A.

Jurisdiction distinguished from exercise of Jurisdiction

1. ANTONINO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY, G.R. NO. 185663, JUNE 2012

FACTS: Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located at Makati City and
owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under the governing lease contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first refusal in the
event Su would decide to sell the subject property. On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement
where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to who between them would
shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended. On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. RTC
dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of improper venue and nonpayment of the appropriate docket fees. Antonino’s complaint is one
for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the place where any of
the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue. Antonino’s
complaint is one for specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the court of the
place where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila, respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that her complaint is a real action and the location of the subject property is determinative
of its venue. Alternatively, she submitted a certification issued by the Commission on Elections, stating that she is a resident of Makati City. She
then prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order directing the clerk of court to assess the proper docket fees. This was
denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed Antonino’s complaint.

RULING: Petitioner should have filed the case either in Muntinlupa City, where she resides, or in Manila, where private respondent maintains his
residence. Other than filing the complaint in any of these places, petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case.
Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith raised improper venue as an affirmative defense and his stand was sustained by trial
court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case. Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept of lack of
jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of discretion. Petitioner, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, actually concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. In this case where the court refused to
exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue, neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion is available to challenge the assailed order of
dismissal of the trial court.

“Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to
decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all
other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.”

In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antonino’s complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying Antonino’s
cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue.

2. SPOUSES ABRENICA V. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, G.R. NO. 180572, JUNE 18, 2012

FACTS: In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The first was SEC Case
No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery,
Batangas. The second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents
sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in
1997.

The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799,
which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004,
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226, held that:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he received as profits from the sale and resale of the
Lemery property in the amount of P4,524,000.00;

2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount of P4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum
from the time he received the same and converted the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and

3. To pay the costs of suit. Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which
provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court.

Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which provides that decisions in intra-
corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless stayed by an appellate court. On January 7, 2005, respondents filed
an Opposition (To Defendant’s Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC2 prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule
43, which was later on denied by the trial court.

Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently filed with the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUE: WON the lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.
 RULING: The CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the appreciation by the trial court of the
evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lastly, the
CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did not mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the
case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, but they did not do so. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the parties,
what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper
subject of an appeal.

Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected their second attempt at the
annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for Reconsideration.

We DENY petitioners’ claims.

The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may not defy the pronouncement of this
Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment
of judgment was no longer available to them, because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was
dismissed.

It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners themselves when petitioner Erlando (1)
filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the
RTC of the issues still pending before the trial court.

“It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial
of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
play by the rules.”

Navida vs. Dizon etal (Jurisdiction)

FACTS:
 2 petitions, G.R. 125078 & 125598, assailed the perceived lack of jurisdiction of RTC over the matter
 Proceedings before the texas courts:
 Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different texas state courts by citizens of 12 foreign countries, including
the Philippines;
 Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to a chemical used to kill nematodes
while working on farms in 23 foreign countries;
 Respondents want the case be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
 The federal district court granted the motion to dismiss subject to certain conditions;
 Proceedings in the RTC of General Santos City
 336 plaintiffs from GenSan filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of GenSan.
 They prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries suffered from DBCP, claiming that they were exposed to
the said chemical even though the defendants knew it was harmful;
 Defendant filed their motion for bill of particulars
 The RTC dismissed the complaints on the following grounds:
 The activity took outside the Philippines territory, hence, outside Philippine jurisdiction;
 The tort in the complaint, which is “product liability tort” is not the tor category within the purview of Philippine Law
 That Petitioners coerced into submitting their case in the Philippines
 The voluntary appearance of defendants has little significance;
 Petioners violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia
 The case is barred by “litis pendencia” – SINCE THE CASE IS PENDING IN THE US COURTS, THE PRESENT
COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED
 The petitioners filed a Petition for Review
 Proceedings in the RTC of Davao City
 155 plaintiffs from Davao filed a complaint in the RTC of Davao, similar to the complaint of Navida etal (GenSan)
 However, the RTC likewise junked the case for the following reasons:
 That Petitioners would have this court dismiss the case to pave the way for their getting an affirmance by the supreme
court
 It shares the opinion of legal experts, to wit:
 The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since
the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws (Former Justice Secretary Demetria);
 While a class suit is allowed in the Philippines, the device has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify
as a class suit injury within the contemplation of Philippine statute (Retired Supreme Court Justice Sarmiento);
 Absence of doctrine in the Philippines regarding product liability
 Petitioners (Davao) contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code
are broad enough to cover the acts complained of; and that the opinions of the legal experts are bereft of basis;
 Motion to withdraw was filed by Respondents asserting that the Petition for review is moot and academic since they
already entered into an amicable settlement with petitioners
ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether or not the Court is correct in dismissing the petition due to lack of jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the matter?
1. That the acts complained of occurred within the Philippines;
2. That Article 2176 of the Civil Code is broad enough to cover the act;
3. That assumption by the US District Court did not divest jurisdiction of the Philippine courts; and,
4. That the compromise agreement does not justifiably prejudice remaining respondents.
RULING/S:
ISSUE ON JURISDICTION
1. The court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of jurisdiction.
1. The jurisdiction of court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set by defendants. What determines jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
2. None of the parties actually move for the case based on the RTC jurisdiction but more on the prayer for damages.
3. The trial court has clearly jurisdiction over the matter.
1. THE RULE IS SETTLED THAT JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF A CASE IS CONFERRED BY LAW AND IS
DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT. Once
vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other
that the legislature thru enactment of a law.
4. On whether the act occurred in the Philippines, the Court held YES. Thus, civil code article 2176 which provides that “whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done..xxx” is applicable in the case at bar
and therefore, RTC obviously has jurisdiction over the matter.
1. Also, the case at bar is a personal case, not a criminal, hence, lex situs theory is not necessarily applicable.
5. The facts clearly shows that the claim for damages is the cause of action and that the RTC unmistakably has jurisdiction over the matter.
6. Moreover, the RTC of GenSan and Davao validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies.
1. In the case Meat Packing Corp. of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, the court held that “jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
in civil cases is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons..xxx…active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of court’s jurisdiction and
willingness to abide in the resolution of the case”.
2. Jurisdiction is different from “exercise of jurisdiction”. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein.
3. Where a court has jurisdiction over persons of the defendants and the subject matter, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is
the exercise of jurisdiction.

Biaco v. PCRB (Jurisdiction)

Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch
manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank.

As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which the real
estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.

When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written demand,however, proved
futile.

Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental.
Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution
was served on the spouses.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others, that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction
because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed
RTC decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1)
by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A
judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

NOTES:

 An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
 An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person.
  An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements.
 A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be personally served with summons as
provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof in
accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

VELAYO-FONG v. VELAYO (Jurisdiction)

FACTS:

Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, Spouses Velayo
alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses
Velayo-Fong prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fong’s properties found in the Philippines.

However, before the application for the writ can be acted upon by the RTC, Spouses Velayo filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons be
served to Velayo-Fong at her Two Condominium Suites. One at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos Street, T. Towers Condominium,
Makati. Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion.

Then, the Process Server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts to serve the copy of summons and complaints issued at the
given addresses of Velayo-Fong, finally, the Process Server was able to serve personally the summons together with the copy of the complaint upon
Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel, right in the presence of a lobby counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign
in receipt thereof.

Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong, upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents’
complaint because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officer’s Return, no summons was served upon her; that she has valid and
meritorious defenses to refute respondents’ material allegations.

The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order.

Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her as she did not remember having been served with
summons but remembers that a man hurled some papers at her while she was entering the elevator and, not knowing what the papers were all about,
she threw back the papers to the man before the elevator closed; that she has a valid and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of
respondents’ complaint.

She also argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she is a non-resident.

ISSUES:

1. How may service of summons be effected on a non-resident?

RULING:

1. Under Sec. 17, Rule 14, when the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially. This
kind of service of summons applies only where the action is in rem because in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res.

 Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present in the country, and thus, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
 In the present case, Spouses Velayo’s cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages, plus attorney’s fees, be awarded in their
favor affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is an
actionin personam. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
their persons.

NOTES:

 The party seeking to have the order of default lifted must first show that her failure to file an answer or any other responsive pleading was due
to fraud accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and then she must show that she has a valid and meritorious defense.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V JUDGE MANGOTARA, ETC. ET AL

GR NO 170375

FACTS: The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases involving the same parcels
of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case,
G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case, G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505
(execution pending appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals);
and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a
quo until they reached this Court via the present Petitions. In the Resolution[23] dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions
considering that they either originated from the same case or involved similar issues.

Issue: Whether or not RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisidiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and heirship in an action for quieting of title as
said issues should be ventilated and adjudicated only in special proceedings

Jurisdiction vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction

LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo argue that the RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisidiction to resolve the issues of status, filiation, and
heirship in an action for quieting of title as said issues should be ventilated and adjudicated only in special proceedings under Rule 90, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Agapay v. Palang[84] (Agapay case) and Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay
v. Del Rosario[85] (Yaptinchay case). Even on the assumption that the RTC-Branch 3 acquired jurisdiction over their persons, LANDTRADE,
Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo maintain that the RTC-Branch 3 erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction by adjudicating and passing upon the issues on
Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in the Quieting of Title Case. Moreover, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo aver that the resolution
of issues regarding status, filiation, and heirship is not merely a matter of procedure, but of jurisdiction which cannot be waived by the parties or by
the court.

The aforementioned arguments fail to persuade.

In the first place, jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between the two, thus:

Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[86](Emphasis
supplied.)

Here, the RTC-Branch 3 unmistakably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in Civil Case No. 4452.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular
court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature
through the enactment of a law. The power to change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but the
legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.[87]

The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title under the circumstances described in Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Records show that the parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 4452 have a combined assessed value
of P35,398,920.00,[88] undisputedly falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3.

The RTC-Branch 3 also acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo when he filed his Answer to the Complaint of Vidal and AZIMUTH;
and over the juridical personality of LANDTRADE when the said corporation was allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452.

Considering that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 4452, then it
can rule on all issues in the case, including those on Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship, in exercise of its jurisdiction. Any
alleged erroneous finding by the RTC-Branch 3 concerning Vidal’s status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, is
merely an error of judgment subject to the affirmation, modification, or reversal by the appellate court when appealed.

**************

LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452
was already instituted two years later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot tack its adverse possession of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo
considering that there is no proof that the latter, who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely possessed the properties at all.Republic of the
Philippines Vs. Hon. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Iligan City, Lanao
del Norte, and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, and the Philippines National Bank/Land Trade Realty Corporation Vs. National Power
Corporation and National Transmission Corporation (Transco)/National Power Corporation Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (Special Twenty-Third
Division, Cagayan de Oro City) and Land Trade Realty Corporation/National Transmission Corporation Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (Special
 Twenty-Third Division, Cagayan de Oro City) and Land Trade Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 170375/G.R. No. 170505/G.R. Nos. 173355-
56/G.R. No. 173401/G.R. Nos. 173563-64/G.R. No. 178779/G.R. No. 178894.,July 7, 2010

Error of Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Error of Judgment ; Question of Law vis-à-vis Question of Fact

DIPAD vs OLIVAN

FACTS: Due to a collision between the car of petitioner spouses Dipad and the passenger jeep owned by respondents, the former filed a civil action
for damages before the sala of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Clavecilla.`

During trial, Roberto Dipad mentioned in his direct testimony that because he was not able to make use of his vehicle for his buy-and-sell business, he
suffered damages by way of lost income for three months amounting to P40,000. Then, during cross-examination, the defense required him to produce
his personal copy of his ITRs for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.

Dipad vehemently objected on the ground of confidentiality of the ITRs citing Section 71 of the National Internal Revenue Code, which reads:

Section 71. Disposition of Income Tax Returns, Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and Filers — After the assessment shall have been made, as
provided in this Title, the returns, together with any corrections thereof which may have been made by the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office
of the Commissioner and shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as such upon the order of the President of the Philippines, under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner.

Furthermore, in contrast to the interpretation by petitioners of the commentary that ITRs cannot be divulged, their very reference characterizes Section
71 as an exception to the rule on the unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.

In its 6 May 2005 Decision, the RTC dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for being an inappropriate remedy. According to the trial court, the errors
committed by (MTC) Judge Clavecilla were, if at all, mere errors of judgment correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but by ordinary
appeal.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC.

ISSUE: W or N the RTC committed reversible error in dismissing their Rule 65 Petition as an improper appeal, since grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction was committed by MTC Judge Clavecilla when he required the production of their ITRs.

HELD: The appeal is lacking in merit.

Upon perusal of the reference, we find that petitioners inaccurately quoted the commentary. The provision prohibits employees of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) from divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. Section 270 obviously does not address the confidentiality of ITRs.

Exceptions or acts which do not constitute unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.

a) Section 71 of the Tax Code makes income tax returns public records and opens them to inspection upon order of the President of the Philippines.

The Court then reminds the counsels of their duty of candor, fairness and good faith when they face the court. Canon 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility instructs that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper;

The court stress that it is basic in our jurisdiction that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a mode of appeal. The remedy, which is narrow in
scope, only corrects errors of jurisdiction. Thus, if the issue involves an error of judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition,
and not by a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On the contrary, errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or
mistakes in the court’s findings based on a mistake of law or of fact.

The only error petitioners raise refers to Judge Clavecilla’s mistake of not applying Section 71, which allegedly prohibits the production of ITRs
because of confidentiality.

The RTC did not grievously err in dismissing the Rule 65 Petition as an improper appeal. This ruling is only in keeping with the proper conduct of
before the courts and the prompt administration of justice at every level of the judicial hierarchy.

Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action No. RTC 2005-0032 is AFFIRMED.

UCPB VS LUMBO

FACTS:
  The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. To secure the performance of their obligation, they
constituted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklan and all the improvements thereon that they owned and
operated as a beach resort known as Titay’s South Beach Resort.

 Upon their failure to settle the obligation, UCPB applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest
bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale. The certificate of sale was issued on the same day, and UCPB registered the sale in its name. The title
over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period.

 Respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the
consolidation of title, and damages (Civil Case No. 5920).

 During the pendency of Civil Case, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the
property. RTC granted the ex parte petition of UCPB, and issued the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to
place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of possession was served on the respondents with a demand for them to
peacefully vacate on or before January 31, 2002. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB, they were allowed to
temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons.

 Respondents filed in the RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the
foreclosure sale. They included an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent the
implementation of the writ of possession.

 On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the
denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA.

 CA ruled by granting respondent’s petition and enjoining the RTC’s implementation of the writ of possession.

 However, records show that the petitioners have the legal course to file a petition for the cancellation of the writ of possession bases on
cited legal grounds that the mortgage was not violated or that the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions of the law.

 Moreover, the respondent judge erred in declaring that he could not act on the application for injunctive relief because the writ was issued
by another court of coordinate jurisdiction. The petition was filed before the same branch of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan but was re-raffled to
another branch and later on consolidated before the branch of the respondent judge where the action for the annulment of the foreclosure
sale is pending. Thus, the case, which incidentally is a mere continuation of the de-parte proceeding before the same court though not before
the same branch

ISSUE: WON the CA grossly erred in granting the respondents’ petition for certiorari and/ or mandamus, and in enjoining the RTC from
implementing the writ of possession in favor of UCPB.

HELD:

 YES. Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents’ application for injunction to prevent the
implementation of the writ of possession, its error related only to the correct application of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the
application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an
error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and such error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.

 Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over both Civil Case and Special Proceedings, it should follow that its
consideration and resolution of the respondents’ application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings were taken in the exercise of
that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point unquestionably entitled to the full
implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that it capriciously or whimsically denied the
respondents’ application, its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

AGG TRUCKING VS YUAG

FACTS:

 Petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid had employed respondent Melanio Yuag as a driver since 28 February 2002.His clients were Busco Sugar
Milling Co., Inc., operating in Quezon, Bukidnon; and Coca-cola Bottlers Company in Davao City and Cagayan de Oro City.

 Petitioner noticed that respondent had started incurring substantial shortages. It was also reported that he had illegally sold bags of sugar
along the way at a lower price, and that he was banned from entering the premises of the Busco Sugar Mill. Petitioner asked for an
explanation from respondent who remained quiet.

 Alarmed at the delivery shortages, petitioner took it upon himself to monitor all his drivers, including respondent, by instructing them to
report to him their location from time to time through their mobile phones.He also required them to make their delivery trips in convoy, in
order to avoid illegal sale of cargo along the way.

 Respondent, along with 20 other drivers, was tasked to deliver bags of sugar from Cagayan de Oro City to Coca-Cola Bottlers Plant in
Davao City. All drivers, with the exception of Yuag who could not be reached through his cellphone, reported their location as instructed.
The Coca-Cola Plant in Davao later reported that the delivery had a suspiciously enormous shortage.
  When confronted about the shortage and his failure to report his location, respondent did not respond to petitioner. Thereafter he was
instructed to "just take a rest" which respondent construed as a constructive dismissal. After respondent demanded that his separation be
made in writing, petitioner insisted that respondent return the next day and take a rest. Respondent however, went to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal and asked for his separation pay and 13th month pay; alleging that he was dismissed based on his non-returned call.

 The Labor Arbiter however, sustained the dismissal for lack of substantial proof to sustain the allegation of illegal dismissal and that parties
were under an employer-employee relationship. Upon appeal with the NLRC, the LA decision was reversed because respondent was
deemed to be under preventive suspension without pay. A motion for reconsideration was made but was denied for being filed out of the
reglamentary period.

 On appeal through certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the court ruled on the existence of an employer-employee relationship and reversed
the NLRC decision by reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision instead with modification to the award for damages.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN REVERSING THE NLRC DECISION WITHOUT ANY FINDING
OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

HELD:

 A writ of certiorari is a remedy to correct errors of jurisdiction, for which reason it must clearly show that the public respondent has no
jurisdiction to issue an order or to render a decision. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court has instituted the petition for certiorari to correct acts of
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This remedy serves as a check on acts, either of excess or passivity, that constitute grave abuse of discretion of a judicial or
quasi-judicial function

 Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.

 The raison detre for the rule is that when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a situation, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari

 Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and on what
these acts were.In this case, the CA seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a petition for certiorari was to determine whether
there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.The CA proceeded to
review the records and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.The pivotal issue before the NLRC was whether petitioners telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a break, was
already a positive act of dismissing him.

 Furthermore, the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision had nothing in it that was whimsical, unreasonable or patentlyviolative of
the law.It was the CA which erred in finding faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.

 In addition to this, the CA erroneously modified the NLRC decision when it can no longer be modified for being filed out of time. It is not a
mere technicality that the CA may brush aside. The NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had become final and executory 25 days before
respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.Thus, subsequent proceedings and modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and
void.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of ROC, praying that the Decision of the Sandiganbayan acquitting private respondents of the charge
of Violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 be nullified and set aside.

 ABELARDO PANLAQUI, Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, RENATO B. VELASCO and ANGELITO PELAYO, Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator and the Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Sasmuan, Pampanga, VICTORINO MANINANG
being then the Barangay Captain of Malusac, Sasmuan, Pampanga, and hence all public officers, while in the performance of their official
functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one
another and with WILFREDO CUNANAN, the representative of J.S. Lim Construction, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and with evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government and grant unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the following
manner: accused ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, without being authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a
Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN, whereby the municipality
leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a
period of thirty (30) days, which equipment items were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto and Pakulayo
Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga; thereafter accused caused it to appear that work on the said project had been accomplished and 100%
completed per the approved Program of Work and Specifications and turned over to Barangay Malusac; as a result of the issuance of the
Accomplishment Report and Certificate of Project Completion and Turn-Over, payments of P511,612.20 and P616,314.60 were made to
and received by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the fact that no work had actually been done on the Palto and Pakulayo
Rivers considering that J.S. Lim Construction had no barge or any kind of vessel registered with the First Coast Guard District and that no
 business license/permit had been granted to the said company by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Guagua, Pampanga, which acts of the
accused caused undue injury to the Government and granted unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the total amount of ONE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY- SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX AND 80/100 PESOS (P1,127,926.80),
Philippine Currency.

 Respondents were duly arraigned and pleading not guilty to the charge against them. Trial on the merits ensued, both prosecution and
defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their documentary exhibits.

 SB rendered decision : Acquittal of the accues

 Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the People, represented by OMB through the OSP.

ISSUE:

WON THE COURT A QUO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (PD) NO. 1594

HELD:

No. It is fitting to reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. Tria-Tirona,[6] to wit:

 x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of
due process.

 x x x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.[7]

 It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is
extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error
of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial
court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not
for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a
quo.

 The foregoing is essentially an issue involving an alleged error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner has not convincingly
shown that the prosecution has indeed been deprived of due process of law. There is no showing that the trial court hampered the
prosecution's presentation of evidence in any way. On the contrary, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to present its ten witnesses
and all necessary documentary evidence. The case was only submitted for decision after the parties had duly rested their case. Respondent
trial court clearly stated in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its conclusion that the project was actually undertaken, justifying
payment to the contractor.Clearly, petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial resulting in denial of due process.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II

FACTS:

 Dominador Ong Treasurer of the Sun Ray Metal, Inc., was charged for violation of PD No. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) and by defrauding the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
 The prosecution showed that Sun Ray Metal, Inc. purchased brass metals and aluminum wires separately through 2 letters of credit issued
by the petitioner bank in favor of the supplier of the raw materials. To secure the obligation by Sun Ray Metal, Inc. to the petitioner bank,
the private respondent, in his capacity as treasurer of Sun Ray Metal, Inc., executed two (2) trust receipts in favor of the petitioner bank. He
likewise personally bound himself, jointly and severally with Sun Ray Metal, Inc., to petitioner bank in connection therewith. However,
despite repeated demands, the private respondent failed to pay the petitioner bank the proceeds of the sale of the raw materials or to turn
over the said materials in case of his failure to sell the same.
 The public respondent ratiocinated that the private respondent was not duly authorized to represent Sun Ray Metal, Inc. considering that
there were other high-ranking officers who could have negotiated the contract; that there was no written authority from the board of
directors of the said corporation authorizing the private respondent to execute the trust receipts in its behalf in favor of petitioner
bank. Moreover, the defense sufficiently proved that the restructuring agreement effectively novated the obligation under the trust receipts.

ISSUE:

WON the public respondent judge gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter acquitted the
private respondent.

HELD:

The petition is not meritorious.

  We have thoroughly perused the records and carefully analyzed the cases relied upon by the petitioner and found no cogent reason to depart
from the judgment of the public respondent in the case at bar.
 In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is no indication or proof
that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of the trial court’s decision of acquittal will put the private respondent in
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. Consequently in such an event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.[
 The fairly recent case of Palu-ay v. Court of Appeals is instructive, to wit:

In the case at bar, a hearing was held during which the prosecution and the defense were heard on their evidence. Thereafter, judgment was
rendered on the basis of the evidence presented. Consequently, any error made by the trial court in the appreciation of the evidence was only
an error of judgment but not of jurisdiction so as to render the judgment void.

Indeed, the question raised by the petition for annulment of judgment is a factual question that cannot be reviewed not only because the
decision of the trial court is now final but also because a review of such question at the instance of the prosecution would violate the right of
the accused against being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.

Petitioner also contends that its petition for certiorari does not put the private respondent in double jeopardy since the petition only seeks the
nullification of the judgment of the public respondent and does not in any way place the private accused on trial again. The defense of
double jeopardy, according to the petitioner, is therefore premature in these proceedings.

 The record shows that the court a quo allowed both parties an exhaustive presentation and offer of evidence and submission of their
respective memoranda. If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as argued by the petitioner in this petition, such
are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari proceeding. If at all, such alleged error by the public
respondent was merely an error of judgment, but not an error of jurisdiction.
 In this case, petitioner’s action does not concern the civil aspect of the case but the validity of the judgment itself. Indeed, petitioner does
not actually question the award of damages. What he contends is that the trial court decided the case outside the issues made out by the
pleadings and thereby deprived the prosecution of due process.

PEOPLE vs. ASIS

(1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the
appellate level.
(2) While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
(3) An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of
judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion.

 Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between him and the three offended parties Montes, Calvez,
and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
 Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder and one count of frustrated murder
 The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait,
when it found no treachery and evident premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was
acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes.
 The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision of acquitting Abordo in one case, only holding him liable
for Serious Physical Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two other cases.
 The CA dismissed the petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that as the State was
questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal.
 It said thus:
a. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy.
b. Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In filing the petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double
jeopardy.
c. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the Constitution, the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.
d. The petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but
also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari..

HELD:

Yes.

Certiorari is the proper remedy

  A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the
appellate level.
 Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct
in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court.

Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine

 In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule,
however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused
in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
 In People v Louel Uy, the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing by the petitioner that the
lower court in acquitting the accused:

(1) Committed reversible errors of judgment

(2) Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or denial of due process.

 Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void.

No double jeopardy

 When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.

OSG’s petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of merit

 While the CA was erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSG’s petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of merit.
 While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. A
reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process.
 Also, what the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo’s constitutionally
guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court’s evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

Error of Judgment v Error of Jurisdiction

 Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
 An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on
the said findings and its conclusions of law

LIGOT VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive
four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing
the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution."

When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in
Philconsa v. Mathay:

"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the
1935 Constitution..” Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by
Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.

On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by
former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his
retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-General’s adverse decision to Singson’s claim On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco
denied Ligot’s request for reconsideration.
Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the salary for members
of Congess “as provided by law” was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the member of Congress

HELD: The petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is
whether or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity
to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which
they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.

Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.”

SALIBI VS COMELEC

FACTS: a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul the Resolutions dated
26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections

- When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months

- It’s undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family

were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

- Private respondent filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacyand to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the COMELEC

- private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-
year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code

- both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument

- the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in
Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010
local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the
said position

- the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior
notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him

- petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for
the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case

- the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that “all resolutions be delivered to
the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation” in view of “the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of
material time.”

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.

HELD: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto
have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an
error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty

3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue
is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.

4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of
the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be finaland non-reviewable.

5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to
the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 159288 October 19, 2004
JOHNSON LEE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and NEUGENE MARKETING, INC., respondents.

Facts:

NEUGENE Marketing, Inc. (NMI) was incorporated in 1978 with funds provided by the Uy Family. One of the original incorporators, Eugenio
Flores, Jr. assigned/divested himself of his shares in favor of Sonny Moreno, 1,050 shares; Arsenio Yang, Jr., 700 shares and Charles O. Sy, 700
shares.
In 1987, the NMI sold and delivered to the Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMCI), in Victorias, Negros Occidental, 77,500 pieces of empty white
bags for the price of 565,750.00. NMI issued Charge Invoice No. 0809 dated June 11, 1987 to VMCI covering said sale. VMCI again purchased
100,000 pieces of empty white bags from NMI for 730,000.00 for which NMI issued Charge Invoice No. 0810. In payment of said purchases from
NMI, VMCI drew and issued two Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Checks: Check No. 068706 dated August 3, 1987 in the amount of 565,750.00
and Check No. 068993 dated August 19, 1987 in the amount of 934,400.00. Both checks were payable to the order of NMI.

On March 22, 1988, Johnson Lee, Sonny Moreno, Leoncio Tan and Nicanor Martin filed a petition with the Securities and Investigation Clearing
Department (SICD) of the Commission praying, among other things, for the annulment or nullification of the Certification of Filing of Resolution of
Voluntary Dissolution of NMI for being contrary to law and its by-laws.
In the meantime, the trustee wrote the petitioner, Johnson Lee, being the president of the company, on March 8, 1988 requesting him to turn over to it
the P1,500,150.00 he received in payment of the empty bags sold by NMI to VCMI. However, he failed to do so.

Due to nonpayment, a verified complaint for three (3) counts of estafa was filed against the petitioner and Sonny Moreno with the City Prosecutor’s
Office. Appended to the complaint were photocopies of Charge Invoices, issued by NMI to VMCI.

To prove the loss due to destruction of the original copies of the charge invoices and checks, as well as the authenticity and due execution thereof, the
prosecution presented Ban Hua Flores, who testified that she saw the two checks in the office of the petitioner at the Singson Building, Plaza Moraga,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sometime in 1987, she went to the office of the VMCI and inquired if it still had copies of the two checks and the clerk thereat
informed her that it would be difficult to locate the checks as they were stored in the bodega, where many other checks were kept. Flores also testified
that the signatures at the dorsal portion of the checks were those of the petitioner, the President of NMI, with whom she had been working, and that he
indorsed and deposited the same on September 4, 1987 with the Solidbank, instead of the BPI Plaza Cervantes branch in Manila, the official
depository bank of NMI. According to Flores, she was able to secure microfilm copies of the checks from Solidbank, and was sure that the copies of
the checks and invoices were faithful reproductions of the original copies thereof.

Testifying for the prosecution in obedience to a subpoena issued by the court, Merlita Bayaban, Manager for Corporate Affairs of VMCI, declared that
the records section of VMCI, which had custody of all checks and other corporate records, was near her office. She testified that the checks, including
their other records, were lost during the flood in 1985. She also testified on the Certification issued by Carolina Diaz, the Comptroller of VMCI,
confirming the loss of the two checks. She, however, admitted that she did not see the original copies of the checks and that she was not a signatory
thereto.

The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, claiming that the prosecution failed to prove
the authenticity and due execution of the offered documents, a prerequisite to the admission thereof as secondary evidence. They also filed a Motion
for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court denied both motions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in admitting in evidence the
photocopies of the checks and charge invoices in lieu of the original copies thereof.

Held:

For a petition for certiorari or prohibition to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate, plainly and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right
to a writ.23 The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate24 and that (a)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The trial court acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent,
being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.26 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.27 A petition for certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari.
These two remedies are mutually exclusive.28

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will
and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the
appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Certiorari will
issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. 29 An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.30 Certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors made by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of law thereon.31 As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount
to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved. 32

RTC had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the public respondent against the petitioner for estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the photocopies of
the charge invoices and checks was issued by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if erroneous, the same is a mere error of judgment and
not of jurisdiction. Additionally, the admission of secondary evidence in lieu of the original copies predicated on proof of the offeror of the
conditions sine qua non to the admission of the said evidence is a factual issue addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 33 Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown to have been committed by the trial court, the resolution of the trial court
admitting secondary evidence must be sustained. The remedy of the petitioner, after the admission of the photocopies of the charge invoices and the
checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the decision to the appropriate appellate court. Moreover, under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, only questions of law may be properly raised.

Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An
interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of
allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before this Court only allows questions of law.

WILLY TAN y CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 148194: April 12, 2002

FACTS: Willy Tan was found guilty of bigamy by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal. He was sentenced to suffer a
prison term of prision correccional in its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2)
months.Petitioner applied for probation. The application was granted by the trial court but the release order was withheld in view of the filing by the
prosecution, a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code was prision mayor and the imposable penalty, absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be the medium period of prision
mayor, or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the prosecution argued, petitioner was not eligible for probation. Judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused Willy Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt thus, petitioner filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not:

i. the court of appeals gravely erred in applying section 2, rule 50 on dismissal of improper appeal to the court of appeals as the said
section refers to an appeal under rule 41 in ordinary civil action but not to an appeal in criminal cases which is governed by rule 122
of the revised rules on criminal procedure.
ii. the court of appeals erred in holding that the supreme court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction on pure questions of law.
iii. the court of appeals gravely erred in holding that because the appeal raised pure questions of law, it is without jurisdiction to resolve
the issue raised in the appeal.
iv. the court of appeals gravely erred in dismissing the appeal outright instead of declaring the amended decision void for utter want of
jurisdiction.
v. the court of appeals erred in holding that rule 65 is the proper remedy to raise the issue of jurisdiction and if so in not treating the
appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.[3]
The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998, three days after the questioned decision was promulgated.[6] It was a remedy
that the law allowed him to avail himself of, and it threw the whole case effectively open for review on both questions of law and of fact whether or
not raised by the parties.
Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power to hear cases on appeal in which
only an error of law is involved.[7] Indeed, the Court of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is authorized to determine
errors of fact, of law, or both.[8]These rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases,[9] and they do not thereby divest the Supreme
Court of its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions.

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final
or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal,
or has applied for probation-implements a substantive provision of the Probation Law which enunciates that the mere filing of an application for
probation forecloses the right to appeal.

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best: Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the
trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision and writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment.[13] There is
no principle better settled, or of more universal application, than that no court can reverse or annul, reconsider or amend, its own final decree or
judgment.[14] Any attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the same, except in respect to correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course.

People vs. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005

Facts:

Chief Inspector Muyot was charged with Violation of of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
after 489 grams of shabu was found on his house by virtue of a search warrant. Muyot pleaded not guilty to the crime charged during the
arraignment. After trial on the merits, Judge Tria-Tirona rendered a decision acquitting Muyot on ground of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner appealed, contending that Judge Tria-Tirona, in acquitting Muyot, committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and
evidence on record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable conclusion of the latter's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
prays for the nullification and the setting aside of the decision acquitting Muyot claiming that Judge Tria-Tirona abused her discretion in
disregarding the testimonies of the NBI agents on the discovery of the illegal drugs.

Issues:

1. Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits without violating the constitutional precept against
double jeopardy?

2. Should the judgment of conviction be set aside?

Held:

1. No. An acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of
Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be
had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because
the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process.

There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to
be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the accuseds right against double jeopardy.

2. The petition smacks in the heart of the lower courts appreciation of the evidence of the parties. It is apparent from the decision of public
respondent that she considered all the evidence adduced by the parties. Even assuming arguendo that public respondent may have improperly
assessed the evidence on hand, what is certain is that the decision was arrived at only after all the evidence was considered, weighed and passed
upon. In such a case, any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An
error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no
error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of the evidence, certiorari will not lie.

Jurisdiction conferred by law not by the parties nor by their agreement or consent

Jurisdiction over the nature of the case

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos v. Nisperos-Ducusin

Facts:

The land which is the subject of the instant case is part of the 58,350-sq.m. agricultural land in Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union
acquired by Santiago Nisperos, the predecessor of petitioners, during his lifetime. He declared said property for taxation purposes starting December
1947. Santiago and his wife Estefania died and were survived by their nine children: Tranquilino, Felix, Olling, Maria, Lenardo, Millan, Fausto,
Candido and Cipriana. The heirs of Santiago, petitioners herein, claim that the subject property was occupied, controlled and tilled by all nine children
of Santiago. They paid taxes for it and even hired farm workers under Maria and Cipriana’s supervision for the cultivation of the same. It was
eventually declared under the names of Maria and Cipriana for taxation purposes.
During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria took respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their cousin
Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own child.On February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting as representatives of their other siblings,
executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa8 in favor of petitioners over the 58,350-square-meter property and another 46,000-square-meter property.
On April 28, 1992, a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer9 (VLT) over the subject property was executed between Maria and Cipriana as landowners,
and respondent, who was then only 17 years old, as farmer-beneficiary. The instrument was signed by the three in the presence of witnesses Anita,
Lucia and Marcelina Gascon and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Susimo Asuncion. The same was notarized by Notary Public Atty. Roberto E.
Caoayan. On June 24, 1992, Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 0002122453902 10 was issued to respondent by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) over the subject property. By virtue of said CLOA, OCT No. CLOA-62311 was issued to respondent a month later, or on July
24, 1992.

Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which petitioners claim to have discovered only in August 2001, petitioners filed a complaint on September
6, 2001 with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La Union. Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and
respondent was reached prompting the MARO to issue a Certificate to File Action. 12

On January 23, 2002, petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for annulment of documents and damages against respondent.

On March 6, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss14 petitioners’ complaint. The DARAB Regional Adjudicator denied respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss and ordered her to file her answer to the complaint.

In respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim16 dated July 7, 2002, respondent alleged that Maria and Cipriana acquired the property from Santiago and
possessed the same openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly; thus, the consent of petitioners is not necessary to the VLT. She denied the
allegations of fraud and falsification, and insisted that she is a bona fide beneficiary as she has been tilling the land with her parents even before 1992.
She added that her minority does not disqualify her from availing the benefits of agrarian reform.

On October 16, 2002, DARAB Regional Adjudicator Rodolfo A. Caddarao annulled the VLT and OCT/CLOA in respondent’s name.

Then respondent contested the Regional Adjudicator’s decision before the DARAB which the latter reversed, holding the validity of the VLT and
respondent’s title.

So petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review which the latter dismissed, upholding the DARAB decision. Hence, petitioners
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

Issue: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the nature of the case at bar?

Ruling:

No. DARAB has no jurisdiction over the nature of the case at bar.

The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB.

Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the complaint by petitioners in 2001, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to
cases involving the following:

xxxx

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs)
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;

xxxx

However, it is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority for the DARAB
to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.23

Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements" and includes "any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee."

Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental,24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction
over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 25

In the instant case, petitioners, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in their complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between
them and respondent. In fact, in their complaint, they described respondent as a "ward" of one of the co-owners, Maria, who is "not a bona fide
beneficiary, she being not engaged in farming because she was still a minor" at the time the VLT was executed. 26
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a
petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner
or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.27

Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by petitioners. As held in Heirs of Julian dela
Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz:

The Court agrees with the petitioners’ contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction
over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR
Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian
reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the
DARAB.28 (Emphasis supplied.)

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012

RA 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The fund was to be sourced from the P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of
copra. Of the P0.55 levy of which copra seller was issued COCOFUND receipts, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the Phil. Coconut Producers
Federation (COCOFED), the national association of coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) as having the largest
membership.

It would appear that FUB was the bank of choice which the Pedro Cojuangco group had control of. The PCA bought the 72.2% of FUB’s outstanding
capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27,573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was
deposited to the UCPB interest free. Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA were given their corresponding UCPB stock
certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their
UCPB shares to private individuals. After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1, which created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gottenwealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies.
PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan.

Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the PCA used public funds x x x in the total amount of P150 million,
to purchase the FUB shares amounting to 72.2% of the authorized capital stock of the FUB, although the PCA was later reimbursed from the coconut
levy funds and that the PCA subscription in the increased capitalization of the FUB, which was later renamed the x x x (UCPB), came from the said
coconut levy funds x x x.

Pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement, out of the 72.2% shares of the authorized and the increased capital stock of the FUB (later UCPB), entirely
paid for by PCA, 64.98% of the shares were placed in the name of the "PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers" and 7,22% were given to
defendant Cojuangco. The remaining 27.8% shares of stock in the FUB which later became the UCPB were not covered by the two (2) agreements
referred to in item no. 6, par. (a) and (b) above. "There were shares forming part of the aforementioned 64.98% which were later sold or transferred to
non-coconut farmers.

Regarding the questioned transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB
shares" which cost the PCA more than Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we declare, that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB shares to
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable consideration, and therefore null and void

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil Case No. 0033-A, an "ill-gotten wealth" case brought under EO Nos. 1 and 2, to declare
the Cojuangco UCPB shares acquired by virtue of the Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement and/or the PCA Agreement null and void because "not
supported by valuable consideration".

Ruling:

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints, including the shares allegedly acquired
by Cojuangco by virtue of the PCA agreements.

The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints has peremptorily been put to rest by the Court in its January
24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic. There, the Court, citing Regalado 27 and settled jurisprudence, stressed the following interlocking
precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a
suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor will
be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.

The Republic’s material averments in its complaint subdivided in CC No. 0033-A included the following:

CC No. 0033-A
12. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. served as a public officer during the Marcos administration. During the period of his incumbency as a
public officer, he acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property.

13. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his association, influence, connection, and acting in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, embarked upon devices, schemes and
stratagems, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as when he –

a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of Defendants x x x Maria Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua etc., the
purchase by . . . (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the x x x (FUB) which was subsequently converted into a universal
bank named x x x (UCPB) through the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) being initially in the amount of
P85,773,100.00 in a manner contrary to law and to the specific purposes for which said coconut levy funds were imposed and collected
under P.D. 276, and with sinister designs and under anomalous circumstances, to wit:

(i) Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds as a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds with
which to exercise his private option to buy the controlling interest in FUB; thus, claiming that the 72.2% of the outstanding
capital stock of FUB could only be purchased and transferred through the exercise of his "personal and exclusive action option to
acquire the 144,000 shares" of the bank, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA, x x x executed on May 26, 1975 a
purchase agreement which provides, among others, for the payment to him in fully paid shares as compensation thereof 95,384
shares worth P1,444,000.00 with the further condition that he shall manage and control the bank as Director and President for a
term of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years and to designate three (3) persons of his choice who shall be elected as
members of the Board of Directors of the Bank;

(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his own
private and commercial interests, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of
PD 755 (a) declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and fiduciary and trust funds and do not form
part of the general funds of the National Government, conveniently repealing for that purpose a series of previous decrees, PDs
276 and 414, establishing the character of the coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary, trust and governmental funds; (b)
confirming the agreement between Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA on the purchase of FUB by incorporating by
reference said private commercial agreement in PD 755;

(iii)To further consolidate his hold on UCPB, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. imposed as consideration and conditions for the
purchase that (a) he gets one out of every nine shares given to PCA, and (b) he gets to manage and control UCPB as president for
a term of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years;

(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal with and make use of the coconut levy funds x x x Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance
by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an unconstitutional decree (PD 1468) requiring the deposit of all coconut levy funds with
UCPB, interest free to the prejudice of the government.

(v) In gross violation of their fiduciary positions and in contravention of the goal to create a bank for the coconut farmers of the
country, the capital stock of UCPB as of February 25, 1986 was actually held by the defendants, their lawyers, factotum and
business associates, thereby finally gaining control of the UCPB by misusing the names and identities of the so-called "more than
one million coconut farmers."

14. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position
and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, and unjust enrichment, violation of
the constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.28

In no uncertain terms, the Court has upheld the Sandiganbayan’s assumption of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and
0033-F.29 The Court wrote:

Judging from the allegations of the defendants’ illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that both CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the
context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of sequestered shares, property or
business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees
and acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of
government funds or property. Recovery of these assets––determined as shall hereinafter be discussed as prima facie ill-gotten––falls within the
unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and E.O. No. 14, Series of 1986, vests the Sandiganbayan with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil
and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Correlatively, the PCGG Rules and Regulations defines
the term "Ill-Gotten Wealth" as "any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of E.O. Nos. 1 and 2,
acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or
similar schemes":

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

(2) x x x x
 (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation in any
business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance,
promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and

(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for personal gain or benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2(a) of E.O. No. 1 charged the PCGG with the task of assisting the President in "The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
… President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates … including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." Complementing the aforesaid Section 2(a) is Section 1 of
E.O. No. 2 decreeing the freezing of all assets "in which the Marcoses their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees have any interest or participation."

BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES

G.R. No. 165922

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938),
or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives from the payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to
the Philippine Government or where such action is brought to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

In 2004, Baguio Market Vendors MPC, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City a petition to extrajudicially
foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, which subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938,
petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Baguio Market Vendors MPC’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article
62(6) of RA 6938.

2. Whether or not Section 22, Rule 141 prevails over Article 62(6) of RA 6938

Ruling:

1. No. The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1)
actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of cooperatives. Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal
fees in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.

2. Yes. (1) The power to impose judicial fees is eminently judicial (rule of procedure) and (2) the 1987 Constitution insulated the Courts rule-
making powers from Congress interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution the provision in the 1973 Constitution allowing Congress
to alter judicial rules.

How Jurisdiction is determined

Bases conversion development authority v. Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga

Pursuant to the national policy of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into alternative productive uses for the promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon and the entire country in
general,[6] the BCDA was created. EO 80 was issued, authorizing the establishment of the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) to act as the
operating and implementing arm of the BCDA with regard to the management of the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 163, creating and designating the areas covered by the CSEZ as those consisting of the Clark military reservations, including the
Clark Air Base proper and portions of the Clark reverted baselands, and excluding the areas covered by previous Presidential Proclamations, the areas
turned over to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and the areas in the reverted baselands for military use.[12] Under Section 2 of
Proclamation No. 163, these lands were transferred to the BCDA, which shall determine how to utilize and dispose of such lands. The CSEZ
Technical Research Committee discovered that titles over parcels of land within the CSEZ, which had just been transferred to the BCDA, had already
been issued in the names of private individuals. BCDA filed separate Complaints for Cancellation of Title against the private respondents, the PARO,
and the Register of Deeds of Angeles City, Pampanga. BCDA alleged that since the properties (subject properties) were outside those allocated to
DAR, and were already titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines then transferred to the BCDA, they could not be the subject of an award
by the PARO. The BCDA added that the subject properties, which had already been transferred to it, were reserved by the Philippine government as
part of the Clark military reservations in accordance with the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of
America. The respondents argued that since the subject properties, which were part of the landholdings of the National Housing Authority, were
awarded to the private respondents as the bona fide and de jure farmer-beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, jurisdiction over the cancellation of their titles fall under the DAR through its Adjudication Board known as the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Issue: WHETHER or not THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE AS RULED BY THE HON. RTC JUDGE PHILBERT ITURALDE, OR THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.[35]

Ruling: This case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes (controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements), cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program .

This Court agrees with the BCDA for this case to fall within the ambit of DARABs jurisdiction, the issue must be one that involves an agrarian
dispute, which is not attendant in the instant case.

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. [42] The BCDAs complaints did not contain any allegation that
would, even in the slightest, imply that the issue to be resolved in this case involved an agrarian dispute. In the action filed by the BCDA, the issue to
be resolved was who between the BCDA and the private respondents and their purported predecessors-in-interest, have a valid title over the subject
properties in light of the relevant facts and applicable laws. The case thus involves a controversy relating to the ownership of the subject properties,
which is beyond the scope of the phrase agrarian dispute.

The RTC, therefore, gravely erred when it dismissed the complaints on the grounds that they were prematurely filed. The action filed by the BCDA
was cognizable by regular courts.

Republic of the Philippines v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

On January 30, 2007, petitioner Republic filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 62-M-2007 before the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, for
cancellation of titles and reversion against respondent RCAM and several others. 6 The complaint alleged, inter alia, that RCAM appears as the
registered owner of eight (8) parcels of land, Lot Nos. 43 to 50, with a total area of 39,790 square meters, situated in Panghulo, Obando, Bulacan
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 588 supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on November 7, 1917. OCT No. 588
allegedly emanated from Decree No. 57486 issued on October 30, 1917 by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office pursuant to a decision
dated September 21, 1915 in Land Registration Case No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9269 in favor of RCAM.A reading, however, of the said decision
reveals that it only refers to Lot Nos. 495, 496, 497, 498 and 638 and not to Lot Nos. 43 to 50.In 1934, RCAM sold the said eight (8) parcels of land to
the other named defendants in the complaint resulting in the cancellation of OCT No.588 and issuance of transfer certificates of title in the names of
the corresponding transferees. Subsequently, the Lands Management Bureau conducted an investigation and ascertained that the subject lots are
identical to Lot No. 2077, Cad-302-D and Lot Nos. 1293, 1306 and 1320, Cad-302-D with a total area of 22,703 square meters. These parcels of land
were certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 17, 1983 as falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and it was only
on May 8, 1984 that they were declared alienable and disposable per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1776, with no public land application/ land
patent.7

Republic received a copy of a motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention filed by the Samahang Kabuhayang San Lorenzo
KKK, Inc. (KKK),8 occupants of the subject property, which was subsequently granted by the RTC. RCAM filed a motion to dismiss assailing the
jurisdiction10 of the RTC over the complaint. It alleged that the action for reversion of title was essentially one for annulment of judgment of the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan, acting as a Land Registration Court, 11 hence, beyond the competence of the RTC to act upon.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action filed by the Republic.

Ruling: The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC 22 acting as a Land
Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein"23 and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00,24 fall under the jurisdiction of
the RTC.25Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the RTC in denying RCAM’s motion to
dismiss.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.

The denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.16 However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.17 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.18 The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.19
COMELEC V. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 171208
September 7, 2007

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts:

On or about July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, in the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of RTC, Ma. Leonisa Genovia, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully, cast her vote in substitution of another person
by misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia and voted in substitution of said Emely Genovia in Caloocan City. Under Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code, violator of any election offense shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not
be subject to probation. Caloocan RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, it citing Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) reading that except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial courts dismissal order
contending that dismissal order is contrary to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code that the regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code.

Yes. As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides, regional trial courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote.

In fine, while BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts jurisdiction over criminal cases
carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less than one year but not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, any
criminal action or proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein mentioned two cases, falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of respondent Judge Thelma Canlas Trinided-Pe Aguirre, in Criminal Case No. C-
73774 are SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is DIRECTED to reinstate the case to the court docket and to conduct appropriate proceedings thereon with
reasonable dispatch.

LLAMAS v. CA

G.R. No. 149588 , AUG. 16, 2010

NACHURA, J.

FACTS.

Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas were convicted of “other forms of swindling”. Petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the court
after they have been convicted, and moved that the proceedings be annulled.On August 16, 1984, petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati
with the crime of "other forms of swindling" penalized by Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)Francisco R. Llamas and
Carmelita C. Llamas sold their property in Paranaque to Conrado P. Avila, representing it tobe free from all liens and encumbrances while it was
leased to the Rural Bank of Imus. RTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed decision of the trial court, and on 22 December
1999 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Petitioners filed a petition for review, rejected by the SC for failure to state material dates.SC
denied subsequent motion for reconsideration; judgment of conviction final and executory

On April 27, 2001, Petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas was arrested by the police but they failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas
because he was nowhere to be found. On July 16, 2001, Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the
issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There being no action taken by the trial court on the motion, petitioners
instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions.The Court initially
dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the
October 22, 2001 Resolution.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC and CA since the courts did not take any action when they (the petitioners)
raised the issue of jurisdiction.

2. WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal case.

Ruling:

1. No. Following Bitanga, this Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules. In People v. Bitanga the Court explained
that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases: Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the
remedy of annulment of judgment. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases.

2. Yes. The established rule is that the statute in force (in this case the statute was BP 129) at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court. The penalty for the crime charged in this case is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which has a duration
of 1 month and 1 day to 4 months, and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value. Here, the
imposable fine is P12,895.00. The MeTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the
information, its jurisdiction was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.

Notes:

 Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
 Sec. 18. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in
the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
 Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
 Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. —
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
 Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

Decision.

Petition DENIED.

WT CONSTRUCTION, INC., v. vs.HON. ULRIC R. CAÑETE

G.R. No. 157287, February 12, 2008

AZCUNA, J.:
Juliana vda. De Cabahug filed a case for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, Alberto Cabahug,3 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City presided by Judge Ulric R. Cañete. Ciriaco Cabahug, the administrator of the estate and heir of Alberto, was granted the
authority to sell one of the properties of the estate to defray the expenses for the payment of taxes due from the estate. The property to be sold was the
parcel of land subject of the petition. Ciriaco entered into an Agreement for Sale of Land with Downpayment with WT Const. for P8,691,000. It was
later discovered that Ciriaco did not inform his co-heirs of the sale. He appropriated the amount paid by petitioner, so public respondent issued an
Order on August 19, 1997, relieving Ciriaco of his functions as administrator and directing him to render an accounting of all the properties and assets
of the estate. Referring to the provision of the agreement relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price conditioned upon the removal of
occupants and obstructions in the property, petitioner refused to pay the remaining balance. Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of
Execution claiming that the issuance of the writ is premature for the following reasons: (1) the expenses to be deducted from the purchase price could
not be ascertained as there are still squatters on the land who have yet to be evicted; (2) the existence of an action for Quieting of Title, Injunction and
Damages for ownership and possession of a portion of the property in question or 4,690 square meters; and (3) the balance of the purchase price
would be significantly reduced if the claim of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid action will be granted. There being no merits to the urgent Motion to
Quash the Writ of Execution, the same is denied. Petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but the CA dismissed the petition
on July 25, 2002.

Issue: Whether or not a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in a contract, one of which is a
private corporation.

Ruling:

As to petitioner’s argument that the probate/estate court cannot adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties under the deed of sale, the
CA rightly found that this was a new issue not raised in the probate/estate court. Furthermore, the deed of sale in question is the sale of the property of
the estate to pay for taxes, a matter definitely within the power of the probate/estate court to order.

It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce obligations under such a deed of sale. Otherwise, they would not be able to secure the proceeds
to pay for the taxes and this would defeat the purpose of the proceedings to settle the estate. Stated otherwise, the power to enforce obligations under
the deed of sale of a property ordered sold to pay debts of the estate is but a necessary incident of the power of a probate/estate court to order and
effect such sale in the first place.

In fine, this Court sees no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65592 dated July 25,
2002 and February 12, 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

Notes. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

CARIÑO v. CHR
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:

Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to
undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed.

The respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a
Decision of Secretary Cariño decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and
del Castillo.

The respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them.

Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted alleging as grounds therefor,
"that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case."

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or
even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

Ruling:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make
findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission
on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775)
on the merits."