In Re: Edilion

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels
him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in
order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed
to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has
jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may
compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M.
No. 1370. May 9, 2005

Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues
from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he
worked at the Civil Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law
profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP
annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the
profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights
bereft of due process of the law.

Issues:

1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive
in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working
abroad from 1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property without
due process?

Held:

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary has
inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program
without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is]
clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court
to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege,
and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

FACTS:

Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.He was also cited in the
complaint as not paying his professional tax or PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his
pleadings filed in court. It was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060”
where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently
promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafabut was appealed
pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his
IBP dues.

RATIO:

Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of
IBP dues. Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR. V. ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.

FACTS:

On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the
disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for filing a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss
that contained abusive, offensive and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon
presented a falsified document in court. The said document purported to be a notarized document
executed at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

Moreover, on December 19, 2000, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon
saying, “Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, angabogadonarito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwina kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito” at the Municipal Trial Court in Daet before
the start of a hearing.

The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act;
yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter
in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel
and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The
Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of
Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon,
as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of
evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it.
The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks
imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of
hearing. On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting and approving
the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only
one year.

ISSUE:

DID THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE IBP INVESTIGATING

COMMISSIONER ERR IN FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST
HIM AND IF THE PENALTY IMPOSED WAS JUSTIFIED?

HELD:

The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and finds no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to
Atty. Barandon the falsification of an affidavit without evidence that the document had indeed
been falsified. Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum
and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. The Court has
constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial
nature of our legal system.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Several
disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before
the start of a court hearing and Atty. Ferrer failed to show convincing evidence denying the said
charge against him.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to
maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court,
was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold. Consequently, the
penalty of suspension of one from the practice of law is deemed just and proper.

Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan

Facts:

Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology filed for the
disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The petition stated that respondent, in
notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of
the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter
his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and
offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a penalty of
P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

Contention of the petitioner: He did not know that the rule is to be applied strictly in notarizing
documents because some of his colleagues are not doing it.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper

Held:

Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before them a number corresponding to the one in their
register and to state therein the page or pages of their register, on which the same is recorded.”
Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries
public.

Canon 5 is also violated because the canon states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of
the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence
which the respondent failed to satisfy by not.

With regard to the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, the Supreme Court
held that it was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on
the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have
possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does
not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.

PNB V UY TENG PIAO

VICKERS; 1932

NATURE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

FACTS

- Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations at the CFI
of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the
defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three months from
the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage properties should be sold at auction
in accordance with law and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment.

- The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by the
sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer.

- On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latter’s right to redeem one
of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos
for P8,600.

- The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was credited to the
account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300.

- On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of the balance of the
judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent per annum.

- The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to redeem the first property
resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment.

- The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its officer, a
certain Mr. Pecson.
- Hence this appeal

ISSUES

1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment

2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case

HELD

1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the defendant, that the
bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the
condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank through
its board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the agreement.

2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and witness in a trial is
not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this case
can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they are to testify as required by the case,
they should withdraw from the active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of
the Code of Legal Ethics.

Disposition: The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum
of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be reckoned from
August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant.

Domingo Austria vs. Hon. Antonio C. Masaquel

G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Doctrinal Digest:
It is not an act of willful disregard and disobedience to the court which constitutes direct contempt
when a plaintiff requests his counsel to approach respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to
him to refrain from hearing the case on the new trial on the belief that the latter is impartial because
the adverse party’s lawyer was once the Judge’s associate in court.

Story Line:

Box 1: (Scene –Judge Masaquel decided that the land subject if the case belongs to the plaintif,
the latter immediately filed a motion for execution of judgment and prayed they hold possession
of the land.)

Judge Masaquel: This court after appreciation of the facts and pieces of evidence presented by the
parties renders that the land subject of this case belongs to Domingo Austria, the plaintiff.)

Counsel for Austria: Your Honor, may we move for the immediate execution of the judgment and
we pray that my client be given the possession of the land.

Judge Masaquel: Granted!

Box 2: (Scene – Atty. Mariano Sicat, a previous associate of Judge Masaquel entered as new
counsel of the defendant.)

Atty. Sicat: Your Honor, I am appearing as new counsel for the defendants. My client wants to
stay the execution of the judgment, we will file a supersedeas bond to stay the execution.

Judge Masaquel: Granted counsel!

Box 3: (Scene- Pedro Bravo, the defendant in the civil case, boasts to his neighbors that with his
new lawyer he will surely win the case. This was overheard by Domingo Austria.)

Pedro Bravo: Oh ano mga kapitbahay! Sa bago kong abogado siguradong sa akin mapupunta yang
lupa na yan! Malakas ang kapit eh!

Domingo Austria: I smell something fishy! Sabi ko na eh, yung bagong abogado nyan may kapit
dun sa judge.

Box 4: (Scene –Mr. Austria asks his counsel to talk with Judge Masaquel in his chamber and
request that he inhibit from further hearing the case. Judge was offended and cited Mr. Austria in
direct contempt.)
1st Scene:

Counsel for Mr. Austria: Your Honor, my apologies but my client is requesting that you inhibit
yourself from further hearing this case.

Judge Masaquel: What?! Mamaya sa courtroom tatanungin ko yang client mo kung anong
pumasok sa isip niya bakit niya ko pinag-iinhibit!

2nd Scene:

Judge Masaquel: Mr. Austria, why did you ask your counsel to request me to inhibit from further
hearing this case? What are your grounds?

Mr. Austria: Your Honor, it appears that you and the new counsel for the defendant have some
professional relationship and I think that prevents you from being impartial in hearing this case.

Judge Masaquel: Really? Well your intuition is not one of the grounds for my inhibition. This
offends me as a judge and my integrity. I will cite you in direct contempt!

Box 5: (Scene – Mr. Austria files a petition for certiorari with the SC questioning the validity of
the order citing him in direct contempt.)

Counsel for Mr. Austria: Your Honor, we are filing a petition for certiorari questioning the validity
of the order citing my client in direct contempt.

SC Justice: This petition is meritorious. It is not an act of willful disregard and disobedience to the
court which constitutes direct contempt when a plaintiff requests his counsel to approach
respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case on the new
trial on the belief that the latter is impartial because the adverse party’s lawyer was once the
Judge’s associate in court.