Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Euro Firefighter
Paul Grimwood FIFireE
London Fire Brigade (retired)
Paul Grimwood
Published by Jeremy Mills Publishing Limited
113 Lidget Street, Lindley, Hudders®eld
West Yorkshire, HD3 3JR
www.jeremymillspublishing.co.uk
Copyright # 2008
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form
or by any means without prior permission in writing from the publisher.
ISBN 978-1-905217-06-9
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Author biography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Chapter 1 Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Chief John Norman's `Five Guiding Principles of
Fire®ghting' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 RECEO/REVAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Managing `risk' on the ®re-ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 What is considered an `acceptable risk'? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Property conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.2 Life hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Command and control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1 Risk assessment or size-up? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.2 Mode of attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.3 Modes of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Crew Resource Management (CRM) ± The error chain. . 25
1.7 The Sixteen Fire®ghter Life Safety Initiatives . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 2 Venting structures ± The reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 US ®re ventilation tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 European ®re zoning tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Anti-ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Tactical ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Ventilation pro®le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 Pre-existing ventilation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.8 Unplanned ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.9 Objectives of venting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.10 Considerations of venting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 Creating safe vent openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.12 Air-track management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.13 Selecting ventilation locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.14 Timing ventilation openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.15 Venting for LIFE (including VES). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.16 Venting for FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.17 Venting for SAFETY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.18 Venting large ¯oor spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.19 Horizontal ventilation ± The Glass Rules . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.20 Vertical ventilation ± Resource dependent . . . . . . . . . 58
2.21 Positive Pressure Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.22 Positive Pressure Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.23 Limited-staf®ng issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.24 FDNY Ladders 3 ± Occupied non-®reproof tenements . 71
2.25 FDNY Ladders 4 ± Private dwellings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.26 Risk management ± Venting structures. . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.27 Venting and rapid ®re progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.28 Combining US-EURO tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter 3 Venting structures ± International round table discussion . . . 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Attributes of a pre-assigned task-based venting strategy . 84
3.3 Attributes of a reactive conditions-based venting strategy 88
3.4 Tactical errors when using either strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5 Staf®ng requirements for primary response venting tactics 91
3.6 Situations when not to ventilate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7 Situations where venting should be a primary action . . . 96
3.8 Simplifying the tactical approach to venting structures . . 99
3.9 Basic Glass Rule concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.10 Avoiding the error chain in venting tactics . . . . . . . . . 102
3.11 Creating an opening ± Who is responsible? . . . . . . . . . 104
3.12 Door control and air-track management . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.13 Exterior wind hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.14 Author's summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 4 Important European and US case studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2 Learning from the past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3 Case study ± Student exercise (Blaina, UK) . . . . . . . . . 115
4.4 Five minutes on the ®re-ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5 Keokuk, Iowa 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 Fairfax County, Virginia 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.7 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1995. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.8 Coos Bay, Oregon 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.9 Michigan 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.10 Cincinnati, Ohio 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.11 Worcester, Massuchusetts 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.12 Charleston, South Carolina 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.13 Tayside, Scotland 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter 5 Limited staf®ng ± Three-person crews . . . . . ..... . . . . . . 139
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . 139
5.2 Critical Task Performance Index . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . 140
5.3 Three-phased training approach . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . 142
5.4 Increasing performance of limited-staffed crews. . . . . . . 143
5.5 Exterior attack strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.6 Completing the CTPI ± Classroom exercise . . . . . . . . . 146
5.7 OSHA Two in/Two out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Chapter 6 Primary command and control ± Tactical deployment . . . . . 151
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 Military Rules of Engagement and strategic principles . . 153
6.3 Fire®ghting Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.4 Critical Tasking and the Performance Index (CTPI) . . . 156
6.5 Primary response (®rst alarm) systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.6 Primary response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.7 Incident Command System (ICS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.8 Tactical Deployment Instructor's (TDI) course . . . . . . . 163
6.9 `Take the ®re ®rst'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.10 Search and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Chapter 7 Operations ± Tactics ± Strategy ± `Back to Basics'. . . . . . . . 169
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7.2 Fire®ghting tips and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.2.1 The ®re®ghter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
7.2.2 The company of®cer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7.2.3 The ®re chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Chapter 8 SCBA air management ± BA control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.1 The history of BA control procedures in the British Fire
Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
8.2 UK BA control ± The system basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.3 Rapid Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.4 Stage One procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.5 Stage Two procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.6 Main control procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.7 Rapid Intervention (BA emergency teams) . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.8 SCBA air management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.9 Trapped ®re®ghters ± Air conservation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Chapter 9 CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
9.1 History of CFBT and 3D ®re®ghting tactics . . . . . . . . . 192
9.2 Compartment ®re growth and development . . . . . . . . . 198
9.3 Fire dynamics and ®re behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.4 Fire®ghting ¯ow-rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
9.5 Water droplets and cooling theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
9.6 Nozzle techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
9.7 One-SevenJ Compressed Air Foam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
9.8 Water-fogging systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
9.9 Fire Development Simulator ± Demonstrator . . . . . . . . 232
9.10 Fire Development Simulator ± Attack unit . . . . . . . . . 233
9.11 Fire Development Simulator ± Window unit . . . . . . . . 233
9.12 Fire Development Simulator ± Backdraft unit . . . . . . . 235
9.13 Fire Development Simulator ± Tactical units . . . . . . . 235
9.14 Fire Development Simulator ± Gas-®red units . . . . . . . 236
9.15 Fire Development Simulator ± Loading units . . . . . . . 237
9.16 Fire Development Simulator ± Safe operation . . . . . . . 241
9.17 PPE and ®re®ghter heat stress/thermal injury . . . . . . . 247
9.18 CFBT health and safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
9.19 Small-scale Demonstration units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
9.20 Reading the ®re ± B-SAHF (Be Safe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
9.21 Stabilizing the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
9.22 Door entry procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
9.23 Gaseous-phase cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
9.24 Gaseous-phase combustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
9.25 Fuel-phase combustion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
9.26 Working with case histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
9.27 Training risk assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
9.28 Operational risk assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Chapter 10 Compartment Fire Behavior . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 269
10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 269
10.2 Learning objectives . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 270
10.3 Combustion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 271
10.4 Units of measure . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 279
10.5 Heat release and combustion data .......... .... . 279
10.6 Fire growth and development . . . .......... .... . 281
10.7 Classes of ®re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 283
10.8 Fire plumes and detached ¯aming combustion ± Fire
types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 284
10.9 Rapid ®re progress (RFP) . . . . . . .......... .... . 285
10.10 Further terminology . . . . . . . . . .......... .... . 299
Chapter 11 High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
11.2 Telstar House ®re (London, England 2003) . . . . . . . . 303
11.3 Edi®cio Windsor ®re (Madrid, Spain 2005) . . . . . . . . 307
11.4 Two major of®ce ®res ± Similar experiences! . . . . . . . . 311
11.5 High-rise commercial ®res ± Past lessons learned . . . . . 312
11.6 Is there a training need? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
11.7 High-rise residential ®res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
11.8 BDAG research UK ± Safe working practice in high-
rise ®res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
11.9 Model high-rise procedure for limited-staf®ng response 327
Chapter 12 CFBT Training Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
12.2 Unit One ± Fundamentals of Compartment Fire Behavior 343
12.3 Unit Two ± Application of Compartment Fire Behavior
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
12.4 Unit Three ± Application of Positive Pressure Ventilation
training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Introduction
ix
x l Euro Fire®ghter
®re®ghter in cutting through a steel street door to allow a better hit on the ®re with
the other hose-line. At this stage we have to question roles and assigned tasks, in
linewith any declared (or non-declared) tactical mode of attack. If all ®re®ghters
on-scene are outside the structure, in relatively `safe' positions, the IC may effectively
take part in operational tasks, as needs dictate (even this is arguable according to
structural safety hazards). However, from the moment ®re®ghters step a foot inside
the structure, this now becomes an interior offensive operation. At this point critical
strategic concerns would include:
I A tactical mode (offensive or defensive) was never declared;
I As ®re®ghters have entered `a few feet' into the structure, an offensive tactical
mode of operations should now be declared and communicated to all on-
scene via the command system;
I With ®re®ghters deployed to the interior, the IC must now take a command
position and locate himself effectively in order to observe and `read' ®re
conditions, looking out for changing circumstances and recognizing warning
indicators of hazardous situations developing. This position may ideally be at
a corner of the structure to allow visual contact with at least two sides of the
building, which will also provide vital information as to structural safety;
I Crew brie®ngs must be clear as to their objectives ± the reference to
advancing in `a few feet' may be interpreted in different ways, as was the case
here.
With dif®culties being experienced in gaining access via the steel door, the IC
decided to create additional openings by breaking some windows for the purpose of
creating points of access for the second hose-line. At this stage the two ®re®ghters
on the ®rst line had advanced some way into the structure and although the
intention may have been to break windows to create access points, they also clearly
served as ventilation points.
Over the next two minutes the IC (who was also reportedly a trained CFBT
instructor) was not in a position to see the changing ®re conditions as smoke became
darker and started to push out of the eaves of the roof under great pressure.
Suddenly there was an `event' of rapid ®re progress and the two ®re®ghters inside
were tragically caught and trapped.
At another ®re in the same year, this time on a US ®re-ground, nine ®re®ghters
were to tragically lose their lives. Again, the `routine' approach to a seemingly `minor'
®re demonstrated how things can take a turn for the worse in a few brief moments. A
`trash' ®re situated against the exterior wall of a large furniture superstore spread
into the large volume structure, suddenly trapping ®re®ghters as the interior ®re
intensi®ed.
Again, the command structure reportedly failed to establish `control' from a
command perspective and progressive ICs, within the ®rst few minutes, were tied
up at the operational level, or were micro-managing the scene without stepping back
and gaining a wider perspective of what was occurring. It will be seen time and
again, throughout this book, that `tunnel vision' is a result of `command without
control'. It is clearly possible to have command of a ®re-ground but at the same
time, not be in control of operational aspects. Any opportunities to break the tactical
`error chain' are sadly missed because of this inability to `control' the ®re-ground,
and any exposure to risk is therefore frequently increased beyond acceptable limits.
Introduction l xi
hose-line they are advancing is ¯owing at less than 230 liters/min (60 gallons/min)
into rapidly developing ®res.
One of the misconceptions about CFBT is that container ®res are `real' ®res. In
fact they are only 1.5 MW simulations that produce pure gaseous ¯aming com-
bustion. In `real' compartment ®res, energy release rates may commonly be between
5 to 15 MW and the fuel-load will be more concentrated, requiring deeper
penetration and cooling of the fuel-base. As CFBT instructors learn to deal with vast
amounts of ¯aming combustion in FDS units using ¯ow-rates as low as 40 liters/min
(10 gallons/min), they may take on a false sense of security and become over-
con®dent in the ability of low-¯ow hose streams to deal with actual room ®res
verging on, or surpassing, the ¯ashover stage. This misunderstanding can cost lives!
The biggest learning curve here is that you cannot identify a `good' ®re stream by
simply `looking' at it! Modern nozzles are designed to trade ¯ow-rate for reach and
may provide a totally false impression of true water content.
It is not just ®re®ghter safety issues that this book deals with, but also the safety of
the very people we serve. There are many instances where we may have accepted
greater levels of exposure to risk to ourselves and yet through some tactical error or
miscommunication, we may have fallen short in our responsibility towards building
occupants. Therefore, it is not just the ®re®ghter who is affected by inappropriate
tactics or error chains but also the occupants of ®re-involved buildings.
We must train ®re commanders and ®re®ghters to deal more effectively with
incidents. More importantly, we must establish a clearer appreciation of what is
`acceptable risk' under speci®c circumstances and re¯ect this through our SOPs.
We can increase a ®re®ghter's chances of survival by taking simple precautions. We
can improve ef®ciency and safety through the provision of simple checklists in
Standard Operating Procedures that will encourage a risk-based culture through a
selective operational thought process. We can ensure that ®re commanders and
®re®ghters have a more in-depth appreciation of when to ventilate and when not to.
We can also educate ®re®ghters in the most effective methods of opening up a
structure and advancing in with greater safety, whilst anticipating and recognizing
potential hazards through the general dynamics of air and smoke movements.
This book will discuss simple guidelines used to establish safe but effective
tactical approaches into ®re-involved structures. It is written in such a way to assist
the instructor, ®re chief, or ®re®ghter to learn from key points provided in bullet
lists. Through a series of simple SOPs covering a wide variety of ®re-ground
situations, you will learn to apply basic concepts using a more pro-active approach,
whilst effectively balancing `risk' versus `gain' and implementing Risk Control
Measures, that may one day save the lives of you or your crew.
Always make it your personal objective to:
Learn from the past, seek out new information, gain new knowledge and use that new
knowledge to challenge assumptions and conventional wisdom, to stimulate and share
new ideas.
But in doing this always remember, respect and honor those who have gone before
us, as you study their own experiences through the various accounts and case
histories:
It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man
stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to
Introduction l xiii
the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and
blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows
the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause; who,
at the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement; and who, at worst, if he
fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold
and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.
Theodore Roosevelt 1910
xiv
Author biography
Paul Grimwood is a thirty-®ve-year veteran of the British Fire Service, having served
most of his time as a ®re®ghter in London Fire Brigade's busy West End district. In
the mid 1970s he also served an eighteen-month detachment into New York's South
Bronx 7th Division, during the busiest period in FDNY's history. From 1976±77 he
further served as a volunteer ®re®ghter/EMT on Long Island's south shore.
For more than thirty years Paul has been undertaking global research into
structural ®re®ghting strategy and tactics and has contributed in excess of 200
technical articles since 1979, in an effort to advance ®re®ghter safety. During this
time he has served and responded out of more than 100 ®re stations around the
world, working alongside some of the ®nest ®re®ghters you could ever wish to meet.
He has also presented papers on ®re service operations at international conferences
in several countries since 1993.
His other books include Fog Attack (1992) and 3D Fire®ghting (2005), the latter
of which he joint authored with ®re®ghting colleagues Battalion Chief Ed Hartin
(USA), and Station Of®cers John McDonough and Shan Raffel (Australia).
From 1984 he served eleven years as a London Fire Brigade ®re investigator
and was part of the six-person team that investigated the tragic King's Cross ®re in
1987 where thirty-one lives were lost, including a colleague (Station Of®cer Colin
Townsley) from London's Soho ®re station.
He is a trained USAR instructor (EMT) and was deployed on operational disaster
relief assignments into Iraq (1991) and Bosnia (1993). He is also a CFBT and
tactical ventilation specialist (1984-2008) and a Tactical Deployment (command
and control) and High-rise Fire®ghting instructor.
Paul is the founder and principal of Firetactics.com, a website which has provided
in excess of 14,000 pages of structural ®re®ghting SOGs in six languages FREE to
over 2.5 million visitors from more than seventy countries since July 1999 (source
Webstat.com).
He is an advisor to several UK Government Task Groups including ODPM
Compartment Fire Behavior Training; BDAG High-rise Fire®ghting; CLG High-
rise Fire®ghting, as well as an editorial reviewer for the Fire Safety Journal (the
of®cial journal of the International Association of Fire Safety Science). He is also an
established `expert' technical witness and advisor in ®re service operations, having
worked on several high-pro®le cases in the USA and Europe.
In 2008 Paul was awarded the Institute of Fire Engineers' (IFE) highest academic
status (FIFireE) in recognition of his thirty-year professional commitment to
®re®ghter safety.
xv
Acknowledgments
As with any work such as this, the author is generally blessed by some major
commitment from a large body of people who have provided a vast amount of
research, advice and information that goes to make up the completed text. I do not
accept the entire credit for this book but would wish to mention a few colleagues
here whose own work and endeavors have contributed, inspired, motivated, and
assisted my own professional development and objectives.
The late Assistant Chief Of®cer Roy Baldwin London Fire Brigade
Station Of®cer Tom Stanton (retired) London Fire Brigade
Deputy Chief William Bohner (retired) City of New York Fire Department
Deputy Chief Vince Dunn (retired) City of New York Fire Department
The late Battalion Chief William Clark City of New York Fire Department
Assistant Commissioner Jon Webb London Fire Brigade
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Terry Adams London Fire Brigade
Commandant Frederic Monard Sapeurs Pompiers de Paris
Battalion Chief Ed Hartin Gresham Fire and Emergency Services, Oregon, USA
Station Of®cer Shan Raffel Queensland Fire and Rescue, Australia
Station Of®cer John McDonough New South Wales Fire Brigades, Australia
Chief Fire Of®cer Peter Holland Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service, UK
Deputy Chief Fire Of®cer Paul Richardson Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service, UK
Chief Fire Of®cer Barry Dixon Greater Manchester County Fire Service UK
Chief Fire Of®cer John Craig (retired) Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service, UK
Matt Beatty (Rescue One) City of New York Fire Department
Nate DeMarse (Engine 68 Bronx) City of New York Fire Department
Lt. Daniel McMaster Alexandria (Virginia) Fire Department, USA
Major SteÂphane Morizot Versailles, Paris
Chief Jan SuÈdmersen City of OsnabruÈck Fire Service, Germany
Fire Of®cer Tony Engdahl City of Gothenburg Fire Service, Sweden
Captain Juan Carlos CampanÄa City of Madrid Fire Brigade, Spain
Captain Jose Gomez Antonio Milara City of Madrid Fire Brigade, Spain
Pierre Louis Lamballais www.¯ashover.fr
Frank Gaviot Blanc Fire Engineer, France
Jesper Mandre Fire Engineer, Sweden
Mr. Khirudin bin Drahman @ Hussaini Malaysia Fire and Rescue Service (Bomba)
Stefan Svensson Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Revinge
Cliff Barnett Fire Engineer, New Zealand
Dietmar Kuhn Fire Engineer, Germany
Dave Dodson Reading the Smoke ± Fire®ghter and author
Chief Billy Goldfedder www.®re®ghterclosecalls.com
Adrian Ridder Fire Engineer, Germany
Station Of®cer JuÈrgen Ernst BoÈblingen, Germany
Station Of®cer John Chubb Dublin Fire Brigade, Eire
Cas Seyffert (retired) City of Johannesburg Fire Department, SA
Nigel (Snowy) Kind South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue, UK
Plus all my dear friends and close family who have put up with me whilst I toil away
for hours on end engrossed in research; to my two dear sons Richie and Paul Jnr
who are now following their own successful careers; to my best friend and partner in
life Lorraine; and to each and every ®re®ghter I have had the pleasure to meet ± you
are a special breed, stay safe!
Finally, to anyone I have forgotten to mention ± Thank you!
xvi
Institution of Fire Engineers
(IFE)
The Institution of Fire Engineers now has approaching 10,000 members in over
twenty countries, who represent a complete cross-section of the ®re engineering
discipline.
The objectives of the IFE are to encourage and improve the science and practice
of Fire Extinction, Fire Prevention and Fire Engineering and all operations and
expedients connected therewith, and to give an impulse to ideas likely to be useful ±
in relation to such science and practice ± to the members of the Institution and to
the community at large.
The global appeal of the organization assists international networking, which
means you are able to tap into a vast membership, from around the globe, in efforts
to share common aims, interests and knowledge.
xvii
Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Chief John Norman's `Five Guiding Principles of Fire®ghting' . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 RECEO/REVAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Managing `risk' on the ®re-ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 What is considered an `acceptable risk'? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.1 Property conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.2 Life hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Command and control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1 Risk assessment or size-up? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.2 Mode of attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.3 Modes of command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Crew Resource Management (CRM) ± The error chain. . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.7 The Sixteen Fire®ghter Life Safety Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Fire chiefs and chief of®cers are not the ones to generally go into a burning building to
save someone or save someone's property. We are not the ones that have to deal with a
shooting at three o'clock in the morning when the whereabouts of the perpetrator are
unknown. We are not the ones who are generally laying our lives on the line each and
every day to protect our communities, so the least we can do is damn well make sure
that those brave men and women who are, have the best equipment, the best PPE, the
best training, the best policies and procedures, the best safety practices, the best
management, and the best leadership . . .
If you can look in the mirror without any hesitation and say, `Yes, I have done all
that I can,' then you should have no trepidation or concern about a task force coming
into your community following a line-of-duty death. If you can't say yes, then you
need to turn in your badge . . . today!
Brian Crawford ± National Fire Academy
No matter what the questions are, the answers are in the mirror.
Fire Chief Magazine Editorial ± September 2007
1
2 l Euro Fire®ghter
1.1 INTRODUCTION
far better option! Then I turned the key and the ¯ames disappeared. Hey ± we got
things done in those days right?
I look back now ± all these years later ± and shudder! What the hell were we
doing? We could have achieved virtually the same results whilst using `safer systems
of work' (nice buzz words from the 1980s). But really, we just needed to take a step
back in these situations, balance the `risks' against the potential for `gains' and apply
some simple Risk Control Measures. We might have achieved the same outcomes
but with a lot less exposure to risk.
as twenty years ago for ®re®ghters to be exposed to very high levels of risk, with very
little concern for their personal safety. Fire®ghters were expected to follow any order
without question and to accept any risk to accomplish the mission. The most
respected ®re®ghters were often those with the most obvious disregard for their own
safety ± those who demonstrated the attitude that the ®re must be defeated `at any
cost'.4
Today, we are moving toward a different perception of the relationship between
bravery and risk. Without question, we still respect, value, and honor bravery and
courage ± particularly when a situation involves saving lives. Even so, a con-
temporary sense of values requires a very different assessment of appropriate
and inappropriate risks. In many cases, that calls for limiting the exposure of
personnel to risks that they might be willing to accept for themselves. A ®re depart-
ment's de®nition of acceptable risk might be more conservative than the level of
risk an individual ®re®ghter might willingly accept. In the current value system,
higher-level of®cers are often more responsible for limiting risk exposure than for
demanding courage from their forces.
It is not acceptable for ®re departments to risk the lives of their members because
they are not adequately trained or equipped or because they do not apply appro-
priate judgment in conducting emergency operations.
Every incident commander (IC) should anticipate that the authority having
jurisdiction for occupational safety and health laws will thoroughly review any
incidents in which injuries or fatalities occur ± using NFPA 1500 and other
applicable standards as benchmarks ± to consider if actions taken were reasonable
under the circumstances. A ®re department should expect that an investigation
would seek to determine if its members were provided with every appropriate form
of protection, including training and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
The move to `risk-managed' ®re-grounds in the UK has been gradually, but
strictly, enforced through national occupational health legislation since 1974,5
although the basic framework for ®re®ghter safety is clearly rooted in national
practices that were adopted at least two decades earlier. Risk-managed concepts
associated with ®re-ground `accountability', SCBA air management and Rapid
Intervention Teams (RITs), became part of the UK Fire Service culture following
several multiple LODDs in London in the 1940±50s.6 The US approach is
legislated by federal (Occupational Safety and Health Administration or OSHA)
regulations and NFPA guides that serve as established industry `standards'.
However, it was the mid 1980s before risk management principles and ®re-ground
safety standards (i.e. NFPA 1500 and other OSHA regulations) for the US ®re
service were seriously addressed.
Risk assessment is a powerful tool for informing, but not dictating, decisions on
the management of risk. The implication is that a ®re commander, having assessed
that a particular course of action may involve exposure to risk, would not necessarily
abandon it. As in many other industrial settings, some level of risk is accepted and
has to be managed. Indeed, as will be seen later in this book, more recent guidance
speci®cally encourages controlled, deliberate risk-taking in certain circumstances.
4. FEMA, (1996) Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service, FA-166, United States Fire Administration
5. Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 (UK)
6. Fires at Covent Garden and Smith®eld Market (see Chapter Fourteen)
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 5
1.2.1 RECEO/REVAS
Furthermore, there also exist some well-known and simple acronyms that are widely
used by ®re®ghters to assist the prioritization of critical tasking at a structural ®re.
The ®rst of these is known as RECEO ± this strategic approach was provided as far
back as the 1940s by Chief Lloyd Layman:
R ± Rescue
E ± Exposures
C ± Con®nement
E ± Extinguish
O ± Overhaul
Later training texts also add:
V ± Ventilation
S ± Salvage
Another well-known acronym is REVAS:
R ± Rescue
E ± Evacuate
V ± Ventilate
A ± Attack
S ± Salvage
A review of John Norman's excellent `Five Guiding Principles of Fire®ghting'
suggests that the most important primary action on arrival at a ®re-scene is
obviously the rescue of those in immediate peril. This does not account for occupants
who may be trapped inside the structure but rather prompts an immediate rescue
action to remove visible occupants who are at windows or on balconies, or offers
approval towards attempts to locate and rescue `known' life risk. This may entail the
urgent placement of a ladder or an exterior access by ®re®ghters, using rescue ropes
from an upper level, or from the roof itself.
The risk-based approach applied to the concept of `known life hazard' is one
that is well established and de®ned under OSHA 29 CFR 1910.156 as in any
Immediate Danger to Life or Health (IDLH) environment where:
I Immediate action could prevent loss of life
I For a `known' life risk only
I Not for standard `search and rescue' of `possible' or `suspected' life risk
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 7
Any such deviations from the regulations must be exceptions and not de facto
standard practices. When the exception becomes the practice, OSHA citations are
authorized (29 CFR 1910.134[g][4][Note 2]) (see notes in Chapter Five).
In the UK, the term `known life hazard' refers to a de®nition provided by
Technical Bulletin 1/97 ± Safe Practice for SCBA Air Management, where the Rapid
Deployment Procedure provides an adequate but minimal level of safety and
accountability when staf®ng and resources may be restricted during the initial stages
of ®re service response. This level of control is only for use in exceptional circum-
stances where persons are at great risk requiring very urgent assistance,
or where dangerous escalation of the incident can be prevented. The `known
life hazard' in this case must be either within view, or `known' to be within a
short distance of the entry point to the risk area. Although not accounted for in
the wording of the bulletin's de®nition, it may also be argued that exceptional
circumstances include cries for help from within the ®re-involved structure.
Chief Norman goes on to suggest that where staf®ng is restricted on arrival,
simple actions might serve to save a large number of lives and these should be
implemented as a matter of urgency where possible. Such actions may include the
closing of a door to con®ne the ®re, the placement of a primary hose-line to protect
an escape route, or a primary attack made to suppress the ®re itself ± all prior to
interior searches taking place. He goes on to say that where staf®ng permits, both
`®re attack' and `interior search' of the building should occur at the same time,
under a coordinated approach. These are simple guidelines borne out of the
extensive experiences of literally thousands of inner-city ®re®ghters over decades of
®re response and yet, an annual review of LODD incidents clearly demonstrates
how ®re®ghters are repeatedly being killed, simply because they fail to follow these
basic principles of ®re®ghting which clearly promote risk-based concepts.
8. National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1500: Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety
& Health
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 9
When I re¯ect back on the whole thing, what I think is really important to bring out is
that the courage and the bravery of the ®remen was more outstanding than I thought it
possibly could have been. You could look in their faces and you could see the fear. They
knew what they were getting into. They knew what they were going to. They knew
they were going to have the worst ®re®ght of their lives, yet they all went, without
question. You could almost see the relief on some of the people that we didn't send in,
put in the staging area. You could almost sense the relief in their faces that we weren't
sending them across the street at that time. All we had to do was say, `You're up next,
you're on your way' and they would have gone in.
There's been such tremendous talk about how many ®remen came to the WTC on
their own and these did contribute to our fatalities because they themselves became
fatalities. The answer is, Yes it's a shame and it's unfortunate that we didn't have
better discipline within the department, where we would have assured they would
have all reported to a staging area or a central location, but when you think about it,
it's part of our culture as ®re®ghters to do exactly what they did. That's why they did
it. It's that mental attitude that enables a normal person, which is what a ®re®ghter
is, just a normal person, male or female, to go into a burning building. That's what
keeps the ®re department running, that mental attitude. The same thing that caused
those people to leave what they were doing when they were off and report to that
site, that's the attitude that enables them to enter burning buildings on an everyday
basis. Obviously, in the future, the department is going to have to demand more
discipline from people, but somehow not sti¯e that attitude that enables them to do
their job.
Chief Turi's words were strikingly clear in stating that we must ®nd the right
balance between accepting risk without sti¯ing the attitude that makes ®re®ghters
do their job well.
The question, `What is an acceptable level of risk?' is one with which ®re®ghters
will always have con¯ict. We might examine this from two angles:
I Property conservation
I Life hazard
9. www.®retactics.com /FDNY-TRIBUTE-11SEPT2001.htm
10 l Euro Fire®ghter
10. Graves., A., (2007), Vacant Structure Fires and Fire®ghter Injuries In The City Of Flint, Flint (Detroit)
Fire Department
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 11
Vacant buildings
I Highest level of risk taken to save savable life
I Acceptable level of risk to preserve savable property may be taken based on
NFPA 1500 rules of engagement
Abandoned buildings
I Highest level of risk taken to save savable life
I No level of unacceptable risk may be taken to attempt to save abandoned
property of little or no value based on NFPA 1500 rules of engagement
I Defensive strategies shall be used to minimize risks and protect exposures
I Defensive strategies can be used transitionally to control ®re from the
exterior, followed by interior extinguishments and overhaul if structural and
hazard conditions permit safe entry
I Interior attacks should not be initiated unless there is a known life in jeopardy
or unless ®re conditions are incipient or minimal and structural and hazard
conditions permit safe entry
In forming these protocols the City of Flint Fire Chief stated that:
I The risk to ®re department members is the most important factor considered
by the incident commander in determining the strategy that will be employed
in each situation.
12 l Euro Fire®ghter
Deputy Assistant Chief John Norman (FDNY) re¯ects upon his own experi-
ences11 as follows:
As a young ®re®ghter, I confess to having enjoyed the challenge of ®res in vacant
buildings. I regarded them as occasions where I could sharpen my skills and test myself
without civilians being endangered. It was something like a trip to an amusement
park, where I could experience all of the thrill and excitement without any of the
distractions posed by concern for the occupants. This attitude was extremely common
in the ®re departments in which I served.
Then a string of tragedies occurred that started changing the ®re®ghters' thinking.
Probably none of them individually would have succeeded in effecting this change,
but the combined weight of their loss awakened a number of the members. The death
of a lieutenant; the crippling of two ®re®ghters in a vacant building, followed rapidly
by the death of a chief and severe injury to other ®re®ghters at yet another vacant
building; the narrow escape of two ®re®ghters when a collapsing wall of an
unoccupied building sheared the bucket off of their platform, carrying them to the
ground ± all of these incidents served to change the attitude of our members toward
vacant buildings.
Now ®re®ghters, at least in the New York area, display an attitude of caution
when operating at vacants. They no longer rush headlong into aggressive interior
attack. More often than not, they assume a defensive mode, using an outside stream
in conjunction with a careful survey of the stability of the structure. The of®cers in
command must exercise tight control over their subordinates to ensure that they don't
unnecessarily expose themselves to dangerous conditions. Otherwise, the lessons that
these ®re®ghters paid for with their lives will have been wasted. The real shame is that
the lesson has only been learned locally, for it is still common in some areas for
(®re®ghter) casualties to occur in buildings that are in such poor condition that they
were barely standing prior to the ®re and shouldn't have been entered in the ®rst place.
So now we might ask ourselves, are we honestly able to justify subjecting our
®re®ghters to varying levels of risk or ®re-ground hazard without addressing the
management of such risk in a way that effectively balances the `risk versus bene®t'
conundrum? Is it acceptable to account for risk on the basis that, `We haven't
suffered locally from any serious injury or LODD in 40 years so we must be doing
something right'?
I Even though there was life risk at only one in 100 ®res (above) can we justify
applying the same SOP to both occupied and vacant buildings?
I Are ®res in vacant or abandoned buildings presenting a greater risk to our
®re®ghters than normally occupied structures?
I Is it possible that ®res in such buildings will burn through more rapidly due
to a lack of compartmentation and removal of window glass?
I Are ®re®ghters more likely to become disoriented in structures where
windows are boarded up?
I Should we consider establishing ± and might we be legally liable in doing so ±
a more defensive approach for vacant buildings even though there is savable
property?
11. Norman, J., Fire Of®cer's Handbook of Tactics, Fire Engineering/Penwell Publishing
14 l Euro Fire®ghter
Fig. 1.1 ± An example of grading risk and documenting directives (SOPs) to implement
effective Risk Control Measures or strategy during interior search and rescue operations
can be seen above. In adopting these priority levels for search and rescue assignments
we can implement effective Risk Control Measures to deploy more safely, whilst effectively
balancing `risk versus gain'.
Note: In all cases, coordinate ®re attack with search and rescue where on-scene staf®ng
permits.
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 15
but is it in any way justi®able in a court of law? Some might argue from this very
view that there is a legal onus upon the ®re service to deploy for the purpose of
interior search at every incident. In the case of vacant or derelict properties it is
worth noting12 that the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) supports
the view that interior offensive operations should not be undertaken where there is a
reasonable belief that the structure is unoccupied. This is somewhat in opposition to
the common notion that the very same structures should be entered at any stage
where there is reasonable belief that they may be occupied. However, legal arguments
and case histories suggest that decisions to commit ®re®ghters into dangerous and
hostile environments must be made on a reliable assumption that the `risk versus
bene®t' conundrum has been addressed in our tactics, and based on information
known or reasonably believed at any particular time.
Would it not be more logical to suggest that where there is `known' life risk our
®re®ghters will do all they can to save life, but where life risk is only a possibility
we should perhaps temper our approach in a more controlled manner. One way we
can do this is by ensuring that unless there is a `known' life risk, interior search is
always undertaken with the direct and personal protection of a hose-line. This may
slow operations, but in some situations we may come across trapped or downed
occupants whilst advancing the line ± as occurred in both of the recorded cases in
Flint (see above). In occupied structures during the early hours, where we can
reasonably suspect occupants may still be inside, interior search may justi®ably take
place ahead of, or on ¯oors above, the primary attack hose-line, provided that
sensible precautions are taken and there is no reasonable alternative. However,
where there is no sound reason to `know' or strongly `suspect' a life risk, we should
take greater care with our tactical approach and implement more effective Risk
Control Measures, just as we would/should with the OSHA Two In/Two Out
ruling13.
12. International Association of Fire Chiefs, (2001), The 10 Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire®ghting
and the Acceptability of Risk
13. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 (Occupational Safety & Health Administration USA)
16 l Euro Fire®ghter
events may unfold that is either to the advantage or disadvantage of the ®re®ghting
operation. Where inappropriate decisions have been made, a period of `catch-up'
may ensue. It is during this period that an organized command system, supported
by a powerful culture of leadership, may be able to assert some redirection over
the path this chain of events has laid. Without such a system in place, and without
strong leaders, there may be utter chaos and a negative outcome!
A ®re department may sincerely believe they have a command system in place.
They have a rank structure, they have a system of staged response, they have a
document that says `Incident Command' as its heading. But if they don't have
coordination, if they don't have command from the ®rst unit arriving on-scene, if
they don't have the most vital parts of the ICS in place, if they don't have trained
and knowledgeable leaders and an effective system of communication, they will fail
somewhere. If the `leader' simply turns up on-scene, says, `I am now in command,'
and begins to shout orders at the top of his/her voice in a micro-managed style
of operational management ± moving around the ®re-ground without any logical
purpose, direction or clear objectives ± then failure is inevitable.
Effective command relies on control. That's why we call it `command and
control,' for you may be in command but unless you are also in control, your system
is destined to fail when tested under the most extreme circumstances. The effective
control of a ®re-scene can only come from an organized and disciplined structure
of command that provides practical channels of communication. The concept of
`fail-safe' operations must also be inherent throughout the system to ensure that
where things may go wrong, there is always a back-up to check and counter errors,
or deal with changing circumstances.
There are countless examples of communication failure at ®res and these have
often led to fatalities. On occasions these failures are due to technology limitations
or malfunctions. In other situations these breakdowns in communication are due to
the human `error chain'. There are many situations where maydays have been
called over the ®re-ground radio but were never heard by on-scene commanders or
safety chiefs who were too busy shouting orders and taking care of `business'. There
have been situations where a critical message has been passed by radio to an
incident commander by a chief's aides or ®eld communications staff who were
actually within view and walking distance of the IC. However, because this critically
important message was never received or acknowledged (according to standard
radio procedure), and the sender simply `assumed' it had reached its intended
target, it is clear and well documented that lives have been lost in this way on
numerous occasions.
The NIOSH14 (USA) ®ve most common factors associated with ®re®ghter
deaths are:
14. National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health (NIOSH), Fire®ghter Fatality Investigation &
Prevention Program
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 17
Is it beginning to hit home yet? It should! We may sincerely believe we all have
®re®ghter safety covered, and an effective ICS in place, but be honest with yourself
± is that true?
I Who establishes command on the primary response, prior to a chief arriving?
I How do they establish and communicate a `mode' of command?
I How does any subsequent transfer of command occur effectively?
I Do you frequently carry out `table-top' exercises to test the ability of com-
mand functions to recover, where various peripheral events and situations
might arise to throw a normal routine approach astray?
The main objective of a size-up is to answer the questions, `How can I most effectively
deploy my forces to achieve the objectives of life and property protection?' and `Have
I got suf®cient resources on-scene?' In contrast, the purpose of a risk assessment is
to establish the level and types of exposure to risk that personnel may encounter,
and to decide how these hazards might be managed, controlled, prevented or
balanced against the potential for gains. There is undoubtedly some crossover here but,
answer this ± Can you complete a size-up without addressing the risk factors? Yes
of course! In fact, that is very common indeed. If ®re®ghters are climbing ladders
or operating in potential hazard zones without full PPE or SCBA, you may have
sized-up the ®re effectively but failed to address their exposure to risk!
18 l Euro Fire®ghter
In his book15, Chief Michael Terpak of Jersey City USA refers to an acronym ±
COAL TWAS WEALTHS, which serves as a useful reminder of how to undertake
a very advanced size-up. In this version of a size-up we can see how a more complex
analysis of a structural ®re situation might be reviewed during the ®rst ®ve minutes
of an incident.
Construction
Occupancy
Life hazard
Terrain
Water supply
Street conditions
Weather
Exposures
Area
Time
Height
Special considerations
Fig. 1.2 ± Chief Terpak's Acronym COAL TWAS WEALTHS is representative of a very
detailed size-up. It took an entire book to explain it and yet this analysis of a ®re-scene
needs to be undertaken during the ®rst few seconds following arrival.
I Life hazard
I Location
I Apparatus
I Construction
I Exposures
I Weather
I Auxiliary appliances
I Special matters
I Height
I Occupancy
I Time
As an exercise, see if you can pick out what's missing (above) in terms of risk
assessment. Or, add in where you can, how risk assessment needs addressing. For
example, there is no mention of building utilities (electric/gas supply etc.) in the
above lists. This is a risk assessment issue: ®nd them and shut them down where
needed. This is an example of recognizing a risk and managing the hazard by
removing it as far as possible.
Remember:
I Establish what the risks are
I Select a safe system of work (mode of attack)
I Implement Risk Control Measures
I Monitor the dynamic processes on the ®re-ground
I Are the risks proportional to the bene®ts or gains?
As well as the following examples of Risk Control Measures:
I Routine evaluation of risk in all situations
I Well-de®ned strategic options
I Standard Operating Procedures
I Effective training
I Accountability and SCBA air management
I Full protective clothing ensemble and equipment
I Effective incident management and communications
I Safety procedures and safety of®cers
I Back-up crews for interior attack
I Back-up crews for rapid intervention
I Covering hose-lines
I Adequate resources
I Rest and rehabilitation
I Regular evaluation of changing conditions
I Experience based on previous incidents and critiques
to ensure a safe `system of work' is selected, based on the staf®ng and resources
immediately available. Is there a `known' or `reasonably suspected' life hazard? Is
the ®re simply compartmental or has it breached structural boundaries? What is the
level of ®re involvement? What is the potential ®re load? What are the indicators
for smoke build-up and transport to voids and other areas far removed from the
®re? Can this be safely removed? Can you assure `interior attack' or `search team'
security? These are all questions that have an element of ®re®ghter safety attached.
An incident commander has a wide span of discretionary authority for making
risk management decisions. A strategic plan must not needlessly place the lives of
®re®ghters or emergency responders in danger, but it should not be so over-cautious
that it allows a ®re to destroy property that could be saved ± or keeps other valuable
functions from being performed. The ultimate test of a risk management decision is
whether or not a reasonable, well-informed person would ®nd the decision
appropriate under the circumstances.
Safety of®cer
The role of an incident safety of®cer does not relieve an incident commander of
the responsibility for managing risk at an incident. By the same token, an incident
commander should be able to rely on the incident safety of®cer to provide a
balancing perspective on the situation. An incident commander should look at a
situation as: `How to get the job done and operate safely.' The incident safety
of®cer should look at the situation as: `How to operate safely and still get the job
done.'17
A. Mobile command
1. Nothing Showing Mode: These situations generally require investigation by
the ®rst arriving unit. The of®cer can go with his/her company to check
while utilizing a portable radio to maintain mobile command.
2. Fast Attack Mode: Circumstances which call for immediate action to stabilize
the situation ± such as interior ®res in residences, apartments, or small com-
mercial occupancies ± require that the of®cer quickly decide how to commit
his/her company.
17. FEMA, (1996) Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service, FA-166, United States Fire Administration
18. National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1561: Standard on Emergency Services Incident
Management System
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 21
I Situation is stabilized; or
I Situation is not stabilized and the of®cer/company withdraws to set up a
command post, or transfers command to an arriving company or chief of®cer
who shall establish a stationary command.
If a company of®cer assumes mobile command and elects to join his/her company in
action/investigation, he/she should announce to alarm, ?Command will be operating
in the mobile command mode.'
Whenever the mobile command mode is chosen, it should be concluded
as soon as possible with one of the following outcomes:
I The situation is quickly stabilized by the initial offensive attack or the pre-
liminary investigation reveals no problem requiring the incident commander's
active participation. In either case, the company of®cer should then return
to a ®xed command location and continue to discharge his/her command
responsibilities; or
I The situation is not likely to be quickly stabilized, or initial investigations
indicate possible long-term involvement. The company of®cer should recog-
nize these situations and assign command of his/her company to a company
member or another company of®cer, return to a ®xed command location
and continue to function as the incident commander until relieved of this
responsibility ; or
I Command is passed to the next arriving company or of®cer.
Note: The `passing of command' must occur only once during any given incident
and should not be passed to an of®cer who is not yet on the scene.
I The of®cer may assign a `move up' within his/her company and place
the company into action with the personnel available. The individual and
collective experience and capability of the crew will regulate this action.
I The of®cer might assign company members to perform non-hazard zone
functions such as reconnaissance or intelligence gathering.
22 l Euro Fire®ghter
Passing command
In some SOPs, ®re authorities allow for the initial (®rst response) command
responsibility to be `passed' over to another on-scene company of®cer. This may
occur in situations where the ®rst company of®cer is deeply involved in a life safety
issue, for example, and is unable to effectively take command. In this situation the
command is `passed' by radio but this passing of command is only allowed to occur
once during any incident and then, only under extenuating circumstances. The
passing of command is not to be confused with the `transfer' of command.
Transfer of command
NFPA 1561 states that Standard Operating Procedures shall de®ne the circum-
stances and procedures for transferring command as well as to whom any such
command will be transferred. As an incident becomes larger or more complex,
the transfer of command has historically been one of the most dangerous phases
of incident management. A brie®ng that captures all essential information for
continuing effective command of the incident and provides for ®re®ghter and public
safety must occur prior to transfer of command. This information should be
recorded and displayed for easy retrieval and subsequent brie®ngs (command board
or even audio taped).
During the transfer of command, the following information should be handed
over and acted upon:
I Assume command
I Con®rm existing tactics and tactical priorities (strategic plan)
I Con®rm the tactical mode as `offensive' or `defensive'
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 23
In general (see NFPA 1561 for guidance) the roles of support and incident advisors
are to assist and mentor the IC in his/her role. Additionally there are speci®c
responsibilities assigned to each role. The support advisor is more tactical, reviewing
the strategy employed and assigning logistics and safety responsibilities. The
incident advisor will liaise with other agencies, where necessary, and provide
strategic support, but will not become involved at the tactical level. A local of®cer
may well ®ll this role most effectively where possible.
An Incident Advisory Team is not incident management by committee. Each of
the team members has a speci®c set of roles and responsibilities and the IC role is
not necessarily adopted by the senior ranking chief in the team but rather the ®rst
arriving chief. The Incident Advisory Team process is designed to increase the
effectiveness of command and ®re®ghter safety during the most critical stages of the
incident. This `front-end loading' of the command organization allows the team to
effectively manage the ®rst hour of an incident, which is statistically the most
dangerous period for ®re®ghters. It is also the most critical time for decision-making
and it is almost impossible to recover from poor operations on the front-end of an
19. National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1561: Standard on Emergency Services Incident
Management System, (2008 Version)
24 l Euro Fire®ghter
incident. Accountability within the team should apply to all three members but
ultimate responsibility should lie with the IC, even though he/she may not be the
senior ranking of®cer.
Span-of-control
Span-of-control is perhaps the most fundamentally important management
principle of ICS. It applies to the management of individual responsibilities and
response resources. The objective is to limit the number of responsibilities being
handled by, and the number of resources reporting directly to, an individual. ICS
considers that any single person's span-of-control should be between three and
seven, with ®ve being ideal. In other words, one manager should have no more than
seven people working under them at any given time.
When span-of-control problems arise around an individual's ability to meet
responsibilities, they can be addressed by expanding the organization in a modular
fashion. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. An incident commander can
delegate responsibilities to a deputy and/or activate members of the command staff.
Members of the command staff can delegate responsibilities to assistants, etc.
There may be exceptions, usually in lower-risk assignments or where resources
work in close proximity to each other.
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 25
the nose landing gear operated correctly, but the 59 cents indicator green light bulb
was at fault. In the wake of the needless death and destruction, the Crew Resource
Management (CRM) program was developed and implemented by the commercial
airline industry.
There are ®ve critical components that comprise the basis of the Crew Resource
Management program (CRM). These are:
I Communication under stress
I Teamwork
I Leadership
I Task allocation
I Critical decision making
5. Violating limitations
Violation of de®ned operating limitations or speci®cations either intentionally or
inadvertently ± as prescribed by manufacturers, regulations, manuals, or speci®-
cations ± opens the door wide for an accident. This `link' includes equipment
speci®cations, operation limitations, and local, state and federal regulations relating
to the safe operation and use of all equipment.
6. Inadequate leadership
A failure to establish or assert command, or inadequate performance in leadership,
is questionably the leading cause of ®re®ghter LODDs. The ability to take control of
a situation, to establish authority, to formulate a viable and achievable strategy, and
to communicate effectively in both dispatch and receipt of messages, are critical
functions of an incident commander. Furthermore, besides having an in-depth
understanding of operating procedures and the technical aspects of ®re-ground
management, building construction, ®re behavior, hazards and safety, an effective
incident commander possesses the ability to immediately recognize a situation that
is placing his/her ®re®ghters in a dangerous position, and will implement instant
actions on the ®re-ground to ensure their safety.
Guiding principles and managing risk at ®res l 29
7. `Tunnel vision'
It is often very easy to lose sight of changing conditions. This may occur where an IC
is overloaded with tasks, or where he/she has established an incident plan but misses
vital information that might cause this plan to be altered. It is essential to search out
this information ± which might be as critical as occupants who have escaped to the
street whilst ®re®ghters are being sent in to search for them, initial reports of a ®re
on the seventeenth ¯oor being changed to the sixteenth ¯oor, or cracks appearing in
a wall of the structure. It is essential that on-scene intelligence is gathered and any
amendments to the ®re-ground plan are made immediately as practical. Take time
to step back and see the overall picture and gain as much early information as
possible within a minimal time-scale.
9. Ambiguity/unresolved discrepancies
Ambiguity exists any time two or more independent sources of information do
not agree. This can include observations, radio reports, people, training manuals,
SOPs, senses or expectations that do not correspond with existing conditions. This
situation is often overlooked and reappears only after an accident occurs. Failure
to resolve con¯icts of opinion, information, or changes in conditions, or not raising
issues that need to be brought to the attention of command or sector of®cers,
generally has very negative consequences.
22. National Fallen Fire®ghters Foundation, (2007), National Fire®ghter Life Safety Summit
32 l Euro Fire®ghter
I Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to
the initiatives;
I Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health
and safety;
I Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or
mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement;
I Thoroughly investigate all ®re®ghter fatalities, injuries, and near misses;
I National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should
be developed and championed.
Chapter 2
Venting structures ±
The reality
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 US ®re ventilation tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 European ®re zoning tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Anti-ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Tactical ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Ventilation pro®le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 Pre-existing ventilation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.8 Unplanned ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.9 Objectives of venting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.10 Considerations of venting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 Creating safe vent openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.12 Air-track management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.13 Selecting ventilation locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.14 Timing ventilation openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.15 Venting for LIFE (including VES). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.16 Venting for FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.17 Venting for SAFETY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.18 Venting large ¯oor spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.19 Horizontal ventilation ± The Glass Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.20 Vertical ventilation ± Resource dependent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.21 Positive Pressure Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.22 Positive Pressure Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.23 Limited-staf®ng issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.24 FDNY Ladders 3 ± Occupied non-®reproof tenements . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.25 FDNY Ladders 4 ± Private dwellings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.26 Risk management ± Venting structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.27 Venting and rapid ®re progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.28 Combining US-EURO tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
33
34 l Euro Fire®ghter
2.1 INTRODUCTION
a vast range of occupancies from tiny apartments to of®ces to hotels. The white or
cream frontages were often decorated with dramatic pillars and other architectural
effects, and there were sometimes interconnecting balconies at the lower levels. The
rear of these buildings were never quite so grand in their appearance, and I could
instantly see why the hook ladder was renowned for its use in some incredible
rescues in this part of London (with narrow alleys and dif®cult structural recesses to
access). But the area was rapidly changing to the north and west of the station's
response area and this is where we were on this very night; Chippenham Road W2 to
be exact!
In this sadly abandoned structure I could feel the radiated heat from the stairway
on the side of my face. It really was beginning to `roar' up the stairs and there were
some anxious looks around the room. Finally the ladder came back to our position
in what were probably just a few brief moments, but it seemed a lot longer. We were
all grateful to abandon this situation and escape the clutches of a ®re that was now
threatening the stability of the entire structure. However, as we reached the ground
a call came from the rear of the building for a hook ladder!
0315 hours I was straight off the escape ladder and up onto the roof of the engine
to get the short steel-hooked ladder. All crews were committed to searching the last
remaining uninvolved sections of the building for one of the `squatters' who was still
missing. We were at the back of the building within seconds and I went up with
Dave Woodward. The absence of window glass made this an easy climb with the
hook ladder. We had an escape line with us and were checking all the rooms at all
levels as we arrived. The ®re was pretty lively by now and was spreading into the
rooms themselves from the stairway. We reached the top ¯oor and then as we did so
the room turned orange. Flames came belching out of the window and we made a
hasty retreat back down to ground.
The squatter turned up later and thankfully had evacuated himself from the ®re.
Hey if my training instructor had seen all this he would have been proud! Tom,
wherever you are ± thanks for shedding my fears!
1. Grimwood, P., (1992), Fog Attack, FMJ/DMG International Publications Ltd, Redhill, Surrey, UK
36 l Euro Fire®ghter
Having worked at close quarters with South Bronx ®re®ghters in the FDNY during
an eighteen month detachment in the mid 1970s, I have seen how the US ®re
service operates. The South Bronx area during the late 1960s to mid 1970s was
literally `ablaze' with several working ®res in almost every street, every night! The
smell of smoke ®lled the air and a depressing foggy haze constantly hung over
the southern part of the borough. The ®re®ghters of this era had plenty of ®re
experience upon which to base their strategic approaches and it became clear that
opening up structures by breaking windows and cutting holes in roofs was a daily
and routine event. This action was taken to relieve interior smoke and heat
conditions and assist ®re®ghters in advancing inside the structure to rescue trapped
occupants and suppress the ®re.
It was certain that the high volumes of ¯aming combustion that emerged from
exterior openings were something I had rarely seen during my ®ve years of inner-city
®re®ghting in London, preceding this assignment. The sight of such large structures
alight on all ¯oors reminded me of pictures and movies I had seen of bombings from
the Second World War. Fire would come rolling out of multiple windows on all four
faces of very large brick-built structures and sometimes take the roof as well, prior to
successful suppressive efforts being achieved.
Furthermore, as a volunteer ®re®ghter on Long Island, New York, I was trained
and regularly deployed to open up and ventilate buildings by breaking windows and
cutting holes in roofs at almost every working structure ®re we attended. The
training manual stated `vent early and vent often' and this was the creed by which we
worked. I have to say, unlike the FDNY, the volunteers lacked the ®re experience
of their inner-city brothers and most efforts to ventilate structures seemed
uncoordinated, imprecise and inappropriate.
I questioned the sense in opening up structures in this way; it appeared
the buildings often suffered badly through the sheer extent of ®re spread, as air
¯owed in freely to enrich the ¯aming combustion. However, I was soon to learn
that New York City construction differed internally when compared to structures
common in London, with small attic spaces termed `cocklofts' and structural voids
frequently located within buildings. Such structural features allowed ®re to travel
upwards to the roof with great speed, before mushrooming across to take the
entire roof, then moving back downwards as the ®re began to devour ¯oor by ¯oor.
The large open staircases that were so common in tenements also exempli®ed how
large numbers of people were often trapped by smoke and heat mushrooming into
upper ¯oors. A simple venting action at the head of the stairs, where roof teams
removed or opened skylights, quickly relieved interior conditions and enabled
the majority of occupants to escape unaided. I also witnessed some great roof
operations where roof cuts of varying types and purpose undoubtedly saved
structures from more severe ®re damage, con®ning the ®re to speci®c wings or
parts of a structure.
On a wider note, my overall experiences of the ventilation strategy ± whilst
working on a series of lengthy detachments to ®re departments across the USA ±
demonstrated that a large number of ®re®ghters would break out windows blindly,
with no apparent intent, direction or purpose. Even so, I acknowledged that the
general concept of opening up buildings under speci®c circumstances would reap
great rewards, providing the strategy was applied with a clear purpose, or intent and
that the actions of ®re®ghters were organized, disciplined and controlled.
38 l Euro Fire®ghter
2. Note: At the time of writing, PPV has never been a strategy used by London ®re®ghters. It has
been used for some years, however, in several other major European cities, e.g. Paris, Manchester,
Newcastle, Liverpool and Birmingham, to aid ®re®ghting operations.
Venting structures ± The reality l 39
outside, for fear of causing a backdraft or smoke explosion. Subsequently, the ®re
was located after much of the smoke had cleared from the structure.
An effective venting strategy demands that a ®re department is adequately
equipped, well staffed, well organized and properly trained to operate under strictly
documented protocols. In London (as with most European ®re brigades) it has
never been the case that equipment, organization, training ± nor an operational
documented procedure ± have existed to enable effective or viable venting operations
to be carried out safely or effectively. The culture prevents an organized assault on a
®re building where gaining access to key areas at a very early stage, following ®re
service response and arrival on-scene, is critical to any success in gaining a tactical
advantage. Therefore, the anti-ventilation process still remains the dominant
strategic approach to ®res in Europe.
What is required is some middle ground to both approaches that recognizes
situations where a building is best left `closed', as well as other situations where the
creation of vent outlets will greatly assist the overall ®re®ghting and rescue operation.
2.4 ANTI-VENTILATION
The men of the ®re brigade were taught to prevent, as much as possible, the access of
air to the burning materials. What the open door of the ash-pit is to the furnace of a
steam-boiler, the open street door is to the house on ®re. In both cases the door gives
vital air to the ¯ames.
James Braidwood
Master of Fire Engines, Edinburgh Fire Engine Establishment
On the Construction of Fire-engines and Apparatus, the Training
of Firemen and the Methods of Proceeding in Cases of Fire (1830)
Anti-ventilation is the con®nement, or isolation, of the ®re compartment (room or
space) from other areas that may be occupied. We do this by zoning off the ®re room
simply by closing the door. Such actions prevent air ¯owing in to feed the ®re but,
perhaps more importantly, will greatly reduce the amounts of combustion products,
smoke, heat and ¯ame transporting throughout the structure. This may also serve to
reduce the dangers associated with rapid ®re escalation, ¯ashover, backdraft and
smoke explosions.
Anti-ventilation may be the optimum strategy where:
I A clear objective or reason to create an opening has yet to be identi®ed;
I A ®re is demonstrating `under-ventilated' conditions;
I A charged primary hose-line is not yet in position to attack the ®re;
I The location of vent openings may spread the ®re into roof spaces;
I A ventilation-controlled ®re might advance towards ¯ashover; and
I The ¯ow-rate at the nozzle is unlikely to deal with such escalation;
I A snatch rescue (interior search without attack line in position) is in progress;
I Wind is entering the A side of the structure (for example the entry doorway)
but we need to vent the B, C, or D sides for Vent-Enter-Search (VES) ±
Close the entry door as much as possible until all VES operations are
completed. Remember to close doors or control their opening widths where they
may be feeding air in to escalate a ®re ± ®re isolating or containment actions may
serve as life-saving tactics on their own!
Venting structures ± The reality l 41
If you make as many vent openings in a ®re building as possible, is this likely to
relieve conditions and stabilize the ®re, or will it make things worse? Venting is the
tactical approach adopted by many. However, if you shut every building up tightly
and consider ventilation as an after-thought, once the ®re is under control, are you
doing any better?
Establishing a middle-ground approach to ®re venting strategy and tactics
requires acknowledgment that there are both advantages and disadvantages to be
gained by `opening up' structures in some situations and leaving them `closed' in
others.
The author's original de®nition of his 1991 strategy states:
The ®rst four points are primary to any decision to ventilate and the second four
points may be equally as critical. Without the answers you cannot safely ventilate
and without a primary objective in mind, you cannot justify any sound reason to vent.
42 l Euro Fire®ghter
3. From an incident command point of view, various authorities will/may use a range of communicative
designators to assign speci®c sides, areas or ¯oors in a structure for the purposes of assigning tasks
and command functions. One method is A, B, C and D sides ± A being the front, and then B, C, D
clockwise when facing the front of the structure.
44 l Euro Fire®ghter
������� ������
���� ��� � �� ��� ������ �� ����� � ����� ������� ���� �� ��� �������� ��� ������� ���
�������� ����� ��� ��������� ���� ������ ���� ��� ��� ����� �� ����� � ���� ��� ��� ����
������� �������� �� ��� ��������� �����������
�� � ���� ����������
������� ������
������� ������
���� ��� � �� ��� �������� ���� �� ����� � �� ������ ��� ��� ����� ���� �� ����� � �������
����� ����� � ���� ������ ������� ��� ��� ������ ���� ���� ����� � ��������� ��� ����� ��
���� ��� ����������
���� ��� � �� ��� �������� ���� �� ����� � �� ������ ��� ��� ����� ���� �� ����� � �������
����� ����� � ���� ������ ������� ��� ��� ������ ���� ���� ����� � ��������� ��� ����� ��
���� ��� ����������
Venting structures ± The reality l 47
The air-track is the `point to point' route that is taken by air ¯owing into a structure
and combustion products leaving the structure. Sometimes, a fully involved room
on ®re will have an open or failed window and yet there will be little or no smoke
or ¯aming issuing. This may be because the window is serving as the air inlet point
and ¯aming combustion, or smoke, is issuing at another point. In ¯uid dynamics,
the term `gravity current' (or density current) is primarily a horizontal ¯ow in a
gravitational ®eld that is driven by a density difference. Such ¯ows may occur in
air, water, snow, volcano lava, or in many other ways. A typical gravity current air-
track in a ®re structure sees the movements of cool air ¯owing in (`under-pressure')
and hot air (smoke or ¯ames) moving out in the `over-pressure' area. Both ¯ows
are in opposition to each other but it is only at the interface of the two ¯ows that
they meet. In effect, we have air ¯owing in, and smoke ¯owing out, of the same
opening.
It is useful to ascertain on arrival where the air-track (if in existence) is entering
and leaving the structure. As information is relayed to the incident commander it
then becomes apparent how the air-track might affect tactical objectives. The
choices are to:
Potentially, the ®rst action may be to close down and control the air-track ± this may
have some stabilizing effect over ®re conditions.
A moving smoke layer may develop in The ®re may develop rapidly, beyond
the overhead which will draw more air the control of the ¯ow-rate available at
in on the `under-pressure' and create the nozzle.
better visibility at lower level.
Much needed air/oxygen may ¯ow into The ®re may advance into areas
areas occupied by trapped occupants. occupied by trapped victims or
searching ®re®ghters, or into structural
voids.
Fig. 2.3 ± Both positive and negative effects may be derived from the existence of an air-
track in a ®re, and the ®re commander must weigh up the bene®ts and disadvantages in
each speci®c situation. Where no amount of water (or insuf®cient water) is ¯owing on the
®re, it may be sensible to reduce the air-track or prevent it entirely.
������� ���������� � ��� ������� � ��
������� ������
4 5
FIRE
������� ������
3 6
2 1
���� ��� � ��������� ���������� ���� �������� ����������� ������ �� ������ ����
���� ��� � ��������� ���������� ���� �������� ����������� ������ �� ������ ����
50 l Euro Fire®ghter
Air-track pro®ling
Air-track pro®ling means assessing the various ways an air-track might form in a
structure ®re, demonstrating the `point to point' pathway or route that the air¯ow
might take, from vent inlet to outlet. It must be pointed out that not all ®res will
present an obvious air-track. In some cases, an air-track may not be in existence,
even where there is suf®cient air available from within the structure to allow a ®re to
develop and progress through the various growth stages.
I Scenario A (1 to 1) ± Air ¯ows in at the lower area of the entry doorway and
heads towards the ®re, whilst hot gases and smoke (or ¯ame) head back
towards the door, leaving the room or compartment at the upper area of the
opening. In this scenario, smoke and heat will head directly towards the
position occupied by advancing ®re®ghters and subject them to varying
amounts of radiant heat.
I Scenario B (5 to 5) ± Air ¯ows in at the lower area of an open (or broken)
window located near the ®re whilst smoke and heat (or ¯aming) leave
the upper area of the same window. In this case, radiant heat from the air-
track is mainly limited to the immediate area of the window and room of
involvement.
I Scenario C (3 to 5) ± Air ¯ows in at the lower area of an open (or broken)
window located some way from the ®re, whilst hot gases and smoke (or ¯ame)
leave the upper area of the same window. In this case, a much larger area is
exposed to radiant heat from the air-track, between the ®re and the window.
I Scenario D (1 to 4/5) ± Air ¯ows in the entry doorway whilst smoke and
heat (or ¯aming) leave the compartment/building via one or more windows.
The greatest amount of radiant heat exists from and between the ®re and the
window(s).
I Scenario E (5 to 2) ± Air ¯ows in through an open or broken window whilst
smoke and heat (or ¯aming) leave the compartment/building at another
window ± the two windows are some distance apart. In this case, the ®re
may be localized at a point somewhere between the two windows or it may
involve the entire area. This may particularly occur where an exterior wind is
directing the air-track, where a ®re exists centrally between two points, or
where the ®re is on a lower level and an opening is created at a higher level.
I Scenario F (one to avoid) ± This scenario is not related to the ¯oor-plan in
Fig. 2.4 but rather to a multi-level occupancy where the ®re involves part of
an occupancy on a lower ¯oor (for example the ®re is on the third ¯oor of a
twelve-story building). The air-track in this situation may occur in several
ways but if the door(s) and pathway from the stair-shaft to the occupancy
remain open, air will ¯ow up and into the occupancy, feeding the ®re. There
are several possibilities here:
1. The air-track is from stairs to ®re to window outlet
2. The air-track is from stairs to ®re, back to stairs (windows intact)
3. The air-track is from a window to the ®re, back to a window
Any actions we might take that may alter this particular air-track, thus
causing a negative pressure to occur behind advancing ®re®ghters, may
create a clear tactical disadvantage for the advancing ®e®ghters.
An example of this might be where we create an open path from stairs to
occupancy with all doors open en route. If we add to this an open door in the
Venting structures ± The reality l 51
stair-shaft at ground level and then create an opening at the head of the stairs
on the roof (perhaps an automatic venting system will do this for us on detect-
ing smoke in the stairway), we may see a sudden and massive air movement in
the direction of the stair-shaft. It is this negative pressure, created by the up-
draft as air travels out of the roof vent, that can actually `draw' or `pull' ®re out
of the occupancy into access routes, corridors, hallways and adjacent areas.
At a ®re in a Houston residential high-rise, one ®re of®cer described this effect as
follows:
They exited the apartment and headed down the hall, but a nasty thing happened
when they opened the stairwell door, sources say. The stairwell acted like a ferocious
maw, sucking heat and smoke down from the burning apartment. For Jahnke and
Green the effect was overwhelming. The smoke grew thick as a blindfold; a torrent of
hot air whirred past. The captains reportedly tried to beat a retreat by following their
hose out of the apartment and down the hallway, a task made brutally complicated by
the coiled, irregular pathway of their lifeline. The violent shift in the air current created
high confusion by sucking the heat away from the ®re. To Jahnke it seemed as if they
were headed toward the ®re, not away from it, as they followed the path of the hose,
Hauck says.
This ®re was a tragedy and Captain Jahnke lost his life. Another incident involved
two London ®re®ghters who also lost their lives while ®ghting a basement ®re.
Whilst ®re®ghters were making their advance down into the ®re, a stair-shaft was
vented at the roof. This action created a reverse in the air-track that caused a sudden
and intense development of the ®re.
There are countless situations where stair-shaft venting actions have saved lives.
There are also many instances where such actions have caused sudden reversal of
the air-track, pulling ®re out of an occupancy, and lives have been lost.
Therefore it is critical that we consider the following points:
I As much as possible, try to keep doors closed between the stair-shaft and
®re-involved occupancy.
I Vent with an objective ± as always!
I When venting the head of a stair-shaft in a building where ®re-protecting
lobbies are not constructed at each ¯oor level, ensure that an adequate ¯ow-
rate is working on the ®re and coordinate with the attack team.
I Close the roof vent if any sudden or unexpected reversal of the air-track
occurs.
I The effect of stair-shaft ventilation requires openings to be made at both the
top and bottom of the stairway.
I Where auto-smoke vents are ®tted in a stair-shaft, good pre-planning will
ensure that ®re®ghters are aware of this arrangement. Be aware of any
overriding facility that may exist to take control of sudden air-track reversal.
These are just a few examples of how air-tracks might form. The important points
concerning air-tracks are:
I The point to point air-track is from inlet to ®re to outlet.
I The air inlet may also serve as the outlet (may be the same window).
I The inlet and outlet may be the entry door.
I There may be radiant heat from the overhead, between ®re and outlet.
52 l Euro Fire®ghter
As this book will convey over and over again, a common error that may lead to
®re®ghter injuries, or even fatalities, is the failure to account for wind direction
and velocity when selecting an opening point. At one ®re, used as a case history in
this book, ®re®ghters were certain that the point of entry for the ®re would be as
follows ± in this order and whatever the circumstances!
In this case, their entry point suited both of the above requirements. However, they
were entering into the leeward side of the structure. This meant that if any opening
was created on the windward side, either through planned or unplanned ventilation,
then the interior of the structure was likely to become untenable. Does it truly make
sense to attempt to gain ground against a headwind in this way? In reality, the ®re
could have been more effectively approached from the `®re side' via the `rear'
entrance! Even though there is a fear that the advancing hose-line and wind may
drive the ®re throughout the structure, here is a de®nite opportunity to control
the air-track by closing the entry (rear) door.
Note: If wind is entering the A side of the building (entry doorway) and we need
to VES the B, C or D sides, then we need to control/close the entry door as much as
possible whilst this is occurring.
If wind is entering the A side (entry doorway) and openings are non-existent
elsewhere in the structure, we either need to create one as near to the ®re as possible,
or maintain the entry doorway, closing it as far as possible to prevent wind
in¯uencing ®re development. Would you Positive Pressure Ventilate (PPV) a ®re
building without having ®rst created a vent outlet?
54 l Euro Fire®ghter
4. The coordination of search team and ®re attack team are con®rmed; the air-track is in existence from
A side to D side; a venting action of the ¯oor above the ®re D side, followed by the B side, should be
effective in clearing combustion products, ®re gases and smoke from most of this area.
5. The coordination of search team and ®re attack team are not con®rmed; the air-track is in existence
from C side to A side; it might be dangerous to create openings on the upper ¯oor for fear of pulling ®re
up the stairs, trapping the ®re®ghters. An immediate effort to get the primary line in place, protecting
their means of escape, should be undertaken prior to any venting actions occurring. In this situation the
wind direction is a major factor and even committing ®re®ghters into such a situation is extremely
hazardous.
Venting structures ± The reality l 55
easily achieved by the simple removal, or opening, of a roof access hatch over
the stairway. However, this required some reactive tactical decision making by the
incident commander that often came late in the incident, despite immediate access
being available via aerial ladders, or other adjacent roofs. The author was concerned
about the lack of thought being applied to such tactics and began a campaign in the
1980s to reverse this tactical failing that appeared common throughout the UK.
The concept of venting stairways from the roof was widely practiced by FDNY
®re®ghters who have this written into their SOPs and the author learned this
valuable lesson during his 1970s detachment from London to the New York Fire
Department.
Vent-Enter-Search
Another valuable search tactic is that of Vent-Enter-Search (VES) which requires
an outside vent ®re®ghter to position, according to documented pre-assigned tasks
(SOPs), either on the face of a building using a ®xed metal ®re escape, or the side or
rear of a structure. This assignment's role was to provide ventilation (for ®re) or to
assess where there were access points (windows) that might lead to rooms near,
above, or adjacent to the ®re room where a quick entry might be made, and a search
completed, before returning back to the relative safety of the access point.
On occasions, VES would be used in the ®re room itself. Many times a ladder has
been placed, or an outside vent man (OV) has worked from an exterior ®re escape,
to locate and enter a window serving the ®re compartment itself. A quick venting
action, followed by a quick entry through the window and a rapid search of areas
near to the window, have enabled some dramatic rescues to be completed. Often, a
baby lying in a cot has been pulled from the clutches of ®re in this way.
Being successful at using the VES concept relies on the following
considerations:
I The concept of VES must be written into SOPs.
I Fire®ghters should train for VES.
I It may be a pre-assigned task or a reactive decision.
I It must be communicated to all interior crews that this venting action is
occurring and at which speci®c location (D side second ¯oor etc.).
I If wind is entering the A side of the building (entry doorway) and we need to
VES the B, C, or D sides, then we need to close the entry door as much as
possible whilst this is occurring.
I Ideally, VES is undertaken by a minimum of two ®re®ghters in full PPE and
SCBA, with only one entering the room and the other remaining at the head
of the ladder or outside the window being used.
I Close the door to this room (see below).
I The ®re®ghter entering will make a quick sweep search of the room.
I On completing the search, return and exit via the entry point.
I Do NOT proceed further inside the structure to search other areas.
I Report back that the room has been searched and look for other potential
VES points to repeat the process.
Where an entry is made to a ®re compartment using correct CFBT door entry
techniques, several short `pulses', or a couple of brief `bursts' of 35±40 degree
(cone) water-fog are often enough to cool the overhead and inert the gas layers,
whilst maintaining thermal balance in the room. An exterior venting action of the
window then takes place and the water vapour escapes within the smoke. This
allows ®re®ghters to advance into a safer environment to fully extinguish the ®re.
Cross-ventilation tactics in large structures are generally only effective for very
small ®res where vast amounts of smoke are generated, for example in pipe lagging
or similar. Again, in larger ®res, the creation of horizontal ventilation openings may
be counter-productive.
operations on roofs. This task has now moved down the line of prioritization in
some areas as it has been affected by Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) duties or
FAST truck (Fire®ghter Assist Search Team) assignments, for example, which will
often be a primary response function.
The use of PPV to create a forced draft `point to point' air-track, in order to clear a
structure of smoke, is now a commonly used strategy in post-®re situations where
the ®re has been declared under control. In some (but not all) situations the ®re may
not be fully extinguished but a major knock-down of the ®re has been achieved.
There are a wide range of PPV ventilators on the market with differing designs
that may produce slightly different effects. The objective is to get a high amount of
air forced into the structure, moving at a good velocity.
Two types of ventilator:
I Conventional air-stream
I Turbo air-stream
Three-phased approach:
I Phase One ± Post-®re use for smoke clearance only (®re completely
extinguished).
I Phase Two ± At a stage where the ®re was declared `under control' but
remained burning to some extent ± smoke clearance.
I Phase Three ± Pre-®re attack (pre-entry) for clearing a path of heat and
smoke to enable a rapid entry and advance.
Despite the belief that Phase One and Two PPV operations were hazard-free, there
were several instances where the ®re was re-instated to a point where structures
burned out of control, having already been suppressed to a stage of damp-down,
turn over and overhaul.
This was caused by small amounts of hidden ®re remaining in voids and attics
that fed on the forced draft to develop and burn with some greater ferocity. There
was also the effect of re-instating the pyrolysis process. This occurred as hot wall
linings and surface fuels, which had been mostly extinguished, started to produce
¯ammable gases from a state of smolder to a stage where these gases may actually
ignite from the sparks being driven out of the surfaces, in the forced draft created by
PPV. This effect has led to ¯ashovers (thermal runaway) occurring even after the
®re had been controlled or almost extinguished.
Despite these drawbacks, the concepts of PPV were being advanced (at the time
of writing) in a wide number of UK ®re brigades, including six of the seven large
metropolitan ®re authorities in England and Scotland (not London Fire Brigade), as
well as many other parts of Europe.
When purchasing PPV equipment ®re brigades will need to consider the
following:
I The suitability of the selected fan
I Fan performance
I The necessary stowage and maintenance arrangements
I The necessary mobilizing and call-out arrangements
I The training of personnel
I The manual handling implications (weight and portability)
I The levels of noise
PPV should not be introduced as part of ®re-ground operations until ®re®ghters
have a clear understanding of the use of tactical ventilation and its effect on ®re
behavior.
I The air inlet point must be geometrically suited to the air outlet
I The outlet opening must be at least 50% in area of the air inlet point
I Fire®ghters must not block the air¯ow at the inlet point
I No PPV where conditions present warning signs of backdraft
I No PPV in large compartments where the ®re is ventilation controlled
I No PPV unless the IC has clear communication with the interior crews
I The control of the fan must be an assignment and must be staffed
I The placement of the fan is critical ± not too close!7
I Known voided properties or balloon-frame structures may not be suited to
this strategic approach.
I Thermal image cameras (TICs) may assist in locating such ®re spread.
I Consider the effect of automatic venting systems, where installed.
I Where VES is practiced, PPA may not be a viable tactic unless carefully
coordinated with a single room entry (vent point).
I Risk Control Measures should include cover hose-lines at points where
intense exterior ¯aming may cause exposure problems.
I The PPA air-¯ow should never be applied after entry has been made.
I A period of at least 30 seconds should occur between PPA air¯ow being
initiated and entry being made, to allow for some stabilization of the smoke
mixing and the creation of a directional forced draft (NIST suggest up to 120
seconds before stabilization occurs).
I If, at any stage, the ®re conditions appear to worsen inside the structure, recall
the interior team to evacuate and direct the air¯ow away from the inlet open-
ing as they exit, but where any such ®re development is threatening their escape
route, direct the air¯ow away from the inlet point immediately.8
Tactical awareness
There have been some suggestions that the narrow air-cone of the turbo units may
allow the potential for some blow-back of ¯aming at the entry door. This may be the
case if the air is ¯owing directly into the room involved and the vent outlet has not
been created, or is not large enough to handle the air exhaust rate.
There is also some potential for a very large PPV ventilator to be too powerful for
PPA in a small area or compartment. In this instance, a very large vent outlet is
needed, or the speed of the fan must be reduced to decrease the amount of air ¯owing
7. Positioning of the PPV ventilator in pre-attack (PPA) is critical because if the unit is placed too close,
the potential exists for some `blow-back' from the ®re gases as they roll out of the entry inlet (doorway)
and ignite, rather than being directed through and out of the exit outlet (window). The potential for
¯ashover inside the structure also exists where the path to the exit outlet is restricted in any way. This
can occur where an interior door is closed, where ®re®ghters overcrowd and block the route, or where
the exit outlet is not created prior to fan placement, or is not large enough. The ®re conditions must be
closely monitored in order to assess what effect the forced draft from the ventilator is having on ®re
development.
8. This point is worthy of debate amongst students ± if ®re conditions are deteriorating and the fan's air-
¯ow is directed away from the inlet opening (doorway), both visibility and interior heat conditions may
rapidly deteriorate and greatly hinder the interior crew's escape from the structure. At the same time, it
is natural to remove the believed cause of the ®re's sudden deterioration by turning the fan away. This
is a critical decision to be made by the fan assignment (as staffed) and the air-¯ow should be
maintained into the structure, where occupied by ®re®ghters, for as long as possible. Many ®re®ghters
have been able to escape ¯ashover conditions where the air¯ow has been maintained.
62 l Euro Fire®ghter
in. In this case, a high air-¯ow may lead to thermal runaway and ¯ashover as the
combustion products are unable to escape from the ®re compartment fast enough.
The decision to initiate PPV should only be made by the incident commander
following a dynamic risk assessment, which should include the availability of
suf®cient resources. Ideally the unit should be deployed in readiness, but should
only be activated on the instructions of the incident commander (and not as an
automatic function) who will consider various factors such as:
I The size of the compartment to be ventilated;
I The location and stage/extent of ®re development;
I If known occupants are trapped, establish their location;
I Check for signs of rapid ®re development;
I Wind direction;
I The location for the outlet vent;
I The location of the SCBA Entry Control Board (air management) may need
to be away from fans due to their operating noise;
I Hose-lines to cover outlet vent exposure risks (water is NOT to be directed
into the outlet vent under any circumstances).
Sequential ventilation
Where multiple rooms or ¯oors require ventilation, the process of sequential
ventilation will achieve the best results. This entails providing a maximum volume
of pressurized air to vent each area in turn and will minimize overall ventilation
time. The doors to all rooms should be closed initially, then, starting with the room
nearest the fan, open the door and window to maximize the positive pressure
available. Once cleared, this room can be isolated and others tackled sequentially in
the same manner. The same principle is used for multiple ¯oors starting at the
lowest affected area. For large volume buildings it may be possible to use sequential
ventilation if the area can be divided into smaller compartments. This will
dramatically improve the effect of PPV.
This approach may also be used where, for example, a mattress is alight under-
neath and within, a foam sofa has smoldered for some time, or where a pile of plastic
bags has smoldered away inside a cupboard. In these scenarios the compart-
ment itself may have accumulated a heavy layer of combustion products, smoke and
¯ammable (even cold) ®re gases within. Prior to lifting the mattress or the plastic
bags, or cutting into the sofa to reveal the ®re, PPV (or hydraulic or natural venting)
may be used to remove the dangerous combustion products from the immediate
zone. This simple act may prevent a `smoke explosion' and save lives!
9. Fire Research & Development Group (UK Home Of®ce), (1996), Report 17/96
64 l Euro Fire®ghter
direction, should the strength, and/or direction of the wind, change during the
ventilation process.
Burning rate
A room ®re will develop towards ¯ashover, providing it has adequate amounts of
fuel and air/oxygen. In a large room with high ceilings and items of stock or furniture
spread widely apart, any progressive development towards ¯ashover may be hindered,
as any ®re spread from a single burning item (unless very large) through convection,
conduction or radiation is unlikely to occur. However, in smaller rooms, convected
heat will reach the ceiling and radiated heat may well reach surrounding fuels where
closely spaced. If suf®cient air is available then the ®re will develop to ¯ashover. The
heat output of the ®re is dependent on these facts, along with the potential ®re load
in the room. A burning ®re load can only burn to around 50% ef®ciency where air is
supplied through normal-sized windows and doors. However, where air is forced
into the compartment, space or room by an exterior wind, or PPV air-¯ow, it is just
like blowing on barbecue coals; they will glow and burn more ef®ciently and ®ercely.
The energy is released more rapidly from the fuel (®re load) where this occurs and
NIST research showed that the burning rate of a room ®re might be increased by up
to 60%10.
This raises a question about ®re®ghting ¯ow-rate. If we are to accept that a
compartment ®re is likely to achieve an increased rate of burn (up to 60% greater)
where PPV is used over natural ventilation, perhaps we should also be considering
how effective the available ¯ow-rate at the nozzle is likely to be. Another question
addresses the potential for an increased rate of burn causing compartmental
boundaries to become breached by ®re at an earlier stage. Such an effect might then
lead to earlier structural collapse. Whilst the rate of burn (heat release) may increase
in this way, ®re compartment temperatures, on the other hand, may not increase,
as the incoming air from the PPV air-¯ow serves to cool the environment. This is
an effective way to demonstrate to students the differences between heat and
temperature.
However, a further series of test burns11 in a three-story ®re training building
were scienti®cally monitored by NIST and provided a range of typical results. It was
suggested that ¯oor temperatures in the ®re compartment were likely to increase in
situations where PPV caused a room ®re to burn with greater intensity, despite the
cooler air¯ow from the PPV:
The [NIST] data indicated that, with both natural and Positive Pressure Ventilation
techniques, using correct ventilation scenarios resulted in lower temperatures within
the structure at the 0.61 m (2 ft) height, where victims may have been located, and
at the 1.22 m (4 ft) height, where ®re®ghters may have been operating. There were
only limited ventilation con®gurations where the temperatures in rooms other than the
®re room exceeded the victim or ®re®ghter threshold temperatures with either
ventilation technique.
The use of Positive Pressure Ventilation resulted in visibility improving more rapidly
and, in many cases, cooled rooms surrounding the ®re room. However, the use of
Positive Pressure Ventilation also caused the ®re to grow more quickly, and in some
10. Kerber, S. & Walton, W., (2005), NIST Report NISTIR 7213, Building & Fire Research Laboratory
11. Kerber, S. & Walton, W., (2006), NIST Report NISTIR 7342, Building & Fire Research Laboratory
Venting structures ± The reality l 65
cases, created higher temperatures at the lower elevations within the structure.
Overall, this limited series of experiments suggests that PPV can assist in making the
environment in the structure more conducive for ®re®ghting operations.
Each test in this series had a ®re load that consisted of six pallets and 7.5 kg (16.5 lb)
of ®eld-cut dry hay. The ®re load was selected to achieve ¯ashover or near ¯ashover
conditions in the ®re room with up to a 2.5 MW rate of heat release. The research
proposed that vent outlets for PPA were ideally located where the vent from the ®re
room opened directly to the outside of the structure and did not cause the ®re to be
vented via paths leading through uninvolved rooms.
12. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University, p177
66 l Euro Fire®ghter
Texas University USA (Dr. O A Ezekoye): `In the ®rst study we noted evidence
that suggested that PPV with downstream venting might not be completely harmless.
While the temperature increases in the lower layers of the downstream-vented room
were not suf®ciently large to absolutely imply that injury [to occupants at ¯oor level]
was de®nite, a risk seemed to be exposed. The ®rst tests were not quite as well
characterized as the second tests, and in these tests we found the magnitude of the
heating in the lower layers did not pose a hazard.'
Chiltern Fire UK (Mostyn Bullock): `It is not my intention to give the
impression that I would support the idea that heat ¯ux at the casualty location is
always reduced by PPV. Indeed our data [regarding Test 3] indicated that the reverse
was true in that heat ¯ux levels reached 33 kW/m2 at the casualty location as a result
of the offensive use of PPV accelerating a ¯ashover of the ®re. I would support a view
that offensive PPV needs very careful deployment, especially where occupants may be
trapped downstream of the ®re.'
13. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University, p179
14. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University, p178/182
Venting structures ± The reality l 67
PPV in high-rise
Between 1985 and 2002 there were approximately 385,000 ®res in US high-rise
buildings greater than seven stories. These ®res resulted in 1,600 civilian deaths and
more than 20,000 civilian injuries15 and between 1977 and 2005,
20 ®re®ghters died from traumatic injuries suffered in high-rise ®res in the
USA16.
Note: These ®gures do not include the World Trade Center losses of 11 September
2001.
Fire®ghters often rely upon built-in ®re protection systems to help control a high-
rise ®re and protect building occupants. In many cases the buildings do not have the
necessary systems or the systems fail to operate properly.
In a later series of tests undertaken by NIST researchers17, 160 experiments
were conducted in a thirty-story vacant of®ce building in Toledo, Ohio. The
aim was to evaluate the ability of ®re department PPV fans to pressurize a stairwell
in a high-rise structure in accordance with established performance metrics for
®xed stairwell pressurization systems. Variables such as fan size, fan angle, setback
distance, number of fans, orientation of fans, number of doors open and location of
vents open, were varied to examine capability and optimization of each. Fan size
varied from 0.4 m (16 in) to 1.2 m (46 in). Fan angle ranged from 90 degrees to
80 degrees. The setback distance went from 0.6 m (2 ft) to 3.6 m (12 ft). One fan up
to as many as nine fans were used, which were located at three different exterior
locations and three different interior locations. Fans were oriented both in series and
in parallel con®gurations. Doors throughout the building were opened and closed
to evaluate the effects. Finally a door to the roof and a roof hatch were used as
vent points. The measurements taken during the experiments included differential
pressure, air temperature, carbon monoxide, meteorological data and sound levels.
I Regardless of size, portable PPV fans should be placed 1.2 m (4 ft) to 1.8 m
(6 ft) set back from the doorway and angled back at least 5 degrees. This
maximizes the ¯ow through the fan shroud and air entrainment around the
fan shroud as it reaches the doorway.
15. Hall, J.R., Jr, (2005), High-rise Building Fires, NFPA, Quincy, Massachusetts
16. NFPA Database, Traumatic Fire®ghter Fatalities in High-rise Of®ce Buildings in the United States
17. Kerber, S. & Walton, W., (2007), NIST Report NISTIR 7412, Building & Fire Research Laboratory
68 l Euro Fire®ghter
I Placing fans in a V-shape is more effective than placing them in series (this
was also noted in a European research project the author was associated with
in France in 1999±2000).
I When attempting to pressurize a tall stairwell, portable fans at the base of the
stairwell or at a ground ¯oor entrance alone will not be effective.
I Placing portable fans inside the building below the ®re ¯oor is a way
to generate pressure differentials that exceed the NFPA 92A* minimum
requirements. For example, if the ®re is on the twentieth ¯oor, placing at
least one fan at the base of the stairwell and at least one near the eighteenth
¯oor blowing air into the stairwell could meet the NFPA 92A minimum
requirements.
I Placing a large trailer mounted type fan at the base of the stairwell is another
means of generating pressure differentials that exceed the NFPA 92A mini-
mum requirements.
I Fans used inside the building should be set back and angled just as if they
were positioned at an outside doorway.
* NFPA 92a ± Recommended Practice for Smoke Control Systems (NFPA Standards)
18. Purser, D., (2002), `Toxicity Assessment of Combustion Products', in The SFPE Handbook of Fire
Protection Engineering Third Edition, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts
Venting structures ± The reality l 69
87 ppm 15 minutes
52 ppm 30 minutes
26 ppm 1 hour
9 ppm 8 hours
Fig. 2.6 ± The maximum level of carbon monoxide and exposure time that cannot be
exceeded without causing illness. Source: World Health Organization.
200 ppm 2±3 hours Mild headache, fatigue, nausea and dizziness.
3,200 ppm 5±10 minutes Headache, dizziness and nausea. Death within
1 hour.
6,400 ppm 1±2 minutes Headache, dizziness and nausea. Death within
25±30 minutes.
Threshold of hearing 0
Conversational speech 60
Heavy Truck 90
PPV 100±110
Jackhammer 100
Chainsaw 110
Fig. 2.8 ± Comparisons of sound levels (PPV as recorded during NIST research).
19. Grimwood, P., (2006), Standard Operating Guidelines 4242 for Limited Staffed Crews, Firetactics.com
Venting structures ± The reality l 71
In this situation, the use of PPA for clearing a smoke and heat-free path to the ®re is
something that a limited-staffed crew may undertake within reasonably safe
parameters. The vent outlet is already in existence; one ®re®ghter can place the
ventilator; two ®re®ghters can enter with a hose-line after a period of 60±120
seconds of PPV, allowing the entry path to be created. They may then advance to
the ®re room and continue with full suppression of the ®re or isolate the ®re (close
the door) and search all other areas of the structure prior to returning outside and
taking the ®re from the exterior window.
Brownstones
Brownstones were built in the late 1800s as private dwellings. They are typically
three to four stories with a basement on the ®rst ¯oor ± and a cellar beneath. They
are usually 20±25 ft wide and up to 60 ft deep. They can be built with party wall
construction. The roof is normally ¯at and has a small parapet wall to the front and
usually no parapet wall on the rear. Access to the roof is from the top ¯oor via a
scuttle. Although three to four stories on the front, Brownstones may have four to
®ve stories on the rear.
Rowframes
Rowframes vary from two to ®ve stories and are 20±30 ft wide, and 40±60 ft deep.
They are of balloon-frame construction and can be set in a row of up to as many as
twenty buildings. Walls separating the buildings may or may not be ®rewalls. There
may be a common cockloft (attic).
Taxpayers
This term applies to a one or two-story commercial building, with exterior masonry
walls, and wooden interior construction. Size can vary from 20 ft wide and 50 ft
deep to as much as an entire block. Taxpayers may be sprinklered ± but usually only
the cellar is. May have a common cockloft and many void spaces.
`H' type
Masonry bearing walls, wood beams, steel beams, and girders.
Stairway types vary: may be wing type (located in the wing), or transverse
(stairwells located in each wing and connected by a hallway). Although `H' is the
most common, there are other types: `E', `O', `U', and `Double H'. The narrow area
that connects the wings is referred to as the throat.
The Bronx is still loaded with six-story H-types, as far as the eye can see. Many of
these are vacant, but many are still thriving after renovation. The author is told the
far south of the borough probably has the most lingering damage from the `war
years' in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The FDNY venting strategy is pre-planned and documented across several SOPs.
Two of the most detailed of these documents are termed Ladders 3 (Tenements) and
Ladders 4 (Private Dwellings). These two documents are fairly precise in assigning
the `task-based primary response' to roles, whilst the FDNY command, control and
®re-ground radio procedures ensure that operations are effectively coordinated.
Saving life is the primary function of ladder companies. Any immediate,
limited ventilation is justi®ed if it is coordinated between the inside team and the
outside team and it will help facilitate an interior search for occupants. Bear in mind
that ventilation for search purposes will generally intensify the ®re and could endanger
other occupants of the building.
FDNY Ladders 3 (p12).
There are three key `venting' roles (termed positions) pre-assigned on the ladder
company and these are:
I The roof-position
I The outside vent position (OV)
I The chauffeur21
These three ®re®ghters comprise the `outside' team on a ladder company in New
York and the Ladders SOPs will pre-assign their tasks. They know pretty much what
their role is before they arrive on-scene. That is not to say the assignments are so
21. Note: The chauffeur (driver) is also responsible for operating the aerial ladder. However, the
additional ventilation duties are assigned on the basis that two ladders respond on the primary
response to a structure ®re. The ladder chauffeur should remain on the turntable when members have
entered the building by aerial ladder and are in precarious positions such as: a ¯oor over a heavy ®re,
the roof of a building with a heavy ®re condition etc. The chauffeur should keep alert as to the Who?
When? and Where? of members using the aerial ladder.
Venting structures ± The reality l 73
rigid that they cannot be varied or redeployed more effectively, but they remain very
proactive in anticipation of any potential for common roles that need ful®lling. For
example, the chauffeur and OV will commonly and automatically take up positions
on the front ®re escape (where in existence) to cross ventilate the structure. They
will do this in support of the interior attack teams, or for the purposes of VES
(Vent-Enter-Search) to locate victims in immediate danger in, or adjacent to, the
®re-involved room(s).
The OV position:
Except for assisting the chauffeur in front of the ®re building when aerial or portable
ladders are needed for rescue or removal, assignment is to ventilate the ®re area from
the exterior providing lateral ventilation. This is generally done from the ®re escape
landing of the ®re apartments. Access is via the front or rear ®re escape. Some
buildings have one or two apartments per ¯oor with one ®re escape. In this case the
OV's choice is eliminated and he/she uses that ®re escape.
Other buildings have three or four apartments per ¯oor (or more) and the building
will have both front and rear ®re escapes. In this case he/she must choose the correct
one to attain a position on the exterior of the ®re ¯oor. If the location of the ®re
apartment is not obvious from the exterior of the building the OV should communicate
with his/her of®cer. Once the location is veri®ed the OV can then reach the correct ®re
escape via a window from a lower or adjacent apartment or from a drop ladder/
portable ladder at ground level.
FDNY Ladders 3 (p12)
There are occasions when the OV position is varied:
I Store ®re: Ventilate the rear of the store from the exterior. If this would expose people
above on a ®re escape, ventilate immediately after they are out of danger. If a delay
in ventilation is encountered and/or anticipated, noti®cation should be made to your
company of®cer.
I Top ¯oor ®re: Proceed to roof with saw and Halligan tool. If possible, descend ®re
escape and provide ventilation. Entry and search will be completed if he/she teams
up with the second OV (or another available member). If unable to descend the ®re
escape notify your company of®cer, attempt to vent ®re apartment from roof level,
and then assist the roof ®re®ghter with roof vent.
In both situations, they will affect the removal of any occupants but still must consider
®re severity or extinguishing operations, which may endanger him/her. This task may
prove dif®cult due to window bars and or gates.
When the OV must assist the chauffeur in a removal operation, or the OV is
unable to descend the ®re escape from the roof, the of®cer may dispatch a member of
the forcible entry team to perform outside ventilation after they have forced the door to
the ®re apartment. Entry and search will be completed if he/she teams up with another
available member.
FDNY Ladders 3 (p13)
Where a tower ladder (with bucket/basket) responds as opposed to an aerial ladder,
the tactics alter slightly. The OV will operate from the basket and the chauffeur will
remain on the pedestal to take overall control of the basket's operation.
74 l Euro Fire®ghter
The roof position assignment is perhaps even more critical in the task-based
response plan.
The roof ®re®ghters' access to the roof is achieved via:
I Adjoining building
I Aerial ladder
I Rear ®re escape
I NEVER by the internal stairs
The Ladders 3 SOP continues:
The duties of a roof ®re®ghter demand an experienced, observant and determined
®re®ghter capable of decisive action. The responsibility of this position covers three
broad areas: life, communication, and ventilation. Roof ventilation is critical for search,
rescue and extinguishment of the ®re. NOTHING SHALL DETER the member
assigned the roof position from carrying out the assigned duties. The roof ®re®ghter
should always con®rm his/her way off the roof as soon as he/she reaches the roof. The
roof ®re®ghter is responsible for the following:
I Opening the bulkhead door and skylight, or scuttle and roof level skylight over
interior stairs;
I Probing bulkhead landing for victims;
I Probing for roof level skylight draft stop;
I A perimeter search of the building for persons trapped and those who may have
jumped or fallen. This search shall include the sides, rear and shafts of the building;
I Locating the ®re and making a visual check for extension across shafts or by auto
exposure;
I Transmitting vital information to the incident commander, either directly or
through the company of®cer, on conditions observed from that vantage point;
I When necessary, team up with OV to VES ®re ¯oor and, if not needed for search on
that ¯oor, proceed to VES the ¯oors above the ®re;
I When necessary, team up with second roof ®re®ghter to VES all ¯oors above the
®re;
I At top ¯oor ®res, venting top ¯oor windows from roof level. He/she is also
RESPONSIBLE FOR UTILIZATION OF THE SAW to vent the cockloft and
top ¯oor when necessary AFTER COMPLETING INITIAL DUTIES;
I Conveying information to second ladder company. Informing them of the extent of
the search completed, so that all ¯oors above the ®re may receive a thorough search.
Also informing the second ladder company when proper examination of exposed
interior stairs and public hall has not been made due to other duties. The second
ladder company shall complete the above-mentioned examinations;
I Reporting back to their company of®cer (generally located on the ®re ¯oor) when
assignment is completed or when relieved by second ladder company and apprising
them of all pertinent information.
An analysis of the FDNY approach to venting assignments sees primary responsi-
bility devolved to the individuals who must locate themselves speedily and effectively
in positions from where they will operate. Their task assignments are numerous but
are based in order of prioritization and needs as determined. They must however,
according to the directives in Ladders 3, communicate and coordinate their actions
with each other.
Venting structures ± The reality l 75
In getting into such key positions early in the ®re®ghting operation, there is much
opportunity to gather and relay vital information to others on the ®re-ground and
early opportunist rescues can be made.
FIRST FDNY LADDER COMPANY TO ARRIVE:
1. Ladder company operations on ®re ¯oor.
2. Determine life hazard and rescue as required.
3. Roof ventilation and a visual check of rear and sides from this level.
4. Laddering as needed.
5. If second ladder company will not arrive within a reasonable time, make
interior search and removal of endangered occupants above the ®re.
SECOND FDNY LADDER COMPANY TO ARRIVE:
1. All ¯oors above the ®re ¯oor for search, removal, ventilation, and to check for
®re extension.
2. Con®rm roof ventilation (assist ®rst unit).
3. Check rear and sides of buildings.
4. Reinforce laddering and removal operations when necessary.
It can be seen here that the FDNY tactical approach remains pre-assigned, but to a
much lesser degree. The second ladder company is, for example, directed to report
to the IC for its assignments. VES is normally the tactic of choice by FDNY in these
situations where the COMPLETE removal of glass, window sash, curtains, blinds,
etc., from the window selected for entry/search/rescue is directed. This is accom-
plished in preference to rapid, incomplete ventilation of all available windows, with
the sole intent of facilitating the inside operation.
Roof operations are generally not feasible during initial ®re operations at ®res in
private dwellings with peaked roofs*. Therefore, the roof ®re®ghter can be used to
advantage in the VES operation. The roof ®re®ghter will normally take the front of
the building and the OV person the rear or side for VES, although these positions
are interchangeable. Any other venting action will normally be in support of the
advance of the primary attack hose-line and therefore, such venting will not
normally take place until the engine company are advancing their charged line in.
For a ®re on upper level, ventilation must be accomplished via ladder. In addition
to ventilation of the ®re room, ventilation must be provided to facilitate movement
of the engine company up the interior stairs. There is often a window right at the
head of this stair. In other buildings, a bathroom located at the top of the stair may
be vented to improve the interior situation.
*A particular style of larger private dwelling in NYC, of somewhat older construction (the Queen Anne), is
however vented at the roof as soon as possible, where needed. The particular roof construction sees large
voids hidden in attics, valleys, ridges, dormers, and around hips. In this particular type of structure, one
window that shall not be entered for VES is the one immediately over the side entrance door. This window
is generally at the top of an interior stair.
Venting structures ± The reality l 77
venting as a primary task, the training need may simply be how to create a vent
opening. The `why' is arguably countered by the need to wait for a directive, or
request. There is no decision made on the part of the person creating the opening
other than where to locate, as the decision to open up comes from another source.
Having this, a trained and experienced ®re®ghter may relay vital information back to
the interior team asking for ventilation in situations where `rapid ®re' indicators are
in existence.
If, however, the ®re®ghter has ®nal responsibility to decide the if, when and
where of ventilation, then a greater need for more in-depth training clearly exists. A
high level of experience, awareness and understanding is needed in relation to ®re
behavior and ®re dynamics. How is a ®re likely to develop? How is a ®re likely to be
affected by air-¯ow? How are the dynamics of building stack effect, wind and other
interior air movements likely to in¯uence a ®re's growth and direction of spread?
Of these, the most critical role is perhaps that of the door assignment, who may be
the ®rst person to notice visual signs that are indicative of changing circumstances or
hazardous conditions.
If you have addressed all the above bullet points in your risk assessment and size-up
and you possess a clear understanding of ®re behavior indicators, then you should
now be in a position to answer this question.
Venting structures ± The reality l 79
I Fuel-controlled ®re
I Ventilation-controlled ®re
I Under-ventilated (cool conditions)
I Under-ventilated (hot conditions)
In the fuel-controlled scenarios, a ®re will be in the incipient or minor growth stages
of development. There may well be light to heavy smoke production but the
conditions will generally be `cool' throughout the compartment. In this situation, is
there any possibility of rapid ®re development? If so, how might this occur? The ®re
gases will generally be below their Lower Flammable Limits (LFLs). The only
phenomenon relevant here is that of ¯ashover, as the ®re ®nds suf®cient amounts of
fuel, in an abundance of air, and progresses towards this sudden growth stage that
culminates in full room involvement with ¯ames issuing from windows.
In the `ventilation-controlled' scenarios, the ®re gases will generally exist within a
wider range of limits, either side of the LFLs.
Under-ventilated ®res will lead to large accumulations of ®re gases existing above
the Upper Flammable Limit (UFL) and before they can take part in the combustion
process they must be mixed with air/oxygen. This may occur where air enters the
®re gases, or where the gases themselves transport on the convection currents to
other parts of the structure, or to the exterior. If this mixing occurs then the ®re may
develop rapidly (even explosively) if an ignition source is present. Alternatively, the
combustion process may redevelop in the form of a ventilation-controlled ®re
heading towards ¯ashover (ventilation-induced) termed `thermal runaway'. Where
®re gases are very hot they may auto-ignite without the need for an ignition source.
This may occur both inside and outside the compartment. A backdraft may also
result in a very intense ®reball, possibly with explosive force.
It is this side of the ¯ammability limits (above the UFL) that we must be
especially concerned with when creating ventilation openings as the admission of air
may lead to:
Where the ®re is under-ventilated, the creation of a vent opening (including that of
the entry doorway), should be approached with caution using Compartment Fire
Behavior Training (CFBT) door-entry techniques and careful selection of vent
openings. If for example, a window is showing signs of high heat within, (maybe it is
starting to crack or craze, or is going very black and stained) then maybe we should
con®rm if this window should be vented under these conditions with either the
interior crews, the ®re ¯oor commander or the IC.
Another possibility is that the air-track created by an opening into an under-
ventilated ®re might cause the stirring up of the base ®re, sending a ¯aming ember
up on convection into ®re gases existing between the LFL and UFL at the ceiling.
�� � ���� ����������
������� ������
���� ��� � ������ �� ����������� ��� ���������� ��� ��������� ����� ���������� �����
��������� ������������������� �������� �������� �������� ��� ���������� ����� �����
��� ���� ��� �� � �������� ��������� ��� �� ������ ������� ������� ��� ��� ��� ���� ���
������ �� �������� ����� ����� �� ��� ��������� ��� � ����� ��������� �� ���������
���� ��� � ������ �� ����������� ��� ���������� ��� ��������� ����� ���������� �����
��������� ������������������� �������� �������� �������� ��� ���������� ����� �����
��� ���� ��� �� � �������� ��������� ��� �� ������ ������� ������� ��� ��� ��� ���� ���
������ �� �������� ����� ����� �� ��� ��������� ��� � ����� ��������� �� ���������
Venting structures ± The reality l 81
The result: a `smoke explosion' or `¯ash-®re'. This is even more likely where PPV is
used.
Fig. 2.10 ± The `most likely' phenomena associated with rapid ®re progress for different
regimes of burning or state of enclosed ®re conditions.
®re-involved structures,' and acknowledged that the recent interest by a Chief Fire
Of®cer (John Craig of Wiltshire) in the theory and practice of `tac-vent ops' was a
major step towards national acceptance. He was personally requested by CFO Craig
and the Wiltshire Fire Brigade to assist in writing the ®rst UK SOP document
(Operational Note) on `Tactical and Positive Pressure Ventilation' in 1989.
At this time, the UK Fire Service was guided in venting operations by a single
thirty-®ve-word paragraph in Book Twelve of the Manual of Firemanship which
stated that rooftop venting operations should only be undertaken `as a last resort'.
The tactical ventilation strategy was founded upon a combination of US venting
operations with UK anti-ventilation tactics. All operations started from an anti-
ventilation stance where it was equally important to zone-off compartments by
closing doors once rooms had been searched. If the ®re compartment itself were
located, this too would be closed off, unless an immediate attack hose-line was
advancing in. The basic core principles of the author's original tactical venting
strategy supported limited roof operations (particularly on inner-city mid-rise ¯at-
roofed buildings) and VES tactics, with PPV (PPA) a viable alternative in smaller
structures.
The combined US-Euro tactical ventilation protocols:
I Start all operations from an anti-ventilation stance;
I Locate the ®re;
I Establish the stage of ®re development and area of involvement;
I Establish any existing air-track and its in¯uence on the ®re;
I Read all ®re and building conditions ± B-SAHF;
I Ventilate the stair-shaft in mid-rise at the earliest opportunity;
I Select viable cross-ventilation points if needed;
I Establish a viable purpose to create an opening (for FIRE or LIFE);
I Ventilate only under the directive of interior crews;
I Consider VES operations in a carefully controlled manner;
I Utilize combination fogging/venting tactics where viable;
I PPV (PPA) in compartments of limited volume or size (may include high-
rise but not large volume buildings);
I Consider defensive PPA where viable (zoning off the ®re compartment), to
clear adjacent compartments (zone-control) prior to taking the ®re.
In order to effectively apply these protocols, ®re®ghters must be well versed and
trained in ®re dynamics and the fundamental principles of tactical application,
including CFBT.
Chapter 3
Venting structures ±
International round table
discussion
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Attributes of a pre-assigned task-based venting strategy . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3 Attributes of a reactive conditions-based venting strategy . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Tactical errors when using either strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5 Staf®ng requirements for primary response venting tactics . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Situations when not to ventilate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7 Situations where venting should be a primary action . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.8 Simplifying the tactical approach to venting structures . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.9 Basic Glass Rule concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.10 Avoiding the error chain in venting tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.11 Creating an opening ± Who is responsible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.12 Door control and air-track management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.13 Exterior wind hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.14 Author's summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Contributors
The author wishes to point out that the views and opinions expressed by contributors in the
following round table discussion are personal views of the contributors, and not necessarily
representative of an of®cial view held by their ®re authority.
I Deputy Assistant Commissioner Terry Adams (London Fire Brigade)
I Battalion Chief Ed Hartin (Gresham Fire and Rescue, Oregon USA)
I Chief Jan SuÈdmersen (City of OsnabruÈck Fire Service, Germany)
I Major Stephane Morizot (Versailles, Paris, France)
I Fire®ghter Nate DeMarse (City of New York Fire Department)
83
84 l Euro Fire®ghter
Hartin (Gresham) ± Ed Hartin has thirty three years of service and is the Training,
Safety, and EMS Division Chief in Gresham, near Portland, Oregon. Chief Hartin
lectures on an international level in ®re behavior and tactical ventilation and he
considers these two topics to be very closely aligned.
I do not see pre-de®ned ventilation assignments as `proactive', but as a reaction to
prior experience (not all bad, but not necessarily proactive). Pre-de®ned assignments
provide a simple algorithm base approach (if, then) to ®re-ground tactics. When
many similar incidents are encountered, this type of assignment provides a consistent
response that potentially works much of the time.
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 85
Building factors are a major consideration in tactical ventilation, but not the only
one. Pre-de®ned assignments without any consideration of burning regime (fuel or
ventilation controlled), stage of ®re development, and the possibility of ®re spread,
have the potential to result in undesirable ®re behavior. This potential is increased if
®re®ghters simply learn the `plays' and do not understand why they are performing
speci®c tactics.
DeMarse (FDNY) ± Nate DeMarse has served in the US Fire Service for thirteen
years. Prior to joining the FDNY in 2003, he previously served nine years in the
Midwest, working in three suburban departments. He is currently assigned to a
FDNY Engine Company in the Bronx. Nate is the photo editor of Fire Engineering
Magazine and has been a Hands On Training (HOT) instructor at Fire Engineering's
Fire Department Instructor's Conference (FDIC) in Indianapolis, Indiana since
2006. He believes there are several advantages of pre-assigned tactical ventilation
response systems and three of the most important of these are:
1. By coordinating horizontal ventilation with the attack line's advance, it will
provide an opening for the intense heat, steam and the products of com-
bustion to be expelled from the building. This is crucial as the attack line
advances to extinguish the seat of the ®re.
2. By coordinating horizontal ventilation with the members operating inside
the ®re apartment, the smoke will lift and the ®re will `light up'. In many
cases this will allow members to pinpoint the exact location of the seat of the
86 l Euro Fire®ghter
®re very quickly. By placing your head on the ¯oor and looking under the
smoke, victims may be seen and room and furniture layouts can be observed.
3. The member providing pre-assigned ventilation also acts in a dual role. The
member will search for victims that are trapped behind the ®re. This
procedure, also called VES (Vent-Enter-Search) has resulted in many
successful rescues of civilians who would have otherwise perished as the
attack line moves through the ®re area.
One disadvantage of pre-assigned horizontal ventilation may take place when an
inexperienced member is responsible for making a decision to ventilate a window or
not. If a charged hose-line is not moving towards the seat of the ®re, the member must
resist the urge to vent the window until the line has been charged and ready to move in.
If the window is broken prematurely, members searching the ®re area for victims, and
to locate the seat of the ®re, can be overtaken by `rapid ®re' progress, as fresh air is
drawn into the ®re area.
The same restraint may be needed if a heavy wind condition is present. The
member that is responsible for horizontal ventilation must recognize wind conditions
and the adverse effect that they could have if blowing directly into the ®re apartment.
In this case, the window may not be vented until after the ®re is darkened down.
of assigned tasks may be too long to allow for good results. Pro-active approaches are always
good because they put guys in the right spots, in a quick, ef®cient manner; if staf®ng does
not allow for total coverage from one company, then additional units should be assigned to
®ll-out the coverage of roles and positions, without calling for resources later.'
CampanÄa/Milara (Madrid) ± Juan Carlos CampanÄa and his colleague Jose Gomez
Milara are both twenty-year veteran Sergeants (Captains) in central Madrid, Spain,
who have driven the concepts of CFBT training in their city for the past ®ve years.
They also strongly believe that venting tactics should form part of their ®re brigade's
primary response strategy but at this time this is not the case:
There are clear situations in which it can be very useful to have one or two specialist
trained ®re®ghters outside the structure with clear pre-assigned tasks to venting. But I
think that not in all structural ®res is this needed or even convenient when venting the
structure, and the ®nal decision must be taken by the company of®cer. We think that
®xed and pre-assigned ventilation could possibly be dangerous to the interior teams, to
the spread of the ®re towards these teams and towards unaffected areas, and to the
safety of the occupants, unless carefully coordinated.
Beatty (FDNY) ± Matt Beatty is a very experienced ®re®ghter serving with Rescue
Company One in downtown Manhattan, New York City. Mr Beatty has been a
NYC ®re®ghter for twelve years, serving three Ladder Company assignments and
two Engine Company assignments before his transfer to Rescue One. He is
currently working towards a bachelors degree in ®re service administration.
There are basically two positions that do the bulk of venting from the outside. The roof
position and the outside vent. Although the positions are pre-assigned, the tactics are
not necessarily automatic. Horizontal ventilation assigned to either position is done
after consulting with the truck company of®cer on the inside. When he requests
horizontal ventilation, it is then carried out by the pre-assigned roof or OV position.
The only automatic ventilation that occurs is that of the roof position. This is the
venting of the bulkhead door, skylights or scuttle. The purpose of this is to relieve heat
and smoke from the interior stairs to facilitate the interior ®re®ghter's ability to `get
above' the ®re for searches, and increase civilian survival on the interior stairs and
¯oors above. The only time any cutting of the roof is done is when ®re has entered the
cockloft (space between the top ¯oor ceiling and the roof). The FDNY rarely vents
peaked roofs of private dwellings, as horizontal ventilation is generally suf®cient.
So to answer, I believe the pre-assigned position is critical to a well-run department.
It assures the position is covered. It assures the member covering this position knows
exactly where he is going as he gets off the rig, and that he has the proper tools with
him. It allows the of®cers to simply call the assigned position (`Ladder 103 to Ladder
103 Roof'), when needed. It avoids time consuming instructions, as the member
assigned already knows what their duties are when they arrive at the ®re.
I do not see any disadvantages. The venting of the interior stairs (in non-®reproof
buildings)1 is always an advantage. Any horizontal venting is undertaken only after
consultation with the interior ®re®ghters, so it shouldn't be an issue.
1. The term `non-®reproof' buildings refers to older premises without protected stairways or interior ®re
compartmentation. The two primary considerations in `®reproof' construction are design and materials.
Fire-resisting walls, ¯oors, and partitions to limit the spread of ®re should subdivide a building. Elevator
and stair-shafts, walls, light wells, and other vertical structures must be isolated for the same reason.
88 l Euro Fire®ghter
Adams (London) ± `Reacting to ®re conditions, as they develop, offers a far more
¯exible approach that is better able to cope with unpredictable events as they evolve on the
®re-ground.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `As in question one, I do not view this approach as necessarily
``reactive''. If ventilation tactics are selected based on assessment of conditions and
anticipation of future ®re development and spread, this is a ``proactive'' approach.
The primary advantage of ventilation based on current and anticipated ®re conditions is
the ability to positively in¯uence ®re behavior and conditions within the structure. While
not a ``disadvantage'' from my view (selection and implementation of ventilation tactics
on the basis of conditions), this approach requires thinking ®re of®cers and ®re®ghters
with an understanding of building construction, ®re dynamics, and the in¯uence of tactical
operations.'
CampanÄa/Milara (Madrid) ± `We consider this stance is not reactive. We believe that
we have to work in a structural ®re according to the needs, according to the conditions, and
according to the safety of the ®re®ghters and victims. For us the main advantage of this
``reactive'' stance is a more controllable environment by the company of®cer, who ±
according to his visual information (exterior) and the information from the interior teams
about what they see and what their requirements are in order to carry their assignment
(search, rescue, extinguish . . .) ± decides how, where and when to vent.
The decision to ventilate can't only be based on the experience of one person. The person
who has the high responsibility to take the decision to ventilate must be very highly trained
in ®re dynamics, construction, ventilation techniques, and of course, be a very experienced
of®cer. Of course, the rest of his team also must be well trained in order to advise their
of®cer. Otherwise, this person can make a wrong decision and put the situation at risk.
In Madrid there is neither proactive nor reactive approach to venting. We have not the
training, and even our chiefs aren't aware of the advantages and disadvantages of
ventilation.
In our experience, there were a lot of situations of structural ®res in which particularly a
lack of ventilation had put at risk the interior teams and the result of the entire operation,
simply because the ICs have not contemplated the possibility of ventilation as a tactical
option.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `A reactive approach really depends on the type of buildings in the
area. The FDNY's buildings can be broken down into several different types, which is why
we are able to have clear procedures on the buildings. An advantage to a reactive approach
is that it would place total control over ventilation with the of®cer in charge. This would
help to avoid indiscriminate ventilation. However, I do think overall this is a disadvantage,
because the of®cer in charge now has to speci®cally instruct the ®re®ghters to ventilate; ®nd
®re®ghters who are not already engaged in other operations to do it; get them in position,
and carry it out. In a pre-assigned approach, the ®re®ghter is completely focused on his
ventilation duties, even while en route to the ®re. As the FDNY books state ``Nothing
shall deter the roof-®re®ghter from carrying out this assignment''.'
Adams (London) ± `Yes! Increasingly incident commanders are not ``time served'' and
consequently lack experience to make the right call all of the time.
The venting plan can become uncoordinated which can put people at risk if rapid ®re
spread occurs as a result of poor tactical venting, particularly in very windy conditions.
Unless hand-lines are available, or even well placed monitors (ground or aerial) positioned,
when an area is vented the ®re intensity will initially increase. You must have adequately
positioned jets to control this. I have also seen poor tactical venting of the ¯oor above present
an easy route for ¯ames to loop back to that ¯oor from below.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `I believe that neither pre-de®ned assignments nor those based on
conditions are inherently prone to error. However, unthinking application of pre-de®ned
assignments can result in poor or hazardous outcomes.
90 l Euro Fire®ghter
For example, our department previously had a standard practice of Positive Pressure
Ventilation by the ®rst arriving company as the default option. In a number of cases, this
resulted in poor outcomes due to a lack of foundational knowledge about the in¯uence of
this tactic on ®re behavior. A shift to selection of ventilation tactics based on conditions
and development of a sound knowledge base has signi®cantly improved ®re-ground
effectiveness.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `The majority of the errors we have seen with pre-
assigned venting have been associated with incorrect timing of horizontal vents. Members
have broken windows before the initial line was in a good position, allowing the ®re to grow
and spread and making the advancement and extinguishment more dif®cult. Pre-assigned
vertical ventilation has worked well when members were clear on their assignments and had
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 91
been trained to perform those tasks correctly. Occasionally, a member detailed from another
company was put in a position with which he was unfamiliar, resulting in various
problems.
From a reactive standpoint, any ``errors'' we have experienced were related to poor size-
ups and decision-making on the part of individual and command of®cers. Members who
are making ``where and when'' decisions regarding ventilation must be able to assess key
®re and building factors, and quickly assign members to address key tasks. Incorrect or
poorly timed orders have resulted in ineffective venting, or have allowed interior members to
endure dif®cult conditions that could have been avoided.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `If ®re®ghters are trained properly, there should be really no major
issues. I've always taught the younger ®re®ghters that all actions on the ®re-ground should
be taken for a speci®c reason, and with forethought. This forethought may have been
thought out years ago, when the procedures were written, or may have to occur right then
and there. But if ventilation is carried out, with reason and forethought, it should not be an
issue. Now, that is not to say things can't go wrong. An example: a decision to ventilate by
an of®cer, or a standing order even, could lead to an intensi®cation of the ®re that wasn't
expected, such as a shift in wind direction.'
Adams (London) ± `London Fire Brigade protocols three engines (no ladder company)
totalling twelve to fourteen personnel. However, I would personally consider a minimum
response of sixteen ®re®ghters would be required to ensure that venting operations were
undertaken as part of the primary response tasks.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `I believe that this is dependent on the magnitude of the ®re.
However, as a baseline, 26 personnel (four engines, two trucks, and two chiefs) would
provide a solid starting point.'
Morizot (Versailles, western Paris suburbs) ± `To me, the minimum response to
reach this purpose is sixteen ®re®ghters. In France, we work with groups composed of two
®re®ghters and in an engine or pumper there are two groups (four), plus a sub of®cer, plus a
driver (two) six ®re®ghters.
So I consider you need two pumpers plus an aerial (crew of three) plus an IC (incident
commander or of®cer in charge) sixteen ®re®ghters.
I One group attack line
I One group search/vent
I One group water supply (hydrant)/vent
92 l Euro Fire®ghter
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `I think that the absolute minimum number of truck
(ladder) company members to allow for proper interior and exterior operations, is ten. These
ten would include a two-man inside team on the ®re ¯oor, two men on the ¯oor above, two
members on the roof, and two members performing horizontal venting and searches above
the ®re from the front and the rear. The number of units initially assigned to the incident
and the assignment of members to the various positions would depend on the staf®ng of the
individual departments; some departments will assign units from one company to cover
various assignments, while others will decide to combine members from different companies,
as they arrive.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `At a minimum, strictly to ventilate the building (not to accomplish
other tactics) would require four. Two ®re®ghters to go to the roof and vertically vent the
interior stairs, and two ®re®ghters to ventilate the outside horizontally, the ®re ¯oor, and
the ¯oors above.'
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 93
Adams (London) ±
I `In buildings with computer controlled ``air con'' or venting systems where
opening up will unbalance the system
I Sprinklered premises possibly ± again a ®re-engineered solution.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `In offensive operations, the question is generally not ``Would I
ventilate?'' but ``When would I ventilate?''.'
SuÈdmersen (OsnabruÈck) ±
`I would not ventilate in situations where there is:
I Pressurized smoke;
I Under-ventilated ®re with unknown seat of ®re;
I Fires in large, unknown buildings.'
It's also even more dif®cult to vent them by traditional PPV methods because these
buildings are generally ®tted with sky domes. These allow smoke and hot products of
combustion to get out, but limit the possibility to put the building in pressure.
The actions to undertake with a reasonable kind of success concern the control of openings
just to avoid bringing in too much air.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `If I am operating on the interior of a building, there are a few
circumstances in which I would not horizontally ventilate:
1. High-rise ®res
Wind conditions must be carefully evaluated and communicated before
window ventilation takes place. Premature horizontal ventilation in a high-
rise building could cause members to be overrun by a wind-driven ®re
condition. The members that are sent to the ¯oor above to search should
evaluate the wind conditions on the ®re-side of the building and report to
the members operating below before horizontal ventilation takes place.
2. Fire will be pulled
While searching and locating windows, those windows should not be broken
if it will cause ®re to be drawn to your location. This could cut off your
means of egress, trapping you, or the search will have to be abandoned and
the victims will perish.
3. Signs of backdraft
A third instance may be the case of a commercial structure presenting with
signs of a backdraft. In this case horizontal ventilation must be delayed until
lines are stretched and vertical ventilation is attempted.
4. Operating on the ¯oor above
If I am operating on the ¯oor above the ®re and horizontal ventilation will
allow ®re to enter the ¯oor that I am operating on via auto-exposure, I will
not ventilate the window. If the window is open, I will close the window to
deter auto-exposure.
If I am operating on the exterior of a building, there are a few instances where I might
delay horizontal ventilation:
5. If members are present on a ladder or ®re escape and are directly above and
in the path of the ®re and gases, I would delay window ventilation until they
reach a safe location.
6. If ventilating the windows would cause civilians trapped above further harm
and complicate rescue efforts, I would delay window ventilation until the
civilians are removed.
7. I will also delay horizontal ventilation if the initial attack line has not been
charged. In most cases, horizontal ventilation should be delayed until the
attack line is charged and ready to advance to the seat of the ®re for
extinguishment. The only exception to this rule is to save a life (VES). For
example, if a charged line is not in place but a victim is known or suspected
trapped in the room serviced by the window you stand in front of,
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 95
ventilation may be performed to save that life. Your primary goal upon
entering the window should be to close the interior door leading to the ®re
area in an effort to limit the ®re from extending to your location.
If you are delaying window ventilation for any reason, especially in the case of a trapped
civilian, you must communicate to the members operating inside. The same is true if you
are delayed getting into position. Communication is very important if your department
expects you to perform horizontal ventilation (proactive) as the attack line moves in on the
®re. Any delay should be communicated.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `As a general rule, if it can be vented, we will vent it.
The compelling difference in our venting tactics comes from the timing and placement of the
vent openings. Dangerous structural conditions will obviously preclude operations in certain
areas, such as lightweight metal or wood roof assemblies that are involved in ®re, or peaked
roofs with dangerous pitches.
In commercial, mercantile, or industrial buildings, high ceilings, large open ¯oor spaces,
and exceptional ®re loading ± without appropriate ®re attack capabilities in place ± will
cause venting to be delayed, so as not to allow rapid ®re spread to uninvolved areas.
Any building that has a signi®cant exterior wind condition, such as a high-rise or
waterfront structure, will often not be vented until all visible ®re has been extinguished, if
the of®cer in charge feels that the potential for violent ®re spread is signi®cant. Fireproof
commercial high-rise buildings are often equipped with windows that do not open; even if
windows can be opened, the lack of interior compartments and the high-wind potential often
keep horizontal venting from taking place.
If no life hazard is present or suspected, our department will not ventilate until the ®re
can be controlled. If an attack line is in position to control the ®re, or the ®re can be held in
place by interior doors or compartments, then selected venting can occur. If the construction
of the building provides signi®cant compartmentation, venting in areas distant from the ®re
seat can be performed as conditions indicate.
Vertical ventilation should not take place in lightweight roof assemblies that are exposed
to ®re on arrival, unless the members can be independently supported from a ladder or
bucket. Tightly sealed buildings, or those with ``smothered'' ®re conditions, should not get
early horizontal venting at lower levels, but should be vented at the highest point before
entering.
I would estimate that in my experience with private dwellings, non-®reproof apartments,
and older row frames, the breaking of glass for ventilation has been generally safe and
effective (70% good, 20% improper but manageable, 10% dangerous). There have been
times in recent years where energy-ef®cient buildings have slowed ®re growth to the point
where routine glass-breaking has led to ¯ashovers with members operating in the building.
The tendency to respond to high temperatures encountered while searching, by breaking
windows from the inside, has led to rapid ®re growth in some cases. Older members, used
to seeing ®re on arrival and encountering relatively well-ventilated structures, have had to
adjust to the perils of energy-ef®cient buildings and ``pre-¯ashover'' ®re conditions on
arrival.
The majority of our bad experiences have come from window failures in high-rise
buildings, or smaller buildings exposed to high-winds. While members had previously waited
for the line to be charged and ``moving'' before venting, this strategy has been troublesome
96 l Euro Fire®ghter
when high-winds are involved. In high-rises, the glass will not be broken until the door
is closed to the ®re apartment, or water is being applied to the ®re. In smaller buildings, the
incident commander will give the order to break or not break the glass, based on the
situation at hand.'
CampanÄa/Milara (Madrid) ± `We personally would not ventilate during the ®rst
moments of the response, until I would know all the circumstances of the ®re (location and
possible spread of the ®re, victims etc.) and, of course, until all the necessary lines are
charged and ready to protect all the exposures and to begin the advance over the ®re.
Of course we would not ventilate in the speci®c circumstance of a possible backdraft, if we
could not do direct and vertical ventilation.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `I would not ventilate immediately if the interior crews were still
searching for the ®re, unless they requested it. I would also not ventilate if there is a
probability of a wind-driven ®re being created, particularly at high-rise buildings, at least
until water was being put on the ®re. Also, I would hold off ventilating a bulkhead (roof
door) on a high-rise building, until it can be determined what effect it will have on the
®re ¯oor. I would not cut a peaked roof private dwelling, unless ®re was directly under
the roof, as horizontal ventilation is almost always suf®cient in these types of buildings, and
personnel can be utilized elsewhere.'
Adams (London) ± `In my opinion, just about any time, the sooner the better, but you
must have water with you. It is letting the heat and dangerous unburned gases out.
De®nitely in ®re-protected stairwells, especially if they are not double lobby approach
protected. Hose-lines will compromise the door seals from the ®re ¯oors and opening up also
keeps the staircase cooler (wind effect) on crews who might be located there.'
SuÈdmersen (OsnabruÈck) ± `I would recommend the use of PPV in just about any
situation, except in relation to the hazardous circumstances described above. To me, it is
simply a ``GO'' or ``NO GO'' decision with PPV. If you go to the interior of the structure
for ®re or rescue purposes, then you must ventilate. Maybe this sounds too simpli®ed but it
will work!'
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 97
Morizot (Versailles, western Paris suburbs) ± `I would say mostly all the other
situations.
The condition to ventilate is to know why, where and how. When you consider that
smoke and hot gases are fuel, then it's always a good help to be able to lower the quantity of
fuel as well as heat as we know that heat produces fuel.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `If I am operating on the interior there are several circumstances
where I would ventilate. I will elaborate:
1. To alleviate conditions while searching for trapped victims or the ®re
location. As I stated above, this will allow the smoke condition to slightly lift
off of the ¯oor, increasing visibility and the chances of ®nding victims and
the seat of the ®re. If you predict that the ®re will be pulled toward your
location, do not ventilate the window until a charged attack line is ready to
advance to the seat of the ®re.
2. If the main body of ®re is knocked down and members are opening walls
and ceilings, checking for ®re extension, I would remove windows in the
immediate ®re area. This will allow members to visually operate instead of
operating by touch and feel only.
3. If I am working on the exterior, and horizontal ventilation is my assigned
task, I will move into position opposite the attack line's advance. When the
attack line is charged and ready to move in, the window should be taken.
4. Additionally, if I arrive in position prior to the attack line being charged and
there is reason to believe that someone is trapped behind the ®re, I will also
ventilate the window. After the window has been removed and the initial
``blow'' of the heat and gases leaves the structure, I would enter to search for
the victims (VES). My ®rst action at this point would be to locate an interior
door to close and limit the ®re from extending in my direction. By closing
the interior door, this will also allow the room that I am searching to lift for
an easier search.
While I was working in the Midwest, we didn't have the luxury of opening stairway doors
and skylights at the roof level since there were very few buildings with those features. Now I
see what a positive impact those ventilation openings have on the outcome of a ®re. I think
it is absolutely crucial to the operation to ventilate the stairways and skylights of non-
®reproof buildings as early in the operation as possible. It is so crucial that at least one
member should be assigned to do this task immediately upon the ®re department's arrival at
the scene. Stairways, scuttles and skylights should be vented before any cutting operation is
performed on the roof.
Opening stairwells and other vertical arteries prevents the smoke from banking down to
lower ¯oors. Mushrooming is described as the smoke rising to the top ¯oor, and then
banking down to lower ¯oors due to the lack of vertical ventilation. Once the vertical
arteries are opened, mushrooming is prevented. This makes stretching and operating attack
lines, as well as searching and checking for ®re extension, faster and more ef®cient. Venting
the stairways will also allow civilians to evacuate normally instead of via ®re escapes or ®re
department ladders.'
Engdahl (Gothenburg) ± `In all situations, PPV is a primary consideration and well-
used tactic. We generally attempt to con®ne the ®re and clear smoke and gases from areas
98 l Euro Fire®ghter
adjacent to the ®re room before ®ghting the ®re. If this is not possible we will ventilate the
®re room, as close to the ®re as possible, and use the air¯ow from the fan to create a safer
path for the ®re®ghters.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `Once members are in a position to control the ®re,
horizontal ventilation can begin in all areas, as indicated; once the ®re is ``knocked down'',
more complete ventilation and smoke removal can take place as needed. If a life hazard
exists, or is suspected, selected venting of windows can begin before the ®re is contained,
with careful consideration of the likely effects. Usually this venting occurs at the ®re room
and/or the likely location of victims, depending on smoke and ®re conditions and the
interior layout of the building. In these cases members must take control of interior doors and
remain in relatively safe positions, in anticipation of rapid ®re growth and spread. As
interior operations are taking place, a simultaneous effort to contain the ®re in a room or
area must be undertaken, until suf®cient ®re ¯ow can be brought to bear.
Vertical ventilation can occur immediately on arrival, provided that the building type
and ®re location indicate it. Stairwells in multiple dwellings, natural openings on one-story
commercial buildings, and ¯at roofs on rowframes or private dwellings are all areas that
should be accessed and ventilated as soon as possible, as their opening can have signi®cant
positive effects on occupants and the lateral spread of ®re in these buildings. Attached
similar buildings, or other structures where lateral ®re spread to exposures is likely, must
receive early, aggressive vertical ventilation in order to prevent mushrooming and to slow
lateral spread suf®ciently for interior attacks to be effective. Top-¯oor ®res, attic/cockloft
®res, and ®res in balloon-framed structures all require early venting and control of the void
spaces; ®res in these buildings which have not reached the top ¯oor or vertical voids may
still bene®t from vent openings over the interior stairwell, which can improve conditions on
the top ¯oor.
If a mid-rise building is non-®reproof or ordinary constructed with open stairwells, it is
critical to open bulkhead doors or skylights in the stairwell to improve conditions in the
common areas. If the building is ®reproof, with rated stair enclosures, it is less critical
initially, but may become important as time passes. When lines are advanced from stand-
pipes, or victims and operating members open and close stairwell doors, the stairwell may
become contaminated and dif®cult to pass for victims stuck above the ®re. If victims cannot
be ``protected in place'' on the upper ¯oors, pressurization of the stairwells with rooftop
openings must be made to clear poor conditions.'
CampanÄa/Milara (Madrid) ± `In our opinion this is one of the situations in which a
rapid defensive ventilation action (vertical or PPV) can make a difference in the survival
of occupants above the ®re, and to stop the interior spread. I think that this is a critical
priority, especially in the case of unprotected stairways.
In our service the stairway is considered as a tactical priority, but as I said before, we
don't usually ventilate it because of the lack of training and knowledge. We usually assign
one or two teams for going to the stairway at the same time or after the attack team is in
place. I think this must not be done before. We have found a lot of people in the areas above
the ®re, some dead and others in very bad condition.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `I would always ventilate the interior stairs at non-®reproof multiple
dwellings by removal of the bulkhead door and skylight. I would always ventilate as water
is being applied to the ®re, and to facilitate searching for life. Venting the stairway in
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 99
mid-rise buildings really depends on the construction. Is it ®reproof or non-®reproof? Are the
stairs enclosed (a ®re door on each ¯oor)? Or open? In a stairwell that is open, it should be a
priority to vent the interior stairs. This will increase the survival chances of civilians on the
upper ¯oors, or in the stairwell, and it will allow ®re®ghters better conditions to operate in
on the upper ¯oors and stairwell, as well as in the ®re apartment. When the building is
®reproof, and the stairs are enclosed, it becomes less critical, especially as the height of the
building increases. Search of the stairways is still essential, but there is relative safety on
the upper ¯oors, since the hallways can be isolated from the stairs. In fact, in the FDNY,
we rarely remove occupants from the ¯oors above a ®re in ®reproof multiple dwellings. We
will instruct them to remain in their apartment, and open the window if there is a light
smoke condition. This is usually safer than walking them down the stairs, past the ®re
¯oor. A search still must be conducted in the stairwells for civilians who may have been
overcome while attempting to ¯ee the building. Eventually the stairwell door will have to
be chocked open to relieve the smoke conditions. So to answer, generally if the stairwell is
open, then stairwell ventilation is essential; if the stairwell is enclosed, it is not as critical
early on.'
slow it down and then extinguish it. So, limit as much as you can the air supply feeding the
base of the ®re. Then allow the smoke and hot gases to escape by the vent outlet and in doing
so, you'll include ventilation in your tactics.
A chimney is also a good example because you can see or imagine the process (®re,
exhaust, inlet, tube) and you can easily duplicate this to a ®re-scene. To make ventilation
ef®cient, you need to know the ``geography'' of the building/room.
Concerning PPV, it's something different requiring another form of training which takes
more time. There is also one thing I often say which is when you don't know, when you're
not sure, leave the fan in the pumper. Only use PPV when you know how, where and what
you're doing, and keep ready to stop the fan and close the inlet at any moment according to
the evolution of the situation.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `I think creating a loose SOP/SOG on when and when not to
ventilate could simplify the approach of ventilation. Obviously, a rule can't be written for
every instance, but general operations can be stated. I say a ``loose'' SOP because it would
have to be ¯uid and able to be changed. These ventilation rules should be discussed and
drilled into new recruits and reiterated at company level drills to keep even the more
experienced members up to date on the ventilation procedures. Whether your ventilation is
proactive or reactive, some form of rule(s) could be created.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `I think the best way to avoid mistakes in ventilation
is to tie together all the different decisions and factors from the very earliest levels of training.
Too often members are content to learn how to physically ventilate with no true com-
prehension of what they are doing to the overall ®re condition and attack and search effort.
Fire behavior, building construction, and all other pertinent areas of study should be
repeatedly tied together, so that an overall understanding is gained, rather than simply a
mindless reproduction of behaviors. Ventilation must be viewed as a tactical priority, which
(in my opinion) is second only to water application in importance. If the gravity of these
tactics are never impressed on a new member or of®cer, then no amount of regulation or
direction will make them ``get it''.
If it is not practical for all members to have such an understanding or decision-making
ability, then company of®cers should maintain strict control over all ventilation tactics and
should, in advance, make clear the guidelines for company operations. The man making
the decision, whoever that man is, has to see the whole picture before he does something to
affect it (positively or negatively) for all involved.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `The ®rst consideration should be educating the ®re®ghters of why and
when, or why not to ventilate. I think it is important for ®re®ghters to have a thorough
understanding of ventilation in the various types of buildings to be encountered in their
response area, and to have SOPs based on the types of buildings they will encounter. They
should understand exactly in which type of buildings vertical ventilation will occur at all
times, and in which buildings it will not, or permission must be granted (and the reason
why given).
They should understand that horizontal ventilation should not be initiated until contact
is made with the interior crews, and they request it. In a situation where a search will be
made for life, and will be accomplished from the exterior, obviously ventilation will have to
occur for entry to be made. In this situation, they should at least inform the of®cer on the
interior that they are about to ventilate, and give them the opportunity to respond, prior to
venting.'
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 101
Adams (London) ± We have had hose-lines feeding dry risers punctured by falling glass,
which compromises the water supply ± not good. This places personnel at risk who may be
operating in the street.
Always try to open or remove windows before breaking glass, but if they must be broken,
ensure the area is clear and that crews are expecting falling glass. Such an operation must
be coordinated.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `In much the same way as cutting a roof opening, once glass is
broken you cannot change your mind (relative to location of the opening).
Bad outcomes usually relate to inappropriate location or excessive openings (without
regard to ®re location).'
Morizot (Versailles, western Paris suburbs) ± `To me, the rule depends on the
situation, but, generally speaking, I prefer to operate in a ``rich'' (smoke) environment
rather than in an over-ventilated compartment/structure, due to the risks of rapid ®re
development. The general idea would be to facilitate smoke and gas removal in front of the
attack line and prevent air coming in from behind.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `In my opinion, basic Glass Rules should be initially limited to
opposite the attack hose-line's advance. After the ®re is knocked down, then additional
windows can be taken to assist ventilation. If there is a life-hazard, members will do
whatever is needed to get to the victims. Whether your operation is VES, interior searches or
both, windows will probably be broken to alleviate conditions on the interior.
With that said, those same rules should deter ``freelance ventilation''. Freelance
ventilation is unacceptable and could cause additional injuries to members. The practice of
a member running around haphazardly smashing out windows is unacceptable and
unprofessional.
I have mixed experiences with breaking glass to horizontally ventilate. These mixed
experiences did not necessarily cause the ®re to progress, but I ®nd it easier to simply open
replacement energy ef®cient windows (or EEWs) than to break them. I have never opened
a window with the intent to later close it.
The way that I have been taught to remove EEWs is to unlock the window and raise it
part way. This will break the integrity of the middle sash. Then strike one of the sashes
outward with a tool. This will normally remove the entire half of the window. Repeat the
steps for the other half of the window.
2. `Glass Rules' are either documented (SOP) or local `unwritten' rules that provide guidelines for
®re®ghters of when windows should be vented; where they should be vented; why they should be
vented and under whose directive such actions should occur. As with any venting operation, openings
should serve a purpose; be closely coordinated with interior operations (crews); and be effectively
located to achieve the objective to hand.
102 l Euro Fire®ghter
The easiest way to remove EEWs when time is less of a factor is simply to use the tabs
located on the top of the sash. Open the window part way, operate the tab and pull towards
you. Then twist the window out of the frame. This technique is very useful on food-on-the-
stove or minor ®re type runs where damage should be limited. Even in a ®re situation, it is
very quick if heat conditions allow you to stand up and operate the tabs.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `In high-rises, the glass will not be broken until the
door is closed to the ®re apartment, or water is being applied to the ®re. In smaller buildings,
the incident commander will give the order to break or not break the glass, based on the
situation at hand.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `The decision ultimately to break glass should rest with the interior
of®cer who knows the conditions inside the ®re apartment. I ®nd it essential to clear all large
shards of glass from the window, and broken glass can be extremely slippery on ®re escapes
and on the ground. It is not only important for ®re®ghters to drill and practice on breaking
glass, but also on removing the sash and window frame/screens, as this is equally important
to venting a window. As we say in NYC, ``You are making the window into a door''!'
Adams (London) ± London now have all operational staff with personal issue radios.
People thought (myself included) that this might lead to general talking and consequent loss
of focus ± but it hasn't. What people seem to do is listen to what is being said between teams,
and this has had real bene®ts to overall command and coordination at incidents. Radio
discipline has remained good and people only talk when they need to.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `NIOSH often identi®es the need to ``closely coordinate ventilation
and ®re attack'' in recommendations included in line-of-duty death (LODD) reports.
Failure to coordinate these two tactical elements can result in increased potential for extreme
®re behavior. This is particularly true when increases in ventilation are unplanned, exhaust
openings are made in the incorrect location, or charged hose-lines are not in place and
ready to commence ®re attack when ventilation is performed (this includes opening the
access point). One of the greatest problems in the application of tactical ventilation is
inappropriate use of PPV. Many ®re departments in the USA have an understanding of
the general concept, but not how this tactic in¯uences ®re behavior. This leads to signi®cant
risk to ®re®ghters and potential for extreme ®re behavior.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `In my opinion the system that we use works very well. Most
members are not assigned to the outside vent position until they have gained experience as
can, irons'' and roof ®re®ghters. The experience as the can and irons ®re®ghter provides
®re®ghters with a good base on when ventilation is needed, when it is not needed or when it
should be delayed.
With that said, the outside vent ®re®ghter knows where he has to be, how to get there and
when ventilation should or should not take place. Personally, I have never seen an error in
that chain that wasn't immediately resolved. For example: the OV picks the wrong ®re
escape, but immediately realizes the error and repositions to the correct one.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `Our biggest issues have come from horizontal
openings made before the line was actually in position to control the ®re. Members have
become over-eager, or misread the actions of the engine, sometimes resulting in a tougher
®re to ®ght than was necessary. In some cases, where reactive orders were given, the re¯ex
time associated with equipping, accessing and making the openings, has led to poor results.
More often than not, these are training and motivation issues that could be easily addressed
for the future.
As far as poor location of the openings is concerned, these problems are usually found on
the roof, where members cannot quickly determine the proper location from their personal
size-up. Rather than asking for help in determining the location, some members simply
``gave it their best shot'', resulting in inef®cient and poorly placed openings. However, there
have also been some cases where too many ``for life'' openings were made in the wrong
spots, resulting in excessive, uncontrolled ®re growth.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `I have seen situations where venting was done too soon, and the ®re
increased in size, because the line was not moving in on the ®re. I have also seen ventilation
implemented too early, which caused unnecessary auto-exposure of the building and its
occupants. I have further seen situations where insuf®cient ventilation has caused ®re to
spread further than it would have, if complete ventilation were done. The FDNY has had
several incidents in which ®re®ghters were killed (and many more incidents where nobody
was seriously injured) where ®re ``blow torched'' on ®re®ghters because of ventilation
caused by failing windows (not vented by ®re®ghters).'
Adams (London) ± `Whilst the incident commander has overall responsibility to initiate
ventilation, the person actually undertaking it should be thinking what is below (danger of
falling glass onto street); if venting the ¯oor above the ®re, can ®re auto-expose into the
openings created?; and how any vent opening might effect the intensity of the ®re's
development. Open it rather than break it ± once it is broken you cannot close it!'
Adams (London) ± `In London, yes, this should be a consideration. However, there is
always the need to protect means of egress (sometimes you need to get out in a hurry!!) and
the two are not mutually supportive. Taking hand lines in tends to make this somewhat
dif®cult in any event.'
Hartin (Gresham) ± `We have placed increased emphasis on maintaining door control,
but this is not a standard (do it always) practice. Closing the door after entry requires a
speci®c decision on the part of the attack team and/or command.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `From my experience, the door to the ®re apartment or ®re area is
chocked open to allow the attack line to smoothly advance to the seat of the ®re. In some
cases, I have seen a ladder company of®cer leave a member at the entry door, but mainly for
orientation purposes and not to control the air-¯ow to the ®re area. Additionally, doors
inside the ®re apartment or building are also closed in an attempt to slow or contain ®re
extension.'
McMaster (Washington DC) ± `All members of the department are trained in the
importance of door control, particularly when searching ahead of, or above the attack line.
If the ®rst crew to reach the ®re area is a truck, they are trained to search the room and then
close the door upon exiting; if they are unable to enter the room, they are to close the door
and search the areas away from the door, until the ®re can be attacked. Most of these
principles are followed quite well.
Unfortunately, the complacency and bad habits developed by some members allow unsafe
door management to take place in areas remote from the ®re. Although they may under-
stand its importance to safety, poor discipline often ®nds members searching remote rooms
106 l Euro Fire®ghter
with the doors open, or hanging out on stairways, or standing directly in doorways; all of
which could cause serious trouble if the ®re behind, or below them, grows rapidly.
I will say that containment of the ®re in its original compartment is a critical part of our
initial attack operations, as the inside team from the ®rst truck will proceed immediately to
the ®re area in order to search the ®re room, and then close the door upon exiting. Members
operating ahead of, or above the ®re are also cautioned to close the doors that separate them
from the spreading ®re conditions. Members performing VES will immediately locate and
close the door to the room they enter, before searching for victims; once the search is
complete, the member will then evaluate the conditions in the rest of the building before
deciding to reopen the door, or leave it closed.
The closest we come to employing the ``air-track management'' procedures is in a high-
rise apartment building. Members will move as quickly as possible to the ®re apartment and
close the door to contain the ®re; if conditions allow for entry into the apartment before the
hose-line is in place, the door to the apartment will then be closed behind the operating
members, even though they are essentially ``closed in with the ®re''. This is done to protect
the common hallway, and also to prevent the growth and spread of the ®re within the
apartment.
I suppose the most dif®cult part of making vent decisions regarding air-track manage-
ment would be the trade off of poor visibility and high heat with closed doors and windows,
for the relative improvement in conditions when openings are made, but the potential for
rapid ®re growth in return.'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `In the FDNY a lot of emphasis is placed on door ``control'' and
``management''. At times an of®cer has the option of leaving one ®re®ghter at the door to
control it, and even keep it closed, but unlocked, so he can act as a beacon for the ®re®ghters
within the apartment. He can also keep the door closed if the wind conditions are
aggravated by having the door open.'
In your experience, how much has wind direction and velocity caused
problems in the ®re attack where inappropriate glass has been taken
out by ®re®ghters? Is it correct to take glass out where wind may enter?
Hartin (Gresham) ± `Wind is a major issue. However, we have had a greater problem
with unplanned ventilation caused by ®re effects on window glazing.
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 107
The appropriateness of taking window glass (or leaving the door open) on the windward
side is dependent on circumstances and the tactical approach being taken. Cross ventilation
can be quite effective if it is applied in a planned and systematic manner.'
DeMarse (FDNY) ± `In a low or mid-rise building or private dwelling, I have never seen
wind direction and velocity come into play on the outcome of the ®re. At ®res where a high
wind condition is at an angle that would blow into a ®re apartment, horizontal ventilation
is delayed until water is on the ®re.
I have observed window failure from ®re conditions has a drastic outcome on ®re®ghting
efforts in a high-rise building. The ®re was on an upper ¯oor of a forty-one-story high-rise
multiple dwelling. The windows failed as the ``inside team'' of the ®rst due ladder company
reached the apartment. Wind conditions (50 mph) whipped the ®re into a blowtorch
condition, which burned members of both the engine and ladder companies as they retreated
to the hallway. Several attempts to close the door were made, but the door could not be fully
closed. The hallway and attack stairway became untenable.
The original ®re apartment was fully involved. Fire entered the apartment above via
auto-exposure and that apartment was completely involved. The ®re continued to extend to
two ¯oors above, when multiple 2.5 inch attack lines were able to advance and extinguish
the ®re. In order to advance on the ®re, walls had to be breached from adjoining apart-
ments. Additional lines were advanced across exterior balconies where the aluminum safety
railings had melted away.
Once again, it is important to point out that these windows were not taken by ®re®ghters,
but failed due to ®re conditions. I included this story to reiterate the impact that wind
conditions had on this ®re.'
CampanÄa/Milara (Madrid) ± `We had to ®ght some ®re in which the spread of the ®re
was totally towards the inside, and with wind blowing into the building there were not any
¯ames or smoke coming out from the street side. For this reason I consider that the wind is a
very powerful factor to take into account when we want to open up the structure.
108 l Euro Fire®ghter
We should not open up any building in the side in which a wind, with enough velocity,
may enter. We don't ever know how this mass of air can affect the conditions, although
sometimes it can work as a PPV. Of course, there will be situations in which it can work
well (to our advantage).'
Beatty (FDNY) ± `It has happened many times in the FDNY where wind has killed and
injured our members. For this reason, taking windows should be a thought-out, and
planned tactic, especially in high-rise residences where the wind conditions can be severe,
due to the layout of the building and the height. One of the ways the determination is made
in the FDNY, is that the roof ®re®ghters of the ®rst and second due trucks go to the
apartment directly above the ®re apartment (remember . . . roof ventilation is not an initial
consideration in this type of building). Their job is to chock open the apartment door, and
open the windows in the apartment, to ®nd out what will happen on the ®re ¯oor below if
those windows are removed. He then noti®es the of®cer in the ®re apartment of any
potential for wind problems. The of®cer in the ®re apartment will then decide whether or not
glass should be taken, and if the apartment door will remain open.'
Firstly I want to thank all of the contributors to this round table debate on venting ®re-
involved structures, for sharing their views and experiences. It was both enlightening
and interesting to bring these international views from highly experienced ®re
of®cers together.
It is clear that there are two distinctly different tactical approaches developing
here between the two continents, and please remember, there are several urban
approaches compared here. The US inner-city approach is based very much on the
basic core principles of creating openings in structures very early in the operation,
even during the primary response stage. In contrast, the European approach is
generally more aligned to venting structures as a secondary response task and even
then, only where ®re conditions denote that a clear need exists. However, there is a
clear trend in Europe to move towards the use of PPV for venting structures and
increasingly, this is being seen as a ®re attack tool, used to control and stabilize
interior conditions prior to entry. This trend may also be shared by many ®re
departments throughout suburban USA and Europe.
One thing was quite clear, and all contributors agreed in their responses, that
inadequate staf®ng and/or a lack of effective training were the two main factors
that most likely led to a breakdown in venting operations where critical factors such
as precision, coordination and communication may fail.
The author's experience would further con®rm that to gain a true tactical
advantage from any venting actions, it is absolutely critical that such openings be
made at the earliest opportunity on the primary response. In order to do this a ®re
department would need:
1. Documented protocols for primary response (SOPs);
2. Directives for assigning levels of responsibility;
Venting structures ± International round table discussion l 109
and rapid ®re spread where deployment needs can change dramatically in just a few
brief moments.
However, the author believes that one key pre-assignment that London (and
many European inner cities in general) has repeatedly over-looked is that of the roof
position. It may be that DAC Adams (and several other contributors) is quite
correct in stating a minimum requirement of sixteen ®re®ghters on-scene before
tactical ventilation can become a realistic consideration in any primary response to
structure ®res3. However, the placement of a two-person roof team at every call to
®re in central London, where a ¯at roof existed, would ensure the following:
I Early placement at a key position on the structure
I Important reconnaissance of roof and surrounds
I Can usually evaluate both rear and front for signs of ®re or occupants
I Where interior light-wells or shafts exist can check the same
I Ideally located, if needed, to undertake rescue/access via rope
I Instantly available for ventilation at stair-shaft access hatches
This one role would have undoubtedly saved lives and assisted interior ®re®ghting
operations throughout the inner-city areas of London during the author's time
there. In fact the author did begin a pilot project during the 1990s (working with
local of®cers), to set up a two-person roof team for access via adjacent structures or
by aerial ladder. During this short-term tactical research project there were nothing
but good experiences, where stair-shafts were cleared of smoke and trapped
occupants were assisted to safety via interior routes much earlier in the ®re®ghting
operation.
This is one pre-assignment that should be occurring in every inner-city area where
¯at roofs, terraced (row) construction, interior open light-shafts and roof access
from adjacent structures may exist. Such early reconnaissance and the placement of
pre-assigned roof-teams provide key information to the Incident Commander and
interior crews, and assure that critical areas of a structure are immediately and
automatically checked for occupants, and signs of ®re. Where vertical ventilation
over a stair-shaft is viable and needed at an early stage, this is often easily achieved
without special tools.
The potential for using PPV as an attack tool is secondary only to the basic core
principles of natural venting operations, but should not be underestimated.
However, where using PPV in pre-attack, the application of `forced drafts' into a
®re-involved structure means that if things are going to go wrong, it's going to
happen much faster! Similarly, where ®re®ghters are inexperienced in reading ®re
conditions, they may not be able to adapt the strategy fast enough and implement
safe actions where conditions begin to deteriorate. Therefore, the training need in
pre-attack PPV (PPA) is far more detailed than many will currently realize. A solid
foundation in practical ®re behavior training (CFBT) should precede the
introduction of PPA as a ®re attack strategy. If this training need is not delivered
then it is highly likely that the use of PPA by poorly educated ®re®ghters will lead to
some situations where buildings are burned down and ®re®ghters are severely
injured, or even killed, through the inappropriate use or misapplication of such a
strategy.
3. Limited staf®ng SOPs and protocols exist that may allow limited venting tactics, within the context of
critical task prioritization at ®res (see Chapter Five).
Chapter 4
4.1 INTRODUCTION
111
112 l Euro Fire®ghter
uniformed city authority that appeared to have forgotten their plight. Yet these very
men would give their lives regularly, every year, in their attempts to protect the
people who lived in the South Bronx. They considered everyone an equal and never
based decisions to risk their lives in saving someone on race, colour or creed.
The weapon of choice at the time was predominantly the 1.75 in (45 mm) high-
¯ow attack line that used poly ethylene oxide (PEO) as a water additive. The
system, entitled `Rapid Water', offered 40% increases in ¯ow-rate and doubled
nozzle pressure through decreases in friction loss in the hose-line.
However, it has since been reported1 that:
During the mid-1970s, when New York City underwent ®nancial dif®culties culmi-
nating in federal bankruptcy, the ®re department was noti®ed that layoffs were possible.
[1,600 ®re®ghters were laid off in 1975 although 700 were re-hired within three days
of the lay-off]. In the midst of ensuing labor disputes, the ®remen's union [reportedly]
viewed this innovation as a threat to manpower requirements, due to each engine's
augmented ®re®ghting effectiveness, and allegedly sabotaged the expensive blending
equipment, though this rumor was never substantiated. Moreover, the complex equip-
ment was prone to unpredictable breakdowns, and maintenance problems were severe
and ongoing. A strong factor terminating the project was that the term ``slippery water''
[used by some] conjured up misperceptions of personnel hazards such as unsure foot-
holds in large, slippery areas. Accordingly, interest in the potential of PEO as a viable
®re®ghting agent died, and no meaningful resurrection has since been attempted.
On some nights, there would be two or three ®res burning at the same time in the
same street, involving very large tenement blocks. Due to the limited number of
engines available, commanders would often simply make do. A single `all hands'
response would handle all the ®res, and adaptable crew deployment re¯ected this. It
was almost a nightly event to see very large ®ve or six-story tenement blocks alight
on several ¯oors. From a high point you could generally look around the area at
night and witness several large glows within a few streets of each other. The Bronx
was de®nitely `burning'!
Many of these structures were open to the elements and were in fact generally
abandoned, with windows and doors missing. Where windows were intact there was
a repeated tendency for the ®re®ghters to open up and ventilate wherever they
could. A mass assault on the structure seemed common, where all glass would be
taken in an effort to remove smoke, heat and dangerous ®re gases. This sometimes
enabled the ®res to take a hold on the building and high quantities of water were
often needed from the street to deal with the escalating ®re fronts.
One of the worst ®res I worked in New York was up at 179th St., where two
tenement blocks raged side by side. As the evening wore on the ®re erupted from
what must have been forty-eight windows on each frontage, and both roofs were
completely engulfed in ¯ames. In total there were nearly 100 windows with ¯ames
issuing on six levels into the street front. Never in my life had I seen anything on this
scale and I think the ®re had us beat! We were there for several hours and I
remember thinking what it must have been like for London ®re®ghters back in the
World War Two era, with limited resources being put under pressure in this way.
1. Chen, E.B., Morales, A.J., Chen, C.-C., Donatelli, A.A., Bannister, W.W. & Cummings, B.T., (1998),
Fluorescein and Poly(Ethylene Oxide) Hose Stream Additives for Improved Fire®ghting Effectiveness,
Fire Technology, 34(4) p. 291±306
114 l Euro Fire®ghter
Author's note: It is not the intention to criticize any particular ®re department,
or individuals concerned, when reviews of past case histories are undertaken.
The overriding objective is to learn what we can from the experience of others.
By not doing so, we may dishonor their bravery and service. They would surely
want us to learn how we may prevent future ®re®ghters from suffering the same
fate. `With hindsight' is a privilege that just does not exist at the time, on-scene
at an emergency. We do our best within the limitations of our own knowledge,
experience, understanding and awareness.
2. Bindenagel, J.D., (2001), Speech: The Return of History, US Department of State, Forum Alpbach,
Austria
Important European and US case studies l 115
There are several websites online which provide up-to-date information on ®re-
®ghter fatalities, near-miss accidents and general safety issues. You can join the
mailing lists of these excellent website services and receive regular updates on
relevant safety issues that affect ®re®ghters:
I http://origin.cdc.gov/niosh/®re/ NIOSH ®re®ghter fatality reports
I http://www.®re®ghternearmiss.com/ Near miss accident reports
I http://www.®re®ghterclosecalls.com/ Fire®ghter safety issues
Note: The following case study reports are provided in general abstract form
only and the reader is advised to download the complete reports from relevant
websites for full review.
One way of doing this is to take a case study ®re report (for example from NIOSH)
and remove all the investigator's recommendations/conclusions from the front and
rear of the report. This leaves a sequence of events as they occurred, and supple-
mentary information, plans, images etc.
Then ask the students to study the report and provide their own list of
recommendations. This can be either an individual or group task and may also be a
collaborative classroom exercise to promote debate. Give the students a brief as to
which speci®c topic (see example list above) should provide the foundation upon
which to base their recommendations and conclusions. Following on from this, you
can summarize by comparing the students' conclusions with those of the NIOSH
(or other) investigators.
������� ������
06.15.30
+5.31
immediately entered the property and proceeded upstairs where they located and
rescued a young child. On re-entering the property to continue their search the
two ®re®ghters were caught in a backdraft that engulfed the whole house in ¯ames
(0615 hours). On trying to make their escape they were unable to open the front door
that had jammed shut on the hose-line as the pressure from the backdraft had blown it
closed. In their efforts to ®nd an alternative escape route they crawled into the ground
¯oor living room. Both ®re®ghters remained trapped and died from their injuries,
despite subsequent efforts from colleagues to advance a 45 mm hose-line into the fully
involved structure to rescue them.'
Initial deployment (six ®re®ghters):
I One incident commander
I One pump operator
I One BA entry control of®cer (ECO)
I Two search and rescue to upper ¯oor to search for known life hazard
I One ®re®ghter to rear of structure in an effort to lay attack hose-line
Initial conditions on arrival at 0610 hours:
I Heavy smoke issuing from front door
I Ground and ®rst ¯oor windows heavily blackened at front
I Dark smoke issuing under pressure from the eaves
I Two children also died in this ®re
Incident
Time Actions
0610 First engine arrives on scene
0611 Two ®re®ghters wearing BA enter at front with 19 mm hose-reel
0611 Flames reported issuing from ground ¯oor rear
0612 Attempt by ®re®ghter to run second hose-reel to rear of building
0613 First BA crew out of property with one child found
0615 First BA crew return inside to locate second child reported missing
0615 Backdraft occurs engul®ng entire house in ¯ames
0617 Second BA crew enter property in attempt to rescue colleagues
0619 Second engine arrives on scene ± ®ve further ®re®ghters
0620 One line of hose run from hydrant to augment engine tank supply
0620 Third BA crew enter property to assist rescue of trapped ®re®ghters
0625 Third BA crew exit and re-enter to advance a 45 mm hose-line in
0627 First ®re®ghter victim removed from ground ¯oor to street
0629 Second ®re®ghter victim removed from ground ¯oor to street
118 l Euro Fire®ghter
Note: The of®cial report on this ®re concluded that the door between the kitchen
at the rear of the property and the living room at the front was closed by an adult
occupant on discovering the kitchen ®re. The investigators further surmised that the
backdraft was actually a `smoke explosion' that was caused by the post-¯ashover ®re
in the kitchen, breaching the ceiling and igniting an ideal pre-mix of ®re gases
existing on the upper ¯oor.
UK Fire Investigator John Taylor put forth an alternative theory to this of®cial
view and the author is in total agreement that the ®re development and `rapid ®re'
phenomena were most probably not as the of®cial reports concluded.
The reasons for this are:
I Photographs of a remaining edge of the kitchen door suggested that it may
have been in the open position throughout the ®re
I There was a heavy smoke layer reported as `hammering out' of the front door
on arrival and very early on in the ®re®ghting operations
I Heavy dark smoke `hammering' out of the front door suggests a fast moving
gravity current (air exchange with hot ®re gases and smoke) was in existence
I Very heavily stained windows at the front of the house on both ¯oors
I Fire®ghters (victims) reported extremely hot conditions at high level as they
ascended the stairs on the ®rst entry
I For a heavy smoke layer to come `hammering' out of the front door on ®re
service arrival, the post-¯ashover ®re in the kitchen would have had to have
breached the ceiling with some heavy ¯aming combustion into the rear of the
upper ¯oor, if the kitchen ®re was isolated behind a closed door
I This point to point air-track, from entry door to kitchen ®re to upper ¯oor,
back down stairs and out entry door, would create extreme heat conditions
on the stairway where ®re®ghters may not have been able to advance in
I Also note that a child was rescued from the rear upper ¯oor bedroom and did
not appear severely burned but rather overcome by smoke. If ¯aming
combustion had entered this bedroom, from the ¯oor below, some minutes
before ®re service arrival, then there would most likely be obvious and severe
burn injuries.
Present and debate this ®re with students, discussing the sequence of events and
asking for their conclusions and recommendations.
An adult occupant, sleeping upstairs in the front bedroom, awoke to the cries of a
child. The adult opened the front bedroom door to the hall and found hot smoky
conditions4. The adult returned to the front bedroom, opened a window on the
front side of the house and called for help, alerting several neighbors. It is believed
that the calls to 911 began shortly after this. The adult returned to the smoky
upstairs hallway, found the crying child and exited the residence by the front
bedroom window onto the roof of the front porch. Approximately two minutes later,
at 0826 hours, ®re®ghters and police began to arrive at the ®re-scene. The smoke
plume was visible as ®re®ghters approached the scene and there was little if any
wind disturbing the plume. Fire®ghters radioed Central Dispatch, reporting `white
to dark brown smoke' showing from the residence. The adult occupant was outside
with the child and explained that there were three children still in the house. The
front door to the residence was forced open by a police of®cer at approximately
0827 hours. The of®cer discovered heavy smoke conditions. He could not make
entry into the house. At 0828 hours, the ®rst arriving crew of ®re®ghters prepared to
enter the residence and placed a call requesting additional ®re®ghters.
At approximately 0831 hours, the ®re chief arrived at the ®re-scene with an
additional ®re®ghter. Three ®re®ghters entered the house and brought two infants
from upstairs bedrooms to the front door. Two police vehicles were used to trans-
port the infants to the hospital. The ®re chief was administering CPR to the second
infant and was transported to the hospital. Based on radio transmissions, the ®rst
infant was en route to the hospital at approximately 0834 hours and the second
infant was en route to the hospital at approximately 0835 hours. According to
witness statements, the full ®re involvement of the living room, leading to a fully-
involved ®re condition in the stairwell, occurred as the infants were being trans-
ported to the hospital (approximately ®ve or six minutes after ®re service arrival).
A hose-line had been advanced into the entry foyer of the house. The `dry' hose-line
was placed on the ¯oor, while the ®re®ghter returned to the engine to charge the line.
When the hose-line was `charged' (pressurized with water) it was discovered that the
hose had burned through and ¯ames were coming out of the doorway to the house.
At approximately 0848 hours, as a second ®re crew made entry into the house and
began to attack the ®re with a hose-line, a ®re®ghter was discovered on the ¯oor of
the living room. Later the other two ®re®ghters from the ®rst crew were found on
the second ¯oor: one on the landing at the top of the stairs with a child victim, and
another in the doorway of the front bedroom. All three ®re®ghters and the one child
found in the house, as well as the two children taken to hospital, died from injuries
caused by the ®re.
The critical event in this ®re was the onset of ¯ashover conditions in the kitchen.
Within 60 seconds after the ¯ashover occurred in the kitchen, the ¯ames had spread
through the dining room, living room and up the stairway.
Again, we see a clear opportunity for ®re®ghters to close an internal (hall to
lounge) door as they pass it, on their way up to the bedrooms. This might have
effectively sealed off the ®re spread, protecting their means of egress, and have
bought them some more time whilst they rescued the children trapped upstairs.
(Note: The end doors from the hallway to the dining room were permanently closed
and inaccessible from either side).
4. Madrzykowski, D., Forney, G.P. and Walton, W.D., (2002), Simulation of the Dynamics of a Fire in a
Two-Story Duplex, Iowa, 22 December 1999, NISTIR 6854
��������� �������� ��� �� ���� ������� � ���
������� ������
������� ������
Keokuk's Fire Chief Mark Wessel (MW), relating to the tragic events that occurred
during this ®re. If you want to know what it's like being the on-scene chief at a multi
LODD here it is, right from the heart:
AG: `Let's talk about the NIOSH report and especially, the recommendations.
Staf®ng was an issue. It is obvious that your resources were stretched by the
motor vehicle accident (MVA) and then the report of the residential ®re. Is
it safe to say that your initial response to the ®re was a quint, engine and
four personnel. Was this SOP?'
MW: `Yes, that was the initial response. Whenever you have a total shift of six personnel, a
®ve man minimum and answer 850 to 900 calls for service a year, you are going to have
times when you respond to an emergency with three, four, or ®ve personnel on the initial
response. This is what we learned: It's not how many you respond with, it's what you do
with them when you arrive. If you lose perspective of the whole picture, it doesn't matter
how many you have.'
AG: `What do you believe NIOSH considered an appropriate staf®ng level
for a city like Keokuk?'
MW: `I think this will also better explain the previous question. I don't think NIOSH
actually stated how many personnel would be an appropriate staf®ng level for a community
like Keokuk. If you were to take into consideration NFPA and all of the evolutions that
need to be accomplished, I would think that number would be somewhere between thirteen
and sixteen personnel. Now, that would be for a single-family dwelling. Next, take into
consideration the age and condition of the community. How about all of the commercial
structures in the community? And, the industrial base that Keokuk serves? I guess one
might easily estimate the need for twenty-four to thirty personnel on duty ready to respond.
But, the $700 question. How do we pay for it? We don't. We make do with what we can
afford. With that comes responsibility to formulate SOPs that can be effected safely. If you
can't do that, then stand back and become defensive in your attack of the emergency. It's
much easier to stand in front of the media and say we had to let it burn because we did not
have the resources to use a reasonable amount of safety to protect the ®re®ghters, than it is to
conduct a memorial service. It's much easier to look at a reporter with rubble in the
background than to look into the faces of the grieving family of a ®re®ghter. That I can say
with certainty, and anyone reading this should take it to the bank.'
AG: `The report recommended that the IC does initial size-up before
initiating ®re®ghting efforts and then continually evaluating risk versus
gain as the incident continues. AC McNally was the highest rank initially.
Wouldn't he have done a size-up before starting search and rescue? And
would you not take command once on-scene under ``normal'' circumstances?'
MW: `Under normal circumstances, yes. TUNNEL VISION played a huge role in the
way that ®re was approached. Mother, with a four-year old in hand, screaming, ``MY
BABIES ARE INSIDE'' was key to the deviation from normal operations. I believe being
keyed up from the MVA that morning just prior to the call ± in fact they were called off of
that incident to this one ± played a part in the initial operation. Having no medical
transport available played a key role. One might say that this ®re was routine. ROUTINE
is no longer a word in our vocabulary. Other than pulling into the ®re-scene and seeing
smoke from a residential structure, there was nothing else routine about it. There was
nothing normal about that day.'
124 l Euro Fire®ghter
AG: `Do you think too much emphasis or not enough is put on an ICS?
What would it have done for you on this day? You had to get the kids out. In
retrospect, break the incident down to what might have been done
differently.'
MW: `I truly feel ICS is the most important aspect of ®re®ghter safety we can have on the
emergency scene. Good command should re¯ect control, coordination, goals and com-
munication. I guess I could beat myself up inde®nitely over the operation. Some may even
say I should. Trust me, I have. Through this I have gained nothing. What has been most
effective is dissecting the incident into small enough pieces to calculate. Also, dissecting the
department so that the task is not so overwhelming in the development of good SOPs,
SOGs.'
AG: ` ``Defensive search'' was mentioned. I don't mind telling you that it
put a silly look on my face. The only thing that I could think that it meant
was to take a long stick and poke it through a window and maybe someone
would grab it. How close am I?'
MW: `Actually Chief, you're not too far off. What defensive search actually refers to is the
idea of not over-committing. Do not place yourself in a position that you might become part
of the problem. I know we train to rescue people. I know we all have learned the right hand
rule and left hand rule on primary search and rescue. Let me just say this: If you have
®re®ghters who have not had this training, they should not be your rescue team. If you are a
®re®ghter who has not had this training, then you should refuse to perform interior search
and rescue. I was teaching a basic breathing apparatus class and was asked the question
about CEUs for HAZMAT Tech. I asked if the student was a Tech and he replied, ``Yes''.
This particular student had never worn breathing apparatus. Maybe over the years things
have changed that much, but I always thought you needed to wear breathing apparatus to
train to the HAZMAT Tech level. Don't put yourself or your people in an over-committed
environment. When and if other resources arrive, then and only then, might you consider
further commitment. Stay next to a door or window to do your search. Do not commit
further than your resources or training allow for a reasonable amount of safety.'
AG: ` ``Maintains close accountability for all personnel at the ®re scene.''
This would suggest that you didn't know where your FIVE people were,
when it is painfully clear that you knew exactly where they were and what
they were doing. Was this meant to address communications issues? Who
had radios that day?'
MW: `I did in fact know that they were performing rescue operations on the interior of the
structure. When you have this few personnel on the scene, you can track everyone without
too many problems. As the incident grows, you must then utilize a formal accountability
system to track all the operations that are simultaneously occurring. Having a good
accountability of your personnel will help to stabilize a scene, reduce freelancing and provide
a safer more pro®cient operation. Having an established accountability program will reduce
the impact of Murphy's Law.'
AG: `NIOSH addressed communications. Were there dif®culties with radio
transmissions, radio equipment, and no back-up channels? What caused
your radios to be a focus for their review?'
Important European and US case studies l 125
MW: `At the time of this ®re, only the of®cers had portable radios. Today, all personnel
carry radios. There was very little communication occurring at the scene that morning.
In fact, it would be reasonable to say little or none, except for initial communications
with dispatch. I think NIOSH focused on this mainly because communications seems to be
a common denominator in LODDs. It would seem to me that whenever a team is focused
on search for a known victim, the radios become very quiet. We have worked on
our communications quite a lot. We continue to have a long way to go. With radio
communications there is always room for improvement. I think for me the lesson in
emergency scene communications was not what was communicated but more of what was
communicated.'
AG: `RIT is a biggie. A lot of discussion over the years. At what point in
this incident did you actually have enough manpower to assign RIT? And
honestly? Knowing Iowa OSHA like I do, I would have bet on a citation for
violating Two In/Two Out. Was RIT part of the equation early into this
incident?'
MW: `No, RIT really wasn't a consideration. Actually the Two In/Two Out rule is
negated in Iowa if a known rescue is in progress. Two In/Two Out never played a role in
any of the investigation. My only observation towards Two In/Two Out is: Why is it better
in OSHA's eyes to perform a rescue with only one person if you know someone is trapped
than if you are assuming someone may be trapped? I thought OSHA was about employee
safety. If that is the case, even they make an exception to the rules (SOPs).'
AG: `The last NIOSH recommendation addresses Personal Alert Safety
System (PASS) devices. Your ®re®ghters each wore two; one integrated
into the SCBA and the other attached to their coats. Yet, no one could recall
hearing any audible alarms from any of the stricken ®re®ghters. Could it be
speculated that a thermal event inside the structure rendered the devices
inoperable?'
MW: `The third party testing revealed that, due to the extreme thermal event, the
electronics failed in all the audible devices. One more lesson: If it is man made, it can, and
most probably will, fail at the worst time.'
AG: `Could you talk about relationships and their importance when dealing
with a traumatic event?'
MW: `Considering I've been fortunate to have not had prior experience with a LODD, I
would say we had to learn how to deal with the trauma. Fortunately, the ®re®ghters
respected each other through the entire ordeal. There were so many different emotions being
experienced, you just had to wonder how the department would make it. I guess the Good
Lord stayed with us through to the end. Although I'm sure we remain far from the end.
Each person experiences grief in a different way and at different times. Knowing that you
are going to have all these different emotions occurring, you have to stay on top of the game.
We were able to come through this with little animosity and hurt feelings. It's all about
RESPECT.'
AG: `The last time you and I spoke, you told me about the McNally boys and
I saw that gleam in your eye and that smile stretch across your face. Tell our
readers about them.'
126 l Euro Fire®ghter
MW: `All three of our men had kids at home. Some were rather young and would need to
analyze all of this at a later age. Some were older and could, for as well as can be expected,
experience the pain and suffering of the loss of their father immediately. I really could not
relate to them very well as I had never experienced a loss of this type. All I could do is sit
back and pray that the children could rationalize the loss and continue to move forward.
Fortunately, to the best of my knowledge, all has gone well. As for the McNally boys; they
are doing well. Pat, the oldest son of Dave, was in college working towards a degree in law
enforcement. He wised up, changed his mind and moved towards an education in ®re
science. Pat decided he wanted to be a ®re®ghter. Of course, I was pleased with his decision.
Any father would be excited about his son or daughter following in his footsteps. The
difference is, Pat had experienced the worst of times. Then Pat came to my of®ce and said
he wanted to be a ®re®ghter in Keokuk. Well, you can imagine the mixed emotions I had.
We talked quite extensively regarding the reasons he wanted to be a ®re®ghter. Pat had the
right answers, the right attitude. Pat has been with the department for over a year now, and
is doing very well. I just see so much of his father in him, sometimes he'll do something or the
look on his face will remind me of Dave, and I have to walk away. Usually with tears
moving down my cheeks. Pat's desire to be a ®re®ghter in Keokuk also in some way makes
me feel very good inside. Dave's youngest son has also expressed an interest in the ®re
service, and he too would like to be a ®re®ghter in Keokuk. I only hope I have the
opportunity to make that a reality for him also.'
AG: `That is a ®tting ending to this interview, but your story of that day will
continue, won't it? You have such a passion for this that I can tell that you
never want anyone else, be it ®re®ghter, family or friend to have to
experience it. Your ®nal thoughts, please, Mark.'
MW: `As it is written in Job, ``Should we accept the good that is given and not accept
the bad?'' Life sometimes throws a curve and we take it on the chin. I knew even as a
®re®ghter I had a responsibility to others. My partner was relying on me for his safety.
Then as I was promoted, others were relying on me as well. Eventually the department
became my responsibility, and things went bad. I had always thought that I operated
safely.
Sometimes your eyes get opened unexpectedly. You don't have to experience what
Keokuk experienced. Why is it, we all know if we are punched in the nose, it is going to hurt
like hell? Yet some of us still have to pick a ®ght to believe it. Let Keokuk be your punch in
the nose. Let our incident be your incident. Study it. Pick it apart. Plug it into your
Operating Procedures. Not just what is written, but how you actually operate on the scene.
For most, you will probably ®nd there are some major discrepancies in your written
procedures and your everyday, take-it-for-granted, on-scene operations. You have the
ability to ``Make The Changes''. Do you have the desire? If not, let someone else lead.
From the bottom to the top, you must be willing to step forward. Not stand back, not stand
still. This is not a social club. If you think it is, ask your family if the social pleasure is worth
the risk? If you are not willing to train, then get out. Fishing is much more relaxing, but
learn to swim ®rst.
Many people have touched my life and supported my department and me through this
tragedy. I can only say ``Thank you'' to all of them. To the ®re®ghters of Keokuk, my hat
is off to them. They exemplify the de®nition of ®re®ghter. They have supported me through
this, when often lines are drawn in the sand.
As long as my mind, body and soul can summon the strength, I will continue to carry the
message of ®re®ghter safety. Listen to my pain and understand how important it is for
Important European and US case studies l 127
``Everyone to go home''. Keep that thought in the forefront of all you do. Do not buckle to
the pressures of peers or politicians. If you can do this, you may just ®nd yourself sleeping
better at night. Stay safe.'
The ®ndings from this incident will be incorporated into future ®re®ghter training.
(Note: The Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department are to be congratulated in
establishing such an open and thorough approach to the investigation of this
incident, in their efforts to ensure that such tactical errors are not repeated).
Issues Comments
Incident command The ®rst arriving company did not establish command.
The acting battalion chief was coming from another call
and had a delayed arrival. All ®rst alarm companies had
self-committed before the acting battalion chief assumed
command of the incident.
Accountability Accountability procedures were not implemented. The
locations and functions of companies operating inside the
house were not known to the incident commander. It was
not realized that members were missing.
Crew integrity All crews did not function as single tactical units. Some of
the individual members from these companies performed
unrelated tasks and were not under the supervision of their
company of®cers. Most of the personnel were working in
temporary assignments for that shift.
8. Routley, J.G., (1995), Three Pittsburgh Fire®ghters Die in House Fire, USFA Report 078
130 l Euro Fire®ghter
Issues Comments
Emergency survival The actions of the three victims when they realized they
actions were in trouble are not known; however, they do not
appear to have initiated emergency procedures that could
have improved their chances of survival or made other
®re®ghters aware of their need to be rescued.
Rapid Intervention Some ®re departments have adopted procedures to assign
Teams a Rapid Intervention Team at working ®res. The objective
of this team is to be ready to provide immediate assistance
to ®re®ghters in trouble.
Communications There was a lack of effective ®re-ground communications
at this incident. There was no exchange of information
with the interior crews after they entered the dwelling. All
of the ®rst alarm companies were operating before the
acting battalion chief arrived and assumed command. The
incident commander did not receive any progress reports
from these companies.
sixteen career and twelve volunteer ®re®ghters operating out of two stations. The
department serves a population of approximately 22,000 residents in a geographic
area of about 26 sq miles.
The victim and a ®re®ghter made entry into the structure with a hand-line to
search for and extinguish the ®re. While searching in the basement, the victim
removed his regulator for one to two minutes to see if he could distinguish the
location and cause of the ®re by smell. While searching on the main ¯oor of
the structure, the ®re®ghter's low air alarm sounded and the victim directed the
®re®ghter to exit and have another ®re®ghter working outside take his place. The
victim and the second ®re®ghter went to the second ¯oor without the hand-line
to continue searching for the ®re. Within a couple of minutes, the victim's own low
air alarm started sounding. The victim and the ®re®ghter became disoriented and
could not ®nd their way out of the structure. The victim made repeated calls over
his radio for assistance but he was not on the ®re-ground channel. The second
®re®ghter `buddy breathed' with the victim until the victim became unresponsive.
The second ®re®ghter was low on air and exited. The ®re intensi®ed and had to be
knocked down before the victim could be recovered.
11. Laidlaw Investigation Committee in cooperation with the Cincinnati Fire Department and Cincinnati
Local Fire®ghters 48, 2004
132 l Euro Fire®ghter
The initial attack hose-line consisted of 300 ft (100 m) of 1.75 inch pre-connect.
This is a very long hand-line and as the engine was sited just a few feet from the front
door of the property there was inevitably a large amount of hose that coiled and
kinked. This became worse as ®re®ghters laid to the side and rear of the structure
before returning to enter at the front. Photographic images taken from above clearly
show the hose-line problem as laid to the side of the house.
This caused water problems with low pressure and ¯ow-rate experienced at
the attack nozzle being advanced in when the ¯ashover occurred. Just prior to the
¯ashover, there were several horizontal ventilation openings being created via
windows at the side of the structure.
blasts were sounded to signal the evacuation. Fire®ghting operations changed from
an offensive attack, including search and rescue, to a defensive attack with the use
of heavy-stream appliances. After the ®re had been knocked down, search and
recovery operations commenced until recall of the box alarm eight days later on
11 December 1999, at 2227 hours, when all six ®re®ghters' bodies had been
recovered.
near-complete collapse of the roof some minutes later. Several calls for help were
made by trapped ®re®ghters and efforts to rescue them were commenced. These
efforts proved unsuccessful. By the time the ®re was brought under control, nine
Charleston ®re®ghters had lost their lives.According to Charleston County Coroner
Rae Wooten, the ®re®ghters died of a combination of smoke inhalation and burns,
but not from injuries sustained from the collapse itself.
This ®re is subject to extensive investigations and carries major legal implications.
However, there are known facts as reported that are worthy of debate:
I The initial call was to a `structure ®re'.
I The ®rst on-scene chief observed an exterior rubbish ®re and radioed this in.
I The primary response of two engines and a ladder arrived within a few
seconds of two chiefs being on-scene.
I One of these engines should have obtained a water supply according to
department SOP but both reported directly to the structure.
I Both engines were supplying attack hose-lines within the ®rst ®ve minutes
from tank water supply.
I The nearest hydrant was 500 ft from the involved building.
I At 1913 and again at 1917 hours, chiefs were calling additional engines in to
lay supply lines to feed the two on-scene engines.
I A 2.5 inch attack line had been laid into the structure but could not be
¯owed for fear of running tanks dry before supply lines were connected.
I By 1924 hours Engine 11 was down to a quarter (tank water).
I When original supply lines were ®nally laid in to feed attack engines they
were single 2.5 inch hose supply lines which were unable to provide adequate
¯ow-rate in relation to the speed and intensity of the developing ®re.
I When the chief of department arrived on-scene at 1916 hours the ®re was
developing rapidly in a large volume structure housing an extremely high ®re
load. There were water supply problems that prevented the required amount
of water reaching the attack hose-lines and a large number of ®re®ghters
(at least sixteen) were occupying the structure.
I At this stage there was a report of a trapped occupant who was quickly
reached and rescued.
Timeline
I 1908 hours ± First call reporting a possible `structure ®re' is received. The
units dispatched include Charleston Fire Department Engine 10, Engine 11,
Ladder 5 and Battalion 4, while Engine 16 responded for standby.
I 1911 hours ± Engines 10 and 11 arrive on-scene and B4 reports a trash and
debris ®re that is up against the wall in the loading dock area, but that they
have not yet entered the building to check for extension.
I 1912 hours ± Ladder 5 arrives.
I 1913 hours ± (Approximate). Fire crews enter the showroom building and
®nd no obvious ®re, however the incident commander reports some light
smoke is visible near the ceiling tiles.
I 1913 hours ± (Approximate). A door leading from the showroom to the
loading dock area is opened by the incident commander, and the force of
the ®re pulls the door out of his hand. Fire enters the showroom.
I 1913 hours ± Additional engines are being assigned to water supply.
Important European and US case studies l 135
were made by ®re commanders that the search would be thorough. The con-
sequence was that by the time the woman was found she had lost her life to the ®re.
Some brigade personnel made mistakes.
Many ®re service operations result in initial confusion as to who is accounted for
and who may be missing. There is often a regular pattern of misinformation, no
information and contradictions. The incident commander, regardless of rank,
experience and pressure, has to make judgements and take decisions.
It was considered that the ®rst seven minutes following arrival on-scene were the
most critical to the potential for saving life (2338±2345 hours) (see gray area on
timeline).
On arrival the incident commander assessed the situation. There was a serious ®re
in one apartment, on the left at ground ¯oor level, and a number of persons were at
windows calling for assistance. Within one minute the IC had ordered a hose-line
through the front window into the ground ¯oor left ¯at, which was on ®re. Fire-
®ghters could not pass through the close (common hall) of No. 13 because ¯ames
were coming out of the door of the ground ¯oor left ¯at and the close was full of
smoke. The IC ordered a second hose-line through the close of No. 11 and into the
rear of No. 13, to assist with the ®re®ghting.
It was during these vital early stages that evidence given by members of the public
states that a ®re®ghter spoke to the female victim. However company commanders
were adamant that information regarding the victim's predicament never reached
them from any ®re®ghter or member of the public. Had it done so they were both
equally adamant it would have altered their priorities. One of the ®re®ghters, who
did subsequently enter the building in BA, had been in the back court and gave
evidence of generally acknowledging various occupants at upper ¯oors who called
for assistance. He did not, however, ®nd the victim. That occurred much later after
the ®re was extinguished and some other occupants had returned to their own or
another ¯at.
Throughout these early operations the IC and sub-of®cer continually assessed
what was happening at both front and rear of the structure and frequently spoke at
the front of the building to occupants, to help reassure them that the situation was
being brought under control. Naturally some residents were concerned and vocal;
others were calm and quiet watching the operation. The IC in particular describes
how he remained fairly constantly at the front of the structure, both to ensure he had
a good command and observation position and to remain in contact with those
occupants he could see.
The IC took the strategic decision to extinguish the ®re as the best method of
ensuring the safety of those occupants that he could readily identify at the various
windows. It was, in ®re service terms, very much a normal tenement incident. This
normality is also probably one of the reasons for the public concern that surrounds
the way the incident was managed on that evening, i.e. how could the ®re service get
it so wrong on a typical ®re.
The speed of events was again nothing unusual. Frequently in tenement ®res it
can be anticipated that the priority will be the need to extinguish the ®re to avoid
ladder rescues. The strategy of the IC therefore re¯ected what was in effect a routine
incident.
However, the occupant of the ground ¯oor apartment that was on ®re caused
such a distraction and excitement amongst the crowd that the police present
ultimately held him under arrest. The incident commander found his attention
Important European and US case studies l 137
diverted by this individual and by the subsequent need to ensure that suf®cient
evidence was gathered surrounding this individual's actions relating to the ®re.
The ®re itself was therefore fought in a conventional way, albeit that the hose-line
into the front window had the impact of driving some of the ®re, and more
particularly the products of combustion, into the stairwell (since the door had been
left open by the occupant when he exited the ¯at).
Crews made good progress in this ®re®ghting endeavour. However, initial
deployments came under review during the investigation in to the ®re.
Time Action
2334 First call saying that there was a ®re in an apartment block in Dundee.
Two engines, an aerial and an ADO (battalion chief) were dispatched
to the scene.
2325 Second further call. The caller stated that, `The windows have blown
and smoke is coming out.'
Third further call received. The caller said, `There is a ®re underneath
me.'
Fourth further call reporting the ®re.
2336 Four further calls received including one from an occupant, saying,
`We are on the second ¯oor and we can't get out because there is smoke
belching through the corridor.'
The control room radioed the incident commander to say, `For your
information, the occupants of the ¯at above are unable to exit due to
the smoke.'
Ninth further call received to ®re.
2337 Tenth further call from female victim stating her address and saying,
`It's my house.'
2339 The aerial arrives and the incident commander sends back the message
`Make pumps 3.' (This is an assistance message used in the ®re service
to request a third engine). Fire Control seek con®rmation: `Is this
``person reported'' or just ``make pumps 3''?' A11.1 radios back:
`Make pumps 3.'
2339 Eleventh further call received in which the caller refers to someone
`screaming for help.'
Time Action
2345 Of®cer in charge sends a radio message saying, `Ground ¯oor well alight,
two jets [attack hose-lines], four SCBA in use, persons reported.'
2354 Further radio message reporting that, `One further male removed from
second ¯oor ¯at by ladder. Six breathing apparatus sets are in use.'
0000 Radio message from divisional of®cer saying that ADO will remain in
charge of the incident and that divisional of®cer will undertake health
and safety monitoring.
0004 Radio message from ADO that `All persons are accounted for.'
0014 Radio message from ADO indicating, `Stop', (i.e. no further resources
required ± ®re extinguished).
Limited staf®ng ±
Three-person crews
5.1 INTRODUCTION
I was in Johannesburg lecturing at a conference when a ®re®ghter came up to me:
Paul, all the textbooks on ®re®ghting tactics seem to take it for granted that there
are going to be adequate resources and staf®ng on-scene at every structure ®re.
Furthermore, just about all of the Standard Operating Procedures I have seen are
written for staf®ng of ®ve and above. In our little town we will get three ®re®ghters
responding to a structure ®re on a single engine and they will be there for around thirty
minutes before aid arrives from surrounding districts. Believe me when I say, things
aren't going to improve in this respect. How should we approach ®res? How can we
base our documented guidelines (SOPs) that you talk of on a common risk-based
approach?
The stark reality of limited staf®ng and ®re-ground resources sometimes means an
initial response of ®re®ghters is restricted to a three-person crew. Further still, in
some rural areas it is common for this crew to be alone on-scene, without immediate
support or back-up for quite some time. It is surprising perhaps that the three
person crew is a `standard' response in many parts of the globe, including parts of
rural and even urban USA. One thing is certain, and that is that adequate crewing
standards should always be hotly pursued through labour relations where possible.
Past staf®ng studies clearly demonstrate that critical tasking on the primary and
secondary response to a structure ®re (and a wide range of other incident types) is
139
140 l Euro Fire®ghter
dramatically affected where staf®ng is inadequate. Key tasks just don't get carried
out and ®re®ghters are sometimes morally forced into situations where their safety is
recklessly compromised.
However, where there are three-person crews operating at ®res then we must
surely offer clear risk-based guidelines from a safety perspective. With this in mind,
the concept of `quick-water' attack using `3D ®re®ghting' techniques ± to conserve
and maximize the limited water supply on the ®rst-arriving engine ± is a strategy that
has gained enormous popularity with ®re departments that respond with limited
resources.
The Critical Tasking Performance Index (CTPI)1 demonstrates three-person
crews are only able to guarantee 23% of the critical tasks necessary on arrival at a
structure ®re. An initial response of at least ten to fourteen ®re®ghters must be
assembled on-scene to achieve a CTPI of 100% at even the most basic of `low-rise'
structure ®res. It is clear that critical tasks need careful prioritization where crews
and resources are limited in numbers. However, the document also demonstrates
how a limited-staf®ng CTPI may be dramatically improved by using the three-
phased tactical approach described in the Fire2000.com staf®ng bulletin.
Reduced property damage, improved viability of retrieving live casualties, and
safer ®re®ghting operations for limited-staffed responses are the result of careful
deployment of three-person crews following risk-assessed ®re®ghting concepts.
In 1983±84 a study was undertaken in Dallas, USA that measured the impact of
various staf®ng levels on the effectiveness of using three, four and ®ve ®re®ghters on
®re apparatus responding to structure ®res. The research included ninety-one full-
scale ®re simulations and three full-scale ®re tests, where performance was
measured. Prior to this there had been several other studies that measured the effect
of varying crew sizes on the ef®ciency of existing ®re strategy and tactics. However,
few, if any, studies have actually attempted to optimize structural ®re®ghting
strategy and tactics in line with pre-existing reduced or limited staf®ng response.
general consensus of the research was quick to point out that critical tasking on the
®re-ground was directly related to time versus crew size and key tasks were delayed
where crews were under-resourced. It was proposed in the Dallas study that crew
sizes below four ®re®ghters were literally unable to achieve effective performance in
laying out hose-lines, placing ladders, and augmenting water supplies to the attack
pumper. The research also acknowledged that performance of crews varied depend-
ing on the differing types of risk, occupancy and levels of ®re protection existing
therein.
The Fire2000.com research project fully endorses the ®ndings of the Dallas
research. It is directed at both the management and deployment of resources and
offers a three-phased approach to optimizing and increasing performance of limited-
sized ®re crews. The Fire2000.com SOG is based upon a simple twelve point
Incident Action Guide (IAG, see Fig. 5.2) that clearly de®nes situations when
a limited-resourced crew might commit to an interior offensive attack or when it is
safer and more effective to function in a defensive mode ± attempting ®re con®ne-
ment and/or exposure protection. A day of Visual Pattern Recognition (VPR)
training can be used to assist ®re®ghters in forming a thought process that enables
decision-making based upon the IAG.
The CTPI takes into account nine essential features2, or critical objectives,
that require effective implementation on ®rst arrival at a structure ®re. The grading
index suggests that ®res on the upper ¯oors of tall buildings, or those at large
commercial or industrial risk, will place greater demands upon the responding ®re
force, and these are not addressed directly in the supporting IAG. As an example,
the CTPI recommends that a minimum complement of ten to fourteen ®re®ghters
are needed on ®rst response to achieve a 100% grading. A team of three ®re®ghters is
only able to guarantee 23% of the CTPI ± that is one quarter of the critical tasks
they may be faced with ± at a small working ®re in a low-rise residential structure. As
with the Dallas research, the CTPI does not apply to large ®res in large volume
structures, where ®re-ground resources are generally stretched beyond the limits of
an initial response. A basic `working ®re' in a tall open-plan of®ce building (above
the sixth ¯oor) would require at least thirty-six ®re®ghters just to implement the
fundamentals of an incident management plan, by ensuring safe and effective crew
deployment and ®re-ground resource support.
2. These nine core tasks may vary according to personal assessments and local review (see CTPI form).
142 l Euro Fire®ghter
life loss incidents, including LODDs. It may also be seen that national, federal and
local health and safety regulations are acknowledged within the scope of the CTPI.
In contrast to the Dallas research, the CTPI addresses `tasks' as `objectives' or `roles'
and does not apply the principles of physical competence aligned to ®rst-response
actions ± as in placing a ladder or laying a hose-line. The Dallas research itself
acknowledged that several factors such as attitude, skill, experience, coordination
and motivation would directly in¯uence such tasks.
The nine objectives are then graded individually in the CTPI, depending on their
importance or relevance, to the effect that crews of one to six ®re®ghters are able
to achieve the objectives in order of priority. It should be noted here that the
OSHA Two In/Two Out rule (see section 5.6) is legislated in the USA, and this may
affect the percentage applied in the CTPI, though local interpretations3 of OSHA
apply. Although a three-person crew is only able to guarantee 23% of achievable
objectives in the CTPI, they are graded at 44% overall effective in contrast to other
sized crews, where working to the IAG, and if adequately trained and equipped
under the three-phased approach.
Critical Task Performance Index (CTPI) (Initial response to small working ®res in
low-rise, low volume structures of average ®re load).
I Phase One ± The use of CFBT nozzle `pulsing' or `bursting' techniques will
conserve the apparatus water tank supply and increase the tank's working
duration without an augmented supply. These techniques will optimize the
available water supply, effectively cooling the overhead and gaining some
rapid knock-down of ®re in a `fast attack' mode.
3. Some US States interpret the OSHA ruling to allow the IC to form one of the `Two In' members,
leaving the sole outside ®re®ghter operating the pump to take temporary command.
Limited staf®ng ± Three-person crews l 143
I Phase Two ± The use of Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) and anti-
ventilation tactics, to create `safety' zones, is explored, and strict protocols
are followed to assure that ®re®ghters implement the strategies safely and
effectively. The result may be a safer and more comfortable working environ-
ment in which ®re®ghters can advance to search for trapped occupants
and locate the ®re. This strategy is supported by the use of thermal
imaging cameras. An alternative option to PPV attack is VES. This is most
de®nitely a viable option for three-person crews where `quick hit', `get in
and get out' search tactics will enable a search pattern by taking one room at a
time.
I Phase Three ± Finally, for exterior attacks, ®re con®nement and exposure
protection, the use of water additives is explored to increase the duration of
the apparatus water tank supply. Both class A foam or Compressed Air Foam
Systems (CAFS) are known to extend a limited water supply's suppressive
performance by up to six times, increasing the capability of a limited-staffed
crew with limited resources.
It can be argued that no primary response to a residential structure ®re is truly 100%
effective unless ®rst responders are able to:
I Conserving available tank water by using nozzle `pulses' and short `bursts'
will increase tank duration by three to four times and ensure water appli-
cations are optimized by reducing run-off and increasing ef®ciency
I Use of Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) and anti-ventilation techniques,
according to safe working protocols (see Chapter Two), allows approach
routes to clear of smoke, heat and dangerous gases and enables the ®re room
to be closed down (close door) and the ®re itself to be isolated, whilst the
structure is searched; or for the ®re to be extinguished by direct attack. Note:
The ideal ventilation outlet may already be in existence and a ®re®ghter may
not therefore be needed for this task.
I Use of Class A foam or CAFS (or similar) from an exterior position, gains
rapid knock-down of extensive ¯aming combustion and protects exposures.
Note on the IAG: Ensure compliance with OSHA (Two In/Two Out), NFPA, and
other local directives at all times, and follow your own departmental procedures. The
IAG is a model procedure that may be adopted or adapted where such compliance is
not stipulated or applicable.
144 l Euro Fire®ghter
1 FFR
10
RISK-ASSESSED
INCIDENT ACTION GUIDE
Three-Person Crewing Structural Response MODE OF ATTACK
RISK-ASSESSED
INCIDENT ACTION GUIDE
Three-Person Crewing Structural Response MODE OF ATTACK
4. Some US states interpret the OSHA ruling to allow the IC to form one of the `Two In' members,
leaving the sole outside ®re®ghter operating the pump to take temporary command.
Limited staf®ng ± Three-person crews l 147
ladders or forcing doors, but are more general `objectives'. The nine examples
given earlier may offer some idea as to what is required of a primary response to a
structure ®re. It may be that you consider tactical ventilation and forcible entry
should be on the list, so put them in and also increase the number of boxes (or give
each student two forms) if needed.
Having then identi®ed a list of critical core tasks (objectives) for the primary
response, the students should attempt to prioritize and grade by percentage the
importance of each task. For example, the need for interior ®re attack may be seen
as a higher priority over interior search and rescue, or obtaining a continuous water
supply. Each task should be listed and graded on the basis of ten objectives being
equal to 100%. Therefore, the average grading for each task would be 10% but
some tasks will be graded higher or lower in percentage, according to their
importance.
Having completed this part of the exercise, students should then be asked to
consider how many of these objectives are likely to be achieved by the primary
response during those vital ®rst few minutes following arrival on-scene. It can be
seen that primary response levels up to ten ®re®ghters are included, but you can
increase or reduce this, as needed. The students should enter a tick where the task
can be viably implemented by each speci®c number of ®re®ghters on-scene; a
question mark where it is doubtful; or a cross where the task cannot possibly be
achieved.
Having reached this stage, students can then roughly estimate a performance
grading for each number of ®re®ghters on-scene by following the guide at the base
of the form:
I y Full percentage achieved
I ? Allotted percentage divided by 3
I X Zero percentage achieved
Therefore, any box achieving a tick ensures the full grading percentage given to that
task is added to the overall percentage achieved for that number of ®re®ghters. Any
box with a question mark will only receive a third of the graded percentage (e.g. 3%,
if 9% was the graded percentage); and any box with a cross will not receive any
®gure to add to the ®nal total.
This way a grading can be concluded for three-person crews in achieving the
listed tasks or objectives and then compared to other primary responses ranging
from one to your own choice.
Legal compliance
It is stated that compliance with federal or local OSHA (and other) regulations
(where in force) is beyond debate. However, it is most likely that in practice there
are ®re departments that are utilizing loopholes in the standards to implement
`urgent' measures on the ®re-ground, in the belief they are still legally conforming to
applicable standards.
Limited staf®ng ± Three-person crews l 149
The purpose of the standards is to improve the safety of ®rst responders but it can
equally be argued that in some situations, the standards serve to hinder a safer
approach. Two outside ®re®ghters might be better employed in some circumstances
in attacking either the ®re itself, or in protecting those that have committed in
advance, in search of trapped or remaining occupants. This statement is neither in
support of the standards nor against them, but merely recognizes that there are
de®nitions and statements that appear therein that are ambiguous in any practical
application.
Loopholes
(Open to the legal test process)
In some local state OSHA de®nitions it has been documented that the pump
operator (MPO) cannot form one of the Two Out if the IC remains outside. In other
states the pump operator has been approved to act as one of the Two Out providing
the pump is set and running. NFPA 1500 itself states the IC can delegate the IC to
the MPO if he/she commits as one of the Two In.
In some states (e.g. Oregon) it has been documented that a team committed for
`investigation' is not involved in `structural ®re®ghting' and can therefore work outside
the scope of the regulations ± a Two In/One Out for example. Other potential loop-
holes exist where a team is committed to an interior ®re that is de®ned as being in
the `incipient' stage. The term `incipient' can be de®ned as `a ®re not having reached
the free burning stage,' and this de®nition itself is open to challenge in the courts.
The State of New Mexico (OSHA), with Federal acknowledgement, have further
interpreted the rules as follows:
The standard does not require the Two In/Two Out provision if the ®re is still in the
incipient stage and it does not prohibit ®re®ghters from ®ghting the ®re from outside
before suf®cient personnel have arrived. It also does not prohibit ®re®ghters from
entering a burning structure to perform rescue operations when there is a reasonable
belief that victims may be inside. It is only when ®re®ghters are engaged in the
interior attack of an interior structural ®re®ghting that the Two In/Two Out
requirement applies. It is the incident commander's responsibility to judge whether a
®re is an interior structural ®re and how it will be attacked.
Another legal loophole (and a good strategy) might be the use of VES tactics
whereby a team of two ®re®ghters (incident commander and ®re®ghter) work from
the exterior windows serving bedrooms and other parts of the structure. With the IC
remaining at the head of the ladder he/she is still in visual or voice contact as the
other ®re®ghter enters for a quick sweep search of individual rooms. As each room is
searched the ®re®ghter returns to the ladder and they then re-site from the exterior
to search another room. The legal argument is interesting as can the IC (at the head
of the ladder) be considered both `In' and `Out' for the purposes of the OSHA
ruling? Nowhere does OSHA stipulate four ®re®ghters are needed on-scene for
compliance, although this is implied. The legal wording requires Two In and Two
Out and this point (in this scenario) may be arguable in a court test-case.
NFPA 1500
It is stated within the text of this Standard that if immediate action(s) might serve to
prevent life loss or serious injury, then the need to act prior to four ®re®ghters
arriving on-scene is acceptable if based on an effective and justi®ed size-up and risk
assessment.
150 l Euro Fire®ghter
In Summary:
I Fire®ghters utilizing SCBA in IDLH, potentially IDLH or unknown
atmospheres shall operate in a buddy system with two or more personnel.
I Fire®ghters using the buddy system are required to be in direct voice or
visual contact or tethered with a signal line. Radios or other means of
electronic contact shall not be substituted for direct visual contact for
employees within the individual team in the danger area.
I Identically equipped and trained ®re®ghters are required to be present
outside the IDLH, potentially IDLH or unknown atmospheres prior to a
team entering, and during the team's work in the hazard area in order to
account for, and be available to assist or rescue, members of the team
working in the IDLH, potentially IDLH or unknown atmospheres.
I A minimum of four individuals is required, consisting of two individuals
working as a team in the IDLH, potentially IDLH or unknown atmospheres
and two individuals present outside this atmosphere for assistance or rescue
at emergency operations where entry into the danger area is required.
I OSHA allows for one of the two individuals outside the hazard area to be
engaged in other activities, such as incident commander in charge of the
emergency incident or the safety of®cer. However, OSHA does state that the
assignment of operators of heavy equipment as standby personnel, could
clearly jeopardize the safety and health of the workers in the danger area.
I If a rescue operation is necessary, OSHA requires that the buddy system be
maintained by the rescue team while entering the IDLH, potentially IDLH
or unknown atmospheres and that this team shall be properly equipped and
trained for this operation.
Chapter 6
6.1 INTRODUCTION
London 1986
We had a series of experiences over a hectic few months that taught me a lot about
tactics, but perhaps more about human psychology.
It was the 1980s and London was in a transition stage. We were just coming out
of the `iron-lung' era where ®re®ghters, who often chose to `eat smoke' as a way of
proving they `had balls', were facing the con¯icting enforcement of occupational
health and safety legislation. For years I had battled against the forceful opinions
of those who were either too lazy or too incredibly complacent in their tactical
approaches. Those who chose not to wear their SCBA provided a good example.
There was also a collection of company commanders (junior of®cers) who were of
the typical `reactionary' belief that SCBA wasn't needed until it was needed! In fact
our procedures were so rigid that in some situations these of®cers refused outright to
allow SCBA to be removed from an engine until ordered. Then, one after the other,
there were some serious lessons to be learned!
1986 ± The Water Gardens are a series of high-rise apartment buildings situated
in London's Edgware Road, Paddington. One day we were called to a smell of
151
152 l Euro Fire®ghter
smoke at the 12th ¯oor level of one of the buildings. As we approached the ®re ¯oor
in the elevator we had no SCBA or ®re®ghting equipment with us. The IC hit the
button for the ®re ¯oor despite our procedure that stated we go two ¯oors below and
take SCBA and hose-lines with us. Hell, it was only a smell of burning right? Wrong!
When we arrived at the 12th level the lift lobby was full of smoke. The ®re had
taken hold in an apartment along the hallway and we were told there was a family
trapped inside. There were frantic radio calls to get SCBA equipped ®re®ghters up
with a hose-line but we needed to do something. I entered the apartment with
Hughie Stewart and we began to crawl past the ®re down a long corridor. The
smoke was as bad as I had ever experienced and at ®rst I sucked the remaining air
out of the carpet by placing my nose ¯at on the ¯oor. Then when that failed, I took
my ®re helmet off and breathed what dead air was inside the `head space'. All the
time we were moving forward and you know what, I could hear the women and
children screaming ahead of me. Suddenly, I started to feel the smoke get to me and
that dizzy feeling kicked in. I just took a breath, held it, and crawled as fast as I could
out of there! Hughie was already lying prone on the landing and I joined him.
The IC informed me that there were two women and two children who were
threatening to jump from the balcony of the ¯at, and that all attempts to reach them
by aerial ladder had failed. The crew coming with SCBA had taken the wrong
elevator and were trying to ®nd their way down to us but had become confused as to
our exact location. There were no ventilation or roof assignments and, in this case,
no opportunity to utilize rope access/rescue from the balcony above. In the end, we
got them! But it was a close call and we could have lost an entire family, along with a
few ®re®ghters, simply through complacency.
1987 ± King's Cross underground railway was a ®re that took the lives of thirty-
one people, including a colleague, Station Of®cer Colin Townsley of Soho ®re station.
The standard approach to just about any ®re in those days was to (1) investigate;
(2) locate the ®re; and (3) call for SCBA and a hose-line. I asked the question:
Why do we wear all our PPE, helmets, boots and a whole weight of clothing to
investigate? If we are going to ®nd ®re then we need our SCBA as well! Or why not
just investigate in our shirtsleeves and then call for PPE, SCBA and a hose-line?
That's what happened at King's Cross. The ®rst crews down onto the ticket hall
concourse of the underground station, located just a few feet below the surface,
found a developing ®re. They had no equipment and no SCBA. Colin Townsley
remained at the heart of the developing ®re, calming and controlling hundreds of
people exiting from the train platforms below, whilst his crews returned outside to
collect SCBA and a hose-line.
Within a few short seconds, before the ®re®ghters could return, the ®re suddenly
erupted from what was a relatively small ®re to a raging inferno, trapping all nearby.
Colin was found some distance from the ®re on an exit route, just a few feet from the
base of the stairs leading to the street. Close to him lay another victim, a woman,
whom he had apparently attempted to bring out with him.
I say to this day, if Colin had his SCBA on his back he would still be here. It would
have taken him twenty to thirty seconds to travel from the concourse to the location
he was found. It takes less than ®ve seconds to get air into the mask and the mask
over your face. Colin's cause of death was smoke inhalation.
In 1989 I started a national campaign to encourage the donning of SCBA for ®re
reconnaissance purposes. In my station area alone we had ®ve or six calls to ®re
alarms actuating every shift. In some instances we would descend some hundreds of
Primary command and control ± Tactical deployment l 153
feet sub-surface into the tube network to investigate a smell of burning or a call to an
automatic ®re alarm. In 99% of cases these surmounted to nothing, and to carry in a
weighty SCBA seemed hard work to many. There was a clear feeling of overkill, and
complacency crept in, in opposition to my proposed strategy. I countered this with
the view that as long as we were responding with lights and sirens, we were
responding to an emergency and that level of emergency response remained until we
were able to con®rm for ourselves that a `non-emergency' existed. If you're going to
jump red lights and break speed limits to respond, why downgrade the level of
urgency because you don't see anything from the street on arrival? The relevant
procedures stated SCBA should be worn in any situation where entering smoke, but
only with a directive from the incident commander. I was proposing nationally that
SCBA should be taken in to any situation where a ®re®ghter may encounter smoke,
and from which he/she might be unable to escape to safe air; or, in deep
reconnaissance situations where SCBA might be urgently needed for the purposes
of deploying a rescue team. The Chief Of®cer of the London Fire Brigade1 himself
stated that, as he understood written procedures, it was not necessary to receive a
directive from the incident commander to simply have SCBA on your back, but it
was necessary to receive such a directive if you were `going under air'. However, it
was clear that a `gray' area existed in written procedure.
What did I learn during these few months? I con®rmed in my mind, from a
tactical perspective, how critical it was to approach every emergency that was
showing `nothing' on arrival as if it was likely to be the worst-case scenario waiting to
be uncovered within the depths of a structure. I would assign only limited credibility
to information passed to me by persons not part of the London Fire Brigade and
would wish to check for myself that everything was in order.
Also, from a psychological point of view, I learned that complacency was rife, not
only throughout the ®re service but also in everyday life. What is needed is a certain
type of person who will repeatedly maintain a level of self-discipline and conform to
safe practice, even when a short cut might make things quicker and easier, despite
an element of risk being attached. How many times do we take that short cut in life?
In the emergency ®eld, you just cannot afford to, because one day it will catch you
out! Believe me when I say `Complacency is the ®re®ghter's worst enemy!'
Approach every single response with a strong element of professionalism and base
your approach as if the worst-case scenario is about to happen. Act ahead ± don't
`react' ± and make sure you follow your procedures (SOPs), unless there is a
genuine and viable reason not to.
The last thing I learned (but I really already knew) is that there are good ®re
commanders ± those that are conscientious and care about their crews ± and then
there are the complacent ones, who haven't had anything bad happen to them yet.
You'll know the difference when the time comes.
1. Clarkson, G., (1988), The Fennel Public Enquiry into the King's Cross Fire
154 l Euro Fire®ghter
decisions based on a core ethic: Don't waste human life. Implicit in his speech
and in the Powell Doctrine is that committing troops to combat should be neither
an easy nor an automatic decision. In fact, such a decision should be made only if
there is a signi®cant advantage to be gained.
Fire Service veteran Eric Lamar writes2:
The 21st century battleground is dynamic, chaotic and complex, and so is the ®re-
ground. As with the military, we have gone to great lengths to employ organizational
systems and technology to instil a degree of order and predictability to the working
®re environment. Both line ®re®ghters and infantry soldiers now have an array of
modern protective gear, surveillance equipment and offensive tools to achieve rapid
victory. The uniform application of command and control systems is designed to ensure
coordinated and effective action and to strictly limit casualties. In reality, our systems,
protocols and technology often fail us with disastrous results. Why?
He continues:
Almost without exception, our ®re®ghting forces are most vulnerable during interior
structural ®re®ghting. This operational environment most closely resembles the combat
setting to which Colin Powell refers in his famous Doctrine. In his view, committing
forces requires four imperative strategic considerations.
I Committing troops must be an absolute necessity;
I There must be a compelling risk posed by not acting;
I Overwhelming resources must be applied;
I A clear exit strategy must be in place.
Mr Lamar continues:
Do ®re of®cers and ®re®ghters routinely commit to interior operations where the
objectives are fuzzy and the strategy is unclear? Are ®re®ghters routinely killed in
interior environments where the responses to these four strategic considerations should
suggest completely different tactics?
A review of LODD reports will suggest that this is undoubtedly the case, and that
®re of®cers should carefully review their own ®re-ground strategy and tactics, within
a cultured view of justifying their tactical decisions on risk-based approaches
supported by the practical application of all necessary risk control options.
Further to this, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) present their
view on Rules of Engagement.
IAFC ten Rules of Engagement and risk assessment (see Figs 6.1 and 6.2).
Acceptability of risk:
1. No building or property is worth the life of a ®re®ghter;
2. All interior ®re®ghting involves an inherent risk;
3. Some risk is acceptable, in a measured and controlled manner;
4. No level of risk is acceptable where there is no potential to save lives or
saveable property;
5. Fire®ghters shall not be committed to interior offensive ®re®ghting
operations in abandoned or derelict buildings that are known or reasonably
believed to be unoccupied.
Risk assessment:
6. All feasible measures shall be taken to limit or void risks through risk
assessment by a quali®ed of®cer;
7. It is the responsibility of the incident commander to evaluate the level of
risk in every situation;
8. Risk assessment is a continuous process for the entire duration of each
incident and the incident command system should ensure this occurs from
the moment ®re®ghters ®rst arrive on-scene;
9. If conditions change, and risk increases, change strategy and tactics;
10. No building or property is worth the life of a ®re®ghter.
HIGH LOW
RESCUE 1 2 3 4 5
EARLY ADVANCED
FIRE STAGE 1 2 3 4 5
HIGH LOW
SAVE PROPERTY 1 2 3 4 5
LOW HIGH
FIREFIGHTER RISK 1 2 3 4 5
Fire®ghter Marginal
Safety/Life High Probability Probability Low Probability
Safety HRisk of Success of Success of Success
Low risk Initiate offensive Initiate offensive Initiate offensive
operations ± continue operations ± continue operations ±
to monitor risk to monitor risk continue to
factors. factors. monitor risk
factors.
Medium risk Initiate offensive Initiate offensive DO NOT initiate
operations ± continue operations ± continue offensive operations
to monitor risk factors to monitor risk ± reduce risk to
± employ all available factors ± be prepared ®re®ghters and
risk control options. to go defensive if risk actively pursue
increases. risk control options.
High risk Initiate offensive DO NOT initiate Initiate offensive
operations only with offensive operations operations only.
con®rmation of that will put
realistic potential ®re®ghters at risk
to save endangered of injury or fatality.
lives.
For example, a ®re of®cer can use the notebook charts in Figs 6.1 and 6.2 to assess
an incident on a scale from one to ®ve, for concerns like rescue possibility and
savable property (high to low), ®re stage (early to advanced) and ®re®ghter risk (low
to high). If the incident has a total risk rating of four to nine, an offensive interior
strategy is a good option. A rating of ten to fourteen requires a marginal rescue, and
a ®fteen to twenty rating warrants a defensive exterior strategy.
There are several `tasks' that your department may already be ful®lling automatically
on the primary response. In some locations a department will pre-assign the ®rst
responding engine to the ®re, whilst the second engine will reverse lay to the hydrant.
In other situations the ®rst engine will go straight to the water supply. These are
pre-assignments, and their objectives are established through written directives. The
®rst arriving ladder company may automatically ful®l the roles of forcible entry,
search and rescue, and ventilation, again conforming to pre-assigned directives.
`Company assignments' may not always be the most effective means of deploying
staf®ng. It has been shown that pre-assigned response systems are more effectively
utilized by breaking companies down into smaller work-group assignments, in order
to optimize critical ®re-ground needs. Rather than assigning an entire ®ve-person
company or unit to a role, it is often more productive to assign two or even three
critical tasks to a company. Look at ®re case studies and review how many times
entire companies were `assigned fully to the C side to ventilate' or to advance a
back-up hose-line, without even considering the staf®ng arrangements.
it has been shown that at least 25% of working structural ®res worsen following ®re
service arrival, before they are ®nally suppressed. That is to say that the area of
®re involvement grows larger between the time ®re®ghters arrive on-scene and
control being achieved. This is easily understood, since ®re®ghters are likely to
create an opening or openings (entry points) in an effort to locate the ®re and gain
information on structural layout, even before they have equipment ready to get
water on the ®re. Such openings will most likely provide a path for vital air to enter
the building, allowing the ®re to increase in size and intensity. Therefore, one of our
objectives should be to prioritize incident stabilization during this vital ®rst ®ve
minutes. This calls for a more in-depth appreciation of how ventilation pro®les in a
®re-involved compartment or structure may be widened or narrowed through our
own actions. A better understanding of ®re behavior and air dynamics is critical
where incident stabilization is to be effective.
Fire®ghters should take actions that will serve to stabilize conditions and slow ®re
development, rather than actions that may destabilize the interior ®re environment.
Don't vent without a directive or an objective and communicate and coordinate
your actions with the interior crews. Take viable actions that will ensure the security
of crews working the interior of a structure such as laying in a back-up support hose-
line, providing them with some much needed lighting, or controlling the door
opening at their point of entry, ensuring that any development or changes in
conditions are communicated immediately both to the interior and the IC.
Reconnaissance
Fire®ghters arrive on-scene to reports of a ®re deep inside a large structure. It might
be a high-rise building, factory, large warehouse or sub-basement of an underground
railway system. From the street there is nothing showing and no signs of ®re. Sound
familiar?
They send an investigation team to locate the ®re and report on status. On arrival
they ®nd a reasonably small ®re that could be immediately extinguished ± if only
they had some suppressive agent with them! By the time they get hose-lines laid in
and a ®re attack initiated, the ®re has developed into a con¯agration.
This scenario happens daily! In many cases it has led to the deaths of ®re®ghters
and many trapped occupants. The concept of `fast attack' uses special strategies,
tactics and highly innovative equipment to achieve immediate knock-down on
arrival of a small ®re that is threatening to spread out of control.
Fire con®nement may not be possible and it may take several minutes to establish
water supply and lay in attack lines deep into the structure. An on-the-spot
suppressive action with just a few liters of water might be all that it takes to prevent a
con¯agration.
The tactical IFEX 3000 backpack is the most mobile support unit to be used
in combination with the fog gun. The unit holds a 13-liter water/agent cylinder, a
2-liter air cylinder and a pressure regulator with two outlets giving air pressure to the
gun and to its water support. Water and any additive can be ®lled directly into the
water cylinder. The concentration of additive should be reduced to 0.5±1% rather
than the 3±6% normally recommended. The harness is provided with an additional
bracket for mounting an extra air cylinder to support a breathing apparatus.
Air resistance acting on the water stream breaks the water droplets down and
reduces the normal mean droplet size from about 700 microns to an average of
100 microns. So the cooling surface of 1 liter of water is increased from the normal
160 l Euro Fire®ghter
3. From a structural ®re®ghting perspective, the `hot' zone refers to any area occupied by ®re®ghters
where they are forced to wear SCBA and full PPE.
Primary command and control ± Tactical deployment l 161
developing beyond the capability of hose-lines in place? Is water even on the ®re? Is
the water supply continuous and augmented? Quickly scan the structure for warning
signs. Do your ®re®ghters need to come out now? Are you convinced that the size-
up the captain just gave you on hand-over was an accurate assessment of the
situation? Have they really got water on that ®re? Are you in direct communication
with the attack team(s)? Do you know how many ®re®ghters are committed and
roughly where they are?
You have ®ve minutes Chief ± It's your call!
Water supply
It is absolutely critical that a continuous ¯ow of water is provided to the ®re-ground
at the very earliest opportunity. Rural ®re departments that may have immediate
supply problems must be well practiced in locating and transporting water to the
®re-scene. If an interior ®re attack (offensive tactical mode) is implemented, then
the minimum attack hose-line ¯ow-rate of 100 gallons/min will only provide a few
minutes of unit tank supply where ¯owed. Where an exterior defensive mode is in
operation and exposure protection is the strategy, then higher ¯ow-rates are almost
certainly needed.
One of the biggest tactical errors possible is to deploy ®re®ghters to an offensive
interior attack and have them run out of water. Make sure your primary response
(®rst alarm) SOPs provide clear directives of who is responsible for supplying the
®re-ground with a continuous ¯ow of water.
Never underestimate ®re-ground needs in this respect. Exterior dumpster or
other outside ®res may appear controllable with a single tank supply but if there is
potential for exposures, get that water supply heading in.
Forward lay ± The supply hose is run from hydrant to ®re building. This may entail
the ®rst engine going straight to the hydrant and laying its own supply onto the ®re-
ground (may be time consuming). In other situations a pump is sited at the hydrant
as well. Sometimes the ®rst engine goes straight to the ®re and the second due takes
the hydrant and forward lays to the ®re-ground engine.
Reverse lay ± The ®rst due may drive by, take a look at the ®re and complete a quick
visual size-up, before dropping a supply line and running this in a reverse lay to the
hydrant. The second due will respond straight to the ®re building and connect to the
supply line as left by the ®rst engine. Where hydrants are closely spaced, the ®rst
engine may also drop two attack lines before reverse laying from ®re to hydrant.
Fast attack ± The ®rst due (or arriving) engine responds direct to the ®re building
and runs direct off the tank, leaving the second due engine to provide a continuous
supply by using either a forward or reverse lay. This strategy will enable rapid attack
and search operations where staf®ng permits. The danger is that the tank water
supply may be exhausted before a continuous supply arrives on-scene.
Water relay ± Several engines are used to boost pressure in a very long run from
water supply to ®re building.
Water shuttle ± Special water carriers (or engines) are used to collect from a supply
source and transport water and dump this into a portable on-site container or dam
left at the ®re-ground.
162 l Euro Fire®ghter
Not considering an immediate need for laddering the exterior for a visible or
`known' life hazard, or an obvious exposure problem, the optimum tactical
objectives at any interior (offensive) ®re operation will be to implement three basic
tactical operations as follows:
1. Primary attack hose-line;
2. Interior search and rescue (or RIT after second line in operation);
3. Secondary support (back-up) hose-line.
A minimum staf®ng of twelve ®re®ghters, along with a minimum on-scene ¯ow-
rate of 200 gallons/min (750 liters/min) and three engines are needed to safely meet
these tactical objectives providing the hydrant is close by. The ®rst engine goes
to the ®re, supported by the second due to the hydrant (forward or reverse lay),
and the third arriving mainly for staf®ng (few engines carry six ®re®ghters). Even in
this situation a staf®ng of twelve may not be able to meet an ef®cient ®rst alarm
CTPI rating depending on the structure, occupancy, ®re load and stage of ®re
development.
4. http://www.cfbt-eu.com/
164 l Euro Fire®ghter
5. http://www.cfbt-eu.com/
Primary command and control ± Tactical deployment l 165
Pre-course requirements6 are that students are quali®ed CFBT instructors. Training
is undertaken in multi-compartment, multi-level CFBT tactical units as well as
acquired structures, where available.
6. http://www.cfbt-eu.com/
7. Fire Engineering Magazine USA, (2002), December edition
8. Grimwood, P., (1991), Fog Attack, DMG/FMJ International Publications, Redhill Surrey, UK
166 l Euro Fire®ghter
These are primary actions and should take priority over all others.
The author's 1991 assessment of ®re-ground primary and secondary actions
placed interior search strictly into the list of secondary actions, and this was
considered highly controversial at that time. Ever since then we have operated under
constant threats of cuts in on-scene staf®ng that have perhaps made this approach
even more topical. If our staf®ng and resources are to be stretched then perhaps our
strategy and tactics should be in¯uenced by such reductions in the weight of attack.
If the second due engine will take an additional two or three minutes to support the
®rst due, or where there are reductions in staf®ng, it is certain that critical tasking on
the ®re-ground will become more complex and this will affect the order of priorities
if our risk assessment is undertaken correctly. There will be greater delays in
effecting primary operations where we must implement additional Risk Control
Measures. In some situations, it will become necessary to change the order of core
objectives in order to maintain safety standards. Where before we were able to
immediately coordinate ®re attack with search and rescue, or search and rescue with
ventilation etc., we may now have to put in place some Risk Control Measures to
support a single objective ± an example might be to take a hose-line to support our
search, in situations where much needed ®re-ground support is not immediately
available.
In 1994 a retired Los Angeles Fire Chief John Mittendorf claimed9 that the
priority between ®re attack and search and rescue was changing, and that controlling
the atmosphere and conditions within a ®re-involved structure was increasingly
being viewed as more important than carrying out search and rescue. He stated his
belief that ®re attack rather than search and rescue was the ®rst-crew job and that
this view was spreading across the USA. He further stated that a more ef®cient use
of limited manpower could be achieved by redirecting efforts towards controlling
and relieving interior conditions.
This proposal became a tragic lesson when, in 1996, two UK ®re®ghters were
killed by a backdraft that occurred a few minutes after they, and four other ®re-
®ghters, arrived on-scene as the initial response to a house ®re. They faced the
moral dilemma of several children being reported trapped upstairs, and opted to
take the interior search prior to taking the ®re, failing also to initiate any form of
con®nement or isolation strategy. The ®re escalated suddenly, producing a massive
®reball and subsequent ¯ashover inside the house.
Deputy Chief (Toledo, Ohio) John `Skip' Coleman proposed that:
Unless you can effectively do several things at the same time [on the initial response] ±
PUT THE FIRE OUT [®rst].
Chief Tom Brennan (FDNY, retired) made some important points, and went on to
say:
Tactical objectives used to isolate the ®re and account for human life are as valid for
one as the other.
He continued:
Some of our strategy and tactical texts of the past have put the stamp of approval on
®re control being put on hold if the life exposure is too severe and must take priority.
Chief Brennan could see a need to reverse this rule. Ron Hiraki is an Assistant Chief
in Seattle, Washington. He said:
We should always remember that the best way to accomplish the rescue objective is
to take the danger away from the victims or put out the ®re. Even if the ®re is not
immediately controlled or extinguished, a quick attack can slow the spread of the ®re
and buy other ®re®ghters additional time to take the victims away from the danger.
Lieutenant Bob Oliphant of Kalamazoo, Michigan, suggested that rescue should be
the ®rst consideration, but not necessarily the priority. He said,
I am truly saddened when I read accounts of ®re®ghters who died trying to effect rescue
when there was only a remote chance of ®nding anyone.
Frank Shapher, Chief of St. Charles Fire Department, Missouri made his point,
Rescue is always our highest priority at a structure ®re, but it should not be the ®rst
thing we do unless, of course, we are determined in getting ourselves injured or killed!
Therefore I always maintain that the best way to rescue people from a burning building
is to put out the ®re.
Chief Shapher challenged those who disagreed with him to read the NIOSH reports
to see how ®re®ghters get injured or killed whilst making rescue attempts. Chief
Rick Lasky of Lewisville Fire Department, Texas similarly suggested looking at the
same contributing factors causing losses on the ®re-ground, and proposed a switch
of rescue for ®re control in larger commercial structures.
The author's original proposal in 1991 recommended essential `primary' and
`secondary' actions (`Golden Rules') to be followed by ®re®ghters on arrival at a
structure ®re. As a Standard Operating Procedure, these rules placed ®re attack
ahead of interior search as a primary action.
The plan was described as `comprehensive but by no means complete'. It
remained ¯exible in as much as `tactical options' may be either up or down-graded
in the hierarchy to suit speci®c circumstances ± but a sound basis of risk analysis
must be put forward to support any such decisions. The simple action of thinking
laterally and closing a door or restricting air¯ow towards the ®re may be enough to
prevent ®re spread and save lives!
Operations ± Tactics ±
Strategy ± `Back to Basics'
7.1 INTRODUCTION
169
170 l Euro Fire®ghter
notes that experience from past events is often recorded in the form of short para-
graphs or even a simple sentence: just a few words, giving a directive of something
that should be done, should not be done, should be avoided, or should be carefully
risk assessed and controlled.
It is through these few words that we often fail to spot critical information based
on past ®re experience. A simple sentence may appear as sound advice that we may
consider at some time, but most of us are generally unaware that this information is
the result of a tragic event that occurred many years, or decades, before.
It is therefore essential that we provide a means for our experience base to
develop, broaden, expand and update. This should be in the form of written docu-
mented directives. The author holds strong views that the directives should not
serve solely as guidelines but rather as de®nite orders or procedures to be followed.
These directives (SOPs) should only be varied, or deviated from, where a clear
tactical decision is made on the basis that a safer or more effective outcome will
likely result. This decision to deviate must only be taken by those who can be held
responsible and accountable for any such digression, and sound tactical reasoning
should be presented in subsequent debrie®ngs to support any decisions which
depart from directives.
Good legal argument has traditionally presented the view that SOPs are directives
and SOGs are guidelines. Where clear directives include the words `will', `must', etc.,
the orders are there to be followed. The words `should' and `may' are there to give
leeway to those who deviate from procedure. But why should there be doubt here?
The SOP should be clear in its directives, although deviation is acceptable where
sound argument can be tendered as to why such deviation occurred. Where words
(should/may) allow too much ¯exibility in a SOP, then deviations will frequently
occur without reasoning or justi®cation. If for example, a SOP states speci®cally
that a 24 mm nozzle `should' be taken up to a high-rise ¯oor for the primary attack
line, then anyone who takes up a combination fog nozzle has not effectively broken
with directives in the procedure. If a SOP states you `must' take the elevator to a
point at least ®ve ¯oors below the reported ®re ¯oor, but you decide to take the
stairs because the reported ®re is on the sixth ¯oor, then that is a perfectly sound
tactical reason to deviate from procedure. If a ®re®ghter breaks with procedure that
states `Do not create a ventilation opening without a clear directive and objective,
and without approval from the interior crew(s)', then questions need to be asked as
to why that opening was made. These instructions are giving a clear order: Do not
do it unless three boxes can be ticked. If the ®re®ghter makes the opening anyway,
without ticking all the boxes, then there may be a tactical error or the ®re®ghter
might have made a sound tactical decision based on the fact that communications
were down and in his/her extensive experience the situation was obviously in need of
venting. Perhaps the vent opening was authorized under a pre-assigned directive or
a VES operation. Either way, we need to be clear in the way we word our SOPs.
2. Where staf®ng permits, coordinate ®re attack with interior search and
rescue ± but entry to the structure should be made behind a hose-line until/
unless ®re conditions are stabilized.
3. Only enter a structure ahead of the primary attack line being placed under
the following circumstances:
I A `known' life hazard exists
I To locate and isolate the ®re where conditions appear stable
I A suspected life hazard may exist, where ®re conditions appear stable.
4. Isolate the ®re wherever possible by `zoning down' the structure (anti-
ventilation) in an effort to control unchecked ®re development and to
stabilize ®re conditions. Begin all operations from an anti-ventilation stance.
5. Only create ventilation outlets with:
I An assigned directive; and
I A clear objective; and
I Con®rmation of the interior crew(s);
I Consideration given to wind speed and direction.
6. Ensure such vent openings are precise (correctly located in line with the
®re and interior crew's positions); coordinated (in line with ®re attack);
and communicated and approved by the interior crew(s).
7. As you enter a structure for interior operations, look up and get a view of as
much of the exterior as possible. Are there any signs of ®re? What stage is
the ®re development? Are there pre-existing vent openings? Are there
security bars on windows? Take in what information you can with a quick
visual scan.
8. Stay low, stay oriented and at all times be very aware of what is occurring at
the ceiling. In high-ceiling compartments, or heavy smoke conditions, this
may not be possible. However, it is essential to gauge temperatures in the
overhead to prevent ®re getting behind you. Use brief bursts of water into
the ceiling to gauge conditions and listen for rapid conversion to vapour.
Be very aware of dangerous smoke or ®re-spread behind false ceilings.
9. Always follow your SOPs and/or direct orders from commanders at a ®re
and avoid freelancing at all costs.
10. At building ®res there will be very few occasions when you need to run.
Always move and act quickly, but take time to pause, take a breath, think
about your surroundings, promote a calm ®re-ground demeanour and
always be in control of yourself as well as the ®re!
11. Always buddy up and work with at least one ®re®ghter, particularly when
entering a ®re-involved structure. Remain in close proximity to each other
at all times until exited from the structure. Conform to SCBA air manage-
ment or accountability procedure.
12. If proceeding into the structure for search or rescue purposes, in advance
of the primary attack hose-line being in place, or without water being
applied to the ®re, close all doors and make attempts to isolate the ®re
wherever you are going beyond or above the ®re.
13. When forcible entry is required for an inward-swinging door behind which
there is intense heat and ®re, the inward swing must be controlled. A
®re®ghter or of®cer should hold the doorknob closed with a gloved hand
or short piece of rope while other ®re®ghters force the lock open (Vince
Dunn FDNY).
172 l Euro Fire®ghter
Author's note: Chief Dunn offers some important advice above. However,
be aware that ®re®ghters have escaped ¯ashover conditions after thirty
second periods of entrapment, or even longer! There are ®re-scene videos
and ®re®ghter testimonies that prove this. On occasions the interior ®re
presents full ¯aming combustion from exterior windows, but incomplete
combustion inside the compartment. In other situations the interior
¯aming occurs at high level and ¯oor temperatures are around 300±400 ëF
(not full ¯ashover) ± severe but survivable. Don't ever operate recklessly
and believe you can survive a ¯ashover, but be ready and oriented to
escape quickly where interior conditions suddenly deteriorate.
23. Ladder buildings on all sides wherever ®re®ghters are known to be working
on ¯oors inside a building, in order to provide rapid access to alternative
exit routes.
24. Always ensure an adequate ¯ow-rate (absolute minimum 100 gallons/min
[380 liters/min]) is available at the primary attack nozzle(s) prior to initiating
any ventilation opening.
25. Be very aware of wind speed and direction before creating any openings in a
structure, including at the entry point (might need to create an outlet point
before opening the entry).
26. Utilize the optimum attack stream pattern in line with achievable objectives
± water-fog for gas cooling or gas-phase attack, or straight stream for direct
®re attack.
27. Ensure that the chosen stream pattern has an adequate ¯ow-rate for the
objective at hand.
28. Ensure that the ¯ow-rate available at the nozzle is adequate considering the
size of the compartment and the potential ®re-load involved.
29. Multiple crews must not be deployed into a structure for search and rescue
purposes without at least one interior hose-line protecting their means of
egress.
30. Always try to maintain contact with a wall and remain oriented when
searching or advancing a hose-line in heavy smoke conditions. If laying
hose across large open ¯oor-space in such conditions, do not lose contact
with the hose for any purpose.
31. Hose-lines may become dif®cult to follow out to the exit in heavy smoke
where they become heavily looped or laid across furniture etc. Guide-lines
(ropes), or some form of high-intensity lighting beacons, or safety/security
crews with thermal imagers should be used to guide ®re®ghters to the exits
under such circumstances.
32. In large areas, all ®re exit routes/doors should be instantly operable, should
they be needed, and exterior crews may be assigned to force them open
where considered necessary, being careful not to admit additional air into a
developing ®re situation.
33. Ensure SCBA cylinder contents gauge checks are carried out at least once
every ®ve minutes.
34. Be conscious of SCBA air management `turn around times' (TATs) ±
always base the TAT on the lowest cylinder reading (see Chapter Eight)
35. If you enter a smoke and heat-®lled room, hallway, or apartment above
a ®re and suspect ¯ashover conditions behind you, locate a second exit, a
window leading to a ®re escape, or portable ladder, before initiating the
search (Vince Dunn FDNY).
4. Assert command (be in control from the outset, even before you arrive), and
deploy ®re®ghters strictly according to local procedure and documented
protocols.
5. Wherever procedure is not followed, be prepared to give logical account as
to the reasons why this deviation occurred.
6. Multiple crews must not be deployed into a structure for search and rescue
purposes without at least one interior hose-line protecting their means of
egress.
7. Utilise the Rapid Deployment Procedure for interior `snatch rescue'
attempts.
8. Only deploy ®re®ghters under an effective system of ®re-ground
accountability and resource management.
9. Ensure an emergency team (or RIT) is available at the earliest opportunity,
especially where offensive interior operations are initiated.
10. If ¯ames are discovered still burning at a gas meter or broken pipe after a
®re has been knocked down, do not extinguish the ¯ame. Let the ®re burn,
protect the exposures with a hose stream, and alert command that the gas
has to be shut off at the cellar or street control valve (Vince Dunn FDNY).
11. During a ®re in a one-story strip store, vent the roof skylight over the ®re
before advancing the hose-line to prevent injury from backdraft explosion,
or ¯ashover (Vince Dunn FDNY).
12. When it is not possible to vent the rear or roof of a burning store quickly
and signs of backdraft or explosion are evident from the front of the store,
vent the front plate-glass windows and doors, stand to one side, let the
superheated combustible gases ignite temporarily, and then advance the
hose-line for ®re attack (Vince Dunn FDNY).
13. Ensure SCBA cylinder contents gauge checks are carried out at least once
every ®ve minutes.
14. Be aware of SCBA air management `turn around times' (TATs) ± base the
TAT on the lowest cylinder reading.
looking at different areas or that one does not know about ®re conditions
that are evident to the other. Crews operating in the area where the ®re
appears to be under control might be in serious danger if they do not know
where the ®re is still burning.
3. Evidence of a signi®cant interior ®re that cannot be located should sound a
warning to the incident commander. Crews working in a smoke-®lled
building might be unable to ®nd the ®re. At the same time the continuing or
increasing presence of heavy smoke suggests that a signi®cant ®re is burning
somewhere inside the structure. The risk of a sudden outbreak of ®re or a
structural collapse increases with time spent on the scene. Be sure to deploy
adequate ¯ow-rate and implement Risk Control Measures to reduce the
potential of any hazards.
4. Ensure you have adequate communications from the dispatch centre to
your aide, to you, to your ®re-ground sectors, and to those undertaking
operations in the hazardous or `hot' zones. It is established that unnecessary
radio traf®c can serve to hinder ®re-ground operations. Only allow essential
information or requests to be passed, make full use of command and tactical
channels, and use effective radio procedure ± the receiver must always
acknowledge important information. If not, keep sending!
5. Before committing crews, ensure they are given a clear brief on their
assignment and objectives. Further, make sure they are kept up-to-date with
important information. If they are assigned to search for a missing person
who suddenly turns up outside, make sure the crew is evacuated or clearly
and effectively re-assigned.
6. When crews exit the structure, make sure they are immediately debriefed and
that vital information is exchanged. Brie®ng and debrie®ngs of ®re®ghters
should be precise, clear, accurate, and effectively documented on-scene as
they occur. Use bullet points to record vital points.
7. Consider the role of safety of®cer at the earliest opportunity.
8. Sometimes `known' life hazards are forgotten! That's a tragic statement but
it's true. Most recent ®res in Fairfax, Tayside and Chicago have all presented
situations where there were `known' life hazards, but, even more importantly,
their locations were known as well. Yet these people all died and we failed
them. Yes we failed them.
Chapter 8
8.1 The history of BA control procedures in the British Fire Service . . . . 176
8.2 UK BA control ± The system basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.3 Rapid Deployment Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.4 Stage One procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
8.5 Stage Two procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.6 Main control procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.7 Rapid Intervention (BA emergency teams) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.8 SCBA air management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.9 Trapped ®re®ghters ± Air conservation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
1. http://www.®re.org.uk/FireNet/ba.php
176
SCBA air management ± BA control l 177
These pilot procedures served to greatly improve the safety of ®re®ghters working
the interior of ®re-involved structures whilst wearing BA. However, they were to be
of little assistance when the ®rst of two disastrous ®res occurred at London's Covent
Garden Market in 1949.
The ®rst ®re occurred at 1110 hours on 20 December 1949 in the basement of
Covent Garden Market. It continued until 1340 hours on 22 December 1949 and
was a very dif®cult and hazardous ®re.
The lessons learned from this ®re were:
I Hose used to enable ®re®ghters to follow the way out was dif®cult to trace in
the deepening water, which eventually reached 4 ft in depth.
I Men worked alone. In trying to rescue a colleague, one ®reman became so
exhausted he barely made it back to street level to summon assistance. He
did in fact collapse and vital minutes were lost in the rescue attempt.
I There were no recording and supervising procedures for men entering and
leaving the incident in BA.
I No method of summoning assistance in an emergency as with present day
DSU (PASS) alarms.
I Communications were bad to non-existent. This consisted of signals or, as
was often practiced, the mouthpiece of the BA was removed thereby allowing
the ingress of toxic products into the respiratory tract.
I No minimum charging pressure for BA cylinders. Many were only two thirds
full.
I No low cylinder pressure warning alarm.
I Many ®re®ghters wore BA but did not start up until it was absolutely
essential, by which time they had taken in quantities of smoke and gases,
which had their effects. It would appear that an ability to `eat smoke' and the
time taken to service sets were contributing factors in this procedure.
It is interesting to note that none of the above points was deemed worthy of further
investigation, and it was considered that the brigade's organization was satisfactory,
as stated in Chief Fire Of®cer, Mr F.W. Delve's report dated 24 January 1950 to the
London City Council.
In 1950 the London Brigades introduced a `nominal roll board' that was held in
the watch room. All riders were listed by name but at this time these boards were
not, it would appear, carried on ®re units responding to incidents. Other than the
nominal roll board, the procedure for BA did not change between the 1949 ®re and
the next in 1954.
The second ®re at Covent Garden Market occurred in a ®ve-story warehouse at
1500 hours on 11 May 1954 and continued until approximately 2230 hours on the
same day. Two London ®re®ghters were to lose their lives at this tragic incident.
The lessons learned from this ®re were:
I No recording and supervising of men entering and leaving the incident in
BA. In fact one ®reman was only unaccounted for when roll calls were taken
later at the ®re stations which had responded to the incident.
I No means of summoning assistance (RIT) in an emergency. Crews took
nearly an hour to locate a trapped colleague after a collapse.
I No evacuation signals to warn men to withdraw if signs of collapse became
evident.
178 l Euro Fire®ghter
I It is obvious that the above lessons were some of the same as experienced at
the 1949 basement ®re.
Following the second ®re at Covent Garden, the Home Of®ce issued Technical
Bulletin No 2/1955. This document stresses the importance of two fundamental
points of good breathing apparatus procedure:
I BA should be donned and started up in fresh air before the wearer enters the
incident.
I If the wearer's nose clip or face mask becomes dislodged for any appreciable
amount of time he should return to fresh air to avoid the problems associated
with the exposure to noxious atmospheres.
Once again it would appear that no other moves were made to provide a more
detailed procedure for the operational use of BA.
In the early hours of 23 January 1958, a ®re broke out in the basement of London's
Smith®eld Market. This ®re was to be one of the most dif®cult London Fire Brigade
had faced and two more ®re®ghters were killed. The incident continued for three
days.
Once again there were lessons to be learned: The same problems occurred at
Smith®eld as had occurred at the two previous ®res at Covent Garden. The single
exception was a local procedure introduced by the London Fire Brigade(s) in
1956 following the second Covent Garden Fire. This was the provision of a control
point set up in Charterhouse Lane to record the entry of men into the BA incident.
The control point consisted of a blackboard and recorded:
I Name;
I Station;
I Time of entry to structure;
I Time due out from structure (based on calculated oxygen consumption
rates).
This procedure (the ®rst ever BA Control Procedure) proved invaluable and was to
indicate later in the incident that two men were missing and overdue.
Following the loss of life at Smith®eld and Covent Garden, January 1958 saw
calls for a more comprehensive schedule of BA procedures to be formulated. These
calls came from Mr Delve, Chief Fire Of®cer of London, Mr Leete, Deputy Chief
Fire Of®cer of London, and Mr Horner of the Fire Brigades Union.
Due to the outcry over the recent deaths of ®remen, the Home Of®ce set up a
Committee of Inquiry into the operational use of BA. This was a sub-committee of
the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council. It appeared from its ®rst meeting that
some efforts had previously been made by the Home Of®ce to establish a procedure
for the use of BA but nothing had been circulated to brigades on the progress made.
By June 1958 twelve brigades were circulated with a trial procedure and by
August a number of observations and recommendations had been received by the
Committee of Inquiry who began to prepare an interim report.
In October 1958 FIRE SERVICE CIRCULAR 37/1958 was issued. It detailed
the ®ndings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommended the following:
I Tallies for BA sets;
I A Stage One and Stage Two control procedure for recording and supervising
BA wearers;
SCBA air management ± BA control l 179
out, men lost contact with the hose, costing the life of a divisional of®cer
(deputy chief) who ran out of air.
I The communications equipment used was not successful as it became
entangled with other equipment. Communications were lost in the early
stages of the ®re. Communication between crews with oxygen breathing
apparatus was non-existent but SCBA air sets with face masks allowed good
intercommunications between crew members.
I RAF (Royal Air Force) had no recording or supervising procedures
thus there was a lack of knowledge for responding local ®re department
crews.
I 1(1)(d) visits were very few and the sparse information and lack of plans
available did not assist ®remen as to the best route to take to the seat of the
®re.
I Relief crews sent in ®ve minutes before low pressure alarm. No
appreciation made of the time needed for relief crews to enter and reach the
®re and working crews to return to control.
I Distress Signal Units (PASS) not available. When men got lost or
separated these would have assisted in locating them.
I Heat problems. As men were never trained in heat, there were severe
operational problems, even for experienced crews.
In 1966, the Home Of®ce issued TECHNICAL BULLETIN 10/1966. This included
the physical speci®cation for the DSU (PASS) methods of attachments to sets and
the prescribed testing procedure.
Following the lessons learned at Neatishead, the Central Fire Brigades Advisory
Council issued FIRE SERVICE CIRCULAR 46/1969 in December 1969
following extensive trials by brigades. The circular dealt with both the speci®cations
and operational procedures for the use of guide-lines, personal lines and branch
lines (a system of personal and crew search ropes). To provide more information, a
number of diagrams of associated equipment were attached as an appendix. The
facing letter of the circular recommended adoption of the procedures.
Note: The term `guide-lines' is used here to describe search ropes. The guide-line
(primary search rope) is 60 meters in length (190 ft) and is laid from the entry point.
The term `branch guide-line' refers to secondary search ropes laid in off the primary
line, at points within the structure. These lines are marked A or B (main guide-lines)
or 1±4 (branch guide-lines). A maximum of two guide-lines and four branch lines
may be laid from an entry control point, depending on the stage of BA control
implemented. Each crewmember also attaches to these search ropes with his/her
own shortened personal line attached to the SCBA.
Emergency procedures
The ECO shall:
I Commit an emergency team(s) (RIT), if available, and immediately inform
the IC of the incident if:
I Any team fails to return to the ECP by the indicated `time of whistle'
(indicated outside the brackets);
I A DSU (PASS) is operated;
SCBA air management ± BA control l 183
210 130
180 115
160 105
140 95
Fig. 8.2 ± The author's simple TAT formula that may be used by interior ®re®ghters to
estimate their turn-around times; i.e. the starting cylinder pressure is halved and then 25 is
added (or 1000 psi if using 45 min cylinders or 500 psi if using 30 min cylinders) to the
resulting ®gure. This will recommend the gauge pressure at which a ®re®ghter should turn
around and begin to exit. (The 25 bars represents a ten-minute safety margin, at which
stage the low-pressure alarm would begin to actuate and by which time the ®re®ghter should
be outside with his crew, or buddy. (The 1000 psi represents ten minutes and 500* psi
equals ®ve minutes reserve air). These ®gures are reliable estimates where moderate work is
undertaken. Where work is considered heavy (sucking air) then air consumption may
almost double and TAT is greatly reduced .(But check your own cylinder pressure and
contents ratings before relying on this data.)
One US ®re®ghter's formula employs the one-half time plus ®ve minutes method.
To accomplish this, subtract 5 minutes from 33, giving you 28 minutes. Half of this
is 14 minutes. For this operation, your team would penetrate for 14 minutes and
then turn for home. This leaves a ®ve-minute air reserve time. However, this is a
time estimate and does not account for real time air consumption. A ®re®ghter can
still easily run out of air before exit.
A simpli®ed rule of thumb guide to air management, based on reaching the
exterior with an estimated ®ve or ten minutes of air reserve, can be used to guide
®re®ghters as follows:
I 30 min/cylinder (moderate work) ± TAT of 1500 psi (5 min reserve)
I 30 min/cylinder (heavy work) ± TAT of 1800 psi (5 min reserve)
I 45 min/cylinder (moderate work) ± TAT of 2000 psi (5 min reserve)
I 45 min/cylinder (heavy work) ± TAT of 2200 psi (5 min reserve)
I 45 min/cylinder (moderate work) ± TAT of 2250 psi (10 min reserve)
I 45 min/cylinder (heavy work) ± TAT of 2800 psi (10 min reserve)
Note `Fire®ghter 1' guidance ®gures, and be sure to check the contents (liters)
and charging pressures of actual cylinders in use in your department before relying
on these charts, guides and `rule of thumb' estimates:
I Low pressure cylinder ± One minute per 100 psi
I High pressure cylinder ± One minute per 200 psi
Common pressures are 153 bar (2,216 psi), 207 bar (3,000 psi), and 310 bar
(4,500 psi) for 1,800 liters and 2,500 liters of compressed air. Some European ®re
departments utilize the twin-cylinder concept to increase working duration and
provide more comfort to the wearer.
SCBA air management ± BA control l 189
5. Bernocco, S., Gagliano, M., Jose, P. and Phillips, C., (2005), `The Point of No Return' in Fire
Engineering Magazine, Penwell Publications, USA
190 l Euro Fire®ghter
191
192 l Euro Fire®ghter
even reports of serious injuries caused through inappropriate methods and tech-
niques being taught therein. It wasn't just that you could obtain steel shipping
containers and set ®res inside to train ®re®ghters. In order to achieve safe and
effective training evolutions, everything had to be in accordance with clearly de®ned
risk-assessed protocols.
Most importantly, this method of training ®re®ghters presented easily repeatable
conditions, where each ®re®ghter/student would experience exactly the same levels
of ®re development under safe and controlled conditions. When held in contrast to
live ®re training in acquired structures, where much preparation time was needed
and each ®re®ghter experienced somewhat different conditions, the training in ISO
shipping containers ensured a more uniform approach to training a squad, unit or
entire force of ®re®ghters.
Learning curves
As Rosander and Gisellson were developing their gas-phase ®re®ghting theories and
nozzle `bursting' techniques at the start of the 1980s in Sweden, the author had not
long returned from a two-year working detachment (1976±77) to the New York
City Fire Department. During this period he had been assigned into the (South)
Bronx area (Division 7) during the busiest period for ®re action in the history of the
FDNY. It was common to receive anything up to twenty or thirty calls per shift and,
of these, four to ®ve responses per night would be to serious working ®res in large
structures. In fact, this level of ®re action saw occasions where there were just not
enough units to handle all the ®res, and it was common for a single response to be
®ghting three or four large building ®res in a single street at the same time.
During this period the author learned a great deal about ¯ow-rate! The level and
extent of ®re action clearly demonstrated how adequate amounts of water would
deal quickly and ef®ciently with fast developing ®res. The tactics were impressive,
particularly where staf®ng and resources were readily available. The response
system was based very much on a pro-active pre-assigned task based approach,
which meant that key tasks were pre-planned according to riding position and
company assignments. Prioritizing critical tasks or deployment issues on arrival was
not something a commander usually needed to think about as the response of
(generally) three `engines' and two `ladders' (companies) automatically ®lled roles
on arrival, in accordance with a well documented pre-plan of assignments, delegated
to ®rst or second arriving engines and vice versa for ladders.
However, it became fairly easy to stand back, take a look at a ®re and instantly
estimate the needed ®re-¯ow requirements simply by taking in the ®re conditions as
they presented. How many windows/¯oors were issuing ®re or smoke? What type of
occupancy or building was involved? What color was the smoke and how intense was
the ®re? How fast was the smoke moving? Was there attic or interior void involve-
ment? What was clear to the author was that the tactics were nearly always to `open
the ®re up' (ventilate) to allow smoke and heat to leave the building, so that the pre-
assigned response could rapidly advance into the structure in order to overpower or
counter any ®re development with a superior ¯ow-rate.
In contrast, the `new-wave' European Rosander and Gisellson techniques were
suggesting an optimized application of very small amounts of water droplets (water-
fog) to control the gaseous-phase combustion, prior to advancing in and cooling
walls and ceiling areas, and ®nally suppressing the base of the fuel-phase ®re
(burning surfaces). The concept of ventilating structures was at con¯ict with their
194 l Euro Fire®ghter
methods, as this would inevitably lead to a greater release of energy from the ®re
(heat release rate), which may exceed the small amounts of water being used to
overcome the gas-phase ®re.
However, at this time, the author ± having returned from New York ± was in the
process of introducing a new-wave strategy he termed `tactical ventilation'. This was
a compromise between the aggressive use of venting tactics (USA) and the more
conservative use of `anti-ventilation' tactics (UK) that would see a structure remain
tightly closed during the vast majority of ®re attack operations. Quite simply, the US
approach was intended to relieve smoke and heat from a structure whilst the UK
approach was intended to prevent the ¯ow of air in to feed a ®re. This latter
approach to isolating ®res had a lot to do with the fact that the ®re attack strategy in
the UK and Europe in general was based very much on the principles of `fast attack'
using 1,400±1,800 liter water tanks and high-pressure (40 bar) (500 psi) low-¯ow
hose-reel booster lines on engines for 85% of primary ®re attacks.
Nevertheless, the author could see great merit in both approaches. Through his
experience of inner-city ®re®ghting, it was demonstrated that in some instances it
was a better option to keep the structure closed down (anti-ventilated), whilst in
others the creation of vent openings would have greatly assisted ®re®ghting and
rescue operations and possibly have saved lives. It was certain, however, that both
tactical approaches had been responsible for life loss at past ®res, either through the
inappropriate use of venting or the failure to create openings when needed. With
this in mind, the tactical ventilation solution was being proposed as a compromise.
The compromised stance came in the form of a strict range of parameters and
protocols with which to work.
In 1984, whilst assigned to units working in the heart of London's busy West End
district, the author worked with local commanders to develop a strategy for com-
bining the Rosander and Gisellson tactics with his own tactical ventilation strategy
at real ®res. Over a ten-year period (1984±94) these combination tactics were
used operationally at a wide range of ®res with great success. The main objectives
were to:
I Begin operations from an anti-ventilation stance, wherever possible;
I Create openings where an obvious tactical advantage may exist;
I Attempt to `fog' areas prior to entering (door entry procedure);
I Attempt to `fog' an area prior to ventilating to the exterior;
I Attempt to cool gases in the overhead using brief bursts of water-fog;
I Attempt to gain rapid `knock-back' of gaseous combustion using brief bursts
of water-fog.
Whilst there were some obvious successes achieved locally in London in combining
both strategies, there was never an overall national acceptance of such methods, and
a platform upon which to change the culture of ®re®ghting practices in the UK
seemed non-existent. This was despite the author's constant and extensive publication
of articles in national trade journals, as well as a book1 promoting the bene®ts of
CFBT, tactical ventilation, and the Rosander/Giselsson Swedish ®re suppression
techniques.
Then, over a tragic three-day period in 1996, things suddenly changed. On the
®rst day of February 1996, rapid ®re progress killed two UK ®re®ghters during their
1. Grimwood, P., (1992), Fog Attack, FMJ/DMG International Publications, Redhill, Surrey, UK
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 195
attempts to rescue several children from a house ®re. Then, just three days later,
further rapid ®re progress caught a female ®re®ghter and her colleague during a ®re
in a large superstore. Whilst her colleague was pulled from the store, she had
reportedly died instantly.
There were suddenly national calls for action as it was apparent that both ®res
raised concerns over ®re®ghting tactics coupled with a lack of knowledge of ®re
behavior. It is tragic, but typical, that it took these deaths before any deliverance
would ®nally be acknowledged, and Compartment Fire Behavior Training (CFBT)
became nationalized across the UK as a strategy in 1997, along with the introduction
of tactical ventilation and the Rosander/Gisellson techniques.
These `life safety' initiatives would go on to dramatically lower ®re®ghter LODD
statistics in the countries where such training was delivered in a continuing modular
phased-in approach, and Fog Attack (by the author and published in 1992) became
the recognized training manual of the period that provided the springboard for
starting CFBT. The US Navy in their 1994 research tests, and the Fire Service
College UK ± as well as several ®re brigades around the world ± referred to it
frequently when writing their original CFBT/tactical ventilation training syllabuses.
3D ®re®ghting tactics
The concept of 3D ®re®ghting was born out of the need to address structure
®res from the point of view that ®res, or occupant status, should not be allowed to
deteriorate further following ®re service arrival. As a training concept, `3D ®re-
®ghting' was used to in¯uence any CFBT failings from a `real world' perspective.
It was established through research data in London that, in general, building ®re
conditions actually worsened following the arrival on-scene of ®re®ghters in around
25% of occasions. That is to say, the extent (area) of ®re involvement actually
increased after ®re®ghters arrived, prior to ®re control occurring. Whilst it is easy to
defend this well-de®ned statistic from the viewpoint that working ®res are sometimes
most likely to develop further before ®re®ghters are able to take necessary action,
perhaps we should seriously take a look at our tactical approaches ®rst! In many
instances, you will note ®re®ghters taking actions, or not taking needed actions, that
cause ®res to worsen.
Examples:
I Creating an opening (outlet vent) without good reason or logic;
I Selecting an entry point (doorway) without consideration of wind direction
or speed;
I Creating an opening at the entry point prior to a charged hose-line, and crew
ready for entry, being in place;
I Failure to close doors in an attempt to control ®re development and isolate
the ®re;
I Inappropriate deployment, prioritizing interior ®re attack over exterior
exposure protection;
I Failure to ventilate essential areas, such as at the head of stair-shafts, where
smoke and heat is mushrooming across and back down.
Of course, many of these issues are reliant on adequate staf®ng and resources
(water) but, even so, simple actions by ®re®ghters are so often neglected, and the
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 197
25% statistic referred to above was a result of a study involving 307 serious ®res in
an inner-city area that was considered reasonably well staffed compared to some
situations.
The main reasons for deteriorating ®re conditions during the ®rst few minutes
after arrival may well be a failure to understand the principles of air-track manage-
ment, practical ®re dynamics and basic ®re behavior at ®res.
Whilst CFBT and 3D ®re®ghting clearly share many of the same objectives, a few
of the failings of the early CFBT programs were:
I There was little, or no, integration with tactical ventilation training;
I There was (is) no emphasis placed on minimum safe ¯ow-rates;
I There were (are) no limitations placed on the size of ®re where pulsing or
bursting fog patterns might become ineffective;
I There was little (or no) attention paid to maintaining ®re®ghting skills in the
more traditional methods using straight stream ®re attack.
The training concepts of 3D ®re®ghting were used to equip ®re®ghters with a more
rounded view of how compartment and structure ®res were likely to present them-
selves outside the training scenario, and attempted to form a stronger bridge, to
assist the transfer of knowledge and skills between the training environment and the
®re-ground itself. The use of combination tactics, when venting areas that had been
pre-water-fogged, was also central to the 3D ®re®ghting culture. The combination
tactics had been termed 3D ®re®ghting as the main emphasis was on dealing with
the three-dimensional hazards of smoke and ®re gases that ®re®ghters so often
neglected during their early tactical approaches.
Certainly, 3D ®re®ghting is about getting water into the gas layers, but it is also
about getting adequate amounts of water onto the ®re, using the optimum methods
of water application with the equipment and resources available. This meant that
the more traditional methods for suppressing ®res, in the form of straight-stream
direct attacks, were not forgotten.
The introduction of CFBT training in the UK had seen both positive and
negative effects. Whilst the ISO container ®res presented challenging training
scenarios for ®re®ghters, at just 1.5 MW and 2.8 MW maximum heat release rates
(HRR), the ®res fell short of `real-world' post-¯ashover compartment and structure
®res which generally presented a far greater level of ®re intensity of 3±15 MW. A
whole generation of new ®re®ghters were trained in dealing solely with gas-phase
combustion but were not taught how to handle rapidly developing fuel-phase ®res.
This caused many real ®res to be under-¯owed, with serious consequences.
The 3D ®re®ghting approach also dealt speci®cally with ®re®ghting ¯ow-rate,
from the perspective of providing ®re®ghters with a minimum amount of water
that would enable a safe advance into real ®re conditions developing close to, or
verging on, the point of ¯ashover. This minimum ¯ow-rate was termed the `tactical'
¯ow-rate.
It is essential that CFBT instructors understand the difference between a 1.5 MW
training burn at its peak of development and a 5 MW room ®re that is still
developing. They must further appreciate the importance of ¯ow-rate as well as
application technique, when applied to intense and rapidly-progressing enclosure
®res. This greater depth of knowledge and awareness is critical to the safety of
®re®ghters in the real world, and 3D ®re®ghting manuals have always addressed
these very issues.
198 l Euro Fire®ghter
¯ow-rates! In these cases, the ¯ow-rate being applied to real ®res through 45 mm
lines was actually reducing (just 80 liters/min) when replacing high-pressure hose-
reel booster lines that would ¯ow around 80±110 liters/min on the ®re.
When demonstrated to the ®re®ghters, using inline ¯ow meters, what was
occurring, they appeared to struggle with the possibility that this could actually be
the case. They were sincerely of the belief that because the ®re stream `looked' good
and reached a good distance, they were providing a higher ¯ow attack line compared
to the smaller booster lines. They had not heard of the `automatic' nozzle (which
they were using), that constantly trimmed the nozzle outlet to achieve an effective
throw, at the expense of some trade-off to ¯ow-rate! Depending on the pressure
being sent to the nozzle, the nozzle aperture automatically adjusted to provide
stream `throw' over ¯ow. This can be a good thing under circumstances where
nozzles are ¯owed correctly with adequate amounts of pressure in the ®rst place.
There was a general problem right across the UK (and commonly elsewhere,
including the USA) that nozzles were often under-pumped. The UK research
showed that only 11% of the ®fty-eight ®re brigades were ¯owing effectively from
their 45 mm primary attack hose-lines, achieving 500 liters/min at the nozzle! In
fact, the nation's average ¯ow-rate was shown to be just 290 liters/min, when ®re-
®ghters believed they were achieving almost twice this amount. In reality, with this
¯ow rate, they are only capable of putting out half the amount of ®re! Even more
concerning was the fact that since the UK Fire Service had begun a transition at the
turn of the 1990s from its use of traditional smooth-bore and combination fog/
straight `impingement' nozzles, towards the more modern concepts of nozzles with
¯ow-selectors, automatic internal mechanisms and spinning teeth rings, the actual
¯ow-rate available at the nozzle had halved.
These facts ± coupled with the belief that lower ¯ow-rates were just as effective on
all ®res because `new-wave' burst and pause techniques had been widely taught in
the UK for compartment ®re®ghting since 1997 ± saw several instances of ®res
being under-¯owed. During this process, ®re®ghters may have lost their lives.
The coroners' narratives (summary) of four UK ®re®ghter deaths, over two
®res in 2004 and 2005, suggested that inadequate amounts of water might have
been available at the nozzles to deal with the ®res in question and, in effect, were
most likely contributory factors in the cause of their deaths. In one case a crew was
attempting to gain entry into an apartment ®re, in which at least one ®re®ghter
was believed to have still been alive following an event of rapid ®re progress, but
stated that despite applying brief bursts of water from the nozzle into the overhead,
the hose-line in use provided an ineffective stream that `seemed to be having little
effect on the ®re.' The energy release for this ®re was estimated somewhere between
5±15 MW and was wind-assisted into a direction that opposed the advancing hose-
team, who were quickly beaten back off the ®re-¯oor. There was a clear need for
greater amounts of both pressure and ¯ow at the nozzle and the limits of gas-phase
®re®ghting were clearly surpassed in this situation, meaning alternative approaches
were needed, as `pulsing' droplets into 5 MW ®res with low ¯ow-rates and
inadequate nozzle pressure becomes problematic.
achieve. As an example, in one 15 MW ®re test the control criteria were established
as a period of six minutes from the start of ®re suppression to the time when loss
of mass in the fuel (wood cribs) reached a point where data demonstrated such
loss had ended. At this point, ¯ows of 113 liters/min (30 gallons/min) had been
unsuccessful in achieving control of a 100 sq m (1,000 sq ft) ®re within the six-
minute criteria set. However, much higher ¯ow-rates were successful in achieving
suppression earlier.
During the author's ®re®ghting ¯ow-rate research of 120 working ®res in London
in 1989±90, it was noted that where ¯ow-rates were bordering on the critical rate of
¯ow as described by Sardqvist and Stolp (above), the control of 50% of these ®res
was only achieved whilst in the decay stage of ®re `growth'. That is, the vast majority
of the fuel-load had burned away and the energy release from each ®re was in
decline. Although this enabled a lower ¯ow-rate to suppress the ®re, such a tactical
approach could not be termed `successful', for where ®re®ghters are forced into this
situation, they may face greater dangers including those of structural collapse.
NFA Formula 0.16 gallons/min per sq ft of ®re Plus a secondary back-up line
(USA)
Dunn (FDNY) 0.12 gallons/min per sq ft of ®re Plus a secondary back-up line
Fig. 9.1 ± Needed ¯ow-rate estimates provided by several authorities that have undertaken
research into the ¯ow-rates used to suppress actual ®res in structures.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 203
*Where walls, ¯oors or ceilings are breached by ®re, or where wind is creating a
high-intensity forced draft ®re, the ¯ow rate is increased by 50%.
It should also be noted that the author recommended this formula only be applied
to areas of ®re involvement measuring between 50 sq m (500 sq ft) and 600 sq m
(6,500 sq ft).
Where, for example, a ®re has involved 25% of a 300 sq m (3,250 sq ft)
single-story building, with ®re showing through the roof 3, the formula would
suggest:
Now compare that formula, as derived from the author's real ®re research in
London, with the National Fire Academy (NFA) formula, which is actually a means
tested formula also based on real ®re demands in the USA.
The structure would convert to 3,250 sq ft with 25% involvement at 800 sq ft.
800/3 266 gallons/min (which converts back to 1,000 liters/min)
We can see the NFA formula is very similar to the author's metric formula where
A 6 is used, as this converts to a needed ¯ow-rate of:
I 900 liters/min (author) (Attack hose-line and back-up support line).
I 1,000 liters/min (NFA) (Attack hose-line and back-up support line).
Fig. 9.2 ± Comparisons of established ¯ow-rate formulae that have been derived from `real
®re' research ± 75 sq m (800 sq ft) of ®re involvement.
Whilst there are many detailed engineering ¯ow-rate formulae based on scienti®c
theory and mathematical calculations, very few of these will align with the ¯ows
that were extrapolated from `real world' ®res, as was the case with the above four
methods (see Fig. 9.2). In fact, the vast majority of these engineering ¯ow-rate
formulae will provide gross overestimates in actual needed ¯ow-rates. However, this
is the purpose of design systems (to plan for the worst-case scenario), and this may
be re¯ected in their calculations.
The four versions of ¯ow-rate formulae listed in Fig. 9.2 are all derived from real
®re research ± two programs in the USA and two based on data supplied by London
Fire Brigade's Division of Investigation. It is also worth noting that this 75 sq m area
represents an average-sized house in the UK. Try to picture in your mind this
area of ®re involvement at 75 sq m (800 sq ft) which, at full involvement in a two-
story house, will easily be controlled by a single hose-line ¯owing 450 liters/min
(120 gallons/min). However, a secondary back-up hose-line should always be laid in
support where the primary line is going interior. Where the same 75 sq m area of ®re
involvement exists in the larger 300 sq m (3,250 sq ft) structure, then two hose-lines
may be critical and the secondary support line may be needed to assist the attack
(remember ± these are minimum ¯ow-rate estimates).
When comparing ¯ow-rate formulae in this way, it is essential that the method
used to suppress ®res in each speci®c research project is also considered. As an
example, the IOWA research is based solely on the use of water-fog directed in
from a position exterior to the ®re compartment. This method of attack is termed
`indirect' extinguishing and entails fog streams being directed in through windows
or doorways leading to the ®re compartment, where the fog stream is swirled around
the room so that water droplets evaporate on hot surfaces. The effect is one of
mass vaporization and the dominant mechanism of extinction is smothering, or
displacement of the oxygen, with some cooling effect also. The method of attack is
therefore aimed at the gas-phase ®re although much surface cooling obviously
occurs.
In contrast, the National Fire Academy formula was originally derived from
direct attack methods, which were the dominant form of attack, where straight
streams were aimed at suppressing the fuel-phase ®re. In early NFA courses circa
1979±84, the academy used the ISO ®re-¯ow formula as well as a modi®cation
of the Iowa formula. When the Preparing for Incident Command (PIC) course was
re-written, the new NFA formula was developed under peer review of some
students, who were experienced ®re-ground commanders. They produced the ®re-
ground method of Area (sq ft)/3 gallons/min. It was stated that the commanders
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 205
believed an aggressive interior attack on a ®re had an upper limit of 1,000 gallons/
min (3,780 liters/min) and after this, the ®re should generally be fought defensively.
The two other methods of estimating needed ®re-¯ows were both based on real ®re
research, undertaken in London against a large number of working ®res (Grimwood
1989±90: 120 ®res and Sardqvist 1994±97: 307 ®res). During these periods London
®re®ghters would predominantly use the direct attack methods to control ®res but
would also resort to some use of fog patterns to gain knock-back against ¯aming
combustion and provide protection to nozzle operators.
Therefore, it is important to appreciate how dif®cult it is to compare some ¯ow
formulae where the mechanisms of extinction are different.
The key recommendations suggest minimum ¯ows on the attack hose-lines should be
100 gallons/min (378 liters/min) minimum but ideally 150 gallons/min (570 liters/min).
compartment ®re fuel load of 3±15 MW, where heavy penetration into the fuel
sources may also be needed to achieve any real cooling effect.
European formulae:
I NR (newtons) 1.57 P d2/10
(European smooth-bore)
I NR (newtons) 0.22563 liters/min y P
(European combination fog/jet or automatic nozzles)
These are metric formulae where P nozzle pressure and nozzle diameter
208 l Euro Fire®ghter
US Formulae:
I NR (lbf) 1.57 d2 P
(US smooth-bore)
I NR (lbf) 0.0505 gallons/min y P
(US Combination fog/straight or automatic Nozzles)
Effective ®re-ground ¯ows from 134 inch hose potentially range from 150 to 190 gallons/
min (570±700 liters/min. The City of New York Fire Department (FDNY) con-
siders 180 gallons/min (680 liters/min) the ideal ¯ow from 134 inch lines in terms
of ®re extinguishment capability and handling characteristics. Some members of
the ®re service suggest that actual ®re-ground ¯ows from 134 inch hose are some-
what less than the 150 gallons/min minimum given above. The main reason for this
is a widespread underestimation of the friction loss in 134 inch hose at ¯ows of
150 gallons/min (570 liters/min) or more.
In Europe there was some interesting research undertaken by the Building
Disaster Assessment Group (BDAG) in the UK that examined various aspects
associated with ¯ow-rate, hose sizes and physiological demands on ®re®ghters,
speci®cally in high-rise situations.
Their conclusions suggested that 51 mm (2 inch) attack hose-lines appeared as
the most viable option, especially in high-rise ®res, for applying optimal ®re®ghting
¯ow-rates. They did not compare the 51 mm option with 65 mm (112 inch) attack
lines but the 51 mm hose-line did appear more suitable than the 70 mm (234 inch)
option, in relation to maneuvrability and physiological demands.
Speci®c heat
Speci®c heat is the amount of heat required to raise 1 gram (g) of a substance by
1 degree Celsius (ëC). Speci®c heat is expressed in Joules (J). The speci®c heat
capacity of water varies slightly from 0 ëC to 100 ëC, but at 18 ëC it is 4.183 kJ/kg ëC.
18 ëC is selected here because it is the typical temperature of water when it comes
from an underground water main.
I Example 1
Determine how much heat will be absorbed in raising 10 kg of water from
18 ëC to 100 ëC
4.183 kJ/kgëC 10 kg (100 ëC 18 ëC) 3,430 kJ
Speci®c heat capacity is expressed in J/kgK or J/kgëC
I Example 2
Determine how much heat will be absorbed if 1 kg of water at an initial
temperature of 18 ëC is perfectly converted to steam at 100 ëC
4.183 kJ/kg (1 kg) (100 ëC 18 ëC) 2,257 kJ/kg (1 kg)
343 kJ 2,257 kJ
2,600 kJ
2.6 MJ
(a) Speci®c heat multiplied by the mass of water and the increase in tem-
perature to reach boiling temperature at 100 ëC
(b) Plus the product of latent heat of vaporization at 100 ëC multiplied by the
weight of water
(c) Plus the speci®c heat of steam multiplied by the mass of steam and the
increase in temperature from 100 ëC to the temperature of the ®re gas.
I Example 3
Determine how much heat will be absorbed if 1 kg of water at 18 ëC is
perfectly converted to water vapour at 300 ëC
4.183 kJ/kg (1 kg) (100 ëC 18 ëC) 2,257 kJ/kg (1 kg)
4.090 kJ/kg (1 kg) (300 ëC 100 ëC)
343 kJ 2,257 kJ 818 kJ
3.4 MJ
The information in Fig. 9.3 below indicates that 1 kg of water, converted to steam
as in Example 3 above, would be an insuf®cient amount to absorb the heat released by
1 kg of any of the fuels listed. The result however is different when water is applied to
a ®re in typical ®re®ghting rates of kilograms per second, that is, liters per second.
Substance MJ/kg
Wood 16
Polyurethane 23
Coal 29
Rubber Tyres 32
Petrol 45
Ef®ciency in ®res
Water can never be applied at 100% ef®ciency for various reasons, and most
building ®res do not retain 100% of the heat energy in the room where the ®re is
occurring. The net result is that both the energy absorption of the water and the
energy production of the ®re need to be modi®ed by calculated ef®ciency factors.
212 l Euro Fire®ghter
I Example 7
An of®ce ®re burning at 100% ef®ciency would have an average heat release
rate of approximately 0.25 MW for each square meter of area. Determining the
amount of heat released for this ®re in a space measuring 6 m 6 m, we ®nd:
6 m 6 m 0.25 MW/sq m 9.0 MW
If the foregoing is true, one hose-line delivering 7 kg/s in a fog pattern at
75% ef®ciency or a solid-bore jet stream at 50% ef®ciency could both deliver
enough water ¯ow to control and extinguish this ®re burning at 100%
ef®ciency (see Examples 5 and 6 above).
Complex computer models have been developed to provide theoretical water ¯ow
estimations and are formatted to take into account additional factors, such as
®re®ghting team intervention times; the effect of automatic suppression systems
that may have operated, correcting HRR as necessary; ventilation parameters
directly affecting HRR; thermal radiation and speci®c boundary cooling demands,
thereby balancing total water requirements for a range of ®res in a structural setting.
I Example 8
If the ef®ciency of a jet nozzle at 7 kg/s is 50%, as in Example 6, but the
ef®ciency of the ®re is only 50%, ®nd the total energy that can be absorbed
by the water ¯ow.
Qs 7 kg/s (0.50 2.6 MJ/kg)/0.50 18.2 MW
Or, by re-arranging the equation, the amount of water required will be:
F (0.50 18.2 MW)/(0.50 2.6 MJ/kg) 7 kg/s
F ®re®ghting water ¯ow in kg/s (liters/second)
Qs heat absorption capacity of ®re stream
In practical terms it must be pointed out that a ®re®ghter's physiological barriers
are relative to compartment size where, for example, a 1 MW ®re enclosed within a
40 sq m compartment may present similar barriers to the ®re®ghter as a 16 MW ®re
in a larger 300 sq m compartment.
214 l Euro Fire®ghter
I A ®re®ghting fog spray will consist of a wide range of droplet sizes right
across the spectrum from extremely small to very large. The make up of
the droplet range will depend upon nozzle design and nozzle pressure.
Higher nozzle pressures will generally lead to smaller droplets, and vice
versa. Where a nozzle is designed to function at a nozzle pressure (NP) of
7 bars (for example) the most effective range of droplets will normally be
produced.
I In some instances, droplet theory suggests that some smaller droplets may
follow close behind larger droplets, enabling them to penetrate further into
the hot gas layers than they would normally be able to on their own.
I These theoretical effects associated with thermal balance; thermal inversions;
ascending and descending smoke layers; air in-¯ows etc. can all be practically
demonstrated in a Fire Development Simulator (FDS).
These are valid questions and several references have attempted to provide
the answers. It is of particular relevance to manufacturers of Water Mist Fire
Suppression Systems (WMFSS) who are engaged in supplying ®xed ®re®ghting
installations as a replacement for Halon gas ®xed-protection systems. Herterich
identi®ed a need for consistent terminology when discussing ®re®ghting sprays,
especially when considering the characteristic size of the droplets. Grant and
Drysdale adapted a `spectrum of droplet diameters' to demonstrate the broad range
of possibilities. The size ranging from 100±1,000 microns (0.1±1.0 mm) was of
most interest in ®re®ghting terms and this conformed, on the chart, to a droplet size
equal to light rain or `drizzle'.
The cut-off between `sprays' and `mists' remains somewhat arbitrary however.
For example the US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) have suggested a
practical de®nition of `water mist' as a spray in which 99% of the water volume is
contained in droplets less than 1,000 microns (1.0 mm) in diameter, compared with
conventional sprinkler systems where 99% of volume diameter may be in the order
of 5,000 microns (5.0 mm). Some regard this NFPA de®nition of a `mist' as being
too `loose' in relation to WMFSS, and an alternative de®nition was advanced
suggesting a `mist' should comprise 99% of volume diameter equal to or below
500 microns (0.5 mm). It is worth noting that most WMFSS produce droplets in
the range 50±200 microns, and it is generally accepted that droplet sizes less than
20 microns are necessary for a spray to have true `gas-like' attributes.
Modern ®re®ghting nozzles produce sprays through pressure atomizing effects
and the result is termed a `polydisperse' spray ± that is, it comprises a wide range
of droplet sizes, ranging from coarse to very ®ne. There are several methods of
measuring droplet sizes within a spray but the results often con¯ict, depending on
the method used. It has been suggested that there is an optimum droplet size in
terms of ®re suppression, but this has never been achieved, as the objectives are
variable. In terms of theory it is fairly straightforward in ascertaining the optimum
size, but in real situations a ®re®ghting spray has to contend with several hindering
factors when injected into a hostile mass of super-heated ®re gases. The smaller the
droplet the better its cooling capacity, but if the droplets are too small then it is likely
that interaction with the buoyant ®re plume may prevent droplets reaching the
source of the ®re.
This loss of water to the surroundings is only particularly relevant where ®nal
extinction of the ®re source with a spray is the objective. In terms of gas-phase
cooling, this effect is not so prevalent and droplet sizing within the spray can
be reduced. The ideal ®re®ghting nozzle will produce a spray with droplets small
enough to suspend in air for at least four seconds, optimizing 3D water-fog appli-
cations during gas-phase cooling. However, such a nozzle will also be versatile
enough to move from spray to main stream and back again with ease to enable direct
hits at the ®re source. With this in mind it has been generally accepted that a water
spray with a mean droplet size of around 300 microns (0.3 mm) is ideal for gas-
phase cooling using the 3D ®re®ghting applications.
Temperature inversions
Temperature inversions are where the temperature gradient between the overhead
and the ¯oor is reversed. When this occurs, the temperature at ¯oor level (where ®re-
®ghters are located) may become hotter than at the ceiling. This can be an extremely
uncomfortable experience for the ®re®ghter and is one to be avoided at all costs.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 217
This again demonstrates that sprays producing larger droplets will reach a greater
surface area (especially walls and ceiling), which in turn creates excessive amounts
of steam and less contraction of the gases. Gas-phase cooling is only effective where
the droplets evaporate in the ®re gases, avoiding contact with hot surfaces as much
as possible.
A study by the Fairfax County Fire Department in 1985 compared the cooling
capabilities of smooth-bore streams against combination nozzle streams in both
straight and wider fog patterns. Using protected thermocouples, they noted the
combination nozzle's `fog' pattern was three times more effective in cooling the
overhead than a smooth-bore. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly the straight stream
from the combination nozzle was also twice as effective as the smooth-bore in
cooling the ¯aming overhead. The ®re®ghters involved in the tests were convinced
they would rather have the ¯exibility of a combination nozzle at the outset for any
interior ®re®ghting operation.
In 1994 the US Navy's Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) initiated a study on
board the Navy's full-scale ®re test ship to determine the bene®ts and drawbacks of
using the three-dimensional approach in comparison to a more traditional straight
stream attack to extinguish a growing Class `A' ®re within the con®nes of a 73 cubic
meter compartment. The fuel load comprised of wood cribs and particle-board
panels initiated by n-Heptane pool ®res. To provide further realism, obstructions
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 219
were placed between the ®re sources and the entry point to the ®re compartment.
This forced the attack teams to advance well into the compartment before a direct
hit at the base of the ¯ames was achieved. A 38 mm hose-line was used with a ¯ow of
360 liters/min for both the water-fog and straight stream attacks. When utilizing the
fog pattern the water was `pulsed' in short bursts from a 60 degree cone applied
upward at a 45 degree angle into the ¯aming overhead. After the gaseous com-
bustion was extinguished, the ®re®ghters advanced to the seat of the ®re to complete
extinguishment using a straight stream. Thermocouples at various levels recorded
temperatures throughout the tests and total water usage was noted. It became clear
that the three-dimensional application of water-fog was far more effective in con-
trolling the environmental conditions ± the thermal balance remained undisrupted
and steam production was minimal. In comparison, the straight stream attacks
created excessive steam, disrupting the thermal balance and causing burns to
nozzle operators, sometimes forcing them to retreat from the compartment. The
reductions of compartmental temperatures were also more rapid with the pulsing
tactics utilizing a fog-pattern. The US Navy report concluded that:
The three-dimensional fog attack strategy is the best method to maintain a safe and
effective approach to a ®re involved compartment when direct access to the seat of a
®re cannot be immediately gained.
4. Grimwood, P., (1992), Fog Attack, FMJ/DMG International Publications, Redhill, Surrey UK
220 l Euro Fire®ghter
fog! Any air in¯ow that may have taken place at the nozzle will be minimal (around
0.9 cubic m) and the negative pressure is maintained.
*The above calculation was subsequently amended (2006) by French Fire Engineer Frank
Gaviot Blanc and presented in the following format ± www.¯ashover.fr
Fig. 9.5 ± The expansion ratio of water to vapor may be countered by the contraction in the
gas layers as they cool, as seen above in column nine where the emboldened positive ®gures
represent unsuccessful attempts to counter water to vapor expansion where the expansion
has exceeded the gas contraction in these examples. However, the negative ®gures above
these in column nine demonstrate an effective reduction in total air volume. Note the
differences in ef®ciency in column ®ve, where the 100% (theoretical) ef®ciency is compared
to Barnett's 75% ef®ciency factor for a water-fog application. Courtesy of Frank Gaviot
Blanc (France).
SERIES 1
SERIES 2
14.00
12.00
10.00
������� ������
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��������� ������� ������� ��
���������� �� ������� ������������ �� �� ��� �� ������ �� ��� ����� ������ ��� �������
������� �� ������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ���� ����������� ���� ����
���� ��� ���� �� ����� ������ ����� �� ����� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ������ ���� �� �������
����������� �������� ���� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ������ �� ����� ������ ���� ���� ���
��������� ���� �����
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��������� ������� ������� ��
���������� �� ������� ������������ �� �� ��� �� ������ �� ��� ����� ������ ��� �������
������� �� ������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ���� ����������� ���� ����
���� ��� ���� �� ����� ������ ����� �� ����� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ������ ���� �� �������
����������� �������� ���� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ������ �� ����� ������ ���� ���� ���
��������� ���� �����
��� � ���� ����������
SERIES 1
SERIES 2
45.00
40.00
35.00
������� ������
30.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��� ������� ������� ��
������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ����� ��� ����� �� ����� �� �����
��������� ����� ��� ��� ����������� �������� ���� ������� ��������
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��� ������� ������� ��
������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ����� ��� ����� �� ����� �� �����
��������� ����� ��� ��� ����������� �������� ���� ������� ��������
������� ������
���� ����� ��������� ���������� � ���
SERIES 1
SERIES 2
14.00
12.00
10.00
������� ������
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ��� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��������� ������� ������� �� �����
������ �� ������� ������������ ������ ��� �� ������ �� ��� ����� ������ ��� ������� ������� ��
������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ���� ����������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ����
�� ����� ������ ����� �� ����� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ������ ���� �� ������� �����������
�������� ���� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ������ �� ����� ������ ���� ���� ��� ��������� ���� �����
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ��� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��������� ������� ������� �� �����
������ �� ������� ������������ ������ ��� �� ������ �� ��� ����� ������ ��� ������� ������� ��
������ ���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ���� ����������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ����
�� ����� ������ ����� �� ����� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ������ ���� �� ������� �����������
�������� ���� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ������ �� ����� ������ ���� ���� ��� ��������� ���� �����
��� � ���� ����������
SERIES 1
SERIES 2
35.00
30.00
25.00
������� ������
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ��� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��� ������� ������� �� ������
���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ����� ��� ����� �� ����� �� ����� ���������
����� ��� ��� ����������� �������� ���� ������� ��������
���� ��� � �� ��� ���������� ��� ��� ��������� �� �� ���� ���� ��� ������� ������� �� ������
���� �� ��������� ����� �� ����� ���������� ����� ��� ����� �� ����� �� ����� ���������
����� ��� ��� ����������� �������� ���� ������� ��������
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 225
5. Hartin, E., Battalion Chief (Training Division), Gresham Fire District, Oregon USA
��� � ���� ����������
������� ������
SERIES 1
SERIES 2
14.00
12.00
10.00
������� ������
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
���� ���� � � ��� ���������� ������� ����� � ����������� ������ ������������ �� ��� ������
����� �� ���� ������� ���� �� ��� ���� ������ ������ �� � ���� ���� ���� ������ ��������� ���
������ �������� ������� ���� ��� �������� �� ������� �� ������ ��� �� � ����� ���� ������
��� �� ���� �� �������� ������� ������� �� �� ��� �� ������� ������������ ����� ����� ��
����� ��������� �� ��������� �� ��� ������� ��� ������������ �������� ��� ������ ��������
�� ��� ���������� ���� ������������ ������� ��������� �� ��� ������ ��� ���������� ��������
������ ����� �� ��� ���� ���� ������� �������� ����� �� ��� ��� ��������� ����� �� � ���
������� ��������� �� ������� ��� ���� �� ��� ��� ������� ��� ����� �� ������� ������� ��
����������� ������ ��� �� �� ��� ��������� ���� ����������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ���� �� �����
���� ����
������ ������� �� ���
���������������
���������������� ���������
���� ���� � �����������
������ ���������� ������������
�� ������� �� �����������
����������� ������
����� �� �������
���� ����� �������
����������
���������
��� ������
���� ������ ������������
�� ����� �� � ����
��������
��������
��������� ���������
��������� ���
���� �����
������ �������� ������� ���� ��� �������� �� ������� �� ������ ��� �� � ����� ���� ������
��� �� ���� �� �������� ������� ������� �� �� ��� �� ������� ������������ ����� ����� ��
����� ��������� �� ��������� �� ��� ������� ��� ������������ �������� ��� ������ ��������
�� ��� ���������� ���� ������������ ������� ��������� �� ��� ������ ��� ���������� ��������
������ ����� �� ��� ���� ���� ������� �������� ����� �� ��� ��� ��������� ����� �� � ���
������� ��������� �� ������� ��� ���� �� ��� ��� ������� ��� ����� �� ������� ������� ��
����������� ������ ��� �� �� ��� ��������� ���� ����������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ���� �� �����
������ ����� �� ����� ��������� ���� ���� ���� ������ ���� �� ������� ����������� ��������
���� ����� ��� ������ ���� ��� ������ �� ����� ������ ���� ���� ��� ��������� ���� �����
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 227
act of `cracking' the ¯ow control to a 20% opening (®rst indent) ensures the water
applications are controlled and not excessive.
The origins of the Rosander/Giselsson techniques were optimized and taught in
Swedish and Finnish FDS units during the 1980s using a nozzle (TA Fog®ghterJ)
that ¯owed between 100 and 350 liters/min, with a ¯ow-control function that
followed closely the operating principles of a `slide-valve' nozzle. In the USA the
slide-valve design is common to the Task Force Tips (TFT) range of nozzles.
at channeling the droplets into the in-¯owing air-stream that is heading for
the ®re. Where this process is applied in reverse, an initial burst of fog aimed
straight at the ®re (below the NPP), preceding any fogging of the overhead,
may cause a `water to vapour expansion' that will increase ¯aming in the
overhead and send ¯ames in your direction.
I The `shark.' A more recent application being taught in Sweden (e.g.
Gothenburg) is called the `shark'. The application promotes the opposite of
the `over-pressure/under-pressure' method described above. It is mentioned
here purely because it is being taught and is in use in Sweden in 2007. Using
a TA Fog®ghterJ nozzle, the ¯ow goes from 100 liters/min to 300 liters/min
in one sweeping nozzle movement that is intended to drive any gaseous
combustion over and behind, away from the nozzle operator.
1. Set the nozzle to straight stream.
2. Open the nozzle, but not completely, and attack the heart of the ®re.
3. Increase the opening of the nozzle (¯ow), and start turning the nozzle tip
in order to go to fog pattern. During this, move the nozzle to the ceiling,
all in one sweeping motion.
4. As the nozzle is directed to the ceiling, open the nozzle so you are at
maximum ¯ow with a wide-fog protection pattern and then close the
nozzle.
The author has not used this nozzle application in real ®res, outside a training
scenario, and cannot attest to its viability. There is no doubt that the thermal layer
will disrupt as water to vapour expansion may be excessive and ®re gases are moved
around the compartment.
I Pencilling. The term `pencilling' refers to brief bursts from a straight stream
or narrowed fog pattern, often applied in a lobbing fashion, to direct small
`slugs' of water onto burning surfaces in a controlled attempt to suppress
¯aming. This application is often useful in maintaining visibility as fuel sources
are approached and then torn or cut open to reveal the base of the ®re, in
a controlled manner, or removed from the compartment via an adjacent
window. This term (pencilling) is used in a different way in the USA, where
straight streams are applied in short bursts into the overhead. This has
the same effect as narrow fog patterns in cooling the overhead, although the
hazards of thermal inversions are far more likely when using straight
streams6, compared to bursting water droplets in fog patterns.
I Painting. This term refers to the cooling of wall and ceiling linings, using
a narrow fog or straight stream, in an attempt to draw heat out of the
solid materials that may radiate heat back into the gases. The effect known
as `hot-wall' occurs where compartment boundaries either retain heat or
bounce it back into the compartment. This has the effect of radiating vast
amounts of heat back into the ®re gases and may lead to auto-ignitions of the
gas layer. To avoid this situation, where surfaces and compartment
boundaries are acting as heat sinks or insulators, a cooling stream may be
`painted' across the surfaces to draw the heat out.
6. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University. Refer to US Navy Tests p.54 and MAFS tests p.63.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 229
7. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University, Refer to p.390 onwards (UK Fire Brigade Experience)
230 l Euro Fire®ghter
In both tests the temperatures at several heights in the FDS were data-logged and
there was a clear division between the plain water applications when compared to
the results obtained using One-SevenJ CFS. The foam system demonstrated
impressive cooling ability when applied in very brief bursts into the overhead. There
was remarkable knock-back of the gaseous ®re and thermal balance was easily
maintained. The water vapour produced by the foam system appeared far less
obvious than when water was used, and the nozzle operators were able to advance
with much less work of the nozzle when using foam as compared to water. Previous
research had raised an issue with the excessive amounts of water-vapor produced by
CAFS when applied in constant-¯ow direct attacks, but this was certainly not the
case when using the One-SevenJ CFS system, where the structure reportedly
reduces this hazard.
In the tactical unit the ®re®ghters were unable to gain entry to the basement ®re
when using water, but found the One-SevenJ foam system provided a far more
comfortable environment in which to descend, where they were then able to enter
the basement compartment and achieve full extinction of the ®re. In conclusion, the
foam was more effective on the visible ®re and the ceiling temperatures, and far
easier to work with than water. This particular foam system is now in operational
use in the UK (East Sussex) and is also under extensive ®eld trials in the city of
Phoenix, USA. The Phoenix Fire Department previously sent several instructors
to East Sussex Fire and Rescue in the UK to learn how to operate the system, and to
observe the interior ®re®ghting tactics being used to apply foam into the gas layers
to prevent ¯ashover.
As this book goes to print there is a major European-funded research project
underway in France, entitled PROMESIS, that is testing and comparing several
different ®re®ghting systems, including high-pressure and low-pressure water
systems and various CAFS against hot gas layers. The results of this research (along
with details of past CAFS research) can be located at the author's website8 and at
Euro-®re®ghter.com. As with any new system, make sure you evaluate thoroughly
the potentials for failure, as well as the bene®ts which may be achieved.
8. http://www.®retactics.com/CAFS.htm
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 231
A CFBT instructor will learn to run and manage a training evolution inside a FDS
Demonstrator in order to: ensure the safety of students at all times; guide students
through the learning process; highlight all learning points; ensure prompt and safe
crew rotations (explain and practice how this will occur prior to actually taking them
into the burn); ensure correct nozzle techniques, and, most importantly, to ensure
that each student gains the same experience as all others. Such a process begins with
pre-planning, detailed brie®ngs and an understanding of all of the training objectives,
before the evolution begins.
������� ������
Technical standards
There are numerous technical standards that relate to the design, installation, use
and maintenance of the hardware systems required to operate this type of system
including:
I Electrical standards
I Gas storage and supply standards
I Pressurized systems standards
I Computer control systems
Fibre boards: Types of ®breboard are differentiated by the size and type of wood
®bres used, the method of drying, what type of bonding agent is used and the
method by which it is pressed into shape.
Medium density ®breboard (MDF) is manufactured by a dry process at a lower
temperature than for example hardboard, another type of ®breboard. The effect of
this is that the natural glues and resins contained within the wood are rendered
ineffective. MDF therefore uses manufactured bonding agents and resins. Varying
density boards with differing ®nishes are used for various end uses.
Oriented strand board (OSB) is manufactured from waterproof heat-cured
adhesives and rectangular shaped wood strands that are arranged in cross-oriented
layers, similar to plywood. This results in a structural engineered wood panel that
shares many of the strength and performance characteristics of plywood. Produced
in huge, continuous mats, OSB is a solid panel product of consistent quality with no
laps, gaps or voids.
It can be seen in Fig. 9.11 how different fuels are likely to affect CFBT training
evolutions in terms of temperatures, radiant heat, speed of ®re development, and
duration of training burn. Where storage of boards is likely to allow moisture content
to dry out, or where moisture (damp) is allowed to increase, this too will affect how
CFBT evolutions will progress. These factors must all be built into the documented
risk assessment for training. Suddenly changing from 12 mm to 19 mm boards (for
example) is not acceptable without pre-planning, practice burns and a document
introducing the change.
Similarly, all ®re loads must be pre-planned and documented as part of the risk
assessment for each individual FDS unit. Another in¯uencing factor is that of wind
and weather, for both will have an impact on how well, or how poorly, a CFBT
training burn will progress. As an example, a gusting wind entering an open end of a
FDS unit will likely increase the air-track and burning rate of the fuels, creating
unpredictable conditions. To prevent this, many installations are designed and
located with natural windbreaks.
�������
FUEL VARIANTS������
IN CFBT
FLASHOVER OCCURS AROUND 1000kW HRR
5000
������� ������
ORIENTED STRAND BOARD
4000 PLYWOOD
MEDIUM t2 FIRE
Heat Release Rate (kW)
ULTRAFAST t2 FIRE
OSB
3000
PLYWOOD
2000 MDF
1000
MEDIUM t2
0
0 100 200 300 400 500
Time (s)
���� ���� � ������� ���� ������� ����� ��� �������� ��� ������� ������ ������ ��� ���
������� ���� ��������� ���� ��� ��������� �� ����������� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���� ��� �������
����� ��� ������ �� ����� ��� ������� ��������������� ��� ������������� ��� ���������� ��
���� �������� ���� ���� ��� �� ������ �� ���� �������� ������ ��� ��� ���� ������� ����
����� �� ������� ���� �� ������������ ������ ����� �� ������� ���� �������� ����� �����
��� ���� �� ��������� ���� �������� ��� ����������� �� ���� ����������� ��� ����� �� ���
��������� ������� ��������������� ������ ������ � �������� ���������� ����� ��������� ������
���
���� ��
��������� �� �����
������� �������������
�����������
���� ���� ������ ��� ��������
��� �������� �� ����
��� ������� ��������������
������ �����
��� ���
������� ���� ��������� ���� ��� ��������� �� ����������� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���� ��� �������
����� ��� ������ �� ����� ��� ������� ��������������� ��� ������������� ��� ���������� ��
���� �������� ���� ���� ��� �� ������ �� ���� �������� ������ ��� ��� ���� ������� ����
����� �� ������� ���� �� ������������ ������ ����� �� ������� ���� �������� ����� �����
��� ���� �� ��������� ���� �������� ��� ����������� �� ���� ����������� ��� ����� �� ���
��������� ������� ��������������� ������ ������ � �������� ���������� ����� ��������� ������
��� �� �� �� �� ����� �� ������ ���� ���� ������ ��� �������� �� ���� �������� �����
240 l Euro Fire®ghter
Cribbing ®res. The best way to begin the ®re is by use of cribbing ± small pieces
or strips of 2±3 inch long particleboard and wood, which are placed in a metal burn
container or drum, to form a ®re that will develop and burn consistently to heat up
the boards. Where a central ®re is used in a fully loaded (three wall) end of the burn
chamber, more fuel is needed in the base ®re, than if placed in a corner. The wood
strips can be surrounded by a small amount of kindling of a type such as smaller
pieces of wood, paper, dry straw etc., to allow the ®re to grow. The cribbing ®res
should also be backed by pieces of board tightly butted together if corner based. An
ignition source acceptable to local or national guidelines, such as a ¯are, can be used
to ignite the kindling and base ®re.
Two instructors wearing full PPE/SCBA should accompany each other at all times
when lighting this base ®re. Under no circumstances should it be necessary, or
acceptable, to use ¯ammable liquids to assist the initial ignition of the base ®re,
although the author acknowledges that in some countries this is an accepted practice.
Demonstrator FDS Six boards (three end walls and three in the ceiling);
or four boards (two end walls and two in the ceiling).
Attack FDS Six Boards (three end walls and three in the ceiling);
or nine or twelve boards for more advanced training ±
to be risk assessed according to ventilation
pro®les9.
Window FDS Twelve to fourteen wood pallets; or eighteen boards;
or a mix of both, and additional off-cuts as available.
Interior Backdraft FDS Twelve to fourteen wood pallets.
Fig. 9.12 ± These guidelines for loading FDS units with 12 mm ( 12 inch) particleboard are
only offered in very broad terms, but are based on normal practice in most areas.
Fig. 9.13 ± The Fire Service College (UK) uses OSB as a fuel, and loads its FDS units as
shown (2007).
1
Demonstrator OSB 2 inch 7 ft 4 ft ± six boards
1
Attack container OSB 2 inch 7 ft 4 ft ± twelve boards
1
Window container OSB 2 inch 7 ft 4 ft ± eighteen boards
1
Multi compartment per ®re OSB 2 inch 7 ft 4 ft ± three boards
Fig. 9.14 ± Devon Fire Service (UK) also uses OSB as a fuel source and loads its FDS
units as shown (2007)10.
9. Depending on fuel type and size, the use of twelve boards (or more) in an Attack FDS may need careful
risk assessment in line with ventilation pro®les, to ensure safe conditions are maintained.
10. Chubb, J. and Reilly, E., (2007), Dublin Fire Brigade report into UK CFBT
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 241
When loading FDS units be sure to follow local manual handling guidance and ensure
that protective respirators and PPE are worn at all times by personnel entering
the simulators, even where the structure is cold. There will always be hazardous
particles ¯oating inside and around these units and full protection must be used.
Fig. 9.15 ± Instructor:student ratios will vary. The above are guides as to what may be
considered as safe minimums.
11. Graveling, R.A., Stewart, A., Cowie, H.A., Tesh, K.M., and George, J.P.K. (2001), Physiological and
Environmental Aspects of Fire®ghter Training, ODPM UK
12. Chubb, J. and Reilly, E., (2007), Dublin Fire Brigade report into UK CFBT
������� ������
���� ����� ��������� ���������� � ���
1000
572oF
X Emergency
Air Temperature (oC)
100
140oF
Ordinary
68oF
Routine
10
0.01 0.10 0.50 1.00 10.00
Thermal Radiation (cal/cm2 sec)
���� ���� � ��� ����� �� ������� ���������� ����� �� ���������� �� ������ ���� ������������
�������� ��������� ��� ��������� ����������� �� ����� �� ��� �������� ��� ����� ������� ���
����������� ������� ������ ���� ����������� ��� �������� ������ �� ������� �� ������ ���
��� �� ���� ��� �� ��� � �� ��� ������ ��� ��� �� ���� ��� �� ��� � �� ��� ������ � ������
��� �� � ��������� ����������� ��� � ����� � ����� ������ ������ ���� ���� ���� ��� ������
���� � �� ����� � ����� ���������� ��� ��������� ��������� �� ���������� �����������
���� ���� � ��� ����� �� ������� ���������� ����� �� ���������� �� ������ ���� ������������
�������� ��������� ��� ��������� ����������� �� ����� �� ��� �������� ��� ����� ������� ���
����������� ������� ������ ���� ����������� ��� �������� ������ �� ������� �� ������ ���
��� �� ���� ��� �� ��� � �� ��� ������ ��� ��� �� ���� ��� �� ��� � �� ��� ������ � ������
��� �� � ��������� ����������� ��� � ����� � ����� ������ ������ ���� ���� ���� ��� ������
���� � �� ����� � ����� ���������� ��� ��������� ��������� �� ���������� �����������
244 l Euro Fire®ghter
1 Introduce yourself.
3 If the ®re alarm should sound you will leave the building and gather in
the car park opposite for role call.
5 Remember to maintain your ¯uid, salt and sugar levels at all times,
both before and after working in CFBT units.
8 Do not enter any units unless you are wearing respiratory protection.
11 Full PPE is to be worn at all times when inside the `training' zone
(also think decontamination).
19 Ensure that ¯uids are taken at start of the course and regularly
throughout the day.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 245
22 Jewellery is to be removed.
23 Ensure all PPE is in good condition and that gloves and ¯ash hoods
are dry.
27 Rig SCBA in `safe air', ECO or buddy to check teams are correctly
dressed.
28 Fires are `REAL' ± Crews must listen to instructors and `STAY LOW'.
29 Anyone ®nishing the exercise early must report to ECO and remain at
the entry control point until completion of the exercise.
31 On completion of the training you may close down your SCBA set
under the supervision of ECO ± in safe air! COLLECT YOUR BA
TALLY FIRST!
36 When drinking, ensure that hands and face are washed ®rst.
37 Reinforce hydration.
246 l Euro Fire®ghter
13. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 247
not specify that the hose-line has to ¯ow 360 liters/min, simply that it must be capable
of doing so. Use of a variable ¯ow nozzle (with a maximum ¯ow rate of at least
360 liters/min) meets this requirement. The volume of water required far exceeds that
necessary for the typical CFBT session. Use of a continuous water supply such as a
hydrant exceeds this requirement. If tank water must be used, there is no reasonable
work around, but this requirement is easily addressed using a portable water tank
and/or water tender. Attack and back-up lines must be supplied from separate sources.
The standard does provide that a single source can be used, provided that it has
suf®cient ¯ow and backup power and/or pumps to ensure an uninterrupted supply in
the event of a power failure or malfunction.
NFPA 1403 requires assignment of an instructor in charge (incident commander),
safety of®cer, and suf®cient instructional personnel to maintain a student:instructor
ratio of 5:1. This also requires close reading of the standard and consideration of
intent. The standard is equally applicable to single compartment cells (where a limited
number of participants can enter and work inside) and complex acquired structures.
The typical staf®ng for a CFBT session of three instructors can meet the require-
ments of this standard if instructors have clearly de®ned roles, effective operating
positions, and the number of participants inside the cell is not excessive. An additional
consideration is provision of a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) outside the cell (not
speci®cally mentioned in the standard, providing a team of at least two ®re®ghters
outside the hazard area ready to respond to emergencies is required in the United
States by Federal and state respiratory protection regulations).
The provisions of NFPA 1403 are intended to provide a safe training environment
when working with live ®re. They are by no means the only way to do so (as evidenced
by safe and effective training conducted throughout the world using other systems of
work). However, where applicable, this standard can be simply and effectively applied
to CFBT with good result. Hopefully subsequent revisions of this standard will
address some of the differences in purpose built live ®re training props and structures
used in CFBT.
within one's protective clothing is also signi®cant. These injuries are generally
referred to as scald or steam burns. Moisture may also help to store heat energy in
protective clothing14.
Thermal Protective Performance testing measures the amount of heat transfer
through a ®re®ghter's clothing composite (the combination of all layers) when
exposed to a combination of convective heat and thermal radiation. The NFPA
standard TPP test method measures heat ¯ow through the garment while exposed
to an 84 kW/ sq m (2 cal/sq cm/s) thermal environment (see Fig. 9.16). This level
of ¯ux is chosen in order to replicate a ¯ash ®re or mid-range post-¯ashover
exposure (a `®reball'). A minimum TPP rating of 35 is required according to the
NFPA standard. At this level of protection a ®re®ghter would have approximately
17.5 seconds (theoretically) to escape from a ¯ashover exposure before sustaining
second degree burns. It is important to recognize that TPP measurements do not
imply a certain protection time, because the testing only simulates one condition
amongst an unlimited set of clothing exposure conditions. Research by Krasny15
suggests that ®re®ghters wearing TPP 35 garments are likely to receive serious
burn injuries in less than 10 seconds when exposed to a ¯ashover ®re environment.
Other data indicate that a ®re®ghter can survive ¯ashover conditions of 816 ëC
(1,500 ëF) for up to 15 seconds depending on the conditions16.
A Conductive and Compressive Heat Resistance (CCHR) test is used for
evaluating the garment shoulder and knee areas of structural and proximity ®re-
®ghting protective garments. In general, testing of existing and potential reinforce-
ments with this method has shown that thicker materials provide higher CCHR
ratings; however, several other observations have been made17:
I The requirement in the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971 has been raised to 25. At
this level, all coat shoulder areas must be reinforced with at least one layer,
and trouser knees must have several layers of additional reinforcement.
I Heavy dense reinforcement materials such as coated fabrics generally offer
lower CCHR ratings compared to standard textile materials. Leather also
provides relatively low CCHR ratings when compared to composite
reinforcements of similar weight and thickness.
Total Heat Loss (THL) is used to measure how well garments allow body heat to
escape. The test assesses the loss of heat, both by the evaporation of sweat and the
conduction of heat through the garment layers. As clothing is made more insulative
to high heat exposures, there is a trade-off with how well the heat build-up in the
®re®ghter's body (that can lead to heat stress) is alleviated. Garments that include
non-breathable moisture barriers or very heavy thermal barriers prevent or limit the
transmission of sweat
moisture, which carries much of the heat away from the body. If this heat is kept
inside the ensemble, the ®re®ghter's core temperature can rise to dangerous levels if
14. NISTIR 6299, A Heat Transfer Model for Fire®ghter's Protective Clothing
15. Krasny, J.F., Rockett, J.A. and Huang, D. (1988), ``Protecting Fire Fighters Exposed in Foom Fires:
Comparison of Results of Bench Scale Test for Thermal Protection and Conditions During Room
Flashover, Fire Technology, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA
16. Kerber, S. and Walton, W., (2006), NIST Report NISTIR 7342, Building and Fire Research
Laboratory
17. Total Fire Group 2007 Reference Guide
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 249
other efforts are not undertaken (i.e. limiting time on-scene, rotating ®re®ghters,
providing rehabilitation at the scene).
Thus a total heat loss test has been included in several NFPA standards to
provide a balance between thermal insulation for protection and evaporative cooling
insulation for stress reduction.
The Total Heat Loss (THL) requirement in NFPA 1971 provides a tool for
examining the trade-off between thermal insulation (from heat) and the stress-
related aspects of clothing materials. In general, as the material composite thickness
increases, higher levels of thermal insulation (measured using TPP testing) are
obtained. At the same time, thicker composites typically create more stress on the
®re®ghter. With the advent of THL testing, organizations can now choose to
optimize the selection of their composites by balancing composite Total Heat Loss
values with thermal protective performance values (while still meeting the minimum
performance for both areas of performance).
In late 1998, the International Association of Fire®ghters sponsored the study
entitled, Field Evaluation of Protective Clothing Effects on Fire®ghter Physiology: Predictive
Capability of the Total Heat Loss Test. This study demonstrated that the THL was the
test that best predicted changes in ®re®ghter core and skin temperatures as related
to work stress. The study is signi®cant because it was the ®rst ®re®ghter ®eld test
with real time monitoring and simulated ®re-ground activity. It also provided a basis
for reducing stress in ®re®ghter protective clothing by specifying a minimum THL
value for the garment composite. While NFPA originally adopted a lower require-
ment of 130 W/sq m in the 2000 edition of NFPA 1971, the IAFF recommended
value of 205 W/sq m was ®nally adopted for the new 2007 edition of NFPA Standard
1971.
The European Committee on Standardization, or CEN establishes standards
in Europe. Membership in CEN is made up of the individual countries in Europe,
although voting is based on the size of the country's population. CEN has pre-
pared standards on the major elements of the ®re®ghting protective ensemble,
including:
1. Protective clothing for ®re®ghters (EN 469)
2. Helmets for ®re®ghters (EN 443)
3. Gloves for ®re®ghters (EN 659)
4. Footwear for ®re®ghters (EN 345, Part 2)
5. Hoods for ®re®ghters (EN 13911)
Unlike NFPA, the various CEN standards have been developed by different
committees or work groups. Consequently, the types of requirements and levels of
protection are not consistent between ensemble elements. While many of the same
kinds of tests are performed on each ensemble element, there are substantial
differences in the way that these tests are conducted that make it nearly impossible
to compare results from NFPA tests to those from CEN tests.
Garment requirements in EN 469 ± For protective garments for structural
®re®ghting, there are signi®cant differences between EN 469:2006 and NFPA 1971,
2007 Edition:
I No moisture barrier is required, but optional tests are provided.
I There are no requirements for trim other than that it not interfere with the
function of the clothing.
250 l Euro Fire®ghter
I Substantially lower levels of thermal insulation are required (two levels are
provided). Testing is performed in two ways for ¯ame transfer and radiant
heat transfer. Performance is based on temperature rise with no relationship
to predicted burn injury.
I Flame resistance testing is performed on the composite with examination of
after-¯ame and after-glow, but no char length measurement is made.
I Heat resistance testing is performed in an oven at 355 ëF (180 ëC) instead of
500 ëF (260 ëC) as required in NFPA 1971. This permits the use of materials
that melt, such as nylon.
I The thermal shrinkage requirement is more severe for EN 469 (<5%) than
for NFPA (<10%), though testing is performed at a lower temperature.
I Cleaning shrinkage is limited to 3% by EN 469 while NFPA 1971 allows 5%.
I A liquid runoff test is used for assessing chemical penetration using a different
battery of chemicals.
I Water penetration and breathability tests are provided at two levels.
I No wristlet performance requirements are speci®ed.
I Trim requirements are less extensive.
Helmet requirements in EN 443 ± EN 443 has fewer requirements than NFPA
1971 for helmets. For example, EN 443 compliant helmets are not required to have
chinstraps, neck-guards, face-shields or ear covers. The majority of requirements
parallel NFPA 1971 but use different test methods:
I Impact and penetration testing are conducted with a different mass and after
different types of preconditioning.
I A different electrical insulation test is used.
I Strap elongation and breaking strength are measured in EN 433, while the
entire retention system is evaluated in NFPA 1971.
International standard garment requirements in ISO 11613 ± Due to an
impasse between Europe and North America, ISO 11613 for structural ®re®ghting
contains two parts, or separate sets, of requirements. One part re¯ects requirements
consistent with EN 469 (2006), while the other part is based on the 1991 edition of
NFPA 1971.
Because each part is based on a different existing standard, the test methods used
for similar performance determinations are often very different and make product
comparisons extremely dif®cult. Jurisdictions may choose either one part or the other;
however, requirements are not to be mixed between the two parts. Jurisdictions are
instructed to choose the appropriate set of requirements based on a risk assessment
of their activity.
Since ISO 11613 was based on earlier versions of both EN 469 and NFPA 1971,
clothing that is compliant with this standard may not conform to either the proposed
2006 edition of EN 469 or the 2007 edition of NFPA
1971. Part A (based on the CEN standard) includes no criteria or requirements
for a moisture barrier. Part B contains fewer requirements on the moisture barrier,
no overall shower test, no Total Heat Loss test and no conductive and compressive
heat resistance test (unlike the 2007 edition of NFPA 1971). ISO 11613 is being
extensively revised for expected release in 2008. The new edition will address all
parts of the ensemble. Since there are fewer required components, there are fewer
overall required tests.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 251
Heat stress
The physiological and psychological effects on ®re®ghters taking part in hard work,
whilst wearing full structural PPE and SCBA, are well researched. There have been
several studies that assess to what limits a ®re®ghter may function effectively, whilst
working the interior of a structure ®re or training burn. Elevated internal body core
temperatures can increase mental and cognitive impairments, such as increasing
decision-making time and decreasing memory functions.
Dehydration and thermal strain, along with excessive VO2 Max, increased heart
rates (to 200 bpm) and high blood pressure during ®re®ghting operations, have all
demonstrated through research that ®re®ghters may work to extreme limits inside a
®re-involved structure.
There are three different types of heat-related injuries18:
I Heat cramps
I Heat exhaustion
I Heat stroke
18. Baird, C., (2006), Gresham Fire and Emergency Services, Oregon USA
252 l Euro Fire®ghter
Heat cramps are the least damaging and are characterized by muscular-skeletal
cramping resulting from loss of water and electrolytes while the body is attempting to
cool itself through sweating. Treatment includes rest, along with ¯uid and electro-
lyte replacement. Gentle stretching of the affected muscle group can help relieve the
pain.
Heat exhaustion results from signi®cant ¯uid loss from profuse sweating. Signs
and symptoms include:
I Weakness
I Nausea
I Rapid heart rate
I Hypotension
I Pale, diaphoretic skin
I Poor skin turgor
Skin turgor is an abnormality in the skin's ability to change shape and return to
normal (elasticity). Skin turgor is the skin's degree of resistance to deformation and
is determined by various factors, such as the amount of ¯uids in the body (hydration)
and age.
Treatment for heat exhaustion begins with moving the patient out of the sun and
to a cool area. The patient should be placed supine, with legs elevated, if tolerated.
Loosen their clothing and provide active cooling through increased air movement.
Heat stroke is the most severe form of heat-related illness and marks the point at
which the body is no longer able to cool itself adequately. Typical symptoms of heat
stress include excessive facial skin reddening; heavy perspiration; headaches;
cramps; weakness; dizziness; fainting, and loss of concentration to the point where
the victim is almost in a daze with a staring look of confusion in the eyes.
Proper rehabilitation, hand and forearm cooling, monitoring of ®re®ghters, and
effective use of the three crew rotation system, are all useful methods to combat heat
stress.
In an ODPM report 5/200319 the authors provided useful information based
upon the research of the physical state of CFBT instructors undertaking training
evolutions in FDS units. To gauge whether any performance decrement might have
occurred, the instructors were asked whether they thought they could perform a
rescue at the end of the training exercise. Although all the instructors believed they
would have had no problems performing a rescue after live ®re training exercises
conducted in modi®ed containers, this was not the case for those conducted in the
®re buildings (`Hot Fire' exercises). After three (out of twenty exercises involving
twelve different instructors) of these exercises, the instructor doubted his ability to
perform a rescue, and one instructor was sure he would not be capable. As the key
function of the instructors is to act as safety of®cers during the training exercises,
and hence be responsible for rescuing a collapsed trainee ®re®ghter, these ®ndings
were cause for concern.
In an extension of this study, the authors measured the energy demand of rescuing
a 50 kg dummy wearing SCBA from a ®re building. Even though the dummy was
considerably lighter than the average ®re®ghter, there was no heat exposure and the
instructors were assisted, the simulated rescues required heart rates of 160 bpm and
19. Elgin, C. and Tipton, M., (2003), Department of Sport and Exercise Science, University of
Portsmouth for Of®ce of Deputy Prime Minister (UK)
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 253
an average energy expenditure of 47 kcal. If no heat was dissipated, this would result
in an increase in deep body temperature of 0.6 ëC. Given the highest deep body
temperature at the end of a Hot Fire exercise was 40.6 ëC and heart rates up to
194 bpm were observed, it was concluded that the ability to perform a rescue at the
end of an exercise may be severely compromised. However, it should be emphasized
that these conclusions were based on the very worst-case scenarios of highest body
core temperatures and heart rates.
Conclusions from the study:
I The physiological responses of the instructors observed during the Hot Fire
training exercises were within the range of those reported previously.
I The rescue tasks devised were representative of the worst-case scenario that a
single instructor may face according to the responses to a questionnaire sent
out to all the brigades in the UK.
I These rescue tasks were very demanding and approached the physiological
limits of the majority of current instructors.
I Despite the arduous nature of the rescue tasks, the instructors monitored
were capable of performing a rescue task after acting as a safety of®cer in a
live ®re training exercise.
I Evidence from this study showing a sweat loss of 1.5 liters during the Hot
Fire exercise and rescue task con®rms the importance for all ®re®ghters
involved in Hot Fire training exercises to be fully hydrated at all times.
I It is likely that in less favourable situations (higher deep body temperatures,
greater levels of dehydration, less ®t or experienced instructor, or a casualty
heavier than 85 kg) a rescue may not be possible, or attempts to continue to
do so may result in a heart attack in the rescuer.
I It should also be considered whether it is acceptable to expect less ®t
®re®ghter instructors to undertake such a strenuous task in combination with
heat exposure.
20. Aust, N., Forssman, B. and Redfern, N., (2007), Report 10-5289-R1D3/2007 CFBT Exposure Study,
Heggies PTY Ltd NSW, Australia
254 l Euro Fire®ghter
measured by its urinary metabolite. The CFBT exposure study was initiated by the
Health and Safety Branch of the NSWFB due to concerns about the current control
measures for airborne hazardous substances present in particleboard wood-smoke
and the potential exposure of NSWFB personnel to chemicals in particleboard
wood-smoke during CFBT activities.
The conclusions of the research suggested that:
I It is unlikely that, with the correct use of SCBA, there would be signi®cant
inhalation exposure to any of the chemicals of concern measured in this
study, even though notable concentrations of PAH and formaldehyde were
measured in the personal breathing zones of ®re®ghters participating in
CFBT activities.
I Biomonitoring demonstrated small but statistically insigni®cant increases in
urinary metabolites of PAH, suggesting some uptake may have occurred.
I Testing of structural ®re®ghter's ensemble and duty wear suggests that a
small amount of naphthalene is present on new structural ®re®ghter's
ensemble, and may also penetrate this to reach duty wear. Cross con-
tamination of garments is also a potential source of garment concentrations.
I With the correct use of PPE, the risk of short-term or long-term health
effects from these low concentrations of naphthalene is negligible.
I With the correct use of PPE, the risk of short-term or long-term health effects
(including cancer) from formaldehyde exposure during CFBT activities is
negligible.
I There was negligible exposure to volatile organic compounds, inorganic
compounds, and hydrogen cyanide during CFBT activities.
I There is little to no foreseeable risk of exposure to chemicals of concern for
individuals located in the vicinity of CFBT activities ± but not participating ±
as long as they are not in direct contact with the smoke.
I There may be a small amount of dermal exposure to naphthalene despite the
use of structural ®re®ghter's ensemble, however the concentrations at which
the ®re®ghters may be exposed are likely to be well below the concentration
at which health effects would occur in the majority of the population.
Based on this present study the following recommendations were made to further
limit risk of exposure of NSWFB personnel to hazardous substances present in the
particleboard wood-smoke:
I A review of current NSWFB procedural hygiene requirements i.e. disrobing,
hand washing, eating areas, washing of clothing and location of observers.
I CFBT burn activities limited to one burn per day for trainers.
I Health surveillance and monitoring of NSWFB trainers.
I Instructors take and record core temperature before and after each exercise.
I Instructors should not load containers.
I Sauna provided to assist and maintain acclimatization.
I The use of skin barrier creams are considered optional, but not essential, as
added personal protection.
I Construct a sheet larger than the door opening and ®t a handle to one side ±
this will be used to close off the door to starve the ®re of air, allowing a build-
up of heat and a smoldering ®re before sliding it away to allow a sudden
in-rush of air and a backdraft (may take several attempts!).
A useful video demonstrating the correct use of the doll's house, along with several
ways to ignite the gases, and other small-scale demonstrator FDS units is available
on DVD in the book 3D Fire®ghting21.
Important: As the generation of toxic gases will occur during this demonstration,
it should be controlled by one or two instructors (or students) wearing full PPE and
SCBA with observers far enough away from the smoke that they do not breathe the
products of combustion.
21. Grimwood, P., Hartin, E., McDonough, J. & Raffel, S., (2005), 3D Fire®ghting, Oklahoma State
University
22. http://www.uclan.ac.uk/facs/destech/builtenv/facilities/®relab/equipment/MFbangbox.htm
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 257
Smoke is fuel
I Smoke has trigger points
I Flash point
I Fire point
I Ignition temperature
I Limits of ¯ammability
Limits of ¯ammability
I Fuel lean ®re gases (below the LFL)
I Flammable limits (between the LFL and the UFL)
I Stoichiometric point (Ideal mixture of gas/air)
I Fuel rich ®re gases (above the UFL)
Air-track
I The point to point air-track is from inlet to ®re to outlet;
I The air inlet may also serve as the outlet (may be the same window);
I The inlet and outlet may be the entry door;
I There may be radiant heat from the overhead, between ®re and outlet;
I There may be more than one inlet/outlet;
I As further openings occur, the direction of the air-track may change;
I Any such change may be to the advantage or disadvantage of occupants or
®re®ghters working the interior;
I We can sometimes take actions that will reverse the direction of the air-track
to our advantage;
I We may sometimes take actions that will alter the direction of an existing air-
track to our disadvantage!;
I Air-tracks are greatly in¯uenced by exterior wind and interior building
pressures such as stair-shaft stack effects in tall buildings;
I The potential for an `auto-ignition' of superheated ®re gases within a com-
partment are far greater in locations adjacent to vent inlets/outlets.
prioritize and justify our actions. The only reasons to enter ahead of the hose-line in
this situation are:
I A reasonably suspected life risk may exist;
I A known life risk de®nitely exists;
I It is necessary to locate the ®re.
It is logical to take a quick look to see if the ®re's location is immediately obvious
for we may even be able to close the ®re down, by closing an interior door, which
might slow the spread of ®re. In taking this action we must carefully risk assess our
situation. Such an action should only be undertaken if following these protocols:
I The reconnaissance team should consist of at least three ®re®ghters.
I Two ®re®ghters enter as a team and remain together.
I One ®re®ghter remains at the door to observe conditions and control the
door opening.
I All should have a communication link with each other.
I A portable ®re suppression device should be taken in support (IFEX?).
I If at any stage an `air-track' forms with heavy smoke moving out on the
over-pressure, then the reconnaissance team should return to the outside
immediately and the entry door closed.
I In any `recon' situation into smoke and heat, penetration into the structure
should be no further than ten to twenty paces without a hose-line, depending
on conditions. At this point, if the ®re (or approximate area) has not been
located then the `recon' team should return to the exterior and the door(s)
should be fully closed.
Where there are viable reasons to suspect there may be occupants inside a structure,
then it is again a case of risk assessing the situation. The reasons to `suspect' should
be heavily weighted in the favour of a strong likelihood, rather than a slight possibility,
where ®re conditions are deteriorating. Searching ahead of the primary attack hose-
line being laid is a strategy fraught with danger and this is a tactical approach that
should be carefully assessed in the risk versus gain conundrum.
I A `search' team should consist of at least three ®re®ghters.
I Two ®re®ghters enter as a team and remain together.
I One ®re®ghter remains at the door to observe conditions and control the
door opening.
I All should have a communication link with each other.
I A portable ®re suppression device should be taken in support (IFEX?).
I If at any stage an `air-track' forms with heavy smoke moving out on the
over-pressure, then the search team should return to the outside immediately
and the entry door closed.
I In any interior search situation into smoke and heat, for suspected life risk,
penetration into the structure should be no further than ten to twenty paces
without a hose-line, depending on conditions. At this point, if the ®re (or
approximate area) has not been located then the search team should return
to the exterior and the door(s) should be fully closed.
I In any interior search situation into smoke and heat, for known life risk,
penetration into the structure without a hose-line is also dependent on con-
ditions. However, a much greater exposure to risk is acceptable under such
circumstances.
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 261
In all of the above situations, where entering a structure to locate a ®re or search
for suspected or known occupants, you will see we have implemented some
Risk Control Measures in an effort to stabilize interior conditions and reduce un-
necessary risk to ®re®ghters. The function of the door control ®re®ghter serves two
critical needs:
Stabilization or `mayhem'
In situations where ®re®ghters arrive on-scene and proceed to break out all the
windows in a structure without any purpose, objective or tactical reason, then they
are more likely to create mayhem rather than stabilize interior conditions. It is
certain that a serious working ®re existing in an under-ventilated state (it may have
been developing high heat conditions with a continual process of recycling ®re development
inside the structure, leading to heavy pyrolyzation and a large build-up of very hot smoke
and ®re gases) will unleash large amounts of intense gaseous ¯aming combustion
where opened up in such a way. If there were any occupants remaining inside the
structure it is most likely that they are no longer viable rescues.
serve to maintain a stable working environment and reduce the chances of rapid ®re
progress during entry being made to a ®re involved structure/compartment. This is a
routine that should be practiced over and over, on various types of door, in line with
forcible entry practice.
Think how many times you, or your ®re®ghters, have experienced sudden ®re
development on opening a door, or how many times you have seen this occur in
training videos? Could this procedure have prevented such uncontrolled rapid ®re
growth and served to stabilize the conditions on entry?
������� ������
Total Heat Flux (kW/m2)
20
10
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time from Entry into Fire Compartment (min.)
2.4
30 0.9
Total Heat Flux (kW/m2)
20
10
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Time from Entry into Fire Compartment (min.)
���� ���� � �� ���� ��� ����� ������������� ��� ����������� ������� �������� ��������
�������
���� ��������
� ������
�� ������� ��� �������� ������� ������
����� ������������� ��� ���� ��� ������������
����������� ������ ������
������� �������� ��
��������
��� ��� �����
������� �����������
���� ������ ���
��� ��� ��������
�������� ��������
������� �������
������ ������� ����� �����������
��� ������������ �����������
������ ������ ��
���������� �������
��� ��� ����� ������������
����������� ����� ����
��� �������� ���������
�������� ������������������� ������� ��������������
����� ����������� ��� ������
������ ������
���������� �������
������� � ���� ����
������������ ��������
����� �� ������� �� ��� ����������
�� ������ �������� ��� ���� �����
������� �� ������
��� ��� �����
�������
������ ������ ������� � ���� ���� ���� �� ������� �� ��� �������� ��� ���� ����� �� �����
�������
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 265
gas-phase ®re may continue to burn for quite some time and spread down behind
®re®ghters to trap them inside. We are able to simulate this event during live ®re
training in FDS units.
Air-track
Where ®re intensity is increasing, such a dangerous development of a compartment
®re occurring in this way is most likely being driven by one (or a combination of)
three factors:
I The ®re has found added fuel (probably spread to other items);
I The ®re has found additional air/oxygen;
I Fire gases have reached dangerous limits in both temperature and range of
¯ammability.
Where the ®re has spread to additional fuels, then it is a case of getting water on the
fuel-phase ®re quickly before the heat energy release from the fuel-load reaches a
stage where it overpowers the available ¯ow-rate at the nozzle.
If the ®re is suddenly feeding on an additional source of air-supply, then perhaps a
window serving the ®re compartment has broken through the heat, or maybe a vent
opening has purposely been created. In this instance the smoke layer may lift slightly
as the ®re becomes more intense. The air-track development may affect ®re®ghters
locations in several ways.
I As ¯aming combustion develops through an increase in ventilation, there will
be an air-inlet and a combustion/smoke outlet in the structure.
I If there is only one opening in existence then this will serve both needs.
I Where ¯ames ®ll a window opening then the air-track is entering from
another point.
I If a window is only ¯aming at the top section then the air-track (or part of it)
will be entering in the lower section.
I The most likely air inlet will be via the entry doorway following the path to
the ®re.
I The air inlets and combustion/smoke outlets will most likely change or
increase in number during a serious ®re.
I Sometimes, the location of air inlets and combustion/smoke outlets will
reverse.
I Wind may affect the arrangement between inlets and outlets.
I Sudden wind gusts may have devastating affects on ®re development.
I Momentum and inertia forces may suddenly develop within a structure, due
to the differences in internal pressures, driving the air-track with some great
velocity towards the ®re. This too may have some devastating effects in terms
of sudden ®re development.
I An exterior window venting action, in line with an entry door to the structure
or compartment being closed, may create most favorable conditions at ®re-
®ghter locations as the air inlet/®re outlet will now be transferred away from
the entry route.
I In effect, this may redirect ¯aming combustion in the overhead away from
®re®ghter locations as it heads in a new direction, towards the sole inlet/
outlet opening at the window. This will reduce heat ¯ux being radiated down
to the ¯oor where ®re®ghters are located.
266 l Euro Fire®ghter
23. http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/®re
24. http://www.®re®ghternearmiss.com
CFBT (Fire Behavior) Instructor l 267
list of recommendations, or learning points, from both a ®re behavior and a tactical
perspective.
It is critical that we learn from past experiences of others in the hope that we will
not repeat history, where particular events were/are preventable.
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Indianapolis 1992
Then conditions abruptly changed. I'd never seen anything like this. I've fought a lot
of ®res in different kinds of buildings, in all kinds of weather, with all kinds of
combustibles. I thought I'd seen a lot. I thought I'd seen enough that I could deal with
whatever happened and I could take care of my crew. But, as I said, this thing
abruptly changed. To this day, I'm still amazed that this happened.
In the darkness, I could see little orange ¯ickers around me. The heat was
unbelievable. `Unbelievable'. The heat from this ¯ashover was like a blast furnace,
and that causes you to turn into an instinct-driven animal. I've seen people in videos
jump out of windows several ¯oors up, and I thought, `What the hell were they
thinking? We could save those people.' Now I know. The pain from the heat and the
feeling of being trapped is overpowering. If I was on the ninth ¯oor, I would have
jumped.
Unfortunately, John Lorenzano and Woodie Gelenius died in the ®re. They were
found in separate locations on the third ¯oor. I don't know how John and I got
separated. I was the last one to talk to John; I was the last one to see Woodie. Why did
I get rescued and they died? I don't know. It's a thought that will always be with me.
Captain Mike Spalding on the Indianapolis Athletic Club Fire 1992
269
270 l Euro Fire®ghter
The Edexcel CFBT (BTEC) Syllabus for Fire Behavior recommends that instructors
should understand the principles of combustion and compartment ®re behavior
relating to the following speci®c areas:
Combustion
Triangle of ®re (interaction of heat, fuel and oxygen); propagation (conduction,
convection, radiation); process (pyrolysis); chemistry; types of combustion (complete,
incomplete); products (carbons and unburned pyrolysis products).
1. Hartin, E., Gresham Fire and Rescue Service CFBT Training Program, Oregon USA
Compartment Fire Behavior l 271
10.3 COMBUSTION2
Combustion is an oxidation reaction. Several factors need to be present before
combustion can occur. The ®rst requirements are fuel and oxygen. Fuel can range
from a forest to home furniture, or from crude oil to gasoline. A fuel can present
itself in any physical form i.e. gases, liquids or solids can burn.
What is ®re? Flaming ®res involve the chemical oxidation of a fuel (combustion
or release of energy) with associated ¯ame, heat, and light. The ¯ame itself occurs
within a region of gas where intense exothermic reactions are taking place.
The visible ¯ame has little mass, and it is comprised of luminous gases that
emit energy (photons) as part of the oxidation process. The color of the ¯ame is
dependent upon the energy level of the photons emitted. Lower energy levels pro-
duce colors toward the red end of the light spectrum while higher energy levels
produce colors toward the blue end of the spectrum. The hottest ¯ames are white in
appearance.
The oxygen required usually originates from the surrounding air. The oxygen
concentration in normal air varies around 21%. If the oxygen concentration is
lowered, the combustion will be hindered and eventually stop. As oxygen levels drop
below 14%, ¯aming combustion will become problematic and the ®re will take on a
stage of smolder as ¯aming combustion ceases. During this stage of the ®re the
combustion is termed `incomplete' as the ef®ciency of the burn rate is reduced.
This will increase the amount of smoke, ®re gases and other ¯ammable combustion
products that will ®ll the space. In fact, although enclosed ®res may develop in a
plentiful supply of oxygen, most ®res will become ventilation controlled and
rarely burn with anything greater than 50% ef®ciency. Where an additional supply
of oxygen is provided, possibly through a window breaking or a door opening
(admitting air/oxygen into the ®re compartment), the ®re will increase in intensity
and ¯aming combustion will return. There may even be a sudden transition to
¯ashover or possibly a backdraft.
Another source of oxygen is the one contained in the molecule. In organic or
inorganic peroxides, the oxygen present in the molecule can sustain the combustion.
This effect is used in gunpowder or in ®reworks.
In scienti®c terms one can describe a ®re as being an exothermic reaction
between fuel and oxygen. This means that the reaction produces energy, i.e. heat.
Next to heat a ®re generally produces light, combustion gases and soot. An endo-
thermic reaction is one where energy (heat) is absorbed.
Fires may occur in the fuel-phase (at the surface of fuels) or in the gaseous-
phase (¯aming combustion). Flaming combustion may detach from the fuel surface
to burn independently in ®re gases mixed with air/oxygen.
2. Desmet, K. and Grimwood, P., (2003), 3D Tactical Fire®ghting, Crisis and Emergency Management
Centre CEMAC (Belgium), available at http://www.®retactics.com
272 l Euro Fire®ghter
Flames may exist in a diffused state where fuel and air mix in the region where
combustion is taking place or in a premixed state where the fuel and air have
already mixed into a ¯ammable state before the combustion takes place. Any
combustion that takes place in a premixed region is usually very intense and
sometimes explosive.
In combustion, a diffusion ¯ame is a ¯ame in which the oxidizer combines with
the fuel by diffusion. As a result, the ¯ame speed is limited by the rate of diffusion.
Diffusion ¯ames tend to burn slower and to produce more soot than premixed
¯ames because there may not be suf®cient oxidizer for the reaction to go to
completion, although there are some exceptions to the rule. The soot typically
produced in a diffusion ¯ame becomes incandescent from the heat of the ¯ame and
lends the ¯ame its readily identi®able orange-yellow color. The orange ¯ame is
indicative of a diffusion ¯ame that is short in supply of oxygen. Diffusion ¯ames
tend to have a less-localized ¯ame front than premixed ¯ames.
A premixed ¯ame is a ¯ame in which the oxidizer has been mixed with the fuel
before it reaches the ¯ame front. This creates a thin ¯ame-front, as all of the
reactants are readily available. If the mixture is rich, a diffusion ¯ame will generally
be found further downstream.
If the ¯ow of the fuel±oxidizer mixture is laminar, the ¯ame speed of premixed
¯ames is dominated by the chemistry. If the ¯ow-rate is below the ¯ame speed, the
¯ame will move upstream until the fuel is consumed or until it encounters a ¯ame
holder. If the ¯ow-rate is equal to the ¯ame speed, we would expect a stationary ¯at
¯ame front normal to the ¯ow direction. If the ¯ow-rate is above the ¯ame speed,
the ¯ame front will become conical such that the component of the velocity vector
normal to the ¯ame front is equal to the ¯ame speed. As a result, the ¯ame-front of
most premixed ¯ames in daily life is roughly conical.
Flame types3
I Laminar, premixed
I Laminar, diffusion
I Turbulent, premixed
I Turbulent, diffusion
An example of a laminar premixed ¯ame is a Bunsen burner ¯ame. Laminar
means that the ¯ow streamlines are smooth and do not bounce around signi®cantly.
Two photos taken a few seconds apart will show nearly identical images. Premixed
means that the fuel and the oxidizer are mixed before the combustion zone occurs.
A laminar diffusion ¯ame is a candle. The fuel comes from the wax vapor,
while the oxidizer is air; they do not mix before being introduced (by diffusion) into
the ¯ame zone. A peak temperature of around 1,400 ëC is found in a candle ¯ame.
Most turbulent premixed ¯ames are from engineered combustion systems:
boilers, furnaces, etc. In such systems, the air and the fuel are premixed in some
burner device. Since the ¯ames are turbulent, two sequential photos would show a
greatly different ¯ame shape and location.
Most unwanted ®res fall into the category of turbulent diffusion ¯ames. Since
no burner or other mechanical device exists for mixing fuel and air, the ¯ames are
diffusion type.
3. http://www.doctor®re.com
Compartment Fire Behavior l 273
The temperature of ¯ames with carbon particles emitting light can be assessed by
their color4:
Red
I Just visible: 977 ëF (525 ëC)
I Dull: 1,290 ëF (700 ëC)
I Cherry, dull: 1,470 ëF (800 ëC)
I Cherry, full: 1,650 ëF (900 ëC)
I Cherry, clear: 1,830 ëF (1,000 ëC)
Orange
I Deep: 2,010 ëF (1,100 ëC)
I Clear: 2,190 ëF (1,200 ëC)
White
I Whitish: 2,370 ëF (1,300 ëC)
I Bright: 2,550 ëF (1,400 ëC)
I Dazzling: 2,730 ëF (1,500 ëC)
Thermal energy ± Internal kinetic energy.
There is fairly broad agreement in the ®re science community that ¯ashover is
reached when the average upper gas temperature in the ®re compartment (2.3 m
ceiling) exceeds about 600 ëC. Prior to that point, no generalizations should be
made: there will be zones of 900 ëC ¯ame temperatures, but wide spatial variations
will be seen. Of interest, however, is the peak ®re temperature normally associated
with room ®res. The peak value is governed by ventilation and fuel supply charac-
teristics and so such values will form a wide frequency distribution. Of interest is
the maximum value that is fairly regularly found. This value turns out to be around
1,200 ëC, although a typical post-¯ashover room ®re will more commonly be
900±1,000 ëC5.
In a ®re, the initial energy sources that cause the ®re can be multiple e.g. a spark, an
open ¯ame, electricity, sunlight. The type and format of the fuel will dictate the
amount of energy in the ignition source needed to initiate the combustion process.
Once the reaction is started, however, it generates more than enough energy to be
self-sustaining and a chain reaction occurs. The energy given off in excess can be
seen as light and heat generated by the ®re.
The energy liberated in the combustion process causes pyrolysis and the
evaporation of the fuel. In the pyrolysis process the chemical composition of the fuel
is broken down into small molecules. These molecules evaporate and react with the
oxygen in the air. This process is complex and involves sublimation, melting,
evaporation and decomposition with changes in state from solid fuel to liquid to
vapor. Take note of a wood panel board as radiated heat causes it to emit liquid, fuel
vapor and white smoke combustion products as it begins to pyrolyze.
Stoichiometric or complete combustion means that just enough oxygen
molecules are present, to oxidize the fuel molecules. When hydrocarbons undergo
complete combustion only water and carbon dioxide would be formed. Such
conditions are, however, rare, therefore we need to note that other combustion
products will also be formed. In the case of hydrocarbons the formation of carbon
monoxide, pyrolyzates (gaseous volatiles) and soot increases with the oxygen
de®ciency. If other types of fuel are burned additional toxic products are formed
based on their molecular composition e.g. hydrogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide,
hydrogen bromide, sulfur dioxide, isocyanates.
Combining the factors that we already mentioned above one can create the ®re
triangle, which symbolizes all the factors needed for combustion. However next to
fuel, oxygen, and energy one should also note the mixing ratio between oxygen
and fuel. A log of wood will not sustain a ®re if it is ignited with a match; an amount
of wood shavings, however, will. There is a better mixture between the fuel and the
air, which supports the combustion. A much larger surface of the fuel is in contact
with the air, thus a greater reaction surface is offered.
5. http://www.doctor®re.com
Compartment Fire Behavior l 275
A further factor in the combustion process should be added, which is called the
inhibitor. In a combustion process a chemical chain reaction occurs, radicals of
fuel react with radicals of oxygen heat and combustion products are formed. If one
adds a chemical molecule (inhibitor) which reacts with those radicals without
sustaining the combustion process, one can stop the ®re. This principle is used in
dry chemical extinguishers, which contain, for example, potassium or sodium
bicarbonate, or in the now banned Halon gas extinguishers. A catalyst has the
opposite effect to an inhibitor. A catalyst is a substance which promotes the reaction
(without being altered or used in the reaction), e.g. adding metal shavings to oil rags
aids their combustion.
The ignition temperature of a substance (solid, liquid or gaseous) is the
minimum temperature to which the substance exposed to air must be heated in
order to cause combustion. The lowest temperature of a liquid at which it gives off
suf®cient vapor to cause a ¯ammable mixture with the air near the surface of the
liquid or within the vessel used, that can be ignited by a spark or energy source, is
called the ¯ashpoint. Some solids such as camphor and naphthalene already
change from solid to vapor at room temperature. Their ¯ashpoint can be reached
while they are still in solid state. The lowest temperature at which a substance
continues to burn is usually a few degrees above its ¯ashpoint and is called ®re
point. A speci®c ignition temperature for solids is dif®cult to determine because this
depends upon multiple aspects, such as humidity (wet wood versus dry wood),
composition (treated or non-treated wood), and physical form (dust or shavings or a
log of wood).
The auto-ignition temperature is the lowest temperature at which point a
solid, liquid or gas will self-ignite without an ignition source. Such conditions can
occur due to external heating ± a frying pan that overheats causing the oil to `auto-
ignite'. They can also occur due to chemical or biological processes ± a silo ®re may
result because of the biological processes in humid organic material. The auto-
ignition temperature of a substance exceeds its ¯ashpoint.
When considering vapor or gas explosions, or ®res, it is important to look at their
vapor or gas density relative to air. In this way air has a coef®cient of one. A
substance having a relative vapor of 1.5 will be one and a half times as heavy as air,
while a substance with a relative vapor density of 0.5 is half as heavy as air. Gases or
vapors that are heavier than air stay low to the ground or enter lower-lying areas
such as sewers or cellars.
Next to vapor pressure when handling liquids, their volatility is also important.
Volatility refers to how readily a liquid will evaporate. The volatility of a product is
closely linked to its boiling point. The higher the boiling point of a liquid the
harder it will be for the liquid to evaporate. An amount of highly volatile ¯uid spilled
will be of greater concern than the same amount of low volatile liquid, because of its
ease to ®nd an ignition source or because of the toxicity of the vapors. A more
scienti®c term for volatility is the saturated vapor pressure of a liquid at a certain
temperature; this is the pressure exerted by the vapor at that temperature. The
larger the vapor pressure of a liquid, the more vapor is produced. The vapor pressure
has an impact on the extent and area of the gas/air release. The vapor pressure of a
liquid rises with the rise in temperature. The boiling point of a liquid is de®ned as
the temperature at which the vapor pressure reaches 1 atmosphere. The lower the
boiling point, the greater the vapor pressure at normal ambient temperatures and
consequently the greater the ®re risk.
276 l Euro Fire®ghter
������� ������
A rise in ambient temperature causes the explosive range to broaden, enlarging the
concentration range where an explosion can occur. As well as a rise in temperature, an
increase in oxygen concentration can also widen the explosive range of a substance.
The ferocity of an explosion depends on the speed of the ¯ame front. If the ¯ame-
spread remains lower than 340 m/s the explosion is called a de¯agration. If this
speed exceeds 340 m/s ± and they can reach up to 1,800 to 2,000 m/s ± one calls it a
detonation. In layman's terms the differences are de®ned in being faster or slower
than the speed of sound, respectively supersonic and subsonic. After the ignition,
the ¯ame front passes upstream through the ¯ammable mixture, propagated by the
volume expansion of the exothermic combustion reaction. This volume expansion
causes a pressure surge, which compresses the ¯ammable mixture ahead of the
¯ame-front.
Flammable dust from metals such as aluminum, or that of organic compounds
such as sugar, milk powder, grain, plastics, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, wood-dust
etc. can explode. A dust explosion is an explosive combustion of a mixture of ¯am-
mable dust and air. In other words it is a combustion reaction in a mixture of ®nely
mixed dust and air, which starts due to a local heat rise and propagates itself through
the complete mixture. A dust explosion is generally considered as a de¯agration.
The dust explosion range is more abstract than that of gas explosion because it is
dif®cult to determine in real life. Next to the concentration of dust in air the
explosion range depends on:
I Particle size
The ®ner and more irregular the form, the more explosive the dust (greater
reaction surface). In reality a dust cloud is built of a mixture of different
particle sizes.
I Moisture content
The larger the moisture content, the more dif®cult the explosion becomes.
The ®ner and drier a dust cloud is, the more explosive the dust may become.
I Hybrid mixtures
The presence of ¯ammable volatiles in the dust, as in polystyrene granules,
extracted soya beans, other seed waste, or even wood-dust containing paint
or varnish, can promote an explosion. In this case the ignition energy
required is less.
I Dwell time
The time the dust remains in the air, and is thus explosive, depends on it
density.
I Oxygen concentration
The higher the oxygen concentration, the easier the combustion reaction.
I Turbulence
This is a factor which can speed up the ¯ame front but can also hinder the
explosion.
I Temperature
The higher the ambient temperature, the easier the ignition.
I Inert particles
The presence of inert particles as water vapor or inert dust slows the reaction.
Compartment Fire Behavior l 279
A dust explosion can cause secondary explosions; the fact that a primary limited
dust explosion can cause further explosions makes dust explosions very deceptive. A
small explosion in a room can cause dust ± which had settled on surfaces ± to swirl,
allowing it to be ignited by the primary explosion. In this fashion a chain reaction
can occur which can continue throughout an entire installation/compartment if
suf®cient dust is present.
The ignition of a dust-air mixture requires much higher ignition energy than a
gas-air mixture (around 10 millijoules, hybrid mixtures require less). The above
factors all in¯uence the sensibility to ignition of the dust-air mixture.
The ignition temperature of common dust mixtures lies around 330±400 ëC. This
can easily be achieved by industrial hot surfaces. A layer of dust lying on a hot surface
can start smoldering because the upper layers insulate the lower ones, causing the
temperature to rise. The thicker the layer of dust, the lower the temperature
required to cause smoldering. A layer of 5 mm of ¯our only requires a temperature
of 250 ëC to begin smoldering in less than 2 hours. Such a temperature is easily
attained by the surface of a glow-bulb. Regular cleaning (up to 1 mm of dust can be
tolerated) of an installation is therefore a must.
Energy release MJ
I For most fuels the heat released per mass of air consumed is a constant
approximately equal to 3,000 kJ/kg. Therefore, the rate of energy release of a
con®ned ®re can be approximated from the air in-¯ow rate.
I Given that HRR per unit of oxygen is relatively constant at 13.1 kJ/g for
common fuels, for every 1 MW of heat release rate, 76 g/s of oxygen is
consumed.
I Effective heat of combustion of wood in the ¯aming phase for a fully
developed compartment ®re is 10.75 MJ/kg.
I Effective heat of combustion of wood volatiles is 16.4 MJ/kg.
I For a mixture of wood and plastics, the effective heat of combustion is in the
order of 16 MJ/kg (16 kJ/g).
I HRR may also be referred to in relation to time as proportional to the rate of energy
release (as in `T-squared' ®res).
It is necessary to understand the burning characteristics of fuels used in training
scenarios. As an example of using the above measurements in a CFBT training
evolution we might consider the following example:
Fig. 10.2 ± Simple laptop software may be used to calculate the above `known burning
characteristics' by entering basic input data. Such software is able to further calculate
burning rate and ®re intensity with variable venting parameters. For access to this software
use the readers' online link code at the front of the book.
Compartment Fire Behavior l 281
Where walls are not able to retain heat the heat is either lost through the wall to the
exterior or bounced back into the hot layer (insulation).
In cold-wall situations where convection is the dominant mechanism of heat
transfer, venting leads to heat loss from the hot layer and a reduction in
compartment temperature.
In hot-wall situations where radiation is the dominant mechanism of heat
transfer, venting generally leads to some heat loss from the hot layer but the
radiation from hot walls may overwhelm these losses as the combustion process
accelerates (thermal runaway).
®res' that are seen to grow proportionally to the square of the time period. In the
1980s, ®re protection scientists and engineers introduced the concepts of `slow',
`medium', and `fast' T-squared ®res to represent a range of expected rates of heat
release for ®re modelling. Basically, a slow T-squared ®re reaches a burning rate of
1,000 Btu/s (1,055 kW) in 600 seconds, while a medium T-squared ®re reaches that
rate in 300 seconds and a fast ®re in 150 seconds.
The concept of the `ultra-fast' T-squared ®re was introduced shortly after the
concepts of the slow, medium, and fast ®res, when it became apparent that the
range of those three design ®res wasn't suf®cient to capture some of the more
important ®re challenges. The ultra-fast T-squared ®re reaches the burning rate of
1,000 Btu/s (1,055 kW) in 75 seconds.
If we take a look at the Power Laws related to ®re growth and development, we
become aware that even average ®res, of medium ®re loads (of®ces and residential
occupancies for example), existing between normal ventilation parameters within the
con®nes of their compartmentation, are expected to double in size every 60 seconds
where there are adequate amounts of air or oxygen. In areas with higher ®re loads or
high velocity winds feeding in, the growth rate may well develop on a faster time/
area gradient (doubling in size every 30 seconds) or even ultra-fast gradient (doubling
every 16 seconds).
Placing these guidelines into a ®re-ground perspective, where the ®re load is
excessive and the supply of air is plentiful, a large non-compartmented area involved
in ®re can double in size every 15 seconds. If this particular area is, for example,
open-plan to 20,000 sq ft (1,860 sq m) and ®lled with `fast burning' upholstered
furniture, we might expect a ®re involving 500 sq ft (47 sq m) to double in size every
15 seconds. Within a minute of committing ®re®ghters inside the building, this
average-sized ®re may have developed rapidly in area and intensity to involve over
2,000 sq ft (nearly 200 sq m) of ¯oor space! This ®re may have developed so fast
that it was already beyond the control and capability of a single 150 gallons/min
(567 liters/min) hose-line within 15 seconds of entry, or even two hose-lines within
30 seconds.
Class B ®res are those that involve ¯ammable liquids such as gasoline, kerosene,
oils, paints, tar and other substances, which do not leave embers or ashes. Class B
®res are best extinguished by providing a barrier between the burning substance and
the oxygen. Most applied are chemical or mechanical foam.
Class C ®res involve gases like natural gas, propane, butane etc. Extinguishing
such a ®re equals shutting of the source of the gas. Putting out the ¯ames without
being able to reach the valve creates a dangerous situation where a spark can cause
an explosion.
Class D ®res involving burning metals are less common. Combustible metals
include sodium, potassium, lithium, titanium, zirconium, magnesium, aluminum
and some alloys. Most of the lightweight metal parts in cars contain such alloys. The
greatest hazard exists when they are present as shavings or when molten. Fighting
such ®res with water can cause a chemical reaction or it can generate explosive
hydrogen gas. Special extinguishing powder based on sodium chloride or other salts
are available. Extinguishment by covering with clean sand is another option.
Class E ®res. There are some thoughts that electric ®res aren't really considered
a true ®re class. Electricity doesn't burn but, for example, a short circuit can cause a
®re of the insulating material around the wires, which can propagate the ®re.
Extinguishing electrical ®res is best done by using carbon dioxide or by using a
powder extinguisher. The use of water is not advised, certainly not as a direct jet on
apparatus remaining live. Water spray or mist might be used but with great
caution. Due to the air between the water droplets, a much larger resistance exists
than when using a direct jet. Where possible, the electrical supply should be isolated
prior to applying water in any form.
The USA classi®cation of ®res is somewhat different:
Class A ± As above
Class B ± Flammable and combustible liquids and gases
Class C ± Electrical ®res
Class D ± As above
all events that are known KILLERS of ®re®ghters! To simplify the understanding
of critical issues, it is essential for ®re®ghters to know:
I What actions might CAUSE an event of RFP.
I What actions might PREVENT an event of RFP.
I What ®re behavior indicators might offer some warning of impending events.
The types of RFP discussed here are all forms of ®re gas ignition (FGI):
I Auto-ignition (is actually a source of ignition);
I Smoke explosion;
I Flash ®re;
I Ghosting ¯ames;
I Backdraft;
I Progressive ¯ashover.
What ®re®ghting actions might lead to an event of RFP?
I Incorrect location of vent opening;
I Mistimed vent opening;
I Inappropriate vent opening;
I Inappropriate entry point/procedure for gaining access to structure;
I Creating vent openings without con®ning the ®re or laying a charged primary
attack hose-line;
I Delay in getting water on the ®re or into the gas layers;
I Inadequate ¯ow-rate at the nozzle.
The actions that can be taken by ®re®ghters to counter or prevent RFP are:
I 3D tactical `door entry' procedure;
I Con®ne the ®re to room of origin (close doors);
I Get suf®cient water on the ®re as quickly as possible;
I Get water into the gas layers as quickly as possible;
I Tactical ventilation (under strict protocols);
I Anti-ventilation.
What typical ®re behavior Indicators may signal an impending event?
I A smoke layer that is moving up and down or is very turbulent;
I A sudden lowering of the smoke layer;
I Detached ¯aming `®ngers' in the smoke existing at the ceiling;
I Detached ghosting ¯ames moving around the compartment;
I `Pulsing' smoke pushing and sucking back and forth at an opening;
I Heavy black staining or crazing (trailer cracking) of windows;
I An increase in heat in the overhead that forces you to crouch low;
I Smoke or ¯ames being sucked back into the building on the under-pressure
(fast moving air-track);
I A darkening of smoke from white to brown to grey to black;
I Smoke issuing from openings, or under roof eaves, with an appearance of
being under great pressure;
I Black ®re (see de®nition above).
The ®rst known reference, or use of the term FLASHOVER, was made in the 10th
edition of the NFPA Handbook for Fire Protection in 1948, where a `¯ashover point'
Compartment Fire Behavior l 287
was used to describe enclosure ®res reaching a stage of development where all the
combustible material in the area will ¯ash into ¯ame.
In 1961 US Fire Investigator John Kennedy wrote about the phenomenon of
¯ashover, noting the ability of ®re to leap across rooms or down corridors at `express
train speed'. The ®rst scienti®c discussion of the phenomenon appeared in UK Fire
Research note 663 (December 1967) where Dr Philip H Thomas referred to the
term as `the theory of a compartment ®re's growth, up to the point where it became
fully developed.' Customarily, this period of growth was said to culminate in ¯ash-
over, although Thomas admitted his original de®nition was somewhat imprecise
and accepted that the term could be used to mean different things in different
contexts.
refer to ®re spread and fuel surfaces. These are, to me, not alternatives but different
types of ¯ashover: the essence is `¯ash' and `over' ± `overhead' and `over surfaces' are
two varieties. ISO 13943 does refer to `transition', but it could be `slow' or `fast'.
However, for ®re®ghting purposes, the NFPA have recognized for over twenty years
(in their annual reports concerning ®re®ghter life losses) that there are several other
forms of related phenomena or terms used, such as smoke explosion, ¯ameover,
backdraft, ¯ash ®re etc., and that many of these phenomena cannot be explained or
directly attributed by on-scene ®re®ghters.
Therefore, the NFPA reporting system has established the term `rapid ®re
progress' to cover all situations where some form of ®re phenomena led to an
extreme event of combustion causing sudden transition from a small ®re to a large
®re, even where ¯aming is not sustained. They further refer to various sudden or
extreme ®re phenomena as falling into one of three categories:
Progressive ¯ashover
The ®re dynamics associated with normally-accepted de®nitions of ¯ashover
preclude such an event from occurring in high-ceiling, large volume structures.
What normally occurs here is an accumulation of ¯ammable combustion products
and ®re gases in the smoke at ceiling level. This smoke may be collecting in a
¯ammable reservoir, and may be visible or hidden in a ceiling attic space.
When this layer of smoke enters the ¯ammable range, either from the lean side or
the rich side, and suf®cient ®re or heat energy reaches the smoke layer, a fast
developing escalation of ¯aming combustion will spread across the ceiling. The heat
¯ux radiating downwards will eventually ignite fuel sources at the lower level. This
ignition of high level ®re gases will most likely occur very quickly, possibly faster
than a ®re®ghter can run, and will be preceded by a layer of thick black smoke
hitting the ¯oor and reducing visibility to zero. The most intense areas of burning
may be at walls as the gases de¯ect downwards with some high velocity and force,
similar to a ¯ame-thrower effect. Some have referred to this form of event as a
`progressive' ¯ashover. It can equally be argued that this is a form of ¯ash ®re,
where the smoke layer is igniting ± a ®re gas ignition.
7. White, B. (Captain), (2000), FDNY Fire Engineering Magazine, Penwell Publications USA
8. http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/
������� ������
����������� ���� �������� � ���
FIRE GAS
FLASHOVER BACKDRAFT
IGNITION
������� ������
A HEAT INDUCED OR A A VENTILATION-INDUCED
VENTILATION INDUCED INGNITION OF FIRE GASES
AN IGNITION OF
DEVELOPMENT OF A FOLLOWING AIR
ACCUMULATED FIRE
COMPARTMENT FIRE TRANSPORT (GRAVITY
GASES AND PYROLYZATES
LEADING TO SUSTAINED CURRENT) INTO THE AREA
EXISTING IN, OR
COMBUSTION AND A FULLY CONTAINING FUEL ‘RICH’
TRANSPORTED INTO,
DEVELOPED FIRE. ALSO GASES AND AN IGNITION
A FLAMMABLE STATE
NOTE ‘PROGRESSIVE SOURCE. ALSO NOTE ‘HIGH
FLASHOVER’ PRESSURE BACKDRAFT’
SMOKE
FLASH-FIRE
EXPLOSION
AUTO-
ROLLOVER
THESE TERMS ARE OFFICIALLY IGNITION
ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE ISO
STANDARDS OR RECOGNIZED
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE GHOSTING
FLAMES
compartment, and how the external ¯aming effect may spread the ®re. They have
further looked at the forced draft effect that is created where:
I There are windows on opposite sides of the ®re compartment; or
I Additional air is being fed to the ®re from another source (other than
windows).
Having been on the wrong end of such a situation on more than one occasion, the
author can attest it's not an experience you need! The forced draft ®re is also a killer
of ®re®ghters, and is most certainly a situation you need to plan, train, and equip
for. This is a warning to ®re®ghters of a ®re-ground hazard that may be well known,
but is little understood and rarely credited with the respect it deserves.
Such ®res are renowned for creating havoc on the ®re ¯oor and, although most
commonly encountered in tall buildings, this hazard may also affect your strategic
approaches at ground level on a day where wind is gusting moderate to heavy.
If you look back at ®re reports, there are countless incidents where wind speed
and direction have played a major part in causing abnormal and `rapid ®re'
development. Such ®res may burn with great intensity and create excessively high
temperatures, forcing ®re®ghters to retreat from their position with great haste.
Many others have not always been so lucky.
As an incident commander, make sure you account for this hazard when you
position and ¯ow the primary attack hose-line. Never underestimate the potential
effects on the rate of heat release where a second opening is created (point to point
air-track), where a window causes unplanned ventilation, or where an exterior wind
(or interior stack effect) might initiate an event of `rapid ®re' development that
overcomes the capability of the hose-line in use. If you care about your ®re®ghters
you need to make them aware of these hazards.
Smoke explosion
There are three basic requirements9 that must be met before a smoke explosion can
occur. They are:
1. A contained smoke layer that consists of enough unburned pyrolyzates
that places the mixture within its limits of ¯ammability. For example, the
¯ammability limits for carbon monoxide are 12.5% and 74%, for methane
the range is between 5% and 15%, (SFPE, 1995, p.3±16).
2. To ignite the ¯ammable mixture, an ignition source is needed. There is a
minimum amount of energy that will ignite the layer.
3. The last requirement is enough oxygen to support combustion.
Further information:
I A smoke explosion can involve both cold smoke and hot smoke.
I A rich-mix of super-heated ®re gases in smoke may auto-ignite.
I All that is needed in this case is the addition of air ± this is not truly re¯ective of a
`smoke explosion' as a premixed state in the gases should normally exist for
a smoke explosion to occur.
I A smoke explosion usually entails structural damage caused by pressure
waves, whereas the lesser event, termed ¯ash ®re, does not.
9. Sutherland, B.J., (1999), Smoke Explosions Research Report 99/15, University of Canterbury,
Christchurch, New Zealand
Compartment Fire Behavior l 291
guide, lighter colored smoke often indicates that there is an accumulation of pyrolysis
products due to increasing compartment temperatures. This is often seen in rooms or
spaces adjacent to the ®re compartment.
In his paper Smoke Explosions Sutherland reports how white/grey smoke was seen to
precede experimental smoke explosions following a period of smoldering. He states
on p.47 how grey smoke turns white during the transition period towards unstable
conditions. `Smoldering is seen externally as the production of thick white smoke' (p.50).
He also describes how grey smoke signalled Stage 2 and white smoke Stage 3 in the
gradual progression to Stage 4 (smoke explosion).
The author has repeatedly warned since 1991 of the explosive dangers posed by
wood or FIB wall and ceiling linings, and it is believed they played a major part in
the accumulation of ¯ammable pyrolysis products in this situation. These linings
will emit dangerous volumes of white smoke when subjected to a slowly developing
®re. Wood products contain large amounts of water vapor and sometimes formalde-
hyde glues that may increase the white smoke effect. Whilst not every white smoke
situation is explosive by nature, any slow build-up of con®ned white/grey smoke
conditions should always be take seriously.
Perhaps one of the most well-known ®res, where the existence of white smoke led
to a major FGI that killed thirty-one people, was the 1987 King's Cross under-
ground railway ®re in the heart of London. The author was a ®re investigator
working for London Fire Brigade at the scene of the ®re and remembers the
repeated statements made by ®re®ghters and other witnesses.
Taken from the of®cial London Fire Brigade report into the ®re:
Wisps of white smoke were seen coming up from underneath the escalator.
They walked up the central escalator past the smoke which was white.
The two members of staff entered the upper machine room which they found full of
white smoke.
There were large amounts of white smoke building up under the escalator in the
machine room.
Smoke was building up in the roof area of the booking hall.
I looked up the escalator and could see a haze of smoke in the air.
At 1937 hours white smoke was seen by a police of®cer coming from the street entrance
to the station.
The ®re had involved a large amount of wood and timber paneling on the wooden
escalator involved. However, subsequent reports were unable to explain why the ®re
had developed so rapidly into the booking hall to kill so many people within a few
short seconds. Did this white smoke ignite in a ®reball?
It is sometimes the case that ®re®ghters enter compartments where a ®re has
smoldered for some time, producing a vast amount of highly ¯ammable smoke that
is contained in the room or space. The smoke may even be cool and appear
unthreatening to ®re®ghters, who proceed to search for the source of the ®re. When
they ®nd it, they reveal the ®re by cutting into the sofa, or lifting the mattress, or
peeling back the layers of polystyrene plastic to get to a ®re underneath. Suddenly ±
BANG! The ignition source has been uncovered and there is a dramatic explosion
Compartment Fire Behavior l 293
as it meets with the accumulation of premixed gas, often at its stoichiometric point.
This type of explosion has lifted ®re®ghters off their feet and thrown them 6 meters
(20 ft) through the air. On occasions it has killed them in the intense developing ®re
that followed. These ®re®ghter losses sometimes come in their multiples. The space
®re in question can come in the form of a relatively harmless understairs cupboard
that appears in an incipient or decay stage, an attic that is smoky but cool, a large
warehouse ¯oor, or a small room ®re where smoke is light but ®re is hidden. Beware
of this situation and fully vent the smoke before uncovering the ®re's source. (Also
beware of an exterior wind that may enter to stir up ®re embers when venting this
smoke from the compartment).
Auto-ignition
The phenomenon of `auto-ignition' is one of the most common forms of `rapid ®re'
phenomena but is rarely mentioned in training texts. When a crew makes entry to a
®re-involved compartment, or structure, where there is an exchange of hot outgoing
smoke with cool incoming air:
1. If the smoke is above its auto-ignition temperature (AIT); and
2. There are suf®cient ®re gases and combustion products to create a
¯ammable mixture; and
3. Air enters the mixture to bring it within its ¯ammable range without cooling
the smoke below the AIT; then . . .
. . . there will be an auto-ignition of the smoke. This may occur at the exterior of the
exit point only; it may occur inside the entry point or window; or it may burn back
into the compartment following an exterior ignition.
Another way an auto-ignition can manifest itself is within a compartment or space
where a roof vent is opened adjacent to super-heated smoke. There may also be
similar auto-ignitions where pockets of hot ®re gases mix with air in balloon-sized
¯ames. These ¯ames may move around in a compartment and are termed `ghosting
¯ames.'
However, to be more accurate, auto-ignition is not necessarily an event in itself
but primarily a source of ignition. The interior auto-ignition will likely manifest as
either a `backdraft' or as `ghosting ¯ames.' The exterior auto-ignition will most
likely exist purely as ¯aming combustion at a window with rich ®re gases feeding
them from within.
Backdraft
The UK's 40,000 ®re®ghters encounter around ®fty backdrafts a year. On other
occasions they experience various events associated with `unknown' forms of `rapid
®re' progress around 600 times a year: once every 187 working structure ®res10. In
the USA there is an event of `rapid ®re progress' every day. The vast majority of
these events are passed off without injury to ®re®ghters. `We opened the door and there
was a ¯ashover,' is a typical statement made every week by ®re®ghters to interested
media reporters. However, many of these events catch ®re®ghters during their
occupation of the structure and multiples of ®re®ghters are seriously burned every
month. Many are also killed by sudden and unexpected ®re development. If you
want to learn how wide a problem this is becoming, go to Google Alerts11, a free
10. National Fire Service Incident Report Forms (FDR1) from 58 UK Fire Brigades
11. http://www.google.com/alerts
294 l Euro Fire®ghter
web-based service, and enter keywords such as ¯ashover, backdraft and smoke
explosion, to receive daily updates on ¯ashover-related reports. Also remember
these are just those events that were reported to the media. The actual number of
such `events' occurring is probably ®ve or ten times greater!
Several conditions are necessary in order for a backdraft to occur within a
compartment. The ®re must have progressed into a ventilation-controlled state with
a high concentration of pyrolysis products and ¯ammable products of combustion.
Oxygen concentration in the compartment is low, generally to the point where
¯aming combustion is incomplete. In addition, there must be suf®cient temperature
to ignite the fuel when mixed with air. The energy release from a backdraft is
extremely rapid and is generally transient, lasting only a short time. However, the
®re often advances to a fully-developed state due to changes in ventilation resulting
from the over-pressure and heat release caused by the backdraft.
Backdraft de®nitions12
Steward 1914:
These smoke explosions frequently occur in burning buildings and are commonly
termed `backdrafts' or `hot air explosions.' Fire in the lower portion of a building will
often ®ll the entire structure with dense smoke, before it is discovered issuing from
crevices around the windows. Upon arrival of the ®remen, openings are made in the
building which admit free air, and the mixture of air and heated gases of combustion
are ignited with a ¯ash on every ¯oor, sometimes with suf®cient force to blow out all
the windows, doors of closed rooms where smoke has penetrated, ceilings under attics etc.
The Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) de®nes backdraft as:
An explosion of greater or lesser degree, caused by the inrush of fresh air from any
source or cause, into a burning building, where combustion has been taking place in a
shortage of air.
The NFPA de®nition is:
A de¯agration resulting from the sudden introduction of air into a con®ned space
containing oxygen-de®cient products of incomplete combustion.
C. Fleischmann and P. Pagni de®ne backdraft as:
If the compartment is closed, the excess pyrolyzates accumulate, ready to burn when a
vent is suddenly opened, for example, as may happen when a window breaks due to
the ®re-induced thermal stress or a ®re®ghter enters the compartment. Upon venting, a
gravity current carries fresh air into the compartment. This air mixes with the excess
pyrolyzates to produce a ¯ammable, premixed gas, which can be ignited in many
ways.
Enclosure ®re dynamics ± Quintiere and Karlsson:
Limited ventilation during an enclosure ®re can lead to the production of large
amounts of unburned gases. When an opening is suddenly introduced, the in¯owing
12. Gorbett, G.E. and Professor Hopkins, R., The Current Knowledge and Training Regarding Backdraft,
Flashover, and Other Rapid Fire Progression Phenomena, available at http://www.kennedy-®re.com
Compartment Fire Behavior l 295
air may mix with these, creating a combustible mixture of gases in some part of the
enclosure. Any ignition sources, such as a glowing ember, can ignite this ¯ammable
mixture, resulting in extremely rapid burning gases out through the opening and
causing a ®reball outside the enclosure. (Quintiere, 1999)
13. Gorbett, G.E. and Professor Hopkins, R., The Current Knowledge and Training Regarding Backdraft,
Flashover, and Other Rapid Fire Progression Phenomena, available at http://www.kennedy-®re.com
14. Gorbett, G.E. and Professor Hopkins, R., The Current Knowledge and Training Regarding Backdraft,
Flashover, and Other Rapid Fire Progression Phenomena, available at http://www.kennedy-®re.com
296 l Euro Fire®ghter
Indicators of a backdraft
The following are indicators that a backdraft may occur:
I The ®re may be pulsating. Windows and doors are closed, but smoke is
seeping out around them under pressure and being drawn back into the
building;
I No visible ¯ames in the room;
I Hot doors and windows;
I Whistling sounds around doors and windows. If the ®re has been burning
for a long time in a concealed space, a lot of unburned gases may have
accumulated;
I Window glass is discolored and may be cracked from heat (Norman, 1991);
I The key indicator that has been witnessed in the past is the in and out
movement of the smoke, which gives the appearance that the `building is
breathing.'
Flameover
Flameover ± A ®re that spreads rapidly over the exposed linty surface of the cotton
bales. In the cotton industry, the common term is ¯ashover and has the same
meaning.16
This term has since been commonly rede®ned (in the USA) from its original
meaning, to describe rapid ¯ame spread across the surface of highly ¯ammable
surfaces, such as wall or ceiling linings painted in varnish or lacquer. This is a
practical de®nition that is based on ®re®ghters' observed experiences of such `rapid
®re' spread and is not a scienti®c de®nition as such.
15. Gorbett, G.E. and Professor Hopkins, R., The Current Knowledge and Training Regarding Backdraft,
Flashover, and Other Rapid Fire Progression Phenomena, available at http://www.kennedy-®re.com
16. NFPA, (1999), NFPA230 Standard for the Fire Protection of Storage
Compartment Fire Behavior l 297
The ®re gas explosion concept is not de®ned in any ISO standard. This concept is,
however, used in many countries and those de®nitions that exist are largely similar.
One possible de®nition is given below:
`When ®re gases leak into an area adjacent to a burning compartment they can
become well mixed with the air in that adjacent compartment. This mixture can ®ll
all or part of the available volume and may be within appropriate ¯ammable limits.
If the mixture is ignited this may cause a large increase in pressure. This is called a ®re
gas explosion.' A ®re gas explosion occurs without changing the status of any opening
in the compartment. In order for backdraft to occur, the ventilation conditions in the
compartment must change during the development of the ®re. Naturally, the boundary
between the two concepts can at times be hazy.'
The Swedish term `brandgasexplosion' (®re gas explosion) and its associated
de®nition do not account for the fact that smoke explosion has existed for many
years in the English language and has been used practically by ®re®ghters in both
the UK and USA and documented by scientists from at least 1975. It is dif®cult to
®nd the exact origin of the term, but is clear to see it is almost 100 years old, and was
originally used to describe an ignition of combustion products under circumstances
similar to backdraft. More recent scienti®c research has de®ned this term more
accurately. The most detailed paper by Sutherland (1999) clearly described the
phenomenon of ®re gases igniting with explosive force. However, this paper also
described other events where smoke (®re gases) may ignite without explosive
force. There are references to earlier work by Croft (1980) and Wiekema (1984),
who inform us that high-pressure waves associated with ignitions of the gases
(in excess of 5 kPa) may be termed `smoke explosions' and other such ignitions with
minor pressure waves should be termed `¯ash ®res'. Then there are also auto-
ignitions of the gases where they meet additional oxygen supplies at exit points
etc. These cannot be termed `explosions' but are more suited to `ignitions' as a
description of the stated event.
The main issue here is that not all ignitions of the gas layers are explosive. The
author spent much time with Dr Martin Thomas, a senior ®re research scientist in
the UK, in de®ning these terms, and he was in agreement that the term `®re gas
ignition' is a more descriptive term when applied to the broader range of events that
includes `ghosting ¯ames', `smoke explosion' and `¯ash ®re', as opposed to ®re gas
`explosion'. He was also of the opinion that `smoke explosion' was the established
scienti®c reference used for several decades in the UK, and that any alteration of
pre-existing English terminology, to `®re gas explosion', served no logical purpose.
Most importantly, it is essential to differentiate the various phenomena here so
that ®re®ghters are able to gain a wider appreciation of slow-rolling ¯ame ignitions
(more controllable) as opposed to the more dangerous and explosive situations
associated with smoke explosion (take ®re gas explosion).
Some authors continue to use pseudoscienti®c terms in their training texts
and this has caused further confusion. The original terminology translated from
Swedish, as it related to the term `¯ashover', has since been reverted back, in order
298 l Euro Fire®ghter
to conform with current European and North American accepted scienti®c and ISO
de®nitions as follows:
I Swedish `lean ¯ashover' is ROLLOVER
I Swedish `rich ¯ashover' is BACKDRAFT
I Swedish `delayed ¯ashover' is SMOKE EXPLOSION
I Swedish `hot rich ¯ashover' is AUTO-IGNITION
I Swedish `®re gas explosion' is SMOKE EXPLOSION
Black ®re
A term that is commonly used by North American ®re®ghters to describe very
dark hot curling `mushroom-shaped' smoke, that is issuing with some great velocity.
This smoke is demonstrating the transition from an under-ventilated ®re, between
`boiling' smoke and ¯aming combustion. It precedes (normally by a few seconds) a
stage where smoke auto-ignites at the point of exit. It may also signal the onset of
a ventilation-induced ¯ashover. The temperature of this smoke is generally close to
500 ëC (932 ëF) or more.
A ®re engineer in Sweden17 familiar with this theory suggested the following as an
explanation:
The ideal gas law states that pV nRT, which, when simpli®ed, means that
pressure volume amount temperature. For a given amount at constant pressure,
this gives us Charles Law V kT. This means that a gas expands by 1/273 for each
degree (Kelvin) temperature rise.
For example, a 40 ëK difference gives a 40/273 (14.6%) difference in volume. So
on a cold day, 1 cubic meter of air contains 15% more oxygen than on a hot day.
The additional cooling effect of the colder air as it enters the structure is negligible
in relation to the higher oxygen content.
Hot layer interface ± Often referred to as the NPP (neutral pressure plane). It is
assumed that the hot smoky upper layer that forms below the ceiling and the lower
cool layer that shrinks as the hot layer descends are joined at a distinct horizontal
interface (computer model). This is obviously a simpli®cation because the
turbulence within a ®re compartment would prevent any true formation of such
an interface. Also, highly turbulent plumes and hot layers, as well as strong vent
¯ows, may cause the destruction of a clear interface. However, a noticeable change
in conditions from the upper layer to the lower has been observed in many
compartment ®res. The hot layer interface plane and neutral plane are not the same.
The interface is the vertical elevation within the compartment, away from the vent
point, at which the discontinuity between the hot and cold layer is located. The
neutral plane (or point) is the vertical location at the vent at which the pressure
difference across the vent is zero. The terms `over-pressure' and `under-pressure'
are also used by ®re®ghters to describe the area above the NPP (over-pressure) and
the area below the NPP (under-pressure).
Premixed ¯ame ± In premixed burning, gaseous fuel and oxidizer (air) are
intimately mixed prior to ignition ± the ¯ame propagation through the mixture is a
de¯agration (e.g. smoke explosion).
Pulsation cycle ± An indication of the presence of unburned fuel vapours within a
compartment with the potential for premixing and a potential explosion. A warning
sign for backdraft as smoke `pulses' intermittently in and out at a ventilation/entry
point.
Pyrolysis ± The second stage of ignition, during which energy causes gas molecules
given off by a heated solid fuel to vibrate and break into pieces. Regardless of
whether a fuel was originally a liquid or solid, the overall burning process will gasify
the fuel. With liquids, the supply of gaseous fuel is a result of evaporation at the
surface from the heat generated by the ¯ames. Solids entail a signi®cantly more
complex process involving chemical decomposition (pyrolysis) of large polymeric
molecules. Certain combustible solids such as sodium, potassium, phosphorus, and
magnesium can even be oxidized directly by oxygen in the air without the need of
pyrolysis.
Rapid ®re progress ± An NFPA de®nition of all types of rapid ®re escalation that
may occur and be linked to the above phenomena and their associates.
Regimes of burning
1. Fuel-controlled,
2. Ventilation-controlled,
3. Stoichiometric.
Step events ± The heat release rate (HRR) is either controlled by the supply of fuel
or the supply of air. Therefore, in principle, four transitions (steps) are possible:
1. Fuel control to new fuel control;
2. Fuel control to air control;
3. Air control to new air control;
4. Air control to fuel control.
In each of these cases the new ®re is sustained.
Compartment Fire Behavior l 301
The event de®ned as `¯ashover' is usually related to Step 2, although it may also
occur through an increase in ventilation (Step 3).
Thermal balance ± The degree of thermal balance existing in a closed room during
a ®re's development is dependent upon fuel supply and air availability as well as
other factors. The hot area over the ®re (often termed the ®re plume or thermal
column) causes the circulation that feeds air to the ®re. However, when the ceiling
and upper parts of the wall linings become super-heated, circulation slows down
until the entire room develops a kind of thermal balance with temperatures
distributed uniformly and horizontally throughout the compartment. In vertical
terms the temperatures continuously increase from bottom to top with the greatest
concentration of heat at the highest level.
Transient events ± These are short, possibly violent, releases of energy from the
®re which are NOT sustained:
1. Adding fuel;
2. Adding air/oxygen (backdraft);
3. Adding heat (smoke explosion).
Under-ventilated ®re ± Unlike the ventilation-controlled ®re an under-ventilated ®re
is not recognized as a burning regime but rather a situation where fuel-rich
conditions have accumulated within a compartment. The situation may not involve
a fully developed ®re and may only be in a state of smoldering. The conditions may
or may not present warning signs related to backdraft.
Ventilation-controlled ®re ± Sometimes referred to as an `under-ventilated
®re,' although this may be incorrect (see `under-ventilated' ®re above). Most fully
developed ®res that occur under con®nement or within a compartment are
ventilation controlled and burn under fuel-rich conditions. In these situations, the
highest temperatures are normally noted at the ventilation openings. The rate of air
supply is insuf®cient to burn all the fuel vapors within the compartment, possibly
leading to much external ¯aming.
Chapter11
High-rise ®re®ghting ±
The basics
11.1 INTRODUCTION
The author was invited to address the Seoul, Korea Conference on high-rise ®re-
®ghting in November 2007. His simple message was this:
When we are faced with a serious ®re at ground level, our ®re®ghters often encounter
great dif®culties and exposure to some element of risk. When they are faced with that
same ®re, thirty stories above ground, the physiological demands are much greater and
the dif®culties and risks are greatly magni®ed. There may be long time delays between
a ®re commander's chosen strategies becoming tactical operations on the ®re ¯oors.
There may be changing circumstances during this delay that require the strategy to be
altered. There will be a great demand for effective staf®ng to accomplish even the
most basic operation and then, where ®re®ghters are working hard, the need to support
them in a sustained attack on the ®re will treble the resources operating on the ®re
¯oors.
To be effective you must have a pre-plan that is based on the experience of those
who have fought these types of ®res and learned many lessons. The pre-plan must be
well understood by everybody and to achieve this requires frequent practice in such
buildings. The communication process at a high-rise ®re will inevitably break
down and the pre-plan must ensure that critical tasks, such as searching stair-shafts,
elevators and roofs, are documented as written assignments into the pre-plan. The
302
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 303
objective is to enable ®re®ghting teams to adapt and function in small teams with pre-
assigned tasks and, on occasions, without ®re command supervision.
Above all, avoid complacency! This is inevitably the ®re®ghter's worst enemy.
Approach every situation (even calls to automatic ®re alarms) with care and pro-
fessionalism and always try to be at least one step ahead of the ®re's next move.
There are four key words there and if additional factors could be added to
summarize the critical areas that let ®re®ghters down in high-rise ®res, they are
surely these:
I Staf®ng
I Pre-plan
I Communication (both human and technology failures)
I Complacency
I Minimum ¯ow-rate
I Exterior wind and building air dynamics
Some interesting statistics from the USA1:
I Each year, an estimated 15,500 high-rise structure ®res cause 60 civilian
deaths, 930 injuries, and $252 million in property loss;
I High-rise ®res are more injurious and cause more damage than all structure
®res;
I Three-quarters of high-rise ®res are in residential structures, but these cause
only 25% of dollar loss;
I The leading cause of all high-rise ®res is cooking (38%), but cause patterns
vary by property type;
I 69% of high-rise structure ®res originate on the fourth ¯oor or below;
I 60% of high-rise structure ®res occur in apartment buildings; 43% originate
in the kitchen.
1. USFA (2002), Topical Fire Research Series Volume 2 Issue 18: High Rise Fires
304 l Euro Fire®ghter
Steve Dudeney, who at the time of the ®re was an ADO (Battalion Chief)
with London Fire Brigade, picks up the story:
Three engines and an aerial ladder were despatched at 2044 hours to a ®re alarm
actuating at Telstar House, Eastbourne Terrace, Paddington, London, W2.
The ®rst two engines and the aerial ladder arrived three minutes after the initial
call. Crews arriving at the building could see no signs of ®re and had no reason to
suspect that this call was any different to the fourteen other automatic ®re alarm
calls that had received a ®re service response to Telstar House in the previous twelve
months.
The primary response incident commander approached the entrance to the
building and was informed by an on-duty security guard that the alarm panel was
indicating a ®re on the seventh ¯oor of the block. Asked if everyone was accounted
for, he could not be sure but suspected that one person, allegedly working on the
¯oor below the ®re, had not been accounted for.
The station of®cer sent his deputy and a crew up to the ®re ¯oor. They exited the
elevator on the ¯oor below the ®re and were met by a janitor who pointed upward
and continued down the stairs. As they approached the entrance to the seventh ¯oor
of®ce, the crew saw smoke and ¯ames behind the door. The sub of®cer radioed the
IC and informed him that there was a working ®re in progress and that the riser
(standpipe) should be charged with water. He requested two SCBA wearers to
connect the 45 mm (134 inch) hose and nozzle and mask up their SCBA. Meanwhile
he and another ®re®ghter entered the ®re ¯oor without SCBA and attempted to
attack the ®re in the ®rst of®ce workstation on the left, using a 19 mm ®xed hose-
reel ®tted inside the building. This had no effect on the ®re that was burning from
¯oor to ceiling and had entered the false ceiling panels overhead. They retreated to
the ®re®ghting lobby and closed the door behind them. At this time the two SCBA
®re®ghters who had connected the 45 mm (134 inch) hose-line to the riser outlet on
the ¯oor below joined them.
It is known that a single unit of®ce workstation will, when fully involved in ®re
(as this was), produce a peak heat release rate (HRR) of around 5 MW or more.
However, the ®re was further involving ceiling tiles and carpeting, which would
increase the HRR to a greater extent.
At this time the third arriving engine pulled onto the block and ®re®ghters
observed some smoke coming from the seventh ¯oor windows at the eastern end on
the south side.
Only a matter of minutes after the ®rst two ®re®ghters had withdrawn, the SCBA
crew entered the ®re compartment and were immediately faced with a severe ®re that
was rapidly consuming the 1,500 sq m (16,000 sq ft) seventh-¯oor open plan of®ce
space. The heat was reported as `unbearable' and they were immediately forced onto
their stomachs where vision was nil and heat was beginning to penetrate their PPE.
They withdrew and requested that the aerial ladder be deployed to ventilate the
®re ¯oor.
At about 2053 hours the ®re blew a window out on the seventh ¯oor and ¯ames
began to run up the face of the building. The ®re service had been in attendance for
no more than six minutes. Several additional alarms were called in during the next
few minutes as the ®re rapidly escalated.
At this point most of the windows on the ®re ¯oor had failed and ¯ames were
licking the eighth ¯oor when a second crew was committed into the ®re ¯oor.
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 305
However, the ®re was now too advanced for the hose-line in use and the limited
¯ow-rate of around 350 liters/min (90 gallons/min) was unable to deal with the ®re's
development.
An additional hand line was got to work by inserting a dividing breeching
(siamese) into the sixth ¯oor riser; this involved a temporary loss of supply to one of
the lines. The ®rst crew was then forced to withdraw due to low-pressure warnings
on their SCBA, leaving a single crew of two on the ®re ¯oor as no crew rotation or
relief system had been set up in time. The second crew was also forced to retreat
without relief being available in time. This retreat was slow as a large amount of
electrical cabling was now hanging from the ceiling and the crew was becoming
entangled in it. They were also feeling the ®rst signs of heat exhaustion.
At this point the ®rst assistant divisional of®cer (battalion chief) arrived on scene
and took over command of the incident from the station of®cer (captain). As ®re
was seen to be extending into the eighth ¯oor, on-scene engines were increased to
ten and additional aerial appliances were requested.
Up on the seventh ¯oor the retreating crew had actuated their PASS alarms
(ADSUs) and two emergency crews (Rapid Intervention Teams) were sent in to
rescue them. One of the ®re®ghters had become disoriented and wandered back
into the ®re where he soon collapsed. His partner quickly located him and was able
to drag him back toward the exit where they were rescued by the RIT teams. It is
worthy of note that at this time the ®re®ghter who went to the aid of his stricken
colleague was also suffering from severe heat exhaustion and had only just quali®ed
out of recruit training school three weeks before.
The ®rst ®re®ghter was admitted to hospital (intensive care) with severe heat
exhaustion and burns, and his partner was also admitted for heat exhaustion.
that the situation was particularly hot and conditions were untenable. I was not
convinced. Street water supplies were adequate but the building itself only had one
100 mm (4 inch) dry rising main ± strange for such a large building.
After about another forty-®ve minutes I persuaded him to let me resume the
internal attack from the ®re-protected stairwell. We established that we could have
four aerials working to prevent lateral ®re spread at the other end of the ¯oor ± from
where we would commence the internal attack from the stairwell ± although the
aerial monitors were also struggling to hit the ®re because of the projection required
(they were too far from the building to be really effective). They could not get closer
because of obstructions. The ®re streams on the ground also had to be withdrawn
because of falling glass.
We re-established a bridgehead on the sixth ¯oor where crews could gather before
being committed. The ®re had started on the seventh ¯oor and had spread to the
tenth ¯oor by this time. The plan was to deploy two hand-lines from the lobby doors
into the ®re, commencing with the tenth ¯oor as this should stop the vertical ®re
spread. Crews were rotated after about ten minutes on a ®re ¯oor, regardless of how
they felt, as conditions were very strenuous. We worked the two hand-lines in
together with a sector commander at the doorway. This was having success and was
stopping further upward spread after about thirty minutes. We re-assessed the
attack and came back down to the eighth ¯oor and commenced the same plan.
We would work from the doorway and then progress into the ®re as the ®re
was controlled. By this time, certainly the seventh, eighth and ninth ¯oor were in
the diminishing phase of burn so one hand-line was suf®cient as we were really
mitigating further damage. This was achieved by committing one crew at a time into
the ®re ¯oor with a hand-line and again rotating crews frequently.
Fire eventually consumed the whole of the seventh to tenth ¯oors. Four aerial
ladder water towers and a high ¯ow ground monitor, used from the roof of an
adjacent building, assisted in controlling the ®re on the lower ¯oors while a valiant
and successful effort by SCBA crews eventually limited the spread of ®re to 10% of
the eleventh ¯oor by 0200 hours the following morning. Over 150 ®re®ghters on
more than thirty-®ve units fought the battle through the night.
I We have looked at and will be placing on the run within three months (early
2008) on all pump ladders (quads) a rapid attack monitor (Akron Mercury)
that can ¯ow 900, 1,400 or 1,900 liters/min (240, 370 and 500 gallons/min)
through 70 mm (234 inch) attack hose. This will give a better application rate
that we can use from the lobby doors with a 50 m (160 ft) throw that should
have suf®cient water to have real effect on an open-plan ¯oor area with high
®re loading. This will mean that crews will not need to advance into the ®re
¯oor initially, providing a much safer option. The initial crew almost had the
®re, but were overwhelmed as our maximum ¯ow from a hand-line is just
475 liters/min ± ideal for most applications but not very large areas.
I Falling glass is a real problem.
I In a large un-compartmented building a single dry rising main standpipe is
not enough.
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 307
I The only way to put out a high-rise ®re is through internal attack!
I Crew rotation is particularly important and, often, ten minutes working time
on the ®re ¯oor is all ®re®ghters can safely manage. This has severe resource
implications on the staf®ng required.
I Medical teams should be available in the bridgehead recovery area to
monitor crews' physiological status and ensure that crews drink water both
before being committed and immediately after being withdrawn.
London's high-rise SOP is currently in revision (2008) and is at a ®nal stage of draft,
but there are also national revisions being made to high-rise procedures following a
series of events in other parts of the UK. Main changes to the London policy will be
two hand-lines to be deployed, one as a back up line, and the attack will be
initiated from two ¯oors below the ®re ¯oor.
������� ������
CONSTRUCTION
Perimeter
Columns
������� ������
Concrete
Columns
17th Floor
3rd Floor
���� ���� � ������� ������� �������� ������� �������� �������� ����� �� ����� ���
����������� �������
���� ���� � ������� ������� �������� ������� �������� �������� ����� �� ����� ���
����������� �������
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 309
elevator at level eighteen they were unable to locate the stairway and were forced to
return to the elevator to make their ®nal approach to the reported ®re ¯oor.
On their arrival at level twenty-one, as they exited the elevator into the ®re ¯oor,
they were confronted with a vast amount of dark smoke that hung at the ceiling,
around 1.5 m from the ¯oor. To the left of them was a door leading to the accom-
modation, from which heavy dark smoke was emitting. Of®cer Milara estimates that
they arrived at the ®re ¯oor by elevator at around 2326 hours.
The ®re®ghters were informed that a building 45 mm hose-line had been
deployed into the ®re-¯oor earlier by security personnel, and opted to locate this line
to attempt an attack on the ®re. Of®cer Milara reports that inside the ®re ¯oor,
visibility was almost zero, with the smoke layer almost down to the ¯oor. They could
not see or locate the ®re, so Milara asked his colleague to stop and listen. Beyond the
sound of breathing from their SCBA they could hear the crackling of ®re to their
right, so they turned and advanced in this direction.
Outside in the street, the ®re had erupted from the windows of the ®re ¯oor and
spread up to involve another two ¯oors above. Calls for further assistance were
immediately despatched.
Fire came heading directly at Milara's crew as the ®re gases above their heads
ignited. He took the nozzle himself and applied a series of nozzle pulsations into the
¯aming gases. This had no effect on the ®re so he resorted to a series of long bursts
of water-fog, trying to reach the entire volume of ¯aming combustion gases that
®lled the overhead. There were desperate attempts to halt the ®re at this point in an
effort to stop ¯aming gases from getting above and behind the ®re®ghters, but the
water was evaporating within 3 ft (1 meter) of leaving the nozzle, and the radiative
heat levels were exhausting. With ®re spreading above them in the false ceiling,
further attempts were made to halt the ®re's progress by changing to straight stream
in an effort to displace the ceiling tiles and get at the ®re, but it was noted that the
pressure from the building's hose-line was very poor and the stream reach
inadequate.
At this point Milara urgently requested some relief for his crew and another team
of ®re®ghters (Station 6) advanced in to take the nozzle from them. At this point
they had been on the ®re ¯oor for around ®fteen minutes and had consumed over
half of their working consumption of available air.
In the stairway outside of the ®re ¯oor Milara explained to the ®re ¯oor
commander that they urgently needed more hose-lines with greater ¯ows and
pressure if they were going to be able to take this ®re. At this point there were
communication problems and requests for assistance from the ®re ¯oor went un-
heard. Of®cer Milara and the ®re ¯oor commander both then entered the ®re ¯oor
with fresh SCBA cylinders in order for him to assess the ®re's growth and to evaluate
the interior crew's safety. The ®re was becoming much hotter and spreading
rapidly. Milara had never seen anything like this and described it as `looking into
hell.' At this point a minor collapse of interior partitions caused some serious
problems.
The ®re®ghters on the nozzle, Milara, and his commander all became separated
by the collapse as heavy smoke increased, causing a dramatic reduction in visibility.
Then Milara could hear a ®re®ghter screaming, `Help I am dying.' He quickly
located this ®re®ghter who had lost his helmet and SCBA mask during the interior
structural collapse. As the ®re®ghter reached Milara he grabbed at him, taking
Milara's helmet and mask off as well.
310 l Euro Fire®ghter
Milara writes,
In that instant, I felt as if something had hit me in the face. The ®re must have been
close and the temperature up around 300±400 ëC (570±750 ëF). As I breathed in the
hot gases I felt as if I had suddenly been KO'd in a boxing ring!
The other ®re®ghter was now unconscious on the ¯oor and Milara was himself
calling for assistance. One ®re®ghter was able to assist Milara's collapsed colleague
out towards the stairway, but it was left to Milara to ®nd his own way out. Crawling
along on his hands and knees, hardly able to breath, he suddenly realized he had
become disoriented and lost. He managed to ®nd his way inside an of®ce but he felt
weak and was fast giving up the ®ght to escape. At this point all he could think of
were the images of his smiling children's faces and that of his wife. He writes,
Alone, I thought everything is ®nished, this is my end. I still don't know how I
managed to get out of that of®ce in this blazing high-rise and make it along the
corridor without my mask. Suddenly my colleagues located me near the exit to the
stairway and pulled me to safety.
Milara himself, suffering from minor burns and smoke inhalation, was then trans-
ported down in the elevator and placed on oxygen whilst several other ®re®ghters
were rescued and taken to the local hospital. He could not bear to look at his
colleague next to him, as he sincerely believed the worst had happened. However,
Milara later returned into the building with new PPE and fresh SCBA and began the
long ascent via stairs back up to the ®re ¯oors with his own crew, as the elevators
were heavily smoke logged. As they reached the fourteenth ¯oor a tremendous
`roaring' sound was heard and then nothing. Listening to the ®re-ground radio,
again Milara feared the worst. However, nothing was heard about evacuating and
the ®re®ghters continued their ascent to level twenty-one, where twenty-four other
®re®ghters from four ®re stations were now mounting the attack.
It was noted, at this point, that cracks were appearing in the walls of the stair-
way and ®nally the call for building evacuation came to all ®re®ghters. By about
0115 hours the ®re had spread to most of the ¯oors above the twenty-®rst ¯oor,
resulting in a ten-story blaze. Soon afterwards the ®rst chunks of facËade started
falling off, taking the perimeter bay of the RC slab with it in places. The spread of ®re
downwards was gradual at ®rst, probably due to burning embers dropping through
services penetrations, through slab edge openings, and through other openings in
the concrete slabs caused by core wall expansion.
The ®re led to the collapse of virtually all the slab edge bay above the seventeenth
¯oor as well as one internal bay on the north side. The transition ¯oor resisted the
impact of the partial collapses. Below this level there was substantial structural
damage and deformation, but no signi®cant collapse.
It is good to know that all of Madrid's heroic ®re®ghters who fought the Windsor
®re on that night lived to tell the tale! The building suffered severe collapse where
the top twelve stories of the twenty-nine-story building fell. There are several
dramatic videos available online that record these events.
There were many lessons to be learned:
I Fire®ghters reportedly unfamiliar with the building layout;
I No building plans reportedly available to assist ®re®ghters;
I Local security reportedly unfamiliar with the building's ®re®ghting systems;
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 311
used by security to direct people towards the two stairways situated in the NW and
SE sections of the structure. Whilst both stairways had standpipe rising mains,
the SE stairway was also ®tted with a smoke tower. The purpose of a smoke (®re)
tower is to remove any smoke that enters the lobby between the of®ce space and the
stairway, with the objective of keeping an evacuation stairway clear of heavy smoke
contamination.
The initial response from the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) brought several
engines and ladder companies to the scene at 1707 hours, where it was noted that
heavy dark smoke was issuing from an upper level window. A group of ®re®ghters
ascended to the twelfth ¯oor using a lift and then the SE stairs. There was criticism
that the ®re department failed to take control of the evacuation process and direct
occupants away from the SE stairs, which was now the `attack' stairway.
It was noted by some ®re®ghters that the doors on the stairway were self-locking
and therefore were inaccessible from the stairway side. In noting this they wedged
some of the doors open below the twelfth level to enable them to access the stand-
pipe outlets. Just prior to forcing entry into the ®re ¯oor at approximately 1716 hours
(when they were registered as ¯owing water) they noted heavy dark smoke pushing
out around the sides of the closed stairway door. On entry they were unable to
advance the attack hose-line more than a few feet into the ¯oor due to the severity of
conditions.
There were uncon®rmed reports by some occupants that they were asked to
ascend back up the SE stairway as they reached the twelfth level, as ®re®ghters were
masking up in preparation for gaining entry into the ¯oor. The CFD view is that
these statements are uncon®rmed and have no foundation.
Two ®re®ghters reportedly suffered a near miss (caught by heavy smoke and heat)
as they were attempting to force entry into a ¯oor directly above the twelfth level to
search for occupants and ®re spread.
Then, from 1718 hours there were several 911 calls received (one lasting over
eight minutes) from occupants stating they were locked and trapped in stairways
above the ®re and that the heavy smoke conditions were making it dif®cult for them
to breath. At 1719 hours the 911 alarm of®ce passed information to the central
communications van on the ®re-ground that there were occupants reporting they
were locked in the stairways. At 1725 hours the occupant in the SE stairway on the
phone to the 911 alarm of®ce (for 8 minutes 14 seconds) stopped responding to the
dispatcher.
The ®re-ground communications van made several efforts to inform ®re com-
manders that there were occupants reported as `trapped' in several areas of the
building, but more speci®cally at the twenty-seventh ¯oor and in the NW stairs.
They heard someone say `message received' across very busy channels but no call
signs were used, as they should have been, according to CFD radio procedure.
Therefore, there was no certainty that this transfer of critical information (several
messages) was ever received.
At 1751 hours crews were withdrawn from the twelfth ¯oor (attack lines were
now advancing from both stairways on a 30 MW ®re involving 14% of the twelfth
¯oor) in order to implement an exterior attack, to get some knock-down of the ®re
and to prevent ®re lapping into upper ¯oors. The exterior hose streams were just
able to reach the ®re ¯oor.
At 1806 hours the interior attack was reinstated from both stairways and the
exterior streams were shut down. By 1840 hours the ®re on the twelfth ¯oor was
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 315
under control and suppressed. At 1850 hours (over 90 minutes after the twelfth
¯oor door was breached by the ®re department), several bodies were found in the
SE stairs, between the sixteenth and twenty-second ¯oors. Other occupants had
managed to ascend as high as the twenty-seventh ¯oor, where a door from the SE
stairs was unlocked, to enter the relative safety of the of®ce space.
There was much criticism levelled at the CFD and they responded by
investigating the circumstances that surrounded possible failings in their operational
approaches, Incident Command System, and communications between the alarm
centre, the ®re-ground control van and on-scene ®re commanders. The CFD high-
rise procedures, incident management system, and several other relevant procedures
were updated as a direct result of this ®re.
Some of the main changes in procedure brought additional battalion chiefs on the
initial Box Alarm (working ®re) into speci®c `forward ®re command' and `search
and rescue' assignments. The concept of Rapid Ascent Teams (RATs) was also
introduced to complete `top to bottom' stairway searches. A further `golden rule'
found its way into the new CFD high-rise procedure, that `before beginning ®re
attack operations, check the stairwell above the ®re ¯oor for occupants. It is
important to hold the ®re attack until all occupants are clear of the stairway
for a minimum of ®ve (5) ¯oors above the ®re ¯oor.' This is a directive that
has appeared in the FDNY high-rise procedure for more than a decade. It should
also be representative of a very basic rule of ®re®ghting in all buildings not to open
a door onto a stairway, immediately above which there may be ®re®ghters or
occupants in the stairway.
The model approach at this ®re should have accounted for the following points:
I A full evacuation of the building was already underway on ®re department
arrival ± the building was also naturally emptying at the end of a working day
as the ®re occurred;
I The strategy, under such circumstances, should be to protect and maintain
the integrity of occupant escape routes;
I Fire®ghters were aware, prior to forcing entry into the twelfth ¯oor, that the
stairway doors were self-locking;
I The door from the SE stairway to the twelfth ¯oor should not have been
breached until it was certain that the stairway was clear of occupants and ®re-
®ghters, for at least ®ve ¯oors above the point of entry, and that the evacuation
was under the direct control of the ®re department with occupants being
directed away from the attack stairway;
I Search and rescue responsibilities in a high-rise should be assigned as a
speci®c command task and not as part of the IC's responsibilities;
I Effective communications are essential, and the transfer of critical infor-
mation, from the alarm of®ce to the ®re-ground and onto relevant ®re
commanders, must follow stringent protocols.
Since the fatal 2002 Dolphin Cove residential condominium high-rise ®re in Clear-
water, Florida, the ®re department has placed a stronger emphasis on
training. The ®re resulted in several deaths and injured ®re®ghters.
Since the fatal 2003 CCAB high-rise of®ce ®re in downtown Chicago, the ®re
department has placed a stronger emphasis on training. Greater efforts to
improve communications, transfer of information, incident command and ®re®ghting
tactics are now being seen. The ®re resulted in the deaths of six occupants.
Since the fatal 2005 Harrow Court residential tower block ®re in Stevenage, UK, the
®re department has placed a stronger emphasis on training in incident
command, transfer of information, and high-rise ®re®ghting tactics. The ®re resulted
in several deaths including an occupant and two ®re®ghters.
with the hose-pack, the elevator doors automatically closed and returned to the
ground level, leaving four ®re®ghters on the ®re ¯oor.
At this point one of the ®re®ghter's SCBA malfunctioned and he radioed that he
was in trouble. He, along with another ®re®ghter, attempted to locate the stairway.
Both these ®re®ghters had to be rescued along with a resident from an apartment
window on the ninth ¯oor. It was not known at this time that a female resident was
also in the same apartment, whose deceased body was found later. The other two
®re®ghters also became disoriented in attempting to locate the stairway and were
later found deceased on the ninth ¯oor.
I Failure to take the elevator, according to SOPs, to a ¯oor level some way
below the reported ®re ¯oor.
On 12 October 1998, while attempting a rescue, two Memphis (Tennessee)
®re®ghters became disoriented in a smoke-charged hallway on the twenty-®rst ¯oor
of a high-rise apartment building and ran out of air. The ®re started shortly after
0900 hours, and the resident unsuccessfully attempted to extinguish the ®re with
glasses of water for a period of time. She then called the front desk, reported the ®re
and exited the apartment, leaving the door open, and took the elevator to the lobby.
By the time the ®re department arrived, the entire hallway on the twenty-®rst ¯oor
was fully charged with thick black smoke, and the ®re had escalated, breaking out
the apartment windows and allowing the wind to blow the apartment door shut.
The two ®re®ghters were attempting to rescue a trapped occupant, despite being
at the alarm stage of the low-air warning on their SCBA. As they ran out of air, one
®re®ghter managed to locate an exit stairway and escape whilst the other collapsed
into a trash room closet. He was deceased when found some thirteen minutes later.
In the early hours of 2 February 2005, a ®re occurred in an apartment situated on
the fourteenth ¯oor of a seventeen-story residential tower block in Stevenage,
Hertfordshire UK. Two ®re®ghters and one occupant were tragically killed during
this incident following an event of abnormal `rapid ®re development' (ARFD)2
(rapid ®re progress).
On arrival ®re®ghters observed heavy smoke issuing from a window high up in the
structure. A team of three ®re®ghters, including a company of®cer without SCBA,
deployed directly to the reported ®re ¯oor via elevator (there were nine ®re®ghters,
including of®cers, on-scene at this stage). As they exited the elevator into the twelfth
¯oor there were no obvious signs of ®re that appeared well contained inside an
apartment unit. Whilst the of®cer attempted to hook the attack hose-line to the
standpipe, the two other ®re®ghters apparently heard a call for help from within the
apartment and immediately forced entry to deploy themselves in a `snatch rescue'
attempt.
The ®re at this stage was con®ned to one room and they were able to locate and
rescue an occupant from a point beyond the ®re. He informed them that his
girlfriend was still trapped inside the bedroom where heavy ®re was developing
and they re-entered in an effort to also bring her out to safety. During this second
entry, the abnormal rapid ®re progress (ARFD) occurred, trapping both ®re®ghters
inside the apartment, along with the remaining occupant. CCTV and witness state-
ments suggested the ®re developed rapidly to involve the entire 65 sq m (700 sq ft)
2. ARFD is a term used in the UK to describe various events associated with rapid
®re progress
��������� ���������� � ��� ������ � ���
������� ������
���� ���� � ��� ������ ����� ���� ������� ��� ���������� ��������� �� ��� ���������
��� � ������� ��� ���������� ��� �� ��� ������������� ������ �� ������� � ��� ����������
��������� �� �� ������ ���� ������� ����� ��� ����� ��� ��������� ��������� ��� ��������� ��
��� ��� ������ ��� ��� ���������� �� ��� ��������� �� ���� ����� ��� �������� ��� ������� ��
����� ���� ��� ����� ��������� ��� �� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��� ������� � ��� �������
����� ������� �� ��� ����� ���� ����� ��� ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������� ��� �����
320 l Euro Fire®ghter
immediately ®lled with smoke, but the ®re®ghters were able to close the doors and
descend to the twentieth level. What followed was a desperate rescue attempt by
®re®ghters wearing SCBA to rapidly locate the stairway and evacuate their two
colleagues who were not wearing SCBA. The IC himself required resuscitation and
CPR but both ®re®ghters survived.
Following on from this, an elevator was used by a ®re®ghter to transport
paramedics to the upper ¯oors to assist the casualties. However, the elevator was
again taken directly to the ®re ¯oor on level twenty-one. Again smoke entered but
this time all personnel were able to make their escape via the stairway.
I Failure to take the elevator, according to SOPs, to a ¯oor level some way
below the lowest reported ®re ¯oor;
I Not all ®re®ghters ascending in the elevators were wearing SCBA. (There
was no directive for all to do so in the SOP);
I The ®rst actions by ®re®ghters were to rescue their own, before the actual
®re could be dealt with;
I Inadequate pressure and ¯ow-rate was reported by ®re®ghters on the ®re
¯oor where a 12.5 mm ( 12 inch) smooth-bore nozzle was ®tted on a 45 mm
(134 inch) attack hose-line;
I Previous experience in this area of serious ®res where heavy smoke had
moved down two ¯oors below the ®re ¯oor.
On 9 August 1998, a ®re occurred in an apartment3 located on the fourth ¯oor of
the Westview Towers Building in North Bergen, New Jersey. Four residents of the
building died and thirty-two people, including seven emergency responders, were
injured seriously enough to require transportation to a hospital. Twenty-two ®re-
®ghters and an undetermined number of residents were also treated at the scene for
minor injuries due to heat, smoke inhalation, minor burns, cuts, and bruises.
Two of the fatalities occurred in the apartment of origin, number 4E, when the
victims were trapped by heat and smoke conditions that forced them to retreat to the
balcony of their apartment. The balcony was inaccessible by an aerial device and
®re®ghters attempted to reach the trapped victims with ground ladders. One victim
fell to her death during this attempt because she lunged at a ladder, which had not
been secured to the balcony railing. The other victim succumbed to the intense heat
and smoke conditions on the balcony before ®re®ghters could reach her.
Two additional victims were discovered in a stairwell between the sixth and
seventh ¯oors. They were residents of the tenth ¯oor and were overcome by smoke
as they attempted to escape down the stairwell. Fire®ghters removed them to an
apartment on the sixth ¯oor, but were unsuccessful in their attempt to revive them.
On 12 October 1998 in Saint Louis, Missouri a ®re started in apartment 2103 of
the Council Tower Apartments Building and communicated out the windows to the
apartment immediately above on the twenty-second ¯oor. No one died in the eight-
alarm blaze, but thirteen residents and three ®re®ghters received suf®cient injuries
to require transportation to a hospital. Most of the injuries proved to be minor.
However, a Fire Department captain suffered severe burns to his respiratory tract
and is not expected to be able to return to active duty as a ®re®ghter due to the
extent of his injuries.
Fig. 11.3 ± Typical pressures and ¯ows achieved from a UK 150 mm (4 inch) rising main
standpipe. Note that X denotes ®re®ghting streams that were considered inappropriate for
recording through inadequate reach or ¯ow-rate. It can be seen that to achieve full working
performance of a 7 bar (100 psi) combination fog nozzle, the designed safe riser main
working pressure (10 bars) must be exceeded by 50%.
324 l Euro Fire®ghter
Fig. 11.4 ± FDNY pumping pressures through 150 mm (6 inch) standpipes to achieve
2±3 bars at upper ¯oor levels to fully ¯ow smooth-bore nozzles on attack hose-lines. If 7 bar
nozzle pressures are needed to ¯ow combination fog nozzles, the pump pressures will need
to be much higher still.
High-rise ¯ow-rates
The use of 7 bar (100 psi) combination fog nozzles above the seventh ¯oor is
limited by the ability of the rising main standpipe and supply hose-lines to handle
high pressures. In the UK (for example) these pressures are restricted to just
10 bars (150 psi) under BS design codes. Therefore realistically, 475 liters/min
(125 gallons/min) rated nozzles will not ¯ow to their full capacity on the ®re ¯oor
where actual ¯ow-rates will be nearer 250±300 liters/min (60±80 gallons/min).
In this case, using a smooth-bore nozzle on the attack line can actually treble
¯ow-rates.
In the theme of gas-phase cooling and fuel-phase ®re®ghting, as important as
droplet size and fog patterns are, nothing is more important than ¯ow-rate!
Here we have two inner-city ®re brigades in Europe who suffered ¯ow-rate
de®ciencies on the ®re ¯oors of serious high-rise of®ce ®res. In both cases ®re®ghters
were overcome by the ®re and nearly lost their lives and dramatic destruction to the
buildings resulted. In both cases the ®rst in ®re®ghters on the nozzle felt that if they
had received an effective ¯ow-rate at the nozzle, the ®re might have been suppressed
much earlier and not spread beyond a single ¯oor.
Even so, we must establish realistic limitations where modern open plan of®ce
¯oors are involved in ®re. In Chapter Nine we see that the European tactical
(metric) and US NFA ®re ¯ow formulas are two methods of calculating needed
®re-¯ow rates for suppressing structure ®res. Both formulae were derived from
independent studies of actual ¯ow-rates needed to suppress ®res and were both con-
®rmed by operational ®re of®cers for their tactical accuracy. These formulae both
arrive at the same conclusions that in true practical terms, one hose-line ¯owing
700 liters/min (185 gallons/min) will be able to deal with 120 sq m (1,300 sq ft) of
open-plan of®ce space involved in ®re. This hose-line should further be supported
by a secondary back-up hose-line, of equal ¯ow, to protect the exit route for the
High-rise ®re®ghting ± The basics l 325
primary attack team working just ahead of them. If the ¯ow-rate at the nozzle is
restricted by two thirds due to rising main standpipe inef®ciencies or hose/nozzle
combinations, then the single hose-line in use is capable of dealing with just 40 sq m
(430 sq ft) of ®re.
It is for this reason that those ®re®ghters who have a vast knowledge of ®ghting
serious ®res in open-plan of®ce high-rise space prefer to have a smooth-bore, or
other high-¯ow nozzle (at low nozzle pressure) in their hands, in order to achieve
maximum cooling effect of the massive ®re load involvement that threatens to
devour the entire ¯oor with great speed.
Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn, a veteran of the New York City Fire Department's
(FDNY) Manhattan District, suggested a single 2.5 inch (63 mm) hose-line, ¯owing
300 gallons/min (1,134 liters/min) through a 1.25 inch (32 mm) nozzle, could
handle up to 2,500 sq ft (232 sq m) of open-plan of®ce space ®re involvement.
I Chief Dunn suggests 300 gallons/min (1,134 liters/min) will deal with
up to 2,500 sq ft (232 sq m) of ®re.
Another interesting suggestion, based on research in the USA by Chief Bill Peterson
of the Plano Fire Department, stated that when a compartment ®re reaches 925 sq
ft (86 sq m) in size, the interior ®re attack stood a 50% chance of failing. Statistics
demonstrate that only a very small number of ®res progress to 1,000 sq ft (100 sq m)
or beyond.
I Chief Peterson suggests 50% failure rate to control ®re from the
interior after ®re size exceeds 925 sq ft (86 sq m).
According to the NFA ¯ow formula, a ®re involving a ¯oor area of 1,000 sq ft
would require two hose-lines (primary and back-up), each ¯owing at least 165 gallons/
min (1,000/3 333 gallons/min shared between two hose-lines).
The same example using the author's metric formula (tactical ¯ow-rate)
would approximate to a ®re involving 100 sq m of ¯oor area, which would require
an attack ¯ow of 100 6 600 liters/min (160 gallons/min) (a back-up hose-line of
equal or higher ¯ow is additionally recommended) ± Total ¯ow requirement
1,200 liters/min (320 gallons/min).
I NFA ®re-¯ow formula ± Area sq ft/3 gallons/min
I Grimwood's metric formula ± Area sq m 6 liters/min
The NFA formula recognizes that an aggressive interior attack has a probable
upper limit in ¯ow-rate of 1,000 gallons/min, or 50% involvement, before structural
integrity is dangerously compromised (rule of thumb)
Optimizing the interior attack hose-line and back up hose-line means getting as
much ¯ow-rate and stream velocity (reach) to the nozzle as a crew of ®re®ghters can
handle, without making the line so in¯exible through over-pressure that it can't ¯ex
around corners, or overly ¯exible so that it will kink and reduce ¯ow through under-
pressure. It must be lightweight and easy to maneuvre for the number of ®re®ghters
staf®ng the line, and nozzle reaction should be such that the line can easily be
advanced with water ¯owing. Where a line is staffed with four or more ®re®ghters,
then higher ¯ow-rates are generally achievable from a constantly ¯owing hose-line.
Where three or fewer ®re®ghters are staf®ng the interior hose-line then there may
need to be a trade-off with ¯ow-rate and/or stream performance if the nozzle is to be
constantly ¯owed during the advance. It may be possible to utilize the ¯ow-control
handle to maintain a high ¯ow-rate and close the line down during each occasion
the line is advanced, although this may not be ideal in some situations.
There have been many studies in relation to the ideal attack ¯ow-rate, the
optimum diameter attack hose, and the most effective nozzle for ®re®ghting. In this
respect the author has no intentions of presenting a biased view! All nozzles have a
place on the ®re-ground and it is simply ®nding that place and appreciating what
works best for you.
It has become clear through much research that 2 inch (51 mm) hose-lines offer
the most water with least friction losses for an attack line that is manageable and
easy to maneuvre, whilst taking all the above factors into account. There has been
extensive empirical and physiological research into this in the UK and I would
suggest that 2 inch (51 mm) hose-lines may suit hose-line staf®ng up to three
persons and may possibly serve as the optimum choice where staf®ng is four or
higher, although the 2.5 inch (63 mm) line has long been the weapon of choice in
these situations.
28 mm 118 inch 2.5 bar (35 psi) 850 liters/min (225 gallons/min)
Fig. 11.5 ± Smooth-bore nozzle ¯ow-rates with optimum (top) and typical pressures that
may be encountered from rising main standpipes. In comparing these ¯ow-rates with those
in Fig. 11.3 above, it can be seen how ¯ow-rate can be trebled in some situations. In the
theme of gas-phase cooling and fuel-phase ®re®ghting, as important as droplet size and fog
patterns are, nothing is more important than ¯ow-rate! The highlighted areas of
19 mm, 22 mm and 24 mm nozzles demonstrate ideal options for interior ®re suppression.
high-rise response plan for low staf®ng areas. This model procedure offers a
guideline for key roles and critical tasks that need addressing on the initial response
to a high-rise ®re.
Contents
1. Pre-planning
2. Information retrieval
3. Risk assessment
4. Critical control measures
5. On Arrival ± Key tasks
6. Primary incident command assignments
7. Deployment of the reconnaissance team
8. Equipment of the reconnaissance team
9. Establishing a bridgehead
10. Purpose of the bridgehead
11. Search, rescue and evacuation
12. Rapid Deployment Measures
13. Critical task assignments on the secondary response
14. Incident Command System ± Secondary assignments
15. Crew rotation system at serious working ®res
16. Additional equipment required at the bridgehead and staging area
17. Training for high-rise response
18. Air dynamics and wind effects at high-rise ®res
19. Fire suppression ¯ow-rates in high-rise buildings
20. Communications at high-rise ®res
A On arrival
1. Pre-planning
2. Information retrieval
3. Risk assessment
9. Establishing a bridgehead
12.1 INTRODUCTION
Core units
341
342 l Euro Fire®ghter
Learning outcomes
On completion of this unit a learner should:
1. Understand the principles of combustion and compartment ®re behavior;
2. Understand how ®re develops and spreads within a compartment and how it
can be extinguished;
3. Understand the methods used by ®re®ghters to deal with and prevent ®re
development within a compartment;
4. Understand the safety procedures relating to ®re development within a
compartment and how to implement them.
I Understand the principles of combustion and compartment ®re
behavior
Combustion: triangle of ®re (interaction of heat, fuel and oxygen); propagation
(conduction, convection, radiation); process (pyrolysis); chemistry; types
of combustion (complete, incomplete); products (carbons and unburned
pyrolysis products). Compartment ®re behavior: combustible gases; limits of
¯ammability (lower explosive limit, upper explosive limit, ideal mixtures);
ignition sources; ®re gases; types of ¯ame, e.g. colors, premixed, diffused.
I Understand how ®re develops and spreads within a compartment and
how it can be extinguished
Compartment ®re development: terminology, e.g. air-tract, under-pressure,
over-pressure, neutral plane; stages of development (early, ¯ashover, fully
developed, decay); principle of thermal capacity and the concept of com-
bustion inhibitors (`passives'); processes (smoldering ®res, backdraft, ®re-gas
ignition).
Compartment ®re spread: factors involved (compartment construction, com-
partment size, ®re loading, location of ®re, changes in ®re environment,
ventilation); spread to adjacent compartments; effects of limited ventilation;
effects of insuf®cient fuel.
Extinguishing theory and methods: direct cooling; indirect cooling; gas cooling;
with water (effects of steam); latent heat of fusion/vaporization.
I Understand the methods used by ®re®ghters to deal with and prevent
®re development within a compartment
Effects: physiological effects (heat-stroke, heat syncope, heat exhaustion,
dehydration); psychological effects (effects on knowledge, understanding and
capability).
Preventative and coping methods: training; self-assessment; understanding
the limits and capabilities of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); under-
standing the effects of humidity and hydration.
I Understand the safety procedures relating to ®re development within
a compartment and how to implement them
Risk assessment: need for continual dynamic risk assessments.
Safety procedures: checking the maintenance of the compartment; Personal
Protective Equipment; trainer:learner ratio; pre-exercise safety brief; health
monitoring of trainers and learners; branch techniques; movement within
environment; environmental temperature monitoring.
344 l Euro Fire®ghter
Delivery
This unit can be delivered through a combination of discussion-led and practical
sessions. This is a theory-based unit. Therefore, the main delivery methods used will
be formal lectures, presentations and guided group discussions. Syndicate work will
also take place. These methods may be reinforced by using video presentations and
computer simulations.
It is anticipated that learners will be ®re and rescue service staff with a working
knowledge of ®re®ghting operations within the community. Learners should have
the opportunity to use this existing knowledge. There are also a variety of experi-
ments which can be carried out during the course of teaching this unit, to reinforce
what is covered in the discussions. Examples of experiments which could aid the
delivery of this unit are:
CFBT Training Modules l 345
Learning outcomes
On completion of this unit a learner should:
1. Be able to demonstrate the appropriate tactical ventilation procedures and
understand their bene®cial effects;
2. Be able to demonstrate the appropriate extinguishing and cooling techniques
prior to entry;
3. Be able to demonstrate the appropriate entry techniques, recognize the
hazards and risks within the environment, and apply the appropriate tactics;
4. Be able to apply the appropriate procedures for operating a carbonaceous
CFBT facility.
I Be able to demonstrate the appropriate tactical ventilation procedures
and understand their bene®cial effects
Terminology: tactical ventilation (natural, forced, water-fogged); combustible
gases; ignition sources; limits of ¯ammability; over/under-pressure; neutral
zone/plane; air inlet; exhaust vent; air route; air management; ¯ashover; back-
draft, e.g. ventilation-induced; ®re-gas and cold smoke explosion; speci®c
building locations, e.g. high-rise, basements, enclosed room; multi-room
compartment ®re behavior.
Factors in¯uencing use of tactical ventilation: location of ®re; signs and sym-
ptoms of ¯ashover and backdraft; ®re-gas and cold smoke explosion; wind
direction and strength; identi®cation of appropriate air inlets and outlets;
access to the structure and compartment; communications; method of ®re
attack; horizontal/vertical ventilation.
346 l Euro Fire®ghter
Delivery
This unit is based on a balance of research, theory and practical exercises. Learners
must have a sound theoretical knowledge of the fundamentals of compartment ®re
behavior before attempting this unit. The knowledge gained from studying case studies
and real scenarios should be applied within a practice, purpose-built carbonaceous
CFBT training simulator. Creating the required, safe, simulated environments will
help learners to understand how these operational techniques and procedures can
be applied.
Practical demonstrations should cover the use of current good practice equipment
such as: the aquarium, the Bang Box, Bunsen burners and glass container with
wooden chips inside, the single compartment chipboard box and the doll's house
(a multi-compartment chipboard box).
Learners should use a range of methods to ®nd out about policies, procedures and
good practice relating to dealing with compartment ®re to assist with their personal
development. Examples of theses methods are textbooks, the brigade intranet,
the Internet, technical journals and statutory instruments. They should also be
encouraged to work individually, in syndicate pairs and in groups to enable them
to think through and compare ideas, to share knowledge and understanding, to
network and to assist in their personal development.
For good practice tactical ventilation procedures, tutors should refer learners to
the Fire Service Manual ± Volume 4 Fire Service Training Guidance and Compliance
Framework for CFBT (HMSO, 2000).
348 l Euro Fire®ghter
Assessment
Assessment for this unit could take the form of training reports, debrie®ng presenta-
tions, videoed practical exercises, and professional discussions with the assessor,
which could either be recorded on observation sheets or with audio recording
equipment. Evidence should show depth and breadth of understanding, analysis
and evaluation, an independent approach, intuition and perception, and an ability
to apply the appropriate learning and development techniques.
Learners could be given a complete scenario (or several short scenarios) upon
which their assessment is based. The scenarios must be developed in suf®cient
detail, to re¯ect the complexities of a real-life situation. Learners could produce a
project, supported with answers to questions based on the scenario, or conduct
a professional discussion with an assessor. Much of this unit is practical and, there-
fore, practical activities must be carried out, where appropriate. Simulated environ-
ments should be used. Evidence could be compiled through the use of observation
sheets or video-recording equipment.
For the ®rst learning outcome, learners must demonstrate the tactical ventilation
procedures and be aware of bene®cial effects listed in the unit content.
Learners must identify the factors to be considered when using tactical ventilation
procedures and the bene®ts of this approach. This could be assessed by a practical
demonstration or a presentation covering the appropriate unit content.
Learners must also demonstrate the tactical ventilation techniques appropriate
for each situation. This could be achieved by using the CFBT facility to present
demonstrations to other learners acting as trainees. Learners should also apply
dynamic risk assessments within the changing ®re environments.
For the second learning outcome, learners need to apply their knowledge and
understanding of CFBT extinguishing and cooling techniques in a practical setting,
within the ®re compartment and in adjacent compartments. This can be done
through facilitating CFBT simulated scenarios. Demonstrations could include:
I Original ignition stage to ¯ashover/backdraft stage;
I Direct and indirect extinguishing;
I Over/under-pressure extinguishing techniques;
I Cooling and water-fogged ventilating techniques on smoke in compartments
adjacent to the ®re compartment;
I Cooling of the smoke in the ®re room compartment from the adjacent
compartments.
For the third learning outcome, learners need to identify the stage of a ®re upon
arrival, apply appropriate entry techniques, and use current good practice tactics to
prevent further pyrolysis. Additionally, learners will need to show how they would
implement the range of emergency procedures relevant to the carbonaceous CFBT
facility. This should be done during the practical simulated scenarios undertaken in
the carbonaceous CFBT facility. For the fourth learning outcome, learners must be
able to use the appropriate procedures for operating the carbonaceous CFBT
facility. Learners should describe the physical properties to users of the simulator
and apply the loading protocols of the carbonaceous fuels used by the system. They
should select various materials and apply the safety requirements related to the
physical properties created during their decomposition.
Learners should also implement the health monitoring procedures required for
CFBT trainers as identi®ed in the Generic Risk Assessment (GRA). This could be
CFBT Training Modules l 349
Learning outcomes
On completion of this unit a learner should:
1. Be able to demonstrate the appropriate Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV)
techniques;
2. Be able to demonstrate the appropriate entry and air control techniques,
recognize the hazards and risks associated with using PPV techniques, and
implement the appropriate emergency procedures;
3. Be able to apply the appropriate operating procedures for the positive
pressure ventilation (PPV) training facility.
I Be able to demonstrate the appropriate Positive Pressure Ventilation
(PPV) techniques
Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) techniques: identifying the appropriate
outlet and inlet locations and sizes; appropriate positioning of PPV; method
of ®re attack to extinguish ®re within the ®re compartment; air ¯ow
management; sequential ventilation of compartments adjacent to the ®re
room compartment; speci®c building locations (high-rise, basements and
enclosed rooms).
Hazards and risk identi®cation and tactical responses: escaping hot combustible
gases; provision of a covering water spray jet at the outlet (exit port);
preference to open windows rather than breaking to create outlet (exit port);
broken glass and debris; using aerial appliances to create high level outlet
(exit port); ensuring that water spray jets are not directed into the created
outlet (exit port).
I Be able to demonstrate the appropriate entry and air control
techniques, recognize the hazards and risks associated with using
PPV techniques, and implement the appropriate emergency proce-
dures
Entry and air control techniques: identi®cation of location of the ®re
compartment; identi®cation of wind direction and strength; identi®cation
of access for air¯ows created by PPV fans; current good practice for radio
communications during operational use of PPV fans; performance of
appropriate sequential ventilation around ®re compartment.
Hazards and risks: creating an appropriate size for the outlet (exit port);
possibility of locally intensifying the ®re; increasing potential for creating a
350 l Euro Fire®ghter
Delivery
Before they can safely attempt this unit, learners must:
I Have a thorough knowledge of the fundamental principles of compartment
®re behavior;
I Be able to demonstrate good practice tactical ventilation procedures.
Learners should be putting theory into practice in the real work environment. This
should involve using case studies in the classroom and practical scenarios in a
current good practice purpose-built carbonaceous Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV)
training facility. Creating the required, safe, simulated environments will help learners
CFBT Training Modules l 351
to understand how these operational techniques and procedures are applied. Tutors
should use a range of approaches in the delivery of this unit. For example, lectures,
handouts, audiovisual aids, role play, and practical demonstration using the follow-
ing current good practice equipment, e.g. PPV fans, breaking in tools and Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE).
Learners should read widely about policies, procedures and good practice related
to PPV training to assist with their personal development. Textbooks, the brigade
intranet, the Internet, technical journals and statutory instruments are all useful
resources. They should also be encouraged to work in syndicate pairs and groups, so
as to think through and compare ideas, share knowledge and understanding, to
network and to assist in their personal development.
Learners should be able to apply their knowledge and understanding of current
good practice when using the PPV training facility.
Assessment
Assessment might take the form of training reports, presentations, practical exercises
and video or audio evidence. Learners could be given scenarios upon which their
assessment is based. The scenarios must go into a level of detail suf®cient to re¯ect
the complexities of a real-life situation. Much of this unit is practical, therefore
evidence must be gathered, where appropriate, in a simulated environment.
Evidence should show depth and breadth of understanding, coherence, analysis,
evaluation, independence, intuition and perception, and an ability to apply appro-
priate learning and development techniques.
For the ®rst learning outcome, learners must apply appropriate sequential
ventilation techniques in compartments adjacent to the ®re compartment. They
must also apply PPV techniques in speci®c structures and appropriate inlet/outlet
and air¯ow management techniques. All of these could be assessed by direct obser-
vation of learners applying techniques during a simulated exercise(s). Tutors could
also conduct a question and answer session with learners, to con®rm their appli-
cation of knowledge, and their understanding of appropriate techniques, for a range
of situations. For the second learning outcome, learners need to apply appropriate
entry and air control techniques into the ®re compartment, identify the signs and
symptoms of backdrafts and ¯ashover, and the associated hazards and risks. This
could be assessed through a practical session, followed by a one-to-one discussion
with the tutor.
Lastly, learners will need to apply tactics to meet the needs of the incident and be
able to implement emergency procedures as appropriate. This could be assessed
by direct observation of learners and supported by questions and answers to con®rm
their application of knowledge and understanding relating to the scope of appli-
cations covered by the GRA. For the third learning outcome, learners must operate
the PPV training facility using the appropriate procedures. Learners should be able
to inform users of the physical properties of, and apply the appropriate loading
protocols to, the carbonaceous fuels used by the system. They should select
the various materials and apply the safety requirements related to the physical
properties created during their decomposition.
Learners should also implement the health monitoring procedures required for
PPV trainers as identi®ed in the Generic Risk Assessment (GRA). This could be
assessed by direct observation of performance and supported by the use of questions
352 l Euro Fire®ghter