Republic

of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA
CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER
and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.


AQUINO, J.:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated
August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863.
The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The
complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis
R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus,
and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the
daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas
Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas
Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was
submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was
opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared
Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who
represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead
when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.

Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will
because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned.
Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y
que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la
recepcion de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del
difunto."

The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in
certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing
of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o
desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against
alienation, that conch tion would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no
hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada
(See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting
perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R.
Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October
10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the
compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of
Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus
signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco
entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and
executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947
wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with
Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).

On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition
of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of
partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint
that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the
decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and
laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26,
1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.

Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G.
R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than
fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).

Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco
was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res
judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly
legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may
be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco.
Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's
estate?

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco
"a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos
por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was
an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis
Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged
natural children. His exact words are:

Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los
cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein,
which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No.
54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69,
Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of
Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying
that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in
Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's
wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate.
A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule
131, Rules of Court).

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus
was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus,
as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder
abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo
natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...

Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would
have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate
child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate
family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.

The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).

Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child
should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged
such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit
from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be
succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were
legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See
De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged
natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey
vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to
the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52
Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).

The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her
natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.










Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,
respondents.

Porfirio C. David for petitioner.

Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.


DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R,
promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor
of petitioner:

(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA
REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;

(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased FRANCISCA
REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewen

(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the
share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;

(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties subject of
this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share and share
alike;

(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of this
decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay to
plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;

(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James to pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano
Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;

(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim. 1

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by
two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter,
Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949
without any issue.

On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero
Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased
Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the
complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all
the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.

Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the
subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said
properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently
executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove
ownership of the properties in suit.

From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as already stated,
reversed the decision of the trial court, thereby dismissing petitioner's complaint, reconsideration
having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed of the following assignment
of errors:

I

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA
REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the
private respondents.

There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct
factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. '60'), which
describes it as follows:

. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y linderos siquientes:
Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles)
arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio

After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948.
Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed the
property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared
the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously
thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.

The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale (Exh.
'3') which describes the property as follows:

. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la linea Ferrea y
Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de
Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea de una extension
superficial de 1229.00 metros cuadrados.

After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the
same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in
Nueva Ecija, Francisco Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the
property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed
the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his
father,

As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because
defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and
1917, are the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff.

Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the
identification of the lands in question.

To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la
cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the
time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la via ferrea del Railroad Co.')

With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now
being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the
M.R.R. Co.

With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and
in the tax declaration is one and the same property.

The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed
between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely
have occurred.

Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the
realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt
that this property is the same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being
sought after by the plaintiff.

With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true
that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in
her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948. (Reference to
Exhibits omitted.)2

Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the
present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-
established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals
are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None
of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the
daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca
Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can
consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.

In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father
is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.

Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have
minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the
deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his
tale.

This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a
certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro
Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the
'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without
taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his
filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the
inheritance in question. 4

That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of
a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock
as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and
mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At
most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code
of the Philippines.)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the petition by minute resolution for lack of
merit.



Separate Opinions


ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the petition by minute resolution for lack of
merit.

Footnotes

1 pp. 134-135, Record on Appeal.

2 pp. 22-24, Rollo.

3 Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195; Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 88 SCRA 695.

4 p. 24, Rollo.

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION

June 17, 1987

G.R. No. L-66574

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.


PARAS, J.:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in
Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her
favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa
Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo
Santero;

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual
Santero;

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person,
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to
intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated
August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual
Santero and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14,
1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking
part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well
as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of
the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980,
Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4
was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the
trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —

WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law applicable, the
same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976
declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-
appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Costs against the oppositors-appellees.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the
same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with
the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren
Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and
prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero
to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their grandmother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the
petitioners' grandchildren Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and
therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children of her son
Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand children;

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable
provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are
provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue
here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could
inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero
who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art.
990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New
Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation
(Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which
expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in
the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate
of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is
the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. 6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to
the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is
changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the
Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing
him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-
a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of
this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since
petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the
Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such
contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in
the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the
subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long
became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to
decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and
executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order
of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and
executory, hence null and void. "

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., took no part.


Footnotes

1 RA pp. 30-35.

2 RA pp, 35-38.

3 R.A. p. 87.

4 Penned by Justice Marcelino R. Veloso and concurred in by Justices Porfirio V. Sison, Abdulwahid A.
Bidin and Desiderio P. Jurado.

5 Motion for Reconsideration, p. 78-79, Rollo.

6 F. Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 O. G. (First S) No. 3, p. 196).

7 Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing, p. 2862, Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. II, Third Revision, Eight Edition.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.

R E S O L U T I O N


PARAS, J.:

The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its
Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being
challenged in this Second Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their
respective pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of
the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on
November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil
Code which reads:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.

include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as
amici curiae during the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.

The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual
Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo
Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children
with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)

Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?

The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In
connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain)
by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and
not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not
dispute the fact that the New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights
were never before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely
entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of
the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These
are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A
careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed
by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the
inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time
does not exist.

Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.

Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and if any one
of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions. (933)

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another illegitimate
child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.
(940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall be
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from
their deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves
illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which
it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p.
196).

According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939 to
944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar.
Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs.
Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil., 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited
by former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an
illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural
parent (also a legitimate child himself is already abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil
Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant case.

Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our
law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article
943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters
which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted
successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992,
prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a
legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to
be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his
illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate
descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In
this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code,
are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did
not consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the
intestate succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the
three aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.

Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find
support from other civilists. We quote:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the legitimate
family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing
him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-
a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p.
196, Rollo)

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is
broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p.
2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore
with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law
does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan
relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y
ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola,
op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it
is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when
the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral,
as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in
a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.

To recapitulate, We quote this:

The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in legal
history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to
place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO
209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done
away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to
say that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by
law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by
Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).

In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to
clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby
reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.





Separate Opinions



GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known
author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the
Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy and
methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our own
version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the
illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the
disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid
as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our civil law conform
"With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with modern trends in
legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow
path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the
ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in
the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother. There
are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral relative — her
niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will
inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the order
of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in Art. 970
of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate children
and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-brothers or half-
sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those
where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own
grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which
provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority view
of this Court states:

xxx xxx xxx

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child the right
of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without change provisions
of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the
illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by operation of law only to persons
with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not impress
me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because the Code has
been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions upon which the
word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren —
legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said
cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law include
the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to
members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.



Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known
author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae — former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and
Professor Ruben Balane — together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the
Philippines.

It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court.
But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy and
methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our own
version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the
illegitimate families have been relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the
disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid
as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our civil law conform
"With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with modern trends in
legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations from the strict and narrow
path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to follow the
ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in
the new Civil Code.

We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own
grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother. There
are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral relative — her
niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will
inherit as against the grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.

As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the order
of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in Art. 970
of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.

I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate children
and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-brothers or half-
sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and
illegitimate families. I see no reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those
where a firm wall of separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own
grandchildren.

The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which
provides:

The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their death to
their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances
given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate
child's legitimate off-spring.

I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents
Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority view
of this Court states:

x x x x x x x x x

In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child the right
of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without change provisions
of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice, because while the
illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by operation of law only to persons
with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)

The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not impress
me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because the Code has
been amended. The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions upon which the
word's effectivity is dependent.

My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just.
Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren —
legitimate or illegitimate — more than the second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said
cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the indiscretions of her son but why should the law include
the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to
members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.

I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.