Académique Documents
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1. Nature of ULP
Anent the charge of unfair labor practice, Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code considers it an unfair labor practice
when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization
or the right to form an association. In order to show that the employer committed unfair labor practice under
the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined
as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case
at bar, respondents were indeed unceremoniously dismissed from work by reason of their intent to form and
organize a union. (Park Hotel, et al. vs. Manolo Soriano, et al. G.R. No. 171118. September 10, 2012).
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize. The prohibited acts are related
to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Thus, an employer may be held liable
for unfair labor practice only if it can be shown that his acts interfere with his employees’ right to self-
organization. Since there is no showing that the respondent company’s implementation of the Right-Sizing
Program was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees’
right to self-organization, there is no unfair labor practice to speak of in this case. (Nelson A. Culili v. Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 165381, February 9, 2011).
Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related
to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even
if unfair, are not unfair labor practices. (General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-Tupas vs. COCA-
COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 178647. Feb. 13, 2007).
2. ULP of employers
a. Interference (it covers both restraint and coercion) – direct or indirect
b. Restraint or coercion (Economic coercion – wage increase, granting of bonuses, lay-offs, isolation of
union president)
c. Prohibition against membership in a union (yellow0dog contract) implieas that any person who signed
such contract was a cowardly dog bec. he had abandoned his guaranteed rights to self-organization under the
Constitution. He becomes subservient, like a dog.
d. Company or captive unionism
e. Contracting out of services being performed by union members
f. Acts of discrimination (dismissal or lay-off, closure or shutdown, rehiring, transfer, retrenchment
g. Refusal to bargain
h. Gross violation of a CBA
i. Dismissal for giving testimony
j. Union security clauses
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that respondent CAB’s suspension of
negotiation with CABEU-NFL and its act of concluding a CBA with CABELA, another union in the bargaining unit,
were motivated by ill will, “bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy…” However, the facts show that CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no
longer the representative of the workers. It just wanted to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of
the overwhelming majority of its rank and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA
with CABELA.” Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to be punished in
cases of unfair labor practices. (Central Azucarera De Bais Employees Union-NFL, represented by its President,
Pablito Saguran vs. Central Azucarera De Bais, Inc. G.R. No. 186605, November 17, 2010).
Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA negotiations
cannot be equated to “refusal to bargain.” Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the phrase “duty to bargain
collectively.” For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated
by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety. It
cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspension and even
expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance on the
suspension of mining operations for the suspension of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith.
(Manila Mining Corp. Employees Association, et al. vs.. Manila Mining corp, et al.,G.R. Nos. 178222-23,
September 29, 2010).
We found it proper to award moral and exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees as their dismissal
was tainted with unfair labor practice. The Court said: Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of
workers and employees to selforganization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere
of freedom and mutual respect; and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable
labor-management relations. As the conscience of the government, it is the Court’s sworn duty to ensure that
none trifles with labor rights. (Geronimo Q. Quadra vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 147593, July 31, 2006).
To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261
of the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof.
Evidently, the University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of
Union members. (Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139940,
September 19, 2006).
Direct evidence that an Ee was in fact intended or coerced by the statements of threats of the Er is not necessary
if there is a reasonable interference that the anti‐union conduct of the Er does have an adverse effect on self‐
organization and CB. (The Insular Life Assurance‐NATU v. The Insular Life Co. Ltd. G.R. No.L‐25291, Jan. 30, 1971).
A company’s refusal to make counter‐proposal, if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may
indicate BF and this is especially true where the union’s request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. (Kiok
Loy v. NLRC. G.R. No. L‐54334, Jan. 22, 1986).
ALU is the certified exclusive bargaining representative after winning the certification election. The company
merely relied on the letter of disaffiliation by BFEA’s president without proof and consequently refusing to
bargain collectively constitutes ULP. Such refusal by the company to bargain collectively with the certified
exclusive bargaining representative is a violation of its duty to collectively bargain which constitutes ULP.
(Balmar Farms v. NLRC. G.R. No.73504, Oct. 15, 1991)
Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership and a closed‐ shop
applicants provision will not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an
employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership without any reasonable ground thereof.
(Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L‐22456, Sep. 27, 1967).
2. PEACEFUL PICKETING – the right of workers during strikes consisting of the marching to and fro before
the premises of an establishment involved in a labor dispute, generally accompanied by the carrying and display
of signs, placards or banners with statements relating to the dispute. (Guidelines Governing Labor Relations,
October 19, 1987)
3. LOCKOUT – means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. (Article 212 (p) Labor Code, as amended by Section 4, R.A. 6715).
1. A strike must be approved by a majority vote of the members of the Union and a lockout must be approved
by a majority vote of the members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation or Association or of the partners
in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose.
2. A strike or lockout VOTE shall be reported to the NCMB-DOLE Regional Branch at least 7 days before the
intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period.
In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the cooling-off period, the 7-day requirement
shall be counted from the day following the expiration of the cooling-off period. (NSFW vs. Ovejera, G.R. No.
59743, May 31, 1982)
In case of dismissal from employment of union officers which may constitute union busting, the time
requirement for the filing of the Notice of Strike shall be dispensed with but the strike vote requirement being
mandatory in character, shall “in every case” be complied with.
The dispute must not be the subject of an assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, a certification for compulsory or voluntary arbitration nor a subject of a pending case involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
MAY A UNION FILE A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR THE EMPLOYER FILE A NOTICE OF LOCKOUT IF THE LABOR
DISPUTE IS BASED ON A GROUND OTHER THAN ULP AND CBD?
No. The union/employer may not file a notice based on grounds other than ULP and CBD. Violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic
provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable and no strike or lockout may
be declared on grounds involving inter-union and internal union disputes or on issues brought to voluntary or
compulsory arbitration including legislated wage orders and labor standard cases.
However, if improvidently filed and it appears on the face of the notice that the issues raised are non-strikeable
or the real issues discovered during conciliation proceedings are not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike or
Lockout, The NCMB Regional Branch shall dismiss motu propio the notice without prejudice to further
conciliation, or upon request of either or both parties in which case, the Notice of Strike or Lockout is treated
as a Preventive Mediation Case. (See Definition of Preventive Mediation Case under Appendix 3, Definition of
Terms).
WHAT IS THE LEGAL IMPLICATION IF THE CONTENT-REQUIREMENT OF THE NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT
HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH?
Any notice which does not conform with the foregoing requirements shall be deemed not having been filed.
WHAT IS THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE REQUIREMENT TO OBSERVE THE COOLING-OFF PERIODS
AND THE STRIKE BAN?
The prescribed cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after submission of report of strike vote are
mandatory. The observance of both periods must be complied with, although a labor union may take a strike
vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. The avowed intent of the law is to provide an
opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The waiting period, on the other hand, is intended to provide
opportunity for the members of the union or the management to take the appropriate remedy in case the strike
or lockout vote report is false or inaccurate. Moreover, the cooling-off and 7-day strike ban provisions of law
are reasonable and valid restrictions on the right to strike and these restrictions constitute a valid exercise of
police power of the State. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike vote report would be deemed
mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for
which the filing of the strike notice and strike vote report is required cannot be achieved. The submission of
the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the
majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (National Federation of Sugar
Workers vs. Ovejera, 114 SCRA 354)
The seven (7) days waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity
to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
The need for assurance that the majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is
usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself
against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union
and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to
wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the
tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which
should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare.
Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not
infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will
go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to
succeed. (Lapanday Workers Union, Tomas N. Basco vs. NLRC and Lapanday Agricultural Development
Corporation, G.R. Nos. 95494-97, 7 September 1995)
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A VALID STRIKE
OR LOCKOUT?
The requirements for a valid strike or lockout are mandatory in character and non-compliance therewith is
sufficient ground to declare the strike or lockout illegal.
If a strike is declared illegal, the employer may be authorized to terminate the employment of union officials
who knowingly participated in the illegal strike and/or any worker or union officer who knowingly participated
in the commission of other illegal acts during the strike.
In case the lockout is declared illegal, any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence
thereof may be entitled to re-instatement including payment of full backwages and other benefits.
WHO HAS THE DUTY TO DECLARE THAT THE NOTICE OF STRIKE/LOCKOUT HAS BEEN CONVERTED INTO
PREVENTIVE MEDIATION CASE?
Upon the recommendation of the Conciliator/Mediator handling the labor dispute, the Director of the Regional
Branch of the NCMB which has jurisdiction over the labor dispute has the duty to declare and inform the parties
that the issues raised or the actual issues involved are not proper subjects of a Notice of Strike or Lockout
and that the Notice of Strike or Lockout has been converted into a Preventive Mediation Case without prejudice
to further conciliation or upon the request of either or both parties.
MAY A LABOR DISPUTE SUBJECT OF A NOTICE OF STRIKE OR LOCKOUT, MATURE INTO A VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATION CASE?
Yes. By mutual agreement, the parties may decide to bring the matter for resolution before an accredited
voluntary arbitrator of their choice, in which case the Notice is deemed automatically withdrawn and dropped
from the dockets.
Where the matter of legality or illegality of strike is raised in the dispute over which the Secretary assumed
jurisdiction or in disputes certified by the Secretary to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, the same
may be resolved by the Secretary or the Commission, respectively. (International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
vs. Secretary of Labor and Associated Labor Union, G.R. No. 92981-83, January 9, 1992.)
CAN ANY PERSON PERFORMING ANY OF THE PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES MENTIONED IN THE PROCEEDING
PARAGRAPH BE CHARGED BEFORE THE COURT?
Yes. They may be charged before the appropriate civil and criminal courts.
If the person so convicted is a foreigner, he shall be subjected to immediate and summary deportation and will
be permanently barred from re-entering the country without the special permission of the President.
If the act is at the same time a violation of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), a prosecution under the Labor Code
will preclude prosecution for the same act under the RPC or vice-versa.
ARE THE STRIKERS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF WAGES DURING THE PERIOD OF A LAWFUL STRIKE?
As a general rule, striking employees are not entitled to the payment of wages for unworked days during the
period of the strike pursuant to the principle of “No work- No pay”. However, this does not preclude the parties
from entering into an agreement to the contrary.
On the other hand, when strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the existence of valid
grounds but the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new
conditions that constitute unfair labor practices, the strikers, who refuse to accept the new conditions and are
consequently refused reinstatement, are entitled to the losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the
employer’s discriminatory acts from the time they were refused reinstatement.
In the national interest cases, the certification or assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over the
dispute under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as a amended, has the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended strike or lockout whether or not a corresponding return to work order has been issued. The workers
shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and re-admit all
workers under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing before the strike.
WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
TO ISSUE ASSUMPTION AND CERTIFICATION ORDERS?
The power to issue assumption and certification orders is an extraordinary authority strictly limited to national
interest cases and granted to the President or to the Secretary of Labor, “which can justifiably rest on his own
consideration of the exigency of the situation in relation to the national interest”.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of Labor is vested with
the discretionary power to decide not only the question of whether to assume jurisdiction over a given labor
dispute or certify the same to the NLRC, but also the determination of the industry indispensable to national
interest.
The President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any labor dispute involving industries indispensable to national interest in order to settle or terminate the
same.
Under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie
finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is
pending that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in the implementation of a mass lay-off.
5. Assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary or Certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration
The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor Secretary under Article 263(g) is not limited to the
grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to
the incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume
jurisdiction” connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to resolve all matters
within the dispute that gave rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout, including cases over which the
labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. (Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al. vs.
Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, et al./Triumph International (phils.), Inc. vs. Bagong
Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al., G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010).
Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. The
grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor makes it incumbent upon him to bring about soonest, a fair
and just solution to the differences between theramiemployer and the employees, so that the damage such
labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally
averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in the activities of the industry or the possibility of those
contingencies that might cause detriment to the national interest. In order to effectively achieve such end, the
assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout. Moreover, if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work,
and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Assumption and certification orders are executory in character
and are to be strictly complied with by the parties, even during the pendency of any petition questioning their
validity. (YSS Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Organization vs. YSS Laboratories, Inc., G.R.
No. 155125, December 4, 2009).
Automatically enjoins the intended or impending strike/lockout but if one has already taken place, all striking
or locked out Ees shall immediately return to work and the Er shall immediately resume operations and re‐admit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. (Trans‐ Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc.‐Unlicensed Crews Ee’s Union v. CA. G.R. No. 145428, July 7, 2004).
Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be showing of special circumstances
rendering actual reinstatement impracticable, or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purpose of the law
in providing for assumption of jurisdiction by the SLE in a labor dispute that affects the national interest. (Manila
Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16, 2004).
Mere issuance of an assumption order automatically carries with it a return‐to‐work order although not
expressly stated therein. (TSEU‐FFW v. CA. G.R. Nos. 143013‐14, Dec.18, 2000).
a. Issues that the SLE may resolve when he assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute
SLE may subsume pending labor cases before LAs which are involved in the dispute and decide even issues falling
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of LAs such as the declaration of legality or illegality of strike. (Int’l.
Pharmaceuticals v. SLE G.R. Nos. 92981‐83, Jan. 9, 1992).
Power of SLE is plenary and discretionary. (St. Luke’s Medical Center v. Torres G.R. No. 99395, June29, 1993).
Where the return to work order is issued pending the determination of the legality of the strike, it is not
correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if illegal. Precisely,
the purpose of the return to work order is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made.
(Nature of assumption order or certification order. (Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 75271‐73, June 27, 1988).
The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of a police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the
common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The SLE
acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede
the worker’s right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. (Philtread Workers Union v.
Confesor. G.R. No. 117169, Mar. 12, 1997).
Art. 263(g) does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of
such right national interest will be affected. The LC vests upon the SLE the discretion to determine what
industries are indispensable to national interest. The underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the
settlement of labor disputes is that assumption and certification orders are executor in character and are strictly
complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This
extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to
labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Art. 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that all
striking or lock‐out Ees shall immediately return to work and the Er shall immediately resume operations and
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Records of the
case would show that the strike occurred one day before the members of the union were dismissed due to
alleged redundancy. Thus the abovementioned article directs that the Er must readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. (PLDT v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas
G.R. No. 162783, July 14, 2005).
WHEN A DISPUTE IS ASSUMED BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF LABOR, OR CERTIFIED TO THE NLRC FOR
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION, MAY A STRIKE OR LOCKOUT BE VALIDLY DECLARED ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAME
DISPUTE?
No. The assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout.
WHAT ARE THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES IN CASE OF DEFIANCE OF THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER BY THE
EMPLOYER AND BY THE EMPLOYEES?
In case of non-compliance with the return-to-work order in connection with the certification or assumption of
jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor, the employees concerned may be subjected to immediate disciplinary
action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages,
damages and other affirmative relief even criminal prosecution against either or both of them.
The Secretary of Labor may cite the defiant party in contempt pursuant to the power vested in him under the
provisions of the Labor Code.
It shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the SLE
or the NLRC, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement
to full employment benefits from the locking‐out Er or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or
affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties. (St. Scholastica’s College v. Torres.
G.R. No. 100158, June 2, 1992).
CAN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) BE DEPUTIZED TO ENFORCE ORDERS FROM THE DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT?
Yes. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or any Labor
Arbiter may deputize the PNP to enforce any of its order, award or decision.
IN CASE THE PNP IS DEPUTIZED TO ENFORCE ORDERS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WHAT WILL BE ITS
ROLE?
In such a case, the role of the PNP is merely to assist the sheriff or the appropriate DOLE Officers in enforcing
the decision, award or order. It shall maintain peace and order and public safety in the area where the decision,
award or order is to be enforced. It shall also give security to the officers enforcing the decision, award or
order. (Please see also Article 264 (d), Article 266 of the Labor Code, as amended, and Guidelines for the
Conduct of PNP During Strikes, Lockouts and Labor Disputes in General, Oct. 22, 1987).
IS THE INGRESS AND EGRESS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT PART OF THE STRIKE AREA?
No. Since it is not part of the strike area, the same could not be blocked or picketed.
WHO IS A STRIKE-BREAKER?
A strike-breaker means any person who obstructs, impedes or interferes with by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation any peaceful picket by employees during any labor controversy.
8. Illegal strike
The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are: 1. When it is contrary to a specific
prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or 2. When it violates a
specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or 3. When
it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against
non-union employees; or 4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or 5. When it is
declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE
Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or 6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement,
such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. (Toyota v Toyota Workers Association. G.R. Nos.
158786 & 158789 October 19, 2007).
No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike.
As for the union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer
may be terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief. (Gold City Integrated Port Services,
Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No. 86000, Sep. 21, 1990).
Those union members who have joined an illegal strike but have not committed any illegal act shall be reinstated
but without back wages.The responsibility for the illegal acts committed during the strike must be on an
individual and not on a collective basis. (First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Confesor G.R. No. 106316,
May 5, 1997).
9. Injunctions
a) Requisites for labor injunctions
No court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or lockout except as provided in Article 218 and 263 of the
Labor Code, as amended. The National Labor Relations Commission proper shall have the power to issue
temporary injunctions but only after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its rules. It may also issue
restraining orders to appropriate cases subject as a general rule to the requirements of due notice and hearing.
Petitions for injunctions or restraining orders shall be handled or resolved with extreme care and caution. All
efforts to conciliate or settle amicably the issues in the main dispute and those involved in petitions for
injunctions shall be exhausted. Injunctions and restraining orders therefore may be issued only in case of
extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all
efforts at conciliation are exhausted.
Injunction orders shall be enforced only to the extent necessary to correct violations of law and shall not prevent
the workers from exercising the right to peaceful picketing. The right to ingress or egress may be exercised
only for lawful purposes as may be indicated in the injunctive orders in line with established jurisprudence.
Injunction orders issued under Article 218 and 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, shall be served and enforced
by appropriate officials or employees of the National Labor Relations Commission or by such officials or
employees of the Department of Labor and Employment who may be designed by the labor secretary.
The assistance of other civilian authorities like national, local or city officials may be sought, if necessary. Only
under extreme circumstances shall the assistance of the PC/INP be enlisted and in such cases, the police
authorities shall also serve on a supportive capacity to the labor department officials or employees. All efforts
must be exerted in all cases to bring about voluntary and peaceful compliance with injunctive orders. PC/INP
representatives shall be guided by duly promulgated guidelines.
A party, by filing its 3rd party claim with the deputy sheriff, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the NLRC
acting through the LA. The broad powers granted to the LA and to the NLRC by Art. 217, 218 and 224 of the LC
can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or
relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
The RTC, being a co‐equal body of the NLRC, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to
enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter. (Deltaventures v. Cabato. G.R. No. 118216, Mar. 9, 2000).
The concerted action taken by the members of the union in picketing the premises of the department store, no
matter how illegal, cannot be regarded as acts not arising from a labor dispute over which the RTCs may exercise
jurisdiction. (Samahang Manggagawa ng Liberty Commercial v. Pimentel G.R. No. L‐78621, Dec. 2, 1987).