as a Filipino.2 In 1993, she returned to the Philippines for good. The
following year, she was appointed as Treasurer of the B.P. Verceles Foundation3 and regularly
attended the meetings of its Board of Directors.4 1awphi1.nét
In 1995, the respondent registered herself as a voter of Precinct No. 16 in Tubao, La Union.5 As
certified by the Assistant Revenue District Officer, Revenue District No. 3 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) in San Fernando City, the respondent also filed her income tax returns for the
taxable years 1996 and 1997.6 Between the years 1993 to 1997, the respondent would travel to
the U.S.A. to visit her children.7
The respondent abandoned her status as lawful permanent resident of the U.S.A. effective
November 5, 1997 for the purpose of filing her candidacy for Mayor of Tubao, La Union in the May
11, 1998 elections. On January 28, 1998, she surrendered her alien registration receipt card
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila.8
The respondent ran in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected Mayor of Tubao, La Union.
Thereafter, during the May 14, 2001 elections, the petitioner ran for re-election and won. She was
proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor on May 16, 2001.9
On May 26, 2001, the petitioner, also a candidate for Mayor during the May 2001 elections, filed a
petition for quo warranto with the RTC of Agoo, La Union. He prayed that (a) the respondent be
declared disqualified to hold the position of Mayor of Tubao, La Union; (b) the respondent’s
proclamation as winner be declared null and void; and (c) the petitioner be proclaimed as the duly-
elected mayor.
In her Answer, the respondent argued that she had clearly and unequivocally shown, through
direct and positive acts, that she already renounced and waived her right to permanently reside in
the U.S.A. even before she surrendered her "green card" in 1998. As a counterclaim, she prayed
for the payment of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, moral damages, and exemplary
damages.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision10 dismissing the petition for quo warranto. The
RTC ruled that the respondent was qualified to occupy the position as Municipal Mayor.
The RTC held that the respondent’s act of registration as a voter, or of filing an income tax return,
does not constitute an abandonment or waiver of her status as a permanent resident of the
U.S.A.11 Nonetheless, it declared that the respondent was no longer such permanent resident
during the May 2001 elections because she had already waived her green card even prior to the
filing of her certificate of candidacy when she first ran for mayor in the 1998 elections.12 The RTC
held that the waiver of the status as a permanent resident under Sec. 68(e)13 of the Omnibus
Election Code is still effective. It ruled that Sec. 40(f)14 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991 did not repeal Sec. 68(e). For one, there is nothing in the repealing clause of the LGC that
indicates an intention to repeal or modify the Omnibus Election Code.15 Moreover, the two
provisions are not inconsistent with each other. In fact, Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election
Code complements Section 40(f) of the LGC, in the sense that the former may supply the
condition when permanent residents may be qualified to run for public office.16
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed this petition for review based on the following ground:
THE TRIAL COURT HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRAVENED APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION DESPITE PRESENCE OF LEGAL GROUND FOR ITS GRANT. 17
The fundamental issue in this case is whether or not the respondent was able to meet the
residency requirement for the position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.
Before ruling on the substantive issues of the case, we note that the petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorariwith this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 may be filed with this Court to assail the decision of the RTC on
questions of law, the rule is that the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.18 The Court notes that the petitioner has not relied on any such exceptional
circumstances.
The remedy of the petitioner was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a writ of
error under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 2(a) of Rule 41 provides for
the appeal to the CA of cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The
petition for quo warranto in this case was filed with and decided by the RTC in its original
jurisdiction; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to appeal by writ of error to the CA.
We also note that the contested term of office, which commenced on June 30, 2001, lasted only
until June 30, 2004. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns the
petitioner’s right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality.19 For this reason, we resolve to accept
the appeal and consider the case on the merits. Further, as we have previously ruled, Courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review
and if it will aid in fostering free, orderly, and peaceful elections.20
The issue in this case involves one of the essential qualifications for running for public office, that
is, the one-year residency requirement prescribed under Section 39 of the LGC, thus:
SECTION 39. Qualifications. –
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
local language or dialect.
In interpreting this requirement, our ruling in Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections21 is
instructive, thus:
The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. …22
More recently in Coquilla v. Commission on Elections,23 we further clarified the meaning of the
term, and held as follows:
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling"
or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is
acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues (sic) until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).24
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 we held that a Filipino citizen’s immigration to a foreign country
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In other words, the
acquisition of a permanent residency status in a foreign country constitutes a renunciation of the
status as a resident of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Court explained in another
case26 that a new domicile is reacquired if the following conditions concur:
… (1) [R]residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3)
an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.27
Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the respondent effectively abandoned
her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the status of a permanent U.S. resident.
Nonetheless, we find that the respondent reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before
the holding of the May 2001 elections.l^vvphi1.net The records show that she surrendered her
green card to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in
1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have been made clearer.
Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for good in 1993, she continued living
here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic visits to her children who were residing there.
Moreover, she was elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her
term. We find such acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to stay in the
Philippines indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her
permanent residence. As we ruled in Perez v. Commission on Elections:28
When the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it
clearly appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. In this case,
considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is
familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private
respondent is qualified, having been governor of the entire province of Cagayan for ten years
immediately before his election as Representative of that province’s Third District.29
The petitioner posits that, under existing law, the waiver of the status as a permanent resident of a
foreign country is no longer allowed to cure the disqualification, in case of permanent residents
abroad. He argues that the prevailing law is the LGC of 1991 which impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code for being inconsistent. He asserts that the inconsistency lies in the fact
that Section 40(f) of the LGC does not provide for the waiver of the status as permanent residents
in a foreign country which, on the other hand, is provided under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. He contends that under Section 40(f) of the LGC, permanent residents or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right even after the
effectivity of the law on January 1, 1992, are disqualified from running for any local elective
position. Hence, the petitioner argues, since the respondent continued to avail of the right to
reside permanently in the U.S.A. until 1997, the respondent was disqualified from running for
mayor during the May 2001 elections.
The respondent counters that the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec. 40(f) of the LGC of 1991 is
patently illogical, absurd, and myopic, if not totally outrageous. Such interpretation would, in effect,
forever ban Filipinos from running for local elective positions, that is, those who are permanent
residents abroad and who have failed to abandon their status as such after the effectivity of the
LGC.30 The respondent avers that the provision simply means that after the effectivity of the LGC,
permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside there and
continue to avail of the said right are disqualified from running for any elective local position. She
argues therefore that she is no longer disqualified because, at the time she ran for office, she
already ceased to avail of her right as a permanent U.S. resident or immigrant.31
We agree with the respondent. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was not repealed by the
LGC of 1991. The repealing clause of the LGC, Section 534,32 does not specifically mention a
repeal of any provision of the Omnibus Election Code. The legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific provision of law, it
does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and the old
laws.33
Finally, the respondent avers that in the event of her disqualification from holding office, the
petitioner cannot assume the mayoralty post because he did not obtain a plurality of votes for the
position.
The rule is well settled. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. As we held in Reyes v. Commission
on Elections:36

In this case, we discern no irreconcilable inconsistency between Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 40(f) of the LGC. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code provides in
part:
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.
On the other hand, Sec. 40(f) of the LGC provides that "permanent residents in a foreign country
or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code" are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate
the results under the circumstances. 37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in EPC No. A-07 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The two provisions are basically the same in that they both provide that permanent residents or
immigrants to a foreign country are disqualified from running for any local elective position. The
difference lies only in the fact that Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides
for an exception to the disqualification. This does not make the two provisions inconsistent with
each other.1awphi1.nét

Moreover, the two provisions are in pari materia – they relate to the same subject matter. Statutes
in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in
harmony with each other.34 Thus, the RTC correctly made the following observations:

The deletion is based on the premise that once a person waives or abandons his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country he has, therefore, ceased to be such from
the time of the waiver or abandonment. The phrase as used in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code is a catchphrase or a conditional clause on how a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country could fall outside the coverage of the prohibition. The legislature found the
inclusion of the phrase unnecessary or, with no offense meant to the framers of Batas Pambansa
[Blg.] 881, a surplusage, so to speak. Hence, the deletion.

So that, the absence of that conditional clause in Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code may
be supplied by Section 68(e) of the Omnibus Election Code as both provisions relate to the same
subject matter and purpose; hence, in pari materia. And, when statutes are in pari materia, they
are to be "construed together; each legislative intent is to be interpreted with reference to other
acts relating to the same matter or subject." (Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws, 2nd
ed., p. 331)35
Gamboa v. comelec
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 135927 June 26, 2000
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR
HASSAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY.
NASIB D. YASSIN,respondents.
BUENA, J.:
Way back in the 1950's and during the martial law era, it has been said that even the dead, the
birds and the bees voted in Lanao. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which seeks to nullify the Order issued by the Commission on Elections [COMELEC, for brevity]
dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct," is
an illustrative case.
The facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of
voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R.
Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought
to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari.1
On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the
respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del
Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and
annulment of book of voters.2
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani,
herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the
twenty three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be
annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition"3 which included the affidavits
of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the
book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing
the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. 4
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the
COMELEC issued an Order 5 dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department
for appropriate investigation. The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a
memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the
alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation
conducted."6 Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue
of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro
and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in
the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur." 7
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts yielding the
following results —
At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the COMELEC accompanied by
traditional leaders, political leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a
representative from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics Office, Mr. Lacson Abdullah,
and a Team from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly
Barangay Padian Torogan with these comments and observations:
It appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no
roof, and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that
no single human being could possibly reside in these two structures.
Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential
place. So this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the
Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285. (Ref.
Municipal census Report as of September 1, 1995).
Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC Investigating Team asked the
people around who among them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called
Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered affirmatively.
Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team still with the people mentioned
above are in Barangay Lumbac to look for the other supposed Barangay named Rakutan,
and found this observations.
xxx xxx xxx
By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular inspection, the Madalum Municipal
Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun, arrived at the
scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange Mitsubishi car with four armed
bodyguards, the (sic) confronted the Team Leader of the COMELEC Investigating Group
and angrily insisted to stop the ocular inspection.
This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not to take a shot on him, pointed
his pistolized Rifle to this man when the photographer positioned his camera to take a
picture of him while he is arguing with the investigating leader, Mr. CASAN MACADATO.
Moving camera film and several pictures are added hereto for further information and as
exhibits. Also attached hereof are the names and signatures of among the more-or-less
one hundred people who observed the conduct of this ocular inspection.
 (NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of the five (5) man Committee from
the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur created in respect to the Memo/Invitation from the
COMELEC Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated June 15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN
MACADATO, EO II, Chief Investigation Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally and in
public Mr. ALAWI to be his Secretary during this investigation, and of course, the (sic)
with the consent of the DILG Team).1âwphi1.nêt
I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi
Member, DILG Team
Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato
Election Officer II
Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team8
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial
Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998
reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.9
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost
precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:
(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:
(a) DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team created pursuant to the
Order of the Commission en banc dated February 11, 1998, to continue
the conduct of ocular inspection and investigation as contained in the
original directive of the Law Department dated April 29, 1998;
(b) RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the Regional Director of the
Philippine National police, (1) to immediately relieve and transfer Chief
of Police Mahdi Mindalano of Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him
to an area where it will be extremely difficult for him to return to
Mandalum and do further damage to effort of the Commission to
investigate ghost precincts in said area considering the urgency of said
investigation. (2) to look into the possibility of involvement of other
policement (sic) in Madalum in the aforestated criminal mischief of the
Police Station Commander or their possible partisanship.
(c) RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to immediately assign sufficient number of men to maintain
peace and order in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to
escort and secure the safety of the COMELEC Investigating Team
during the conduct of ocular inspections and investigations.
(2) finds Padain Togoran as ghost precinct and shall be excluded from the
special election to be conducted in Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Madatu, to immediately resume the
investigation, the remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings
to the Commission with dispatch, allowing it to submit partial findings if
necessary.
The Law Department of this Commission is hereby directed to implement this order.
SO ORDERED. (emphasis supplied) 10
On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in
their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued
by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, petitioners
moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs.
COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision declaring the
precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as ghosts precincts.
In a resolution 11 issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied the motion to consolidate,
considering that G.R. No. 134456 had already been dismissed in our resolutions of August 4,
1998 and August 18, 1998.
The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. 12
On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that Padian Torogan is a
barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-
Torogan as a ghost precinct. In any case, the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-
called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere election. The petition states that precinct No. 27A
located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC
although the assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian
Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order
would be the election precinct in the said place.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per
barangay. 1 In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number.
Nevertheless, the determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and
whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it
is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments
and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same. 14 Upon review of the records, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or
private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there
were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have
left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody
resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under
the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done
by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. 15 In the
case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be
done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglunsod concerned subject to the
mandatory requirement of a plebiscite 16 conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.1awphil

The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly
when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded
which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to
it. 17 The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in
the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent,
said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. 18 No voter is
disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the
Constitution 19 is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral
exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and
are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the
more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage
because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes.
Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people. 20

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order dated June 29, 1998 of
the Commission on Elections is UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC the precincts, barangays, polling places and number of registered voters where there was a failure
of election:
G.R. No. 150469 July 3, 2002
PRECINCT NO. BARANGAY POLLING PLACE REG. VOTERS
MAYOR JUN RASCAL CAWASA, COUNCILORS MAASIRAL DAMPA, H. ACKIL MAMANTUC,
MOMOLAWAN MACALI, ANDAR TALI, ALLAN SANAYON, and AMIN 2A Bangko Bangko Prim School 200
SANGARAN, petitioners,
vs. 2A1/2A2 Bangko -do- 254
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDULMALIK M. MANAMPARAN, respondents.
3A Cabasaran Cabasaran Prim. Sch. 155
DECISION 10A/10A1 Liangan Liangan Prim. Sch. 236

CARPIO, J.: Total 845

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order under Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure1 assailing
the Resolution of the Commission on Elections ("Comelec" for brevity) en banc2 in SPC No. 01-
276 dated October 24, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The results of
special elections held on 30 May 2001 covering Precincts Nos. 2A, 2A1/2A2 in Barangay Bangko,
Precinct No. 3A in Barangay Cabasaran and clustered Precinct No. 10A/10A1 in Barangay
Liangan are hereby ANNULLED.
After canvassing the election returns from the 36 precincts, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Nunungan deferred the proclamation of all winning candidates due to the failure of the said 4
precincts to function. Special elections were set on May 30, 2001 considering that the number of
registered voters in the remaining four precincts would affect the election results. The Comelec
promulgated Resolution No. 4360 on May 21, 2001 authorizing the conduct of special elections in
the affected areas, including barangays Bangko, Cabasaran and Liangan in Nunungan, the
pertinent portion of which states:
"VII. Memorandum of Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain dated 19 May 2001.
REGION MUNICIPALITY/PROVINCE

Accordingly, the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the four (4) Region XII Nunu(n)gan, Lanao del Norte
contested precincts affect the standing of candidates is hereby SET ASIDE until the choice of the
people is finally determined through another special election to be authorized, conducted and
Barangays:
supervised by this Commission as soon as possible unless restrained.

1. Bangco
Finally, the Law Department is hereby directed to investigate the election irregularities that
transpired in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte involving the Office of the Election
Officer and thereafter, file election offense case/s should there be finding of probable cause and 2. Cabasaran
other appropriate cases if warranted under the circumstances.
3. Liangan
3
SO ORDERED."
REASONS : disagreement of venue of election, tension of BEIs, forcible taking of the ballot boxes
The Facts and other election paraphernalia.

During the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Jun Rascal Cawasa ("petitioner Cawasa" for brevity) Scheduled date: May 30, 2001
and private respondent Adbulmalik M. Manamparan ("private respondent Manamparan" for
brevity) were among the candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte xxx
("Nunungan" for brevity). Out of the forty (40) precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six (36)
functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining four (4) precincts. The following were In view of the foregoing the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
1. To schedule the special elections in the foregoing areas on May 26 and 30, 2001 as herein
specified;
xxx
Let the Executive Director, Deputy Executive Directors for Operations and all the working
Committees implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED."4
As scheduled, the special elections covering the 4 precincts were conducted on May 30, 2001.
The special elections for Precincts Nos. 2A, 2A1/2A2 of Barangay Bangko were conducted in the
Municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo, Lanao del Norte. The special elections for Precinct No. 3A
of Barangay Cabasara and Precinct Nos. 10A/10A1 of Barangay Liangan were conducted in the
Municipality of Sapad, Lanao del Norte.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Nunungan canvassed the election returns of the 4
precincts on May 31, 2001. After the canvassing of the election returns, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates on the basis of the earlier 36 election returns of
the May 14, 2001 regular elections and the 4 election returns of the 4 precincts subject of the
special elections.
The May 14, 2001 regular elections and the May 30, 2001 special elections show the following
results with respect to the position of mayor:
Sub-Total of Votes Sub-Total of votes Grand
Obtained May 14, 2001 Obtained May 30, Total
Regular Elections 2001 Special Elections
Private Respondent Manamparan 1,197 570 1,767
Petitioner Cawasa 1,283 187 1,470
Margin . . . . . 297
As shown above, during the May 14, 2001 regular elections, the lead of petitioner Cawasa was
eighty six (86). After the May 30, 2001 special elections, private respondent Manamparan
overcame the margin with a lead of 297 votes.
Petitioner Cawasa was proclaimed mayor of Nunungan and his co-petitioners Maasiral Dampa, H.
Ackil Mamantuc, Momolawan Macali, Andar Tali, Allan Sanayon and Amin Sangaran were also
proclaimed as councilors of Nunungan.
On June 4, 2001, private respondent Manamparan filed an appeal and petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Cawasa docketed as SPC No. 01-252. The appeal/petition was
dismissed by the Comelec Second Division on September 26, 2001.
In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, private respondent Manamparan filed a petition for "Annulment
of Election Results during the May 30, 2001 Special Elections in Precincts No. 2A, 2A1/2A2, 3A,
and 10A/10A1 of Nunungan, Lanao Del Norte, and Annulment of Canvass and Proclamation with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction" docketed as SPC Case No. 01-276. Impleaded as respondents were petitioner Cawasa
and the Municipal Board of Canvassers composed of Mario Allan Ballesta,5 Nedalyn S. Sebial6and
Iluminada O. Pegalan.7
As mentioned at the outset, on October 24, 2001, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution
annulling the results of the special elections of the 4 precincts (Precinct Nos. 2A, 2A1/2A2, 3A,
10A/10A1) held on May 30, 2001 conducted in the municipalities of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and
Sapad. The Comelec en banc also annulled the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as
the results in the 4 contested precincts affect the standing of candidates.
The Comelec Ruling
In granting the petition, the Comelec held that "the special elections in the 4 contested precincts
were not genuinely held and resulted in failure to elect on account of fraud. " The Comelec’s ruling
is summarized as follows:
First. The Comelec clarified that the Comelec en banc can take cognizance of the petition for
annulment of election results in accordance with Section 4 of RA 71668 , otherwise known as the
"Synchronized Elections Law of 1991." It explained that while the proclamation of a candidate has
the effect of terminating pre-proclamation issues, a proclamation that is a result of an illegal act is
void and cannot be ratified by such proclamation and subsequent assumption of office. The
Comelec declared that there is no forum-shopping considering that SPC 01-252 pending before
the Second Division of the Comelec is a pre-proclamation controversy,9 while SPC 01-276 pending
before the Comelec en banc is a case for annulment of election results.
Second. The Comelec found that the special elections were not held in the designated polling
places in Nunungan but were transferred to the municipalities of Sapad and Sultan Naga
Dimaporo without any authority from the Comelec. According to the Comelec, the Election Officer,
who happened to be the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, caused the transfer of
the polling places without asking permission from the Comelec. The transfer was likewise in
violation of the due process requirements found in Section 153 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Moreover, it ruled that the unauthorized transfer of a polling place is also punishable as an
election offense under Section 261(z) (17) of the Same Code. We quote the pertinent portion of
the Comelec ruling thus:
"The transfer of polling places cannot be done without due process.1avvphi1 This is the explicit
rule of Section 153 of the Omnibus Election Code, x x x:
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, the Election Officer, who happened to be the Chairman of the respondent
Board, also caused the transfer of the polling places without asking the permission of this
Commission and in violation of the due process rule, thereby, making the afore-quoted Section
153 inutile.
Considering these unwarranted acts of the official of this Commission, the sanctity of the special
elections therefore is suspect. Nothing in the records could show that notice was given to the
political candidates and to the registered voters affected by the special elections of the
said transfer of polling places. Who therefore voted on the assailed special elections given
these circumstances? This issue has never been squarely addressed by the respondents.
We take judicial notice of the distance of the venues of voting which are more or less 25
kilometers away from Nunungan, far from being accessible to the voters given the time and
material constraints. The panorama of what is supposed to be a free and honest exercise of
democracy is indeed rendered myopic by fraud perpetrated by no other than the COMELEC
officials concerned."10
Third. The Comelec found that the Municipal Board of Canvassers, headed by Mario Allan
Ballesta, preposterously feigned ignorance of the fact that during the said special elections,
members of the Philippine Army 26th Infantry Battalion served as election inspectors without
authority from the Comelec.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC en banc Resolution was issued without jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for the following reasons:
"1. The proclamation of the six (6) petitioners Maasiral Dampa, H. Ackil Mamantuc,
Momolawan Macali, Andar Tali, Allan Sanayon, and Amin Sangaran were annulled and
set aside in violation of due process of law. They were not impleaded as respondents in
the petition to annul the election. They were not notified of the proceedings. x x x.
2. The transfer of the venue of the special elections at Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad
and the appointment of military personnel as members of the Board of election Inspectors
of the four (4) precincts were agreed upon by the private respondent and the municipal
candidates and their respective political parties.
3. The election officer in the exercise of his discretion has authority to transfer the venue
of the special elections in view of the agreement of the political parties and municipal
candidates on the transfer of the venue of the special elections. x x x.
4. There is substantial compliance with the provisions of Sec. 153 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The political parties and municipal candidates of the municipality
Nunungan were notified and in fact agreed to the transfer of venue of the special
elections.
5. The COMELEC en banc promulgated the October 24, 2001 resolution without requiring
its election officer of Nunungan, the provincial election supervisor of Lanao del Norte, and
Regional Election Director of Region XII to explain why the special elections of the four
(4) precincts were transferred to the municipalities of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad.
The petitioner Mayor Jun Rascal Cawasa prayed that the case be set for trial and hearing
in order that the election officer of Nunungan be required to testify and explain the
circumstances of the special elections. The COMELEC en banc did not act on the motion.
It promulgated the resolution of October 24, 2001 without investigating the circumstances
why the election officer transferred the venue of the special elections to the municipalities
of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad. No hearing was conducted by the COMELEC en
banc."11
Simply put, the issues raised boil down to whether or not : (1) the transfer of the polling places to
the adjacent municipalities is legal; (2) the appointment of military personnel as members of the
board of election inspectors is legal; and (3) the petitioners were accorded due process prior to the
promulgation of the assailed resolution in SPC No. 01-276.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Legality of the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of Military Personnel
as Members of the Board of Election Inspectors
There is no dispute that the venue of the special elections was transferred to the adjacent
municipalities of Sultan Naga Dimaporo and Sapad in lieu of the regular polling places located in
barangays Bangko, Cabasaran and Liangan. There is likewise no dispute that military personnel
were appointed as members of the Board of Election Inspectors ("BEI" for brevity) in the 4
precincts. Petitioners and private respondent Manamparan agree that the 4 precincts covered by
the special elections with a total of 845 registered voters will affect the result of the elections.
Petitioners insist on the validity of the conduct of the special elections claiming that the political
parties and the municipal candidates were notified and in fact agreed on the transfer of venue and
the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. They contend that there is
substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 153 of the Omnibus Election Code
considering that the election officer as the representative of the Comelec reported the matter to
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte and the transfer was not disapproved by the
Comelec. Petitioners claim that an "election officer has authority to transfer the polling places even
four days before the scheduled election" citing Balindong vs. Comelec12 and Alonto vs. Comelec.13
Petitioners fail to persuade. Sections 152, 153 and 154 of the Omnibus Election Code shed light
on this matter, to wit:
SEC. 152. Polling Place. – A polling place is the building or place where the board of election
inspectors conducts its proceedings and where the voters shall cast their votes.
SEC. 153. Designation of polling places. – The location of polling places designated in the
preceding regular election shall continue with such changes as the Commission may find
necessary, after notice to registered political parties and candidates in the political unit affected, if
any, and hearing: provided, That no location shall be changed within forty-five days before a
regular election and thirty days before a special election or a referendum or plebiscite, except in
case it is destroyed or it cannot be used.
SEC. 154. Requirements for polling places. –Each polling place shall be, as far as practicable,
a ground floor and shall be of sufficient size to admit and comfortably accommodate forty voters at
one time outside the guard rail for the board of election inspectors. The polling place shall be
located within the territory of the precinct as centrally as possible with respect to the residence of
the voters therein and whenever possible, such location shall be along a public road. No
designation of polling places shall be changed except upon written petition of the majority
of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the
Commission upon prior notice and hearing.
A public having the requirements prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be preferred as
polling place.14
The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of Comelec Resolution No. 4360 issued on
May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154 of the Election Code. As
clearly provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the
preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of
the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec
after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the Comelec which determines whether a change is
necessary after notice and hearing.
The Comelec has unequivocally stated that "nothing in the records showed that notice was given
to the political candidates and registered voters affected by the transfer." Private respondent
Manamparan has categorically denied petitioners’ claim that all the political parties and municipal
candidates agreed to the transfer of venue. The Court discerns no substantiation of petitioners’
claim regarding the agreement to transfer. There is then no cogent reason for us to disturb the
findings of the Comelec on this matter. Indeed, the factual findings of the Comelec supported by
substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable.15 Thus, it has been held that findings of fact
of the Comelec based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive
upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the
same.16 Moreover, there is no question that the transfer of venue was made within the prohibited
period of thirty days before the special election.
Reliance on Balindong vs. Comelec17 and Alonto vs. Comelec18 is misplaced. Alonto involved an
entirely different factual scenario from the instant case. In said case, the Court upheld the validity
of the transfer of the counting and tallying of the votes after the closing of the polls from the
precincts to the PC camps. The Court held that the transfer was dictated by necessity and
authorized by the Comelec directly or by its provincial representative. The Court explained that
"while it is highly desirable that the authority for the transfer of the counting should be directly
authorized by the Comelec itself, the latter’s denial of the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
where this legal point was advanced was tantamount to a validation of the authority issued by its
provincial representatives."
On the other hand, the Court in Balindong19 held that the mere fact that the transfer of polling place
was not made in accordance with law, particularly Secs. 152-154 of the Omnibus Election Code,
does not warrant a declaration of failure of election and the annulment of the proclamation of the
winning candidate, because the number of uncast votes will not affect the result of the election. In
the case at bar, there is no dispute that the election returns from the 45 precincts will affect the
results of the elections.
Next, the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI is another grave electoral
irregularity that attended the special elections held on May 30, 2001. There was absolutely no
legal basis for the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. Verily, the
appointments were devoid of any justification other than the bare assertion, again, that "the
political parties and municipal candidates agreed on the said arrangement." The pertinent
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code regarding the composition, appointments and
substitution of the members of the BEI are quoted as follows:
SEC. 164. Composition and appointments of board of election inspectors. - At least thirty
days before the date when the voters list is to be prepared in accordance with this Code, in the
case of a regular election or fifteen days before a special election, the Commission shall,
directly or through its duly authorized representatives, constitute a board of election
inspectors for each precinct to be composed of a chairman and a poll clerk who must be
public school teachers, priority to be given to civil service eligibles, and two members,
each representing the two accredited political parties. The appointment shall state the precinct
to which they are assigned and the date of the appointment.
SEC. 165. Oath of the members of the board of election inspectors. - The members of the
board of election inspectors, whether permanent, substitute or temporary, shall before assuming
their office, take and sign an oath upon forms prepared by the Commission, before an officer
authorized to administer oaths or, in his absence, before any other member of the board of
election inspectors present, or in case no one is present, they shall take it before any voter. The
oaths shall be sent immediately to the city or municipal treasurer. (Sec. 157, 1971 EC)
SEC. 166. Qualification of members of the board of election inspectors. - No person shall be
appointed chairman, member or substitute member of the board of election inspectors unless he is
of good moral character and irreproachable reputation, a registered voter of the city or
municipality, has never been convicted of any election offense or of any other crime punishable by
more than six months of imprisonment, or if he has pending against him an information for any
election offense. He must be able to speak and write English or the local dialect. (Sec. 114, 1978
EC)
xxx
SEC. 170. Relief and substitution of members of the board of election inspectors. - Public
school teachers who are members of the board of election inspectors shall not be relieved nor
disqualified from acting as such members, except for cause and after due hearing.
xxx
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 664620 modified Section 164 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said
section reads:
SEC. 13. Board of Election Inspectors. – The board of election inspectors to be constituted by the
Commission under Section 164 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be composed of a chairman
and two (2) members, one of whom shall be designated as poll clerk, all of whom shall be public
school teachers, giving preference to those with permanent appointments. In case there are not
enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service, or other
citizens of known probity and competence who are registered voters of the city or municipality may
be appointed for election duty.
Clearly, the BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school
teachers. If there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in
the civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed. It was
highly irregular to replace the duly constituted members of the BEI, who were public school
teachers. Nothing in petitioners’ pleadings would even suggest that the substitution was made for
cause and after hearing. The importance of the constitution of the BEI to the conduct of free,
honest and orderly elections cannot be overemphasized. The Court has held that, "the members
of the board of election inspectors are the front line election officers. They perform such duties and
discharge such responsibilities that make them, in a real sense, foot soldiers who see to it that
elections are free, honest and orderly. They are essential to the holding of elections."21
Second Issue: Denial of Due Process
Petitioners claim that there was a clear violation of due process of law because a hearing was not
conducted on the circumstances of the special election. Petitioners further claim that the Comelec
rendered the assailed resolution without requiring its field officers, specifically, the election officer,
provincial election supervisor and the regional election director to explain the transfer of the polling
places. Lastly, petitioners point out that none of the eight (8) proclaimed members of the
Sangguniang Bayan22 of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte and the proclaimed Vice Mayor were notified
and impleaded as respondents in the petition to annul the election results citing Velayo vs.
Commission on Elections.23
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 or "The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991" provides that the
Comelec sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 6, in turn, provides as follows:
"SEC. 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of
a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect."
A prayer to annul election results, as in the instant case, and a prayer to declare failure of
elections based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence or analogous causes, are actually of
the same nature and the Election Code denominates them similarly.24 The Comelec may exercise
the power to annul election results or declare a failure of election motu proprio25 or upon a verified
petition.26 The hearing of the case shall be summary in nature.27 A formal trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
evidence on which a fair decision can be based.28 In fine, a trial is not at all indispensable to satisfy
the demands of due process.
The petition was heard by the Comelec en banc on June 27, 2001. During the said hearing, the
Comelec directed the parties, as agreed upon, to submit their respective memoranda within five
(5) days from date and after which, the case shall be submitted for resolution. Petitioners were
duly heard through their pleadings, thus, there is no denial of procedural due process to speak of.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Nunungan,
including Election Officer Ballesta, were summoned to the hearing held on June 27, 2001 and
furnished a copy of the petition.
The pre-conditions for declaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any
precinct or precincts because of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes and (2) that the votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the elections.
The concurrence of these two circumstances justifies the calling of special elections.29 Here, the
Comelec found that the special elections were vitiated by fraud due to the illegal transfer of the
polling places and the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. Inevitably, the
Comelec could not ascertain who voted during the special elections. The circumstances were such
that the entire electoral process was not worthy of faith and credit, hence, in practical effect no
election was held.30
In Velayo vs. Commission of Elections,31 the Court held that "the non-inclusion of a proclaimed
winner as respondent in a pre-proclamation controversy and his lack of notice of the proceedings
in the Comelec which resulted in the cancellation of his proclamation constitute clear denial of due
process." In the Velayo case, the proclaimed mayor and the members of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers were not impleaded in the pre-proclamation cases brought before the Comelec.
However, in this case, petitioner Cawasa and the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
were in fact impleaded, notified and even heard by the Comelec in SPC No. 01-276. At this late
stage, public interest in the speedy disposition of this case will only be further derailed by the re-
opening of the case for the benefit of petitioners-councilors who did not advance any new and
substantial matters in this petition warranting the declaration that the special elections were valid
and untainted by fraud.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of public respondent Commission on Elections, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc in SPC No. 01-276 dated October 24,
20001 is hereby AFFIRMED.
VIvero v. COMELEC
 Republic of the Philippines MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together with EMMANUEL's
SUPREME COURT written acceptance of the party's nomination.4
Manila
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time
EN BANC against EMMANUEL, which was received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was
docketed as SPA No. 98-292. In his petition MULA contended that the nomination of
EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is illegal on the following grounds:

G.R. No. 135691 September 27, 1999 a) The substitute, before he filed his Certificate
of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an
independent candidate. Being so, he cannot
EMMANUEL SINACA, petitioner,
rightfully substitute the disqualified one;
vs.
MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
b) The nomination of respondent substitute
bears only the approval of Provincial Chairman
Matugas and without consultation and consent
of the higher political hierarchy especially Mr.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Robert Ace Barbers who has also a say on
nomination of candidates within his jurisdiction,
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for as evidenced by an authority hereto attached
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order assailing the Resolution of 6 October as Annex "E";
1998, of respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292,
declaring as invalid the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by herein c) Substitution generally takes place when by
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca.1 reason of a candidate's disqualification the
party to which he belongs loses such
The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling representation. In the instant case, the
party LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of disqualification did not at all prejudice LAKAS
mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy
Barbers (hereafter "BARBERS Wing") nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while the is still there representing the party after the
other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter "MATUGAS Wing") endorsed the disqualification. The substitution is a
candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter TEODORO). redundancy and not necessary under the
circumstances, more so that it was done with
Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the "BARBERS malice and without the required consensus of
Wing," filed before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was the political hierarchy. 5
docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a
resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:
Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy because of prior
conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude.2 a) The petition does not state a cause of action
as it is not based on any of the grounds for
On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On disqualification as provided under Sec. 68 of
even date, herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an independent the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40(A) of
candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and the Local Government Code of 1991;
became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS "MATUGAS Wing" as
the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the b) The issue of who in LAKAS has the
basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy 3 attached thereto is his authority to nominate candidates for local
certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Governor Francisco T. officials, is an intra-party matter hence beyond
the jurisdiction of the Comelec;
 c) Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by
LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and official
candidate for Provincial Governor to nominate
the party's local candidates; and
d) The petition is already moot and academic
because of the proclamation of EMMANUEL
as mayor of the Municipality of Malimono,
Surigao del Norte.6
On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and
upheld the candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL.7 The pertinent part of the resolution reads:
It is therefore clear, that candidate for governor Matugas was clothed with the
authority to nominate the respondent as substitute candidate for the position of
mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice the disqualified candidate, Apropos
thereto, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that on May 10, 1998 the proper nomination was issued by the
official of the party authorized therefor, it stands to reason that the substitution
was valid, respondent having accepted the nomination and his certificate of
candidacy dated May 10, 1998, correspondingly filed.
Respondent is correct in stating that the question of nomination is a party
concern which is beyond the ambit of the Commission. What matters is, the
candidate has been certified as a party member and the nomination duly issued
in his favor.
Be that as it may, the petition is rendered moot and academic by the
proclamation of respondent on May 12, 1998, as evidenced by the certificate of
canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for municipal offices with SN
16671298 and his oath of office dated May 13, 1998, which forms part of the
record of this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of MATUGAS
in the nomination was not sufficient because the party's authority to nominate was given to both
MATUGAS and Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS), in their joint capacity, and that
the nomination of EMMANUEL is void since he was an independent candidate prior to his
nomination. 8
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution9 which set aside the resolution
dated 28 May 1998 of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for the following
reasons:
In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues that the signature only of
Governor Matugas in the nomination was not sufficient because the party's
authority to nominate was given to both Governor Matugas and Senator Robert
Barbers, in their joint capacity.
We do not have to resolve this issue because the more important issue is
whether respondent is disqualified as a substitute candidate. He was an
independent candidate for councilor at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not
belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate.
We sustain petitioner's position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified
mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca
was not valid because the latter was an independent candidate for councilor prior
to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate
who was a Lakas party member.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE
the Commission (Second Division)'s resolution dated May 28, 1998. We declare
Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be a substitute candidate for mayor of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL his proclamation as such being
void ab initio. Upon finality of this resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position
of mayor of the municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, to which the vice-
mayor elected in the May 11, 1998 elections shall succeed by operation of law.
Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us alleging that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. EMMANUEL principally contends that
his nomination as a substitute candidate was regular and valid hence, his proclamation as mayor
of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte must be upheld.
In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified EMMANUEL solely on the basis that he was
an independent candidate prior to his nomination as a substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party who
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
 accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must
be of the same political party as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the
political party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements.
EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party "MATUGAS
wing" to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the Party's provincial chairman. 10 That
EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of
membership, 11 which is being controverted for having been presented as new evidence for the
first time before this court, but more importantly by his certificate of candidacy filed before the
COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party. 12
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. 13 It is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he
is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any,
and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated. 14
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the
electorate. It constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting his
ballot. Thus, with the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy that he is affiliated
with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent candidate,
but as a member of the LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to political
party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the electorate conscious of the platform of the said
political party. 15
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial.
What is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as
independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a
substitute for TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a
member of the LAKAS party "MATUGAS wing." As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and
carry out the party's ideology, political ideas and platforms of government. As the official candidate
of an organized political party, he is bound by the party's rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its
tenet and its policies, its platforms and programs of government. To the electorate he represents
the party, its principles, ideals and objectives. 16
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the
disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the
Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate
must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be
nominated as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute
candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the
candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional requirement or condition not
provided under the said provision without encroaching into the domain of the legislative
department.
As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in her dissenting opinion, to wit:
. . . . With due respect to the majority opinion, I find that at the time the substitute
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor and at the time of his
election as such, he was an independent candidate no more. He was, at that
time, a nominee of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact is
evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance dated 10 May 1998
executed by the Provincial Chairman of the said party of Surigao del Norte and
by herein respondent. This certificate bonafide member of the said party. To rule
that respondent was still an independent candidate and not a member of the
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP political party at the time of filing his certificate of
candidacy as a substitute candidate for mayor is to arrogate upon this
Commission what would have been the sole and exclusive prerogative of any
political organization — to determine party membership and its nominees to
elective positions. It is an accepted fact that, in this country, politicians switch
party affiliations more frequently than the ebb and flow of the tides. 17
The argument advanced by private respondent MULA that MATUGAS has no authority to
nominate a candidate without the concurrence of BARBERS is devoid or merit.
Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its Deputy
Secretary General and National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the party
officer authorized to nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue Certificates of Nomination and
Acceptance for the Party's official candidates for the positions of Board Members, City Councilors,
Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and councilors for the Province of Surigao del Norte. 18
This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former
authorization given by the party of both BARBERS and MATUGAS. 19 Both BARBERS and
MATUGAS were given separate and distinct authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran for
governor against MATUGAS.
Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, namely
TEODORO and CANOY, 20 both of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from different
factions. TEODORO was indorsed by the "MATUGAS wing" and CANOY by the "BARBERS
Wing." The certificates of candidacy of these candidates were never questioned despite the fact
that they belong to the same political party and were separately and independently endorsed by
either BARBERS or MATUGAS. Therefore, if the absence of a joint nomination is to be considered
fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of TEODORO or CANOY, then there would in
effect no candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the
LAKAS "MATUGAS wing," the substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be
substituted and since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of TEODORO, then
MATUGAS' nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.
There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in joining a political party. The right of
individuals to form an association as guaranteed by the fundamental law includes the freedom to
associate or refrain from association. 21 No man is compelled by law to become a member of a
political party; or after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for
whatever reason reasons seems good to him, and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or
indifferent, or without cause. 22 The decision of a candidate on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to his discretion. 23
We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that the decision as to which member a party
shall nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is not cognizable by the courts.
A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a
standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preference. 24 Political parties are
generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law
principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves
the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue
interference. 25 Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests
with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the court's jurisdiction. 26
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not
assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but will leave the
matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the
polls. 27 Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how
nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political
parties may handle party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may
establish. 28
An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid
even though an improper method is followed in the nomination of candidates. 29 This is because in
determining the effect of a particular irregularity in a party nomination for office on the result of the
general election, the pivotal issue is whether the irregularity complained of has prevented a full,
fair, and free expression of the public will. Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to the
contrary, an election may not even be invalidated by the fact that the nomination of the successful
candidate was brought about by fraud, and not in the manner prescribed by the statute, provided it
appears that noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair and free vote. 30
of Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed into office. The fact
that the nomination of a substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but a
technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the electorate.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as
signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are
considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give
effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or
if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be
nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been questioned before the
election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating the will of the
electorate, which should not be done. 30 In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 32 the Court held that
the "will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had
not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith
before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the
people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the
candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy."
Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to
defeat the will of the people. 33 Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail.
This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the
COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring
EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao
del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining in the case at bar as to warrant this Court's
intervention in ascertaining the propriety of EMMANUEL's nomination as a substitute candidate by
the LAKAS "MATUGAS wing."

Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUEL's nomination as substitute candidate has been
rendered moot and academic by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of Canvassers