Heirs of Andora v.

Reyes
G.R. No. L-60549

Fact:

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, the defendants filed their respective
Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration, manifestation adopting the
answer.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use,
that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property
for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since
the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank,
Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA
to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession.

Issue: Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in the
taking of private property for the promotion of tourism?

RULLING:

No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded
to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The expressions of national
policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential
Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. — To acquire
by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for
tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas declared
as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d) protection of water shed
areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for any other purpose expressly
authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to exercise the power of eminent domain
under its own name, which shall proceed in the manner prescribed by law and/or the
Rules of Court on condemnation proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of
payment which it may deem expedient and acceptable to the land owners: Provided, that
in case bonds are used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter
III, Section 8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.
 Grego v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125955

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct.
Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco
sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his
opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position
since he had been “removed from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant
to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160. For a third time, Basco was elected councilor
in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995, petitioner Grego filed
with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing
and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor
for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the
seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office. COMELEC resolved to dismiss the
petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution was
later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not
agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony
with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement
said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which
Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed
the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have
used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Borja v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 133495

FACTS:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros in 1988 for a term ending in
1992. In 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms,
from 1992 to 1998. In 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already
served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible
to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco
disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation
of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

RULLING:

No, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election
because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only
continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s
assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than
of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any
term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution
did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a
third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the
right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.

Subic Bay v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military
reservation into alternative productive uses. On November 24, 1992, the American navy
turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,
petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the
sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang

Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as
required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and
submitted such to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed
a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents resorted
to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance. On February 1, 1995, the
President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ
including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution
No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing
for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
ISSUES: Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or
repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10. Whether or not the questioned local initiative
covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

RULING:

YES, COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to
a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description “referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body
of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand,
referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which
has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on
the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people; hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.

The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the
proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should
the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only
when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is
merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not
hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However,
it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or
lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is
really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court
could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.

Macasiano Vs. Diokno

Gr No. 97764

FACTS:

On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the
closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was
authorized to enter into a contract to any service cooperative for the establishment,
operation, maintenance and management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because
of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement with the municipality of
Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls
were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan

Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were
later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10
days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, respondents filed with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with
damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The court
issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter pending
the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the

lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

RULLING:

Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public
use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from
the requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show
that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service.
When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property
of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can
use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might lawfully use
or conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used
for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case,
the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease
it to private persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void.

SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

GR No. 102782

FACTS:

In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations
was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the
case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that
even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed
by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of
driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the
PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license
plates of illegally parked vehicles.

Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court
issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit
separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling.
The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the
power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions).
The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure
was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses
for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged
impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its
validity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare
Clause embodied in the LGC

RULLING:

No,The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of
the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to
the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before
us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted
principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance,
to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with
public policy.

At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments
by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the
exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments
in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions
prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.
 Binay vs Domingo
GR. No. 92389

FACTs:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not
exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the
implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public
purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a
few individuals.

ISSUES: Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general welfare clause. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose.
Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

RULLING:

The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which

was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et
ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is
inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature
which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal governments
exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed
with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall
be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein.

Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal
corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the
duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare
of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which
exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited

number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise
of police power in the promotion of the common good.

There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably

classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our
legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted
under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a
relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those
who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken
as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.