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Afghanistan is a landlocked country in South Asia bordering China, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Spanning over 652,000 square miles, the majority-Muslim country's geography can be divided into
the highlands, the northern plains and the southwestern plateau. Mountains are Afghanistan's dominant geographic
feature, with the Hindu Kush range running at a southwestern angle and roughly dividing the country in half. The
four most important cities are the capital Kabul in the east, Kandahar in the south, Herat in the west, and Mazar-i-
Sharif in the north. Because of its location, the country functions as a bridge between energy-rich Central Asia and
energy-deficient South Asia. Afghanistan's primary geographic challenge is resisting the intervention of outside
powers while also maintaining authority over a mostly rural society spread across a rugged landscape. Afghanistan's
location at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent has historically invited
external actors, resulting in a country containing diverse languages, cultures and ethnicities. Indeed, Afghan society
includes significant populations of Pashtun, Tajiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Each of these groups share
populations in a neighbouring country, encouraging external involvement.
For many centuries, Afghanistan has been a natural corridor for conquerors and traders that moved troops or goods
from West to East, between Middle East and India, and the other way around. This was the path chosen by
Alexander the Great, 328 years before Christ. Nowadays, Afghanistan is more than a corridor; it’s a crossroad of
routes in Asia.
The political, economic, social and military life of the Afghan State, of 652.000 square km of surface, is conditioned
by the Hindu Kush mountainous massif which has 600 km in length and ranges the whole country from northeast to
southwest. These mountains part a great amount of territory and hinder communications between the various
provinces; in addition, the harsh continental climate during winter favours the tribe’s importance over the central
government and frequently constrains the state action to the capital and its whereabouts. Traditionally, the terrain
has helped the asymmetrical strategies, particularly the use of the guerrilla. In the depth of the valleys, it’s easy to
find refuge among a population that must manage autonomously the services which, like security, should be
provided by the State itself. The communication problem is worse in the North.
The external borders aren’t natural and lack any type of control; that’s why they are prone to illegal traffic of
weapons, drugs and human beings. Its length is directly proportional to its interrelationships with its neighbours. In
Afghanistan converge three geopolitical regions, where many civilizations reside:
• In the East: Pakistan where 90 % of its Muslim population is Sunni and the 7 % is Shia.
• In the North: the plains of Central Asia are crossed by the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers
where we can see the Orthodox Christian civilization among the main religion, the Islam. We mustn’t forget China
and its ancient culture that each day gains influence in the area.
In the west: the plateaus of Persian Iran with its Shia influence and where there’s also Sunni Muslims from the
Arabian Peninsula. Afghanistan emerges as one of the results of the Great Game; this is the name of the geostrategic
dispute that held the British and the Russian empires in Central Asia during the 19th century. As they were unable to
conquer Afghanistan, these powers agreed on leaving it as a neutral state between both empires.
The Wakhan corridor, located in the Pamir Mountains, north-east of Afghanistan, and in the extreme of which is
situated China, is the strongest signal of the intent of preventing an armed confrontation between these powers.
China’s border, one of the highest of the world, remains closed during at least five months a year due to the snow.
However, this path can have an important role in the future as energy corridor for the layout of the alternative gas
and oil pipes to the current ones that transport energy products to China.
Until the opening of the Salang tunnel by the Soviets in 1964, the pass between Kabul and the north of the country
was very precarious. This tunnel is an important step and has been under attack many times.
The borders of modern-day Afghanistan were drawn during the 19th century to carve out a space between the
British and Russian empires. Afghanistan's most contentious boundary is with Pakistan and is called the Durand Line.
Afghanistan disputes the border, claiming that its true boundary should absorb Pakistan's Pashtun-majority region.
This fuels the antagonism between the two countries and plays a role in Afghanistan's broader challenge of asserting
sovereignty as outside actors try to advance their own interests. What’s more, there are several POL/MIL
organizations in the area that contribute to its stability and that we must take into account when searching for
Afghanistan’s conflict resolution.
In the 20th century, during the Cold War, Afghanistan was the scenario of the rivalry of two other empires, this time
the Soviet and the American empires. The United States planned an encircling strategy against the USSR’s
expansionism known as Kennan’s containment strategy. Therefore, when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in
1979, the Americans reacted supporting the insurgency that was fought to drive away the Soviets. Nowadays, in the
Afghan conflict there are external factors involved even though this time the situation is far more complex, especially
due to its bigger volume. It’s imperative to analyse the interests and the roles of all geopolitical and geostrategic
actors present in all conflicts occurring in a buffer state. Although, in the past Afghanistan could maintain a certain
degree of neutrality thanks to its geographical situation, over the last 31 years it hasn’t known peace. In 1931, the
USSR and the King of Afghanistan signed a non-aggression treaty, in order to strengthen the neutrality. The dynamic
of the Cold War caused the USSR to intervene politically in Afghanistan more and more often until 1979 when the
Soviet troops crossed the border with the pretext of protecting the Afghan communist Government at that moment.
Hopes for a lasting peace settlement in Afghanistan between the U.S.-backed government in Kabul and the insurgent
Taliban appear to be at their highest point in years. U.S. and Taliban officials meeting in Qatar for a fourth round of
talks that started Jan. 21 and lasted most of the week both reported significant progress on a draft accord that
includes a proposal for a U.S. troop withdrawal and a Taliban cease-fire, sticking points that have derailed previous
efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution to the years long conflict in the country.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born diplomat leading the U.S. negotiating team, travelled to Kabul this week to discuss
the mechanics of the tentative agreement with Ashraf Ghani, president of the U.S.-backed Afghan unity government,
which has been left out of the talks thus far. Despite the progress of the talks, Khalilzad emphasized that the parties
have yet to reach an accord and would not finalize a deal until "everything" is agreed upon, including a
comprehensive nationwide cease-fire between the Taliban and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.
The Taliban have categorically rejected Ghani's previous olive branches, as they consider his government an
illegitimate entity propped up by foreign support. But securing Ghani’s blessing will be vital before any peace
initiative can move forward since the ultimate cessation of hostilities will first require an understanding between
Kabul and the Taliban. The movement’s representatives are currently conferring with their senior leaders in Pakistan
to discuss their next steps, and talks between the warring parties are expected to resume in February. At this stage,
Khalilzad and Ghani's shared goal will focus on compelling the Taliban to overcome their long-standing opposition to
speaking directly with the Afghan government. Without their willingness to do so, the negotiations will falter. In this
phase of the peace process, the goal will be an agreement that compels all sides to cease combat so that the long
and protracted process of shaping the post-conflict government can begin.
In the annual forecast, Stratfor assessed the likelihood of a successful negotiation in 2019: "The Taliban will express
more serious interest in negotiations, but talks will only begin if NATO commits to a drawdown, which is unlikely
next year given concerns that the Afghan army isn't strong enough to handle security on its own."
While the first point remains on track — Washington’s willingness to discuss a drawdown undoubtedly induced the
Taliban to take up the talks — the second point was off the mark. To be sure, the current agreement is a draft that
lacks consensus on critical details in its current form. And it's possible that the nascent peace process will still
collapse if the sides fail to reach a compromise on conditions for a cease-fire or over an as-yet unforeseen
circumstance. The Taliban want all foreign troops to leave the country before they will consider halting combat
operations, while the United States insists that it will not withdraw before a cease-fire is in place.
Nevertheless, Stratfor underestimated the impact that the great power competition with China and Russia would
have on shaping Washington’s continued involvement in Afghanistan. It’s true that Afghan security and defence
forces must still overcome organizational and operational deficits that, for now, require support from NATO advisers.
But the White House’s concerted effort to seek an exit from Afghanistan means it is ready to act on a key reality: The
stalemate between Kabul and the Taliban is essentially frozen — and unlikely to change in the near future. This
makes the benefits of seeking an agreement with the Taliban, however imperfect and risky, greater than the cost of
maintaining the current stalemate. After all, rather than a military victory, the purpose of the current U.S. strategy is
to apply pressure to the insurgents on the battlefield to force the Taliban's leadership to choose to negotiate.
Afghanistan is positioned at the junction of several nuclear powers aiming to be regional leaders, such as China,
Pakistan, India, Russia and Iran. The latter, despite not having an atomic arsenal, wants to be treated as a nuclear
country, because they have the uranium enrichment technology necessary to develop this capacity. This group of
neighbour countries grants Afghanistan a special interest.
Russia leads the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), founded in 2002 and to which also belong Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined in 2006 completing the geopolitical region and, as
the Secretary-General of the CSTO, Nikolay Bordyuzha, said: “Uzbekistan’s decision to re-join the CSTO changes
radically the geopolitical situation not only in Central Asia, but in all the post-Soviet territory”. The CSTO has a
mutual defence clause, the deterrent capacity of which contributes to the stability of all the area of North
Afghanistan against potential attacks, including the terrorist ones. Copying the NATO, this organization has created
the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF), the efficiency of which hasn’t been proved yet, taking into account that the
Uzbek Government didn’t want to participate.
For its part, China leads in coordination with Russia the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are also part. Afghanistan has participated as distinguished guest
in the last meetings; this constitutes a political support to the Government of President Hamid Karzai. Among the
priority objectives of the SCO are ensuring stability and combating “terrorism, separatism and extremism”. That is,
the organization has assumed as its own the Chinese conception of fighting against “the three evil forces”; this is
how Beijing names the Uyghur independence in the autonomous region of Uyghur Xinjiang. However, the SCO has a
bigger dimension, since, as it is established in its Founding Charter, its objectives are: “to strengthen mutual trust,
friendship and good neighborliness between the member States; to encourage the efficient cooperation in such
spheres as politics, trade and economy, environment protection, culture, science and technology, education, energy,
and also other spheres; to consolidate multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace,
security and stability in the region and promotion of a new democratic, fair and rational political and economic
international order”.
The fact that Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members of the CSTO and the SCO provides great
stability to this region in the North of Afghanistan. Despite the problems between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, all
these former members of the USSR, along with China, are committed to fight against international terrorism. What’s
more, the leadership of two emerging powers such as Russia and China is trying to remove the USA of this area.
Russia aims to be the power again politically controlling the territories of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia
The five republics of Central Asia, the four mentioned above and Turkmenistan, participate in the NATO’s
Partnership for Peace Program. There is no doubt that the Alliance has a high degree of implication to assist the
Afghan Government through the ISAF, to maintain security in the country, to facilitate the extension of the
Government’s control and to support the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
The bilateral relations that the USA has been establishing in Central Asia after the September 11 attacks have shown
the strategic importance that this region has for the Americans. Uzbekistan’s Government of the President Islam
Karimov and Bush Administration signed an agreement for the use of the Karhi-Khanabad base by the American Air
Force, until November 2005 when they had to leave the base at the request of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s petition to
denounce the agreement with the USA was made public for the first time at the Summit of the SCO held in July 2005
in Astana; this was interpreted as the organization’s first positioning against the US presence in Central Asia.
In Kyrgyzstan, the American agreed to use Manas base. However, with Russia’s resurgence and China’s raising, the
US activities in this area are beginning to make uncomfortable both powers; despite the interest they share to
combat international terrorism.
Afghanistan has nearly 29 millions of inhabitants that have lived during 31 years in wartime; this has caused one
million of Afghans to live as refugees in Iran and 2.5 million in Pakistan. These figures give us an idea of the
importance and influence that both neighbours have in the conflict’s resolution. Living conditions are really hard,
with a life expectancy of only 44.5 years, 20 % of the population live in extreme poverty, 1 out of 4 children dies
before reaching 5 years, and more than 40 % of the population hasn’t got a job. More than the 75 % can’t access
basic services. In this human environment, the social structure is built around the ethnic group and tribe. There are
four that are very important (Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara); and 21 minor (Aimaq, Turkmen, Baluchis, etc.)
The Tajik, that form the 27 % of the population, have a Persian origin and are also Sunnis. They speak Dari or Persian
which was considered an educated language; this made easier their access to the administration and clergy of a
country controlled by Pashtun people. Their presence at the capital and other cities as well as in the wide north-
western area, near the Republic of Tajikistan make this ethnic group the most important one in the country after the
Pashtun; and they don’t hide their aspirations of taking part in the political power.
The Pashtun are the founders of the independent Afghanistan, the main group and the ethnic group that identifies
more with the Afghan nationalism. They are Sunni and constitute the 42 % of the population.
The Hazara are considered as Afghanistan’s pariah by other ethnic groups; they are originally nomad people and
probably Mongolian descent, who have been relegated to the poorer and more mountainous areas in the centre of
the country. They are Shia people and so they have a certain bound with Iran; however, they were also greatly
repudiated by the Taliban people who don’t consider them Muslim. They speak a variant of Persian and they
constitute 9 % of the country’s population.
The Uzbeks and Turkmen of Turkish origin are the 9 % and the 3 %, respectively, of the population. The live in the
north, in regions near the Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s republics. If we sum the ethnic distribution and the
language, we can see that the Pashtun are cohesive with both aspects. Nevertheless, it’s important to highlight that
this group feels more nationalist despite their internal divisions caused by tribal fights for the power. It’s very
enlightening the fact that the layout of the main and nearly the only road of Afghanistan called Ring Road goes
mainly through Pashtun territory.
In Badghis province, 63 % are Tajik; however, in the Gormach and Murghab districts, the majority of the population
is of Pashtun origin, while in the Muqur districts this ethnic group is an important minority (44 %). In Qala and Naw,
72 % are Tajik and 28 % Pashtun.
All ethnic groups are cross-border except the Hazara; this fact gives us an idea of the influence that the neighbour
countries have in the different zones of Afghanistan. The ethnic differences propitiate continued frictions which are
the breeding ground for civil conflicts, typical in Afghanistan’s history, and that shouldn’t be overlooked at this
moment.
The origin of drug cultivation dates back to the 80s to fund the Mujahideen that fought against the Soviet. Drug
trafficking undermines the government and corrupts the structures of the fragile Afghan State. Therefore, after
coming to power, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation with the threat of heavy penalties; in 2001 the cultivated
area decreased significantly.
After the USA invaded Afghanistan, farmers were free to continue with the lucrative cultivations even though they
only receive 1 % of the money resulted. What’s more, Taliban prefer seeing drug trafficking as an important
financing source for their fight, and a way to corrupt Karzai’s Administration.
In 2008, Afghanistan ranked 176 out of 180 countries regarding corruption; however, in 2009 worsened falling to the
179 position. Corruption is present even in the most important Government structures. In addition, the media has
even accused of corruption the stepbrother of President Karzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai, who leads the Provincial Council.
The drug coming from Afghanistan passes through all borders, but especially the Iranian border and through the
north; this creates addicts in all countries that crosses and so all are interested in eradicating it. Russia’s cooperation
in operations to fight this criminal phenomenon must be framed by the concern due to the increase of heroin
addicts in the Russian Federation. It is estimated that the opium trade from Afghanistan surpasses the 8 000 tonnes;
this means around 80 % and 90 % of the opium consumed over the world. Drug trafficking promotes the illegal flow
of arms and it is estimated that it constitutes nearly 50 % of the Afghan GDP.
The Afghan Government is responsible for the eradication of poppy cultivation and they are supported by the ISAF.
The international community has increased the pressure to the Afghan Government so they intensify their efforts in
this fight; this has bear results and since 2007 poppy cultivation has been gradually reduced.
In 1725 created a fragile empire mainly Pashtun, which was the ethnic group ruling. This is without doubt part of the
Pashtuns’ collective memory, because they have a deeper ethnic and tribal sentiment than the one of the Afghan
nationalism. The fragility of the Afghan monarchy was the result of the rivalries between the Pashtun factions,
frequently encouraged the Loya Jirga was created in Kabul; it’s a meeting of tribal chiefs, who in 1747 founded the
Afghan State controlled by a monarchy of the Durrani tribe, who since then are known as the “Durrani” of the
Pashtun ethnic group, and extended their domain through the North at the expense of Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik.
They also conquered certain parts of the East, in the Punjab, Kashmir and Balochistan. This way, they by neighbour
countries.
Over time, the political control of the Pashtuns has retracted on Kabul and the rest of ethnic groups have been
systematically marginalized from Government posts. This fact has caused a number of riots between ethnic groups.
After establishing itself in India, the British Empire competed against the Russian Empire for the geopolitical control
of Afghanistan. In the decade of 1830, the Afghan asked the Russian assistance, leading to the rejection of the
British. This achievement was the spark that provoked the first of the three Anglo-Afghan Wars which took place
between 1839 and 1842. The British had to renounce its dominance in Afghanistan, since they were defeated. Thirty-
six years later, the advancement of Russia in the region was clear, and this started the Second Anglo-Afghan War
that lasted two years. This confrontation ended with the purchase of the Pashtun tribal chiefs’ political will. They
signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi, according to which Afghanistan became an associated State of British India. Great
Britain recognized Afghanistan’s independence in 1919, after being defeated during the third war.
That is, the British didn’t achieve a military victory, but political and it was only possible through negotiations with
the Pashtun chiefs. This historical lesson should be remembered when facing the challenges at the present time.
In 1893, the senior management of the British Administration, Sir Henry Durand, drew up a line of 1 500 miles, in
order to define the western end of British India. This line divided in two parts the Pashtun region, which for the
Afghans was reminiscent of its Empire and was considered Afghan territory. This way, the various Afghan
governments have usually considered vindicating the Pashtun territory that is part of Pakistan. When Pakistan
achieved the independence in 1947, the Pashtun were definitely distributed in two States. Out of 40 million, 13
million Pashtun live in Afghanistan where they are a majority over other ethnic groups, whereas the other 27 million
live in Pakistan, where they constitute a minority and feel discriminated in comparison to other Pakistani citizens,
because their per-capita income is 50 % less that the country’s average. Regarding the cultural sphere, 78 % of men
are illiterate, while in Pakistan are only 40.2 %, and regarding women 98 % of Pashtun women are illiterate, whereas
only 69.4 % of Pakistani are.
In order to prevent any type of instability in the Pasthun area of Pakistan, the ISI has supported the Afghan Pashtun
in their fights against foreign troops or other ethnic groups. During the Afghan conflicts, Pasthun insurgents and
even members of Al-Qaida have found refuge in Pakistan among 2.5 million people of the same ethnic group
sheltered in the northwest of the country.
The Durrani reign lasted until 1973 when the King Zahir was deposed through a coup d’état lead by Mohammed
Doud Khan, who proclaimed a Republic. In 1978 a pragmatic procommunist Government, which intended to develop
a project of modernization over its ideology was established. In order to carry through this project, it was necessary
to smear the traditional systems; for this reason, they tried to undermine the tribal and religious chiefs that were
part in that moment of the opposition.
The project for modernization was supported by the USSR and promoted the idea of creating Pashtunistan; this
clearly went against the Pakistani interests. Its Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, went so far as to encourage a
conspiracy against Doud Khan, supported by the more fundamentalists Pashtuns leaders. After the failure of the
conspiracy, the Pashtun leaders had to seek refuge in Peshawar (Pakistan), where they created an infrastructure in
1976, in order to recruit Mujahideen people from all around the Islamic world. To fight Doud Khan and the
communists, the Islamic party Hekmatyar organized them in detachments.
In 1978, the communist carried through a coup d’état against Doud Khan who was executed. This gave way to a new
government that placed more emphasis on national unity, socioeconomic justice and respect to the Islam, trying not
to exacerbate the Islamists. On the 5th December 1978, Moscow and Kabul signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good
Neighborliness and Cooperation that on the 24th December 1979 the Soviets used as an excuse to intervene in
Afghanistan with 80 000 soldiers.
The USSR had 100 000 troops in Afghanistan that had been provided with heavy weaponry and that didn’t hesitate
to use it; they also tried to control the country’s development through the introduction of improvements in the
woman’s rights, the education sector, a land reform…, following the model valid during the Soviet time in the Central
Asia republics and that changed them radically. For example, Uzbekistan was very similar to Afghanistan, but the
Soviets forced gender equality, its education, etc. Therefore, the social reality in these republics greatly differs the
Afghan even though its origin was very similar. However, all of them were considered foreign laws imposed by force,
contrary to the Islamic traditions and the Pashtun code.
Pashtuns have an ethnic code and of honor called Pashtunwali1 that nowadays is still observed in rural areas. This
code considers these values: revenge (Badal) without time limit, loyalty (Hamsaya), forgiveness (Nanawatay) through
compensation (Saz) or Pashtun cohesion. When in a contradictive situation, the Pashtunwali is above the Sharia.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan left Pakistan in an uncomfortable geopolitical situation between India and the
USSR, ally of the Indian Government. Due to this geopolitical position, Pakistan had to renounce to the strategic
depth in case of a military conflict with India.
In the Cold War context, the USSR’s intervention was considered as a hostile movement by Reagan’s Administration,
which decided to send help to the insurgence through Pakistan’s Intelligence Service (ISI Inter-Services Intelligence),
along with Saudi Arabia and China. The insurgence was provided with Stinger surface to air with infrared guided
missiles, which with a range of more than 4 500 meters, they practically prevented the fly of helicopters, that were a
key aspect in these types of conflicts. In addition, it forced fixed-wing aircrafts, particularly the Su-25, to carry out
their bombings from higher and thus significantly worsening their precision. This difficulty, the weariness of the
Soviet society due to the great number of casualties among its conscripts and Gorbachov’s policy forced the Soviet
withdrawal in February 1989.
In the image we can observe the distribution of the attacks with Improvised Explosive Devises (IED). The areas that
have more insurgence activity and expansion are the Pashtun regions. These maps, created by “The Guardian” with
the data published by WikiLeaks, alert to the increase of these attacks carried out in areas free of insurgents.
The reports gather the suspicions of the Pakistani intelligence services’ supports to the Taliban insurgence. The
statements of the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, in India reveal that, like before, nowadays there is a Great
Game: “It’s no secret what Pakistan’s been doing with the Taliban. All sides know what’s been going on since
Afghanistan was first occupied”
The Taliban movement that we could translate as «Islam scholars» emerges in the Koranic schools (madrasas) of the
Afghan refugee camps of Pashtun ethnic located in the rural areas of Pakistan in the region of Peshawar. The poorer
young Pashtun, war victims and disappointed with the tribal traditions found in the madrasa the support to live and
the religious radicalism to bear the suffering, while receiving at the same time training in the insurgent struggle.
The Pakistani fundamentalist party, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) had a great influence in these schools; they defend a
return to the Islam origins and reject everything that comes from modernization and that may contaminate their
beliefs. Their postulates coincide fairly well with the Jihadist. One of the consequences of this creed, of Deobandi
tradition, is that the woman is relegated to a completely secondary role, subordinated to men and without access to
culture. Moreover, it’s important to know that they consider the Shia people as apostates.
The Taliban
Although the Taliban will drive a hard bargain as they seek to negotiate from a position of strength on the battlefield,
they are likely to ultimately commit to a tentative peace agreement (although bickering and debate among the
movement's leaders over the details of an accord could lead to a slow and cumbersome process). The Taliban
recognize that the current atmosphere presents the best opportunity to clinch their overarching objective of
achieving a U.S.-initiated withdrawal of all foreign forces — currently numbering 22,000 U.S., NATO and allied
troops.
The Taliban have been hinting at their proclivity to end the conflict for some time now. In February, the Taliban
wrote an open letter calling for the American public to pressure Washington to end the war. In June, the Taliban
upheld a three-day cease-fire in response to Ghani’s own weeklong cease-fire in commemoration of the Eid al-Fitr
holiday, the first such move during the course of the war. (The cessation of most hostilities during the holiday
demonstrated the ability of the Taliban's leaders to coordinate a cease-fire policy among its disparate branches.) And
on Jan. 24, the Taliban appointed Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior official and founding member, to lead its
subsequent negotiations from its political office in Doha. His appointment signals the movement's desire for these
talks to reach a definitive outcome.
Ultimately, a withdrawal of U.S. forces would enable the Taliban to claim a moral victory and portray the outcome as
a vindication of their insurgency to drive out foreign forces.
Ghani, naturally, wants an end to the war on favourable terms for the Afghan central government. But because it
cannot stand on its own without U.S. and NATO support, it lacks influence over the ultimate U.S. decision to
withdraw from the conflict and must adjust to the notion that its security and defence forces will gradually lose
external support over time. Since Kabul views the Taliban as an extension of Pakistan, it will want to eventually
shape the post-conflict government in a way that minimizes the movement's role, therefore maximizing its
autonomy from Islamabad.
For the United States, the most powerful actor in the conflict, the very fact that it is willing to discuss a drawdown is
emblematic of its shifting strategic priorities. The United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 as part of a
multinational coalition seeking to dismantle the Taliban regime and destroy al Qaeda. It was the Taliban's protection
of the transnational jihadist group that gave it cover to plan and carry out the 9/11 terrorist attacks masterminded
by Osama bin Laden.
The White House’s concerted effort to seek an exit from Afghanistan means it is ready to act on a key reality: The
stalemate between Kabul and the Taliban is essentially frozen.
The invasion marked the beginning of the global war on terrorism, which eventually expanded to include operations
across half the globe. But even as it wound down operations in much of the rest of the world, it still finds itself mired
in the continuing conflict at its point of origin more than 17 years later. After trying a variety of approaches,
including a troop surge, a troop drawdown, a heightened air campaign and pushes for political reform in Afghan
government ministries, a weary United States is now seeking an end to its involvement as it looks beyond
Afghanistan to China and Russia. Its 2018 National Defense Strategy said as much: "Inter-state strategic competition,
not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."
Pakistan
Islamabad’s own shifting strategic priorities are compelling Pakistan, the Taliban's primary external sponsor, to take
advantage of Washington’s war fatigue to compel a drawdown of NATO forces from Afghanistan so that it can
advance its long-running objective of shaping a friendly government in Kabul. Pakistan is in the midst of an extensive
project to erect fencing along the Durand Line, a boundary the British drew over more than 2,000 kilometres (1,250
miles) of land in 1893 to create a border with Afghanistan — a demarcation that Kabul disputes. The ostensible
objective of Pakistan's project is to prevent militants from the Islamic State and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan from
passing freely over the line between the countries. Viewed in tandem with last year's landmark merger of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas with neighbouring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan's objective becomes
clear: It wants to pacify the restive region bordering Afghanistan so it can devote more military resources to its
enduring rivalry with India. With this objective in mind, Pakistan will continue pushing the Taliban to participate in
negotiations.
Achieving that aim would require a stable Afghanistan. Islamabad would prefer to see a post-conflict Afghan
government that features strong Taliban representation to ensure a greater chance that it could influence Kabul to
adopt policies that favour Pakistan at India's expense. In any case, Pakistan views the U.S. military presence on its
western border with suspicion (especially since the U.S. military has recently moved to forge a stronger defence
partnership with India). So Pakistan will be eager to support a drawdown, albeit one that is measured, lest a hasty
pull-out of U.S. and NATO forces result in a security vacuum that militant groups could exploit. Others with strong
regional interests, including Russia, China and Iran, will hedge their bets by making overtures to the Taliban and by
extending their influence in the areas of the country closest to their borders.
Since its emergence as a State, Pakistan sees in Afghanistan a territory that enables it to win the strategic depth
necessary in a conflict against India. That’s the reason why it intends to establish an Alliance of permanent influence
over the Afghan Government. To Pakistan, the worst hypothesis is for Afghanistan to fall under the influence of India
or of an ally. This is how the Soviet troops’ presence in Afghan territory was perceived. With this kind of influence
over Afghanistan with a Pashtun majority, it wants to prevent a movement from its western neighbour to try to
achieve an independent Pashtunistan. At the same time, Pakistan wants to prevent Afghanistan being a place where
the Pakistan Pashtun dissidents find refuge.
What’s more, the Pakistani Government finds in external enemies a way to strengthen its always subdued internal
cohesion. Taliban radicalism can be a boomerang to Pakistan, if it’s not controlled in its own territory. Its expansion
through terrorism can unsettle the fragile State’s order.
Externally, Pakistan is trying to strengthen its role in international politics and solve the problem created by the
Afghan refugees in its territory. After the fall of the Taliban regime as a consequence of the international coalition’s
intervention lead by the USA, Pakistan found itself in a crossroad which forced it to consider:
1. Pakistan could be tempted to unsettle the Afghan Government, in order to promote a more favourable
change for it;
2. The failure of the Afghan politics could create important tensions in the critical balance of Pakistan’s internal
politics. A big crisis in Pakistan could affect seriously the general strategy of the region.
Pakistan is the nuclear power in the world with less control over its nuclear arsenal, and after September 11 it has
received important aid from the USA, in order to improve its control and to promote development. In the current
year, Obama’s Administration will give Islamabad’s Government 1 200 million dollars; this hasn’t risen its image
among Pakistani.
Pakistan’s situation is conditioned by the Government’s weakness and its problems to solve internal conflicts
originated from the economic crisis in the country, natural disasters and subversive groups that operate in the
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) despite the operations of
the Pakistani army and the regular attacks of the US unmanned air vehicles.
The negotiated resolution of the Afghan conflict would help to stabilize Pakistan and the region, thanks to the links
of its intelligence services with the Taliban movement and other groups bent of the Jihad in Afghanistan. Pakistan
Armed Forces’ role is a key aspect in order to finish with the Taliban sanctuary and Al-Qaida in FATA. We must keep
in mind the power that yield the Pakistani FAS on the political decisions of the country. They opposed for a long time
to involve themselves in the counter-terrorist fight in FATA; they said that they weren’t prepared for these type of
actions and that they were more necessary in Kashmir’s border.
The operations of the Pakistani army in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan have been relatively successful against
the Taliban movement in Pakistan. This movement was originated in 2007 under the name of Tehrik Taliban-i-
Pakistan (TTP); its goal was to establish a fundamentalist Islamic regime in the country. It’s well known that the TTP
has links with Al-Qaida who has supported them technically in their attacks. One of the key aspects to understand
Pakistan’s position in the Afghan conflict is its potential effects in the conflict that Kashmir maintains with India,
because everything that favours India is seen as a menace to Pakistan.
India
For its part, India has taken advantage of the Afghan conflict to introduce its companies in the country as well as
development aid. India is the second most important donor of the East area after Iran, but well ahead of the next
donor, Germany. Moreover, India is gaining more and more political influence in the international framework and
thus it becomes an important country, in order to try and find a valid resolution for the Afghan conflict. At the
moment, it has refused to relate a solution for this conflict with an Indo-Pakistani agreement that involves the
peaceful settlement of the dispute about Kashmir.
A possible solution would be for India to give up any influence in Afghanistan, handing it over to Pakistan in
exchange of Pakistan doing the same regarding Kashmir. This resolution would require ensuring that Pakistan would
not support Kashmir’s Jihadists and that it would control the Pashtun insurgents, regardless of them being Pakistani
of Afghan. For its part, the USA clearly supports India as the deterrent of China and Russia’s regional influence, but
without abandoning in any case Pakistan.
Even though Afghanistan has several oil reserves in the north and of strategic minerals in the south, its main value is
given by its geopolitical situation; Afghanistan becomes a transit place for the energy resources coming from Iran
and Turkmenistan to Pakistan, India, and even China. Iran has the second most important gas reserves in the world
and Turkmenistan is in the fourth place.
Intervention in 2001 paralyzed the project and favoured the Russian company GAZPROM to continue monopolizing
The creation of oil and gas pipelines by Afghanistan to Pakistan and India would increase the output of energy
resources to Central Asia and Iran, a fact that would favour nearly all countries in the area. However this possibility
would affect the Russian politics which tries to control, as much as possible the gas distribution in Europe and Asia.
The company UNOCAL (Union Oil of California), of which Hamid Karzai was a consultant, planned the construction of
a gas pipeline that would go from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan through Herat and would cross Kandahar until
Pakistan through Multan. This project is known as TAP for the countries’ acronyms. In July 2001, the enterprise
established negotiations with the Taliban Government. The US the Turkmen gas.
In 2008, the TAP project became TAPI when they included India even though the country hasn’t accepted to date to
be part of it. Most likely India doesn’t want to depend on Pakistan, its traditional rival, through which would receive
the gas.
Ultimately, U.S. involvement in Afghanistan represents just the latest phase in a conflict rooted in the Cold War. The
Communist coup under the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in April 1978 triggered an anti-government
rebellion that ultimately resulted in a Soviet invasion and occupation that lasted until 1989. That sowed the seeds of
the Afghan civil war as the anti-Soviet mujahideen descended into internecine violence. This chaotic landscape gave
rise to the Taliban in 1994, which sought to purge the country of the mujahideen.
The Taliban’s conquest of Kabul in 1996 led to a five-year reign that included hosting bin Laden, giving the terrorist
leader the opportunity to plot and direct 9/11. Those attacks roused the United States into action against the Taliban
government in late 2001, and the United States finds itself mired in conflict there today. Undoubtedly, the Afghan
peace process will follow a similarly long and complicated path, marked by setbacks and false starts. But the
strategic drivers of the chief actors involved in the current struggle suggests that a resolution to Afghanistan's four
decades of bloody war may be closer than ever.
The Taliban have categorically rejected Ghani's previous olive branches, as they consider his government an
illegitimate entity propped up by foreign support. But securing Ghani’s blessing will be vital before any peace
initiative can move forward since the ultimate cessation of hostilities will first require an understanding between
Kabul and the Taliban. The movement’s representatives are currently conferring with their senior leaders in Pakistan
to discuss their next steps, and talks between the warring parties are expected to resume in February. At this stage,
Khalilzad and Ghani's shared goal will focus on compelling the Taliban to overcome their long-standing opposition to
speaking directly with the Afghan government. Without their willingness to do so, the negotiations will falter. In this
phase of the peace process, the goal will be an agreement that compels all sides to cease combat so that the long
and protracted process of shaping the post-conflict government can begin.
➢ An Afghanization process of the conflict where the Afghan, lead by their Government, will provide security
to its territory and population. In order to achieve this, they will need the necessary police and military
forces to prevent desertions.
➢ It is necessary to prevent Afghanistan becoming a failed state, because it would provide Al-Qaida with the
ideal situation to re-establish its sanctuary. Therefore, the construction of solid state institutions is essential.
➢ It’s indispensable for countries directly involved in the conflict as the USA and states of the area such as
Pakistan, India, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia to take part in the conflict’s
resolution.
➢ The resolution must be effective for the Pashtun in Afghanistan and accepted by the Pakistani Pashtun. This
means that it must be negotiated with the Taliban as far has possible
➢ The resolution must propitiate a significant reduction of poppy cultivation, in order to prevent the
corruption of the Afghan State. Corruption involves a serious risk, because it could finish the Government
soon after the international troops leave the Afghan territory, as it happened after the Soviet departure.
➢ The resolution must achieve Pakistan’s commitment to fight the Jihadists and Al-Qaida in its own territory.
➢ The withdrawal of international troops must be consensual by all countries involved and carried out without
being announced until strictly essential, in order to prevent the powers and countries of the area trying to
gain advantage positions. In addition, the withdrawal announcements strengthen the Taliban and undermine
Karzai’s Government.