Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 79/2017, p.

31-56

non-linguistic thinking —
from a phenomenological
point of view
by Dieter Lohmar (Köln)

In this paper I will investigate the way humans and animals think
without language. This does not mean that we cannot think with the
help of language. In fact, most of our actual thinking appears to us in
the form of our mother tongue. Nonetheless, I would like to show that
the level of language is neither the only nor the basic level of thinking.
We also use a deeper level of thinking, which is usually only expressed
by means of language. The basic way of thinking is non-linguistic.
One of the advantages of this kind of analysis is that it facilitates an
inclusive theory of cognition and thinking, which is also useful in under-
standing animal thinking. However, animal thinking is not my fore-
most concern. I am first and foremost interested in gaining descriptive
access to human thinking as it is. But as seen from the biological point
of view, there is no significant difference between the two subject
matters, since human beings are the only animals to which we have

Dieter Lohmar (1955) is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cologne and Director of
the Husserl-Archive in Cologne. He is working on Husserl’s phenomenology, modern and transcen-
dental philosophy, anthropology, empiricism, and philosophy of formal sciences. Recent publications:
Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasie (Heidelberg: Springer, 2008); Denken ohne Sprache (Heidel-
berg: Springer, 2016).
I would like to thank Dan Zahavi for critical remarks on an earlier version of this paper and
Saulius Genusias and Jacob Rump for their efforts to improve my English text.
This paper is the text of the Husserl Memorial Lecture, held at the Institute of Philosophy of
KU Leuven on October, 15, 2014.

doi: 10.2143/TVF.79.1.3217824
© 2017 by Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. All rights reserved.
32 Dieter Lohmar

privileged access. We should take up the chance to understand elements

of animal thinking through our access to human thinking by means of
our own experiences and conscious activities.
One might think that animal thinking is a prominent theme in con-
temporary analytic philosophy of mind. And for this reason, one might
also feel compelled to address a great variety of theories coming from
this region of philosophy. I will not do this because, despite some
exceptions,1 two paradigms still dominate debates in philosophy of
mind, and they pose unnecessary problems for an appropriate under-
standing of human and animal thinking without language. The first
prejudice is the language paradigm (respectively the propositional
paradigm), which understands thinking only in terms of propositions,
which are in turn connected to each other by logical rules. The second
1
  An important exception is the book of Jose Luis Bermudez, Thinking without Words (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), which starts with the insight that there must be ways of representing
cognitive contents in non-linguistic creatures. However, Bermudez’s detailed theories of thinking in
non-linguistic animals call for a more extended discussion, which I cannot provide in the present
context. (I have to refer to my monograph Denken ohne Sprache: Phänomenologie des nicht-sprach­
lichen Denkens bei Mensch und Tier im Licht der Evolutionsforschung, Primatologie und Neurologie
(Heidelberg: Springer 2016)). I will mention here only a single item concerning his thesis about the
principal limitations of non-linguistic thought. He denies that there might be meta-representational
thought in non-linguistic animals because in his view there is no possible working alternative to
symbolically represent it (i.e., no vehicle). The only alternatives he discusses are pictorial representa-
tions that revolve around the idea of analogical representation of states of affairs in something like
mental models and mental maps (cf. Bermudez, Thinking without Words, 160-63). His interpretation
of such pictorially-based alternatives for the representation of cognitive contents understands them
as a covered version of linguistic meta-representation, i.e., he thinks the structure of this model is
derived from linguistic thinking (ibid., 163). His conclusion is that meta-representation can only be
performed by creatures who use language. This must be rejected on the basis of empirical evidence,
suggesting that meta-representation is possible for some animals, cf. Robert R. Hampton, “Rhesus
Monkeys Know When They Remember,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98 (2001):
5359-62; J. David Smith; Wendy E. Shields, and David A. Washburn, “The Comparative Psychol-
ogy of Uncertainty Monitoring and Metacognition,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2003): 317-
73; J. David Smith, “The Study of Animal Metacognition,” Trends in Cognitive Science 13, no. 9
(2009): 389-96; Robert R. Hampton, “Multiple Demonstrations of Metacognition in Nonhumans:
Converging Evidence or Multiple Mechanisms?,” Comparative Cognition and Behavior Reviews 4
(2009): 17-28.
Bermudez is also discussing some models for pictorial representation of cognitive contents but
these models are too simple in my view. The representation of cognitive contents cannot be done in
single pictures but asks for series of scenic phantasmata. The reason for this seems to lie in the com-
plex structure of categorial intuition, which requires a series of different intentions. Another objec-
tion is that if you interpret feelings as possible symbolic functions, then the feeling of certainty/
uncertainty accompanying a scenic-phantasmatic representation of a state of affairs can easily func-
tion as meta-cognition.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view33

prejudice concerns the principal priority of natural science and the causal
paradigm that rules this science. As will soon become clear, in under-
standing human and animal thinking we should avoid both paradigms
for good reasons. In my own analysis, I will privilege phenomenological
insights, by which I mean that I will accept the results of natural sci-
ences only as an additional confirmation of phenomenological insights —
if and only if phenomenological evidence supports the results in
question.
This text is a Husserl-Memorial lecture delivered at one of the places
where the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology is strongly preserved.
You might therefore anticipate a lecture on Husserl’s phenomenology.
In a way, this expectation will be fulfilled. yet, in another way, it will
be left unfulfilled. Phenomenology in Husserl’s sense should first and
foremost be characterized methodologically: it offers a descriptive investi-
gation into intentionality (of different kinds) using the eidetic method
and the transcendental reduction, and later also using the genetic method
of intentional analysis. Second comes the requirement to connect phe-
nomenology with a wide variety of themes, such as perception, memory,
imagination, cognition, the constitution of time and space, access to
other people’s minds and the constitution of objects of a higher order,
such as communities, cultural objects, moral rules, the sciences, and
so on. If you expect one of these themes to be treated extensively, you
will be disappointed. However you might perhaps learn something about
imagination, as it functions in the process of thinking without language.
Thus I will extend the realm of Husserlian investigations by turning
to a theme which is neither considered in Husserl’s published writings,
nor in his manuscripts. This means that my article will not offer you
a report on the true Husserl but rather demonstrate how an interdisci-
plinary approach to non-linguistic thinking can be developed using
Husserlian methods.
Besides the concrete themes treated and methods used, there is
another characteristic feature of phenomenology that is best framed as
a piece of advice: take seriously whatever is happening in your con-
sciousness! Consciousness is by no means an epiphenomenon; it has a
meaning and it guides your actions.
34 Dieter Lohmar

To investigate thinking without language, I will first have to establish

the concept of a system of symbolic representations for cognitive content (in
short, a system of representations). This term denotes the general idea of
a type of performance of which our language is only a single case. This
means that there are other systems of symbolic representations with the
same performance. Nonetheless, the idea of a system of representations
is best explained in the case of language. A system of symbolic repre-
sentations should enable us to form an idea of a state of affairs and its
connection with other states of affairs or to think of the succession of
events without having the appropriate intuition of them.
Although this kind of thinking usually occurs by means of linguistic
expression, language is only one system of symbolic representations. In
principle, we can conceive of other symbolic systems that have the same
performance.
My approach is based on two key elements of Husserl’s theory of
knowledge. First, it is based on Husserl’s analysis of categorial
intuition  — the complex acts, which fulfill the specific intentions of
cognition. Secondly, it is based on Husserl’s theory of meaning. Both
themes can be found in the Logical Investigations.2 In my view, Husserl’s
phenomenology offers a refined theory of meaning, which serves as a
basis for understanding both language-based and non-linguistic think-
ing. In other words, his theory of meaning leaves open the possibility
of systems of representations for cognitive contents, which employ other
means than language. But first we must find out how non-linguistic
thinking proceeds and show that humans are capable of both modes of
thinking.

2
  For Husserl’s theory of meaning, see the first and sixth Logical Investigation (Edmund Husserl,
Logical Investigations, vol. 1 and 2 (London: Routledge, 2001)). Concerning its connection to the
present theme, see Dieter Lohmar, “Denken ohne Sprache?,” in Meaning and Language: Phenomeno-
logical Perspectives, ed. Filip Mattens (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2008), 169-94. For the theory of categorial
intuition, cf. chapter 6 of the sixth Logical Investigation and Dieter Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of
Categorical Intuition,” in Hundred Years of Phenomenology, ed. Dan Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt
(Kluwer: Dordrecht, 2002), 125-45. It is well known that a continuous self-critique accompanies
these theories in Husserl‘s writings. This critique points to parts of his theory of categorial intuition
and also to certain aspects of his first theory of meaning in the Logical Investigations. I will not dis-
cuss these items here.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view35

Most humans can think in language. Language is a system of sym-

bolic representations that enables us to conceive of objects, states of
affairs, probabilities, etc. An important point is thinking about the
order of succession in a series of events, i.e., whether they are due to the
subject’s motivational activity or to the causal influence of other events.
But we are not so easily convinced that there is also a non-linguistic
system of representations, which also functions in our consciousness. In
my view, in our everyday thinking we simultaneously use different sys-
tems of symbolic representations, such as language, gestures, feelings,
and scenic images.3 To defend such a view, I will provide a phenomeno-
logical analysis of non-linguistic systems, which function in our con-
sciousness.
It is especially fruitful to investigate the scenic-phantasmatic mode of
thinking consisting of phantasmatic pictures, series of such pictures or
scenes that tend to be unified in “video clips” in our phantasy and
thereby come to be identified with short term daydreaming. The phan-
tasmata entailed in imagination stem from all fields of sensibility: they
can be visual, tactual, or acoustic; they can also belong to the fields of
taste and smell. These kinds of phantasmatic scenes constitute the cen-
tral form of non-linguistic thinking. I will interpret this as a phyloge-
netically old mode of non-linguistic thinking that is still operative in
our consciousness.
We might immediately note one possible consequence of this last
suggestion. It is highly probable that non-human members of the pri-
mate group (chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, etc.) and perhaps also a
great variety of other mammals can think using the same non-linguis-
tic systems that we, humans, also use. Yet as mentioned above, this is
only a secondary theme in my investigation. First and foremost, I am
interested in the different modes of human thinking.

3
 We might tend to interpret usual gestural languages as a form of language, which is quite
appropriate for the forms of national gestural language that are highly conventionalized, like asl etc.
But there are also elementary, non-conventionalized forms of gestural communication, which use
only body-related gestures, onomatopoetics, pantomimics, and pictorial symbols based on similarity
semantics.
36 Dieter Lohmar

1.  Cognition, thinking, and meaning

At first sight human thinking seems to rely completely on conceptual

language. There are some very useful phenomenological descriptions of
how we think with the help of concepts. Most basic in this regard is
the insight into the function of acts that become the ground for intui-
tive evidence of states of affairs. Husserl names them categorial acts.
Categorial intuition of simple, everyday objects is the ultimate source
of meaning, and its meaning is transferred to symbolic intentions,
which Husserl names meaning-bestowing acts (bedeutunggebende Akte).
This necessary transition from cases of simple cognitions to symbolic
intentions leads to the insight that language by itself is not cognition
and that cognition from the very beginning does not have a linguistic
character.
Generally, we also map out cognitive performances at different levels.
First there are simple cognitions such as, ‘that thing there is a tree’, ‘this
banana is ripe’, or ‘this book is green’. What makes them simple is
easier to recognize from the late genetic point of view: they can be
fulfilled with sensibility and the use of non-linguistic types (Typus). The
term ‘types’ denotes a pre-predicative function of our consciousness to
collect our experiences with groups of similar objects that we gain
within our perceptual life. A type entails what most of these objects of
our experience have in common. Thus with the help of the type of a
lemon we know in advance that this object has a certain size and shape
(Gestalt), that it smells fruity from a distance, etc. Types are not con-
cepts for they do not entail a generalization; their contents can be
enriched or changed in further experience.4
Husserl gives some striking analyses for the process of categorial intu-
ition in his sixth Logical Investigation. They form the basis of all higher
order cognitions, like the insight that one event is caused by another
(causal connection of events) or that there is the motive, the will, and

4
  Cf. Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg: Meiner, 1973), §§ 81 ff.; Dieter Lohmar,
Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), c. 3.6.d. and p. 274-79; Lohmar,
Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasie (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2008), c. 6-8.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view37

the ability in a subject to change a special state of affairs in her future

actions (motivational connection of events). I cannot present all of the
details of the process of gaining simple cognition of immediately given
sensual objects.5 Moreover, I will not go into all the details of the
process of meaning-giving acts, as this would take too much space.
Nevertheless, we should gain a rough idea of these activities of our
consciousness.
In explaining this claim, we might begin with the better-known case
of using linguistic expressions to express insights. In the complex inter-
play of meaning-bestowing and intuitive acts providing the evidence for
categorial objects (insights in states of affairs, relations between objects,
etc.), the usual first problem is to adjust the expression to intuition —
i.e., to find the right expression, the expression that ‘fits’ the insight.
Only the correct expression will allow others to know what state of
affairs one is intuiting. Often, we simply know how to express our
insights, but this is not the result of following a clear-cut procedure or
being guided by rules. In trying to adjust the expression to better fit
the intuition we have had, we often only feel that one expression is
closer to ‘what I have in mind’. We usually learn about the use of words
and phrases in the everyday contexts of our community and therefore
we often are unable to say exactly — i.e., in a rule-governed or system-
atic way — why one wording better fits our intended meaning than
another.6
Thus, for Husserl, the relation of categorial intuition to meaning-
bestowing acts is characterized by the difference between the intuition
of states of affairs and empty intentions. For humans, the mode of
empty intentions usually uses scenic phantasmata or linguistic

5
  Cf. Lohmar, “Denken ohne Sprache?”; Lohmar, “Die Funktion des Typus bei Menschen und
Tieren: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der kleinsten Einheit des Erkennens,” in Person: Anthropologische,
phänomenologische und analytische Perspektiven, hrsg. von Inga Römer und Matthias Wunsch (Pader-
born: Mentis, 2013), 147-67.
6
  I will come back to the theme of ‘rightness’ of appropriate expressions. As the sign-meaning
relation is based on associations (as well as the relation: Anzeichen-Angezeigtes) the meaning is associ-
ated with the sign used for expression and the connection is intuitively felt, cf. Husserl, Logical
Investigations, first Logical Investigation, § 4. The orientation of this process of adjusting language
expression to intuition of states of affairs is easily grasped in the corrections of our language expres-
sions in cases when we suddenly realize that they do not exactly fit what we mean.
38 Dieter Lohmar

expressions.7 Clearly, fulfilled and empty intentions are not the same,
but they are connected by a normative rule: language should be a true
and faithful expression of categorial intentions.8 But already the fact that
I have to interpret this relation as a norm or a rule reveals that such
truthfulness and faithfulness is not guaranteed in every case. Often, we
distinctly realize the difficulty of adjusting linguistic judgments to the
evidence in intuition. Husserl coins a special concept for exactly this
relation between expression and intuition. We are striving towards
rightness (Richtigkeit), which means appropriateness between categorial
intuition and expression. Thus rightness designates the degree of appro-
priateness of an expression to the intuitively given cognition. The aim
of rightness of expression is a one-way striving: the expression should
be made appropriate to the intuitively given cognition. Intuition is the
guiding principle for my striving to rightness.9 In contrast to the depen-
dent appropriate expression, categorial intuition is a primary and inde-
pendent givenness. We immediately see the crucial difference here
between the Husserlian approach, according to which cognition is
closely bound to categorical intuition, and other common conceptions
of cognition that insist on the dependence of cognition on propositional
forms of linguistic expression.
The norm of rightness for expressions serves to guarantee the most
important function of expression in my own thinking: rightness allows
me to think about exactly the same insight on another occasion (in the
form of an empty intention). In regards to external and public com-
munication, this norm demands that the right external expression

7
  This is like thinking in line with the sentence “Peter is going to go fishing” or having a phan-
tasmatic scene of him in mind with his fishing-rod on his way to the river — but both without really
seeing him. Empty intentions of states of affairs are intentions that we can have only by understand-
ing what precisely is meant by propositions, when, for example, someone utters a sentence like “I see
a pink elephant flying by the window.” A scenic image of a pink elephant may invoke this object of
perception as well with a vague shape of an elephant and a pink-like phantasma but nevertheless both
intentions are empty in regard to intuitive sensibility for it is only a phantasma or words and not
perception.
8
  They should be a “treuer Ausdruck”, cf. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Husserliana
19.1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 313 ff.
9
  Cf. Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969),
§ 46.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view39

allows another person to emptily think exactly what I intuitively thought

earlier. And this norm not only holds for language but for every medium
of expression.10
With regard to this last insight we seem to be permitted to take
another step towards generalizing the function of a true and faithful
re-establishment of the cognition intended in all its singular elements
and traits. The cognition’s symbolic expression should allow one to once
again think of the same insight. In the case of solitary thinking, this
can be done only by me; in the case of public expression, this can also
be done by others. This quite general description of a principal function
cannot determine whether it is language or another symbolic medium
that must be used to reach this aim. This allows us to recognize very
clearly the basic, primary, and independent performance of low-level
categorial intuition.11 Which particular symbolic medium is used to
fulfill the demands for the function of thinking (language, gesture lan-
guage, scenic phantasmata, etc.) turns out to be a second-order question.
Let us also look at understanding language: we can interpret the lan-
guage used by others as words and sentences that point to the intuition
usually connected with the expression used.
Through this process, we can usually gain a clear idea of the state of
affairs at which the words and judgments aim. We do not take this state
of affairs for granted from the beginning, but we know from our own
experience what we will have to do to gain the requisite intuition con-
cerning these intentions. But this also shows that language and the
intuition of states of affairs are not inseparable. Language is a certain
system for representing states of affairs. This means that we can
create — based on the rules of language use — a representation of the

10
  This is also the case for other ways of expression. What is presupposed is a mutual interest in
the communication of contents. Both sides must be oriented to such social norms, otherwise it will
not work. Cf. also Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication (Cambridge: MIT Press,
2008).
11
  We might suppose that at least in the second step of a categorial intuition — for example,
focusing on the color of an object — the necessary function of language is already involved. This
may often be the case with language-using subjects, although not necessarily. I tend to believe that
the phenomenological analysis of categorial intuition is useful for humans and for non-linguistic
creatures alike, in realizing, for example, that a fruit has a certain color indicating that it is ripe and
tasty.
40 Dieter Lohmar

cognitive intention that can be used in our own further thinking about
the situation and that can become the basis for a quite reliable com-
munication with others regarding the same state of affairs. But a trust-
fully shared intention is not yet intuition of the speaker’s intended state
of affairs. Categorial intuition is, in contrast to linguistic representation,
more basic, originary, and independent. With the help of language, we
can conceive of a state of affairs whereby we have had a previous intu-
ition. In thinking, this is possible even in the absence of a present
intuition. This revitalization of cognitive intentions (together with the
option to modify the intended state of affairs and its context) is, gener-
ally speaking, the basic function of a system of representations. If a
system of representations also allows for communication — as language
does — this is an additional feature in comparison to the system’s basic
function.12 We should thus address systems of representations first at
their basic level, i.e., on the level of solitary thinkers, without immedi-
ately directing our attention to the communicative function.
In opposition to the widespread opinion that cognition and thinking
are closely bound to language, I would like to show that Husserl’s anal-
yses of the relation between intuition in knowledge (categorial intu-
ition) and the connected meaning-bestowing acts leaves room for the
use of alternative non-linguistic systems of representations. My argument
relies on Husserl’s conception of low-level cognition as an independent
act of intuition (categorial intuition). In humans meaning-bestowing

12
  To further advance the claim that thinking and language are separable, which I will argue for
in the whole article, let me mention four connected arguments: phenomenological analysis points
out that the most simple cases of cognition (categorial intuition) are functioning independent from
language-based thinking. Thus cognition without language is possible. Today we know that many
animals have complex cognitive abilities, and as reductive explanations of these abilities — for exam-
ple, following Morgan’s canon — often turn out to be much more complicated and burdened by
more assumptions than explanations that simply accept animals as ‘lonesome,’ non-communicative
thinkers, there must also be thinking without language in animals. In what follows, I will show with
the help of phenomenological means that there is a non-linguistic system of representations for cog-
nitive contents still at work in human consciousness. Thus humans are able to think without lan-
guage and they still do so. By saying this, I do not want to deny that when it comes to humans, we
usually face a strong influence of communication when it comes to the forms of cognition and
thinking. From a developmental point of view in humans the communicative precedes the cognitive
and shapes much of it, but this does not imply that non-language thinking is impossible without this
communicative influence. Even if Wittgenstein is right that there is no private language, this does
not imply that there are no private systems of representation.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view41

acts are closely connected to acts of categorial intuition. However, in

Husserl’s view, meaning-bestowing acts are not a necessary element of
cognition at the lowest level. The case of low-level cognition is a lan-
guage-independent intuition. Thus, there remains a difference, a gap,
between categorial intuition and meaning-bestowing acts — also in the
case of language. This difference allows for the possibility of meaning-
bestowing acts using other symbolic media.
More precisely, we should draw a distinction between, on the one
hand, the most basic acts of categorial intuition whose intuitivity is
more or less only dependent on the sensible intuition and the perfor-
mance of the categorial act itself and, on the other hand, categorial acts
of higher orders, such as what we usually call ‘conclusions’ that we draw
from simple low-level insights. This higher-level cognition calls for a
symbolic representation to move onwards (e.g., in ‘conclusions’ from
what I already know to what I can infer from this). Yet we will see that
even the acts of higher-order knowledge called ‘inferences’ are not nec-
essarily based on the use of language or logic.
In Husserl’s theory of cognition, categorial intuition is the source of
the intuitiveness of cognition, it is a fulfilled intention of states of affairs,
of relations, of the value of an object, etc. On the side of empty catego-
rial intentions we see two functions: first, the ability to intend a cogni-
tive content emptily in the mode of some system of representations, i.e.,
to ‘think’ of it; and secondly, the ability to gain new insights into the
higher level of symbolical represented categorial objects, for example,
while drawing connections between states of affairs. This characterizes
thinking in the broadest sense, the sense in which I will be using the
term for the remainder of this essay.
Let me shortly characterize Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition as
it is worked out as part of his theory of knowledge in the sixth Logical
Investigation. Husserl’s account of categorial intuition clarifies how cat-
egorial intentions, like intentions of states of affairs, are fulfilled.13

13
  The most important sources on the theme of categorial intuition in Husserl are: Ernst Tugend-
hat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), 111-36; Robert
Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition,” in “Phenomenology and the Human Sci-
ences”, supplement, Philosophical Topics 12 (1981): 127‑41; Dieter Lohmar, Phänomenologie der
42 Dieter Lohmar

There are different forms of categorial intentions, each of which has its
particular type of synthetic fulfillment.14 Husserl’s analysis is based on
the difference between simple acts, such as a perception of a book, and
the complex founded categorical acts that we find in all forms of cogni-
tion. The respective ways of fulfillment of simple and complex acts are
also different. We might see a green book and have evident intuition of
this simple object of perception (“I see the green book”). Yet this intu-
ition cannot be identified with the categorial intention “I see that this
book is green”. Categorial intuition of this state of affairs calls for a
series of founding acts, which Husserl describes in § 48 of the sixth
Logical Investigation.
We start this process with the simple perception of the green book,
then we have to concentrate on the green color of the book. In the
transition from the first to the second intention, a registered coincidence
occurs between the respective contents of these intentions: the more
implicit intending of the green color in the case of the simple perception
coincides in intention and in the aspect of sensual fulfillment with the
concentrated intending of the color in the second act. On this actively
constituted basis — a basis that is not merely sensual but rather is a
synthesis of coincidence of intentional contents of founding acts — we are
able to perform a new and intuitive intention of the book being green.
This is the third decisive step in the process of categorial intuition.15
Thus sense perception can contribute to the fulfillment of categorial
intentions — at least in most simple cases — yet it does not have to,
because the decisive basis for intuitivity lies in the actively produced
synthesis of coincidence between intentional contents of the more sim-
ple, i.e., founding, acts. Moreover, this synthesis of coincidence can also

Mathematik (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 44-69; Thomas M. Seebohm, “Kategoriale Anschauung,”

Phänomenologische Forschungen 23 (1990): 9-47, Richard Cobb-Stevens, “Being and Categorial Intu-
ition,” Review of Metaphysics 44 (1990): 43-66; Lohmar, Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken, 178-273;
Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorical Intuition,” 125-45.
14
  In the sixth Logical Investigation Husserl analyzes only some basic forms of categorial intuition
(identification, relations, collections, eidetic abstraction) to show that the concept of categorial intu-
ition is justified, and that these forms can serve as a pattern for analyzing the other forms. Cf. Hus-
serl, Logical Investigations, vol. 1 and 2, §§ 47-52.
15
  For more details, difficulties and possible misunderstandings of the theory of categorial intu-
ition, see Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorical Intuition,” 125-45.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view43

take place between acts that only emptily intend a state of affair, as
happens in the case of the logical, arithmetical, or geometrical axioms.
One of the central characteristics of higher-order cognition is that it
has to be framed in symbols that allow for repetition of the basic insights
(i.e., allows for repetition carried out in mere thinking) and that lead us
to further insights in thinking (e.g., while drawing conclusions).
Although language seems to provide the usual method for such oper-
ations, I would like to convince you that this can also be done by other
symbolic means, for example in pictorial intentions like series of phan-
tasmatic scenes. Moreover, and more importantly, we constantly use
non-linguistic modes of thinking; for us, they constitute the most basic
system of thinking. Thinking in language leads to new insights by con-
necting two sentences or by drawing a conclusion from them. In non-
linguistic thinking our intentions of states of affairs and their relations
are based on phantasmata of these states of affairs. Here we find a way
of thinking that is characteristic for the scenic-phantasmatic system of
non-linguistic thinking. Now I will turn to some examples and discuss
some of the central characteristics of non-linguistic thinking.
In the most common cases of thinking we have a lower-level catego-
rial intuition already connected with a meaning-bestowing act and fre-
quently also with an act of expression. These acts are closely connected,
one may even say melded (or welded) together. I see a cherry tree and
say “this is a cherry tree”. Yet this statistically normal connection of
categorial intuition with a meaning-bestowing act using language is by
no means necessary. Language need not be the representing medium
used in meaning-bestowing acts. Just as we may use a language other
than our mother tongue for this function, so we can also use a different
symbolic medium.

2.  The system of scenic phantasmata as means of thinking

I will now focus on non-linguistic thinking, which is carried

out  through the medium of scenic phantasmata of past and future
events combined with feelings. This symbolic medium is suitable for
44 Dieter Lohmar

representation in solitary thinking, but it cannot be used for public

communication.
Let us start with an example of a scenic phantasma: I may be immersed
in my everyday activities with self-confident optimism, thinking over a
morally problematic action and suddenly notice the phantasma of the
face of a close friend or of my grandfather, looking at me skeptically. It
seems as if he is going to say: “this is not a good way to act; don’t do
it; think it over.” Co-performing his emotional valuing of my plans, I
correct my naïvely optimistic view of my inconsiderate plans and change
my course of action immediately.
Scenic phantasmata are found in our wakeful life, in our dreams, as
well as in daydreams.16 Series of scenic phantasmata occur in relaxed
situations; sometimes they unfold in the form of short “video clips”. In
this way they also give rise to feelings. A close analysis will reveal that
scenic phantasmata are part of the non-linguistic system of symbolic
representations still operative in humans. The emergence of scenic
phantasmata may only be momentary. They may appear like single
views of something meaningful. Even then, however, phantasmata have
narrative elements related to situations and stories. Often they appear
like a short and very condensed video clip, or they consist of a series of
scenic images that are enriched by emotions and valuations; they entail
intentions of other persons, their valuations, and co-feelings of their
emotions.
Scenic phantasmata are not to be thought of as pictures through which
other objects are depicted; they are more like experiential scenes that
appear exactly in the same way as if the person were really looking at
me. Thus — somehow — I am also there, right in the scene, but as the
spectator who is incorporated, perhaps only implicitly, in my special per-
spective on that scene. Most scenic phantasmata are not voluntary, as is
easily seen when visual images suddenly impose themselves upon us.
Before I go into the details of non-linguistic systems of representa-
tion, I would like to sum up what we know about the relation between

16
  Cf. Dieter Lohmar, Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasie (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2008), c. 9
and 12.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view45

the intuition of states of affairs and the different modes of symbolic

representation, which we might use to think about them.
Generally, the connection between language and thinking is not as
strict and inflexible as we tend to believe. Not only can we express our
insights in different languages while still thinking in the medium of
our mother tongue, but we can also think in a language other than
our mother tongue. Most of us are familiar with the following experi-
ence: after spending some days in a foreign country, where a foreign
language is spoken with which we are familiar, our thinking takes the
form of this other language. This example suggests that the level of
language is quite on the surface of the whole phenomenon of cogni-
tion, thinking, symbolic representation, and expression. This is in
accordance with what we already know from the phenomenological
analysis of cognition: while intuition constitutes the most basic level
of cognition, meaning-bestowing acts and expressions constitute the
next level.
Regarding the loose connection between thinking about cognitive
contents and language, we might ask ourselves, counterfactually: per-
haps categorial intuition is primary and independent to such an extent
that there is no real need for a symbolic medium to represent the infor-
mation and to enable a hypothetical manipulation of intuitive cogni-
tion? But this is not the case. In fact, we can hold on to the intuition
of states of affairs only for a short time. After this time we must have
a symbolic medium to hold on to the contents of our cognition. In
using a symbolic medium, the intuition transforms itself either into a
firm conviction (which also obtains a symbolic form) that this state of
affairs is the case, or into a modal modification of this conviction.17
This is just as true for the hypothetical manipulation of future states of
affairs, which we embark upon while thinking through our options.
This characterizes the narrow sense of thinking.
We have seen that a symbolic carrier of a conviction is the presup-
position for the three essential performances of thinking in this narrow

17
  Remember: both need not have a linguistic form. A pictorial symbol combined with a feeling
would work just as well.
46 Dieter Lohmar

sense: (1) the ability to awaken and to retain in our mind the same
object of cognition; (2) the ability to draw further conclusions that stem
from the former cognition; and, (3) the ability to manipulate our future
possibilities (and also ponder different hypotheses concerning the course
of history in the past). These central performances allow me to manip-
ulate the possible future of an object or event in different situations, to
ponder possible consequences of — and solutions to — problems.
Essentially, thinking is an active treatment of the contents of our
cognition.
Thinking must have a medium of symbolic representation. The latter,
however, need not be language. Yet language gives us a hint as to the
most important feature of such a system of symbolic representations: I
must be able to produce the material carriers of symbols at any time.
For example, I must be able to produce spoken or written words at any
time either in public speech or in inner speech. I am only able to think
if the symbolic carrier is always readily at hand. I must be able to pro-
duce the carrier of symbols at any time — either in inner or in outer
sensibility. This carrier must achieve its meaning in a meaning-bestow-
ing act based on the intuitive cognition. This is true for language as for
all other non-linguistic systems of representation. In this regard, the use
of non-linguistic symbols also follows the pattern presented in Husserl’s
theory of meaning.

3.  Two modes of non-linguistic thinking

To be more concrete in the characterization of non-linguistic modes

of thinking, I will shortly discuss some examples of high-level thinking,
which unfolds in a symbolic medium. It should not be forgotten that
this symbolic medium is not language but scenic phantasmata.
At this point we should draw an important distinction between a
slow mode of non-linguistic thinking about complex problems and fast
modes of conclusions drawn from simple cognitions. The slow mode is
characterized by thinking about a problem in a repetition of scenes,
which undergo only small modifications. This way of thinking might
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view47

not be fast, yet it solves truly complex problems, which entail numerous
factors to be varied independently, all of this variations mirroring my
possible alternatives in further acting.
Especially in often-repeated scenes (such as occur in daydreams) we
play out possible solutions to a problem, i.e., we are mentally testing our
options, their usefulness for a solution, and their respective conse-
quences. Scenic phantasmata constitute a great and important part of
our conscious life. Here are a few familiar examples: worries about
urgent challenges or uncertainties give rise to worrisome scenes repeated
over and over leading to sleepless nights. Beside this there are also many
phantasies of having success.
Yet not all problems are so complex that they move me for a long
period of time or compel me to modify my values, habits, actions, etc.
There are easier cases in non-linguistic thinking, which also allow for
a quick decision and a quick conclusion (fast mode).
Let me give you some examples of easy conclusions in the fast mode
of non-linguistic thinking. The sorrowful look of my good friend that
suddenly shows up in a phantasma while thinking about some problem-
atic plan immediately changes my plan and influences my decision:
I should not do this!
We come across the same kind of quick conclusions in cases where
animals are forced to decide on simple tasks in an experimental frame-
work: which cup to take to realize a reward? Is it the one that makes a
noise when shaken, or is it the one that does not make a noise? So we
see that there is also a fast mode of gaining new insights on the basis
of non-linguistic thinking. And we will see that both non-linguistic and
language-based thinking employ phantasmatic scenes.
Let us also consider the very time-consuming slow mode of thinking,
which unfolds in series of replays with slight modifications. This mode
of thinking also leads to a decision or conclusion, which is established
by means of adjusting my feelings to alternative solutions that may solve
the problem, or by arranging my motives and actions in a new way.
This mode of thinking is operative in humans when they have to solve
a complex task, which entails one’s own behavior and valuation. For
example, buying a certain house is such a difficult task.
48 Dieter Lohmar

Scenic phantasmata perform, in their own way, a consistent represen-

tation of our everyday longings, wishes, and fears, but they can also lead
to and represent the solution of quite complex problems. There is a
characteristic way of proceeding in the case of problems I call the slow
mode of non-linguistic thinking that uses the scenic-phantasmatic sys-
tem. This slow mode consists of a kind of repetition of short series of
phantasmatic scenes — we might speak of daydreams in this case —
entailing in each replay a small modification of some of the factors.
This replay-and-modify method of non-linguistic thinking can be inter-
preted as a ‘reasonable’ activity of thinking, dedicated to serious and
complex problems of past, present and future reality.
Why do special sorrowful daydreams have to be repeated? We might
suspect that this is due to our order of relevance for possible events.
Certain daydreams must be experienced over and over again as long as
the urgent needs, tasks, and fears they reflect remain the same and
unaltered. But the repetitions of daydreams do not repeat everything
unaltered; we have to be attentive to small modifications in these rep-
etitions that represent real options in real action.
I will give an example. Most of you have had your own experiences
driving a car in traffic. Think about the following situation: I am being
intimidated by an impertinent and aggressive driver, and I give way to
his demands due to the circumstances. Afterwards, this annoying situ-
ation would reemerge in my daydreams many times, and each time it
would give rise to new feelings of anger. But if you are attentive you will
realize that this ‘repetition’ of daydreams is not always identical. Sober,
reflective self-observation makes me realize, for example, small variations
of my behavior. And after some time, with further replays, it can lead
to the realization of the right reaction: had I done this, it would have
stopped him! However, this insight is irreal, accompanied by feelings of
regret, and it cannot change the past. But it is nevertheless a kind of
action on future reality, a plan: if a similar situation were to recur, I
would be able to act appropriately and to resist the unjust demands.18

18
  The result of this active manipulation of the future is a kind of ideal picture of the solution of
problems like this one under given circumstances. Nevertheless, the result of the successful manipu-
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view49

The same is true for events that I am anxiously expecting. The resulting
scene is a plan for the future, and it is a consequence of thinking through
the situation on the basis of my experiences. Nevertheless, it may turn
out that the best solution is a change in my behavior: don’t be so dog-
matic in everyday circumstances. Avoid conflicts like this! There is no
real benefit in this! In such a way, I draw consequences from problematic
experiences by replaying them in phantasy and on this basis finding out
what the most appropriate solution would be.
This slow mode of proceeding in non-linguistic thinking is quite
broadly spread in solving complex problems where there are several
uncertain factors like the probability of different future developments,
different options of influencing a situation by my own behavior, etc.
We may think of complex decisions such as renting or buying a house,
decisions that oblige us to go through a series of alternatives that we
have to ponder so as to find out which solution will meet our disposi-
tions best. For example, if I hate being bound by significant debts I
would tend to rent a house. If I am a person who tries to avoid conflicts
with neighbors at all costs, I will rent a single unit detached house, but
if I like the contact with neighbors but at a certain distance I will rent
or buy a row home, etc. If I have to make this kind of decision, the
alternatives will appear again and again while I try to find out which
of the possible alternatives fits me best.
Even if we have the ability to think by means of language, it is very
difficult to avoid this slow mode of thinking. This is due to the prin-
cipal difficulty of linguistic systems: propositions can only connect two
or three elements in a relation. Therefore, everything that is more com-
plex, such as the decision to buy a house or to marry one’s partner,
cannot be done in a reasonable way in linguistic modes. But we should
also keep in mind that this time-consuming slow mode of decision-
making cannot be used in all situations. There must also be methods
of solving simple problems in a reasonable time with the help of the
non-linguistic system of scenic phantasmata.

lation of a flop (reframing) is often communicated afterwards untruly as a story to cover my failure,
to stand the criticism of my boss, a confrontation in traffic, etc.
50 Dieter Lohmar

Given the need to act quickly, everyday situations call for the possibil-
ity of quick judgment. I will discuss two examples of the fast mode of
higher-order cognition regarding two important basic cases of this
thinking: causal and motivational relations. My examples stem from
everyday circumstances and partly from experimental work in the field
of comparative psychology.
Let me start with a simple task: on a table we see an experimenter
handling two slats and a grape. He presents us the problem: one slat
lies flat on the table and the other one is disoriented, perhaps held up
by something that might be below it. Then the experimenter asks us to
choose one of the slats: where is the reward? I know that we can solve
this problem immediately, but how did we solve it? Now take a look at
the phantasmatic side of this example — i.e., the phantasmata in your
own experience.
This phantasmatic look is possible and highly productive because
former experience provides us with knowledge of the properties of
things. Our former experience with special things shows up in the form
of phantasmata. Consider in this regard seeing someone bite into a
lemon. You will immediately experience a phantasma in your mouth,
which is quite informative about the properties of this thing and its sour
taste. The same is true about causal effects and causal properties of
things. You look at the lemon, nothing happens, but then someone bites
the lemon and suddenly there comes into being a phantasma of its usual
taste in your mouth. This reaction is based on your experience: it pro-
vides you with knowledge of what it means to bite a lemon. An inex-
perienced child will not have such an experience. The same is true for
the usual succession of effects or events following an action of one body
on another body. It will show up in our phantasmata in the same way.
This function is to be regarded as a foresight of a future event. More-
over, this future event cannot be sensed but only thought of phantas-
matically.
A similar situation is presented in the case of a slat that is appearing
in an angular way probably caused by something that is below it and
upholding it. I cannot sense the actual cause. However, since I know
that shortly before there was a grape on the experimenter’s table, it is
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view51

highly probable (although not certain) that the grape is the cause of the
displacement of the slat.
But how can I think of this cause of the disorientation of the slat in
non-linguistic modes? As I know from my own experience, grapes have
a certain resistance and elasticity. The same is true of the thin wooden
slats: I know their physical properties based on my own use of them.
We should not think in terms of physical properties in this case. It is
more like a ‘habit of things’ under well-known circumstances, which I
know in advance. Therefore, I know that they can hold up a slat under
small pressure, and this is exactly what I can ‘see’ in a phantasmatic
mode: the grape is lying under the angular lying slat on the table. In
reality, I can only really see the angular slat, yet I phantasmatically add
the unseen cause in phantasmatic modes.
However, the cause of the changed orientation of the slat can only be
given to me in probable and not absolute evidence because the changed
orientation of the slat could have been triggered by other causes. For
example, there may have been other objects beneath it or the experi-
menter’s hidden hands might have played some joke on me. Yet my
overall experience tells me that it is highly probable that the grape is
the cause and therefore I think of it and its effect on the orientation of
the slat in a phantasmatic way. I therefore believe in the existence of the
grape under the slat because I ‘see’ it phantasmatically. My choice
expresses my certainty about the true cause of the changed orientation
of the slat.19
Now I would like to discuss another case of non-linguistic thinking.
This case concerns the succession of events as effect of a motivational
connection. Here is the example: my colleague lives in a house, which
is divided into several flats inhabited by groups of students. Once, when

19
  From experimental research in the decision making of other members of the primate group
(experiments with chimpanzees, done by Josep Call) we know that the degree of certainty with
which the angular slat will be chosen is around 80 %. Cf. Josep Call, “Understanding Apes to
Understand Humans: The Case of Object-Object Relations,” in Towards a Theory of Thinking: Build-
ing Blocks for a Conceptual Framework, ed. Britt Glatzeder, Vinod Goel, and Albrecht von Müller
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2010), 215-30; Josep Call, “Apes Know that Hidden Objects Can Affect the
Orientation of Other Objects,” Cognition 105 (2007): 1-27. This reveals that chimps understand
causal relations.
52 Dieter Lohmar

she came home late, she placed her bike in the entry hall of the build-
ing making sure that the bike was not in anybody’s way. While locking
up the bike, a phantasmatic scene suddenly flashed in her mind: an
athletic student living on the third floor was looking at her and grin-
ning, as he was letting air out of her tires. After ‘seeing’ this scene
phantasmatically, she immediately changed her plans. She took her bike
outside away from the house and locked it up there instead.
What is the content of this phantasmatic scene? What is its meaning?
And how does it lead to the conclusion and the action that follows?
First, you should know that her phantasma is related to the pre-history
of interaction with the students form the third floor. Once she inter-
rupted a very loud party around 4 a.m. There is a longing for revenge
among some of the students from the third floor, and this feeling
appears to be especially prevalent in the student she saw phantasmati-
cally. The phantasmatic scene represents two aspects: the motive for
revenge (witnessed in the grinning and hateful look) and the chance to
realize this revenge without being watched. Thus, if we want to spell
out the ‘message’ of this short phantasmatic scene in words, we might
say that the student wanted to play out his revenge if he ever had a
chance to do so unobserved. Therefore, my colleague’s decision to lock
up her bike out of his reach in the morning is quite reasonable. It entails
a reasoning process and a conclusion: if one takes precautions and
makes sure that the revengeful act cannot be committed, it won’t take
place, not even if there is a strong wish to commit it. This way of think-
ing about motivational effects enables a quick conclusion and action.
The full phantasmatic scene not only displays the hateful look,
thereby making the motive obvious, but also the concrete way to realize
the revenge. Therefore, what we face here is not just a simple memory
of the person. Rather, we face a plan and a possible way to realize it.
The scene itself is not realistic because it only displays someone else’s
future plans. There are distinct signs of its irreality, like the fact that
the student looks at her. Yet we see that there is a big difference between
the slow mode of proceeding while dealing with truly complex prob-
lems and such easy conclusions as this one. Both examples show that
we can also draw quick conclusions in the scenic-phantasmatic system.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view53

But we also see that these problems are not really complex for they do
not ask for the slow mode of thinking with all of its replays and mod-
ifications. Moreover, you will surely see that all of this is only a small
part of the whole story of non-linguistic thinking.20

4. A look at animals: the slow mode of non-linguistic

reasoning in empirical research on dreaming rats

At the end you might ask why I am so certain that there is something
analogous between how non-human and human animals think non-
linguistically. Such a view might derive from a strong personal conviction
that there is little difference between humans and animals. However, it
is also based on the well-established method of genetic phenomenology
which investigates low-level modes of cognition and thinking. More-
over, further evidence from the hard sciences points in the same
direction. Remember our discussion of the slow mode of non-linguistic
reasoning concerning complex problems. There is some evidence, which
suggests that we can also find this method of solving complex problems
with replays and variations in animals.
Most highly developed mammals can dream. This we know from
their emotional reactions and their attempts to act, which they demon-
strate while they sleep. We interpret these responses as dreamed epi-
sodes prolonging wakeful states of action and aims. Higher cerebral
mammals are also capable of daydreaming. They can identify events
with relative precision and often visually replay difficult situations they
were confronted with or they expect to be confronted with again in the
future. Nonetheless, these theses need to be corroborated by empirical
research, and I have to confess that I did not think it likely that there
were serious researchers in neurology interested in the daydreams among
animals. Therefore, I was very surprised to find out that in the last
decade there has been some intensive research in this field, although

20
  Cf. my monograph Denken ohne Sprache.
54 Dieter Lohmar

daydreams were not the explicit subject matter of this research from the
very beginning.
Therefore, we will examine recent research in the so-called replay
events in the hippocampus of mammals (mostly rats) with the method
of single neuron tracing. In the beginning, these investigations revolved
around the hypothesis that short-term memory is somehow fixated or
consolidated in long-term memory with the help of these replays in the
hippocampus. But we will see that these experiments also allow for an
interpretation of such replays in terms of daydreams and their careful
modifications useful for planning future action.
The method of these experiments is single neuron tracing, which
allows for a statistically reliable identification of some quite simple con-
tents of consciousness. In most studies the neuronal activity in small
regions of the hippocampus of rats seeking to orient themselves in dif-
ferent kinds of mazes (labyrinth) is analyzed, for example, in simple
mazes that have only few characteristic regions, A, B, C, D. The first
results emphasized that the factually experienced course of events is
replayed in rats not only in dream states,21 but also in relaxed wakeful
states.22 The situation in which replay events occur was shown to be
widely independent of original occasion.23
Further findings suggest that there is a synchronous parallel activ-
ity in visual centers, so that we might interpret the replays also as a kind
of visually represented replay activity,24 i.e., a kind of repeated

21
  Cf. Matthew A. Wilson and Bruce L. McNaughton, “Reactivation of Hippocampal Ensemble
Memories During Sleep,” Science 265 (1994): 676-79; K. Louie and M.A. Wilson, “Temporally
Structural Replay of Awake Hippocampal Ensemble Activity during Rapid Eye Movement Sleep,”
Neuron 29 (2001): 145-56; Albert K. Lee and Matthew A. Wilson, “Memory of Sequential Experi-
ence in the Hippocampus during Slow Wave Sleep,” Neuron 36 (2002): 1183-94, William E. Skaggs
and Bruce L. McNaughton, “Replay of Neuronal Firing Sequences in Rat Hippocampus During
Sleep Following Spatial Experience,” Science 271 (1996): 1870-73.
22
 Cf. David J. Foster and Matthew A. Wilson, “Reverse Replay of Behavioural Sequences in
Hippocampal Place Cells during the Awake State,” Nature 440 (2006): 680-83.
23
  Cf. Thomas J. Davidson, Fabian Kloosterman, and Matthew A. Wilson, “Hippocampal Replay
of Extended Experience,” Neuron 63 (2009): 497-507, Mattias P. Karlsson and Loren M. Frank,
“Awake Replay of Remote Experiences in the Hippocampus,” Nature Neuroscience 12, no. 7 (2009):
913-18.
24
  Cf. Daoyun Ji and Matthew A. Wilson, “Coordinated Memory Replay in the Visual Cortex
and Hippocampus during Sleep,” Nature Neuroscience 10, no. 1 (2007): 100-107.
non-linguistic thinking — from a phenomenological point of view55

daydreaming. More refined experimental arrangements show that the

order of wakefully replayed events is not fixed; it can occur in the form
of forward as well as backward replays.25 Thus a modification of such
allegedly merely reproductive “replays” is possible (in my understanding
this is something we should expect from daydreams that are useful for
planning). If the design of the maze was changed into a combination
of two mazes overlapping in part, it was even possible to find (re-)
plays26 that referred to an alternative path through the maze and there
were even (re-)plays of routes that the animals had never experienced
before.27 Therefore, this appears to be a planning activity.
All of this is not a proof for the hypothesis that animals are using
scenic visualization for thinking about and planning activities, but it
does encourage this hypothesis and offers a point of access for further
research that might explore this question more closely.
We might therefore claim that a system of representations, which
combines scenic phantasmata and feelings, is operative in dreams and
wakeful states in higher cerebralized mammals up to primates in the
same way as in humans. This claim, however, is only an important
consequence of my investigations into the different systems of represen-
tations in humans. Nevertheless, the hypothesis concerning animal
thinking is not mere fancy because, as the phenomenological analysis
reveals, it characterizes an important dimension of our own thinking.
Thus, through these phenomenological analyses we might find out in
which ways we are still thinking like animals. The evidence for such
hypotheses stems in the first place from the phenomenology of human
consciousness, but it also rests on the confirmation, which derives from
other methods and other sciences.

25
 Cf. David J. Foster and Matthew A. Wilson, “Reverse Replay of Behavioural Sequences”;
Kamran Diba and György Buzsáki, “Forward and Reverse Hippocampal Place-cell Sequences Dur-
ing Ripples,” Nature Neuroscience 10 (2007): 1241-42; Thomas J. Davidson, Fabian Kloosterman,
and Matthew A. Wilson, “Hippocampal Replay of Extended Experience,” Neuron 63 (2009): 497-
507.
26
  It is reasonable to avoid the reproductive implications of ‘replay’ from this point on.
27
  Cf. Anoopum S. Gupta et al., “Hippocampal Replay is Not a Simple Function of Experience,”
Neuron 65 (2010): 695-705; Dori Derdikman and May-Britt Moser, “A Dual Role for Hippocampal
Replay,” Neuron 65 (2010): 582-84; James J. Knierim, “Imagining the Possibilities: Ripples, Routes,
and Reactivation,” Neuron 63 (2009): 421-23.
56 Dieter Lohmar

Is this still phenomenology? It might appear that we have strayed too

far from the centre of phenomenological research that consists in eidetic
analyses of acts of consciousness. Did we leave the eidetic homeland of
phenomenology for the sake of results from empirical sciences on non-
linguistic creatures? I think not, because our main interest is human
non-linguistic thinking. And one glimpse at Husserl’s theory of pre-
predicative experience in Experience and Judgement (1939), which deals
with an independent layer of consciousness’ performances producing
pre-forms of knowledge, reveals that we are still in the core of phenom-
enological research of consciousness; because one of the reasons why
such experience is named pre-predicative is that we can have it without
language.28

Keywords: thinking, non-linguistic thinking, phantasy, phenomenology of

thinking.

Summary:

Even if most of our actual thinking appears to us in the form of our mother
tongue, the level of language is neither the only nor the basic level of our thinking.
In this paper I will argue that there is a deeper level of thinking that we also use,
which is usually only expressed by means of language. The basic way of thinking is
non-linguistic and it can be established by a careful analysis of the vivid life of our
phantasy activity in thinking about relevant problems.

28
  For a discussion of prepredicative experience, cf. Lohmar, Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken,
c. 3.6 and 3.7.