Académique Documents
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TOPIC 13 ORCINO V. GASPAR
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FACTS: Orcino engaged the services of A y. Gaspar to
(Promulgated June 21, 1988) prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against
several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Orcino
CANON 20 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR bound herself to pay respondent legal fees
AND REASONABLE FEES. ofP20,000.00 — P10,000.00 to be paid upon signing
Rule 20.04 ‑ A lawyer shall avoid controversies with of the contract and the balance to be paid on or
clients concerning his compensa on and shall resort before the conclusion of the case. She was also to
to judicial ac on only to prevent imposi on, injus ce pay P500.00 per appearance of respondent before
or fraud. the court and fiscal. This agreement was embodied
in a contract executed on February 22, 1991. Orcino
CANON 22 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS complied with the contract and A y. Gaspar entered
SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE into his du es. A y. Gaspar, however failed to a end
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this
CANON 3 ‑ A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL hearing that the court, over complainant’s
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, objec ons, granted bail to all the accused. Orcino
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR immediately went to respondent’s residence and
STATEMENT OF FACTS. confronted him with his absence. Gaspar explained
that he did not receive formal no ce of the hearing.
Rule 3.03 ‑ Where a partner accepts public office, he She asked for the records of the case saying that she
shall withdrawal from the firm and his name shall be could refer them to another lawyer. Gaspar then gave
dropped from the firm name unless the law allows her the records. Orcino never returned the records
him to prac ce law currently. nor did she see Gaspar. On September 18, 1991,
A y. Gaspar filed before the trial court a Mo on to
CANON 15 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
Withdraw as Counsel without the consent of Orcino.
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
The court issued an order direc ng Gaspar to secure
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
complainant’s consent to the mo on and his
Rule 15.06. ‑ A lawyer shall not state or imply that he appearance as private prosecutor shall con nue un l
is able to influence any public official, tribunal or he has secured this consent. Oricno refused to sign
legisla ve body. her conformity. A y. Gaspar did not appear at the
hearings nor did he contact Orcino, thus she was
CANON 18 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT compelled to engage the services of another lawyer.
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
ISSUE: Whether or not A y. Gaspar had the right to
CANON 19 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT terminate the a orney‑client rela on
WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
HELD: The client has the absolute right to terminate
Rule 19.02 ‑ A lawyer who has received informa on the a orney‑client rela on at any me with or
that his client has, in the course of the without cause. The right of an a orney to withdraw
representa on, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or or terminate the rela on other than for sufficient
tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rec fy cause is, however, considerably restricted. An
the same, and failing which he shall terminate the a orney who undertakes to conduct an ac on
rela onship with such client in accordance with the impliedly s pulates to carry it to its conclusion. He
Rules of Court. cannot abandon it without reasonable cause. A
lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudica on arises only from the client’s wri en
consent or from a good cause. Sec on 26 of Rule 138
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of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 26. to any. Orcina was upset by A y. Gaspar’s absence at
Change of a orneys — An a orney may re re at any the hearing where bail was granted to the suspected
me from any ac on or special proceeding, by the killers of her husband and it was thus natural for her
wri en consent of his client filed in court. He may to react by confronta on. Her words were u ered in
also re re at any me from an ac on or special a burst of passion and cannot be construed to have
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should intended to terminate A y. Gaspar’s services. She
the court, on no ce to the client and a orney, and made this clear when she refused to sign his “Mo on
on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to to Withdraw as Counsel.” Even if A y. Gaspar was
re re. In case of subs tu on, the name of the jus fied in termina ng his services, he, however,
a orney newly employed shall be entered on the cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold
docket of the court in place of the former one, and unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume
wri en no ce of the change shall be given to the that his pe on for withdrawal will be granted by the
adverse party.” In the present case, Orcina did not court. Un l his withdrawal shall have been approved,
give her wri en consent to Gaspar’s withdrawal. He the lawyer remains counsel of record. Return the
did not even file an applica on with the court for it to amount owed to Orcina. Admonished to exercise
determine whether he should be allowed to prudence.
withdraw.
But gran ng that respondent’s mo on without
complainant’s consent was an applica on for OROCIO V. ANGULUAN
withdrawal with the court, the Supreme Court found FACTS: NAPOCOR passed a resolu on approving the
this reason insufficient to jus fy the withdrawal. grant of a monthly welfare allowance equivalent to
A y. Gaspar’s withdrawal was made on the ground 10% of basic pay to all its employees effec ve
that “there no longer exists the xxx confidence” October 1, 1978. This ws called the NAPOCOR
between them and that there had been “serious Welfare Fund. Later on NAPOCOR passed a resolu on
differences between them rela ng to the manner of lowering it to 5%. A er 2 decades Congress passed
private prosecu on. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the EPIRA whiched directed the reorganiza on of
Code of Professional Responsibility provides: NAPOCOR. Following the direc ve of EPIRA,
“CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS NAPOCOR abolished the fund. Later on NAPOCOR
SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE was approved to release P184M from the fund for
distribu on to members who resigned, re red or
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Rule 22.01– A
lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the separated. Anguluan however issued a memorandum
following cases: a) When the client pursues an illegal that allowed the release to separated members only
or immoral course of conduct in connec on with the to the exclusion of those who resigned, re red or
ma er he is handling; b) When the client insists that separated prior to the EPIRA.
the lawyer pursue conduct viola ve of these canons Segovia, Baysic and affected employees represented
and rules; c) When his inability to work with by A y. Orocio filed with the RTC a pe on for
co‑counsel will not promote the best interest of the mandamus with a prayer for a TRO against NPC.
client; d) When the mental or physical condi on of Orocio and his clients se led for a con ngency fee of
the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the 15%. The par es se led for a compromise agreement
employment effec vely; e) When the client with granted earning differen al to the affected
deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or members and allowed Orocio to collect 15% from it
fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When as a orney’s fees. RTC issued a writ of execu on for
the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; Orocio to collect hi a orney’s fees. A no ce of
and g) Other similar cases.” The instant case does garnishment was also issued. But, respondents
not fall under any of the grounds men oned. contended that the amount Orocio based his 15%
Neither can this be considered similar or analogous fees was merely an es mate. Respondents appealed
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to the CA which issued a TRO. The CA held that Amorin only paid P20m, P10m of which came from
Orocio may only collect P1M on the basis of quantum loans made by complainant using the property as
meruit because the employees se led through a collateral. Respondent then issued three checks to
compromise agreement and not won by Orocio in a cover the P25m balance, which however, were
trial. dishonored. A er several demands made by the
complainant, Respondent amorin failed to pay hence
ISSUE: Whether or not A y. Orocio may collect 15% an Estafa and B.P. 22 case was filed against him. A y.
of the interest of the amount stated in the Amorin in turn, filed one civil and nine criminal case
Compromise Agreement.
against the complainant which damaged her good
HELD: No. First, herein respondents are not clients of business reputa on and credit standing.
Orocio. They are in fact opponents of Orocio’s clients. A y. Amorin in his answer, avers that the property
There had been no objec on by his client’s when he was not sold to him personally but to Loveland Estate
par ally collected from payments by NAPOCOR to Developers, Inc. (LEDI) of which he is the President.
them. His clients do not claim any damage or injury He further alleges that he never offered her legal
by the issuance of the writ of execu on. The 15% to services. Further, It is also not true that he paid
be collected by Orocio is from the agreement with his complainant P25m with three checks. Complainant
clients that he will only collect con ngency fees. This stole 3 blank checks from him and forged the same
kind of arrangement is allowed by law subject to
which was his basis for filing falsifica on and perjury
Canon 20 which provides that a lawyer shall charge cases against complainant. A Mandatory Conference
fair and reasonable fees. The principle of quantum was held before the IBP Inves ga ng Commissioner.
meruit may be a basis for determining reasonable Complainant, in her Posi on Paper, asserts that
a orney’s fees. This principle may apply even if there a orney‑client rela onship existed between her and
is already an agreed wri en fee as long as the court
A y. Amorin. The respondent in his memorandum
finds it unconscionable. The SC found Orocio to have insists that there was no a orney‑client rela onship
worked diligently and if it were not for him there since there was no specific case or transac on which
would have been no compromise agreement. represented her or gave her professional advice. The
However, a orney’s fees had to be reduced to 10% Commissioner of the IBP‑CBD found A y. Amorin
which is also the percentage allowed by the Labor
guilty of misconduct and recommending his
Code. The prac ce of law is a profession and not a
suspension from the prac ce of law for six months.
money making venture.
The IBP Board of Governors then adopted and
approved, with modifica on, the Report and
Recommenda on of the Inves ga on Commissioner;
VIRGO VS AMORIN and considering Respondent's viola on of Canon 1,
FACTS: Whilhelmina Virgo (complainant) filed with Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Canons of
IBP a Complaint for disbarment against A y. Amorin Responsibility when he used his legal knowledge and
(respondent) alleging that: She and her husband training to induce complainant to part with her
owned a house in Loyola Grand Villas which A y. property and eventually defraud her in the process,
Amorin offered to buy. They agreed at the price of A y. Oliver V. Amorin is hereby SUSPENDED from the
P45m with spouses Virgo retaining the cer ficates of prac ce of law for one year.
tle so that respondent could borrow from banks ISSUE: Whether or not there was an establishment or
using the name of the complainant who had good a orney‑client rela onship between the par es
credit standing. A y. Amorin was kind and
accommoda ng and offered to be complainant's HELD: No a orney‑client rela onship exists between
legal consultant on several occasions free of charge. the par es when the legal acts done were only
A y. Amorin prepared Deeds of Sale bearing different incidental to their personal transac on. Complainant
amounts which the spouses signed. However, A y. a ached other le ers sent by respondent, plus a
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dra Memorandum of Agreement, which talk about Madianda soured a er she filed, in the later part of
the complainant's property in Tanay, its excava on 2000, a criminal and disciplinary ac ons against the
for possible hidden treasure, their supposed sharing la er.
in the expenses and A y. Amorin's interest in buying
the said property. Rather than bolstering A y. Madianda, in retalia on to the filing of the
complainant's claim that there exists an aforesaid ac ons, filed a Counter Complaint with the
a orney‑client rela onship between them, such Ombudsman charging Hadluja with viola on of
le ers actually strengthen the idea that the An ‑Gra and Corrupt Prac ces Act, falsifica on of
public documents and immorality, the last two
rela onship of complainant and A y. Amorin is
charges being based on the disclosures complainant
mainly personal or business in nature, and that
earlier made to respondent. In her (Complainant)
whatever legal services may have been rendered or
answer, styled as Counter‑Affidavit, A y. Madianda
given to them by A y. Amorin for free were only
denied giving legal advice to the complainant and
incidental to said rela onship. Noteworthy also is the
fact that complainant was not able to specify any act denied the existence of a lawyer‑client rela onship
or transac on in which A y. Amorin acted as her or between them. A y. Madianda also stated the
her husband's counsel. observa on that the supposed confiden al data and
sensi ve documents adverted to are in fact ma ers
of common knowledge in the BFP. The Inves ga ng
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar
Since the court cannot ascertain whether A y. Discipline came out with a Report and
Amorin commi ed acts in viola on of his oath as a Recommenda on, sta ng that the informa on
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the related by complainant to the respondent is
Virgo Mansion, as a ma er of prudence and so as not protected under the a orney‑client privilege
to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the
communica on; and accordingly recommended that
court where the case is pending, the Court deems it
respondent be reprimanded. IBP Board of Governors
wise to DISMISS the present case without prejudice
therea er issued a resolu on adop ng and
to the filing of another one, depending on the final
approving, the Report and Recommenda on of the
outcome of the civil case.
Inves ga ng Commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not lawyer‑client rela onship was
HADLUJA V MADIANDA established.
FACTS: In said affidavit‑complaint, complainant HELD: It was the complainant who went to
alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then
they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protec on a friend, to bare what she considered personal
(BFP). Complainant claimed that she approached secrets and sensi ve documents for the purpose of
respondent for some legal advice. Complainant obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment
further alleged that, in the course of their complainant approached the then recep ve
conversa on which was supposed to be kept respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
confiden al, she disclosed personal secrets and lawyer‑client rela onship evolved between the two.
produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth Such rela onship imposes upon the lawyer certain
cer ficate and a bap smal cer ficate, only to be restric ons circumscribed by the ethics of the
informed later by the respondent that she profession. Among the burdens of the rela onship is
(respondent) would refer the ma er to a lawyer that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this
friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of instance, to keep inviolate confiden al informa on
respondent to have refused handling her case only acquired or revealed during legal consulta ons. The
a er she had already heard her secrets. Con nuing, court found that respondent indeed breached his
complainant averred that her friendship with A y. duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As
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found by the IBP Inves ga ng Commissioner, the the issuance of a formal authority for Peña. 35 Two
documents shown and the informa on revealed in days therea er, Ms. Ong faxed another le er to the
confidence to the respondent in the course of the bank, this me addressed to its president,
legal consulta on in ques on, were used as bases in respondent Teodoro Borlongan. 36 She repeated
the criminal and administra ve complaints lodged therein the earlier request for authority for Peña,
against the complainant. since the tenants were ques oning ISCI's authority to
take over the Pasay property.
The seriousness of the respondents offense
notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room In response to the le ers of Ms. Ong,
for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the pe oner‑respondent bank, through individual
respondent acted with ill‑will. Without meaning to respondents Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel — Senior
condone the error of respondents ways, what at Vice‑President and Vice‑President, respec vely—
bo om is before the Court is two former friends advised Peña 38 that the bank had noted the
becoming bi er enemies and filing charges and engagement of his services by ISCI and stressed that
counter‑charges against each other using whatever ISCI remained as the lawyer's principal. Peña received
convenient tools and data were readily available. a telephone call from respondent Bejasa. A er Peña
Unfortunately, the personal informa on respondent informed her of the situa on, she allegedly told him
gathered from her conversa on with complainant that Urban Bank would be retaining his services in
became handy in her quest to even the score. At the guarding the Pasay property, and that he should
end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent con nue his efforts in retaining possession thereof.
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without He insisted, however, on talking to the Bank's
perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to president. Respondent Bejasa gave him the contact
a nega ve sen ment, she was viola ng the rule on details of respondent Borlongan, then president of
confiden ality. Urban Bank.
In the same telephone conversa on, respondent
Borlongan allegedly asked Peña to maintain
URBAN BANK VS PENA
possession of the Pasay property and to represent
FACTS: Pe oner‑respondent A y. Magdaleno M. Urban Bank in any legal ac on that might be
Peña (Peña) 7 is a lawyer by profession and was ins tuted rela ve to the property. Peña supposedly
formerly a stockholder, director and corporate demanded 10% of the market value of the property
secretary of Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI). ISCI as compensa on and a orney's fees and
owned a parcel of land 9 located in Pasay City (the reimbursement for all the expenses incurred from
Pasay property). ISCI leased the Pasay property for a the me he took over land un l possession was
period of 10 years. 11 Without its consent 12 and in turned over to Urban Bank. Respondent Borlongan
viola on of the lease contract, 13 the lessee purportedly agreed on condi on that possession
subleased the land to several tenants. ISCI then would be turned over to the bank, free of tenants,
instructed Peña, who was its director and corporate not later than four months; otherwise, Peña would
secretary, to take over possession of the Pasay lose the 10% compensa on and a orney's fees. Later
property 22 against the tenants upon the expira on that a ernoon, Peña received the bank's le er dated
of the lease. ISCI's president, Mr. Enrique G. Mon lla 19 December 1994, which was signed by respondents
III (Mon lla), faxed a le er to Peña, confirming the Bejasa and Manuel, and is quoted below:
la er's engagement as the corpora on's agent to
This is to confirm the engagement of your services as
handle the evic on of the tenants from the Pasay
the authorized representa ve of Urban Bank,
property. In the mean me, a certain Marilyn G. Ong,
specifically to hold and maintain possession of our
as representa ve of ISCI, faxed a le er to Urban Bank above cap oned property [Pasay property] and to
— addressed to respondent Corazon Bejasa, who was protect the same from former tenants, occupants or
then the bank's Senior Vice‑President— reques ng
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any other person who are threatening to return to proceedings below, the Court concludes that Urban
the said property and/or interfere with your Bank cons tuted A y. Peña as its agent to secure
possession of the said property for and in our behalf. possession of the Pasay property. This conclusion,
Therea er, pe oner‑respondent Peña, now in however, is not determina ve of the basis of the
representa on of Urban Bank, filed a separate amount of payment that must be made to him by the
complaint 56 (the Second Injunc on Complaint) with bank. The context in which the agency was created
the RTC‑Maka City, to enjoin the tenants from lays the basis for the amount of compensa on A y.
entering the Pasay property. 57 Ac ng on Urban Peña is en tled to. Urban Bank was informed of the
Bank's preliminary prayer, the RTC‑Maka City issued services that Peña was rendering for ISCI. Urban Bank
a TRO. The bank subsequently took actual possession thus chose to cooperate with ISCI without realizing
of the property and installed its own guards at the the kind of trouble that it would reap in the process.
premises. Peña therea er made several a empts to In an apparent a empt to allow the efforts of ISCI to
contact respondents Borlongan and Bejasa by secure the property to succeed, it recognized Peña's
telephone, but the bank officers would not take any role in helping ISCI, but stopped short of gran ng him
of his calls. On 24 January 1996, or nearly a year a er authority to act on its behalf.
he turned over possession of the Pasay property,
Peña formally demanded from Urban Bank the Urban Bank's le er dated 19 December 1994
payment of the 10% compensa on and a orney's confirmed in no uncertain terms Peña's designa on
fees allegedly promised to him during his telephone as its authorized representa ve to secure and
conversa on with Borlongan for securing and maintain possession of the Pasay property against
maintaining peaceful possession of the property. the tenants. Under the terms of the le er,
pe oner‑respondent bank confirmed his
Peña filed a complaint 67 for recovery of agent's engagement (a) "to hold and maintain possession" of
compensa on and expenses, damages and a orney's the Pasay property; (b) "to protect the same from
fees in RTC‑Bago City in the province of Negros former tenants, occupants or any other person who
Occidental. In response to the complaint of A y. are threatening to return to the said property and/or
Peña, Urban Bank and individual bank officers and interfere with your possession of the said property
directors argued that it was ISCI, the original owners for and in our behalf"; and (c) to represent the bank
of the Pasay property, that had engaged the services in any ins tuted court ac on intended to prevent any
of Peña in securing the premises; and, consequently, intruder from entering or staying in the premises.
they could not be held liable for the expenses Peña These three express direc ves of
had incurred. RTC‑Bago City 72 ruled in favor of Peña, pe oner‑respondent bank's le er admits of no
a er finding that an agency rela onship had indeed other construc on than that a specific and special
been created between him and Urban Bank. The authority was given to Peña to act on behalf of the
eight directors and bank officers were found to be bankwith respect to the la er's claims of ownership
solidarily liable with the bank for the payment of over the property against the tenants. Having
agency's fees. s pulated on the due execu on and genuineness of
the le er during pretrial, 265 the bank is bound by
ISSUE: w/n Pena is en tled to compensa on the terms thereof and is subject to the necessary
HELD: YES. The Court finds that Peña should be paid consequences of Peña's reliance thereon. No amount
for services rendered under the agency rela onship of denial can overcome the presump on that we give
that existed between him and Urban Bank based on this le er — that it means what it says.
the civil law principle against unjust enrichment, but In any case, the subsequent ac ons of Urban Bank
the amount of payment he is en tled to should be resulted in the ra fica on of Peña's authority as an
made, again, under the principle against unjust agent ac ng on its behalf with respect to the Pasay
enrichment and on the basis of quantum meruit. property. By ra fica on, even an unauthorized act of
Based on the evidence on records and the an agent becomes an authorized act of the principal.
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Pe oner‑respondent bank did not repudiate the with the property owner, and whose only authority
ac ons of Peña, even if it was fully aware of his to enter the premises was unlawfully given by a
representa ons to third par es on its behalf as former tenant whose own tenancy has clearly
owner of the Pasay property. Its tacit acquiescence to expired. The 23 sub‑tenants operated beer houses
his dealings with respect to the Pasay property and and nightclubs, ordinary retail establishments for
the tenants spoke of its intent to ra fy his ac ons, as which no sophis cated structure prevented easy
if these were its own. Even assuming arguendo that it entry. A er Peña succeeded in locking the gate of the
issued no wri en authority, and that the oral compound, the sub‑tenants would open the padlock
contract was not substan ally established, the bank and resume their businesses at night. Indeed, it
duly ra fied his acts as its agent by its acquiescence appears that only security guards, chains and
and acceptance of the benefits, namely, the peaceful padlocks were needed to keep them out. It was only
turnover of possession of the property free from the alleged connivance of Pasay City policemen that
sub‑tenants. The agency between ISCI and Peña Peña's ability to retain the possession was rendered
con nued, that ISCI is to shoulder the agency fee and insecure. In any case, 10% of the purchase price of
reimbursement for costs of Peña, and that Urban the Pasay property — a staggering PhP24,161,200 —
Bank never agreed to pay him a 10% agency fee. is an unconscionable amount, which we find reason
to reduce. Neither will the Court accede to the
Peña's account of an oral agreement with Urban
se lement offer of Peña to Urban Bank of at least
Bank for the payment of PhP24,000,000 is just too
PhP38,000,000 for alleged legal expenses incurred
much for any court to believe. Whatever may be the
during the course of the proceedings, 282 an amount
agreement between Peña and ISCI for compensa on that he has not substan ated at any me.
is not before this Court. This is not to say, however,
that Urban Bank has no liability to Peña. It has. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which
Payment to him is required because the Civil Code duty to public service, not money, is the primary
demands that no one should be unjustly enriched at considera on. 283 The principle of quantum meruit
the expense of another. This payment is to be applies if lawyers are employed without a price
measured by the standards of quantum meruit. A agreed upon for their services, in which case they
s pula on on a lawyer's compensa on in a wri en would be en tled to receive what they merit for their
contract for professional services ordinarily controls services, or as much as they have earned. 284 In
the amount of fees that the contrac ng lawyer may fixing a reasonable compensa on for the services
be allowed to collect, unless the court finds the rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum
amount to be unconscionable. 275 In the absence of meruit, one may consider factors such as the me
a wri en contract for professional services, the spent and extent of services rendered; novelty and
a orney's fees are fixed on the basis of quantum difficulty of the ques ons involved; importance of
meruit, 276 i.e., the reasonable worth of the the subject ma er; skill demanded; probability of
a orney's services. 277 When an agent performs losing other employment as a result of acceptance of
services for a principal at the la er's request, the law the proffered case; customary charges for similar
will normally imply a promise on the part of the services; amount involved in the controversy and the
principal to pay for the reasonable worth of those resul ng benefits for the client; certainty of
services. 278 The intent of a principal to compensate compensa on; character of employment; and
the agent for services performed on behalf of the professional standing of the lawyer. Hence, the Court
former will be inferred from the principal's request affirms the appellate court's award of PhP3,000,000
for the agents. to Peña, for expenses incurred corresponding to the
performance of his services. An addi onal award of
In this instance, no extra‑ordinary skills employing PhP1,500,000 is granted to him for the services he
advanced legal training nor sophis cated legal performed as a lawyer in securing the rights of Urban
maneuvering were required to be employed in Bank as owner of the Pasay property.
ejec ng 23 sub‑tenants who have no lease contract
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admission. The respondent duly filed his objec on to greater fault s ll lies with the respondent as he did
the plain ff's move, but the court apparently allowed not appear, based on the records of the case, to be a
the interrogatories and request for admission and lawyer whose prac ce rou ne included regular
directed the complainant (as the defendant in the repor ng to clients on ma ers other than billings.
civil case) to respond. The complainant was never We note that he did not bother to report (or even
informed of this development and the omission allege that he bothered to report) on the
eventually led to the grant of the plain ff's mo on interrogatories and request for admission —
for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to incidents that can make or break a case as it did
the decision against the defendants. What lightens break the defendant's case before the trial court.
the impact of the respondent's mishandling of the Despite knowledge of his client's loca on gained in
case is the complainant's own failings as a client. The late December 2001, he did not likewise bother to
non‑payment of fees is a factor that we cannot inform the complainant of the adverse decision
simply disregard. As a rule, law prac ce is not a pro against her in June 2002, taking it upon himself to
bono proposi on and a lawyer's sensi vity and simply file a mo on for reconsidera on and to accept
concern for unpaid fees are understandable; lawyers the court's ruling when his mo on was denied. In our
incur expenses in running their prac ce and generally view, these are law prac ce mortal sins that we
depend, too, on their law prac ce income for their cannot allow to simply be glossed over or be
living expenses. Likewise, the respondent's penalized by a simple reprimand.
appointment as a consultant should be considered
although it is a ma er that none of the par es have However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as
fully examined. Both the non‑payment of fees and the complainant demands in light of the
the appoint to a public office, however, were not complainant's own contributory faults. Disbarment is
reasons properly presented before the trial court an ul mate remedy in the professional world, no less
through a mo on that informed the court of all the serious and weighty as the power to impose
surrounding circumstances of the desired reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both,
withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by recovery from the penalty — although not totally
way of a mere no ce lacking the client's express impossible — is extremely difficult to a ain. Thus, we
consent. Thus, the court's denial of the desired must at all mes act with cau on and due
considera on, taking into account not only the
withdrawal was not totally unexpected.
interests of the immediate par es, but the interest of
More than these reasons and as Commissioner the public, the bar and the administra on of jus ce
Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never as well.
made any effort to contact the respondent to follow
The general public must know that the legal
up the status of her case, expec ng instead the
profession is a closely regulated profession where
respondent to take full and complete ini a ve in this
transgressions merit swi but commensurate
regard. While the respondent, as counsel, has the
penal es; it is a profession that they can trust
obliga on to inform his client of the material
because we guard our ranks and our standards well.
developments in the case, par cularly of the aspects
The Bar must sit up and take no ce of what
of the case that would require the client's
instruc ons or par cipa on, this obliga on is happened in this case to be able to guard against any
balanced by a complementary duty on the part of a repe on of the respondent's transgressions,
party‑li gant to remain in contact with his lawyer in par cularly his failure to report the developments of
order to be informed of the progress of the case. an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the Bar takes a
pro‑ac ve stance, we cannot really blame members
The complainant's failing in this regard is her failure of the public who are not very well disposed towards,
to inform her counsel of her change of business and who may even distrust, the legal profession a er
address, a serious lapse but one that a resourceful hearing experiences similar to what the complainant
counsel could have easily handled. In a balancing, the suffered. The administra on of jus ce is served well
9
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
when we demonstrate that effec ve remedies exist respondent received a copy of the Decision, the
to address the injus ce and inequi es that may result respondent filed his No ce of Re rement of Counsel
from transgressions by those ac ng in the with the MTC.
dispensa on of jus ce process. TASCDI
Feeling aggrieved by respondent's actua ons,
In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is complainants filed the instant administra ve
liable for a clear case of misconduct that seriously complaint against him. Respondent averred that
affects his standing and character as an officer of the Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the
Court and as a member of the Bar, this liability ought complainants, Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him
to be tempered by the mi ga ng circumstances we that "he [was] withdrawing the case from the
pointed out above. We therefore cannot impose respondent because he already engaged another
disbarment as penalty. Given the mi ga ng lawyer to take over the case, so respondent gave the
circumstances and the extent of their effects on the records of the case to him." Respondent explained
respondent's culpability, we hold that a three‑month that "a er Salvador Ramirez withdrew the case from
suspension from the prac ce of law is the penalty the respondent, and engaged another lawyer, the
that is more in keeping with the damage the respondent turned over the records of the case to
complainant suffered and the interests that the him and the respondent ceased as the counsel of the
public, the bar and the administra on of jus ce have complainants." Respondent further alleged that the
to protect. said Mo on for Reconsidera on was already
prepared by another lawyer. He denied being
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. furnished a copy of the Mo on for Reconsidera on
GERARDO F. LARA is hereby SUSPENDED from the
allegedly prepared and filed by another lawyer
prac ce of law for a period of three (3) months,
engaged by complainant Elisa V. Venterez and that he
effec ve upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
was served with a copy of the denial of the said
Mo on by the MTC. Inves ga ng Commissioner
Dennis A. B. Funa found respondent liable for gross
ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA negligence and recommending the imposi on upon
V. RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS, ANTONINA V. PALMA him of the penalty of three months suspension. IBP
and RAMON DE VERA, complainants, vs . ATTY. Board of Governors passed a Resolu on approving
RODRIGO R. COSME, respondent. and adop ng the recommenda on of the
FACTS: Complainants contracted the legal services of Inves ga ng Commissioner.
respondent in Civil Case No. 981 en tled, "Sps. ISSUE: whether the respondent commi ed culpable
Daniel and Lolita Oviedo, et al. v. Eliza de Vera, et al. negligence in handling complainants' case, as would
," for Declara on of Ownership with Damages filed warrant disciplinary ac on
before the MTC. Complainants alleged that they
directed the respondent to either file a Mo on for HELD: Yes. The rule in this jurisdic on is that a client
Reconsidera on or a No ce of Appeal, but has the absolute right to terminate the
respondent failed or refused to do so. Complainant a orney‑client rela on at any me with or without
Elisa V. Venterez was constrained to contract another cause. The right of an a orney to withdraw or
lawyer to prepare the Mo on for Reconsidera on. It terminate the rela on other than for sufficient cause
must be stressed that the said mo on was signed by is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
complainant Elisa V. Venterez herself as the said fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an
lawyer did not enter his appearance. Said MR was a orney who undertakes to conduct an ac on
denied. Respondent was furnished a copy of the impliedly s pulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is
denial of MR but respondent never bothered to file not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
an opposi on to or any comment on the said mo on cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case
despite receipt thereof. Two months a er
10
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
before its final adjudica on arises only from the Therefore, he would have known that the Mo on for
client's wri en consent or from a good cause. Reconsidera on was denied.
(SECTION 26 RULE 138 ROC) WHEREFORE, the resolu on of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adop ng the report and
A lawyer may re re at any me from any ac on or recommenda on of the Inves ga ng Commissioner
special proceeding with the wri en consent of his is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R.
client filed in court and with a copy thereof served COSME is hereby SUSPENDED from the prac ce of
upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern
give his consent, the lawyer must file an applica on
warning that a repe on of the same or similar
with the court. The court, on no ce to the client and
wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely
adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer
ought to be allowed to re re. The applica on for
withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and
What cons tutes good cause are iden fied under CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, complainants, vs . ATTY.
RULE 22.01, CANON 22 OF THE CODE OF JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL,respondent.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. However, the instant
case does not fall under any of the grounds FACTS: Sandiganbayan found the accused, SPO1
Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3
aforemen oned.
Rolando M. Joaquin, guilty of two counts of homicide
Respondent's defense completely crumbles in face of and one count of a empted homicide for being
the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in involved in a shoo ng incident which resulted in the
Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to death of two individuals and the serious injury of
withdraw the records of the said case from another. At that juncture, complainants engaged the
respondent or to terminate the la er's services. services of herein respondent for the accused.
Respondent then filed a MR with the Sandiganbayan
Without a proper revoca on of his authority and but it was denied. Unfazed by the denial, respondent
withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel
filed an Urgent Mo on for Leave to File Second
of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; Mo on for Reconsidera on, with the a ached
and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from
Second MR. Pending resolu on by the
the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court
clients without representa on. An a orney may only
a Pe on for Review on Cer orari (Ad Cautelam).
re re from the case either by a wri en consent of his Therea er, complainants never heard from
client or by permission of the court a er due no ce
respondent again despite the frequent telephone
and hearing, in which event, the a orney should see
calls they made to his office. Complainants went to
to it that the name of the new a orney is recorded in
respondent's last known address only to find out that
the case. Respondent did not comply with these
he had moved out without any forwarding address.
obliga ons. Therefore, he remains the counsel of
More than a year a er the pe on was filed,
record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981 with
complainants personally verified the status of the ad
the duty to protect complainants' interest. Had he cautelam pe on and discovered that the Court had
made the necessary inquiries as to the status of the
already denied the said pe on with finality and
case, he would have known that he was s ll the warrants of arrest has been issued because
counsel of record as no entry of appearance was ever
respondent did nothing to prevent the reglementary
made by another counsel. It would have been easily period for seeking reconsidera on from lapsing
discernible on his part that there was no change in
his status as complainants' lawyer. As of that me, Respondent states that it is of vital significance that
their client‑lawyer rela onship was s ll subsis ng. the Court notes that he was not the original counsel
of the accused. He only met the accused during the
11
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
promulga on of the Sandiganbayan decision and he and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high
was merely requested to assist the accused and be standard of assiduousness that a counsel must
present during the promulga on of the decision. perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly
Respondent claims that there was no formal observed, respondent had not been quite candid in
engagement undertaken by the par es. But only his dealings with the accused or complainants. The
because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Court notes that though respondent represented to
Lawyer's Oath did he file the MR. Though admi ng the accused that he had changed his office address,
its highly irregular character, respondent also made s ll, from the examina on of the pleadings he filed, it
informal but urgent and personal representa on with can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the
the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan same mailing address as that known to complainants.
who promulgated the decision of convic on. He Presumably, at some point, respondent's office would
asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the have received the Court's Resolu on dismissing the
case of the accused, his other professional pe on. Of course, the prudent step to take in that
obliga ons were neglected and that all these were situa on was to at least inform the client of the
done without proper and adequate remunera on. adverse resolu on since they had constantly called
respondent's office to check the status of the case.
As to the ad cautelam pe on, respondent maintains
Even when he knew that complainants had been
that it was filed on me and within the reglementary calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.
period. He then decided to formally withdraw as
counsel for the accused. He wrote a le er to PO3 Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his
Joaquin, who served as the contact person between appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is
respondent and complainants, explaining his decision presumably steeped in court procedures and
to withdraw as their counsel, and a aching the prac ces, should have filed the no ce of withdrawal
No ce to withdraw which respondent instructed the himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he
accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the should have informed this Court through the
le er through registered mail but unfortunately, he appropriate manifesta on that he had already given
could not locate the registry receipt issued for the instruc ons to his clients on the proper way to go
le er. Respondent states that he has asked the about the filing of the No ce of Withdrawal. In not so
accused that he be discharged from the case and doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the
endorsed the No ce of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin accused.
for the la er to file with the Court. Unfortunately,
PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the
one who should have filed the No ce to Withdraw
that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who
would be as equally accommoda ng as respondent. and not the accused. His tale that he sent a
registered le er to the accused and gave them
Respondent suggests this might have been the
reason for the several calls complainants made to his instruc ons on how to go about respondent's
withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should
office. IBP resolved to find respondent guilty and
specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) have been respondent who undertook the
appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of
months as penalty.
his representa on. He could relieve himself of his
ISSUE: whether respondent commi ed gross responsibility as counsel only first by securing the
negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. wri en conformity of the accused and filing it with
152621‑23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam the court pursuant to Rule 138, Sec on 26 of the
pe on's dismissal with finality Rules of Court. The Court also rejects respondent's
claim that there was no formal engagement between
HELD: YES. The Court takes no ce that the ad
the par es and that he made all his efforts for the
cautelam pe on was actually filed out of me. As to case without adequate and proper considera on. A
respondent's conduct in dealing with the accused
12
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
wri en contract is not an essen al element in the of Pans Mo on for an Opportunity to Submit
employment of an a orney. Counter‑Affidavits and Evidence, of the appeal to the
jus ce secretary, and of the Mo on to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
Defer/Suspend Proceedings. On the other hand,
hereby SUSPENDED from the prac ce of law for three complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly
(3) months.
connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case,
which the former knew fully well was baseless.
According to respondent, the irregulari es
REYES v. CHIONG commi ed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal
inves ga on and complainants connivance therein
FACTS: A y. Ramon Reyes sought the disbarment of
were discovered only a er the ins tu on of the
A y. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. for Viola on of the
collec on suit.
Lawyer's Oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In his Complaint, A y. ISSUE: Did respondent violate Canon 8 of the Code of
Reyes alleges that some me in January 1998, his Professional Responsibility?
services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a
Chinese‑Taiwanese, in a business venture that went Held: Yes. The Court agreed with the
awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu‑based fishball, recommenda on of the IBP. We concur with the IBP
tempura and seafood products factory being set up that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure
by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another to resort to the proper remedies strengthen
Chinese‑Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. complainants allega on that the civil ac on was
Eventually, the former discovered that the la er had intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If
not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for respondent or his client did not agree with
his money back, Pan became hos le, making it Prosecutor Salangas resolu on, they should have
necessary for the former to seek legal assistance. Xu, used the proper procedural and administra ve
through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for remedies. Respondent could have gone to the jus ce
estafa against Pan, who was represented by secretary and filed a Mo on for Reconsidera on or a
respondent. Chiong’s client did not appear upon the Mo on for Reinves ga on of Prosecutor Salangas
court when Prosecutor Salonga issued a subpoena decision to file an informa on for estafa. In the trial
for their preliminary inves ga on, the Prosecutor court, a Mo on to Dismiss was available to him if he
filed a criminal complaint for estafa against said could show that the estafa case was filed without
client. A er which Chiong made an urgent mo on to basis. Moreover, he could have ins tuted disbarment
quash the warrant concomitant with his filing for a proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor
civil complaint and collec on for a sum of money Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to
and damages against A y. Reyes, Xu (the act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have
complainant’s client) and the Prosecutor. Upon their advised his client of the availability of these
confronta on, no se lement was reached. remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no
Respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect jus fica on. Clearly there was no need to implead
in impleading A y. Reyes as co‑defendant in Civil complainant and Prosecutor Salonga because they
Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to never had any par cipa on in the business
conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had transac ons between Pan and Xu, clearly it was for
been ins tuted only to exact vengeance. He alleged the mere harassment of the two.
that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an
addi onal defendant because of the irregulari es the
la er had commi ed in conduc ng the criminal
LIM, JR. v. VILLAROSA
inves ga on. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had
resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency
13
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
FACTS: Humberto C. Lim Jr. filed a verified complaint that the right of an a orney to withdraw or
for disbarment against respondent A y. Nicanor V. terminate the rela on other than for sufficient cause
Villarosa on July 7, 2000. That respondent is a is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
prac cing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Canon 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only
Chapter. Respondents was the lawyer of Lumot A. for good cause and upon no ce appropriate in the
Jalandoni, President of Penta Resorts Corpora on circumstances.
(PRC). That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons‑in‑law,
An a orney may only re re from a case either by
Dennis G. Jalbuena and Humberto C. Lim Jr. That
wri en consent of his client or by permission of the
respondent represented Mrs. Jalandoni in a civil case.
court a er due no ce and hearing, in which event
Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said
the a orney should see to it that the name of the
counsel, hence delicate and confiden al ma ers
new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who
involving all the personal circumstances of his client
desires to re re from an ac on without the wri en
were entrusted to the respondent. The la er was
consent of his client must file a pe on for
provided with all the necessary informa on rela ve
withdrawal in court. e must serve a copy of his
to the property in ques on and likewise on legal
pe on upon his client and the adverse party at least
ma ers affec ng the corpora on par cularly
three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise
involving problems which affect the hotel. Said
the court may treat the applica on as a "mere scrap
counsel was privy to all transac ons and affairs of the
of paper." Respondent made no such move. He
corpora on. The respondent handled the en re case
admi ed that he withdrew as counsel on April 26,
and presented Mrs. Jalandoni as a witness,
1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by
eventually respondent filed a mo on to withdraw as
the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs.
counsel for Mrs. Jalandoni without any approval or
Jalandoni was only presumed by A y. Villarosa
knowledge from the said client, which resulted to
because of the appearance of A y. Alminaza in court,
irreparable injury to Mrs. Jalandoni because it
supposedly in his place. [A client] may discharge his
suffered unexpected defeat. Therea er, Jalbuena was
a orney at any me with or without cause and
sued by PRC for estafa and the respondent
therea er employ another lawyer who may then
represented Jalbuena before the city prosecutor. In
enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that a
his conten on that there is a retainership agreement
client is free to change his counsel in a pending case
between them and he cannot refuse to the said
and therea er retain another lawyer to represent
client. A case was filed against the respondent, due
him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not
to conflict of interest to his clients and for not
need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor
releasing the significant documents which belongs to
does it require approval of the court. The appearance
Mrs. Jalandoni or PRC and which was allegedly used
of A y. Alminaza in fact was not even to subs tute
for the benefit or advantage of Jalbuena in the case
for respondent but to act as addi onal counsel. Mrs.
filed against them by PRC.
Jalandoni’s conformity to having an addi onal lawyer
ISSUE: WON the withdrawal as counsel is valid. did not necessarily mean conformity to respondent’s
desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s
HELD: The rule on termina on of a orney‑client specula ons on the professional rela onship of A y.
rela ons may be summarized as follows: The rela on Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the
of a orney and client may be terminated by the records of this case. Respondent should not have
client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of presumed that his mo on to withdraw as counsel
circumstances beyond the control of the client or the would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped
lawyer. The termina on of the a orney‑client appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni’s counsel beginning April
rela onship entails certain du es on the part of the 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the
client and his lawyer. Accordingly, it has been held court was shown to have actually granted his mo on
14
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had again, he did not file any Comment (October 7,
a semblance of gran ng his mo on. That Mrs. 1999).
Jalandoni con nued with A y. Alminaza’s
COMMISSIONER DE LOS REYES’ FINDINGS: People vs.
professional engagement on her behalf despite
Cabacan has remained pending in view of the
respondent’s withdrawal did not absolve the la er of
negligence of A y. Briones to file the required
the consequences of his unprofessional conduct,
appellant's brief. It is evident that he violated Rule
specially in view of the conflic ng interests already
18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR. She recommends that
discussed. Respondent himself stated that his
withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97‑9865 was due to he be SUSPENDED from the prac ce of law
profession for a period of six (6) months.
the "possibility of a conflict of interest."
IBP: Adopted and Approved the Report and
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Recommenda on. May 26, 2000, A y. Briones
A y. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of
filed with the IBP a Mo on for
viola ng Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of
Reconsidera on/Reinves ga on.
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from
the prac ce of law for one (1) year, effec ve upon He contended: He filed a Comment on the
receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that administra ve case but the same was not considered
a repe on of the same or similar acts will be dealt by the inves ga ng commissioner. Neither did the
with more severely. IBP conduct a formal inves ga on.
15
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
Comment. A y. David P. Briones is SUSPENDED from confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in
the prac ce of law for six (6) months. par cular and the legal profession in general.
BALATBAT VS ARIAS SANCHEZ
FACTS: In the Complaint dated September 8, 1976, B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER,
Luisito Balat‑bat alleged that he engaged the services VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES,
of A y. Edgardo Arias y Sanchez to undertake his NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
defense in the said civil case. According to PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL; AND ANTONIO
complainant, he did not a end the scheduled MARINAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY SHERIFF,
hearings because respondent told him that there was RESPONDENTS.
no need to be present. But when he verified the
status of the case from the then City Court of Manila, FACTS: Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an
ac on for damages against the Director of Public
he was surprised to learn that a Decision dated June
21, 1976 had already been rendered which was Works and BR Sebas an Enterprises. Trial court found
B.R. Sebas an liable for damages but absolved other
adverse to him. A y. Sanchez alleged that it was
Luisito who always cannot a end the scheduled defendants. B.R. Sebas an, thru its counsel, the law
firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, mely
hearings. There was also a confusion as to the
iden ty of A y. Edgardo Arias y Sanchez and A y. appealed the adverse decision to the respondent
Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal,
Edgardo Sorca Arias living in Palawan. Just added
drama because when the no ce of the hearing was Eulogio B. Reyes died and was subs tuted by his
heirs. On February 1974, B.R Sebas an, thru its
sent, it was sent to A y. Sorca in Palawan and not to
A y. Arias in Manila. counsel of record, received no ce to file Appellant’s
Brief within 45 days from receipt thereof; however, it
ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be disbarred failed to comply. Court of Appeals issued a Resolu on
or suspended. requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed for failure to file the
RULING: Respondent was SUSPENDED from the Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. On
prac ce of law for one (1) month, and warned that a
September 1974, Court of Appeals dismissed the
repe on of the same act shall be dealt with more
appeal. On September 1974, pe oner, this me
severely. The se led rule is that the a orney‑client
thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a mo on for
rela on con nues un l the client gives a no ce of
reconsidera on of the resolu on dismissing its
discharge, or manifests to the court or tribunal where
appeal alleging that as a result of the death of A y.
the case is pending that counsel is being discharged,
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm.
with a copy served upon the adverse party. Thus, the
only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either A y. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this
the wri en conformity of his client or an order from case in the trial court and who is believed to have
the court relieving him of the du es of counsel, in also a ended to the prepara on of the Appellant’s
accordance with Rule 138, Sec on 2620 of the Rules Brief but failed to submit it through oversight and
of Court. Respondent’s actua ons likewise violate inadvertence, had also le the firm. Court denied the
Rule 18.04, which mandates that a lawyer keep the mo on for reconsidera on. No ac on was taken by
client informed of the status of the case and respond pe oner from within the period to file a pe on for
within a reasonable me to a client’s request for review, the same became final and executory, and
informa on. A client must never be le in the dark the records of the case were remanded. Trial court
for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and issued a writ of execu on. But on November 1975,
pe oner filed with Court of Appeals a Mo on to
16
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of discre on vested in the appellate court to allow
Preliminary Injunc on but was subsequently denied. extensions of me for the filing of briefs. There must
be such a showing which would call for, prompt and
Pe oner filed prohibi on and mandamus, with jus fy its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and must not
prayer for preliminary injunc on with the Supreme
be upheld. The “confusion” in the office of the law
Court to Court of Appeals denial of pe oner’s firm following the death of A y. Crispin Baizas is not
mo on. SC required them to comment and soon
a valid jus fica on for its failure to file the Brief. With
a er, some amendments were made. Ul mately, the Baizas’ death, the responsibility of A y. Alberto and
pe on was denied. But on May 1976, pe oner
his Associates to the pe oner as counsel remained
filed a mo on for its reconsidera on claiming that un l withdrawal by the former of their appearance in
since it was deprived of the right to appeal without
the manner provided by the Rules of Court. The law
fault on its part, the pe on should be given due firm should have re‑assigned the case to another
course. Supreme Court reconsidered and required
associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in
both par es to submit simultaneously their the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
respec ve Memoranda.
the pe oner could contract the services of a new
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court of lawyer. The rule is se led that negligence of counsel
Appeals gravely abused its discre on in denying binds the client. Moreover, pe oner itself was guilty
pe oner’s mo on to reinstate its appeal, previously of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from
dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief counsel regarding its case. Pe on is hereby
DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is issued in this case is li ed.
involved in the present case. What was present was
simple negligence on the part of pe oner’s counsel,
which is neither excusable nor unavoidable.
REQUIREME V. YUIPCO
Pe oner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause
to warrant a favorable ac on on its plea. To jus fy its FACTS: Requierme, Jr. and his counsel, A y.
failure to file the Appellant's Brief, pe oner relies Dominador Maphilindo O. Carillo, charged Judge
mainly on the death of A y. Crispin Baizas and the Evangeline S. Yuipco with serious misconduct for
supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ac ng with manifest par ality towards defendants in
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. We find no merit in Civil Case No. 838 for recovery of possession and/or
pe oner's conten ons. Pe oner's counsel was the specific performance with preliminary injunc on and
law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not damages. Plain ff was represented by A y. Rolando
merely A y. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the C. Casaway, while defendants were represented by
la er did not ex nguish the lawyer‑client rela onship A y. Lou A. Nueva of the PAO. A third party
between said firm and pe oner. complaint was filed by defendants against Requirme,
who secured the services of NCC Law, A y. Carillo
As revealed by the records, pe oner's counsel, the
appeared on behalf of the firm. Requirme thru
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law firm, received
counsel duly filed an answer to the third party
the no ce to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed complaint and subsequently, an Omnibus Mo on.
to do so within the 45 days granted to it.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on On the scheduled hearing, A y. Nueva manifested in
the part of pe oner's counsel in failing to file the open court that he was no longer appearing as
Appellant's Brief. Gran ng that the power or counsel of the defendant since the la er already
discre on to reinstate an appeal that had been engaged in the services of A y. Calonia. Respondent
dismissed is included in or implied from the power or judge issued an Order giving the new counsel a
discre on to dismiss an appeal, s ll such power or period of 15 days to file an Opposi on or Comment
discre on must be exercised upon a showing of good to the Omnibus mo on. However, during the pre‑trial
and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or conference A y. Nueva again appeared as counsel of
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the defendants. Respondent judge issued an order respondent judge were cancelled, and their hearing
again giving A y. Nueva 15 days to file an Opposi on was rescheduled. On said date, another lawyer from
or Comment to the Omnibus Mo on. Pre‑trial NCC firm A y. Nograles, appeared for third party,
conference was reset on March 15, 1994, where the informed the court that he was taking over A y.
plain ff and third party defendant duly appeared Carillo who already resigned from the firm.
with their respec ve counsels. Defendant on the Respondent judge however made derogatory
other hand was absent. A y. Nueva again manifested remarks against A y. Carillo, that he was
that he was no longer the counsel of the defendants. incompetent and irresponsible. A y. Nograles filed a
On the mo on of the plain ff, defendant was mo on for postponement, but the hearing was
declared “as in default” as to the complaint and pushed through. When plain ff, third party
“non‑suited” as to the third party complaint. defendants and counsels did not appear, respondent
judge declared A y. Carillo in direct contempt of
April 21, 1994: Requireme received a “Mo on to Li
court. December 6, 1995: respondent Judge issued
the Order of Ddefault and Opposi on to Declare an order denying the mo on for the inhibi on and
Third Party Plain ff Non‑Suited”. So he promptly filed
ci ng A y. Carillo for direct contempt of Court,
a Comment/Opposi on on the ground that the imposed to him a fine.MR filed by NCC law was
mo on was mere a scrap of paper since it did not
denied. A y. Carillo paid in protest. NCC Law filed a
contain a no ce of hearing sta ng the me and Formal Offer of Exhibits ad cautelam, defendant duly
places of hearing and was not directed at the par es,
fled their opposi on thereto. An administra ve case
but rather to the clerk of court. June 12, 1994: was filed against respondent judge. The judge
Requierme received a no ce of pre‑trial conference
explained that she did not impliedly accept A y.
dated April 14, 1994, the same day the Mo on to Li Nueva’s request to withdraw counsel, but merely
was filed. Pre‑trial Conference: Judge called the
ordered the new counsel to file the
par es to her chambers, requested the respec ve
comment/opposi on to avoid delay.
counsels of the plain ff and third party defendant
not to oppose on the Mo on to Li , to give the ISSUE: W/N respondent judge acted with par ality
defendants a chance to present evidence. Mo on to towards defendants.
Li was granted and se ng the case for trial. Upon
HELD: Yes, as observed by the Supreme Court, the
the reminder of the plain ff’s counsel that no
respondent judge commi ed the following
pre‑trial order has been issued, the judge said she
irregulari es:
will issue the order a er the presenta on of
witnesses. Trial ensued, during the presenta on of 1. A verbal subs tu on of counsel, albeit
defendant’s evidence on third party complaint, A y. impliedly granted by respondent judge, contravenes
Nueva manifested that he was not presen ng Sec on 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wc
evidence. A er hearing. The respondent judge prescribes the requirements for change of a orneys.
requested A y. Carillo not to present evidence on
counterclaims and to take pity on the defendants as 2. The mo on to Li failed to comply with
they have already surrendered. February 8, 1995: Sec ons 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of ROC wc requires
respondent judge reiterated her request, but to no no ce to be sent at least 3 days before the hearing,
avail, he became unusually strict on the witness. directed to the par es concerned, star ng the me
and place of hearing of the mo on, with proper
March 24, 1995: Requierme and A y. Carillo filed a proof of no ce thereof.
mo on for disqualifica on/inhibi on of Presiding
Judge, but failed to appear on the hearing thereof. 3. Respondent judge showed par ality when she
Respondent judge gave Requieme and A y. Carillo 10 called counsels for plain ff and third party
days to file their comments on the mo on to inhibit defendants to her chambers during a pre‑trial
and reset the hearing. But on the said date, they both
appeared only to find out that all hearings of
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conference and requested them not to oppose the located in Koronadal, South Cotabato and Malungon,
Mo on to Li . (Canon 3, Rule 3.06) Sarangani Province, in viola on of the rule on venue.
Complainant also alleged that respondent forged the
4. Failure to issue a pre‑trial order as required by
signature of her husband in the Affidavit of Loss.
Rule 20 of ROC cannot be excused by her heavy
caseload. It was unthinkable that complainants failed According to the respondent, when her staff Jan Kirt
to remind her as it was her duty. Lester Soledad was at the RTC Office of the Clerk of
Court, she called him through cellular phone and
5. There is no legal basis for holding A y. Carillo
directed him to stop the filing of the complaint as the
in direct Contempt of Court for not appearing during same lacked certain a achments. However, one copy
a hearing, considering that she was fully apprised
thereof was already stamped RECEIVED by the
that he was no longer the counsel of party receiving court personnel, who also assigned a
defendant.
docket number. She kept the copies of the complaint,
Judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory including the one with the stamp, to be filed later
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. when the a achments are complete. She then
They are not common men and women, whose severed the lawyer‑client rela onship due to
errors men forgive and me forgets. Judges sits as overwhelming workload demanded by her new
the embodiment of the people’s sense of jus ce, employer Nakayama Group of Companies, which
their last recourse where all other ins tu ons have constrained her to return the money received as well
failed. The Supreme Court ruled Judge Yuipco liable as the records of the case, thereby leaving her client
for serious misconduct, i.e. ac ng with manifest with no representa on. Complainant charged
par ality toward the defendants in a case. respondent with grave misconduct, gross ignorance
of the law and falsifica on of public documents. Both
the IBP and Board of Governors recommended
CENIZA VS RUBIA suspension of the respondent.
FACTS: Complainant sought the legal services of the ISSUE: Whether or not respondent commi ed some
respondent in regard to the share of her acts for which she should be disciplined or
mother‑in‑law in the estate of her husband Carlos administra vely sanc oned.
Ceniza. As she had no money to pay for a orneys HELD: Yes. Heavy workload is not sufficient reason for
fees, respondent made her sign a promissory note for the withdrawal of her services.Clearly, respondent
P32,000.00, which amount was lent by Domingo violated the Lawyers Oath which imposes upon every
Natavio. Respondent furnished them a copy of the member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
complaint for par on and recovery of money or malice, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18,
ownership/possession represen ng legi me but with and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
no docket number on it. Three months lapsed before Responsibility.
respondent informed them that it was already filed in
court. It was then that they received a copy of the CANON 18 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
complaint with Civil Case No. 4198 and a rubber WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
stamped RECEIVED thereon. However, when
Rule 18.03 ‑ A lawyer shall not neglect a legal ma er
complainant verified the status of the case with the
entrusted to him and his negligence in connec on
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del
therewith shall render him liable.
Sur, she was informed that no case with said tle and
docket number was filed. Further, complainant Rule 18.04 ‑ A lawyer shall keep the client informed
alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the status of his case and shall respond within a
of the law for intending to file the complaint in Davao reasonable me to the clients request for
del Sur when the proper es to be recovered were informa on.
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CANON 22 ‑ A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS respondent asked another lawyer to prepare the
SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE appellants brief. However, on May 11, 1974,
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of
Appeals had dismissed his appeal for failure of
When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for counsel to file an appellants brief. Respondent
a fee or gra s et amore, he undertakes to give his
alleged he then entered his appearance as counsel
utmost a en on, skill and competence to it, for Cayetano and filed a mo on for reconsidera on
regardless of its significance. Thus, his client, whether
with the Court of Appeals, for which he was paid
rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will P800.00. The mo on was, however, denied and
discharge his du es diligently and exert his best
Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979, when
efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend he was released on condi onal pardon. Respondent
his (clients) cause with reasonable dispatch. Failure
claims that he was not the counsel of complainant
to fulfill his du es will subject him to grave Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing of a mo on for
administra ve liability as a member of the Bar. For
reconsidera on before the Court of Appeals and he
the overriding need to maintain the faith and could not be held responsible for the dismissal of
confidence of the people in the legal profession
complainants appeal for failure of counsel to file the
demands that an erring lawyer should be sanc oned. appellants brief. Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
adopted the findings of the IBP and recommended
the suspension of respondent from the prac ce of
SPOUSES RABANAL VS. ATTY. TUGADE law for one (1) year.
FACTS: It appears that complainant was one of the ISSUE: Whether or not lawyer‑client rela onship
accused‑appellants in Criminal Case No. CCC‑I‑150 in existed.
Criminal Circuit Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He
was found guilty of homicide and the case was HELD: Yes. It is immaterial that respondent Tugade
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Complainant assisted Cayetano in the case as a mere friend or
terminated the services of his previous counsel and kababayan of the la er. The absence of a wri en
engaged the services of respondent A y. Faus no F. contract does not preclude a finding that there was a
Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the appeal. professional rela onship which merits a orneys fees
However, despite the extension of me granted to for professional services rendered. A wri en contract
him totalling 60 days, A y. Tugade failed to file the is not an essen al element in the employment of an
appellants brief, resul ng in the dismissal of the a orney; the contract may be express or implied. To
appeal. Cayetano filed a mo on for reconsidera on, establish the rela on, it is sufficient that the advice
but his mo on was denied. Complainants alleged and assistance of an a orney is sought and received
that they paid P1,000.00 to respondent as a orneys in any ma er per nent to his profession. Admission
fees and, in addi on, the amount of P1,400.00 for of respondent lawyer that he received payment from
the prepara on of the appellants brief. Complainants complainant is sufficient evidence to establish a
sought the suspension from the prac ce of law or the lawyer‑client rela onship. In this case, complainant
disbarment of respondent a orney. sought and received legal advice from respondent
Tugade, who admi ed that he agreed to sign the
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent appellants brief to be filed and that he received
said he did not want to accept complainants case due P600.00 from complainant spouses. It is therefore
to his busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless clear that a lawyer‑client rela onship existed
prevailed upon by the la er, who is his kababayan, to between the two.
sign the appellants brief to be filed in the case.
Cayetano gave the transcripts of stenographic notes
pertaining to the case to respondent, and the sum of
P600.00 as li ga on expenses, a er which
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INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE VS NLRC terminate effec ve May 25, 1990. On May 29, 1990,
Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal. On August 21,
FACTS: Interna onal Rice Research Ins tute (IRRI) is
1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered
an interna onal organiza on recognized by the judgment finding the termina on of Micosa illegal
Philippine government. In 1977, it hired private and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages
respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby from the date of his dismissal up to actual
became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and
reinstatement. On appeal, the Na onal Labor
Regula ons, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which
Rela ons Commission was basically in agreement
states viz: with the findings and conclusions of the Labor
"C. Convic on and Previous Separa on Arbiter.
'2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) ISSUE: W/N the NLRC commi ed grave abuse of
criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be discre on in holding that “there is no basis to apply
dismissed from the service.'" pe oner’s ins tute personnel manual in dismissing
the complainant on the sole ground that his
On February 6, 1987, Micosa stabbed to death one convic on of homicide cons tute moral turpitude.
Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños,
Laguna. On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered HELD: No. The basic premise of pe oner is that
a decision finding Micosa guilty of homicide, but Micosa's convic on of the crime of homicide, which
apprecia ng, however, in his favor the presence of is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground
the mi ga ng circumstances of (a) incomplete for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions
self‑defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the of IRRI's Employment Policy Regula ons. It should be
total absence of any aggrava ng circumstance. recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an
Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's
sentence under the Proba on Law. On February 8, Director General that as regular core employee he
1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote "may not be terminated except for jus fiable causes
Micosa that his appointment as laborer was as defined by the per nent provisions of the
confirmed, making him a regular core employee Philippine Labor Code." Thus, IRRI could not remove
whose appointment was for an indefinite period and him from his job if there existed no jus fiable cause
who "may not be terminated except for jus fiable as defined by the Labor Code.
causes as defined by the per nent provisions of the Ar cle 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just
Philippine Labor Code." On March 30, 1990, IRRI's
causes wherein an employer may terminate an
Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual employment. Verily, convic on of a crime involving
wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment moral turpitude is not one of these jus fiable causes.
in view of his convic on in the case for homicide. On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the
On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual employee under Ar cle 282 (d) refers to an offense
that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, against the person of his employer or any immediate
1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from member of his family or his duly authorized
unlawful aggression; that his convic on did not representa ve. Analogous causes must have an
involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to element similar to those found in the specific just
appeal his convic on so that he could avail of the cause enumerated under Ar cle 282. Clearly lacking
benefits of proba on, which the trial court granted to in the ground invoked by pe oner is its rela on to
him. On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance his work or to his employer. In the case at bar, the
of IRRI's Grievance Commi ee who recommended to commission of the crime of homicide was outside the
the Director General, his con nued employment. perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been
However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a commi ed in a restaurant a er office hours and
no ce to Micosa that the la er's employment was to against a non‑IRRI employee. Thus, the convic on of
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
Micosa for homicide was not work‑related, his par cular convic on involves moral turpitude may be
misdeed having no rela on to his posi on as laborer a ques on of fact and frequently depends on all the
and was not directed or commi ed against IRRI or its surrounding circumstances. While xxx generally but
authorized agent. Besides, IRRI failed to show how not always, crimes mala in se involve moral
the dismissal of Micosa would be in considera on of turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it
the safety and welfare of its employees, its cannot always be ascertained whether moral
reputa on and standing in the community and its turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
special obliga ons to its host country. It did not crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since
present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but
tendency to kill without provoca on or that he posed rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
a clear and present danger to the company and its which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita
personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that only.[16] It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
Micosa's service record is unblemished. somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning
of which must be le to the process of judicial
In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
insisted on Micosa's termina on. Certainly, said
termina on cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a
legal basis but factual basis as well. Even under IRRI's
Employment Policy and Regula ons, the dismissal of FIGUEROA VS BARRANCO, JR.
Micosa on the ground of his convic on for homicide FACTS: This is an administra ve complaint filed by
cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of Patricia Figueroa way back in 1971, against
said personnel manual men ons of convic on of a respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar
crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for candidate in the 1970 Bar examina on, praying
dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that convic on of the thereto that herein respondent be denied admission
crime of homicide is convic on of a crime involving to the legal profession. In her pe on, complainant
moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view. averred that respondent and she had been
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to
ci ng In Re Basa and Tak Ng v. Republic[12] as them and that respondent failed to fulfill his promise
everything which is done contrary to jus ce, to marry her a er he passes the bar examina ons.
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness Hence, complainant charged him of gross immorality.
or depravity in the private and social du es which a Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, town‑mates and teen sweethearts. Their in macy
contrary to jus ce, honesty, modesty or good morals. yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the promised he would marry her a er he passes the bar
examina ons. Their rela onship con nued and
Supreme Court to determine. Thus, the precipitate
conclusion of IRRI that convic on of the crime of Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty
homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted promises of marriage. Patricia learned that Simeon
considering that the said crime which resulted from married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon
successfully passed the 1970 bar examina ons. But
an act of incomplete self‑defense from an unlawful
aggression by the vic m has not been so classified as before he could take his oath, Patricia filed a pe on
involving moral turpitude. This is not to say that all to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the
convic ons of the crime of homicide do not involve ground of gross immoral conduct.
moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the in premarital rela ons with Patricia and making
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every promises to marry her cons tute gross immoral
criminal act and is not shown by every known and conduct?
inten onal viola on of statute, but whether any
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
HELD: No. The SC ruled that the facts do not subject of the suit to one Eleonora Astudillo to
cons tute gross immoral conduct warran ng a sa sfy complainant's claim, out of the proceeds of
permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal the sale, without however Dumadag's knowledge and
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual consent. The Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas
rela ons with complainant and promises to marry and Astudillo, was notarized by respondent a orney
suggests a doub ul moral character on his part but and stated that the "parcel of land, together with all
the same does not cons tute grossly immoral the improvements found and exis ng thereon, (is)
conduct. The Court has held that to jus fy free from liens and encumbrances, whatsoever. A er
suspension or disbarment the act complained of the sale to Astudillo, The said proceeds from the sale,
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A according to complainant, was not delivered to him
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false by respondent a orney, even a er the former made
as to cons tute a criminal act or so unprincipled or a demand on the la er.
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It
is willful, flagrant, or shameless act, which shows a Respondent also denies having been asked by
Dumadag to file a mo on for execu on in the land
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community. We cannot cas gate a dispute or having received from him a cow or
man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for P700.00; however he was promised one cow since he
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which paid the expenses in the land dispute case. Anent the
sale by the Avellanos as to Eleonora Astudillo, the
should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason. same, according to respondent, was a private sale,
Dumadag was not a party thereto. Respondent also
claims that he was not aware that a mo on for
execu on had been filed in the land dispute case by
DUMADAG VS. LUMAYA Dumadag when the Deed of Sale between the
FACTS: Respondent A y. Ernesto L. Lumaya of Avellanosas and Astudillo was presented to him for
Banganga, Davao Oriental is administra vely charged notariza on, and that he did not see any cash change
with unethical prac ces, conflict of interest and hands as he was informed that it was just a
disloyalty to client by Maximo Dumada involving the ra fica on of an earlier verbal sale. He notarized the
sale of a parcel of land which was terminated via a deed of sale without inten on to cause any damage.
compromise agreement which provided that A er respondent's comment and complainant's reply
Avellanosas would pay Dumadag the amount of had been filed, the case was referred to the Office of
P4,644.00 and in turn Dumadag would execute in the Solicitor General for inves ga on, report and
favor of the Avellanosas a deed of reconveyance of recommenda on. Actual inves ga on and hearings
the land. The compromise agreement, prepared by were conducted. For the reasons that respondent's
respondent, was approved by the trial court. The acts cons tute lack of fidelity, loyalty and devo on to
Avellanosas failed to comply with their undertaking his client's cause, unethical prac ce and a viola on of
under the compromise agreement to pay his lawyer's oath, the OSG recommends respondent's
complainant the amount of, which necessitated the suspension from the prac ce of law for not less than
filing by Dumadag of a mo on for execu on. five (5) years.
According to complainant, he asked his then counsel, ISSUE: Whether or not respondent's acts cons tute
herein respondent, to prepare and file the
lack of fidelity, loyalty and devo on to his client's
appropriate mo on for execu on; however, the la er cause and is an unethical prac ce and a viola on of
failed to do so. When the writ of execu on was his lawyer’s oath.
issued, Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon, according
to the complainant, instead of serving the same on HELD: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Avellanosas, connived with respondent a orney Canon 16 –
by selling a one (1) hectare por on of the land
26
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
"Rule 16.01 ‑ A lawyer shall account for all money or fois ng falsehood and fabricated public document to
property collected or received for or from the client. molest and harass par es; and (c) libel,
misrepresenta on and unlawful adver sement. Chua
"Rule 16.02 ‑ A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
was charged with many offenses. The evidence was
client separate and apart from his own and those of found to support the charges that he notarized a
others kept by him. forged deed of sale, that he caused to be published
"Rule 16.03 ‑ A lawyer shall deliver the funds and an adver sement of a SEC decision in order to bring
property of his client when due or upon demand. ridicule and shame upon a corpora on, that he filed
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may a civil case knowing that the reliefs he prayed for
apply so much thereof as may be necessary to sa sfy were probably granted in the SEC case, thus, belying
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving no ce his cer fica on against forum shopping. He has also
promptly therea er to his client. He shall also have a been previously reprimanded for bribing a judge and
lien to the same extent on all judgments and for consistently using dilatory tac cs to prolong
execu ons he has secured for his client as provided li ga on.
for in the Rules of Court."
ISSUE: Whether or not the charges against A y. Chua
Both par es failed to apprise this Court of the final sufficient to warrant disciplinary ac on against him.
disposi on of Civil Case No. 283, even as the Court HELD: Yes. When a notary public is a lawyer, a graver
took note of the RTC decision in said case where a responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason
finding was made that the land earlier sold by the of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no
Avellanosas to Dumadag is separate and dis nct from
falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The Code of
the one (1) hectare por on sold by the Avellanos as
Professional Responsibility also commands him not
to Astudillo. However, the RTC in its decision also to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
ordered co‑defendant (herein respondent) A y. decei ul conduct and to uphold at all mes the
Lumaya to pay the plain ff (herein complainant) the integrity and dignity of legal profession. The bar
sum of P4,344.00 he (A y. Lumaya) had received
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
from Deputy Sheriff Rogelio Dongiapon for herein as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
complainant. Therefore, even as respondent honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former his du es to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to
client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of
his clients.
and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his
client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the
canons of professional responsibility. ACCORDINGLY,
the Court hereby SUSPENDS A y. Ernesto Lumaya LIGAYA MANIAGO VS ATTY. LOURDES DE DIOS
INDEFINITELY from the prac ce of law effec ve from FACTS: The instant case arose from an
date of his receipt of this resolu on. Affidavit‑Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya
Maniago, seeking the disbarment of A y. Lourdes I.
de Dios for engaging in the prac ce of law despite
FLORES VS. CHUA having been suspended by the Court. Complainant
alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi
FACTS: The complainant seeks the disbarment of Miyata, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
respondent A y. Chua, a prac cing lawyer and a
Olongapo City, Branch 73, for viola on of Presiden al
notary public, for various offenses amoun ng to Decree No. 603, The accused was represented by
malprac ce, gross misconduct, viola on of his A y. De Dios. Complainant then learned from the
lawyer’s oath, the CPR as well as the provisions of the RTC staff that A y. De Dios had an outstanding
laws of the Philippines, to wit: (a) Fraud through
suspension order from the Supreme Court since
falsifica on and forgery of public document; (b) 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing
27
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a resume her prac ce of law without submi ng the
civil case (Civil Case No. 355‑0‑2005) and another required cer fica ons and passing through the OBC
case (Special Proceeding No. M‑6153) filed against for evalua on. In order to avoid confusion and
Miyata before the RTC, Maka City, Branch 134, conflic ng direc ves from the Court, the OBC
where A y. De Dios appeared as his counsel. recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy
on the ma er of the li ing of the order of suspension
Respondent explained that an administra ve case of a lawyer from the prac ce of law.
was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman,
where she was meted the penalty of 6‑month IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED
suspension. She served the suspension immediately that the following guidelines be observed in the
upon receipt of the Courts Resolu on on May 16, ma er of the li ing of an order suspending a lawyer
2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifesta on from the prac ce of law:
filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally
informed the Court that she was resuming her 1) A er a finding that respondent lawyer must be
prac ce of law on November 17, 2001, which she suspended from the prac ce of law, the Court shall
actually did. A problem arose when Judge Josefina render a decision imposing the penalty;
Farrales, erroneously issued a direc ve on March 15, 2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision
2007, ordering respondent to desist from prac cing is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
law and revoking her notarial commission for the respondent has 15 days within which to file a mo on
years 2007 and 2008. Therea er, respondent filed a for reconsidera on thereof. The denial of said mo on
Mo on for Clarifica on with the Supreme Court on shall render the decision final and executory;
account of Judge Farrales le ers which gave the
impression that A y. De Dios is not yet allowed to 3) Upon the expira on of the period of suspension,
resume her prac ce of law. Respondent averred that respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Maniago, during which she allegedly prac ced law, sta ng therein that he or she has desisted from the
she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited prac ce of law and has not appeared in any court
from prac ce. The complaint, she added, was during the period of his or her suspension;
baseless and malicious, and should be dismissed 4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished
outright. to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Execu ve
ISSUE: WON the respondent’s resump on from the Judge of the courts where respondent has pending
prac ce of law is valid despite her failure to submit cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she
the required cer fica ons and passing through OBC has appeared as counsel;
for evalua on. 5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof
HELD: YES. According to the OBC, a suspended lawyer of respondents compliance with the order of
must first present proof(s) of his compliance by suspension;
submi ng cer fica ons from the Integrated Bar of 6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements
the Philippines and from the Execu ve Judge that he made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for
has indeed desisted from the prac ce of law during the imposi on of a more severe punishment, or
the period of suspension. Therea er, the Court, a er disbarment, as may be warranted.
evalua on, and upon a favorable recommenda on
from the OBC, will issue a resolu on li ing the order
of suspension and thus allow him to resume the
RIZALINO FERNANDEZ VS ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO
prac ce of law. The OBC alleged that it was
JR.
unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in
A.C. No. 4943, where A y. De Dios was able to
28
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment against under oath. He alleged that complainant engaged his
A y. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for alleged patent and legal services a er the first counsel had withdrawn
gross neglect in the handling of Civil Case No. 7500 from the case because of a misunderstanding with
which complainant Rizalino Fernandez and others complainant. He stated that he had no knowledge of
had filed against the Bacolod City Water District what had happened in the case before he handled it
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Bacolod because complainant did not furnish him the records
City. Complainant imputed the following negligent and stenographic notes of the previous proceedings
acts to respondent which led to the dismissal of Civil despite his repeated requests. Respondent further
Case No. 7500: claimed that he failed to formally offer the exhibits as
evidence because complainant could not be reached
1. Respondent did not a end the scheduled hearing when he was needed for conference and the la er
on January 11, 1996 nor seek a postponement
even tried to take over the handling of the case by
thereof, for which reason the trial court considered insis ng on presen ng more witnesses who
respondent to have waived further presenta on of nevertheless failed to appear during trial despite
his evidence and directed him to formally offer his several postponements.
exhibits for admission on January 30, 1996;
The IBP Inves ga ng Commissioner recommended
2. Notwithstanding receipt of the order dated that respondent be suspended from the prac ce of
January 11, 1996, respondent failed to formally offer
law for a period of six (6) months with warning that
his exhibits on January 30, 1996, promp ng the trial the commission of the same or similar offenses will
court to order the dismissal of the case; be dealt with more severely in the future.[4] The
3. While respondent filed a mo on for report and recommenda on of the Inves ga ng
reconsidera on of the order of dismissal, he did not Commissioner was approved on June 29, 2002 by the
file his mo on within the reglementary period, as a IBP Board of Governors.[5] Respondent filed a
result of which the said mo on, actually filed on May mo on for reconsidera on, dated September 17,
7, 1996, was denied by the trial court on May 14, 2002, alleging that the Court should not have taken
1996 for having been filed out of me; cognizance of the complaint because it was not
verified.According to him, the complaint was a mere
4. When asked for an explana on regarding the poli cal ploy to discredit him because he was aspiring
dismissal of the case, respondent informed for a congressional seat in the 1998 elec ons.
complainant through a le er, dated July 30, 1996,
that he had filed a mo on for reconsidera on of the ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of gross neglect in
order of dismissal, but the mo on, which had been the handling of the civil case
filed a long me ago, had not yet been resolved by HELD: YES. A counsel must constantly keep in mind
the trial court; that his ac ons or omissions, even malfeasance or
5. Respondent tried to shi the blame on nonfeasance, would be binding on his client. Verily, a
complainant by claiming that the la er insisted on lawyer owes to the client the exercise of utmost
presen ng his sister from Manila as their last prudence and capability in that representa on.
witness. The truth was that complainants sister had Lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the
already tes fied and there was no more witness to rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone
present; and who deals with them has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and
6. Respondent only a ended one (1) hearing in the competence but also a whole‑hearted fealty to the
civil case. clients cause.[7]
Respondent averred that the complaint filed against Respondents a empt to evade responsibility by
him was baseless and was purely malicious and shi ing the blame on complainant is apparent. His
specula ve considering the fact that it was not made averment that complainant failed to turn over to him
29
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
the records and stenographic notes of the case only discussed and categorically ruled upon by the SC in
highlights his incompetence and inadequacy in its Decision in Dec. 11, 2005 (In Re: Pe on to
handling complainants case. Considering that Disqualify A y. Leonard De Vera). He prayed that the
respondent has been prac cing law for almost 15 instant administra ve complaint be dismissed
years, he should have known that he could easily following the principle of res judicata.
obtain a copy of the records and stenographic notes
from the court where the case was docketed. Complainant maintained that there is substan al
Respondent likewise refers to the alleged obnoxious evidence showing respondent's moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis
a tude of complainant in trying to manipulate the
manner in which he was handling the case as the for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the
main reason for his failure to formally offer his respondent never denied that he used his client's
exhibits in contraven on of the order of the court. money. Complainant argued that the respondent
failed to present evidence that the SC of California
But respondent should bear in mind that while a
accepted the la er's resigna on and even if such was
lawyer owes utmost zeal and devo on to the interest
of his client, he also has the responsibility of accepted, complainant posited that this should not
employing only fair and honest means to a ain the absolve the respondent from liability. Moreover,
lawful objec ves of his client and he should not allow complainant added that the principle of res judicata
would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that
the la er to dictate the procedure in handling the
case. the first administra ve case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualifica on.
ISSUE: Whether or not A y. De Vera commi ed
malprac ce which amounted to moral turpitude in
the State Bar of California and should such be an
VELEZ v. DE VERA applicable basis for a disbarment in the Philippines
FACTS: Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for
HELD: Yes, there is substan al evidence of
the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent malprac ce by A y. De Vera. SC suspended him for 2
A y. Leonard de Vera based on the following years.
grounds:
Sec on 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
1) A y. De Veras’ alleged misrepresenta on in
concealing the suspension order rendered against Disbarment or suspension of a orneys by Supreme
him by the State Bar of California. Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as a orney
2) That the respondent, in appropria ng for his own
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malprac ce, or
benefit funds due his client, was found to have other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
performed an act cons tu ng moral turpitude by the immoral conduct, or by reason of his convic on of a
Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – crime involving moral turpitude, or for any viola on
San Francisco, State Bar of California. Complainant
of the oath which he is required to take before
alleged that the respondent was then forced to
admission to prac ce, or for a wilful disobedience of
resign or surrender his license to prac ce law in the any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
said state in order to evade the recommended 3 year or wilfully appearing as an a orney for a party to a
suspension. case without authority so to do. The prac ce of
A y. De Vera stated in his reply that the issues raised solici ng cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
in above‑men oned Complaint were the very issues personally or through paid agents or brokers,
raised in an earlier administra ve case filed by the cons tutes malprac ce.
same complainant against him. In fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively
30
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
A y. de Vera did not deny complainant's (Julius Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or
Willis) allega on in the la er's memorandum that he property collected or received for or from the client.
(de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his
client and that he deposited said amount in his Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
personal account and not in a separate trust account client separate and apart from his own and those of
and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal others kept by him.
purposes. A y. De Vera insists that Julius’ father A y. De Vera’s ac ons caused dishonor, not only to
authorized him to use the money, and has repaid the himself but to the noble profession to which he
full amount even before the administra ve case was belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of
filed against him. However, aside from these li gants to the profession is inexorably diminished
self‑serving statements, the SC cannot find anywhere whenever a member of the profession betrays their
in the records of this case proof that indeed A y. de trust and confidence.
Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his
client.
A y. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by NAKPIL v. VALDES
the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed FACTS: The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and
tes fied that he "expected de Vera might use the respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s
money for a few days" was not so much an during their school days in De La Salle and the
acknowledgment of consent to the use by A y. de Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to
Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of their families and respondent became the business
the probability that A y. de Vera might, indeed, use consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
his client's funds, which by itself did not speak well of
the character of A y. de Vera or the way such Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a
character was perceived. summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For
lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase
the Moran property for him. They agreed that
In the instant case, the act of A y. de Vera in holding respondent would keep the property in trust for the
on to his clients money without the la ers Nakpils un l the la er could buy it back. Pursuant to
acquiescence is conduct indica ve of lack of integrity their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans
and propriety. It is clear that A y. de Vera, by from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate
deposi ng the check in his own account and using the property. Title was then issued in respondents
the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, name.
malprac ce, gross misconduct and unethical When Jose Nakpil died, respondent acted as the legal
behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant
to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it IMELDA NAKPIL. The ownership of the Moran
cannot be denied that the respect of li gants to the property became an issue in the intestate
profession is inexorably diminished whenever a proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the
member of the profession betrays their trust and Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate.
confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct Respondent transferred his tle to the Moran
himself with all good fidelity to his client. property to his company, the Caval Realty
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL Corpora on. Complainant filed this administra ve
MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY case to disbar the respondent. She charged that
COME TO HIS POSSESSION. respondent violated professional ethics when he:
31
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
(1) Assigned to his family corpora on the Moran in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less
estate he was se ling as its lawyer and auditor. than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transac ons
(2) Excluded the Moran property from the inventory
with his clients.
of real estate proper es he prepared for a
client‑estate and, at the same me, charged the loan
secured to purchase the said excluded property as a
liability of the estate, all for the purpose of UI V. BONIFACIO
transferring the tle to the said property to his family FACTS: The case at bar concerns an administra ve
corpora on. complaint for disbarment against A y. Iris Bonifacio
ISSUE: Whether or not there was conflict of interest for allegedly carrying on an immoral rela onship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
between the respondent A y. Valdes and the
complainant. Some me in December 1987 complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
HELD: YES. Respondent was suspended from prac ce rela onship with respondent A y. Iris Bonifacio with
of law for one (1) year. There is no ques on that the whom he begot a daughter some me in 1986, and
interests of the estate and that of its creditors are that they had been living together at Ayala Alabang
adverse to each other. Respondent’s accoun ng firm Village in Mun nlupa City. Respondent who is a
prepared the list of assets and liabili es of the estate graduate of the College of Law of the University of
and, at the same me, computed the claims of two the Philippines was admi ed to the Philippine Bar in
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict 1982. Carlos Ui admi ed to complainant his
between the interest of the estate which stands as rela onship with the respondent. Complainant then
the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are visited respondent at her office in the later part of
creditors of the estate. Respondent undoubtedly June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
placed his law firm in a posi on where his loyalty to Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admi ed to her
his client could be doubted. In the estate that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was however, that everything was over between her and
to contest the claims of these two creditors but Carlos Ui. However, complainant again discovered
which claims were prepared by respondent’s that the illicit rela onship between her husband and
accoun ng firm. Even if the claims were valid and did respondent con nued, and that some me in
not prejudice the estate, the set‑up is s ll December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a Ui, had a second child. A complaint for disbarment as
conflict of interest in the representa on is then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant
probability, not certainty of conflict. It was against respondent A y. Iris Bonifacio before the
respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict the Philippines (hereina er, Commission) on the
of interest. ground of immorality, more par cularly, for carrying
on an illicit rela onship with the complainants
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded husband, Carlos Ui.
by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine Respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui some me
his conduct by ac ng in a manner that would in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
promote public confidence in the integrity of the bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos
legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China,
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code from whom he had long been estranged. She stated
of Professional Responsibility as the rela onship that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
between an a orney and his client is highly fiduciary formalized his inten on to marry her and they in fact
32
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. It is respondent's must be so corrupt and false as to cons tute a
conten on that her rela onship with Carlos Ui is not criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
illicit because they were married abroad and that to a high degree. A member of the Bar and officer of
a er June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos the court is not only required to refrain from
Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her es with him. adulterous rela onships . . . but must also so behave
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by crea ng
her in Alabang. Furthermore, In the proceedings the belief that he is flou ng those moral standards.
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Respondents act of immediately distancing herself
complainant filed a Mo on to Cite Respondent in from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status
Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
charged respondent with making false allega ons in that she had no inten on of flaun ng the law and the
her Answer and for submi ng a suppor ng high moral standard of the legal profession.
document which was altered and intercalated.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against
ISSUE: Did the respondent conduct herself in an respondent A y. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However,
from the prac ce of law? respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for a aching to
her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Cer ficate,
HELD: NO. The prac ce of law is a privilege. A bar with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the STERN WARNING that a more severe sanc on will be
prac ce of the legal profession simply by passing the
imposed on her for any repe on of the same or
bar examina ons. It is a privilege that can be
similar offense in the future.
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of
legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine qua non
for admission to the bar, then the con nued TOMLIN II V. MOYA II
possession of good moral character is also requisite FACTS: On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a
for retaining membership in the legal profession. complaint 1 before the Commission on Bar Discipline
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer A y. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his
may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by monetary obliga ons and for having issued bouncing
reason of his convic on of a crime involving moral checks; thereby viola ng the Code of Professional
turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral Responsibility 2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22. 3
integrity in addi on to professional probity. Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from
him P600,000.00 par ally covered by seven
Circumstances existed which should have aroused
respondent’s suspicion that something was amiss in postdated checks. However, when complainant tried
her rela onship with Ui, and moved her to ask to encash them on their respec ve due dates, the
probing ques ons. Respondent was imprudent in checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank.
Complainant made several demands, the last being a
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact
remains that her rela onship with Carlos Ui, clothed formal le er 4 sent on September 25, 2002; 5
as it was with what respondent believed was a valid however, respondent s ll failed and refused to pay
marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral. For his debt without jus fiable reason. Consequently,
complainant ins tuted a case for seven counts of
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference
to the moral norms of society and to opinion of good viola on of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before
and respectable member of the community. the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 6 In
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary addi on, he filed the instant case for respondent's
disbarment.
ac on, the same must be grossly immoral, that is it
33
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to was then sentenced to be suspended from prac ce
file his answer but instead he filed several mo ons for two years.
for extension of me to file a responsive pleading 7
and a mo on to dismiss complaint. Respondent
alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for ADVINCULA VS MACABATA
viola on of the rule on non‑forum shopping. He
argued that complainant did not inform the IBP FACTS: Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case
about the cases he filed for viola ons of B.P. Blg. 22 against A y. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the la er
against respondent pending before the Municipal with Gross Immorality. Advincula sought legal advice
Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 9 Respondent from A y. Macabata about the possibility of filing a
argued that the filing of the administra ve case complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours for
despite the pendency of the criminal cases is a form not se ling their accounts as demanded. They had a
of harassment which should not be allowed. mee ng twice in Quezon City. On February 10, 2005,
a er their mee ng, Macabata sent Advincula home
ISSUES: and as she was about to step out of the car, he held
1. Whether or not the administra ve case for her arm, kissed her on the cheek, and embraced her
very ghtly. On March 6, 2005, he offered again to
the respondent’s disbarment should be dismissed for
viola on of the rule on non‑forum shopping; and give her a ride. Macabata stopped the car along
Roosevelt Avenue and forcefully held her face and
2. Whether or not A y. Moya is guilty of Gross kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her
Misconduct and viola on or the Code of Professional breast. Advincula sent a text message informing
Responsibility. Macabata that she decided to refer the case to
another lawyer and she needed to get back the case
HELD:
folder from him. The text messages received from
1. No. The instant pe on for disbarment was Macabata apologizing were then used as
not a viola on of the rule against forum shopping. manifesta on of admission of guilt.
Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or Macabata admi ed that he agreed to provide legal
proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. services to Advincula and that on the two occasions
Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal that they met, Advincula rode with him in his car
cases of the respondent’s viola on of BP Blg. 22 is
where he kissed her on the lips as she offered her lips
different from the administra ve case at hand. The to him. He also argued that the street where he
former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, dropped off Advincula was a busy street making it
while the la er refers to the dishonesty of the impossible for him to commit the acts imputed to
respondent in the payment of his debts.
him. By way of defense, respondent further
2. Yes. A y. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts
and viola on of the Code of Professional of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against
Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary respondent pending before the Office of the City
obliga ons His refusal to pay his monetary Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
obliga ons without jus fiable cause, despite complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she
acknowledging said obliga ons and doing so without remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because
remorse, fails to comply with the expecta on of the civil case for the nullifica on of their marriage
lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6
professional or private affairs. What is more, his December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
failure to file his answer and verified posi on paper Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant
despite extensions of me is a manifesta on of his was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the
disrespect for judicial authori es. For his acts, he complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s
fees and it was respondent who always paid for their
34
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
bills every me they met and ate at a restaurant. offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
A er a hearing was conducted, IBP issued a grossly immoral. Complainant’s bare allega on that
resolu on suspending Macabata from the prac ce of respondent made use and took advantage of his
law for three months. posi on as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have
sexual rela ons with him, deserves no credit. The
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent commi ed acts burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she
that are grossly immoral that would warrant must establish the case against the respondent by
disbarment or suspension from the prac ce of law? clear, convincing and sa sfactory proof, disclosing a
HELD: No, the acts of A y. Macabata would not case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise
suffice to warrant disbarment or suspension from the by the Court of its disciplinary power. In the case at
prac ce of law. Based on the circumstances of the bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the
case and considering that this is respondent’s first burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or
offense, reprimand would suffice. It is difficult to allega on of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusa on
state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard is not synonymous with guilt.
as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
Moreover, while respondent admi ed having kissed
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a
complainant on the lips, the same was not mo vated
lawyer unworthy of con nuing as a member of the by malice. We come to this conclusion because right
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be a er the complainant expressed her annoyance at
unconven onal behavior to the straight‑laced may being kissed by the respondent through a cellular
not be the immoral conduct that warrants
phone text message, respondent immediately
disbarment. In Zaguirre v. Cas llo, we reiterated the extended an apology to complainant also via cellular
defini on of immoral conduct, as such conduct which phone text message. The exchange of text messages
is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show between complainant and respondent bears this out.
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place
members of the community. Furthermore, for such where there were several people in the vicinity
conduct to warrant disciplinary ac on, the same considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
must be so corrupt as to cons tute a criminal act, or
designs on complainant, he could have brought her
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high to a private place or a more remote place where he
degree or commi ed under such scandalous or could freely accomplish the same. Only those acts
revol ng circumstances as to shock the common which cause loss of moral character should merit
sense of decency.
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
Immorality has not been confined to sexual ma ers, neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
but includes conduct inconsistent with rec tude, or lawyer should only jus fy a lesser sanc on unless
indica ve of corrup on, indecency, depravity and they are of such nature and to such extent as to
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to con nue in the
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of prac ce of law. The dubious character of the act
respectable members of the community, and an charged as well as the mo va on which induced the
inconsiderate a tude toward good order and public lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated
welfare. Guided by the defini ons above, we before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
perceived acts of kissing or beso‑beso on the cheeks mi ga ng or aggrava ng circumstances that
as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, a ended the commission of the offense should also
forms of gree ngs, casual and customary. The acts of be considered. Censure or reprimand is usually
respondent, though, in turning the head of meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor
are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
infrac on of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the that no mo on to dismiss or any pleading in
client. connec on therewith had been filed, and the
supposed amicable se lement was not finalized and
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against concluded. Despite repeated demands in wri ng or
respondent A y. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged by telephone for an explana on, as well as the
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, turnover of all documents, Meneses deliberately
respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
ignored the pleas of the complainant. Meneses, in his
prudent and cau ous in his dealing with his clients answer, argued that A y. Navarro had no legal
with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanc on personality to sue him because his legal services
will be imposed on him for any repe on of the were retained by Frankwell Management; that
same or similar offense in the future.
Navarro had not represented Pan‑Asia Interna onal
in any case nor had been authorized by its board of
directors to file this disbarment case against
NAVARRO VS MENESES III respondent; that the retainer agreement between
FACTS: A y. Navarro, for and in behalf of Pan‑Asia him and Frankwell Management had been
Interna onal Commodi es Inc., filed an terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the
administra ve case against A y. Meneses based on verbal advice of its Administra ve Officer Estrellita
the following offenses: 1) malprac ce and gross Valdez; that the case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of
misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) their retainer agreement, and Bretaa was not an
derelic on of duty, by viola ng his oath to do employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant,
everything within his power to protect his clients Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel; and that
interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust the se lement of said case cannot be concluded
and confidence, due to his con nued failure to because the same was archived and accused Bretaa
account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to is presently out of the country.
him to be paid to a certain complainant for the Complainant stressed that Meneses is resor ng to
amicable se lement of a pending case. It was alleged technicali es to evade the issue of his failure to
that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to
group of companies which includes Pan Asia him; that his arguments were all designed to mislead
Interna onal Commodi es, Inc., through its the Commission; and that he was fully aware of the
Administra ve Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged interrela onship of the two corpora ons and always
the legal services of respondent A y. Meneses. He coordinated his legal work with Estrellita Valdez.
handled various cases and was properly Meneses failed to a end scheduled hearings. There
compensated by his client in accordance with their were several postponement and rese ng of hearings
retainer agreement. One of the li ga ons handled by requested by him and granted by Commission. When
him was the case of People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. the case was set for hearing for the last me on May
Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before the 31, 1996, he s ll failed to a end despite due no ce
RTC of Maka . Respondent received the sum of and repeated warnings. IBP recommended that
P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said respondent Meneses be suspended from the prac ce
case, to be given to the offended party, a certain of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years
Gleason, as considera on for an out‑of‑court and directed to return the P50,000.00. It further
se lement and with the understanding that a mo on provided that failure on his part to comply would
to dismiss the case would be filed by Meneses. result in his disbarment.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent ISSUE: Whether or not Meneses commi ed acts
failed to present to his client the receipt viola ve of the Code of Professional Responsibility
acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A
verifica on made with the RTC of Maka revealed
36
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
that would warrant disbarment from the prac ce of sanc ons. Meneses, as counsel, had the obliga on to
law? inform his client of the status of the case and to
respond within a reasonable me to his client’s
HELD: SC ruled that Meneses should be disbarred.
request for informa on. His failure to communicate
The Court agrees Meneses misappropriated the
with his client by deliberately disregarding its request
money entrusted to him and which he has failed for an audience or conference is an unjus fiable
and/or refused to account for to his client despite denial of its right to be fully informed of the
repeated demands. Such conduct on the part of developments in and the status of its case. Although
respondent indica ng his unfitness for the
a copy of the resolu on was personally delivered to
confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing his address and received by his wife on October 9,
such lack of personal honesty or of good moral 1997, he had failed to res tute the amount of
character as to render him unworthy of public P50,000.00 to complainant within the 15‑day period
confidence, cons tutes a ground for disciplinary
provided. Neither has he filed with this Court any
ac on extending to disbarment. Meneses pleading or wri en indica on of his having returned
misconduct cons tute a gross viola on of his oath as said amount to complainant. In line with the
a lawyer which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer resolu on in this case, his disbarment is
the duty to delay no man for money or malice. He
consequently warranted and exigent.
blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides WHEREFORE, A y. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby
that a lawyer shall account for all money or property DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be a ached to
collected or received for or from his client. He was respondents personal records in this Court and
merely holding in trust the money he received from furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
his client to be used as considera on for amicable together with all courts in the country.
se lement of a case he was handling. Since the
amicable se lement did no materialize, he was
necessarily under obliga on to immediate return the
money, as there is no showing that he has a lien over
it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional ROMULO DINSAY v. ATTY. LEOPOLDO CIOCO
capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good
faith on his part is exacted. FACTS: In 1980, certain proper es of the
MORTGAGORS (PLAMACO) were mortgaged to the
The argument of respondent that complainant has no BANK (Traders Royal bank). Upon request of the
legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Sec on 1 MORTGAGEE for extrajudicial foreclosure, the
Rule 139‑B of the Rules of Court provides that SHERIFFS sold the mortgaged proper es to the
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or MORTGAGEE (bank), as the sole bidder, for P3.2M.
discipline of a orneys may be taken by the Supreme On the same date, the SHERIFFS executed a Deed of
Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Sale which was notarized on the same date by Judge
Philippines upon the verified complainant of any Ibrado of the MTC Bacolod. It was in page 4 of the
person. The right to ins tute a disbarment cer ficate of sale, signed by CIOCO, where it was
proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it stated that the bid price was P3.2M. MORTGAGEE
necessary that the person complaining suffered ins tuted the DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT CASE against
injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment the MORTGAGORS alleging that what PLAMACO had
proceedings are ma ers of public interest and the owed was P1.7M, exclusive of interest and other
only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of bank charges, and that the foreclosed proper es
proof of the charge. The evidence submi ed by were purchased by the BANK only for P730K. DINSAY
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline ins tuted the ADMINISTRATIVE and FALSIFICATION
sufficed to sustain its resolu on and recommended
37
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
CASE against the SHERIFF and CIOCO for "gross nor will it be resolved, either in the ADMINISTRATIVE
dishonesty and grave misconduct" alleging that they CASE or in the DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT CASE.
had changed page 4 of the original cer ficate of sale
with another page 4, wherein the bid price was
stated to be P730K. CIOCO claims that the ATTY. OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA v. ATTY. LEONARD DE
subs tu on was solely the act of the sheriff; that the VERA
former's act of signing the original page 4 as well as
the subs tuted one was purely ministerial on his FACTS: Pe oner filed a pe on seeking the
part; and that there was a valid change because of disqualifica on of De Vera from being elected
the amended bid submi ed by the BANK late in the Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th IBP
a ernoon of March 8, 1984 to reflect the true Regional Governor's Elec ons. Pe oners contended
inten on of the bidder. that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque,
Las Piñas and Mun nlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan
ISSUE: W/N Cioco may be charged with disbarment del Sur Chapter is a brazen abuse and misuse of the
(W/N res adjudicata applies) rota on rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a
HELD: No. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis (a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it
class of its own), not being intended to inflict implied that there is no lawyer from the region
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecu on. qualified and willing to serve the IBP. Pe oners also
submi ed that respondent De Vera lacks the
Accordingly, there is neither a plain ff nor a
requisite moral ap tude for the posi on. According
prosecutor. The issue in the ADMINISTRATIVE CASE is
whether the SHERIFFS, by their act of subs tu ng to pe oners, respondent De Vera was previously
page 4, commi ed gross dishonesty and/or grave sanc oned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly
a acking the integrity of the SC Jus ces during the
misconduct. The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is
delibera ons of the plunder law. They further alleged
whether or not the SHERIFF S had unlawfully and
feloniously made an altera on or intercala on in a that respondent De Vera could have been disbarred
genuine document which changes its meaning in in the United States for misappropria ng his client's
viola on of Ar cle 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code. funds had he not surrendered his California license to
prac ce law. Respondent De Vera argued that the
A finding of grave misconduct in the Administra ve
case would not be determina ve of the guilt or Court has no jurisdic on over the present
innocence of the SHERIFFS in the FALSIFICATION controversy contending that the elec on of the
CASE. The DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT CASE is neither a officers of the IBP, including the determina on of the
qualifica on of those who want to serve the
prejudicial ques on to the FALSIFICATION CASE. The
main issue involved in the former is the amount of organiza on, is purely an internal ma er governed as
the highest bid at which the auc on proper es were it is by the IBP By‑Laws and exclusively regulated and
sold in order to determine whether or not a administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred
that an IBP member is en tled to select, change or
deficiency exists. The BACOLOD COURT will have to
transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter
sustain either the original cer ficate of sale or the
cer ficate of sale with the subs tuted page 4, In membership under Sec on 19, Ar cle II and Sec on
either possibility, the ruling will not be determina ve 29‑2, Ar cle IV of the IBP By‑Laws. He also stressed
that the right to transfer membership is also
of the guilt or innocence of the SHERIFFS in the
recognized in Sec on 4, 139‑A of the Rules of Court
FALSIFICATION CASE. In other words, in the
SANDIGANBAYAN rests the determina on of whether which is exactly the same as the first of the
or not the act of subs tu on by the SHERIFFS, a fact above‑quoted provision of the IBP By‑Laws.
admi ed by them but which they allege was done in ISSUE: W/N De Vera should be disqualified from
good faith, should be considered a felony upon a being elected IBP governor
finding of criminal intent. That issue is not involved,
38
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is s ll legally
a high degree. married to another woman. Complainant Estrada
requested the Judge of said RTC to inves gate
ISSUE: Whether the acts of respondent are respondent. According to complainant, respondent
considered as disgraceful or immoral conduct.
should not be allowed to remain employed therein
HELD: We find that the acts complained of cannot be for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
Mere sexual rela ons between two unmarried and permi ed by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses
consen ng adults are not enough to warrant and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
administra ve sanc on for illicit behavior. The Court They allegedly have a ‘Declara on of Pledging
has repeatedly held that voluntary in macy between Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
a man and a woman who are not married, where congrega on. Such a declara on is effec ve when
both are not under any impediment to marry and legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an to legalize their union.
unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found
disciplinary ac on. While the Court has the power to
guilty of the administra ve charge of “gross and
regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for
private conduct, i s not within our authority to such conjugal arrangement.
decide on ma ers touching on employees’ personal
lives, especially those that will affect their and their HELD: A dis nc on between public and secular
family’s future. We cannot intrude into the ques on morality and religious morality should be kept in
of whether they should or should not marry. mind. The jurisdic on of the Court extends only to
However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary public and secular morality. The Court states that our
employees to be more circumspect in their Cons tu on adheres the benevolent neutrality
adherence to their obliga ons under the Code of approach that gives room for accommoda on of
Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety Clause . This benevolent neutrality could allow for
or scandal, not only with respect to their official accommoda on of morality based on religion,
du es but also in their behavior outside the Court as provided it does not offend compelling state
private individuals. This is the best way to preserve interests. The state’s interest is the preserva on of
and protect the integrity and the good name of our the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
courts. ranks a high standard of morality and decency.
“There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the Administrator) memorandum to the Court that
present administra ve complaint against Nicolas B.
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that
Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal Circuit Trial
it should override respondent’s plea of religious
Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.SO freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
ORDERED. complainant, a private person, to present evidence
on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the General”. In order to properly se le the case at bar, it
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living is essen al that the government be given an
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
more than twenty‑five years and had a son with him interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she respondent’s posi on that her conjugal arrangement
is not immoral and punishable as it is within the
40
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
scope of free exercise protec on. The Court could resolu on of the IBP Board of Governors.
not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Respondents filed an Opposi on to the mo on for
Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an reconsidera on. As a preliminary ma er, they argue
uncons tu onal encroachment of her right to that the mo on for reconsidera on is a mere scrap of
religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot paper, because it is not provided for in Rule 139‑B of
simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of the Rules of Court, and that what complainant should
religious freedom but must also apply the instead have done was to appeal to this Court.
“compelling state interest” test.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper for the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the complainant to file for a Mo on for Reconsidera on.
Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the RULING: YES. Rule 139‑B states in per nent part:
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed
religious belief and prac ce; (b) to present evidence 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
on the state's "compelling interest" to override xxx xxx xxx
respondent's religious belief and prac ce; and (c) to
show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the
interest is the least restric ve to respondent's disciplinary sanc on imposed by it is less than
religious freedom. The rehearing should be suspension or disbarment [such as admoni on,
concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the reprimand, or fine] it shall issue a decision
Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision. exonera ng respondent or imposing such sanc on.
The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
pe on of the complainant or other interested party
HALIMAO V. VILLANUEVA filed with the Supreme Court within fi een (15) days
from no ce of the Boards resolu on, the Supreme
FACTS: Complainant Halimao wrote to the Chief Court orders otherwise.
Jus ce, alleging that respondents, without lawful
authority and armed with armalites and handguns, Although Rule 139‑B, 12(c) makes no men on of a
forcibly entered the Oo Kian Tiok Compound of which mo on for reconsidera on, nothing in its text or in its
complainant was caretaker. Complainant prayed that history suggests that such mo on is prohibited. It
an inves ga on be conducted and respondents may therefore be filed within 15 days from no ce to
disbarred. To the complaint were a ached the a party. Indeed, the filing of such mo on should be
affidavits of alleged witnesses, including that of encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a
Danilo Hemandez, a security guard at the compound, ma er of exhaus on of administra ve remedies, to
who had also filed a similar complaint against herein afford the agency rendering the judgment an
respondents. Respondents filed a comment in which opportunity to correct any error it may have
they claimed that the complaint is a mere duplica on commi ed through a misapprehension of facts or
of the complaint filed by Danilo Hernandez in misapprecia on of the evidence. Considering,
Administra ve Case No. 3835, which this Court had however, that complainants mo on for
already dismissed on August 5, 1992 for lack of merit. reconsidera on was filed a er the IBP had forwarded
They pointed out that both complaints arose from the records of this case to this Court, it would be
the same incident and the same acts complained of more expedient to treat it as complainants pe on
and that Danilo Hernandez, who filed the prior case, for review within the contempla on of Rule 139‑B,
is the same person whose affidavit is a ached to the 12(c).
complaint in this case. The Board of Governors of the
IBP dismissed the case against respondents.
Complainant filed a mo on for reconsidera on of the
41
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
RULING: The Court sustains the resolu on of the IBP COTTAM V. LAYSA
Board of Governors except as to the recommended FACTS: Felicidad Lacsamana Co am claim to be the
penalty. owner of two 2 parcels of land in Tagaytay City bth
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional covered by TCT. BY virtue of a special power of
Responsibility provides: a orney given by Co am to Faus no J. Aledia, giving
the la er authority to mortgage the property, the
CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE la er executed a deed of real estate mortgage in
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND favor of Banahaw Lending Corpora on to secure a
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. P500,000.00 financing. Co am paid in full the
mortgage obliga on and the Banahaw Lending
Corpora on, on even date, released the mortgage.
42
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
Co am thereupon learned that the 2 TCT’s were s ll nevertheless, should have taken steps to foreclose
in the custody of A y. Laysa(respondent lawyer). the second mortgage if only to protect the interest of
A y. Laysa then presented Co am with a statement the mortgagees.
of account of Faus no Aledia (allegedly for Felicidad
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a formal
Lacsamana) and in addi on to that A y. Laysa then
in mated to complainant that she would have to pay inves ga on done by the IBP?
the amount before the cer ficates of tle could be HELD: NO. Complaints against lawyers for misconduct
released. A y. Laysa, who notarized both the real are normally addressed to the Court. If, at the outset,
estate mortgage and the release of the mortgage, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wan ng in
was aware that the special power of a orney merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however,
executed in favor of Aledia was not renewed. A y. the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
Laysa was the legal counsel of Banahaw Lending should be made, such as when the ma er could not
Corpora on. She was tasked to to notarize be resolved by merely evalua ng the pleadings
documents involving transac ons of the company submi ed, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
with its clients and admi ed the execu on of the real inves ga on of the case during which the par es are
estate mortgage. At the me of the foreclosure, A y. accorded an opportunity to be heard. Hereunder are
Laysa was no longer the lawyer of the lending some of the per nent provisions of Rule 139‑B of the
corpora on. She claimed that she was approached by Rules of Court on this ma er; viz:
Aledia to help him look for any party who could help
se le the mortgage obliga on, the complainant "SEC. 3. Du es of the Na onal Grievance Inves gator.
being s ll then in England. A y. Laysa then contacted The Na onal Grievance Inves gators shall inves gate
her sister to pay for the outstanding mortgage all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar
obliga on. Another Deed of Real Estate Mortgage referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.
was executed by Aledia in ehlf of the sisters. When "SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. If the complaint appears
this second mortgage was executed, the special to be meritorious, the Inves gator shall direct that a
power of a orney issued in favor of Aledia was not copy thereof be served upon the respondent,
yet revoked and was s ll valid and subsis ng. As a requiring him to answer the same within fi een (15)
result of the arrangement, the foreclosure days from the date of service. If the complaint does
applica on ini ated by Banahaw Lending Corpora on not merit ac on, or if the answer shows to the
was withdrawn. Ini ally, Aledia was paying the sa sfac on of the Inves gator that the complaint is
interests on the loan but he later secretly le the not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the
country and went to the United States, forcing Board of Governors upon his recommenda on. A
respondent lawyer to pay her sister. A y. Laysa copy of the resolu on of dismissal shall be furnished
suggested to Co am that they should go a er Aledia the complainant and the Supreme Court which may
if, indeed, complainant had been faithful in paying, review the case motu proprio or upon mely appeal
through Aledia, her obliga on. of the complainant filed within 15 days from no ce
In her reply to the comment, complainant asserted of the dismissal of the complaint.
that respondent was aware that the object of the No inves ga on shall be interrupted or terminated
special power of a orney had already been by reason of the desistance, se lement, compromise,
accomplished. She could not thus understand why res tu on, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of
the second mortgage was for P650,000.00. the complainant to prosecute the same.
Complainant claimed that she learned of the second
mortgage, as well as the supposed payment made by "SEC. 8. Inves ga on. Upon joinder of issues or upon
respondent to the second mortgagees, only a er the failure of the respondent to answer, the Inves gator
filing of this case. Finally, complainant argues that, shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
assuming a default on her part, respondent lawyer, inves ga on of the case. He shall have the power to
43
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The insisted that by the foregoing actua ons, respondent
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be
himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the
heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon amount of ₱500,000 represen ng the damages that
reasonable no ce, the respondent fails to appear, the they suffered. A Pe on for disbarment was filed
inves ga on shall proceed ex parte. against respondent A y. Ciriaco A. Macapagal,
docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolu on dated
The Inves gator shall terminate the inves ga on June 19, 1996, we required respondent to comment.
within three (3) months from the date of its Respondent received a copy of the Resolu on on July
commencement, unless extended for good cause by 16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed an
the Board of Governors upon prior applica on. The Urgent Ex‑Parte Mo on For Extension Of Time To File
procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to Comment.4 He requested for addi onal period of 30
ensure that the innocents are spared from wrongful days within which to file his comment ci ng
condemna on and that only the guilty are meted
numerous professional commitments. We granted
their just due. Obviously, these requirements cannot
said request in our October 2, 1996 Resolu on.5 The
be taken lightly. extended deadline passed sans respondent’s
comment. Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants
file an Urgent Mo on To Submit The Administra ve
FELIPE V. MACAPAGAL Case For Resolu on Without Comment Of
FACTS: In their Pe on, complainants alleged that Respondent claiming the respondent is deemed to
they are co‑plain ffs in Civil Case No. A‑95‑22906 have waived his right to file comment. On February
pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial 24, 1997, we referred this administra ve case to the
Court of Quezon City while respondent is the counsel Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
for the defendants therein. Respondent commi ed inves ga on, report, and recommenda on.The case
dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer was ini ally assigned to Inves ga ng Commissioner
in Civil Case No. A‑95‑22906 that the par es therein Elizabeth Hermosisima‑Palma who set the hearing on
are strangers to each other despite knowing that the October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.The Minutes of the
defendants are half‑brothers and half‑sisters of Hearing showed that both par es were
complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for present.1âwphi1 The next hearing was set on
Perjury [against the defendants in Civil Case No. November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon
A‑95‑22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 request of the complainants' counsel.No ng that
pending before Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial more than five months had lapsed a er the
Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged postponement of the last hearing, complainants
that respondent introduced a falsified Cer ficate of moved to calendar the case.The new Inves ga ng
Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing
A‑95‑22906; and that they filed another Perjury of the case on January 12, 1999.During the scheduled
charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. hearing, complainants appeared and were directed
A‑95‑22906] before the Office of the City Prosecutor to submit their Posi on Paper.1âwphi1Respondent
of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95‑15656‑A. failed to a end despite receipt of
Next, complainants averred that respondent no ce.Complainants submi ed their Posi on Paper
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading cap oned on January 28, 1999.It took 11 years, more
as Urgent Mo on to Recall Writ of Execu on of the par cularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP,
Writ of Preliminary Injunc on; that said pleading is thru Inves ga ng Commissioner Agus nus V.
not in accordance with the rules of procedure; that Gonzaga, submi ed its Report and Recommenda on.
the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case In his Report, the Inves ga ng Commissioner quoted
No. A‑95‑22906; and that they filed a Vigorous verba m the allega ons in the Pe on; he then
Opposi on to the said pleading. Complainants
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. However, we cannot end our discussion here. It has
Unfortunately, no discussion was made regarding the not escaped our no ce that despite receipt of our
merits of the complaint. However, it was direc ve, respondent did not file his comment.
recommended that respondent be suspended from Neither did he file his Posi on Paper as ordered by
the prac ce of law for one (1) month. In Resolu on the IBP. And for this, he must be sanc oned.
No. XX‑2011‑246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommenda on of the Inves ga ng Commissioner ANACTA v. RESURRECCION
with modifica on that respondent be suspended
from the prac ce of law for one (1) year. DOCTRINE: The Court is vested with the authority
and discre on to impose either the extreme penalty
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be of disbarment or mere suspension. Certainly, the
disbarred for failing to follow the lawful orders of the Court is not placed in a straitjacket as regards the
Court and the IBP penalty to be imposed. There is no ironclad rule that
HELD: Respondent's unjus fied disregard of the disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding
lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not
irresponsible, but also cons tutes u er disrespect for mandated to automa cally impose the extreme
the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are par cularly its discre on either to disbar or just suspend the
called upon to obey court orders and processes and erring lawyer based on its apprecia on of the facts
and circumstances of the case.
are expected to stand foremost in complying with
court direc ves being themselves officers of the FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed against
court. As an officer of the court, respondent is A y. Ressureccion for gross misconduct, deceit and
expected to know that a resolu on of this Court is malprac ce before the Integrated Bar of the
not a mere request but an order which should be Philippines Commi ee on Bar Discipline. Ms. Anacta
complied with promptly and completely. This is also (complainant) engaged the services of A y.
true of the orders of the IBP as the inves ga ng arm Ressureccion (Respondent ) to file on her behal a
of the Court in administra ve cases against lawyers. pe on for the annulment of marriage before the
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz: RTC of QC which she paid 42,000 pesos to
respondent. Complainant showed the pe on for the
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into annulment of the marriage to the complainant but to
the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a the complainants surprise, the case was never filed in
member of the bar, and need not delve into the the RTC a er A y. Ressureccion failed to update and
merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance, apprise her of the status of the annulment of the
however, cannot ascertain whether A y. Amorin marriage. Complainant then sent a le er to the
indeed commi ed acts in viola on of his oath as a respondent through a new lawyer demanding
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the compensa on for the damages suffered and a er no
Virgo Mansion without going through the factual reply by the respondent, she filed the present
ma ers that are subject of the aforemen oned civil complaint. Report and Recommenda on of the
cases, x x x. As a ma er of prudence and so as not to inves ga ng Commissioner and the IBP Board of
preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the Governors:
court where the case is pending, the Court deems it
The Inves ga ng Commissioner found clear and
wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to
the filing of another one, depending on the final convincing evidence that respondent is guilty of
outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the deceit and dishonesty when he misrepresented
above pronouncements, the Pe on filed by having filed the pe on for annulment of marriage
complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. a er receipt of P42,000.00 when in fact no such
45
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
pe on was filed. He thus recommended that (5) convic on of a crime involving moral
respondent be suspended from the prac ce of law turpitude;
for a period of two years and to reimburse/return to
the complainant the amount of P42,000.00. In a (6) viola on of the lawyer's oath;
Resolu on, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
approved the findings of the Inves ga ng superior court; or
Commissioner but modified the recommended
penalty of suspension from the prac ce of law from (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an a orney
two years to four years and ordered respondent to for a party to a case without authority to do so;
return to the complainant the amount of ₱ The Court is vested with the authority and discre on
42,000.00, otherwise his suspension will con nue to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment
un l he returns the sum involved. or mere suspension. Certainly, the Court is not placed
ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be punished in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed.
for his deceit and dishonesty in handling the case of There is no ironclad rule that disbarment must
his client and if so, what would be the penalty meted immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross
against him? misconduct. The Court is not mandated to
automa cally impose the extreme penalty of
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirma ve. Pursuant to disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise its
Sec on 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, discre on either to disbar or just suspend the erring
respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for lawyer based on its apprecia on of the facts and
commi ng decei ul and dishonest acts. Thus: circumstances of the case.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of a orneys by We examined the records of the case and assessed
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. ‑ A member of the the evidence presented by the complainant. A er
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as such examina on and assessment, we are convinced
a orney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, beyond doubt that respondent should only be meted
malprac ce, or other gross misconduct in such office, the penalty of four‑year suspension as properly
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. In the
convic on of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for exercise of our discre on, we are unques onably
any viola on of the oath which he is required to take certain that the four‑year suspension suffices and
before admission to prac ce, or for a wilful commensurable to the infrac ons he commi ed.
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an a orney Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
prac ce of solici ng cases at law for the purpose of reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the
gain, either personally or through paid agents or end desired. This is as it should be considering the
brokers, cons tutes malprac ce. [Emphasis consequence of disbarment on the economic life and
supplied.] honor of the erring person."42 In this case, we
believe that the penalty of suspension of four years
It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in will provide A y. Resurreccion "with enough me to
any of the following circumstances, to wit: ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct."
(1) deceit;
(2) malprac ce;
(3) gross misconduct; GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL INC. v.
NALDOZA
(4) grossly immoral conduct;
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
DOCTRINE: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers different from the proceedings before him; acqui al
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely in the former did not exonerate respondent in the
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an ac on or a la er. He further noted that the RTC Decision itself
suit, but are rather inves ga ons by the Court into hinted at the administra ve liability of respondent,
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a for $2,555.
criminal prosecu on. Accordingly, there is neither a
plain ff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent may use the
ini ated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is acqui al in a criminal case to exculpate him from his
[their] primary objec ve, and the real ques on for administra ve case.
determina on is whether or not the a orney is s ll a HELD: The Court ruled in the nega ve and disagreed
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. with the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Governors. The Courts disbarred him instead.
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actua ons as an officer of the Court Administra ve cases against lawyers belong to a class
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the of their own. They are dis nct from and they may
legal profession and the proper and honest proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
administra on of jus ce by purging the profession of The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with necessary; in an administra ve case for disbarment
the du es and responsibili es pertaining to the office or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
of an a orney. that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecu on will not
cons tute a prejudicial ques on even if the same
FACTS: Gatchalian Promo ons filed a disbarment facts and circumstances are a endant in the
case against A y. Naldoza for the following acts: (1) administra ve proceedings. It should be emphasized
Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
final and executory, (2) Decie ully obtaining 2,555 necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
dollars, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case, administra ve case. Conversely, respondent's
and (3) issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his act. acqui al does not necessarily exculpate him
This was bred from the ac on of the respondent in administra vely. In the same vein, the trial court's
appealing a decision of the POEA. Meanwhile, a finding of civil liability against the respondent will not
criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
filed against herein respondent before the Regional administra ve ac on before this Court. Neither will a
Trial Court . Although acqui ed on reasonable doubt, favorable disposi on in the civil ac on absolve the
he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ administra ve liability of the lawyer. The basic
2,555. Therea er, respondent filed before the IBP a premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
Manifesta on with Mo on to Dismiss on on the different from administra ve ma ers, such that the
ground that he had already been acqui ed in the disposi on in the first two will not inevitably govern
criminal case for estafa. the third and vice versa.
Report and Recommenda on of the IBP Board of
Governors:
They recommended that the respondent be
suspended for 1 year based on the following reasons: IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY.
DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
‑ Respondent cannot hide behind his acqui al
in the Estafa case. The commissioner emphasized FACTS: Respondent Diosdado Gu errez is a member
that the criminal case for estafa was completely of the Philippine Bar. He was convicted of the murder
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
of Samaco and together with his co‑conspirators was makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a
sentenced to the penalty of death. A er serving a new credit and capacity.
por on of the sentence respondent was granted a
In this case, the pardon granted to respondent is not
condi onal pardon by the President in 958. The
absolute but condi onal, and merely remi ed the
unexecuted por on of the prison term was remi ed
"on condi on that he shall not again violate any of unexecuted por on of his term. It does not reach the
the penal laws of the Philippines." In 1958, the offense itself. Thus, the considera ons rendered in
widow of the deceased Samaco filed a verified the case of Lontok are inapplicable here. The degree
complaint before this Court praying that respondent of moral turpitude involved is such as to jus fy his
be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule being purged from the profession.
127, sec on 5. Under sec on 5 of Rule 127, a The prac ce of law is a privilege accorded only to
member of the bar may be removed suspended from those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
his office as a orney by the Supreme Court by reason mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a
of his convic on of a crime insolving moral turpitude. candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
ISSUE: Whether or not the condi onal pardon prescribe a test of academic prepara on but require
extended to respondent places him beyond the sa sfactory tes monials of good moral character.
scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered a er admission: the lawyer must con nue to
HELD: Court held in the nega ve. Murder is, without adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" removal.
includes everything which is done contrary to jus ce,
honesty, modesty or good morals. As used in WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Sec on 5, and
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, considering the nature of the crime for which
vileness, or depravity in the private and social du es respondent Diosdado Q. Gu errez has been
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.
general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and
duty between man and man.
It has been held in Lontok case that a pardon IN RE — ATTORNEY JOSE AVANCEÑA, respondent.
operates to wipe out the convic on and is a bar to
any proceeding for the disbarment of the a orney FACTS: Jose Avanceña, a member of the Bar, was
a er the pardon has been granted. Further, a er charged with falsifica on of public document. A er
receiving an uncondi onal pardon the record of the trial, he was found guilty as charged. The trial court
felony convic on could no longer be used as a basis also found that he took advantage of the law
for the proceeding. Having been thus cancelled, all its profession in commi ng the crime of falsifica on of
force as a felony convic on was taken away. A pardon public document to defraud his clients. From the
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the decision of the lower court, Jose Avanceña appealed
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the to the Court of Appeals and the same was affirmed.
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots On a pe on for review of the decision of the Court
out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the la er Court
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never dismissed the pe on for lack of merit. In 1963, the
commi ed the offense. It granted before convic on, President of the Philippines extended condi onal
it prevents any of the penal es and disabili es, pardon to Jose Avanceña and he wastherea er
consequent upon convic on, from a aching; if discharged from confinement.
granted a er convic on, it removes the penal es and
disabili es, and restores him to all his civil rights it
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PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
49
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
organiza ons; he favorable indorsement of the Evidence of reforma on is required before applicant
Integrared Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local is en tled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the
government officials and ci zens of his community; a orney has received a pardon following his
he pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the convic on, and the requirements of reinstatement
future of his family. The foregoing criteria may be had been held to be the same as for original
made applicable to respondent's case. A er the lapse admission to the bar, except that the court may
of then (10) years from the me respondent took and require a greater degree of proof than in an original
passed the 1978 Bar Examina on, he has shown evidence.
contri on and willingness to reform. He has also
The decisive ques on on an applica on for
submi ed several tes monials, including one from
the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, a es ng to his good reinstatement is whether applicant is 'of good moral
moral character and civic consciousness. character' in the sense in which that phrase is used
when applied to a orneys‑at‑law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of
the office of an a orney. The favorable indorsements
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its
FACTS: Pe oner Quinciano D. Vailoces, a lawyer, was Negros Oriental Chapter, the tes monials expressed
disbarred in 1961 a er having been convicted of in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros
falsifica on of public document. Since 1967, when Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials
the President of the Philippines granted pe oner of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his ac ve par cipa on in
"absolute and uncondi onal pardon" for his crime civic and social undertakings in the community a est
and restored him "to full civil and poli cal rights," to his moral reform and rehabilita on and jus fy his
pe oner has been seeking readmission to the reinstatement. Pe oner, now 69 years of age, has
prac ce of law but had been denied. In his present reached the twilight of his life.
pe on, pe oner a ached, among others,
favorable indorsements of his plea for reinstatement
from the Bar Associa on of his province, the Mayor RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ,
of the municipality where he resides, the Provincial METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
Governor, and the Dean of the College of Law of BRANCH 37, APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
Siliman University. Opposi ons to his pe on were
filed, and this Court referred the indorsements and FACTS: Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of
the opposi ons to the Integrated Bar of the Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
Philippines for comment, and to the Solicitor General City, informed the Court that he is an applicant for
for inves ga on. Both the Integrated Bar and the judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court
Solicitor General favorably found for pe oner. The branches in Metro Manila. In connec on therewith,
Solicitor General recommended the pe oner's he was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council.
readmission. He was told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact
that he was once fined P20,000 "for not hearing a
ISSUE: WON pe oner can be reinstated mo on for demoli on". He claims that this lapse
happened only once as a result of "oversight". He
HELD: The Supreme Court ordered pe oner's requests judicial clemency and, in par cular, that he
reinstatement in the roll of a orneys sta ng that his be allowed to "again be nominated to one of the
conduct a er his disbarment can stand searching vacant branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
scru ny, sufficiently proving himself fit to be or in any of the ci es where his applica on is being
readmi ed to the prac ce of law; and that 21 years
considered". In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty
of disbarment was adequate punishment.
of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the
following mo ons: (1) a mo on for execu on which
was fatally defec ve for lack of no ce to the
51
PALE 3S (20182019)|| Topic 1315
defendant and (2) a mo on for demoli on without 1. There must be proof of remorse and reforma on.
no ce and hearing. These shall include but should not be limited to
cer fica ons or tes monials of the officers or
ISSUE: WON Judge Diaz request for judicial clemency chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
be granted judges or judges associa ons and prominent
HELD: Yes. Sec on 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the members of the community with proven integrity
Judicial and Bar Council provides that the following and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
are disqualified from being nominated for administra ve case for the same or similar
appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman misconduct will give rise to a strong presump on of
or Deputy Ombudsman: non‑reforma on.
1. Those with pending criminal or regular 2. Sufficient me must have lapsed from the
administra ve cases; imposi on of the penalty to ensure a period of
reforma on.
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts
or tribunals; and 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he s ll has produc ve years ahead of him
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to
case; or in an administra ve case, where the penalty redeem himself.
imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000,
unless he has been granted judicial clemency. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual ap tude, learning or legal acumen or
Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified contribu on to legal scholarship and the
from being nominated for appointment to any development of the legal system or administra ve
judicial post, un l and unless his request for judicial and other relevant skills), as well as poten al for
clemency is granted. public service.
A judge is the visible representa on of the law and of 5. There must be other relevant factors and
jus ce. He must comport himself in a manner that his circumstances that may jus fy clemency.
conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to the performance of his official In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance
du es but also as to his behavior outside his sala and for his past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the
as a private individual. His character must be able to verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have
withstand the most searching public scru ny because elapsed since the promulga on of Alvarez. It is
the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson
judge are essen al to the preserva on of the and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in
people's faith in the judicial system. the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedica on
to the ins tu on. Thus, the Court may now open the
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any door of further opportuni es in the judiciary for him.
disqualifica on, should be balanced with the
preserva on of public confidence in the courts. The
Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is
merited. Proof of reforma on and a showing of
poten al and promise are indispensable.
In the exercise of its cons tu onal power of
administra ve supervision over all courts and all
personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
52