Assessment by the engineering sub-team of the OPCW Fact-

Finding Mission investigating the alleged chemical attack in

Douma in April 2018

Paul McKeigue, David Miller, Piers Robinson

Members of Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media
1 Introduction
2 Commentary on the Engineering Assessment
2.1 Methodology
2.2 Results: Location 2
2.3 Results: Location 4
2.4 Conclusions of the Engineering Assessment
3 Implications of the Engineering Assessment combined with other ndings
4 The hijacking of OPCW
5 Acknowledgements

1 Introduction
In our Brie ng note on the Final Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission on the Douma incident,
we noted that the FFM had sought assessments in October 2018 from unidenti ed engineering
experts on the “the trajectory and damage to the cylinders found at Locations 2 and 4”. The Final
Report provided no explanation for why the FFM had not sought engineering assessments in April
2018, when the experts could have inspected the sites with cylinders in position, rather than six
months later when inspection of the sites with cylinders in position was no longer possible and the
assessments had to rely on images and measurements obtained by others. We raised this as an
obvious anomaly.

OPCW staff members have communicated with the Working Group. We have learned that an
investigation was undertaken by an engineering sub-team of the FFM, beginning with on-site
inspections in April-May 2018, followed by a detailed engineering analysis including collaboration on
computer modelling studies with two European universities. The report of this investigation was
excluded from the published Final Report of the Fact-Finding Mission, which referred only to
assessments sought from unidenti ed “engineering experts” commissioned in October 2018 and
obtained in December 2018.

A copy of a 15-page Executive Summary of this report with the title “Engineering Assessment of two
cylinders observed at the Douma incident” has been passed to us and we have posted it here. Please
download and share this document via your own server if you link to it, so as not to overload our
server.

We are studying this document, and encourage others with relevant expertise to contribute. We
provide some initial comments below:-

2 Commentary on the Engineering

Assessment
The report is signed by Ian Henderson, who is listed as one of the rst P-5 level inspection team
leaders trained at OPCW in a report dated 1998. We have con rmed that as the engineering expert
on the FFM, Henderson was assigned to lead the investigation of the cylinders and alleged impact
sites at Locations 2 and 4. We understand that “TM” in the handwritten annotation denotes Team
Members of the FFM.

In response to an enquiry on 11 May 2019, the OPCW press of ce stated that “the individual
mentioned in the document has never been a member of the FFM”. This statement is false. The
engineering sub-team could not have been carrying out studies in Douma at Locations 2 and 4 unless
they had been noti ed by OPCW to the Syrian National Authority (the body that oversees
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention) as FFM inspectors: it is unlikely that Henderson
arrived on a tourist visa.

The OPCW press of ce also attempted to suggest that the report of the engineering sub-team was
not part of the FFM’s investigation. This statement also is false. The sub-team report refers to
external collaborators and consultants: we understand that this included two European universities.
This external collaboration on such a sensitive matter could not have gone ahead unless it had been
authorised: otherwise Henderson would have been dismissed instantly for breach of con dentiality.
We can therefore be con dent that the preparation of the report had received the necessary
authorisation within OPCW. What happened after the report was written is another matter.

2.1 Methodology
As we have repeatedly emphasized, evidence can be evaluated only by comparison of competing
hypotheses. This is a corollary of the likelihood principle, which can be derived from simple rules of
logical consistency.

We noted that a key weakness of the published Final Report was that no competing hypotheses were
considered. Thus the Final Report stated that engineering experts were asked to provide
assessments of the “trajectory” of each of the two cylinders found: implying that they were not asked
to assess whether the holes in the roof and the positions of the cylinders could be accounted for by
anything other than cylinders being dropped from the sky.

The FFM’s Engineering Assessment does not make this error: competing hypotheses are clearly set
out in advance.

For Location 2 (cylinder on roof terrace lying over a hole), the alternative hypotheses are
stated as:
(2-1) the cylinder containing liquid chlorine was dropped from an aircraft, pierced the roof
to form the hole and the impact fractured the valve causing release of chlorine.
(2-2) the cylinder was placed on the terrace next to a pre-existing crater
For Location 4 (cylinder on bed), the alternative hypothesis are stated as:
(4-1) the cylinder tted with frame and ns was dropped from an aircraft, pierced the roof
to form the hole, fell through the hole and was de ected laterally to end up on the bed,
while the valve remained intact
(4-2) the cylinder tted with frame and ns pierced the roof as for hypothesis (1), landed
on the oor below the hole and was placed on the bed
(4-3) the cylinder tted with frame and ns was placed on the bed, and the hole in the roof
was created (by unspeci ed means) either before or after the cylinder was placed on the
bed
2.2 Results: Location 2
An impact angle of approximately 20 degrees from the vertical “was found to be required for
results to bear any resemblance to observations”
A concrete slab could not have stopped a cylinder falling at such an angle from a height of at
least 500 metres. The front of the cylinder showed no sign of interaction with the concrete
slab.
If the cylinder had been stopped by the steel reinforcing bars (rebars), this would have left
indents on the cylinder, but no such indents were observed.
Modelling the impact of a falling cylinder could not reproduce the bending of the rebars to an
angle of more than 90 degrees to point away from the impact. This was more consistent with
an explosive blast.

The results of the modelling studies were summarized with the following sentence:

All the elements listed above point to the conclusion that the alleged impact
event or events leading to observed vessel deformation and concrete damage
were not compatible.
A criss-cross pattern on the paintwork of the cylinder body, that had been attributed by some
observers to the cylinder falling through the wire mesh, was inconsistent with the near-vertical angle
of incidence that would have been required to create the crater.

Experts consulted to assess the appearance of the crater took the view that it was more consistent
with a blast (from a mortar round or rocket artillery) than with an impact from the falling object.
Similar craters were present in concrete slabs on top of nearby buildings.

The mangled remains of the steel frame and ns found on the terrace were not consistent with the
appearance of the cylinder, which showed no signs of having been tted with such a frame or of the
frame having been stripped from the cylinder as a result of impact.

2.3 Results: Location 4

The analysis of Location 4, where a cylinder was found on a bed, showed that the cylinder with
intact valve and ns attached could not have tted through the hole in the roof:

it was not possible to establish a set of circumstances where the post-

deformation cylinder could t through the crater with the valve still intact
(whether or not an end-cap was assumed to have been tted at the front end of
the cylinder), and the ns deformed in the manner observed.

2.4 Conclusions of the Engineering Assessment

In summary:

The analysis at Location 4 showed simply that the cylinder with ns and valve attached could
not have tted through the hole.
The analysis at Location 2, using nite element analysis and computer simulation, was more
complicated. This showed that the concrete slab could not have stopped the cylinder, that if
 the cylinder had been stopped by the rebars there would have been indents on the cylinder,
and that an impact could not have bent the rebars through more than 90 degrees to point
away from the impact location.

We note that several of the anomalies reported by the Engineering Assessment have been identi ed
independently from open source images by members of the Working Group: these include the
inability to t the cylinder through the hole at Location 4, the presence of similar craters on nearby
buildings at Location 2, and the incompatibility of the criss-cross pattern on the paintwork of the
cylinder with a fall through wire mesh.

The results from both locations are summarized in paragraph 32:

The dimensions, characteristics and appearance of the cylinders, and the

surrounding scene of the incidents, were inconsistent with what would have been
expected in the case of either cylinder being delivered from an aircraft. In each
case the alternative hypothesis produced the only plausible explanation for
observations at the scene.

3 Implications of the Engineering

Assessment combined with other
ndings
The conclusion of the Engineering Assessment is unequivocal: the “alternative hypothesisâ€
that the cylinders were manually placed in position is “the only plausible explanation for
observations at the scene”.

Our last Brie ng Note listed two other key ndings:

It is no longer seriously disputed that the hospital scene was staged: there are multiple
eyewitness reports supported by video evidence
The case fatality rate of 100%, with no attempt by the victims to escape, is unlike any recorded
chlorine attack.

Taken together, these ndings establish beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged chemical attack
in Douma on 7 April 2018 was staged.

This raises the question of where and how did the 35 victims seen in the images recorded at location
2 die? The images show signs of acute inhalation injury with blood and mucus owing from the nose
and mouth of most victims. Even though faces had apparently been washed to remove most of the
mucus, yellow staining of the skin remained.

A few weeks before the release of the Final Report, two journalists appeared to suggest that there
had been an earlier chemical attack somewhere else in Douma, perhaps attempting to prepare a
fallback position in case the Final Report were to indicate that the scenes at Location 2 and 4 had
been staged. This is to say the least an implausible explanation of the staging at Locations 2 and 4 –
why move the bodies of the victims to Location 2 for a staged scene, rather than show the real
chemical attack scene if there was one?
As emphasized above, in a real chemical attack with chlorine or any other irritant gas, most victims
would try to escape and non-fatal cases requiring prolonged hospital treatment would far outnumber
fatal cases. The images of the victims seen at Location 2 show that they were evidently exposed to an
irritant gas but were unable to escape. A careful examination of these images leaves little doubt that
the victims were murdered as captives. The staining of the victims’ faces by mucus owing from their
noses and mouths shows in at least some cases the mucus owed up their faces towards the eyes.
This implies that they were hung upside down while exposed to the agent. Bizarrely, the eyes of most
victims appear to have been masked so that the eyes were not affected by gas or mucus. In a few
victims there are visible strap marks suggesting that the eyes were protected by something like
swimming goggles. A possible motive for masking the eyes may have been to make it less obvious that
the victims had suffered prolonged exposure to an irritant gas.

We conclude that the staging of the Douma incident entailed mass murder of at least 35 civilians to
provide the bodies at Location 2. It follows from this that people dressed as White Helmets and
endorsed by the leadership of that organization had a key role in this murder.

We note that the Douma incident was the rst alleged chemical attack in Syria where OPCW
investigators were able to carry out an unimpeded on-site inspection. Since 2014, OPCW Fact-
Finding Missions investigating alleged chemical attacks in opposition-held territory have relied for
evidence on witnesses and materials collected by opposition-linked NGOs of doubtful provenance,
including the CBRN Task Force, the Chemical Violations Documentation Centre Syria, and the White
Helmets. Even for the investigation of the Ghouta incident in 2013, the OPCW-WHO mission was
able to visit the the alleged attack sites for only a few hours, and was under the close supervision of
the armed opposition. For those who until now have been prepared to accept the ndings of OPCW
Fact-Finding Missions that did not include on-site inspections, the nding that the Douma incident
was staged, based on a careful on-site inspection, should cast doubt on the ndings of these earlier
Missions.

4 The hijacking of OPCW

In our last Brie ng Note, we concluded by asserting that “It is doubtful whether [OPCW’s] reputation
as an impartial monitor of compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention can be restored
without radical reform of its governance and working practices”. The new information we have
removes all doubt that the organization has been hijacked at the top by France, UK and the US. We
have no doubt that most OPCW staff continue to do their jobs professionally, and that some who are
uneasy about the direction that the organization has taken nevertheless wish to protect its
reputation. However what is at stake here is more than the reputation of the organization: the staged
incident in Douma provoked a missile attack by the US, UK and France on 14 April 2018 that could
have led to all-out war.

The cover-up of evidence that the Douma incident was staged is not merely misconduct. As the
staging of the Douma incident entailed mass murder of civilians, those in OPCW who have
suppressed the evidence of staging are, unwittingly or otherwise, colluding with mass murder. We
think that in most jurisdictions the legal duty to disclose the cover-up of such a crime would override
any con dentiality agreement with an employer. We would welcome legal opinions on this, given
publicly, by those with relevant expertise. OPCW employees have to sign a strict con dentiality
agreement, and face instant dismissal and loss of pension rights if they breach this agreement. We
would welcome any initiative to set up a legal defence fund for OPCW staff members who come
forward publicly as whistleblowers.
5 Acknowledgements
We thank the OPCW staff members who have communicated with us at considerable personal risk.
We undertake to protect the identities of any sources who communicate with us. Emails to our
protonmail addresses, if sent from another protonmail account (free to set up), are secure. We thank
also the other open-source investigators and journalists who publicly questioned the of cial line on
the Douma incident and thus created the climate for OPCW staff members to come forward.

Search …

Zerif Lite developed by ThemeIsle