G.R. No. 90478. November 21,1991.

*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBA YAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago—together with Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-
Pineda—are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and
Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated “Interrogatories to Plain-tiff,"16 and on
August 2,1989, an “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"17 as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. The PCGG filed an opposition thereto: motion requires leave of court; do not
name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded; it deals with factual matters in which will
be part of PCGG.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pleading interrogaries to plaintiff, as well as the motion for production and inspection
of documents is valid?

RULING:

YES, it is valid. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2)
as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field
of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party
is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether
they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as
much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to
obtain evidence for use upon said trial.
 G.R. No. 182356. December 4, 2013.*
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name
and style of Pongkay Trading, respondent.

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along
North Avenue, Quezon City.4 His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a
certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5 Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when
the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand
suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear
end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana.
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries. She suffered mild to moderate pain of her neck and shoulder. Thus she consulted a
specialist. Yet despite the surgery, she became incapacitated filed a complaint for damages. The presented
evidence are: First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it can
be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury.
Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from
whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical
certificate has probative value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of dela Llana’s illness as supported by 3
evidence presented?

Ruling:

NO, the SC ruled that in civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who
alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the burden of proving
the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra.
dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
 [No. 28607. February 21, 1929]
PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership, plaintiff and appellant, vs. PHOENIX
INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a corporation, defendant and
appellee.

FACTS:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a mercantile
partnership, for the purpose of recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the
sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on
August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was covered by policy of insurance No.
600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiff. For answer, the
defendant, Phoenix Insurance Co., admitted the issuance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special
def ense, alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its
connivance, and that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in
contravention of the express terms of the policy. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the
defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy which was the subject of
the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with interest from the
filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant,
of remnants of the insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence submitted by Phoenix assurance is admissible?

RULING:

YES. The court commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter of
admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality, or
relevancy, or technical objections to the questions, should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is
impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the
part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered
that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mis-
take is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error with:out returning the case for a new
trial,—a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a
court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its
duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this
court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
 No. L-29039. November 28, 1969.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. HON. FELINO D. ABALOS, Judge of the
Court of First Instance, Branch II, 16th Judicial District, and MOHAMMAD USSAM DAMBONG,
respondents.

FACTS:

On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with said court, presided over by respondent Judge,
accusing Mohammad Ussam Dambong, Nikki Dambong, Amiril Hahissi and Ahmad Intoman, of the
crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi, When multiple frustrated
murder upon the persons of Sarahani Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and Abdulrasid Maoludani,
allegedly committed on February 6, 1961, in Guimba Asin, municipality of Panamao, province of Sulu.
When the case was called for trial, the prosecution introduced evidence tending to show that defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place aforementioned, accompanied
by his co-defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as
shot and wounded the other persons named in the information. After the reception of said evidence for the
prosecution, the defense proceeded with the presentation of its own evidence, in the course of which,
defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the casualties and the injuries adverted to above
were due to shots f ired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi, because, as a police sergeant in the
performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had merely fired late the air, to stop a fight
between two (2) groups of persons, to one of which the victims belonged. The defense having, thereafter,
completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24, 1968, the prosecution called March Andi as
rebuttal witness.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony as rebuttal evidence be admitted before the court?

RULING:

YES, The evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed and wounded the persons mentioned in the
information was a new matter not covered directly by the evidence for the prosecution It is true that if it
was the accused who caused the deaths and the injuries alleged, it would follow that AH was ot the author
thereof. The prosecution was entitled, however. as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce positive
evidence to this effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference from its evidence in chief.
 G.R. No. 96492.November 26, 1992.*
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS REYES,
respondents.

FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106,
Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000
square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were
tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on
September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant
of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984, Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other
defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case,
defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the affidavit of eufrocina and efren be admitted although the affiants were not presented
and be subject to cross-examination?

RULING:

YES, it is admissible as evidence. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the ‘Rules of Court shall not
be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits
may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’ Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence
required is no more than substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section
18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989).
In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial
evidence is: ‘Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an
ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence
on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria
for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.’”
PEOPLE VS TURCO (2000)

FACTS:

Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang, Isabela, Basilan, their
houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p. 8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then
staying with her father, Alejandro and her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12)
years and six (6) months old at the time of incident, having been born on December 3, 1982 (p. 3, id).

The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the
evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the
granddaughter of her neighbor, Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony and medico legal certificate would be enough evidence to convict the
accused?

RULING:

YES. Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an
experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape. the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction
of accused-appellant in order to exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290
SCRA 15 [1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving
where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the
victim. Admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence and is therefore an affair
of logic and law. A medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape.
KNAPP v STATE (1997)

FACTS:

Appellant appeals from a judgment in the above-entitled cause, under which he stands convicted of
murder in the first degree. Error is assigned on the overruling of a motion for a new trial.

Appellant, as a witness in his own behalf, offered testimony tending to show a killing in self-defense. He
afterwards testified, presumably for the purpose of showing that he had reason to fear the deceased, that
before the killing he had heard that the deceased, who was the marshal of Hagerstown, had clubbed and
seriously injured an old man in arresting him, and that he died a short time afterwards. On appellant’s
being asked, on cross-examination, who told him this, he answered: “Some people around Hagerstown
there. I can’t say as to who it was now.” The State was permitted, on rebuttal, to prove by a physician,
over the objection and exception of the defense, that the old man died of senility and alcoholism, and that
there were no bruises nor marks on his person. Counsel for appellant contend that it was error to admit
this testimony; that the question was whether he had, in fact, heard the story, and not as to its truth or
falsity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants testimony be admissible as evidence?

RULING:

YES. Relevancy is that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis.”

In Stevenson v. Stewart (1849), 11 Pa. 307, it was said: “The competency of a collateral fact to be used as
the basis of legitimate argument, is not to be determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may
afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend, in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry, or to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in truth.” We are of opinion
that the testimony referred to was competent. While appellant’s counsel are correct in their assertion that
the question was whether appellant had heard a story to the effect that the deceased had offered serious
violence to the old man, yet it does not follow that the testimony complained of did not tend to negative
the claim of appellant as to what he had heard. One of the first principles of human nature is the impulse
to speak the truth. “This principle,” says Dr. Reid, whom Professor Greenleaf quotes at length “has a
powerful operation, [168 Ind. 157] even in the greatest liars; for where they lie once they speak truth a
hundred times.”
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.*
NENA LAZALITA** TATING, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented
by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot,
containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property
to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied
in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over
the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.6
However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any
loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos
and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the
return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sworn statement is admissible as evidence?

RULING:

NO. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the
affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
LOPEZ v HEESEN (1961)

FACTS:

Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October
15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a
shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to appellant, causing him great
bodily and mental pain and anguish, all to his damage in the total sum of $80,000, which included
$25,000 punitive damages.

Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter appellant filed a
demand for jury trial. It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, appellee, Sears, sold to appellee,
Heesen, one of said Higgins Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or
manufactured by appellee, Sears, in that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a dangerous manner
from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this dangerous condition
known to appellee, Sears, was sold to appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it would be used for
hunting purposes and that appellee, Sears, negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the dangerous
and defective condition of the rifle.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony can be admitted as evidence?

RULING:

YES. "It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the
general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not
to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give
their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their
judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the
general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable
avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is
not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also
to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish
the ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly
appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to
prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * *"

Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who
manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company,
Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles
which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of
whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and *454 that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
STATE v BALL (1960)

FACTS:

The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958,
two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South
39th Street. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also
talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his
purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, about 5:50,
as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men
entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men
who had been in the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-
brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to
walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in
my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the
watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn
around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the
cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the
police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash
from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture,
in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the items or evidence obtained are material and relavant to the case and be considered as
admissible?

RULING:

NO. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to
prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized at the time of the
arrest was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly
stolen from the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958; that said
evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly..
G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to leave the
province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her younger
brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and
aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral
Galleno, known well to Evelyn’s family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars’ abode as he was paying
court to Emeterio’s eldest child, Gina.

On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the sugarcane plantation owned
by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all earlier left for school. The only persons left in the
house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.
At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his
pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars’ residence and found the two children left
to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said
residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which resulted in
profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence presented by Dr. Landa (testimony) is relevant to the case and thus
admissible?

RULING:

NO.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that “(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.” This simply means that relevancy is
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol.
II, 1988 ed., p. 434). There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the
determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which
must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience. the trial court’s
conclusions find support in the testimony of accused-appellant’s own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who
was earlier presented during the trial as a prosecution witness), who testified that a laceration is caused by
a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a sharp instrument ----- the wicked fleeth even
when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion
G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL
OMATANG, appellants.

FACTS:

Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay, Pamplona, Negros
Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his neighbors, the spouses
Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the
Pamplona Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that Santiago saw appellants
drinking tuba inside Ana’s store, and offered them a glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just
drank the glass of beer he was offering.4 After that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a
shortcut through the coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning something sinister
because they followed too closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno cautioned
Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about appellants.5 Magno and the spouses simply
continued walking for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway that let water from
the river into the plantation. Magno removed his slippers and started to cross ahead of the spouses.
Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because Santiago had to remove his shoes. When Magno had
crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his companions and saw appellants
attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago on the head and stabbed his
abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.7
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he reached Alexander
Ebias’s house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio Makapa, Mangoto,
Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.8 He decided to
spend the night there.9
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or Rolando about what he saw at the
waterway because he was afraid. Magno added that he left Rolando’s house around 6:30 the next morning
to report the incident at the municipal hall in the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning
by members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of Picio Yan, where he had to attend to
some personal business. Magno declared that he did not report to them that appellants killed the
spouses.10 It was only after he was turned over to the police authorities of Pamplona and brought to the
police station that he reported what he saw the day before at the waterway in the plantation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Magno’s testimony is relevant and thus admissible as evidence?

RULING:

NO, Several portions of Magno’s testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to be no explanation as
to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him considering that he was only five feet away when
he allegedly got an unobstructed view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense
why, if it were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him, Magno chose
to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure that appellants did in fact not run
after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebias’s house, called out to Alexander, asked for
some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his path. Magno’s actions were certainly not the
actions of someone seeking to avoid peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out
to Alexander would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from. Magno’s
claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw appellants kill the spouses is far from
credible, considering that he did not do so, even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when
members of the Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself—such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
KASTIGAR v U.S. 1972

FACTS:

Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the Central District of
California on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege. Prior to the scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court
for an order directing petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand jury under a
grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003. Petitioners opposed issuance of the
order, contending primarily that the scope of the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive
with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the
privilege and compel their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention, and ordered petitioners
to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions under the grant of immunity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the U.S. government may compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the
5th amendment by the grant of immunity?

RULING:

YES. The United States can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by conferring immunity, as provided by 18
U.S.C. § 6002, from use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom in subsequent
criminal proceedings, as such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. Transactional immunity
would afford broader protection than the Fifth Amendment privilege, and is not constitutionally required.
In a subsequent criminal prosecution, the prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively that
evidence proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony.
GALMAN v. PAMARAN (1985)

FACTS:

On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the
premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long sojourn abroad, was gunned
down to death. To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy,1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating
an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board.2 Pursuant
to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena
or in response to an invitation issued by the Board. Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and
produced evidence before the Board were the herein private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major
General Prospero Olivas,3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito
Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. Subsequently, they were convicted of the crime
(murder) imputed against the accused before the Sandiganbayan. The accused counter arguments are: that
its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of
the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies given by the 8 private respondents who did not invoke the rights against
self-incrimination are admissible as evidence?

RULING:

No, P.D. 1886 which created the Agrava Board was enacted not only to determine the facts surrounding
the killing of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., but also identify the culprits for their consequent
prosecution. Sec. 5 of P.D. 1886 compelled respondent Generals Ver and Olivas to be witnesses against
themselves as P.D. 1886 gave them no choice but to testify under pain of being declared in contempt of
court. Fact that the Constitution did not use the word “custodial investigation” shows that it did not
entirely adopt The Miranda doctrine. Use of word “confession” in Art. 4, Sec. 20 does not connote the
idea that it covers only police investigations.— Inasmuch as Generals Ver and Olivas were called before
the Agrava Board as suspects in the killing of Sen. Aquino, they should have been forewarned of their
right to remain silent and to counsel no differently as any person being investigated by the NBI or any
police agency.— The right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself may be invoked not only
in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suits, including forfeiture cases. What is controlling
is not the character of the suit but the nature of the proceedingsThe fact that Sec. 20, Art. IV of the
Constitution deleted the phrase “in a criminal case” shows that the right to remain silent applies to the
Agrava Board hearings although its proceedings is not in its strictest sense criminal. THUS-The
respondent Generals Ver and Olivas were denied due process of law in the Agrava Board hearings.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants “use immunity”; and the other,
which grants what is known as “transactional immunity.” The distinction between the two is as follows:
“Use immunity” prohibits use of witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection
with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, “transactional immunity” grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. P.D.
1886 grants only “use immunity,” but not “transactional immunity.” Hence, dictates of fair play demand
that Generals Ver and Olivas should have been informed of their rights to remain silent by the Agrava
Board.— The view that the right to remain silent must be invoked before the Agrava Board to prevent use
of testimony made thereat is wrong. To save P.D. 1886 from unconstitutionality it must be brought within
the fundamental law. In view of the sanctions imposed by P.D. 1886 to a person who refused to testify at
the Agrava Board, the witness summoned thereat cannot be compelled to answer unless immunity from
suit is offered him.
No. L-69809. October 16,1986.*
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his ciient Manuel Montebon were
in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of thecomplaint for
direct assauit which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico.
After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconic .
“That same inorning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on
a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed
about the problem When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement Appeilant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault”

ISSUES: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line?

RULING:

NO. The phrase “any other device or arrangement” in R.A, 4200 known as Anti-Wire Tapping Law does
not cover an extension line.—The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “deviee or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot
be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line.
The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isoiated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in ftxing the meaning of any of its
parts. The phrase “device or arrange ment” in the Anti-Wire Tapping Law should be interpreted to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature used to tap, intercept or record a telephone
conversation, not an extension line. A person calling another by phone may safely presume that the other
may have an extension line and runs the risk of being heard by a 3rd party. Framers of R.A. 4200 were
more concemed with penalizing the act of recording a telephone conversation than merely listening
thereto. Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension line is not punished by
AntiWiretappingLaw.
G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.*
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication and not a private conversation?

RULING:

NO.
Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret reco rding of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. The contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a
point of absurdity.
MAMBA vs. GARCIA (2001)

FACTS:
at about 7 o’clock in the morning of the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the NBI operatives in the
house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former representative of the 3rd District of Cagayan, where the
entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will
receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial Court and waited for his case to be
called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out of his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and
SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation.
Respondent then called Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court
personnel. Inside, respondent asked Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he answered in the
affirmative, respondent took them to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. After
handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent’s chambers. Upon his signal, the
NBI operatives waiting outside respondent’s court then rushed to the judge’s chambers and arrested the
two police officers after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession

ISSUES:

Whether or not the recorded conversation between Bulatao and SPO2 and SPO4 can be an admissible
evidence?

RULING:

NO. The Investigating Judge’s reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two
police officers is erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties
contravenes the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and
renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. The law covers even those recorded by
persons privy to the private communications, as in this case. Thus, the contents of the tape recorder
cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of respondent judge.
 G.R. Nos. 157294-95. November 30, 2006.*
JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated February 7
and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercito’s Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his Motion for Reconsideration
of the first two resolutions.
The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, “People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al.,” for plunder, defined and penalized in R.A. 7080, “AN ACT DEFINING AND
PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.”
In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel1 filed on January 20, 2003
before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a
subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her
authorized representative to produce the following documents during the hearings scheduled on January
22 and 27, 2003:Bank accounts; receipts; orders; cards;ledgers; and other pertinent documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said documents obtained shall be admissible as evidence under RA1405?

RULING:

NO. Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, the
courts would be encroaching upon the prerogatives of Congress were they to authorize a remedy not
provided for by statute—absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the
courts to read such a provision into the act; R.A. No. 1405 nowhere provides that an unlawful
examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
G.R. No. 193861. March 14, 2012.*
PAULITA “EDITH” SERRA,1 petitioner, vs. NELFA T. MUMAR, respondent.

FACTS:

At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the National Highway
in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar (Mumar),
husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent).
Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, one
Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National Highway heading in
the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned by petitioner Paulita “Edith”
Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, and
in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to
swerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle,
which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which
eventually led to his death.
On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time of the incident.
She claimed that the left tire of Tenerife’s sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van. Consequently, the
left front tire of the van also burst and the van’s driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of the
vehicle. The van swerved to the left towards Mumar’s motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death of
Mumar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner testimony is credible?

RULING:

NO.

The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a
credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The evidence must be natural, reasonable and
probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the
testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.

Rarely does it happen that the investigating officer personally witnesses an accident that he investigates,
yet this does not mean that his observations are not valid. A traffic investigator’s training and experience
allow him to determine how an accident occurred even without witnessing the accident himself. In this
case, Abdullatip had been a traffic investigator for nine years. Even if he arrived at the scene after the
accident, he saw the vehicles in their relative positions as a result of the accident. His experience, as well
as his evaluation of the statements from various witnesses, guided him in assessing who was at fault. In
any case, the presumption of regularity in the exercise of functions is in his favor and therefore his report
must be given credence.
 G.R. No. 175924. March 14, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLAND SABADLAB y BAYQUEL,
accused-appellant.

FACTS:

AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in Makati City, proceeding
towards MA Montessori to fetch her employer’s son who was studying there. Suddenly, a man (later
identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She recognized him
to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal at 5 o’clock am near
her employer’s house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked
a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced
her into the backseat of a parked car, and one of Sabadlab’s cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief.
The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still blindfolded, she was brought out
of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the
blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the
neck downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling
out his name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still
tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after
Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers.
The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 o’clock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to Dapitan
Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told anyone about the
rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAA’s employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first lied
about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer slapped and
boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report the rapes. AAA
underwent medico-legal examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not AAA testimony is credible despite lapses and inconsistencies?

RULING:

YES. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters that the CA precisely
held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating
that the testimony had not been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on
minor details or collateral matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness’ declaration,
veracity, or weight of testimony. The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the victim’s
credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true
herein. The task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their credibility is
best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify
before him.
G.R. No. 157177. February 11, 2008.*
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B.
REYES, respondents.

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes,
went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions
of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to
be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nica-sio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an
employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as
having homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied
by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P200,000.00,
P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is
account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her
existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the signature cards
and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating
and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct
the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich
the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bun-dles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given
to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for
P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought
the same to the teller’s booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no.
0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. “T,” “U”- “U-1”) and
returned to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs. “V”-“V-1”).
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement of account sent to her by BPI
bank that her ATM account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her that they would look into
the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings account
passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said
passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed
that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation, she got
angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the manager assured
her that the matter will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand
letters.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of 200k with respect to the credibility of
evidence present to support it – data on the bank machine?

RULING:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,
or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge
who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not
having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better
position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. Hence, to
arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies and examined the
pieces of evidence on record. Great evidentiary weight is given to the teller’s tape, considering that it is
inserted into the bank’s computer terminal, which records the teller’s daily transactions in the ordinary
course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove the
bank’s claim.
G.R. No. 160811. April 18, 2008.*
RICKY BASTIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On April 24, 1995, at around 11:00 p.m., Lorna Bandiola went to Solido Elementary School in Nabas,
Aklan to fetch her children Lorena and Lorsen who were attending a dance party.3 On her way inside the
campus, she saw petitioner Ricky Bastian, together with co-accused Albino Layasan, Roque Prado and
Renato Prado. The trio were seated on the concrete fence of the school.4
Lorna did not mind them as she proceeded to the dance hall.5 Upon reaching the hall, she learned that the
party was still in progress. She decided to while the time and waited for her children. When the affair
ended at around 2:00 a.m., Lorna left the school premises with Lorena and Lorsen in tow.
While on their way out of the campus, Lorna saw her son-in-law John Ronquillo, the victim, about ten
(10) arms-stretch ahead of them. Apparently, he also went to the dance party and was about to go home.6
It was at that point when Lorna saw petitioner step ahead of his co-accused. Unexpectedly, petitioner
drew a gun and shot Ronquillo on the head. The victim fell instantaneously. Petitioner continued shooting
while Ronquillo lay sprawled on the ground.7
Lorna heard petitioner’s co-accused saying, “He is dead already,” before the group ran away.8 She
trembled with fear and had to be helped by Lorena and Lorsen in going out of the school campus.9
After receiving a dispatch report regarding the shooting incident at the school grounds, Police Officers
Jose Roño, Elmer Villanueva and Ramie Zomil immediately proceeded to the crime scene. The
investigating team arrived at around 2:50 a.m. They found the dead body of John Ronquillo on the
ground, face up. When they checked the body, they recovered one (1) bullet slug on the ground, near the
back of the victim.
The victim’s cadaver was later turned over to the Joy Funeral Parlor in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. There, Dr.
Gloria Boliver of the Municipal Health Office conducted a post-mortem autopsy.
Then the complaint against the accused foregoes. But NPA claim the responsibility over the said incident.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there is credibility on the testimony made by nemelyn tulio is admissible RULING:

YES. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the testimony of Nemelyn Tulio can be discarded,
petitioner’s conviction founded on the positive declarations of eyewitness Lorna Bandiola still stands on
terra firma. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and
positive, is sufficient to convict. – side note --That the New People’s Army allegedly publicly claimed
responsibility for the killing of the victim is beside the point. It is not binding on the Court. It does not
preclude the Court from determining the real killer in accordance with the rule of evidence and settled
jurisprudence.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112262. April 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and
WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

About 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver, both
members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking
along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila. They had just come from Camp Claudio where they
attended a birthday party. They were in civilian clothes.
While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them closely, about ten meters
away. The place was well-lighted. Gonzalo Penalver was carrying a clutch bag, containing a Sanwa
electric tester (Exhibit 1). They crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two men following them.
On(e) of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter. Armando Camat
followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat
who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became
outbalanced. Wilfredo del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid of somebody who
identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San Juan de Dios Hospital.
Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital despite the efforts of Dr. Vittorio Pantig to save him.
Dr. Pantig conducted an exploratory lapar(o)tomy on the abdomen of Nelson Sinoy and found massive
bleeding in the abdominal cavity, and partial damage to the kidney, pancreas and the diaphragm. He tried
to control the bleeding but despite blood transfusion, the blood pressure of the patient went down to zero.
Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2, 1985 after his wound was
already sutured at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. At the AFP Medical Center, Dr. Benedicto Mina took
care of the patient. He gave blood transfusion to the patient. The patient was discharged from the hospital
only on March 15, 1986.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of Penalver is credible to convict the accused?

RULING:

YES. It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by
the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Catubig, 195
SCRA 505) We also see no reason to deviate from the trial courts observation that Penalvers testimony
bore the attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner. We have
scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same to be categorical and candid,
untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It creditably chronicles the material details in the
commission of the crimes in question, and should accordingly be given full credence.
It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses deserve great
respect since it had the opportunity to hear and observe their demeanor as they testified on the witness
stand and, therefore, it was in a better position to discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not
based on their deportment while testifying.
There was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that might have led him to
give fabricated testimony against appellants. He, and even appellant Camat, declared in open court that
they did not know each other before the gruesome incident happened on September 1, 1985. Having no
motive to testify falsely, his positive testimony is sufficient for conviction. When there is no evidence
indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption
is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
G.R. No. 188132. February 29, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSEMARIE MAGUN
DAYAO y ALEJANDRO alias “ROSE,” accused-appellant.

FACTS:
For review of the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 02899, which affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated June 27, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Case Nos. 14061-D and 14062-D. In the said cases,
accused-appellant Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose was found guilty of the crimes of
illegal sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused was caught under buy-bust operation conducted by the police
authorities. And a defense, the accused argued that the testimony made by PO3 Aragao and PO2
Memoracion are contradicting - as to how the team leader PNP Chief Paat received the information
disclosed by the informant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of PO3 and PO2 is still credible despite its lapses and inconsistencies?

RULING:

YES.
As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Memoracion and PO3 Arago, the Court
finds the same unpersuasive. People v. Lazaro states that “[f]or a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt
or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with the
elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused.”
 G.R. No. 144405. February 24, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FERDINAND MATITO y TORRES, a.k.a.
“FREDDIE,” appellant.

FACTS:

On October 16, 1998, around 10:30 in the evening, in San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, Filomena7
Raymundo heard gunshots just moments after her husband Mariano Raymundo, Jr. had stepped out of
their house to go to the backyard to attend to his quails. As the shots came from the direction where
Mariano was, Filomena rushed to the kitchen door and, upon opening it, saw Mariano who was about to
come in. He was pressing his hands on his shoulder which was bloodied and bleeding. Once inside the
house, Filomena asked Mariano what happened and who did it to him. Mariano replied: ‘Binaril ako ni
Pareng Freddie. Binaril ako ni Pareng Freddie.’ Mariano pushed Filomena away from the door when she
tried to look outside. Filomena again asked Mariano who shot him, but Mariano’s voice by then was
barely audible.
“Filomena and her two (2) daughters whom she had awakened, called out to their neighbors for help.
Mariano was boarded on a tricycle and rushed to the Divine World Hospital where he was pronounced
dead.

ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence may be considered as the sole basis of the accused
criminal conviction?

RULING:

YES.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that “indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the
lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.” It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis
direct evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may surpass the latter
in weight and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

First, narrating how her husband, before he died, had identified his killer,
Second, the victim’s daughter narrated how appellant had spoken with her that fateful evening.
Third, a bitter quarrel ensued between the victim and appellant when the latter’s water supply was cut off
by the former, the barangay tanod, and the secretary of the Homeowner’s Association.
Fourth, when asked by his neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of way along his premises–
which he, together with his father, had enclosed with barbed wire–appellant refused to do so.
Fifth, there was a bitter quarrel between the daughters of appellant and the victim.
Sixth, nitrate powder was conclusively proven to be present on the cast taken from the right hand of
appellant.
G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San
Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of
P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of
San Sebastian; (c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob
(Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a
black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger
side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, “Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”; (f) Bautista,
who was seated at the back, shouted, “Wag mong ibigay”; (g) heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag
in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i)
seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-
up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident; (k)
when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw
blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other companions
were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay
Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City;
(o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s money.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara?

RULING:YES.
Well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct
evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent
with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis
that he is not. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial
evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag containing
the money[.]
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.
G.R. No.127154. July 30, 2002.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLDAN A. OCHATE alias “Boy,”
accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Around 5:15 in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, Rowena Albiso and her older brother Roseller were
walking together on their way home from school at Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon reaching the
house of the barangay captain, which is about twenty (20) meters from their school, Rowena stopped and
went to the communal water pump to wash her food container and her slippers. Roseller went home ahead
of her sister.1 On his way home, he passed by the hut of accused Roldan Ochate where he saw the latter
in the yard tucking a scythe on his waist.2 When Roseller arrived home, their father, Romulo, asked for
the whereabouts of Rowena. Roseller told Romulo that his sister was not yet home. Romulo then went to
meet Rowena. However, he was unable to find her. Romulo and Roseller thereafter went to the house of
the accused who is their neighbor but finding no one there, they proceeded to report the incident to
barangay councilman and acting barangay captain Crisanto Montano.3 Montano, in turn, sought the
assistance of some of the men in the barangay in order to find Rowena. The search was conducted the
whole evening of September 26, 1994 to no avail. It was only around eight o’clock the following morning
that the group found Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochate’s house.4 She was already
dead. The medico-legal officer who later examined the cadaver reported that the cause of death was
hemorrhagic shock due to deep and penetrating incised wounds in the neck and abdomen.5 Suspecting
that Ochate was the culprit, police officers as well as other members of the barangay went to see Ochate
at his house but they were not able to find him. It was only on September 29, 1994 that a certain
Bienvenido Pantallano, a member of the CAFGU, was able to locate Ochate and he took Ochate in his
custody and brought him to the Chief of Police of Tampilisan.6

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused may be convicted of a crime rape with homicide based on the circumstantial
evidence presented before the court?

RULING:

NO. ACQUITTED. – the evidences presented is not enough to convict the felon.
Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a case are capable of two inferences,
one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other may be compatible with the
finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.

After a careful review of the entire evidence presented, we find that a combination of the foregoing
circumstances is insufficient to convict appellant of rape with homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to
a fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is the person guilty
of the offense charged. Appellant’s indifference to the events that happened in their barangay beginning
September 26, 1994 up to the time of his arrest on September 29, 1994 may lend support to the suspicion
of the barangay and police authorities that he is the author of the crime. But then, mere suspicion, no
matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain conviction.20 Law and jurisprudence demand
proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.21
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and to overcome the presumption nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established
by the prosecution.22 The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take “a more than
casual consideration” of every circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of the accused.
In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that accused-appellant was considered a suspect because he
did not join the search for the missing girl.24 Appellant testified that he did not participate in the search
because he was busy drying copra.25 It cannot be contradicted that such passive reaction is susceptible to
different interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed as an indication of guilt; but, it may also be
interpreted as mere indifference or even downright insensibility.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented to show that after Roseller left his sister to wash her food
container and slippers at the communal water pump, appellant was seen with her. Furthermore, the
testimony of Roseller that he saw appellant along the road on his way home is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that it was appellant who committed the crime. At best, it is mere conjecture or speculation
which the Court will not subscribe to.
 G.R. Nos. 147773-74. February 18, 2008.*
DENNIS MANGANGEY, GABRIEL WANASON, and ANSELMO FORAYO, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in October 1986, the Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province undertook the widening and
partial relocation of the Banilag-Minoli Road. The project was awarded to private contractor Leon
Acapen. The description of the work to be done and the terms of the contract included, among others:
“1. Roadways and Drainage excavation (removal of slides and overbreaks) [for] 1,800 cubic meters at
P18.00/cu.m.; and 2. Roadways and Drainage Excavation (widening and construction) for 4.010 cubic
meters at P20.00/cu.m. x x x
Quantities given above are only approximate and payments of the work shall be based on the quantities
actually accomplished and completed which shall be measured and determine[d] accurately and shall be
accepted by the Municipal Mayor.” The project was allegedly completed on December 8, 1986 as shown
in the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance dated December 8, 1986. The certificate was prepared and
signed by Construction and Maintenance Foreman Dennis Mangangey, petitioner herein, who attested
that he personally inspected the project and that it was 100% completed in accordance with the agreed
specifications. In another Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, with the same date, the signatories,
namely: Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Gabriel Wanason, petitioner herein, as the
54Mayor’s representative; Municipal Revenue Clerk Anselmo Forayo, petitioner herein, as the
Treasurer’s representative; and Bernardo Acapen (now deceased), as the Engineer’s representative, all
attested that they personally inspected the work done by Leon and found the work in accordance with the
approved program of work. The Government subsequently issued a check for PhP 106,970 as payment for
the project.2 In February 1989, a certain Simon Naigsan wrote to the Regional Office of the Commission
of Audit (COA) and complained about the anomalies in the construction of the road. The COA Regional
Director directed Technical Audit Specialist Engr. Hospicio Angluben to conduct an actual site
inspection. As an offshoot of the affidavit/report and for failure to complete the Banilag-Minoli Road,
provincial officers Engineer Dionisio Padua, Senior Civil Engineer Francisco Tigcangay, and Paracelis
Municipal Treasurer Tomas Pocyao, and project contractor Leon were charged before the Sandiganbayan
in an Information4 dated August 14, 1991, alleging that they conspired with evident bad faith to defraud
the government in 55violation of Section 3(e)5 of Republic Act No. 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information was docketed as Crim. Case No. 17007.

ISSUE: Whether or not corroborative evidence is necessary in the present case?

RULING:

NO. We have reviewed the records and we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the testimony of Angluben
was credible, consistent and categorical in contrast with the testimony of Mangangey, and there is no need
to corroborate Angluben’s testimony. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to
suspect that the witness falsified the truth or that his observations were inaccurate.
PEOPLE v MENDOZA (2005)

FACTS:

The father of the accused is charged with the crime attempted rape against her daughter. Her daughter
testified that she was undressed, kissed, touched in the breast, punched her in the stomach and rape her
unconsciously, and threatened to be kill if somebody would knew what had happened to her. As defense,
her father argued as an alibi, that she always came late, dating several men, and just using him to her
caprice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial made by the accuse can quit him from criminal liability?

RULING:

NO. Denial is essentially the weakest form of defense it can never overcome an affirmative testimony
particularly when it comes from the mouth of the credible witness.