1. Case Digest: Pelizloy v.

Benguet
PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE
PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.

G.R. No. 183137, 10 April 2013.

LEONEN, J.:

Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet, which has facilities like swimming
pools, a spa and function halls.

In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005. Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10%
amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots."

Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice.
Upon the Secretary’s failure to decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction before the RTC.

Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing powers of local government units under
Section 133 (i) of the Local Government Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or
exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as otherwise provided.

The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 (a) of the
LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC
defines "amusement" as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime, or fun."

RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction for lack of merit.
Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory Relief was a proper remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of
Benguet's assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are encompassed by the
phrase ‘other places of amusement’ in Section 140 of the LGC.

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being "amusement places" under the LGC.

RULING: NO.

Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from levying amusement taxes even if
amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes. The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise
provided" by the LGC. Section 140 provides such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly
mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether
amusement taxes may be levied on admissions to these places hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of
amusement’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or
to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned."

Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert
halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the
show or performances.

As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an
impressive one"; while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of
entertainment." As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual
engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that
actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience.

Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be
considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues
for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances.

2. Gamboa v. Teves (Case Digest)

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012

Facts:

The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common
shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of
foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation
of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence
this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that
is – to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011
decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights,
as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors,
coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’
was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

3. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon
the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental
rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.

Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s
contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the
lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-
vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioner’s reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand wh
atconduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this
case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, over
breadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not
beachieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine
of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical
tools developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is
that one to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that
the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law ismore imagined than real. The crime of plunder as a malum in se is
deemed to have been resolve in the Congress ‘decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.

4. Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the
ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition
was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to
show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that
a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It
is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that
the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-
mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent
it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to
their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.
5. Gulf Air Company Philippine Branch v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS: Petitioner Gulf Air Company Philippine Branch (GF), a branch of Gulf Air Company (a foreign corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of Bahrain), availed of the Voluntary Assessment program of BIR
under RR 8-2001 for its 1999 and 2000 Income Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax and its Percentage Tax for the third
quarter of 2000, paying a total of P11,964,648.00. it also made a claim for refund of percentage taxes for the
1st, 2nd and 4th quarters of 2000. In lieu with this, BIR issued a letter of authority, authorizing its revenue officer to
examine their books of accounts and other records to verify its claim. After its submission of several documents and an
informal conference with BIR representatives, GF received its Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency amounting
to P32,745,141.93 and a letter which denied its claim for tax credit or refund of excess percentage tax remittance for the
said quarters and requested the immediate settlement of its deficiency. Later, GF received the Formal Letter of Demand
for the payment of the total amount of P33,864,186.62. In response, it filed a letter to protest the assessment and to
reiterate its request for reconsideration on the denial of its claim for refund. However, the Deputy Commissioner, OIC of
the large Taxpayers Services of the BIR, denied its protest for lack of factual and legal basis and requested the immediate
payment of the deficiency. Aggrieved, GF filed a petition for review with the CTA, which dismissed the petition after
finding that RR No. 6-66 was applicable rule providing that gross receipts should be computed based on the cost of the
single one-way fare as approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Moreover, it noted that GF failed to include in its
gross receipts the special commissions on passengers and cargo. Finally it ruled that the RR 15-2002, allowing the use of
the net net rate in determining the gross receipts could not be given any or a retroactive effect. Thus CTA affirmed the
decision of the BIR and ordered the payment of the deficiency plus20% delinquency interest. GF elevated the case to
CTA En Banc which also affirmed the decision of the CTA in Division. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: whether the definition of “gross receipts,” for purposes of computing the 3% Percentage Tax under Section
118(A) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), should include special commissions on passengers and
special commissions on cargo based on the rates approved by the CAB.13computing the 3%Percentage Tax under
Section 118(A) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), should include special commissions on passengers
and special commissions on cargo based on the rates approved by the CAB.13

HELD: There is no doubt that prior to the issuance of Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002 which became effective on
October 26, 2002, the prevailing rule then for the purpose of computing common carrier’s tax was Revenue Regulations
No. 6-66. While the petitioner’s interpretation has been vindicated by the new rules which compute gross revenues
based on the actual amount received by the airline company as reflected on the plane ticket, this does not change the
fact that during the relevant taxable period involved in this case, it was Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 that was in effect.
GF itself is adamant that it does not seek the retroactive application of Revenue Regulations No. 15-2002. Even if it were
inclined to do so, it cannot insist on the application of the said rules because tax laws, including rules and regulations,
operate prospectively unless otherwise legislatively intended by express terms or by necessary implication. Although GF
does not dispute that Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was the applicable rule covering the taxable period involved, it puts
in issue the wisdom of the said rule as it pertains to the definition of gross receipts

6. Abakada Guro v. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005

J. Puno En Banc

Facts:

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the
bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no
disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other,
with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and
the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-
consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the
presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means
there is no conflict because “a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.”

Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on
exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate
introduced amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance,
constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the
Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.

Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also
contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into
a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Issue:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

Held:

The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is
acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and
has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data
and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-
registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its
Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of
R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A.
No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose
so long as it is within constitutional bounds.

The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court is LIFTED.
7. Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia

G.R. No. L-11860. May 29, 1959

FACTS:
The Commissioner of Customs appeals to the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals affirming that the forfeiture
of the electric range in question under Section 1363 (g.) is illegal. The RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"' a unit of
the Philippine Navy was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan, Korea,
and carry Christmas gifts for our soldiers there. It seems that thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in
connection with the needs of our soldiers there and made trips between Korea and Japan, so that it did not return
to the Philippine until September 2, 1954. While in Japan, it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject
to customs duties.
In the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, all the articles were declared forfeited by the Collector of Customs
of Manila for violations of the Customs Law pursuant to Section 1363 (g) of the Administrative Code as an
unmanifested cargo including the aforesaid electric.

ISSUES:
Whether or not a manifest is required of the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL"

HELD:
Yes. Section 1228 of the Administrative Code provides that “Every vessel from a foreign port or place must have
on board complete written or typewritten manifests of all her cargo”. The court ruled that whether the vessel be
engaged in foreign trade (Section 1221 and 1225, Revised Administrative Code) or not (Section 1228), and even
when the vessel belongs to the army or the navy (Section 1234), the universal requirement from a reading of all
the foregoing provisions is that they be provided with a manifest.

The court also believes that there was no necessity where as in the present case the application of Section 1234
of the Revised Administrative Code to our navy ships is so clear and manifest, considering that the reasons for
requiring a manifest for transport and supply ships of the army and navy of the United States are and with more
reason applicable to our navy ships to carry out the policy of the government, and because we have complete
control over them. It was therefore held that the RPS "MISAMIS ORIENTAL" was required to present a manifest
upon its arrival in Manila on September 2, 1954.

In conclusion, the court holds that all vessels whether private or government owned, including ships of the
Philippine navy, coming from a foreign port, with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by
any foreign government, not engaged in the transportation of merchandise in the way of trade, as provided for in
the second paragraph of Section 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a
manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine port.

8. GR. 178845 October 9, 2012. Atty. Honesto L. Cueva vs Court of Appeals

9. theodore and nancy ang vs spouses alan gr 186993

The spouses “The” (“Ang” in Filipino) owe the other spouses “The” (“Ang”, again in Filipino. Maybe they are relatives,
but not this time) the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (US300,00.00). The Lender (Ang, the lenders) reside in
the United States, so when The Borrower (Ang, the borrowers) failed to pay despite being sent a demand a demand
letter, The Lenders executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating The Attorney (no, his last name is not Ang,
don’t be confused) as their duly designated representative to file the case for collection of money against The
Borrowers, who reside in Bacolod City.
Because The Attorney, who is not Ang, holds office in Quezon City, he filed the collection case in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.

The Borrowers filed a motion to dismiss, saying that venue was improperly laid, as they, The Borrowers, were residents
of Bacolod City, while The Lenders were residents of the United States. As The Lenders were not residents of the
Philippines, the venue should be in Bacolod City, where the The Borrowers live.

(In civil actions, particularly personal civil actions where the nature of the case is enforcement of contract, venue, or the
place where the case should be filed, may either be the residence of the complaining party, the plaintiff, or the
residence of the defendant, at the option of the plaintiff.)

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denied the Motion to Dismiss, holding that since the representative holds office
in Quezon City, the case should be filed in Quezon City. Despite filing a motion for reconsideration, the RTC denied t
again.

The Borrowers elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, who sided with them, citing the rules on venue in civil action,
and said that The Attorney, being a mere representative, is not the real party in interest. The Lender is the real party in
interest, therefore, the matter of venue should be a choice between the residence of The Lender or The Borrower. Since
The Lender is not a resider of the Philippines, there is no other choice but to file the case in Bacolod City, since it is
where The Borrower reside.

What is the correct venue in this case, given the conflicting ruling of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals?
Was the residence of The Attorney, being the designated representative, material to the case?

The Supreme Court:

As to Question No. 1:

“It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and
their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s
caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.

The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily
seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He
can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been
instituted at the time the action is commenced.

However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of
the place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., this Court held that there
can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no residence in the Philippines. In
such case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the defendant resides.

As to Question No. 2

“Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real party
in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Emphasis ours)

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real party in
interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does not
stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-
in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such appointment,
however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in
interest.

Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to file the
complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners – the real
parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to
Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.”

G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012, THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON,
Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG, Respondents.

Indeed, your address is good, Atty. Representative, but not for this case.

10. ABAS KIDA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Article VI. Section 26. Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the
third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every
3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with
the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
RULING:
No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement
in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either
the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days,
is subject to the exception when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. The President’s certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

11. Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.

G.R. No. 194024

FACTS

Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of condominium
units in Phoenix Heights Condominium developed by the respondent.

In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI
for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR, alleging that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in
their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the condominium
and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR.

In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory draft”. HLURB
rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on
the ground that HLURB acted without or beyond its jurisdiction.

The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did
not fall within the scope of the administrative agency’s authority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the petitioners
2. Whether PHCC is an indispensable party

HELD:

1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined
by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.

In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not cognizable by the
HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought.

2. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. It is "precisely
‘when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.’ The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also
as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
PHCC is an indispensable party and should have been impleaded, as it would be directly and adversely
affected by any determination therein. Evidently, the cause of action rightfully pertains to PHCC.

12. Agcaoili v. Suguitan

G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926

FACTS:
Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte
on the 25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all the powers, privileges,
and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. The
 conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of his appointment, are found in
section 1 of Act No. 2041 which provides that "All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office
during good behavior . . . ."
On the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107. Said Act in section 203
provides for “ That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of sixty-five years."
On the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent a to Agcaoili which provides that the former has
the honor to advise the latter that he has ceased to be a justice of the peace by operation of said amendment of the
Administrative Code.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Act. 3107 applies to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the
passage of said act.
(2) Whether or not Sec. 216 applies to public officers.

HELD:
(1) No. Attention is called to one of the provisions of section 3 of the Jones Law "That no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
Considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act
contains a provision "that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years”, the court is forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and
contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and that when Julio Agcaoili was
forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the peace, he was forced to
do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the
municipality of Laoag, without delay.

(2) No. A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must
have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new
idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a thought, a degree greater than that
expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon
are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference
being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a
law may always be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows
therefore that, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer to
corporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or to officers of a
corporation.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed in accordance with the law
to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully and honestly served the Government for
a number of years the legislature adopted a new law which arbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore,
provided that said officer cease to be such when he should reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no
express provision or method for its enforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of
Justice, without any authority given in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the
judicial department of the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who was
designated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, giving reasons
therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecution if he did not
immediately vacate his office.
13.

14. REPUBLIC VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL (GR 192908)

FACTS:

Two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges,
Inc. (St. Vincent): (1) to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the
construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). (2) to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total
area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent. Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended
complaint alleging that the subject land originated from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment
of just compensation pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. In 2005, the Republic filed a motion for the
issuance of an order of expropriation and was granted in both two cases. The trial court denied St. Vincent’s motion for
reconsideration granting expropriation. The lower court, however, modified its Order and required the Republic to
immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to
be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days
within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was
given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition for certiorari. The Republic filed its petition
for certiorari for having been issued an order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be
dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12- SC. The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation
pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and in
consideration of substantial justice. The CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republic’s petition for certiorari
on the ground that the petition was filed out of time. The CA denied the Republic’s motion for reconsideration. Hence,this
petition.

ISSUE: WON, the CA erred in denying the petition of certiorari for being filed out of time?

RULING:
YES. The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republic’s motion for
extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode
of appeal. The CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules. The present petition
may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. What seems to be a
“conflict” is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna
Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand,
relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Labao v.
Flores subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule: The 60-day period is inextendible
to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2)
to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances.

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is
that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be
extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases. Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the
Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated
April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP);
and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.
DECISION: Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the
petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines

15.