RULE 70 (FORCIBLE ENTRY & UNLAWFUL DETAINER)

SUAREZ vs EMBOY

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Jurisdictional Facts That Must Be
Alleged and Sufficiently Established in a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer.—In a complaint
for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:

1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Same; Accion Publiciana; Accion Reivindicatoria; When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.—This Court stresses that to give the court
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to
parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

ALCONERA vs PALLANAN

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts
are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court.—It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its roots to an
unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled against Rafols, complainant’s client. In
ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed
via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 19. Immediate
execution of judgment; how to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and
the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersede as bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from
time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or
period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth
day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the
Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.

Same; Same; Same; Under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and
detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful
possessor.—Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and
detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful
possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by

a) perfecting an appeal;
b) filing a supersedeas bond; and
c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.

The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the
outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial
and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file
a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if
the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within
the period for the perfection of the appeal.

Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ
is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no
discretion whether to execute the judgment or not.—Well-settled is that the sheriff’s duty
in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly
to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance
with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without
undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires
immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ.

Same; Same; Same; Enforcement in ejectment cases requires the sheriff to give notice of
such writ and to demand from defendant to vacate the property within three days; A
sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiry of the three-
day period is running afoul with the Rules.— Enforcement in ejectment cases requires the
sheriff to give notice of such writ and to demand from defendant to vacate the property
within three days. Only after such period can the sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily
removal of the defendant in the ejectment case and his personal belongings. Even in cases
wherein decisions are immediately executory, the required three-day notice cannot be
dispensed with. A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the
expiry of the three-day period is running afoul with the Rules.

TEODORO vs ESPINO
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Ground Rules in Forcible Entry Cases.—
The ground rules in forcible entry cases:
1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of
physical possession of real property;
2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the
property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant (herein respondents).
This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was
unlawful from the beginning;
3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession
(possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can, at the
outset, preclude the court from taking cognizance of the case; and
4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

FERRER vs RABACA

Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Ejectment; It is the ministerial duty of the judge to
grant the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution in an ejectment case upon the
defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond.—Indeed, respondent Judge
should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution considering that the
defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting
the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the
defendant’s failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules
of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz.: Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how
to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal,
he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of
the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal
Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the
action is appealed. x x x

Same; Same; Same; The perfection of the appeal by the defendant in an ejectment case
does not forbid a favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution—only
the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the appellate court of
the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could
stay the execution; A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
could not be misread or misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or
hesitation; Good faith, or honest belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a
non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or
applicability of a rule or legal provision.—Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost
jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was unacceptable in light of
the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the
appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking
of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit with the
appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection of
the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his
omission explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or misapplied, but should be
implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack of
malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled
doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. And,
thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases
similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial
judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a
fact that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.

Same; Same; A judge’s mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court
sufficed to render him administratively accountable; This case is an opportune occasion to
remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to the mandate under Section 19,
Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in
actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has appealed but has not
filed a sufficient supersedeas bond.—We agree with the complainants’ insistence, therefore,
that respondent Judge’s omission to apply Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the
urging to follow the clear and explicit provision of the rule made in the plaintiff’s motion for
immediate execution. Had he any
genuine doubt about his authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he
would have us believe, he could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to
the Rules of Court, which he well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking
for his judicial action. Neither was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that
he did not corruptly favor the defendant by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty
enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to render him administratively accountable. This
case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to
the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution
upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the
defendant has appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary
nature of the special civil action under Rule 70 and the being further deprived of their
rightful possession, should always be borne in mind.

CGR CORP. vs TREYES JR.

Remedial Law; Forcible Entry; Damages; The only form of damages that may be recovered
in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property; Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary
action.—The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas, 480 SCRA 56 (2006), reiterates the long-
established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for
forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis
for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that
in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the
only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he
may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x
(Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted) Other damages must thus be claimed in an
ordinary action.

Same; Same; Res Judicata; Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry
case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorney’s fees.—Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia—that the
identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of present,
hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages. Res judicata
may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for
damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than
those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use
and occupation of their properties could not be considered as splitting of a cause of
action.—Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained
as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of
their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

ABAD vs FIL-HOMES

Same; Ejectment; Under Commonwealth Act No. 538, ejectment of tenant is suspended
while expropriation proceedings is pending but tenant must pay the rent and be entitled
to suspension.—When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation
proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for
ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for
such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary
negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension
shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants
shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with
the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.

Same; Ejectment; Effect of Possession by Mere Tolerance.—It has been held that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

ZACARIAS vs ACANAY

Same; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Contents of a Complaint for an Action for
Unlawful Detainer.—In Cabrera v. Gataruela, 586 SCRA 129 (2009), the Court held that a
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
 1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Same; Same; Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered.—In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA
369 (2006), the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the Municipal Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the case. Thus: To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.—It is well-settled that a court’s
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want
of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.

MANALANG vs BACANI

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Appeals; The Regional Trial Court (RTC), in
an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de
novo.—To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not
conduct a rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court clearly provides: Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership.—x x x. x x x x The judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the
basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional
Trial Court. (7a) Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the
relocation and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the
testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo.
The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on
the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin.

Same; Boundary Disputes; Accion Reivindicatoria; In our view, the Court of Appeals (CA)
correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case.—The case should be dismissed without prejudice to
the filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly
held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not
an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that
is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A
boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the
expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied. The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only
because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on
which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases; Unlawful detainer is
an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.—The MTC dismissed
the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is
fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by
the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over
the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land
of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer.
SUPAPO vs DE JESUS

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Accion Publiciana; Accion publiciana refers to an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one (1) year from the accrual of the cause of action or from
the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.—Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It
refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in
accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property.—This Court has held that the
objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the
issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This
adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose
of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to
the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction Courts; Metropolitan Trial Courts; Republic Act (RA) No. 7691
diversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.—Under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion
of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where
the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is now determined by its assessed value.—Jurisdiction over actions involving title
to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. The assessed
value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is
synonymous to taxable value.

Same; Same; Same; The complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction
over the action.—In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or
all of the claims asserted therein.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Acquisitive Prescription; Lands covered by a title cannot
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.—In a long line of cases, we have
consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless
when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529].

Same; Same; Possession; In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a
Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof.—In addition to the
imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical
consequence of ownership. Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens
Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.

Same; Laches; Burden of Proof; The party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence
proving such allegation.—With respect to the respondents’ defense of laches, suffice it to
say that the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations in
the pleadings. In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence
proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue;
especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata embraces two (2)
concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of
Civil
Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).—Res judicata
embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
“Bar by prior judgment” means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on
the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order
shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an
absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The requisites for
res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or
order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on the merits; (3) It must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The concept of “conclusiveness of judgment” does not require
that there is identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity
of parties.— The concept of “conclusiveness of judgment” does not require that there is
identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. As already
explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-
Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone,
“conclusiveness of judgment” does not apply. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument,
that there is identity of parties, “conclusiveness of judgment” still does not apply because
there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents
(accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in
accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents
to possess and occupy the subject property.

DELA CRUZ vs HERMANO

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) are
generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by the Supreme Court
(SC). By way of exception, however, the Court resolves factual issues when the findings of
the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC) and of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) differ from
those of the CA.—At the outset, the Court notes that the arguments raised here necessarily
require a reevaluation of the parties’ submissions and the CA’s factual findings. Ordinarily,
this course of action is proscribed in a petition for review on certiorari; that is, a Rule 45
petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. Moreover, factual findings of
the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable by this
Court. By way of exception, however, the Court resolves factual issues when the findings of
the MTCC and of the RTC differ from those of the CA, as in this case.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; The one (1)-year period within which to bring
an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the
land, except when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be
counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.—Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the unlawful
deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that in those cases,
possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the
possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived
thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry
was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the
plaintiff learned about it.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one
(1)-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived
of possession demanded that the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former
learned about it.—It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-
year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of
possession demanded that the deforciant desist from dispossession when the former
learned about it. The owners or possessors of the land cannot be expected to enforce their
right to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the
clandestine intrusion. And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action
under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder managed to
conceal the trespass for more than a year, would be to reward clandestine usurpations even
if they are unlawful.

Same; Same; Same; Possession; In a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover the possession even against the owner.—Ownership certainly
carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated is not exactly the same as
that which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to
possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership.
These are different legal concepts under which the law provides different remedies for
recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may be the
character of the possession, the present occupant of the property has the security to remain
on that property if the occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a person
with a better right lawfully causes eviction.

ERORITA vs DUMLAO
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case.—The allegations in the complaint
determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not
depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
answer; otherwise, the
defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; To make a case for unlawful detainer, the
complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property,
either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that
his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and
deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one (1)
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.—To make a case for
unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully
possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff
notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant
remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a
complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A
complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be
considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is
omitted.

Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is
within the Municipal Trial Court’s (MTC’s) exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the
property’s assessed value.—Although the complaint bears the caption “recovery of
possession,” its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case.
Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction
regardless of the property’s assessed value.

Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Estoppel by Laches; As a general rule, lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first time on
appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches.—As a general rule,
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first
time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches. Estoppel by
laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is
analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968). In that case, lack of jurisdiction was
raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the proceedings. It
was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the movant.

Civil Law; Laches; Laches refers to the “negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”—In Figueroa v. People, 558 SCRA 63
(2008), we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is length of time had
elapsed for laches to apply. Laches refers to the “negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.”
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is settled that issues that have not been raised
before the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.—It is settled that
issues that have not been raised before the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Basic consideration of due process dictates this rule. We note that the second
issue raised by the petitioners were not raised before the lower courts. The petitioners only
raised this issue in their petition before this Court. Thus, we need not discuss this issue at
our level.

CONTEMPT (RULE 71)

YASAY vs RECTO

Remedial Law; Contempt; Court agrees with respondents that the charge of contempt
partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. We agree with respondents that the charge of
contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of the contemner
from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie.

Same; Same; Distinction between a civil and criminal contempt.—“A distinction is made
between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered
by
a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed
against the authority or dignity of the court. x x x “Civil contempt proceedings are generally
held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the
enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing
required.” “In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved
party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be
protected.” If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to
punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in
accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real
prosecutor. “The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by
the relief ought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal
when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.”

Same; Same; The power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not
vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.—While
the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power
to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and
on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals
vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for
purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

SISON vs CAOIBES JR.

Courts; Judges; A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion
or pettiness in the performance of his duties.— Thus, the power to declare a person in
contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts
of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous
misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.
Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation
and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with the court’s orderly process by
exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the
public, by tradition and necessity, in as much as respect for the courts, which are ordained
to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of society, is as necessary as
respect for the laws themselves. And, as in all other powers of the court, the contempt
power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and sparingly. A judge
should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.

Same; Same; Contempt; While at first blush it would seem that the respondent judge was
justified in holding the complainant for contempt due to the latter’s refusal to comply with
the judge’s order, it is not lost upon the Court that the complainant was not a party to any
of the cases pending before the respondent judge.—At first blush, it would seem that the
respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s
refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon
this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC,
Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident
involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the
complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was
refused by some staff member in the latter’s sala.

Same; Same; Same; The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant
personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the
Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so
that the respondent could confront and harass the complainant.—We agree with the
Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge should have refrained from
ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own
son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent judge insisted
that the complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the
motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was
deliberately inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass the complainant.

Same; Same; Same; The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner
which smacks of retaliation is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates that “a judge should so behave at all times to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”—The act of a judge in citing a
person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is
appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that “a
judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.” The very
delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct himself at all
times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people,
for he is the visible representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper conduct of
judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all impropriety
and the
appearance thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Authority; The Supreme Court has not been blind to the
improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine,
amounts to grave abuse of authority.—We do not agree, however, that the respondent
judge should be merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the
improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine,
amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges
from a fine of P2,500; one month’s salary; suspension from the service without pay for a
period of three months; and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.

ESPANOL vs FORMOSO

Courts; Contempt; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court has been defined as “some act
or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey
some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which
in some ways tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and
thus lessens the general efficiency of the same”—simply put, it is despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of the court.—The early case of In re Jones defined contempt of
court as “some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a
refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of
the court which in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of
the court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same.” It has also been described as
“a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation.” Simply put,
it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.

Same; Same; The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all
courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the
monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign, a concept which was
adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications.—The offense of
contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but
divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court
was an affront to the sovereign. This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to
our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that courts have the
inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that respect for the courts guarantees
the very stability of the judicial institution. Such stability is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
courts, and, consequently, to the very
administration of justice.

Same; Same; Direct Contempt; Words and Phrases; Direct contempt is a contumacious act
done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing—one may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the
commission of the act of contumely.—In Narcida v. Bowen, 22 Phil. 365 (1912), this Court
characterized direct contempt as one done “in the presence of or so near the court or judge
as to obstruct the administration of justice.” It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and
may be punished summarily without hearing. In other words, one may be summarily
adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission
of the act of contumely.
Same; Same; Indirect Contempt; Words and Phrases; Indirect or constructive contempt is
one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court; The use of falsified and forged
documents is a contumacious act but constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt.—
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the
court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any
abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. We agree with petitioner that the
use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect
contempt not direct contempt. Pursuant to the above provision, such act is an improper
conduct which degrades
the administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, 185
SCRA 472 (1990), we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the
falsity of
the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and as such
is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper proceedings. Thus,
following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only after a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel.

Same; Same; Same; A contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding
of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction—thus, the modes of
procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as
practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.— Settled is the rule that a contempt
proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the
court exercises limited jurisdiction. Thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence
in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal
prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge erred in declaring summarily that respondents are
guilty of direct contempt and ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a
hearing with notice to respondents.

Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Judicial Notice; Courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or
pending in the
same court.—In Gener v. De Leon, 367 SCRA 631 (2001), we held that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such
cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Hence, we reiterate that petitioner took
judicial notice of the Decision rendered by another RTC branch and on the basis thereof,
concluded that respondents used falsified documents(such as land title and tax declaration)
when Sharcons filed its complaint for quieting. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that respondents are not guilty of direct contempt of court.

Habeas Corpus; Bail; A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not
actually restrained of his liberty—and a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his
liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.—The instant petition challenging the
Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents
has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail
as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person
who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not
restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

MARANTAN vs DIOKNO

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Indirect Contempt; Sub Judice Rule; The sub judice rule
restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.—
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings
in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt
under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—x x x a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x (d) Any improper
conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice[.]

Same; Same; Same; The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in
nature; Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for
a criminal con tempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.—
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of
contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and
no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.

Same; Same; Same; Sub Judice Rule; The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that
courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.—For
a comment to be considered as contempt of court “it must really appear” that such does
impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to
be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

Same; Same; Contempt; The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow
them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to
impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice.—The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct
their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the
impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As
important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. The “clear and present danger” rule may serve as an aid in
determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights.

Constitutional Law; Contempt; Clear and Present Danger Rule; Words and Phrases; The
“clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be
“extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before an utterance can
be punished.—The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the
comment must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before
an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the
utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt
that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.

Same; Same; The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.—“A public
utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the
courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly
and fair administration of justice.” By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents’
comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal
intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the
comments of the respondents. Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances,
weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish
for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice. In the present case, such necessity is wanting.