Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Facilitation Committee, at its nineteenth session, developed a list of certificates and
documents required to be carried on board ships together with a brief description of the purpose
of the certificates and other relevant documents. This work was carried out in connection with
the provisions of section 2 of the annex to the FAL Convention concerning formalities required
of shipowners by public authorities on the arrival, stay and departure of ships. The Facilitation
Committee considered that these provisions should not be read as precluding a requirement for
the presentation for inspection by the appropriate authorities of certificates and other documents
carried by the ship pertaining to its registry, measurement, safety, manning, classification and
other related matters.
2 The list, as approved by the Maritime Safety Committee, the Facilitation Committee and
the Marine Environment Protection Committee, at their respective sessions, was circulated under
symbol FAL.2/Circ.35-MEPC/Circ.207-MSC/Circ.593. The list was later revised and circulated
under symbol FAL.2/Circ.42-MEPC/Circ.303-MSC/Circ.704, dated 21 September 1995 and
FAL/Circ.90-MEPC/Circ.368-MSC/Circ.946, dated 3 July 2000.
3 Due to amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended, which entered into
force on 1 January 2002, 1 July 2002, 1 January 2004 and 1 July 2004, respectively; and
amendments to MARPOL 73/78, which entered into force on 1 September 2002, as well as the
entry into force of Annex IV of that Convention on 27 September 2003, the list has been revised
to take account of the relevant provisions of the aforementioned amendments. The revised list of
certificates and documents required to be carried on board ships, approved by FAL 31 (19 to
23 July 2004), MEPC 52 (11 to 15 October 2004) and MSC 79 (1 to 10 December 2004), is set
out at annex.
4 The certificates and documents this circular lists are only those required under
IMO instruments and it does not include certificates or documents required by other international
organizations or governmental authorities.
5 Member Governments are invited to note the information provided in the annex and take
action as appropriate.
***
I:\CIRC\FAL\02\87.doc
FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
MSC/Circ.1151
ANNEX
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Special Trade Passenger Ship Safety Certificate, Special STP 71, rule 5
Trade Passenger Ship Space Certificate
A Special Trade Passenger Ship Safety Certificate issued
under the provisions of the Special Trade Passenger Ships
Agreement, 1971.
1
The form of the Certificate and its Record of Equipment may be found in the GMDSS amendments to
SOLAS 1974.
2
SLS.14/Circ.115 and Add.1 refers to the issue of exemption certificates.
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
MSC/Circ.1151
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3
The form of the Certificate may be found in the GMDSS amendments to SOLAS 1974.
4
The form of the Certificate and its Record of Equipment may be found in the GMDSS amendments to
SOLAS 1974.
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5
The form of the Certificate and its Record of Equipment may be found in the GMDSS amendments to
SOLAS 1974.
6
SLS.14/Circ.115 and Add.1 refers to the issue of exemption certificates.
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
MSC/Circ.1151
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or
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
MSC/Circ.1151
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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Diving systems
Diving System Safety Certificate Resolution A.536(13),
A certificate should be issued either by the Administration section 1.6
or any person or organization duly authorized by it after
survey or inspection to a diving system which complies with
the requirements of the Code of Safety for Diving Systems.
In every case, the Administration should assume full
responsibility for the certificate.
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FAL.2/Circ.87
MEPC/Circ.426
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Noise levels
Noise Survey Report Resolution A.468(XII),
A noise survey report should be made for each ship in section 4.3
accordance with the Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships.
___________
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Committee noted that the adopted amendment impacted on the IMO Code for the
Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU Code), in particular
chapter 13 (Helicopter facilities), and agreed that necessary amendments to the MODU Code
should be prepared.
3 The Committee noted further that ICAO’s Air Navigation Commission authorized the
ICAO Secretariat to undertake a review of Annex 14, Volume II, and the related guidance
material in the Heliport Manual. To this end, a Heliport Design Study Group (HDSG) was
established in 2003. The group will additionally consider the introduction of certification
requirements for heliports and helidecks. It is expected that the group will finalize the review in
2006 with the preparation of a formal proposal for further amendments.
4 Member Governments are invited to bring the above information to the attention of
shipping companies, shipowners, ship operators, drilling contractors and all parties concerned,
pending finalization of appropriate amendments to the MODU Code.
___________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1152.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-seventh session (2 to 6 December 1996) and the
Marine Environment Protection Committee, at its thirty-eighth session (1 to 10 July 1996), approved
the issuance of a new circular (MSC/Circ.781 - MEPC.6/Circ.2) combining the lists of addresses,
telephone and fax numbers and electronic mail addresses of national contact points responsible for
safety and pollution prevention.
- Annex 2 - list of national operational contact points responsible for the receipt,
transmission and processing of urgent reports on incidents involving
harmful substances including oil from ships to coastal.
I:\CIRC\MSC\1153.doc
MSC/Circ.1153
MEPC.6/Circ.10 -2-
4 The two annexes mentioned above are also available on the Internet as follows:
http://www.imo.org (select ‘IMO Circulars/Contact points’ or ‘National Contacts’). The lists on the
Internet will be up-dated as changes and amendments are received, but the printed copy of the list will
only be revised and re-issued annually. To facilitate the incorporation of any changes to the existing
entries, the Secretariat should be advised as follows:
***
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (the Committee), at its seventy-seventh session (28 May
to 6 June 2003), instructed the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping
(STW) to develop training and certification requirements for company security officers.
2 The STW Sub-Committee, at its thirty-fifth session (26 to 30 January 2004), agreed that
neither the STCW Convention nor the STCW Code were appropriate instruments for including
training and certification requirements for company security officers. STW 35, in view of the fact
that company security officers were shore-based, invited the Committee to clarify its instruction
relating to development of training and certification requirements for company security officers.
3 The Committee, at its seventy-eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004), advised the STW
Sub-Committee that instead of developing mandatory requirements, the Sub-Committee should
develop guidelines on training and certification requirements.
4 The STW Sub-Committee, at its thirty-sixth session (10 to 14 January 2005), developed
guidance for training and documentation for company security officers (the Guidance).
5 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), approved the Guidance, as
set out in annex.
***
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MSC/Circ.1154
ANNEX
2 The level of knowledge of the subjects listed in column 2 of the annex should be
sufficient to enable the person to act as the designated CSO.
3 Persons who have satisfactorily completed an approved course based on IMO Model
Course 3.20 on Company security officer, or who have attended a course based on the attached
knowledge, understanding and proficiency (KUP), should be considered to have met the
requirements for service as a CSO.
4 As many of the training objectives in IMO Model Courses 3.19 and 3.20 are common to
both CSO and SSO and further, that many of the KUPs in the competence tables are similarly
common, SOLAS Contracting Governments should therefore take them into account when
setting criteria for the re-training and assessment of those SSOs moving toward CSO
qualifications.
5 Those completing CSO training should provide documentary evidence to this effect to the
relevant SOLAS Contracting Government, and to the satisfaction of that Government when
requested to do so.
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Annex
KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING AND PROFICIENCIES (KUPS)
RELEVANT TO THE COMPANY SECURITY OFFICER
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Methods for Criteria for
Knowledge, understanding and
Competence demonstrating evaluating
proficiency
competence competence
Develop, • Knowledge of international Assessment of Procedures and actions
maintain and maritime security policy and evidence are in accordance with
supervise the responsibilities of Governments, obtained from the principles
implementation Companies and designated approved established by the
of a Ship persons training or ISPS Code and
Security Plan examination. SOLAS as amended.
• Knowledge of the purpose for and
the elements that make up a ship Legislative
security plan requirements relating
to security are
• Knowledge of procedures to be
correctly identified.
employed in developing,
maintaining, and supervising the
Procedures achieve a
implementation of, and the
state of readiness to
submission for approval of a ship
respond to changes in
security plan
maritime security
levels.
• Knowledge of the procedures for
the initial and subsequent
Communications
verification of the ship’s
within the CSO’s area
compliance
of responsibility are
clear and understood.
• Knowledge of maritime security
levels and the consequential
security measures and procedures
aboard ship and in the port facility
environment
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Procedures achieve a
state of readiness to
respond to changes in
the maritime security
levels.
Communications
within the CSO’s area
of responsibility are
clear and understood.
Assess security • Knowledge of risk assessment, Assessment of Procedures and actions
risk, threat, and assessment tools, and procedures evidence are in accordance with
vulnerability for conducting security obtained from the principles
assessments approved established by the
training; or ISPS Code and
• Knowledge of security SOLAS Convention.
assessment documentation assessment of
including the Declaration of evidence Procedures achieve a
Security obtained from state of readiness to
examination respond to changes in
• Knowledge of techniques used to and practical
the maritime security
circumvent security measures demonstration
levels.
of ability to:
• Knowledge enabling recognition,
on a non-discriminatory basis, of .1 conduct Communications
persons posing potential security physical within the CSO’s area
risks searches of responsibility are
clear and understood.
• Knowledge enabling recognition .2 conduct
of weapons, dangerous non-intrusive
substances, and devices and inspections
awareness of the damage they can
cause
• Knowledge of crowd
management and control
techniques, where appropriate.
• Knowledge of instructional
techniques for security training
and education
______________
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (the Committee), at its seventy-eighth session (12 to
21 May 2004), instructed the Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue
(COMSAR Sub-Committee) to consider questions relating to the message priority and the testing
of ship security alert systems and to develop, if necessary, guidance to this end.
3 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), considered the
recommendation of the COMSAR Sub-Committee and approved the Guidance on the message
priority and the testing of ship security alert systems (the Guidance), as set out at annex.
4 SOLAS Contracting Governments are invited to bring the Guidance to the attention of all
parties concerned with matters relating with ship security alerts and systems.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1155.doc
MSC/Circ.1155
ANNEX
I Message priority
1 The Committee, being aware of the message priority requirements applicable to satellite
communications, and given the diversity of ship security alert systems, agreed that there was no
need to develop a message priority requirement for ship security alerts.
2 Ship security alert system communication service providers should deliver the ship
security alert messages without delay so as to permit the relevant competent authorities to take
appropriate action.
3 Ship security alerts may be addressed to more than one recipient, as designated by the
Administration, in order to enhance the resilience of the ship security alert system.
4 The Committee urged once more those SOLAS Contracting Governments that had yet to
establish criteria for the delivery of ship security alerts, to do so as a matter of priority.
6 Administrations should ensure that their designated recipients of ship security alerts are
capable of processing the information received with the highest priority and taking appropriate
actions.
II Testing
1 The Committee agreed that there was a need for ship security alert systems to be subject
to testing.
2 However, given the multiplicity of ship security alert systems and the fact that a number
of systems in use already had test procedures in place, the Committee decided that it would be
impractical to develop a test protocol to cover all systems.
3 The Committee thus agreed that the development of procedures and protocols for testing
ship security alert systems were a matter for individual Administrations.
5 When the ship security alert system accidentally transmits, during testing, a ship security
alert, ships, Companies, Administrations and recognized security organizations should act
expeditiously to ensure that all concerned parties are made aware that the alert is false and that no
emergency response action should be taken.
______________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1155.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), in an effort to assist those
concerned with the matter, approved the Guidance on the access of public authorities, emergency
response services and pilots on board ships to which SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
apply (the Guidance) as set out at annex.
3 SOLAS Contracting Governments are invited to bring the Guidance to the attention of all
parties concerned with matters addressed therein.
5 The present circular should be read in conjunction with MSC/Circ.1112 on Shore leave
and access to ships under the ISPS Code to which it relates.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1156.doc
MSC/Circ.1156
ANNEX
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The purpose of this guidance is to provide recommended practice in relation to the access
of public authorities, emergency response services and pilots on board ships to which SOLAS
chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code apply, in order to facilitate the activities and responsibilities of
ships, ports facilities and of the authorities of SOLAS Contracting Government.
1.2 During routine and normal ship/port interface and ship-to-ship activities it is usual for a
variety of commercial, private and Governmental personnel to require access to a ship. Access
control measures incorporated in Ship Security Plans (SSPs) that implement the requirements of
the ISPS Code should, during routine ship/port interface and ship-to-ship activities, normally be
respected by everyone, including officials seeking access to ships and restricted areas on
board them.
1.3 In addition to routine and normal access, under ordinary circumstances, there are a variety
of situations where law enforcement or emergency response personnel need to conduct law
enforcement functions to address specific security problems or to respond to emergency
situations such as fires. In such situations it may not be possible or reasonable for the ship’s
security personnel to implement the normal access control provisions required by the SSP. The
security and safety of the ship and of the port facilities require that practices be established that
expedite access control for public authorities, emergency response services and pilots. The
observance of such practices should not be construed as a failure of the ship to implement or to
maintain appropriate security measures nor used by officials as an excuse for circumventing a
ship's security measures when conducting routine and normal operations requiring access
to ships.
1.4 It is noted that paragraph B/9.12 of the ISPS Code states that those unwilling or unable to
establish their identity and/or to confirm the purpose of their visit when requested to do so should
be denied access to the ship and their attempt to obtain access should be reported, as appropriate,
to the Ship Security Officer, the Company Security Officer, the Port Facility Security Officer and
to the national or local authorities with security responsibilities.
2 DEFINITIONS
.1 Public authorities means the agencies or officials in a State responsible for the
application and enforcement of the laws, regulations, orders and decrees of that
State; and
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2.2 Public authorities include but are not limited to immigration, customs and health officials,
police, military and coast guard officers, surveyors and inspectors authorized by that State to
exercise - pursuant to the provision of international treaties the State is party to control (port State
control) or control and compliance measures (in accordance with SOLAS regulation XI-2/9) or to
carry out investigations into alleged violations of the provisions of the national legislation or to
carry out marine accident investigations or judicial enquiries. Public authorities also include the
security services of the State. In addition, public authorities include surveyors, inspectors,
auditors, marine accident investigators and persons investigating alleged violations of the
international treaties and the provision of the national legislation of the State the flag of which is
entitled to fly, directly employed by the flag State.
2.3 Public authorities and emergency response services and pilots may be uniformed officials
or persons in civilian clothing.
3.1 The Special measures to enhance maritime security contained in SOLAS chapter XI-2
and in the ISPS Code have been developed for the purpose of enhancing the security in the
international maritime transport sector and should not be used to unnecessary or unjustified delay
or inhibit the access on board of public authorities and emergency response services.
3.2 The ISPS Code, in order to achieve its objectives, embodies a number of functional
requirements. These include, but are not limited to preventing unauthorized access to ships, port
facilities and their restricted areas (section A/1.3.3 of the ISPS Code).
3.3 The fact that a ship security plan (SSP) has been approved by the Administration or by a
recognized security organization acting on its behalf does not create a right for either the ship or
for those on board to invoke its provisions, and to claim, in any circumstance and regardless
of what is required by the applicable security level, that they have authority to prevent any public
authority from boarding the ship when that ship is within the territory of another
SOLAS Contracting Government or of another State.
3.4 It should be noted that SOLAS regulation XI-2/8 on Master’s discretion for ship safety
and security provides that:
“The master shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer or any other person
from taking or executing any decision which, in the professional judgement of the master,
is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This includes denial of access
to persons (except those identified as duly authorized by a Contracting Government) or
their effects and refusal to load cargo, including containers or other closed cargo transport
units.”
3.5 Delaying unnecessarily the arrival of the pilot on the bridge, especially when the ship is
underway, is detrimental to the safety of navigation and may lead to situations where the safety
of the ship and of other ships or of people in the vicinity may be jeopardized.
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3.6 Inhibiting the access of public authorities on board may be construed as obstructing them
from executing their duties or obstructing judicial or other statutory proceedings or the
administration of justice, when public authorities are lawfully seeking to board a ship. In such a
case, the public authority should inform the master of the ship of the laws, regulations, decrees or
orders which gives the public authority the legal right to access the ship in accordance with
international or national law. In accordance with the paragraphs 4.4 and 9.1.5 the public
authority should present an identity document when seeking to board a ship and the ship may
seek to verify its authenticity.
4 IDENTIFICATION
4.2 SOLAS Contracting Governments should ensure that the method of verifying the
authenticity of identification documents carried by public authorities and emergency response
services is available to ships directly through information provided by the port State or the
coastal State.
4.3 The form, format and language of identity documents, of public authorities, and of
emergency response services and of pilots are regulated by national or local legislations and there
is no international standard to this end. In some cases, such identity documents do not bear the
name of the individual but simply an identification number which may be alphanumeric or may
not include the name of the individual but simply a photograph of the holder. If the language of
the identity documents is not in English, French or Spanish these should have a translation, in
one of the three, preferably English, included in the same document of identity.
4.4 Public authorities, emergency response services and pilots whether in uniform or not,
should present an identity document when seeking to board a ship. Section A/17.2.13 of the
ISPS Code requires the port facility security officer (PFSO) to assist ship security officer (SSOs)
in confirming the identity of those seeking to board the ship when requested and the port facility
plan (PFSP) should, in accordance with paragraph B/16.8.13 of the ISPS Code, establish for all
security levels, the procedures for assisting SSOs in confirming the identity of those seeking to
board the ship. When presenting identity documents the person concerned should be ready to
provide contact details which allow the validity of the identification document to be verified, in
addition to the information provided to the ship, in accordance with the paragraph 4.2 above.
4.5 Emergency response services need to show only the identity document of the
person-in-charge of the team responding to the incident, where practicable. The person-in-charge
should be able to inform the ship the number of emergency response personnel who are boarding.
4.6 The issue of visitor identification documents by the ship to public authorities, emergency
response services and pilots who have provided, when seeking to board the ship, verifiable
identity may not be warranted and may exhibit, in lieu of visitor identification documents issued
by the ship, their official identification documents. If the aforesaid do not display visitor
identification documents issued by the ship, this fact should not be construed as a failure of the
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Related reference: Section A/17.2.13 and paragraphs B/4.18, B/9.11 and B/16.8.13 of the ISPS
Code and paragraph 2.7 of the Interim guidance on control and compliance measures to enhance
maritime security (resolution MSC.159(78)).
5 SEARCHES
5.1 Public authorities properly identified and acting in the course of their duties should not be
subject to searches by the shipboard personnel when boarding the ship.
5.2 At the discretion of the master or of the SSO, properly identified emergency response
personnel who are responding to an emergency, for example a fire onboard, should not be subject
to search by shipboard personnel when boarding the ship.
5.3 The engagement of pilots is in various locations compulsory and pilotage is subject in
certain countries to local regulations and practices. Pilots boarding at sea and at the dock are
subject to access control measures at the discretion of the master or the SSO in accordance with
the provisions of SSP. The master or the SSO should communicate with the pilots to ensure that
access control measures for pilots boarding at sea are conducted in such a way that the pilot is not
precluded from reaching the bridge in time to conduct the master-pilot information exchange and
begin providing piloting services necessary for the safety of the ship and for the safety of
navigation. If necessary to ensure that the pilot has timely access to the bridge, verifications of
employment and other access control measures, such as searches, in accordance with the
provisions of the SSP may be waived once the identity of the pilot has been verified to the
satisfaction of the master or SSO. Pilot organizations are encouraged to develop
pre-authorization and pre-clearance procedures with ships to facilitate the boarding of pilots.
Related reference: Paragraphs B/9.14, B/9.15 and B/9.16.5 of the ISPS Code.
6 ESCORTING
6.1 It is a customary practice to escort the pilot from the deck to the navigation bridge on
arrival and from the navigation bridge to the deck during the departure of the pilot.
6.2 It is reasonable to expect that public authorities and emergency response service may not
be familiar with the layout of the ship and thus escorting them whilst on board might be the
prudent course of action. However, it is recognized that in certain cases, either due to the number
of the shipboard personnel or due to the prevailing circumstances at the time, it might not be
possible or practicable to escort public authorities through the duration of their stay on board. In
such a case, the master and/or the SSO should have a general understanding as to the movements
of public authorities and emergency response services on board. The fact that public authorities
and emergency response services might conduct their duties unescorted should not be construed
as a failure of the ship to implement appropriate security measures, neither a case to prevent
public authorities and emergency response services to perform their duties.
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6.3 When the arrangements to be made for the escort of public authorities and of emergency
response services and of the pilots are provided, they should be such as not to unnecessarily
delay, in any way, the performance of their duties.
7.1 In the course of routine, emergency, or law enforcement duties, public authorities and
emergency response services may require access to restricted areas identified by the SSP
according to the paragraph B/9.1of the ISPS Code, it is expected, once the reasons for seeking
access to a restricted area have been established or if they indicate that such establishment would
amount the obstruction of the performance of their duties, that the ship would immediately make
arrangements for the access to such areas.
7.2 Although the navigation bridge is likely designated as a restricted area, pilots require
access to the bridge to perform their essential safety activities. Pilots should be granted access to
the bridge without the need to establish any other reason once the identity of the pilot has been
established to the satisfaction of the master and/or SSO.
8 FIREARMS
8.1 The national legislation of each State provides which public authorities and under what
circumstances are to carry firearms during the performance of their duties. The master and the
SSO should expect that various public authorities will be armed when on board.
8.1.1 These officials should not be asked to surrender their firearms when boarding a ship.
8.2 Paragraph B/16.7 of the ISPS Code recommends that the use of firearms on or near ships
and in port facilities may pose particular and significant safety risks, in particular in connection
with certain dangerous or hazardous substances and should be considered very carefully. Armed
public authority officials should seek, when boarding a ship, to be advised whether the ship is
carrying any dangerous goods or hazardous substance and if unfamiliar with the hazards
associated with such materials, should seek specific advice on safety precautions to be observed.
SOLAS Contracting Governments should ensure that public authorities that are authorized to
carry weapons are aware of the specific risks to safety that are present in respect to the carriage
of dangerous goods or hazardous substances on board ships and port facilities.
8.3 The presence of any firearms on board belonging to public authorities, whether such arms
were declared or not when boarding the ship, should not be construed as a failure of the ship to
implement or to maintain appropriate security measures.
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9 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE
9.1 The shipboard personnel responsible for controlling the access to the ship should:
.1 unless other arrangements have been previously made by, or through, the agent of
the ship, seek from the public authorities, the emergency response services and the
pilots when boarding the ship, the presentation of their identification document
and from the public authorities and the emergency response services the purpose
of their intended visit;
.3 escort, when necessary and without unnecessary delay, the public authorities or
emergency response services to their intended destination on board;
.4 advise, if appropriate, without delay, the master and the SSO as to the arrival of
the public authorities, the emergency response services or of the pilot; and
.5 verify the authenticity of the identity, or identification document if the ship has
serious reasons for doubting the authenticity of the identification document
presented, without obstructing any public authority or the emergency response
services from the performance of their duties.
______________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1156.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Committee agreed that the gross tonnage to be used for determining whether a cargo
ship engaged on international voyages is required to comply with the provisions of SOLAS
chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code shall be that determined in accordance with the
provisions of TONNAGE 69.
3 The Committee recognized that immediate compliance of the cargo ships which have not
been required to comply with the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS
Code presented practical difficulties and would affect the owners and the Companies operating
such ships and the port facilities serving them. As a result the Committee adopted the Interim
Scheme for the compliance of certain cargo ships with the Special measures to enhance maritime
security (the Interim Scheme) as set out at annex.
4 SOLAS Contracting Governments are invited to bring the Interim Scheme to the attention
of owners and of Companies operating cargo ships entitled to fly their flag as well as to the
attention of Designated Authorities, port facility owners and operators and port facility security
officers and to request the latter to respond positively when ships request the conclusion of
Declaration of Security.
***
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MSC/Circ.1157
ANNEX
.1 “Gross tonnage” means the gross tonnage of the ship as determined under the
provisions of the International Convention on the Tonnage Measurement of Ships,
1969 and shown on the International Tonnage Certificate (1969) of the ship;
.2 “Requirements” means the requirements of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the
ISPS Code, taking into account the provisions of part B of the ISPS Code; and
.3 “Cargo ship” means a cargo ship, irrespective of the date on which the keel of the
ship was laid, of 500 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyage
which has not been required by the Administration to comply with the
Requirements on the grounds of national tonnage rules.
2 Terms not otherwise defined in this Scheme shall have the same meaning as the meaning
attributed to them in SOLAS chapters I and XI-2 or the ISPS Code.
3 Cargo ships and Companies operating such ships which have not been required to comply
with the Requirements shall comply with the Requirements not later than 1 July 2008.
4 Until 30 June 2008, cargo ships not complying with the Requirements whilst within a port
facility which is required to comply with the Requirements shall acknowledge the measures to
enhance maritime security established by the Contracting Government within whose territory the
port facility is located and, irrespective of the provisions of SOLAS regulation XI-2/10.31
(relating to the submission of the Declaration of Security) and sections A/5.1 and A/5.2 of the
ISPS Code, shall request a Declaration of Security2 as from 1 October 2005. Contracting
Governments are urged to facilitate such requests and to issue appropriate guidance on this
1
This provision implies that neither the Contracting Government nor the port facility concerned have the right to
decline the conclusion of a Declaration of Security when a cargo ship makes a request to this end and that the ship is
obliged to conclude one when it is requested to do so.
2
Paragraph B/16.56.2 of the ISPS Code recommends that the port facility security plan (PFSP) should establish
details of the procedures and security measures the port facility should apply when it is interfacing with a ship to
which the ISPS Code does not apply.
Paragraph B/16.57 of the ISPS Code recommends that the PFSP should establish the procedures to be followed when
on the instructions of the Contracting Government the port facility security officer (PFSO) requests a Declaration of
Security or when a Declaration of Security is requested by a ship.
If the approved PFSP already includes appropriate provisions to this end then those security measures and
procedures should be applied unless the Contracting Government concerned decides otherwise. If the PFSP does not
contain such provisions, then the PFSO should contact the authorities who approved the PFSP and the authorities
responsible for the exercise of control and compliance measure pursuant to SOLAS regulation XI-2/9 and seek their
advice and guidance.
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Scheme to port facilities located within their territories. If the port facility security officer refuses
the request of the ship for a Declaration of Security then the ship shall use the Declaration of
Security to record the security measures3 and shall complete and sign, on behalf of the ship alone,
the Declaration of Security. If the cargo ship does not have a designated ship security officer, the
Declaration of Security shall be concluded by the master.
5 If an Administration has issued to a cargo ship entitled to fly its flag a statement attesting
that the ship is not required to comply with the Requirements, that statement shall be withdrawn
and cancelled. An Administration may issue to a cargo ship entitled to fly its flag, which it did
not require to comply with the Requirements, a statement attesting that the ship is subject to the
provisions of this Scheme.
7 Cargo ships which, on the date of adoption of this Scheme, were holding either a valid
International or a valid Interim International Ship Security Certificate shall not be entitled to any
benefits under this Scheme and shall maintain compliance with the Requirements. In addition,
port facilities serving cargo ships which on the date of adoption of this Scheme were
implementing security measures in accordance with an approved port facility security plan shall
not be entitled to any benefits under this Scheme and shall maintain compliance with the
Requirements.
___________
3
For the purposes of SOLAS regulation XI-2/9, it is recommended that cargo ships to which this Scheme applies
retain the Declarations of Security for the last ten ports of call. The ship should start retaining the Declarations of
Security as from 1 October 2005.
4
In the event of the ship being refused a Declaration of Security, Declarations of Security which have been
completed and signed on behalf of the ship alone should be accepted as being equally valid to Declarations of
Security concluded between a ship and a port facility.
I:\CIRC\MSC\1157.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), with a view
to providing assistance to the Administrations in the implementation of the requirements of the
1974 SOLAS Convention and in order to ensure the uniform application thereof, approved the
unified interpretations of the Convention, as set out in the annex.
.1 take note of the annexed unified interpretations and use them when applying the
relevant requirements of the 1974 SOLAS Convention; and
.2 bring the annexed unified interpretations to the attention of all interested parties.
***
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MSC/Circ.1158
ANNEX
Regulation II-1/22 – Stability information for passenger ships and cargo ships
Lightweight check
1 A sister ship is a ship built by the same yard from the same plans.
2 A lightweight check is considered the acceptable means of being satisfied that the data
from a lead sister ship’s inclining test can be used for a subsequent ship. The Administration
may request regular repeats of inclining tests and/or require each individual passenger ship to be
inclined, as detailed below.
3 For any newly built sister ship with known differences from the lead sister ship, a detailed
weights and centres calculation to adjust the lead ship’s lightship properties should be carried
out. The validity of the calculated lightship properties should be assessed by carrying out a
lightweight check unless the implications regarding the stability of the ship indicate that an
inclining test should be performed. The acceptable deviation of lightship displacement should be:
In addition, the deviation of lightship longitudinal centre of gravity should not exceed 0.5% of
the LBP of the lead ship. Where the deviation exceeds either of these limits, an inclining test
should be carried out. Where the deviation is within these limits the actual lightship weight and
longitudinal centre of gravity derived from the lightship check should be used in conjunction
with the higher of either the lead ship’s vertical centre of gravity or the calculated value.
4 For a ship in service which undergoes alterations with calculable differences in lightship
properties which materially affect the stability information supplied to the master, a detailed
weights and centres calculation to adjust the lightship properties should be carried out. To avoid
an inclining test, the deviation of lightship displacement should not exceed 2% of the original
approved lightweight or 2 tonnes, whichever is greater, or that approved following the most
recent major alteration or conversion. In addition, the deviation of lightship longitudinal centre
of gravity from the original or that approved following the most recent major alteration or
conversion should not exceed 1% of the LBP of the ship. Where the deviation exceeds either of
these limits, an inclining test should be carried out. Where a ship is within these limits the
calculated values of lightweight, lightship LCG and lightship VCG should be used in all
subsequent stability information supplied to the master.
5 For all passenger ships, a lightship survey should be carried out at periodical intervals not
exceeding five years to verify any changes in lightship displacement and longitudinal centre of
gravity. The ship should be re-inclined whenever, in comparison with the originally approved
stability information or that approved following the most recent major alteration or conversion,
the deviation of the lightweight and/or lightship longitudinal centre of gravity exceeds the limits
in paragraph 4 above. Where a ship is within these limits, the values of lightweight and lightship
LCG derived from the lightship survey should be used in conjunction with the VCG derived from
the most recent inclining experiment in all subsequent stability information supplied to the
master.
___________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1158.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
3 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), following the
recommendation of SLF 47, approved the Guidelines on the provision of stability-related
information for bulk carriers, as set out in the annex.
4 Member Governments are invited to bring the annexed Guidelines to the attention of stability
instrument manufacturers, related computer software developers, mariners, dry cargo terminal
operators and other parties involved in cargo operations.
***
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MSC/Circ.1159
ANNEX
1 PURPOSE
The aim of this document is to provide detailed, comprehensive and user-friendly guidance on
provision of stability-related information and stability computing software supporting for the safe
operation of bulk carriers and, in particular, those bulk carriers to which SOLAS regulation XII/11.3
applies.
2 DEFINITIONS
Stability data is a set of data resulting from ship design process. It covers stability characteristics
pertaining to a specific ship. Stability data is the base for ship stability calculation in operation,
especially stability assessment, by means of hand made calculations or by stability instrument.
2.2.1 A stability instrument is an instrument, either analogue or digital, provided for ships, by
means of which all relevant stability information is provided and all calculations or checks can be
easily and quickly performed, as necessary, to ensure compliance with the applicable stability
requirements.
2.2.2 In this context, the stability instrument comprises the hardware and software.
3 INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED
Stability data should include the data and information outlined here under.
.1 ship’s name;
.5 class notation;
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.10 maximum mean permissible draught corresponding to the summer timber freeboard
(if appropriate);
.11 displacement in salt water (at stated density) corresponding to .9 and .10 at the
designed (level) trim;
.12 maximum permissible draught at the forward perpendicular for bow height
considerations;
.13 the minimum recommended draught at the forward perpendicular for any sailing
condition;
.14 stability limitations of the ship’s design, both for loading operation and, where
applicable, associated with undertaking ballast water exchange at sea; and
3.1.2 A scaled arrangement drawing showing clearly the use and distribution of the various cargo
compartments, tanks, stores as well as machinery and accommodation spaces. Names of
compartments used in the text of the document should be clearly indicated.
3.1.3 A table of capacities with centres of volume (longitudinal, vertical and transverse) for every
compartment available for the carriage of cargo, fuel, stores, feed water, domestic water and water
ballast. Where applicable, such as for cargo holds, tables or curves giving capacity and centre of
volume as functions of compartment depth or ullage should be included. When ullage is used, the
ullage reference point should be clearly stated. The reference planes and the positive direction in all
six degrees of freedom for centres of volume should be the same as those used for any computer or
other information provided as an aid to the safe loading of the ship.
3.1.4 Free surface effect tables and/or curves for every tank and cargo hold that may contain liquid,
as a function of volume showing the effect on the stability of the ship of liquids in partially filled
tanks. These tables/curves should give the free surface moments necessary to correct the initial
metacentric height and those to correct the righting lever values when the ship is inclined. In the
case of tanks containing liquids which may be consumed, discharged or transferred to and from other
compartments while the ship is at sea, including anti-rolling tanks and/or heeling tanks, the
maximum free surface moments which may be developed should be given. When holds or deep
tanks containing liquids are maintained partially filled while the ship is at sea, the free surface
moments used may be based on the actual quantity of fluid contained.
3.1.5 Hydrostatic particulars for the ship at designed trim, in curve or tabulated form, to a base of
mean draught measured to the bottom of the keel over a range covering the lightship and maximum
draughts. When tabulated, these should correspond to evenly-rounded units of draught at intervals
appropriate to the size of ship. The particulars should include:
Position of reference planes should be stated in the case of items specified in paragraphs 3.1.5.4 to
3.1.5.8 and should be the same as the corresponding reference planes for centres of gravity.
3.1.6 Details of load line, draught marks and deadweight particulars. A diagram should be
provided showing the load line marks including:
.1 position of the deck line relative to the upper extreme of the ship’s depth;
.4 corresponding freeboards,
this or other diagram or tabular presentation should also give the relationships between:
.5 mean draught;
.6 extreme displacement;
.8 deadweight.
The positions of the draught marks should be defined in relation to both the ship’s perpendiculars
and the longitudinal reference plane mentioned above.
3.1.7 Form stability particulars (Cross curves of stability). Data in the form of curves or tables
showing the relationship between form righting lever, angle of heel and displacement at the designed
trim over the full operational range of displacement. Where the operating trim or form and
arrangement of the ship are such that a change in trim has an appreciable effect on righting arms,
additional form stability data should be included for a suitable range of trim. The form stability
information should be presented in a form that enables righting arms to be readily determined to the
nearest centimetre.
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3.1.9 Limiting envelope curves resulting from intact stability and damage stability, when
appropriate. These curves should be clearly stated as being GM required curves or KG maximum
curves.
3.1.10 Auxiliary data which are necessary to prove compliance with the relevant stability criteria
and, when appropriate, icing data.
3.1.11 Master’s instructions should precisely and unambiguously detail how the information
provided in the stability data and elsewhere is to be used to obtain the draught, trim and stability
characteristics of a new loading condition and determine whether that condition fulfils the relevant
stability criteria.
3.1.12.1 The loading conditions covered by the stability data should include:
.1 lightship;
.2 docking;
.3 fully loaded departure, with cargo homogeneously distributed throughout all cargo
spaces and with full stores and fuel;
.4 fully loaded arrival, with cargo homogeneously distributed throughout all cargo
spaces and with 10% stores and fuel remaining;
.5 ballast departure, without cargo but with full stores and fuel;
.6 ballast arrival, without cargo but with 10% stores and fuel remaining;
.7 other departure and arrival conditions typical of the ship’s intended service, such as
alternate hold loading, ore loading, deep ballast, etc. as applicable; and
.1 a sketch of the ship indicating, pictorially, the main items of deadweight included in
the displacement;
.2 a table showing the lightship particulars, the distribution of all components of the
deadweight, the positions of their centres relative to the defined reference planes,
corresponding static moments and a summation giving the result which should show
the full displacement mass and the position of its centre;
.3 a table listing the free surface effects of liquids in all compartments which may be
partially filled;
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.4 a diagram showing the curve of righting levers (GZ), corrected for free surface
effects, plotted against angle of inclination. The scales used should be the same for
each loading condition; and
.5.19 vertical position of the ship’s centre of gravity, both uncorrected and corrected for
free surface effects; and
.5.20 a statement giving the limiting value or values of stability parameters for each
stability criterion together with corresponding values achieved.
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A stability instrument installed onboard should cover all stability requirements applicable to the
ships as follows:
3.2.1 The input/output format of the stability instrument should, as far as practicable, be easily
comparable in information and format to the stability booklet so that the operators will easily gain
familiarity with the loading calculations.
3.2.2 The stability instrument should readily provide any information that may be obtained from
the stability booklet by incremented calculation, reflecting the operation scenario in a clearly
presented format.
3.2.3 A simple and straightforward user manual written in the same language as the stability
booklet should be provided. The user manual should contain the approved test conditions and be
written in a language with which the ship's officers responsible for cargo operations are familiar. If
this language is not English, the ship should be provided with a manual written also in the
English language.
3.2.4 The calculation program should present relevant parameters of each loading condition in
order to assist the master in his judgement on whether the ship is loaded within the approved limits
(refer to paragraphs 3.1.8, 3.1.9 and 3.1.11).
____________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1159.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-sixth session, in considering the
Report of the Working Group on Bulk Carrier Safety concerning the issue of the risk control
options for the improvement of the ship/terminal interface for bulk carriers noted the need to
harmonize training programmes for terminal personnel worldwide.
2 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-sixth session, further noted that the above
concern could be addressed by the application of the Code of Practice for the Safe Loading and
Unloading of Bulk Carriers (BLU Code) and that the risk control options in the Manual on
loading and unloading of solid bulk cargoes for terminal representatives under development
would address the concerns referred to above.
3 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004),
agreed that the application of the BLU Code would address the concerns on risk control options
above and urges Member Governments, shipowners, ship operators and terminals to apply the
guidance contained therein.
4 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004),
agreed to continue the development of the Manual on loading and unloading of solid bulk
cargoes for terminal representatives, taking into account the guidance in the IBTA guidelines for
terminal representatives at ship/shore interface, when finalizing the Manual.
5 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), approved
the Manual on loading and unloading of solid bulk cargoes for terminal representatives set out in
the annex and agreed that the application of the guidance contained therein would address the
concerns on risk control options and urged Member Governments, shipowners, ship operators
and terminals to apply the guidance contained therein.
6 Member Governments are invited to implement the BLU Code and to bring the annexed
Manual on loading and unloading of solid bulk cargoes for terminal representatives, to the
attention of terminals, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters, shippers, receivers and other
parties concerned.
I:\CIRC\MSC\1160.doc
MSC/Circ.1160
ANNEX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Foreword 2
Introduction 3
Section 1 Definitions 5
Section 2 Suitability of ships and terminals 6
Section 3 Procedures between the ship and the terminal prior to the
ship’s arrival. 12
Section 4 Procedures between the ship and the terminal prior to cargo
loading/unloading 18
Section 5 Cargo loading and handling of ballast 23
Section 6 Unloading cargo and handling of ballast 26
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FOREWORD
1 In response to the continuing loss of ships carrying solid bulk cargoes – sometimes
without trace and with heavy loss of life - the Code of Safe Practice for the Safe Loading and
Unloading of Bulk Carriers (BLU Code) was developed by IMO as one of a number of measures
to enhance the operational and structural safety of bulk carriers. It was adopted as a
recommendatory instrument by the International Maritime Organization’s Assembly at its
twentieth session in November 1997.
2 Possible stress and damage imposed by cargo handling throughout the life of a ship was
considered to be a possible contributory cause of structural failure of bulk carriers leading to
casualties and losses. The purpose of the BLU Code, therefore, is to provide guidance to ship
masters of bulk carriers, terminal operators and other parties for the safe handling, loading and
unloading of solid bulk cargoes.
3 To augment the BLU Code, the Manual on Loading and Unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes
for Terminal Representatives (BLU Manual) is intended to provide more detailed guidance to
Terminal Representatives (as defined in the BLU Code) and others involved in the handling of
solid bulk cargoes; including those responsible for the training of personnel.
5 Further guidance on the safe loading and unloading of solid bulk cargoes is contained in
the following publications: "Bulk carriers, Handle with Care", IACS Ltd. 1998, 36 Broadway,
London SW1H 0BH, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 (0)207 976 0660, Fax +44 (0)207 808 1100,
E-mail: permsec@iacs.org.uk, Website: www.iacs.org.uk; "The Loading and Unloading of
Solid Bulk Cargoes, ICHCA International Ltd., Suite 2, 85 Western Road, Romford,
Essex, RM1 3LS, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 (0)1708 735 295, Fax: +44 (0)1708 735 225,
E-mail: info@ichcainternational.co.uk.
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INTRODUCTION
1 The BLU Code applies to the loading and unloading of solid bulk cargoes, to or from
bulk carriers of more than 500 gross tonnage. The BLU Code does not apply to: Ships which
are not bulk carriers, by definition, ships which are loading, carrying or unloading grain and ships
which are being loaded or unloaded using shipboard equipment only.
2 The guidance in this Manual is intended to complement the BLU Code by providing
guidance on good practice, regardless of ship size, terminal capacity or cargo quantity. This
should assist terminal representatives to implement the Code.
3 Although this Manual is written primarily in the context of the operation of major bulk
terminals operating ship loaders and unloaders, smaller bulk facilities and non specialist
terminals may also load and/or unload solid bulk cargoes by grabs, conveyors, chutes or even
directly from vehicles etc. Not all the guidance in the Manual may be appropriate to such smaller
terminals and facilities and the ships they serve but the general principles should still apply and
be followed.
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LAYOUT OF GUIDELINES
The Guidelines have been written so that the left hand column contains the specific language of
the BLU Code, and the right hand column contains the guidelines for the Terminal
Representative. These guidelines are further expanded as necessary in the attached annex.
DEFINITIONS
Definitions contained in the BLU Code are on page 6. In addition, the following definitions
refer to a number of other expressions used in these Guidelines.
• “BLU Code” means the Code of Practice for the Safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk
Carriers, as contained in the annex to IMO Assembly resolution A.862(20) of
27 November 1997.
• “Bulk carrier” means a ship which is constructed generally with single deck, top-side
tanks and hopper side tanks in cargo spaces, and is intended primarily to carry dry cargo
in bulk, and includes such types as ore carriers and combination carriers∗.
• "Cargo air draught" means the distance from the surface of the water to the lowest point
of the loader or unloader when in a fully raised position.
• “Dry or solid bulk cargo” means any material, other than liquid or gas, consisting of a
combination of particles, granules, or any larger pieces of material, generally uniform in
composition, which is loaded directly into the cargo spaces of a ship without any
intermediate form of containment.
• “Terminal” means any fixed, floating or mobile facility equipped and used for the
loading and/or unloading of bulk cargo. The term includes that part of a dock, pier, berth,
jetty, quay, wharf or similar structure at which a ship may tie up.
• “Stowage factor” is the number of cubic metres which one tonne of the material will
occupy.
∗ Refer to resolution MSC.79(70) relating to interpretation of provision of SOLAS chapter XII on additional
safety measures for bulk carriers.
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Section 1 – Definitions
1.6 Master means the master of the ship or 1.6 Standard shipping industry practise is
a ship's officer designated by the master. that the Chief Officer (First Mate) is the
designated officer in charge of cargo operations,
and is the person with whom the terminal
representative will normally liaise.
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2.1.2 The ship owner, manager or operator, 2.1.2 Terminals should determine the
when offering a ship for a particular cargo or suitability of a ship for compatibility with both
service, should ensure that the ship: loading and/or unloading terminal infrastructure
as appropriate.
- is maintained in a sound, seaworthy
condition;
- has on board a competent crew;
- has on board at least one officer
proficient in the languages used at both
the loading and unloading ports, or has
an officer available who is proficient in
the English language; and
- is free of defects that may prejudice the
ship’s safe navigation, loading or
unloading.
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2.1.3 It is essential that a ship selected to 2.1.3 It is important that the terminal operator
transport a solid bulk cargo be suitable for its keeps its relevant customers informed of current
intended purpose taking into account the terminal standards, limitations and operating
terminals at which it will load or unload. conditions in terms of any changes to relevant
navigational conditions, water depths,
loading/unloading equipment and rates.
2.1.4 The charterer and shipper when 2.1.4 In addition to the checks carried out by
accepting a ship for a particular cargo or the charterer and/or shipper and/or receiver, the
service should ensure that the ship: terminal operator should take reasonable steps
to assure that all bulk carriers nominated for
- is suitable for access to the planned loading/unloading at the terminal are
loading or unloading facilities; and operationally suitable in all respects for the
- does not have cargo handling purpose.
equipment which would inhibit the
safety of the loading and unloading The following checks are examples of
operations. the type of checks that may be carried out:
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.2 maximum size of the ship; .3 Whether ship will berth port or starboard
side–to.
.3 mooring arrangements;
.4 Tug and line boat requirements.
.4 fendering;
.5 Mooring requirements taking into
.5 safe access; and account:
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2.3.2 Terminal equipment should be properly 2.3.2 Maintenance refers not just to running
certificated and maintained in accordance with repairs and upkeep of equipment, but to the
the relevant national regulations and/or planned and systematic inspection and
standards, and only operated by duly qualified maintenance of equipment at periodic intervals.
and, if appropriate, certificated personnel. This is normally carried out in accordance with
manufacturer’s recommendations, national
2.3.2.1 Where automatic weighing equipment requirements, and industry codes of practice.
is provided, this should be calibrated at regular
intervals. 2.3.2.1 Examination and testing means the
thorough examination of the crane or equipment
at regular intervals, in accordance with relevant
legislation and insurance requirements. Items
needing particular attention include:
.1 Lifting equipment.
.2 Rotating equipment.
.3 Access equipment.
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2.3.3 Terminal personnel should be trained in 2.3.3 Commensurate with their responsibilities,
all aspects of safe loading and unloading of terminal personnel should be able to:
bulk carriers, commensurate with their
responsibilities. .1 Understand the basic principles of bulk
carrier construction.
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2.3.4 Terminal operators should ensure that 2.3.4 In addition to assuring that terminal
personnel involved in the loading and personnel are duly rested, terminal personnel
unloading operations are duly rested to avoid involved in cargo handling work should be
fatigue. provided with personal protective equipment
such as safety helmets, safety footwear, high
visibility jackets, gloves, hearing and
respiratory protection, as required.
3.1.2 Before loading commences there 3.1.2 The master should forward the proposed
should be an agreement between the master loading/unloading plan to the terminal before the
and the terminal representative as to the rate of ship arrives:
loading and order in which the cargo is to be
distributed so as to achieve the final loading .1 The terminal representative should check
plan. In general, this agreement should be the plan and ensure it corresponds to its
based on one or more of the following options: expectations. If it does not the terminal
may revert to the ship requesting a review
.1 the limitations or restrictions on of the proposed plan.
loading procedures, if such are
specified in the ship's Loading Manual .2 By giving the ship adequate time to
or Trim and Stability Booklet, or both; prepare an alternative plan, in compliance
with the ship’s stability booklet and
.2 if the restrictions mentioned in .1 do loading manual or instrument, it should be
not exist, and the ship has a loading possible to identify a mutually acceptable
instrument which has been approved, loading sequence.
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3.1.3 Details should be provided of any 3.1.3 The terminal should be informed if any
necessary repairs which may delay berthing, proposed visits by ship repair contractors or
the commencement of loading or unloading, or service personnel, or if cranes or other equipment
may delay the ship sailing on completion of are required on the jetty.
loading or unloading.
3.1.4 The master should ensure he receives 3.1.4 Before commencement of loading of a
from the shipper of the intended cargo details solid bulk cargo, the shipper must provide the
of the nature of the cargo required by master with the characteristics and properties of
chapter VI of SOLAS 1974, as amended*. the cargo, including:
Where additional details, such as trimming or
continuous measurement of the water in the .1 Stowage factor, angle of repose, trimming
cargo, etc., are required, the master should procedures, and likelihood of shifting.
inform the terminal accordingly.
.2 The transportable moisture limit and
average moisture content where
Appendix A of the BC Code (Code of
Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes)
applies.
* Refer to MSC/Circ.663 and to the form for cargo information, which is set out in appendix 5 to the BLU Code.
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.2.2 a loading plan stating the .3 The master then has the opportunity to
quantity of cargo required, re-calculate the plan and clarify any
stowage by hatches, loading questions so that a safe, correct and
order and the quantity to be mutually acceptable plan is agreed
loaded in each pour, provided the preferably before the ship berths.
ship has sufficient information to
be able to prepare such a plan; .4 If the terminal’s suggested plan is
unsuitable for the ship, and does not meet
.2.3 time required for de-ballasting; its stability and hull stress criteria, then
the terminal representative and master
.2.4 the ship’s length overall, beam, should co-ordinate and agree on a plan
and length of the cargo area from before operations begin.
the forward coaming of the
forward-most hatch to the after .5 Other items of information requested by
coaming of the aft-most hatch the terminal may include:
into which cargo is to be loaded
or from which cargo is to be .5.1 Confirmation that ballast water is
removed; clean sea water ballast.
.2.5 distance from the water line to .5.2 Any ship defects which could affect
the first hatch to be loaded or operations.
unloaded and the distance from
the ship's side to the hatch .5.3 Ship’s operational and navigational
opening; equipment safety status.
.2.6 the location of the ship's .5.4 Details of any planned bunkering and
accommodation ladder; storing operations, or repairs to be
carried out.
.2.7 air draught;
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3.2.2 Ships arriving at loading or unloading 3.2.2 Ship should provide the terminal with a
terminals in a part loaded condition should also load or unloading plan stating the cargo
advise: distribution plan for the cargo to be
loaded/unloaded, the hold rotation and quantities
.1 berthing displacement and draughts. to be loaded/unloaded per run.
3.2.3 Combination carriers (OBO or O/O) 3.2.3 During the unloading of dry bulk cargo it
should advise of the following additional may be necessary to ballast one or more holds to
information: reduce the cargo air draught of the ship. This is
unlikely to introduce hazards if the pipeline
.1 nature of the preceding three cargoes; system has been well washed. However if a
pump or pipeline has not been adequately
.2 date and place at which the last oil washed, the ballasting operation may discharge
cargo was discharged; residual oil into the hold. Atmospheric tests in
the hold should therefore be made before any hot
.3 advice as to content of slop tanks and work is carried out in, adjacent to, or above a
whether fully inerted and sealed; and ballasted hold.
∗ The BC Numbers have been deleted in the revised Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code),
2004, as adopted by resolution MSC.193(79).
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3.3.3 The terminal representative should be 3.3.3 The shipper of the cargo is responsible for
satisfied that the ship has been advised as early ensuring that this information is provided to the
as possible of the information contained in the master in good time.
cargo declaration as required by chapter VI of
SOLAS 1974, as amended.
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Section 4 – Procedures between the ship and the terminal prior to cargo loading/unloading
.3 ensure that the disposition of cargo and .3 The quantity remaining on the belt should
ballast water is monitored throughout be accurately known, or else the belts
the loading or unloading process to should run off before trimming
ensure that the ship's structure is not commences.
overstressed;
.4 Where loading terminals insert empty
.4 ensure that the terminal representative gaps into the flow of material to allow for
is made aware of the requirements for changing hatches, these gaps should be
harmonization between deballasting adequate and there should be good
and cargo loading rates for his ship; communications between loader and
stockyard to ensure the loader can move
.5 ensure that ballast water is discharged safely.
at rates which conform to the agreed
loading plan and do not result in .5 For multi-unloader or loader operations
flooding of the quay or of adjacent the terminal should inform the master of
craft; its procedures for preventing collisions
between the loaders/unloaders. The cargo
.6 retain on board sufficient officers and plans should normally ensure that the
crew to attend to the adjustment of machines will be separated by at least one
mooring lines or for any normal or unworked hatch.
emergency situation, having regard to
the need of the crew to have sufficient .6 The actual quantities to be trimmed should
rest periods to avoid fatigue; be determined by the master in good time
as loading completes, and the distribution
.7 ensure the loading or unloading plans clearly specified to the terminal
have been passed to and agreed with representative and to the loader operator.
the terminal representative;
.7 Due allowance should be made for the belt
.8 ensure that the terminal representative run off on completion.
is made aware of the cargo trimming
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requirements;
.8 Where load/unload plans are programmed
.9 ensure that appropriate information into the computerized control system of
about the cargo to be loaded loader/unloaders, the operator should
(appendix 5) has been received to monitor these carefully, keep the
enable safe stowage and carriage to be programme updated as the operation
achieved; progresses, double check if doubt, and be
able to revert to a manual tally in event of
.10 ensure that there is agreement between any problems with the computer
ship and shore as to the action to be programme.
taken in the event of rain, or other
change in the weather, when the nature .9 The terminal representative should notify
of the cargo would pose a hazard in the the master when cargo conditions have
event of such a change; and changed due to weather.
.2 not deviate from the loading or .1.3 Arrangements for safe access to/from
unloading plan unless by prior the ship.
consultation and agreement with the
master; .1.4 Arrangements for access for
crewmembers through the terminal
.3 trim the cargo, when loading or premises.
unloading, to the master’s
requirements; .1.5 Weather and tidal conditions.
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.6 avoid damage to the ship by the loading .4 Have details to be specified in the
or unloading equipment and inform the ship/shore checklist, and should also be
master, if damage occurs; provided with the terminal’s regulations
and information booklet.
.7 ensure that no hot work is carried out
on board or in the vicinity of the ship .5 Have a procedure for checking the origin,
while the ship is alongside the berth nature and extent of damage whether
except with the permission of the notified by terminal or ship personnel.
master and in accordance with any
requirements of the port administration; .6 Have knowledge of hot work procedures
and to identify any risks, and be familiar with
the control measures and precautions
.8 ensure that there is agreement between required, noting that it may be necessary
the master and the terminal to ballast one or more holds to reduce the
representative at all stages and in cargo air draught of the ship. With
relation to all aspects of the loading or combination carriers, this is unlikely to
unloading operation. introduce hazards if the pipeline system
has been well washed. However if a
pump or pipeline has not been adequately
washed, the ballasting operation may
discharge residual oil into the hold.
Atmospheric tests in the hold should
therefore be made before any hot work is
carried out in, adjacent to, or above a
ballasted hold.
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.6 the quantities of cargo required to .5.2 Cargo should not be loaded high
achieve the departure draft and trim against one hold bulkhead or one side,
should allow for all cargo on the and low against the other.
terminal's conveyor systems to be run
off and empty on completion of a .5.3 Each hold should be loaded using at
loading. The terminal representative least two separate pours per hold.
should advise the master of the nominal
tonnage contained on its conveyor .5.4 The terminal should maintain an
system and any requirements for accurate record of the tonnages loaded
clearing the conveyor system on in each pour into each hold.
completion of loading; and
.5.5 Sudden increases in the loading rates
.7 communication arrangements between causing significant overloading should
the ship and terminal should be capable be avoided.
of responding to requests for
information on the loading process and .6 The amount of cargo remaining on the
of prompt compliance in the event that belts depends on the loading rate at the
the master or terminal representative time. This should be known by the loader
orders loading to be suspended. operator and the terminal representative
Consideration should be given to the
disposition of cargo on the conveyor .7 Ship/shore communications arrangements
systems and to the response time in the should be confirmed when completing the
event of an emergency stop. ship/shore safety checklist, giving all
necessary details and contact details for
both ship and terminal including:
4.2.2 The following are considered important 4.2.2 The ship should provide the terminal with
procedures in respect of cargo unloading: its proposed unloading plan in advance of the
ship’s arrival.
.1 the terminal representative, when
proposing or accepting the initial 4.2.3 The terminal representative should
unloading plan, should advise the co-ordinate with the master and agree upon a plan
master of the nominal unloading rate before operations begin.
and the estimated time required for
each stage of the discharge; 4.2.4 Agreeing the unloading plan prior to
arrival simplifies matters for all concerned when
.2 the master should advise the hold order the ship does arrive, as there usually is little time
and the weight to be unloaded in each for the master to re-calculate the unloading plan
stage of the discharge; after the ship has arrived and is ready to
commence unloading.
.3 the terminal representative should give
the ship the maximum warning when it .1 Master should ensure that the terminal
is intended to increase, or to reduce, the representative is provided with accurate
number of unloading heads used; and information in good time so as the loader/
unloader operator can be notified of the
.4 communication arrangements between ship’s requirements.
ship and terminal should be capable of
responding to requests for information
on the unloading process, and of
prompt compliance in the event that the
master orders unloading to be
suspended.
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5.1.2 The terminal representative should 5.1.2 Special care needs to be taken with heavy
alert the master, when the cargo is heavy, or cargoes such as iron ore, scrap iron, lead and
when the individual grab loads are large, that other concentrates.
there may be high, localized impact loads on
the ship's structure until the tank top is .1 The loader chute, spout or grab should be
completely covered by cargo, especially when kept as close to the tank top as possible
high free-fall drops are permitted. As such and loading should be started at a low rate
impacts have the potential for causing until the tank top in the loading area is
structural damage, special care should be taken covered with a layer of cargo. As the pile
at the start of the loading operation in each builds up on that area the cargo will roll
cargo hold. down the pile and slowly spread over the
rest of the tank top without any heavy
impact.
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5.1.4 Any requirement for cargo trimming 5.1.4 The master, the terminal representative
should be in accordance with the procedures of and the loader operators at the load port should
the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk bear the unloading of the cargo in mind while
Cargoes (BC Code). they are loading the ship. They should, where
possible, avoid trimming cargo on to beams or
ledges from where it will be difficult or unsafe to
remove.
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5.1.6 On completion of loading, the master 5.1.6 The ship’s agent should assist in preparing
and the terminal representative should agree in the necessary documentation on completion of
writing that the ship has been loaded in loading.
accordance with the loading plan, including
any agreed variations.
5.2.3 The master should ensure close 5.2.3 It is prudent that a draught survey is
supervision of the loading operation and of the carried out with about 90% of the cargo loaded.
ship during final stages of loading. The master
should advise the terminal representative when
final trimming of the ship has to commence in
order to allow for the conveyor system run-off.
5.3.2 The ship should be kept upright with 5.3.2 The ship should also ensure that the
the cargo distributed so as to eliminate any ballast is discharged in accordance with
twisting of the ship's structure. loading/unloading plan.
5.3.3 The terminal should use weight-meters 5.3.3 A one per cent error on a 70,000-tonne
which are well maintained and provide an cargo is 700 tonnes.
accuracy to within 1% of the rated quantity
required over the normal range of loading .1 If the weigh scale is reading lower than the
rates. The terminal should frequently monitor actual tonnage loaded, then the scale will
the weight of cargo that is being loaded and be reading 69,300 tonnes when there is
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inform the ship so that it can be compared with 70,000 tonnes on board. If no allowance
the cargo loading plan and the ship's is made for this then it may not be
calculation by draught marks. possible to complete the trimming of the
ship as per cargo plan.
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6.1.2 Monitoring and effective 6.1.2 Contact details and procedures should
communication between the terminal and ship be agreed and noted in the ship/shore safety
must be maintained at all times. checklist.
6.1.3 On completion of unloading, the master 6.1.3 Hold cleaning requirements are
and the terminal representative should agree in normally specified in the relevant charter party
writing that the ship has been unloaded in or contract of affreightment. The holds should
accordance with the agreed unloading plan, be cleaned to the master’s satisfaction in
with the holds emptied and cleaned to the accordance with the contractual requirements.
master’s requirements, and should record any
detected damage suffered by the ship. .1 Where the ship’s crew members have
commenced cleaning the holds as the
terminal completes unloading in each
one; the terminal, when appropriate and
in conformance with national
regulations, should assist the ship in
removing hold sweepings and
unloading all the available cargo
residue ashore.
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6.1.5 When ballasting one or more holds, 6.1.5 This applies to combination carriers,
master and terminal operator should take where holds must be adequately ventilated to
account of the possibility of the discharge of ensure that the atmosphere contains no
flammable vapours from the holds. Suitable flammable or noxious vapours, and is safe for
precautions* should be taken before any hot personnel and heavy machinery to work.
work is permitted adjacent to or above that Ref: ISGOTT (International Safety Guide for
space. Oil Tankers and Terminals) (Ch.12).
6.2.2 At the start and during all stages of 6.2.2 Further guidance is contained in
unloading cargo, the master should ensure that IMO Assembly resolution A.864(20),
frequent checks are made so that: Recommendations for entering enclosed spaces
aboard ships.
.1 cargo spaces and other enclosed spaces
are well ventilated, and persons are Special precautions should be taken and
allowed to enter them only after they Enclosed space entry procedures observed
have been declared safe for entry in where there is a risk of an unsafe atmosphere in
accordance with the guidelines ship’s holds, particularly where:
developed by the Organization;
.1 The cargo has been fumigated en
.2 the cargo is being unloaded from each passage.
hold in accordance with the agreed
unloading plan; .2 The cargo has oxygen depleting
characteristics.
.3 the ballasting operation is proceeding in
accordance with the agreed unloading .3 The cargo is liable to give off
plan; flammable or toxic vapours.
.4 the ship is securely moored, and that The terminal representative should be familiar
weather conditions are being monitored with the BC Code (Code of Safe Practice for
and local weather forecasts obtained; Solid Bulk Cargoes) recommendations for the
* Refer to the section on the operation of combination carriers in the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers
and Terminals (ISGOTT).
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.6 the terminal representative is warned The terminal representative should ensure the
immediately if the unloading process master is made aware of:
has caused damage, has created a
hazardous situation, or is likely to do .1 Any local tidal or current conditions at
so; the berth that could affect the safe
mooring of the ship.
.7 the ship is kept upright, or, if a list is
required for operational reasons, it is .2 Details of any prevailing wind
kept as small as possible; and conditions that could affect the safety
of operations.
.8 the unloading of the port side closely
matches that of the starboard side in the .3 Any forecasts of extreme wind
same hold to avoid twisting the ship. conditions.
6.2.3 The master should ensure close 6.2.3 The master should also ensure that:
supervision of the final stages of the unloading,
to ensure that all cargo is unloaded. .1 Adequate and proper hold lighting is
provided.
6.3.2 The ship is to be kept upright or, if a list 6.3.2 The cargo should be removed in a
is required for operational reasons, it is to be methodical pattern across the hold so that any
kept as small as possible. listing to one side and then the other is kept
small and is constantly being corrected.
6.3.3 The unloading of the port side closely 6.3.3 Where grab operations are carried out
matches that of the starboard side in the same in automatic or semi-automatic mode the
hold, to avoid twisting the ship. unloader operator should:
6.3.4 Unloading rates and sequences should 6.3.4 Where there is significant and
not be altered by the terminal unless by prior unavoidable delays to the unloading, or a
consultation and agreement between the master reduction in the expected rates due to
and the terminal representative. breakdowns or problems with the terminal
materials handling system, the master should
be informed and the plan amended as
necessary.
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6.3.6 The terminal should make every effort 6.3.6 The master should inspect each hold as
to avoid damage to the ship when using soon as possible after the completion of
unloading or hold cleaning equipment. If unloading of cargo from the hold. Any
damage does occur, it should be reported to the damage found should be reported to the
master and, if necessary, repaired. If the terminal representative immediately.
damage could impair the structural capability
or watertight integrity of the hull, or the ship's
essential engineering systems, the
Administration or an organization recognized
by it and the appropriate authority of the port
State should be informed, so that they can
decide whether immediate repair is necessary
or whether it can be deferred. In either case,
the action taken, whether to carry out the repair
or defer it, should be to the satisfaction of the
Administration or an organization recognized
by it and the appropriate authority of the port
State. Where immediate repair is considered
necessary, it should be carried out to the
satisfaction of the master before the ship leaves
the port.
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ANNEX 1
The table below indicates only an example and format for the exchange of information. Terminal
may require additional information, especially in the case of part-loaded ships and combination
carriers (further details of information to be exchanged may be found in section 3 of the
BLU Code). The table may be modified as appropriate by individual terminals.
INFORMATION RESPONSE
1 Ship Name Name ................................................
Call Sign /IMO Number / Flag Call Sign ...........................................
Port of Registry IMO No. ...........................................
Flag ...................................................
Port of Registry ................................
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Master’s Comments
1 Cargo holds and hatch openings are suitable for
cargo operations
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INFORMATION RESPONSE
1.0 Name of Berth to be used No.1 Berth
Which side alongside No.2 Berth
1.1 Estimated time of berthing 1 Berthing time ......................................................
1.2 Estimated time of 2. Estimated completion time .................................
completion
2.0 Unloading Equipment 1. Number of unloaders ...........................................
2. Nominal Rate ......................................................
3. Estimated times for each stage of unloading to be
agreed on arrival.
4. Cargo Air Draught of Unloaders .........................
2.1 Loading Equipment 1. Number of Loaders
2. Expected Rate No.1 Berth:
3. Expected Rate No.2 Berth:
4. Estimated times for each stage of loading to be
agreed on arrival.
5. Cargo Air Draught of Loaders ............................
3.0 Minimum depth of Water No.1 Berth : .......................................................... m
alongside No.2 Berth : .......................................................... m
Ships arriving on max. draughts to plan unloading so
ship raises on even keel for first 12 hours.
3.1 Water Density Depending on tide and weather.
4.0 Depths in Approach and Adequate at all times for all ships. Berthing times
Departure Channels restricted as follows:
No.1 Berth .................................................................
No.2 Berth .................................................................
4.1 Maximum allowable m/sec
docking speed
5.0 Pilotage Anchorage Pilots normally board at ............................................
(Pilot Station VHF) Ships awaiting a berth normally proceed direct to the
................................................................ Anchorage.
6.0 Maximum distance from Ships loading : ......................................... metres
waterline to top of hatch Ships unloading: ......................................... metres
coaming
7.0 Arrangements for
gangways and access
8.0 Tugs: Number available: .....................................................
Number normally required:.............................. Type
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Etc. etc.
11.0 Any advance information Draught Survey:
on proposed loading/ Ships arriving to load should preferably have ballast
unloading operations tanks either fully pressed up or empty.
Slow Deballasting: loading continues at normal rate
until ship requests loading stop.
11.1 1. Loading Plan 1. The Terminal’s preferred options are:
2. Unloading Plan
12.0 Travel limits of Terminal Maximum working distance from foreward end
equipment No.1 hatch to aft end of aft hatch:
No.1 Berth Unloader: .................................... metres
No.1 Berth Loader: ....................................... metres
No.1 Berth Unloader: .................................... metres
No.1 Berth Loader: ....................................... metres
13.0 Mooring Arrangements: Number of headlines or sternlines/breasts/springs:
14.0 Unusual mooring
requirements
Signed: Terminal Date:
Representative
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ANNEX 2
The traditional design and configuration of single-side skin bulk carriers presents obstacles to
safe and efficient cargo handling, especially discharge with grabs.
The usual types of damage that occur during grab discharge operations are grab and payloader
damage in the holds, damage to hatch coamings and covers, and damage to deck fittings and
equipment.
Procedure Keypoint
1 Prevention of damage to ladders
.1 When free digging the Operator should: • Ladder may be buried under the cargo
with only the top section visible.
.1.1 Check for the location of sloping
ladders with intermediate platforms
extending into the hold space, check if
it is going to the outboard or inboard
side, and check for the location of
platforms. • Grab may topple over and strike the
ladder, so make due allowances.
.1.2 Check location of vertical ladders and
look out for intermediate platforms.
.1 The operator should always check along • Leave covers slightly closed over the top
the line of hatches that the covers are of the coaming to prevent spillage
completely opened clear of the coaming. getting into the drain channels.
.2 The travel of the grab into the hold should • Fail to secure the open covers in place,
be controlled so that the grab and the grab which can allow them to roll closed.
trolley are in line as the grab is moving out
and down into the hold. This will ensure • Always be aware that the ship can move
that the swing is under control at all times. in or out, fore and aft, and up and down
due to wind, tide, movement of cargo
.3 When working in the wings the grab trolley and ballast, or crew adjusting mooring
should be positioned so that the grab ropes ropes.
and the grab itself are raised clear of the
coaming. • Raising or lowering the grab close to the
coaming may result in the grab or the
grab rope shackles catching on the lips
of the hatch cover. This will result in
the cover being lifted and dropped
heavily, causing major damage to the
coaming, the cover and the cover drive
mechanism.
•
Damage to the cross-joint sealing
arrangement could also occur.
5 Prevention of damage by payloader to bottoms Payloader drivers should:
of ladders, stool plates and bulkheads –
4th phase • Operate carefully around ladders and
projections. Remove material manually
In co-ordination with the master, the operator where necessary.
should be informed of:
• Avoid grinding the corners of the
.1 Location of the bottoms of ladders. payloader bucket along the bottom of
the bulkheads and hopper tanks, as this
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.2 Location of any pipes or pipe guards. kind of heavy pressure can cause unseen
damage.
.3 Location of bilge covers plates.
• The master should point out the position
of any obstructions on the tank top. On
some ships the locations of bilge cover
plates are marked by a line of paint on
the bulkhead.
.1 Check that the grab is well clear of all deck • As the ship rises up as the cargo is
fittings and equipment before moving. unloaded, the unloader operator should
always check that there is safe clearance
.2 Check that it is clear for the unloader to over all obstructions before attempting
long travel. to move the unloader. The unloader
boom should always be raised before
.3 When working close to the bridge front or moving if there is any doubt.
foremast make due allowances for aerials
and other obstructions to the unloader
boom and keep well clear.
7 Error inducing conditions
The following conditions may lead to operator • Never grab from the foreward and aft
error or misjudgement: ends of the holds without being sure of
where the ladders are.
.1 Overfilled or unevenly filled holds having
ladders and platforms buried under the • Do not work unless the cargo in the hold
cargo. is clearly visible.
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Sides of grab when “across-ship” increase the risk of point impact damage to hopper and tank top
and this is more likely to happen when the grab is at an angle with the ship as it impacts with the
hopper.
Foreward
Aft
Sides of grab when parallel to ship’s side impact more evenly distributed on hopper, but pose
more risk to stool plate
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ANNEX 3
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ANNEX 4
1. The general hazards of loading and/or unloading Bulk Carriers (ref. BLU Code (Code of
Practice for the Safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk Carriers) and BC Code (Code of
Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes))
2. The dangerous effect improper loading and/or unloading can have on a ship.
• The BLU Code so that they understand and appreciate both the obligations it places on their
terminal, and the limitations of the ships the terminal personnel are loading and/or
unloading.
• The correct operating instructions for the ship loader or unloader they are operating.
• A basic understanding of the mechanical and electrical components of the loader and/or
unloader such as travel drives, braking arrangements, ropes and rope care, grab/trolley
winches, conveyors, operating and wind limits, storm anchoring.
• Emergency procedures such as fire on ship, terminal, or loader and/or unloader; mooring
incidents, emergency stops.
• The correct techniques and patterns to be used to load or unload a ship, depending on the
type of and number of loaders or unloaders being used.
To load a ship:
• Distribute the cargo in each hold in accordance with the agreed cargo plan to ensure the
ship remains upright, and is neither stressed nor twisted.
• Ensure no hold is overloaded or overfilled, and that the ship can be safely trimmed on
completion.
• Ensure that good communications are maintained between the loader operator and the
designated ship’s officer, and between master and terminal representative.
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ANNEX
Page 44
To unload a ship:
• Unload the cargo from each hold in accordance with the agreed unloading plan to ensure
that the ship remains upright and is not stressed or twisted.
• Remove the cargo from the holds by either grab or continuous unloader in a manner that
minimizes the risk of damage to the ship’s structure.
• Ensure that good communications are maintained between the unloader operator and the
designated ship’s officer, and between master and terminal representative.
• Assess the risks arising from cargo sticking in frames and on hopper sides and facilitate, if
possible, its safe removal without risk to the safety of terminal personnel and ship’s crew
members, or risk of damage to ship.
1. Have a thorough understanding of the underlying principles related to the loading and/or
unloading of bulk carriers as described in the BLU Code.
3. Understand and manage the ship/shore interface in relation to the operations and
limitations of the terminal, its cargo handling equipment and procedures, the planning,
control and monitoring of cargoes, relevant properties of the cargoes being handled,
berthing/mooring operations and emergency procedures.
The training, assessment and certification of trainees should be carried out by competent persons
within the framework of existing training standards and national health and safety legislation.
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ANNEX 5
HAZARDS
Terminal representatives should be aware that the following hazards may be encountered at the
ship/shore interface during the loading and/or unloading of Solid Bulk Cargoes.
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ANNEX 6
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Every terminal should always have written procedures for dealing with emergency situations.
These should be summarized in the terminal’s information and regulation booklet, and should be
discussed by the terminal representative and the master of each ship on arrival.
Emergency situations that could occur should be assessed for each terminal, but typically should
include:
4. Injuries.
2. Notifying the emergency services, including necessary contact points and list of
contact numbers.
4. Evacuation procedures.
___________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1160.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), approved
amendments to Part A of the Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code
for launching/recovery operations of fast rescue boats.
2 The Committee agreed that there is a need for seafarers involved with launching and
recovering fast rescue boats to be appropriately trained in the use of the equipment on board.
The initial onboard training requirements of seafarers involved with the launching and recovery
of fast rescue boats are set out at annex 1.
4 Member Governments are invited to bring this guidance to the attention of shipping
companies, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and all parties concerned.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1161.doc
MSC/Circ.1161
ANNEX 1
Initial onboard training of seafarers involved with the launching and recovery of fast
rescue boats
1 Every person involved in the operation of launching and recovery equipment and
appliances of fast rescue boats should be required to demonstrate competence to undertake the
tasks and responsibilities which should include but not be limited to:
.1 assessment of the readiness of fast rescue boats, related launch equipment and
launch appliance as fitted, for immediate launch and operation;
.3 safety precautions during launching and recovery of a fast rescue boat; and
.4 procedures for launching and recovery of fast rescue boat in varying conditions.
2 The level of knowledge of the tasks and responsibilities detailed above should be
sufficient to enable the seafarer to perform launching and recovering duties in emergency
situations.
3 Records should be kept on the ship to show which crew members are proficient in the
launch and recovery of fast rescue boats.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1161.doc
MSC/Circ.1161
ANNEX 2
Ongoing training for fast rescue boat launch and recovery teams and boat crews
1 Every person involved in the operation of launching and recovery equipment and
appliances of fast rescue boats or is a member of a fast rescue boat team should participate in
regular onboard training which would include, but not be limited to, drills when weather
conditions permit such exercises to be carried out safely.
2 The factors listed below are to be taken into account when conducting drills:
.3 So as not to expose the fast rescue boat crew to undue risk, the Masters/operators
of ships, in conjunction with the trainers, should take the following into account
while undertaking training in the launch and recovery of such craft:
.3.1 Master and person in charge of the fast rescue boat should consult prior to
any launch and give due consideration to:
3 Records should be kept on the ship with respect to fast rescue boat training on board
including the dates and time of drills, operational status of the ship, sea and weather conditions,
also together with names and duties of those participating in the drill.
____________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1161.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
3 The Maritime Safety Committee at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), having
considered the recommendations made by the Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and
Watchkeeping at its thirty-sixth session, endorsed the General principles and recommendations
for knowledge, skills and training requirements for officers on Wing-In-Ground (WIG) craft, as
set out in the annex.
4 Member Governments are invited to bring this circular to the attention of all concerned.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1162.doc
MSC/Circ.1162
ANNEX
1 Preamble
.1 Officers on a WIG craft should preferably have a base qualification attained under
either the international maritime or aviation qualification systems.
- up to 10 tonnes (small);
- from 10 tonnes up to 500 tonnes (medium); and
- more than 500 tonnes (large).
.5 The base qualifications of officers on WIG craft of Types A and B (as defined in
the Interim Guidelines for a WIG craft (MSC/Circ.1054)) should preferably be
marine qualifications e.g., as master, chief mate, officer in charge of a
navigational watch etc.
.6 Aviation base qualifications are not preferred for officers on Type A WIG craft
but can be accepted where the Administration is satisfied that the candidate
possesses the required knowledge and skills. It should be noted that IMO and
ICAO (MSC 77/21/1) have agreed that operations in fly-over mode rest within
joint maritime/aviation jurisdiction, while those in flight mode are within aviation
jurisdiction.
.7 For service on WIG craft of Types A and B, officers having an aviation base
qualification should have satisfactorily completed an approved course of marine
training and received a certificate, according to the requirements of the
1978 STCW Convention, at least in following areas of marine knowledge:
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ANNEX
Page 3
4 General requirements for a special qualification taking into account the specific
features of a Wing-In-Ground (WIG) craft
.1 The quantity and content of training provided for the officer and the special
qualification reflecting the knowledge and skills attained should cover all aspects
of the officer’s performance of operational and safety functions on a WIG craft.
.2 The required period of seagoing service on a WIG craft for the candidate to obtain
the special qualification for officer on a WIG craft should be sufficient to ensure
his satisfactory performance of the safety functions on a WIG craft and should be
commensurate with aviation standards.
I:\CIRC\MSC\1162.doc
MSC/Circ.1162
ANNEX
Page 4
TABLE
Knowledge of operational modes of a WIG craft and the forces acting on structural
elements of WIG craft in the various modes.
Knowledge and operation of WIG craft engines, machinery and systems including fuel,
electrics, hydraulics, air conditioning, steering, control surfaces and, where fitted, air Plant, auxiliary machinery, equipment and
cushion supplementation. control systems are operated in accordance with
technical specifications and within safe
Knowledge of refueling/bunkering operations. operating limits at all times.
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ANNEX
Page 5
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ANNEX
Page 6
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Page 7
Ability to operate and to interpret and analyse information obtained from displays,
including:
1. system performance and accuracy, tracking capabilities and limitations, and
processing delays
2. use of operational warnings and system tests
3. methods of target acquisition and their limitations
4. true and relative vectors, graphic representation of target information and danger areas
5. deriving and analysing information, critical echoes, exclusion areas and trial
manoeuvres
Respond to Emergency procedures Examination and assessment The type and scale of the emergency is
emergencies of evidence obtained from promptly identified.
Knowledge of precautions to be taken for the protection and safety of WIG craft one or more of the
passengers in emergency situations. following: Initial actions and, if appropriate, manoeuvring
1. approved in-service of the craft are in accordance with contingency
Knowledge of action to be taken in emergency landing. experience plans and are appropriate to the urgency of the
2. approved training WIG situation and nature of the emergency.
Knowledge of arrangements for towing and being towed. craft experience
3. approved simulator
Knowledge of initial action to be taken following a collision or a grounding; initial training, where
damage assessment and control. appropriate
4. practical training
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ANNEX
Page 8
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ANNEX
Page 9
Function: Passenger operations, cargo handling and stowage at the operational level
COMPETENCE KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING AND METHODS FOR CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING COMPETENCE
PROFICIENCY DEMONSTRATING
COMPETENCE
Monitor the safety of Embarkation, accommodation and disembarkation of Examination and assessment Passengers and cargo operation are carried out in accordance with the cargo
passengers during passengers. Cargo handling, stowage and securing of evidence obtained from one plan or other documents and established safety rules/regulations, equipment
embarkation, seating, or more of the following: operating instructions and shipboard stowage limitations.
conduct of voyage and Knowledge of the rules of embarkation, 1. approved in-service
disembarkation. accommodation and disembarkation of passengers on experience The handling of dangerous, hazardous and harmful cargoes complies with
Monitor the loading, a WIG craft. 2. approved training WIG international regulations and recognized standards and codes of safe
stowage, securing, care craft experience practice.
during the voyage and Knowledge of human factors relating to passengers. 3. approved simulator
the unloading of cargoes training, where appropriate Communications are clear, understood and consistently successful.
Knowledge of the effect of passengers and cargo,
including heavy items, on the air- and sea-worthiness
and stability of the craft on the water.
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Page 10
Function: Controlling the operation of the craft and care for persons on board at the operational level
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Page 11
Ensure compliance with Prevention of pollution of the marine environment and Examination and assessment Procedures for monitoring WIG craft operations and ensuring compliance
pollution prevention anti-pollution procedures of evidence obtained from with MARPOL requirements are fully observed.
requirements one or more of the following:
Knowledge of the precautions to be taken to prevent 1. approved in-service
pollution of the marine environment. experience
2. approved training WIG
Anti-pollution procedures and all associated craft experience
equipment.
Prevent, control and fight Fire prevention and fire-ftghting appliances Assessment of evidence The type and scale of the problem is promptly identified and initial actions
fires on board obtained from approved conform with the emergency procedure and contingency plans for the WIG
Knowledge of fire prevention. fire-fighting training and craft.
experience in accordance
Ability to organize fire drills. with STCW Code A-VI/3.1 Evacuation, emergency shut-down and isolation procedures are appropriate
to 3.4 to the nature of the emergency and are implemented promptly.
Knowledge of classes and chemistry of fire.
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ANNEX
Page 12
Operate life-saving Life-saving Assessment of evidence Actions in responding to abandon WIG craft and survival situations are
appliances obtained from approved appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions and comply with
Ability to organize abandon WIG craft drills and training and experience in accepted safety practices and standards.
knowledge of the operation of survival craft and their accordance with STCW Code
launching appliances and arrangements, and their A-VI/2.1 to 2.4
equipment including radio life-saving appliances,
satellite EPIRBs, SARTs, immersion suits and thermal
protective aids.
Apply medical first aid Medical aid Assessment of evidence The identification of probable cause, nature and extent of injuries or
obtained from approved conditions is prompt and treatment minimizes immediate threat to life.
Practical application of medical guides and advice by training in accordance with
radio, including the ability to take effective action STCW Code A-VI/4.1 to 4.3
based on such knowledge in the case of accidents or
illnesses that are likely to occur during WIG craft
operation.
Monitor compliance with Basic working knowledge of the relevant IMO Assessment of evidence Legislative requirements relating to safety of life at sea and protection of the
legislative requirements Conventions concerning safety of life at sea protection obtained from examination or marine environment are correctly identified.
of the marine environment. approved training
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ANNEX
Page 13
Understand and apply Understanding and application of Human Factors for Assessment of evidence An understanding of both the existence and underlying causes of Human
Human Factors for WIG WIG craft operations including: obtained from examination or Factors and of the appropriate operating principles and procedures that will
craft operations 1. Fatigue management and maintaining alertness approved training enable the WIG craft officer to minimize their effects.
2. Need for anticipation in high-speed operation
3. Risk awareness and assessment
4. Application of Bridge Resource Management with
other officers, crew and personnel involved in
WIG craft operation
5. Crew personal Human Factor checks.
___________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1162.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005),
received reports by the Secretary-General pursuant to regulation I/7, paragraph 2 of the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW
Convention), 1978, as amended. The reports were in respect of those STCW Parties, whose
information had not been fully evaluated previously and in time for them to be considered by
MSC 79. A list of the STCW Parties which had communicated information that demonstrated that
they were giving full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the Convention at that session
of the Committee, together with those which had previously been confirmed by MSC 79 (1 to
10 December 2004), MSC 78 (12 to 21 May 2004), MSC 77 (28 May to 6 June 2003), MSC 76 (2 to
13 December 2002), MSC 75 (15 to 24 May 2002), the Committee’s first extraordinary session (27
and 28 November 2001), MSC 74 (30 May to 8 June 2001) and MSC 73 (27 November to
6 December 2000), was promulgated by means of MSC/Circ.1134 dated 10 December 2004.
2 MSC 80 noted that, in preparing the reports required by STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 2,
the Secretary-General had solicited and taken into account the views of competent persons selected
from the list established pursuant to paragraph 5 of section A-I/7 of the STCW Code and circulated
as MSC/Circ.797, as revised from time to time.
3 In accordance with STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 3, MSC 80 confirmed one further STCW
Party, additional to those listed in MSC/Circ.1134, which had communicated information
demonstrating that it was giving full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the
STCW Convention, as amended. The list at annex contains those STCW Parties confirmed by
the Committee at its seventy-third, seventy-fourth, first extraordinary, seventy-fifth,
seventy-sixth, seventy-seventh, seventy-eighth, seventy-ninth and eightieth sessions. The
Committee noted that, as the process of communicating and evaluating information is continuing,
further Parties may be added to the list at annex at subsequent meetings.
4 The Committee draws the attention of maritime administrations, shipowners, ship operators
and managers, ship masters and other parties concerned to the following:
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MSC/Circ.1163 -2-
.1 not all of the STCW Parties listed at annex provide seafarer training, and some of
those Parties listed may only provide a limited range of training; and
.2 the fact that a Party is listed in the annex does not relieve those concerned of their
obligations under the STCW Convention.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1163.DOC
MSC/Circ.1163
ANNEX
___________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1163.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-seventh session (28 May to
6 June 2003), seventy-eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004), seventy-ninth session
(1 to 10 December 2004) and the eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), received reports by the
Secretary-General pursuant to regulation I/7, paragraph 2 of the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention), 1978, as
amended, related to the reports of independent evaluation carried out pursuant to regulation I/8,
paragraph 2.
2 The Committee noted that, in preparing the reports required by STCW regulation I/7,
paragraph 2, the Secretary-General had solicited and taken into account the views of competent
persons selected from the list established pursuant to paragraph 5 of section A-I/7 of the
STCW Code and circulated as MSC/Circ.797, as revised from time to time.
3 In accordance with STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 3, the Committee confirmed that the
STCW Parties, listed in the Secretary-General’s report, which had communicated their report of
independent evaluation pursuant to regulation I/8, paragraph 3, demonstrated that they were
continuing to give full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention,
1978, as amended.
4 The list at annex contains those STCW Parties, confirmed at various sessions of the
Committee to have communicated information pursuant to regulation I/7 demonstrating that
they were giving full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention
and indicating:
I:\CIRC\MSC\1164.DOC
MSC/Circ.1164 -2-
5 The Committee noted that, as the process of communicating and evaluating information
related to reports of independent evaluation is continuing, the list at annex maybe updated at
subsequent meetings.
6 The Committee draws the attention of maritime administrations, shipowners, ship operators
and managers, ship masters and other parties concerned to the following:
.1 not all of the STCW Parties listed at annex provide seafarer training, and some of
those Parties listed may only provide a limited range of training; and
.2 the fact that a Party is listed in the annex does not relieve those concerned of their
obligations under the STCW Convention.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1164.DOC
MSC/Circ.1164
ANNEX
1
Associate Member to the IMO
2
Includes: Faroe Islands
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ANNEX
Page 2
3
Includes: Netherlands Antilles & Aruba
4
Does not include Cook Islands
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Page 3
* Parties to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(STCW), 1978, as amended, confirmed by the Maritime Safety Committee to have communicated information
to the Secretary-General which demonstrates that full and complete effect is given to the relevant provisions of
the Convention.
__________
5
Does not include: Bermuda
Cayman Islands
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
I:\CIRC\MSC\1164.DOC
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its seventy-seventh session (28 May to
6 June 2003), seventy-eighth session (12 to 21 May 2004), seventy-ninth session
(1 to 10 December 2004), eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005) and the eighty-first session
(10 to 19 May 2006), received reports by the Secretary-General pursuant to regulation I/7,
paragraph 2 of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention), 1978, as amended, related to the reports of
independent evaluation carried out pursuant to regulation I/8, paragraph 2.
2 The Committee noted that, in preparing the reports required by STCW regulation I/7,
paragraph 2, the Secretary-General had solicited and taken into account the views of competent
persons selected from the list established pursuant to paragraph 5 of section A-I/7 of the
STCW Code and circulated as MSC/Circ.797, as revised from time to time.
3 In accordance with STCW regulation I/7, paragraph 3, the Committee confirmed that the
STCW Parties, listed in the Secretary-General’s report, which had communicated their report of
independent evaluation pursuant to regulation I/8, paragraph 3, demonstrated that they were
continuing to give full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the
STCW Convention, 1978, as amended.
4 The list at annex contains those STCW Parties, confirmed at various sessions of the
Committee to have communicated information pursuant to regulation I/7 demonstrating that
they were giving full and complete effect to the relevant provisions of the STCW Convention
and indicating:
5 The Committee noted that, as the process of communicating and evaluating information
related to reports of independent evaluation is continuing, the list at annex maybe updated at
subsequent meetings.
6 The Committee draws the attention of maritime administrations, shipowners, ship operators
and managers, ship masters and other parties concerned to the following:
.1 not all of the STCW Parties listed at annex provide seafarer training, and some of
those Parties listed may only provide a limited range of training; and
.2 the fact that a Party is listed in the annex does not relieve those concerned of their
obligations under the STCW Convention.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\01\1164-Rev-1.doc
MSC.1/Circ.1164/Rev.1
ANNEX
1
Associate Member to the IMO
2
Includes: Faroe Islands
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ANNEX
Page 2
3
Includes: Netherlands Antilles & Aruba
4
Does not include Cook Islands
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ANNEX
Page 3
* Parties to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(STCW), 1978, as amended, confirmed by the Maritime Safety Committee to have communicated information to the
Secretary-General which demonstrates that full and complete effect is given to the relevant provisions of the
Convention.
__________
5
Includes: Bermuda
Cayman Islands
Gibraltar
Isle of Man
I:\CIRC\MSC\01\1164-Rev-1.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Committee, at its sixty-sixth session (28 May to 6 June 1996), having considered a
proposal by the fortieth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection to revise the interim test
method for equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems, contained in MSC/Circ.668, approved
a revised test method for equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for category A
machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms contained in MSC/Circ.668 (MSC/Circ.728).
3 The Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, at its forty-ninth session (24 to 28 January 2005),
reviewed the Guidelines for the approval of equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems as
referred to in SOLAS 74 for machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms (annex to MSC/Circ.668, as
amended by MSC/Circ.728) and made amendments to the test method for equivalent water-based
fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces of category A and cargo pump-rooms, taking into
account the latest technological progress made in this area.
4 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), after having considered the
above proposal by the forty-ninth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, approved
Revised Guidelines for the approval of equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for
machinery spaces and cargo pump-rooms, as set out in the annex.
5 Member Governments are invited to apply the annexed Guidelines when approving
equivalent water-based fire-extinguishing systems for machinery spaces and pump-rooms and bring
them to the attention of ship designers, ship owners, equipment manufacturers, test laboratories and
other parties concerned.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1165.doc
MSC/Circ.1165
ANNEX
General
1 Water-based fire-extinguishing systems for use in machinery spaces of category A and cargo
pump-rooms equivalent to fire-extinguishing systems required by SOLAS regulation II-2/10 and
chapter 5 of the FSS Code should prove that they have the same reliability which has been identified
as significant for the performance of fixed pressure water-spraying systems approved under the
requirements of SOLAS regulation II-2/10 and chapter 5 of the FSS Code. In addition, the system
should be shown by test to have the capability of extinguishing a variety of fires that can occur in a
ship's engine-room.
Definitions
2 Antifreeze system is a wet pipe system containing an antifreeze solution and connected to a
water supply. The antifreeze solution is discharged, followed by water, immediately upon operation
of nozzles.
3 Bilge area is the space between the solid engine-room floor plates and the bottom of the
engine-room.
4 Deluge system is a system employing open nozzles attached to a piping system connected to a
water supply through a valve that is opened by the operation of a detection system installed in the
same areas as the nozzles or opened manually. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping
system and discharges from all nozzles attached thereto.
5 Dry Pipe system is a system employing nozzles attached to a piping system containing air or
nitrogen under pressure, the release of which (as from the opening of a nozzle) permits the water
pressure to open a valve known as a dry pipe valve. The water then flows into the piping system and
out of the opened nozzle.
6 Fire extinction is a reduction of the heat release from the fire and a total elimination of all
flames and glowing parts by means of direct and sufficient application of extinguishing media.
9 Wet pipe system is a system employing nozzles attached to a piping system containing water
and connected to a water supply so that water discharges immediately from the nozzles upon system
activation.
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Page 2
11 The system should be capable of fire extinction, and tested to the satisfaction of the
Administration in accordance with appendix B to these Guidelines.
12 The system should be available for immediate use and capable of continuously supplying
water for at least 30 min in order to prevent re-ignition or fire spread within that period of time.
Systems which operate at a reduced discharge rate after the initial extinguishing period should have a
second full fire-extinguishing capability available within a 5-minute period of initial activation.
13 The system and its components should be suitably designed to withstand ambient temperature
changes, vibration, humidity, shock, impact, clogging and corrosion normally encountered in
machinery spaces or cargo pump-rooms in ships. Components within the protected spaces should be
designed to withstand the elevated temperatures which could occur during a fire.
14 The system and its components should be designed and installed in accordance with
international standards acceptable to the Organization1 and manufactured and tested to the
satisfaction of the Administration in accordance with appropriate elements of appendices A and B to
these guidelines.
15 The nozzle location, type of nozzle and nozzle characteristics should be within the limits
tested to provide fire extinction as referred to in paragraph 10.
16 The electrical components of the pressure source for the system should have a minimum
rating of IP 54. The system should be supplied by both main and emergency sources of power and
should be provided with an automatic change-over switch. The emergency power supply should be
provided from outside the protected machinery space.
17 The system should be provided with a redundant means of pumping. The capacity of the
redundant means should be sufficient to compensate for the loss of any single supply pump. The
system should be fitted with a permanent sea inlet and be capable of continuous operation using
seawater.
18 The piping system should be sized in accordance with an hydraulic calculation technique.2
19 Systems capable of supplying water at the full discharge rate for 30 min may be grouped into
separate sections within a protected space. The sectioning of the system within such spaces should
be approved by the Administration in each case.
1
Pending the development of international standards acceptable to the Organization, national standards as prescribed
by the Administration should be applied.
2
Where the Hazen-Williams Method is used, the following values of the friction factor "C" for different pipe types
which may be considered should apply:
Pipe type C
Black or galvanized mild steel 100
Copper and copper alloys 150
Stainless steel 150
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ANNEX
Page 3
20 In all cases the capacity and design of the system should be based on the complete protection
of the space demanding the greatest volume of water.
21 The system operation controls should be available at easily accessible positions outside the
spaces to be protected and should not be liable to be cut off by a fire in the protected spaces.
22 Pressure source components of the system should be located outside the protected spaces.
23 A means for testing the operation of the system for assuring the required pressure and flow
should be provided.
24 Activation of any water distribution valve should give a visual and audible alarm in the
protected space and at a continuously manned central control station. An alarm in the central control
station should indicate the specific valve activated.
25 Operating instructions for the system should be displayed at each operating position. The
operating instructions should be in the official language of the flag State. If the language is neither
English nor French, a translation into one of these languages should be included.
26 Spare parts and operating and maintenance instructions for the system should be provided, as
recommended by the manufacturer.
27 Additives should not be used for the protection of normally occupied spaces unless they have
been approved for fire protection service by an independent authority. The approval should consider
possible adverse health effects to exposed personnel, including inhalation toxicity.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
1 Definitions
2 Product consistency
3.1 Dimensions
3.2 Nominal release temperatures
3.3 Operating temperatures
3.4 Water flow and distribution
3.5 Function
3.6 Strength of body
3.7 Strength of release element
3.8 Leak resistance and hydrostatic strength
3.9 Heat exposure
3.10 Thermal shock
3.11 Corrosion
3.12 Integrity of nozzle coatings
3.13 Water hammer
3.14 Dynamic heating
3.15 Resistance to heat
3.16 Resistance to vibration
3.17 Impact test
3.18 Lateral discharge
3.19 30-day leakage resistance
3.20 Vacuum resistance
3.21 Water shield
3.22 Clogging
4 Methods of test
4.1 General
4.2 Visual examination
4.3 Body strength test
4.4 Leak resistance and hydrostatic strength tests
4.5 Functional test
4.6 Heat responsive element operating characteristics
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5.1 General
5.2 Nozzle housing
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LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
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INTRODUCTION
This document is intended to address minimum fire protection performance, construction, and
marking requirements, excluding fire performance, for water-mist nozzles.
Numbers in brackets following a section or sub-section heading refer to the appropriate section or
paragraph in the Standard for Automatic sprinkler systems - Part 1: Requirements and methods of
test for sprinklers, ISO 6182-1.
The requirements for automatically operating nozzles which involve release mechanism need not be
met by nozzles of manually operating systems.
1 DEFINITIONS
1.1 Conductivity factor is a measure of the conductance between the nozzle's heat responsive
element and the fitting expressed in units of (m/s)0.5.
1.2 Rated working pressure is the maximum service pressure at which a hydraulic device is
intended to operate.
1.3 Response time index (RTI) is a measure of nozzle sensitivity expressed as RTI = tu0.5, where t
is the time constant of the heat responsive element in units of seconds, and u is the gas velocity
expressed in metres per second. RTI can be used in combination with the conductivity factor (C) to
predict the response of a nozzle in fire environments, defined in terms of gas temperature and
velocity versus time. RTI has units of (m.s) 0.5.
1.4 Standard orientation. In the case of nozzles with symmetrical heat responsive elements
supported by frame arms, standard orientation is with the air flow perpendicular to both the axis of
the nozzle's inlet and the plane of the frame arms. In the case of non-symmetrical heat responsive
elements, standard orientation is with the air flow perpendicular to both the inlet axis and the plane
of the frame arms which produces the shortest response time.
1.5 Worst case orientation is the orientation which produces the longest response time with the
axis of the nozzle inlet perpendicular to the air flow.
2 PRODUCT CONSISTENCY
2.1 It should be the responsibility of the manufacturer to implement a quality control programme
to ensure that production continuously meets the requirements in the same manner as the originally
tested samples.
2.2 The load on the heat responsive element in automatic nozzles should be set and secured by
the manufacturer in such a manner so as to prevent field adjustment or replacement.
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3.1 Dimensions
Nozzles should be provided with a nominal 6 mm (1/4 in.) or larger nominal inlet thread or
equivalent. The dimensions of all threaded connections should conform to International Standards
where applied. National Standards may be used if International Standards are not applicable.
3.2.1 The nominal release temperatures of automatic glass bulb nozzles should be as indicated
in table 1.
3.2.2 The nominal release temperatures of fusible automatic element nozzles should be specified in
advance by the manufacturer and verified in accordance with 3.3. Nominal release temperatures
should be within the ranges specified in table 1.
Nominal release temp. Liquid colour code Nominal release temp. Frame colour code *
57 orange 57 to 77 uncoloured
68 red 80 to 107 white
79 yellow 121 to 149 blue
93-100 green 163 to 191 red
121-141 blue 204 to 246 green
163-182 mauve 260 to 343 orange
204-343 black
*
Not required for decorative nozzles
X ± 0.035X + 0.62oC
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3.4.1.1 The flow constant K for nozzles is given in the following formula:
K = Q/P0.5
where:
3.4.1.2 The value of the flow constant K published in the Manufacturer’s Design and Installation
Instructions should be verified using the test method of 4.10. The average flow constant K should be
verified within ± 5% of the manufacturer’s value.
3.5.1 When tested in accordance with 4.5, the nozzle should open and, within 5 s after the release
of the heat responsive element, should operate satisfactorily by complying with the requirements
of 4.10. Any lodgement of released parts should be cleared within 60 s of release for standard
response heat responsive elements and within 10 s of release for fast and special response heat
responsive elements or the nozzle should then comply with the requirement of 4.11.
3.5.2 The nozzle discharge components should not sustain significant damage as a result of the
functional test specified in 4.5.6 and should have the same flow constant range and water droplet size
and velocity within 5 per cent of values as previously determined per 3.4.1 and 3.4.3.
The nozzle body should not show permanent elongation of more than 0.2% between the load-bearing
points, after being subjected to twice the average service load, as determined using the method
of 4.3.1.
The lower tolerance limit for bulb strength should be greater than two times the upper tolerance limit
for the bulb design load based on calculations with a degree of confidence of 0.99 for 99 per cent of
the samples as determined in 4.9.1. Calculations will be based on the Normal or Gaussian
Distribution except where another distribution can be shown to be more applicable due to
manufacturing or design factors.
Fusible heat-responsive elements in the ordinary temperature range should be designed to:
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.1 sustain a load of 15 times its design load corresponding to the maximum service load
measured in 4.3.1 for a period of 100 hours in accordance with 4.9.2.1; or
.2 demonstrate the ability to sustain the design load when tested in accordance
with 4.9.2.2.
3.8.1 A nozzle should not show any sign of leakage when tested by the method specified in 4.4.1.
3.8.2 A nozzle should not rupture, operate or release any parts when tested by the method specified
in 4.4.2.
There should be no damage to the glass bulb element when the nozzle is tested by the method
specified in 4.7.1.
Nozzles should withstand exposure to increased ambient temperature without evidence of weakness
or failure, when tested by the method specified in 4.7.2.
In addition to meeting the requirement of 4.7.2 in an uncoated version, coated nozzles should
withstand exposure to ambient temperatures without evidence of weakness or failure of the coating,
when tested by the method specified in 4.7.3.
Glass bulb nozzles should not be damaged when tested by the method specified in 4.8. Proper
operation is not considered as damage.
When tested in accordance with 4.12.1, all brass nozzles should show no fractures which could affect
their ability to function as intended and satisfy other requirements.
When tested in accordance with 4.12.2, stainless steel parts of water-mist nozzles should show no
fractures or breakage which could affect their ability to function as intended and satisfy other
requirements.
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Nozzles should be sufficiently resistant to sulphur dioxide saturated with water vapour when
conditioned in accordance with 4.12.2. Following exposure, five nozzles should operate, when
functionally tested at their minimum flowing pressure (see 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). The remaining five
samples should meet the dynamic heating requirements of 3.14.2.
Coated and uncoated nozzles should be resistant to salt spray when conditioned in accordance
with 4.12.4. Following exposure, the samples should meet the dynamic heating requirements
of 3.14.2.
Nozzles should be sufficiently resistant to moist air exposure and should satisfy the requirements
of 3.14.2 after being tested in accordance with 4.12.5.
3.12.1 Evaporation of wax and bitumen used for atmospheric protection of nozzles
(see 4.13.1)
Waxes and bitumens used for coating nozzles should not contain volatile matter in sufficient
quantities to cause shrinkage, hardening, cracking or flaking of the applied coating. The loss in mass
should not exceed 5% of that of the original sample when tested by the method in 4.13.1.
All coatings used for nozzles should not crack or flake when subjected to low temperatures by the
method in 4.13.2.
Nozzles should not leak when subjected to pressure surges from 4 bar to four times the rated pressure
for operating pressures up to 100 bars and two times the rated pressure for pressures greater than 100
bar. They should show no signs of mechanical damage when tested in accordance with 4.15 and
should operate within the parameters of 3.5.1 at the minimum design pressure.
3.14.1 Automatic nozzles intended for installation in other than accommodation spaces and
residential areas should comply with the requirements for RTI and C limits shown in figure 1.
Automatic nozzles intended for installation in accommodation spaces or residential areas should
comply with fast response requirements for RTI and C limits shown in figure 1. Maximum and
minimum RTI values for all data points calculated using C for the fast and standard response nozzles
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should fall within the appropriate category shown in figure 1. Special response nozzles should have
an average RTI value, calculated using C, between 50 and 80 with no value less than 40 or more
than 100. When tested at an angular offset to the worst case orientation as described in section 4.6.2,
the RTI should not exceed 600 (m.s)0.5 or 250% of the value of RTI in the standard orientation,
whichever is less. The angular offset should be 15º for standard response, 20º for special response
and 25º for fast response.
3.14.2 After exposure to the corrosion test described in sections 3.11.2, 3.11.3 and 3.11.4, nozzles
should be tested in the standard orientation as described in section 4.6.2.1 to determine the post
exposure RTI. All post exposure RTI values should not exceed the limits shown in figure 1 for the
appropriate category. In addition, the average RTI value should not exceed 130% of the
pre-exposure average value. All post exposure RTI values should be calculated as in section 4.6.2.3
using the pre-exposure conductivity factor (C).
Open nozzles should be sufficiently resistant to high temperatures when tested in accordance
with 4.14. After exposure, the nozzle should not show:
.3 no changes in the discharge characteristics of the Water Distribution Test (see 3.4.2)
exceeding 5 per cent.
Nozzles should be able to withstand the effects of vibration without deterioration of their
performance characteristics, when tested in accordance with 4.16. After the vibration test of 4.16,
nozzles should show no visible deterioration and should meet the requirements of 3.5 and 3.8.
Nozzles should have adequate strength to withstand impacts associated with handling, transport and
installation without deterioration of their performance or reliability. Resistance to impact should be
determined in accordance with 4.1.
Nozzles should not prevent the operation of adjacent automatic nozzles when tested in accordance
with 4.21.
Nozzles should not leak, sustain distortion or other mechanical damage when subjected to twice the
rated pressure for 30 days. Following exposure, the nozzles should satisfy the test requirements
of 4.22.
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Nozzles should not exhibit distortion, mechanical damage or leakage after being subjected to the test
in 4.23.
3.21.1 General
An automatic nozzle intended for use at intermediate levels or beneath open grating should be
provided with a water shield which complies with 3.21.2 and 3.21.3.
Water shields should provide an "angle of protection" of 45º or less for the heat responsive element
against direct impingement of run-off water from the shield caused by discharge from nozzles at
higher elevations. Compliance with this requirement should be determined in accordance
with 4.21.1.
Rotation of the water shield should not alter the nozzle service load when evaluated in accordance
with 4.21.2.
A water-mist nozzle should show no evidence of clogging during 30 minutes of continuous flow at
rated working pressure using water, which has been contaminated in accordance with 4.21.3.
Following the 30 minutes of flow, the water flow at rated pressure of the nozzle and strainer or filter
should be within ± 10 per cent of the value obtained prior to conducting the clogging test.
4.1 General
The following tests should be conducted for each type of nozzle. Before testing, precise
drawings of parts and the assembly should be submitted together with the appropriate specifications
(using SI units). Tests should be carried out at an ambient temperature of (20,±5)ºC, unless other
temperatures are indicated.
Before testing, nozzles should be examined visually with respect to the following points:
.1 marking;
.2 conformity of the nozzles with the manufacturer's drawings and specification; and
.3 obvious defects.
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4.3.1 The design load should be measured on ten automatic nozzles by securely installing each
nozzle, at room temperature, in a tensile/compression test machine and applying a force equivalent to
the application of the rated working pressure.
4.3.3 The hydraulic pressure and load is then released and the heat responsive element is then
removed by a suitable method. When the nozzle is at room temperature, a second measurement is to
be made using the indicator.
4.3.4 An increasing mechanical load to the nozzle is then applied at a rate not
exceeding 500 N/minute, until the indicator reading at the load bearing point initially measured
returns to the initial value achieved under hydrostatic load. The mechanical load necessary to
achieve this should be recorded as the service load. Calculate the average service load.
4.3.5 The applied load is then progressively increased at a rate not exceeding 500 N/minute on
each of the five specimens until twice the average service load has been applied. Maintain this
load for 15 ± 5 s.
4.3.6 The load is then removed and any permanent elongation as defined in 3.6 is recorded.
4.4 Leak resistance and hydrostatic strength tests (see 3.8) [7.4]
4.4.1 Twenty nozzles should be subjected to a water pressure of twice their rated working pressure,
but not less than 34.5 bar. The pressure is increased from 0 bar to the test pressure, maintained at
twice rated working pressure for a period of 3 min and then decreased to 0 bar. After the pressure
has returned to 0 bar, it is increased to the minimum operating pressure specified by the
manufacturer in not more than 5 s. This pressure is to be maintained for 15 s and then increased to
rated working pressure and maintained for 15 s.
4.4.2 Following the test of 4.4.1, the twenty nozzles should be subjected to an internal hydrostatic
pressure of four times the rated working pressure. The pressure is increased from 0 bar to four times
the rated working pressure and held there for a period of 1 minute. The nozzle under test should not
rupture, operate or release any of its operating parts during the pressure increase nor while being
maintained at four times the rated working pressure for 1 minute.
4.5.1 Nozzles having nominal release temperatures less than 78°C, should be heated to
activation in an oven. While being heated, they should be subjected to each of the water
pressures specified in 4.5.3 applied to their inlet. The temperature of the oven should be increased
to 400 ± 20°C in 3 min measured in close proximity to the nozzle. Nozzles having nominal release
temperatures exceeding 78°C should be heated using a suitable heat source. Heating should continue
until the nozzle has activated.
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4.5.2 Eight nozzles should be tested in each normal mounting position and at pressures equivalent
to the minimum operating pressure, the rated working pressure and at the average operating pressure.
The flowing pressure should be at least 75% of the initial operating pressure.
4.5.3 If lodgement occurs in the release mechanism at any operating pressure and mounting
position, 24 more nozzles should be tested in that mounting position and at that pressure. The total
number of nozzles for which lodgement occurs should not exceed 1 in the 32 tested at that pressure
and mounting position.
4.5.4 Lodgement is considered to have occurred when one or more of the released parts lodge in
the discharge assembly in such a way as to cause the water distribution to be altered after the period
of time specified in 3.5.1.
4.5.5 In order to check the strength of the deflector/orifice assembly, three nozzles should be
submitted to the functional test in each normal mounting position at 125 per cent of the rated
working pressure. The water should be allowed to flow at 125 per cent of the rated working pressure
for a period of 15 min.
4.6.1.2 The nominal operating temperature should be ascertained with equipment having an accuracy
of ±0.35% of the nominal temperature rating or ±0.25°C, whichever is greater.
4.6.1.3 The test should be conducted in a water bath for nozzles or separate glass bulbs having
nominal release temperatures less than or equal to 80°C. A suitable oil should be used for
higher-rated release elements. The liquid bath should be constructed in such a way that the
temperature deviation within the test zone does not exceed 0.5%, or 0.5°C, whichever is greater.
4.6.2.1.1 Tests should be conducted to determine the standard and worst case orientations as
defined in 1.4 and 1.5. Ten additional plunge tests should be performed at both of the identified
orientations. The worst case orientation should be as defined in 3.14.1. The RTI is calculated as
described in 4.6.2.3 and 4.6.2.4 for each orientation, respectively. The plunge tests are to be
conducted using a brass nozzle mount designed such that the mount or water temperature rise does
not exceed 2°C for the duration of an individual plunge test up to a response time of 55 s. (The
temperature should be measured by a thermocouple heatsinked and embedded in the mount not more
than 8 mm radially outward from the root diameter of the internal thread or by a thermocouple
located in the water at the centre of the nozzle inlet.) If the response time is greater than 55 s, then
the mount or water temperature in degrees Celsius should not increase more than 0.036 times the
response time in seconds for the duration of an individual plunge test.
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4.6.2.1.2 The nozzle under test should have 1 to 1.5 wraps of PTFE sealant tape applied to the
nozzle threads. It should be screwed into a mount to a torque of 15 ±3 Nm. Each nozzle is to be
mounted on a tunnel test section cover and maintained in a conditioning chamber to allow the nozzle
and cover to reach ambient temperature for a period of not less than 30 min.
4.6.2.1.4 A tunnel should be utilized with air flow and temperature conditions1 at the test section
(nozzle location) selected from the appropriate range of conditions shown in table 2. To minimize
radiation exchange between the sensing element and the boundaries confining the flow, the test
section of the apparatus should be designed to limit radiation effects to within ± 3% of calculated
RTI values2.
4.6.2.1.5 The range of permissible tunnel operating conditions is shown in table 2. The selected
operating condition should be maintained for the duration of the test with the tolerances as specified
by footnotes 4 and 5 in table 2.
The conductivity factor (C) should be determined using the prolonged plunge test (see 4.6.2.2.1) or
the prolonged exposure ramp test (see 4.6.2.2.2).
.1 the prolonged plunge test is an iterative process to determine C and may require up to
twenty nozzle samples. A new nozzle sample must be used for each test in this
section even if the sample does not operate during the prolonged plunge test;
.2 the nozzle under test should have 1 to 1.5 wraps of PTFE sealant tape applied to the
nozzle threads. It should be screwed into a mount to a torque of 15 + 3 Nm. Each
nozzle is to be mounted on a tunnel test section cover and maintained in a
conditioning chamber to allow the nozzle and cover to reach ambient temperature for
a period of not less than 30 min. At least 25 ml of water, conditioned to ambient
temperature, should be introduced into the nozzle inlet prior to testing;
.3 a timer accurate to ± 0.01 s with suitable measuring devices to sense the time
between when the nozzle is plunged into the tunnel and the time it operates should be
utilized to obtain the response time;
.4 the mount temperature should be maintained at 20 ± 0.5°C for the duration of each
test. The air velocity in the tunnel test section at the nozzle location should be
maintained with ± 2% of the selected velocity. Air temperature should be selected
and maintained during the test as specified in table 3;
1
Tunnel conditions should be selected to limit maximum anticipated equipment error to 3%.
2
A suggested method for determining radiation effects is by conducting comparative plunge tests on a blackened
(high emissivity) metallic test specimen and a polished (low emissivity) metallic test specimen.
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.6 to determine C, the nozzle is immersed in the test stream at various air velocities for a
maximum of 15 min.1 Velocities are chosen such that actuation is bracketed between
two successive test velocities. That is, two velocities must be established such that at
the lower velocity (uj) actuation does not occur in the 15 min test interval. At the
next higher velocity (uh), actuation must occur within the 15 min time limit. If the
nozzle does not operate at the highest velocity, select an air temperature from table 3
for the next higher temperature rating.
57 to 77 191 to 203 129 to 141 129 to 141 2.4 to 2.6 2.4 to 2.6 1.65 to 1.85
79 to 107 282 to 300 191 to 203 191 to 203 2.4 to 2.6 2.4 to 2.6 1.65 to 1.85
121 to 149 382 to 432 282 to 300 282 to 300 2.4 to 2.6 2.4 to 2.6 1.65 to 1.85
163 to 191 382 to 432 382 to 432 382 to 432 3.4 to 3.6 2.4 to 2.6 1.65 to 1.85
*
The selected air temperature should be known and maintained constant within the test section throughout the test to
an accuracy of ±1ºC for the air temperature range of 129 to 141ºC within the test section and within ±2ºC for all
other air temperatures.
**
The selected air velocity should be known and maintained constant throughout the test to an accuracy of ±0.03 m/s
for velocities of 1.65 to 1.85 and 2.4 to 2.6 m/s and ±0.04 m/s for velocities of 3.4 to 3.6 m/s.
57 85 to 91 ± 1.0
58 to 77 124 to 130 ± 1.5
78 to 107 193 to 201 ± 3.0
121 to 149 287 to 295 ± 4.5
163 to 191 402 to 412 ± 6.0
1
If the value of C is determined to be less than 0.5 (m.s)0.5 a C of 0.25 (m.s)0.5 should be assumed for calculating
RTI value.
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The test value of C is the average of the values calculated at the two velocities using the
following equation:
The nozzle C value is determined by repeating the bracketing procedure three times and
calculating the numerical average of the three C values. This nozzle C value is used to calculate all
standard orientation RTI values for determining compliance with 3.14.1.
.1 the prolonged exposure ramp test for the determination of the parameter C should be
carried out in the test section of a wind tunnel and with the requirements for the
temperature in the nozzle mount as described for the dynamic heating test.
A preconditioning of the nozzle is not necessary;
.2 ten samples should be tested of each nozzle type, all nozzles positioned in standard
orientation. The nozzle should be plunged into an air stream of a constant velocity
of 1 m/s ± 10% and an air temperature at the nominal temperature of the nozzle at the
beginning of the test; and
.3 the air temperature should then be increased at a rate of 1 ± 0.25ºC/min until the
nozzle operates. The air temperature, velocity and mount temperature should be
controlled from the initiation of the rate of rise and should be measured and recorded
at nozzle operation. The C value is determined using the same equation as
in 4.6.2.2.1 as the average of the ten test values.
− t r (u ) 0.5 (1 + C / u 0.5 )
RTI =
In [1 - ∆ Tea (1 + C /(u ) 0.5 ) / ∆Tg ]
where:
u Actual air velocity in the test section of the tunnel in m/s from table 2
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∆ Tea Mean liquid bath operating temperature of the nozzle minus the ambient
temperature in ºC
∆Tg Actual air temperature in the test section minus the ambient temperature in ºC
The equation used to determine the RTI for the worst case orientation is as follows:
where:
T t-wc Response time of the nozzles in seconds for the worst case orientation
All variables are known at this time per the equation in paragraph 4.6.2.3 except RTIwc
(Response Time Index for the worst case orientation) which can be solved iteratively per the above
equation.
In the case of fast response nozzles, if a solution for the worse case orientation RTI is
unattainable, plunge testing in the worst case orientation should be repeated using the plunge test
conditions under Special Response shown in table 2.
.1 glass bulb nozzles having nominal release temperatures less than or equal to 80°C
should be heated in a water bath from a temperature of (20 ± 5)ºC to (20 ± 2) ºC
below their nominal release temperature. The rate of increase of temperature should
not exceed 20°C/min. High temperature oil, such as silicone oil should be used for
higher temperature rated release elements; and
Twelve uncoated nozzles should be exposed for a period of 90 days to a high ambient temperature
that is 11°C below the nominal rating or at the temperature shown in table 4, whichever is lower, but
not less than 49°C. If the service load is dependent on the service pressure, nozzles should be tested
under the rated working pressure. After exposure, four of the nozzles should be subjected to the tests
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specified in 4.4.1, four nozzles to the test of 4.5.1, two at the minimum operating pressure and two at
the rated working pressure, and four nozzles to the requirements of 3.3. If a nozzle fails the
applicable requirements of a test, eight additional nozzles should be tested as described above and
subjected to the test in which the failure was recorded. All eight nozzles should comply with the test
requirements.
.1 in addition to the exposure test of 4.7.2 in an uncoated version, twelve coated nozzles
should be exposed to the test of 4.7.2 using the temperatures shown in table 4 for
coated nozzles; and
.2 the test should be conducted for 90 days. During this period, the sample should be
removed from the oven at intervals of approximately 7 days and allowed to cool
for 2 h to 4 h. During this cooling period, the sample should be examined. After
exposure, four of the nozzles should be subjected to the tests specified in 4.4.1, four
nozzles to the test of 4.5.1; two at the minimum operating pressure and two at the
rated working pressure, and four nozzles to the requirements of 3.3.
4.8 Thermal shock test for glass bulb nozzles (see 3.10) [7.8]
4.8.1 Before starting the test, condition at least 24 nozzles at room temperature of 20 to 25ºC for at
least 30 min.
4.8.2 The nozzle should be immersed in a bath of liquid, the temperature of which should
be 10 ± 2ºC below the nominal release temperature of the nozzles. After 5 min., the nozzles are to
be removed from the bath and immersed immediately in another bath of liquid, with the bulb seal
downwards, at a temperature of 10 ± 2ºC. Then test the nozzles in accordance with 4.5.1.
4.9.1.1 At least 15 sample bulbs in the lowest temperature rating of each bulb type should be
positioned individually in a text fixture using the sprinkler seating parts. Each bulb should then be
subjected to a uniformly increasing force at a rate not exceeding 250 N/s in the test machine until the
bulb fails.
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4.9.1.2 Each test should be conducted with the bulb mounted in new seating parts. The mounting
device may be reinforced externally to prevent its collapse, but in a manner which does not interfere
with bulb failure.
4.9.1.3 Record the failure load for each bulb. Calculate the lower tolerance limit (TLI) for bulb
strength. Using the values of service load recorded in 4.3.1, calculate the upper tolerance limit (TL2)
for the bulb design load. Verify compliance with 3.7.1.
The nozzle and a pressure gauge should be mounted on a supply pipe. The water flow should be
measured at pressures ranging from the minimum operating pressure to the rated working pressure at
intervals of approximately 10% of the service pressure range on two sample nozzles. In one series of
tests, the pressure should be increased from zero to each value and, in the next series, the pressure
shall be decreased from the rated pressure to each value. The flow constant, K, should be averaged
from each series of readings, i.e., increasing pressure and decreasing pressure. During the test,
pressures should be corrected for differences in height between the gauge and the outlet orifice of
the nozzle.
4.11.1 Stress corrosion test for brass nozzle parts (see 3.11.1)
4.11.1.1 Five nozzles should be subjected to the following aqueous ammonia test. The inlet of
each nozzle should be sealed with a nonreactive cap, e.g., plastic.
4.11.1.2 The samples are degreased and exposed for 10 days to a moist ammonia-air mixture in a
glass container of volume 0.02 ± 0.01 m3.
4.11.1.3 An aqueous ammonia solution, having a density of 0.94 g/cm3, should be maintained in
the bottom of the container, approximately 40 mm below the bottom of the samples. A
volume of aqueous ammonia solution corresponding to 0.01 ml per cubic centimetre of the volume
of the container will give approximately the following atmospheric concentrations: 35%
ammonia, 5% water vapour, and 60% air. The inlet of each sample should be sealed with a
nonreactive cap, e.g., plastic.
4.11.1.5 After exposure, rinse and dry the nozzles, and conduct a detailed examination. If a crack,
delamination or failure of any operating part is observed, the nozzle(s) should be subjected to a leak
resistance test at the rated pressure for 1 min and to the functional test at the minimum flowing
pressure (see 3.1.5).
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4.11.1.6 Nozzles showing cracking, delamination or failure of any non-operating part should not
show evidence of separation of permanently attached parts when subjected to flowing water at the
rated working pressure for 30 min.
4.11.2.1 Five samples are to be degreased prior to being exposed to the magnesium chloride
solution.
4.11.2.2 Parts used in nozzles are to be placed in a 500-millilitre flask that is fitted with a
thermometer and a wet condenser approximately 760 mm long. The flask is to be filled
approximately one-half full with a 42% by weight magnesium chloride solution, placed on a
thermostatically-controlled electrically heated mantel, and maintained at a boiling temperature
of 150 ± 1°C. The parts are to be unassembled, that is, not contained in a nozzle assembly. The
exposure is to last for 500 hours.
4.11.2.3 After the exposure period, the test samples are to be removed from the boiling magnesium
chloride solution and rinsed in deionised water.
4.11.2.4 The test samples are then to be examined using a microscope having a magnification
of 25X for any cracking, delamination, or other degradation as a result of the test exposure. Test
samples exhibiting degradation are to be tested as described in 4.12.5.5 or 4.12.5.6, as applicable.
Test samples not exhibiting degradation are considered acceptable without further test.
4.11.2.5 Operating parts exhibiting degradation are to be further tested as follows. Five new sets of
parts are to be assembled in nozzle frames made of materials that do not alter the corrosive effects of
the magnesium chloride solution on the stainless steel parts. These test samples are to be degreased
and subjected to the magnesium chloride solution exposure specified in paragraph 4.12.5.2.
Following the exposure, the test samples should withstand, without leakage, a hydrostatic test
pressure equal to the rated working pressure for 1 minute and then be subjected to the functional test
at the minimum operating pressure in accordance with 4.5.1.
4.11.3.1 Ten nozzles should be subjected to the following sulphur dioxide corrosion test. The
inlet of each sample should be sealed with a nonreactive cap, e.g., plastic.
4.11.3.2 The test equipment should consist of a 5 litre vessel (instead of a 5 litre vessel, other
volumes up to 15 litre may be used in which case the quantities of chemicals given below shall be
increased in proportion) made of heat-resistant glass, with a corrosion-resistant lid of such a shape as
to prevent condensate dripping on the nozzles. The vessel should be electrically heated through the
base, and provided with a cooling coil around the side walls. A temperature sensor placed
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centrally 160 mm ± 20 mm above the bottom of the vessel should regulate the heating so that the
temperature inside the glass vessel is 45°C ± 3ºC. During the test, water should flow through the
cooling coil at a sufficient rate to keep the temperature of the discharge water below 30°C. This
combination of heating and cooling should encourage condensation on the surfaces of the nozzles.
The sample nozzles should be shielded from condensate drippage.
4.11.3.3 The nozzles to be tested should be suspended in their normal mounting position under
the lid inside the vessel and subjected to a corrosive sulphur dioxide atmosphere for 8 days. The
corrosive atmosphere should be obtained by introducing a solution made up by dissolving 20 g of
sodium thiosulphate (Na2S203H2O) crystals in 500 ml of water.
4.11.3.4 For at least six days of the 8-day exposure period, 20 ml of dilute sulphuric acid
consisting of 156 ml of normal H2SO4 (0.5 mol/litre) diluted with 844 ml of water should be added at
a constant rate. After 8 days, the nozzles should be removed from the container and allowed to dry
for 4 to 7 days at a temperature not exceeding 35°C with a relative humidity not greater than 70%.
4.11.3.5 After the drying period, five nozzles should be subjected to a functional test at the
minimum operating pressure in accordance with 4.5.1 and five nozzles should be subjected to the
dynamic heating test in accordance with 3.14.2.
4.11.4 Salt spray corrosion test (see 3.11.3 and 3.14.2) [7.12.3]
4.11.4.1 Nozzles intended for normal atmospheres
4.11.4.1.1 Ten nozzles should be exposed to a salt spray within a fog chamber. The inlet of each
sample should be sealed with a nonreactive cap, e.g., plastic.
4.11.4.1.2 During the corrosive exposure, the inlet thread orifice is to be sealed by a plastic cap after
the nozzles have been filled with deionised water. The salt solution should be a 20% by mass
sodium chloride solution in distilled water. The pH should be between 6.5 and 7.2 and the density
between 1.126 g/ml and 1.157 g/ml when atomized at 35ºC. Suitable means of controlling the
atmosphere in the chamber should be provided. The specimens should be supported in their normal
operating position and exposed to the salt spray (fog) in a chamber having a volume of at
least 0.43 m3 in which the exposure zone shall be maintained at a temperature of 35 ± 2ºC. The
temperature should be recorded at least once per day, at least 7 hours apart (except weekends and
holidays when the chamber normally would not be opened). Salt solution should be supplied from a
recirculating reservoir through air-aspirating nozzles, at a pressure between 0.7 bar (0.07 MPa)
and 1.7 bar (0.17 MPa). Salt solution runoff from exposed samples should be collected and should
not return to the reservoir for recirculation. The sample nozzles should be shielded from condensate
drippage.
4.11.4.1.3 Fog should be collected from at least two points in the exposure zone to determine the
rate of application and salt concentration. The fog should be such that for each 80 cm2 of collection
area, 1 m1 to 2 ml of solution should be collected per hour over a 16 hour period and the salt
concentration shall be 20 ± 1% by mass.
4.11.4.1.4 The nozzles should withstand exposure to the salt spray for a period of 10 days. After
this period, the nozzles should be removed from the fog chamber and allowed to dry for 4 to 7 days
at a temperature of 20°C to 25°C in an atmosphere having a relative humidity not greater than 70%.
Following the drying period, five nozzles should be submitted to the functional test at the minimum
operating pressure in accordance with 4.5.1 and five nozzles should be subjected to the dynamic
heating test in accordance with 3.14.2.
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Five nozzles should be subjected to the tests specified in 4.12.3.1 except that the duration of the salt
spray exposure shall be extended from 10 days to 30 days.
4.11.5 Moist air exposure test (see 3.11.4 and 3.14.2) [7.12.4]
A 50 cm3 sample of wax or bitumen should be placed in a metal or glass cylindrical container,
having a flat bottom, an internal diameter of 55 mm and an internal height of 35 mm. The container,
without lid, should be placed in an automatically controlled electric, constant ambient temperature
oven with air circulation. The temperature in the oven should be controlled at 16°C below the
nominal release temperature of the nozzle, but at not less than 50°C. The sample should be weighed
before and after 90 days exposure to determine any loss of volatile matter; the sample should meet
the requirements of 3.12.1.
Five nozzles, coated by normal production methods, whether with wax, bitumen or a metallic
coating, should be subjected to a temperature of -10°C for a period of 24 hours. On removal from
the low-temperature cabinet, the nozzles should be exposed to normal ambient temperature for at
least 30 min before examination of the coating to the requirements of 3.1.12.2.
One nozzle body should be heated in an oven at 800°C for a period of 15 min, with the nozzle in its
normal installed position. The nozzle body should then be removed, holding it by the threaded inlet,
and should be promptly immersed in a water bath at a temperature of approximately 15°C. It should
meet the requirements of 3.14.
4.14.1 Five nozzles should be connected, in their normal operating position, to the test equipment.
After purging the air from the nozzles and the test equipment, 3,000 cycles of pressure varying
from 4 ± 2 bar ((0.4 ± 0.2)MPa) to twice the rated working pressure should be generated. The
1
At the manufacturer's option, additional samples may be furnished for this test to provide early evidence of failure. The
additional samples may be removed from the test chamber at 30-day intervals for testing.
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pressure should be raised from 4 bar to twice the rated pressure at a rate of 60 ± 10 bar/s. At least 30
cycles of pressure per minute should be generated. The pressure should be measured with an
electrical pressure transducer.
4.14.2 Visually examine each nozzle for leakage during the test. After the test, each nozzle should
meet the leakage resistance requirement of 3.8.1 and the functional requirement of 3.5.1 at the
minimum operating pressure.
4.15.1 Five nozzles should be fixed vertically to a vibration table. They should be subjected at room
temperature to sinusoidal vibrations. The direction of vibration should be along the axis of the
connecting thread.
4.15.3 The nozzle should then be subjected to the leakage test in accordance with 3.8.1 and the
functional test in accordance with 3.5.1 at the minimum operating pressure.
4.16.1 Five nozzles should be tested by dropping a mass onto the nozzle along the axial centreline of
waterway. The kinetic energy of the dropped mass at the point of impact should be equivalent to a
mass equal to that of the test nozzle dropped from a height 1 m (see figure 2). The mass is to be
prevented from impacting more than once upon each sample.
4.16.2 Following the test a visual examination of each nozzle shall show no signs of fracture,
deformation, or other deficiency. If none is detected, the nozzles should be subjected to the leak
resistance test, described in 4.4.1. Following the leakage test, each sample should meet the
functional test requirement of 4.5.1 at a pressure equal to the minimum flowing pressure.
4.17.2 The nozzle orifices or distribution plates (if used), are to be placed 550 mm, 356 mm
and 152 mm below a flat smooth ceiling for three separate tests, respectively at each test pressure.
The top of a square pan measuring 305 mm square and 102 mm deep is to be positioned 152 mm
below the heat responsive element for each test. The pan is filled with 0.47 litres of heptane. After
ignition, the automatic nozzle is to operate before the heptane is consumed.
4.18.2 The nozzles should be inspected visually at least weekly for leakage. Following completion
of this 30-day test, all samples should meet the leak resistance requirements specified in 3.2.4 and
should exhibit no evidence of distortion or other mechanical damage.
Three nozzles should be subjected to a vacuum of 460 mm of mercury applied to a nozzle inlet for 1
min at an ambient temperature of 20 ± 5°C. Following this test, each sample should be examined to
verify that no distortion or mechanical damage has occurred and then should meet the leak resistance
requirements specified in 4.4.1.
4.20.1 The water flow rate of an open water-mist nozzle with its strainer or filter should be
measured at its rated working pressure. The nozzle and strainer or filter should then be installed in
test apparatus described in Figure 3 and subjected to 30 minutes of continuous flow at rated working
pressure using contaminated water which has been prepared in accordance with 4.20.3.
4.20.2 Immediately following the 30 minutes of continuous flow with the contaminated water, the
flow rate of the nozzle and strainer or filter should be measured at rated working pressure. No
removal, cleaning or flushing of the nozzle, filter or strainer is permitted during the test.
4.20.3 The water used during the 30 minutes of continuous flow at rated working pressure specified
in 4.20.1 should consist of 60 litres of tap water into which has been mixed 1.58 kilograms of
contaminants which sieve as described in table 6. The solution should be continuously agitated
during the test.
4.20.4 Alternative supply arrangements to the apparatus shown in figure 3 may be used where
damage to the pump is possible. Restrictions to piping defined by note 2 of table 5 should apply to
such systems.
*
Sieve designations correspond with those specified in the standard for wire-cloth sieves for testing purposes, ASTM
E11-87, CENCO-MEINZEN sieve sizes 25 mesh, 50 mesh, 100 mesh, 200 mesh and 325 mesh, corresponding with
the number designation in the table, have been found to comply with ASTM E11-87.
**
The amount of contaminant may be reduced by 50 per cent for nozzles limited to use with copper or stainless steel
piping and by 90 per cent for nozzles having a rated pressure of 50 bar or higher and limited to use with stainless
steel piping.
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5.1 General
Each nozzle complying with the requirements of this Standard should be permanently marked
as follows:
(c) manufacturer’s factory identification. This is only required if the manufacturer has
more than one nozzle manufacturing facility;
(f) K-factor. This is only required if a given model nozzle is available with more
than 1 orifice size.
In countries where colour-coding of yoke arms of glass bulb nozzles is required, the colour
code for fusible element nozzles should be used.
Recessed housings, if provided, should be marked for use with the corresponding nozzles unless the
housing is a non-removable part of the nozzle.
1
The year of manufacture may include the last three months of the preceding year and the first six months of the
following year. Only the last two digits need be indicated.
2
Except for coated and plated nozzles, the nominal release temperature range should be colour-coded on the nozzle to
identify the nominal rating. The colour code should be visible on the yoke arms holding the distribution plate for
fusible element nozzles, and should be indicated by the colour of the liquid in glass bulbs. The nominal temperature
rating should be stamped or cast on the fusible element of fusible element nozzles. All nozzles should be stamped,
cast, engraved or colour-coded in such a way that the nominal rating is recognizable even if the nozzle has operated.
This should be in accordance with table 1.
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APPENDIX B
1 SCOPE
1.1 This test method is intended for evaluating the extinguishing effectiveness of water-based
total flooding fire-extinguishing systems for the protection of engine-rooms of category A and
cargo pump-rooms.
1.2 The test method covers the minimum fire-extinguishing requirement and prevention against
reignition for fires in engine-rooms.
1.3 It was developed for systems using ceiling mounted nozzles or multiple levels of nozzles.
Bilge nozzles are required for all systems. The bilge nozzles may be part of the main system, or they
may be a separate bilge area protection system.
1.4 In the tests, the use of additional nozzles to protect specific hazards by direct application is
not permitted. However for ship board applications additional nozzles may be added as
recommended by the manufacturer.
2 FIELD OF APPLICATION
The test method is applicable for water-based fire-extinguishing systems which will be used as
alternative fire-extinguishing systems as required by SOLAS regulation II-2/10.4.1 and II-2/10.9.1.
For the installation of the system, nozzles shall be installed to protect the entire hazard volume (total
flooding). The installation specification provided by the manufacturer should include maximum
horizontal and vertical nozzle spacing, maximum enclosure height, and distance of nozzles below the
ceiling and maximum enclosure volume which, as a principle, should not exceed the values used in
approval fire test. However, when based on the scientific methods developed by the Organization*,
scaling from the maximum tested volume to a larger volume may be permitted. The scaling should
not exceed twice the tested volume.
3 SAMPLING
The components to be tested should be supplied by the manufacturer together with design and
installation criteria, operational instructions, drawings and technical data sufficient for the
identification of the components.
*
To be developed by the Organization.
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4 METHOD OF TEST
4.1 Principle
This test procedure enables the determination of the effectiveness of different water-based
extinguishing systems against spray fires, cascade fires, pool fires, and Class A fires which are
obstructed by an engine mock-up.
4.2 Apparatus
The tests should be performed in a room having a specified area greater than 100 m2, a specified
height of at least 5 m and ventilation through a door opening of 2 m × 2 m in size. Fires and engine
mock-up should be according to tables 1, 2, 3 and figure 2. The test hall should have an ambient
temperature of between 10°C and 30°C at the start of each test.
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NS300
NS300
Figure 1
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Mid-height
500
500
4000
4000
Figure 2
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Table 1
7 Class A fires wood crib (see Note) in 2 m2 pool fire with 30 s Heptane
preburn. The test tray should be positioned 0.75 m above the
floor as shown in figure 1.
8 A steel plate (30 cm × 60 cm × 5 cm) offset 20° to the spray is Heptane
heated to 350°C by the top low pressure spray nozzle
positioned horizontally 0.5 m from the front edge of the plate.
When the plate reaches 350°C, the system is activated.
Following system shutoff, no reignition of spray is permitted.
Note: 1 The wood crib is to weigh 5.4 to 5.9 kg and is to be dimensioned approximately 305 mm × 305 mm × 305
mm. The crib is to consist of eight alternate layers of four trade size 38.1 mm × 38.1 mm kiln-dried spruce or fir
lumber 305 mm long. The alternate layers of the lumber are to be placed at right angles to the adjacent layers. The
individual wood members in each layer are to be evenly spaced along the length of the previous layer of wood members
and stapled. After the wood crib is assembled, it is to be conditioned at a temperature of 49 + 5°C for not less than 16 h.
Following the conditioning, the moisture content of the crib is to be measured with a probe type moisture meter. The
moisture content of the crib should not exceed 5% prior to the fire test.
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Figure 3
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4.3.2.1 Instrumentation
4.3.2.1.1 Thermocouples should be installed in two trees. One tree should be located 4 m from the
centre of the mock-up, on the opposite side of the 2 m2 tray for class A fire test as shown in figure 2.
The other tree should be located 4 m from the centre of the mock-up, on the opposite side of the
door opening.
4.3.2.1.2 Each tree should consist of five thermocouples of diameter not exceeding 0.5 mm,
positioned at the following heights: (1) 500 mm below the ceiling; (2) 500 mm above floor level; (3)
at mid-height of the test compartment; (4) between the uppermost thermocouple and the
thermocouple at mid-height and (5) between the lowest thermocouple and the thermocouple at
mid-height.
4.3.2.1.3 Measures should be provided to avoid direct water spray impingement of the
thermocouples.
4.3.2.1.4 The temperatures should be measured continuously, at least once every two seconds,
throughout the test.
4.3.2.2.1 For the determination of the thermal management, an obstructed n-Heptane pool fire
scenario should be used. The nominal fire sizes should be correlated to the test compartment volume
according to table 4. The test tray should be positioned in accordance with test No.7 as shown in
table 1 and figure 2.
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Table 4 - Correlation between nominal pool fire sizes and test compartment volume
4.3.2.2.2 The rim height of the trays should be 150 mm and the tray should be filled with 50 mm
of fuel. Additional water should be added to provide a freeboard of 50 mm. Table 5 provides
examples of pool tray diameters and the corresponding area, for a selection of nominal heat
release rates.
Note: Interpolation or extrapolation of the data is allowed according to the following equation:
Q = 2.195A−0.18
where:
4.3.2.2.3 A square horizontal obstruction steel plate should shield the pool fire tray from direct
water spray impingement. The size of the obstruction steel plate is dictated by the size of the fire
tray, as indicated in table 5. The vertical distance measured from the floor to the underside of the
obstruction steel plate should be 1.0 m.
4.3.2.2.4 The thickness of the steel plate should be a nominal 4 mm. The vertical distance
measured from the rim of the trays to the underneath of the horizontal obstruction steel plate
should be 0.85 m.
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4.4.1 During fire test conditions the extinguishing system should be installed according to the
manufacturer's design and installation instructions in a uniformly spaced overhead nozzle grid. The
lowest level of nozzles should be located at least 5 m above the floor. For actual installations, if the
water-mist system includes bilge area protection, water-mist nozzles must be installed throughout the
bilges in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommended dimensioning, as developed from bilge
system testing using the tests in table 2, conducted with the bilge plate located at the maximum
height for which approval is sought. Tests should be performed with nozzles located in the highest
and lowest recommended position above the bilge fires. Bilge systems using the nozzle spacing
tested may be approved for fire protection of bilge areas of any size.
4.4.2 The system fire tests should be conducted at the minimum system operating pressure, or at
the conditions providing the minimum water application rate.
4.4.3 During the laboratory fire tests the bilge system nozzles may not be located beneath the engine
mock-up, but should be located beneath the simulated bilge plates at least one-half the nozzle spacing
away from the engine mock-up.
4.5 Procedure
4.5.1 Ignition
The trays used in the test should be filled with at least 50 mm fuel on a water base. Freeboard is to
be 150±10 mm.
The fuel flow and pressure in the fuel system should be measured before each test. The fuel pressure
should be measured during the test.
Agent flow and pressure in the extinguishing system should be measured continuously on the high
pressure side of a pump or equivalent equipment at intervals not exceeding 5 s during the test,
alternatively, the flow can be determined by the pressure and the K factor of the nozzles.
4.5.4.1 After ignition of all fuel sources, a 2-min preburn time is required before the extinguishing
agent is discharged for the fuel tray fires and 5-15 s for the fuel spray and heptane fires and 30 s for
the Class A fire test (Test No.7).
4.5.4.2 The fire should be allowed to burn until the fire is extinguished or for a period of 15 minutes,
whichever is less, measured from the ignition. The fuel spray, if used, should be shut off 15 s after
the end of agent discharge.
4.5.5.1 Before the test, the test room, fuel and mock-up temperature is to be measured.
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.7 the time when the oil flow for the spray fire is shut off;
.2 the level of fuel in the tray(s) to make sure that the fuel was not totally consumed; and
5 CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
All fires in the fire-extinguishing tests should be extinguished within 15 minutes of system activation
and there should be no re-ignition or fire spread.
The 60 s time-weighted average temperature should be kept below 100°C, no later than 300 s after
activation of the system for the thermal management test in 4.3.2.
6 TEST REPORT
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.5 method of sampling;
– drawings,
– descriptions,
– assembly instructions,
– specification of included materials, and
– detailed drawing of test set-up;
.15 conclusions;
.17 test results including observations during and after the test; and
_______________
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Committee, at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 June 2001), noting that
computerized simulation systems are still under development, decided that a simplified evacuation
analysis method was needed in the interim and, having considered a proposal by the forty-fifth
session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, approved Interim Guidelines for a simplified
evacuation analysis of high-speed passenger craft and invited Member Governments to apply the
Interim Guidelines when implementing the requirements of section 4.8.2 of the 2000 HSC Code, and
to submit to the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection information on experience gained in their
implementation.
3 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), after having considered a
proposal by the forty-ninth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection made in light of the
experienced gained in the application of the aforementioned Interim Guidelines, approved the
Guidelines for a simplified evacuation analysis of high-speed passenger craft, together with the
worked example appended thereto, as set out in the annex.
4 Member Governments are invited to apply the annexed Guidelines when implementing the
requirements of section 4.8.2 of the 2000 HSC Code and bring them to the attention of craft
designers, craft owners and other parties involved in the design, construction and operation of
high-speed passenger craft.
***
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1 General
1.1 In addition to the relevant requirements for means of escape, escape routes in high-speed
passenger craft are required to be evaluated by an evacuation analysis early in the design process,
under the International Code of Safety for High-Speed Craft, 2000 (2000 HSC Code), section 4.8.2.
1.2 The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide guidance on how to execute a simplified
(hydraulic) evacuation analysis and use its results to plan the evacuation demonstration required in
section 4.8.5 of the 2000 HSC Code.
2 Definitions
2.1 Ideal deployment time (tM) is the time needed for the preparation and launching of the marine
evacuation system (MES) and the first survival craft in calm water.
2.2 Ideal travel time (tI) is the time needed for the slowest group of people to reach the
embarkation point in calm water. Unless otherwise stated in the evacuation procedure, the number of
people of the slowest group should be assumed equal to the capacity of the largest survival craft
onboard. For the purpose of these Guidelines, tI is assumed to run concurrently with tM.
2.3 Ideal embarkation time (tE) is the time needed for all passengers and crew to board the
survival craft from the starting situation described in 4.8.7.1 of the Code.
2.4 Structural fire protection time (SFP) is the protection time for areas of major fire risk as
defined in section 4.8.1 of the 2000 HSC Code.
2.5 Slowest group of people is the group of evacuating persons for which the highest travel time
is obtained from calculations according to paragraph 3.6.3.3.
3 Method of evaluation
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3.2 Assumptions
This method for estimating evacuation time is basic in nature and, therefore, common evacuation
analysis assumptions should be made as follows:
.1 passengers and crew should carry out the evacuation in a sequence of groups
according to the evacuation procedure;
.2 passengers and crew will evacuate via the primary escape route;
.3 walking speed depends on the type of escape facility, assuming that the flow is only
in the direction of the escape route, and that there is no overtaking;
.4 passengers’ disabilities or medical conditions that will severely hamper their ability
to keep up with the flow are neglected (see paragraph 3.2.8.1 below);
.8 the allowable evacuation time as per section 4.8.1 of the 2000 HSC Code is given
by SFP – 7 (min), where:
3
.8.1 division by 3 accounts for the safety factor, which includes passengers’ ages
and disabilities, restricted visibility due to smoke, effects of waves and craft
motions on deployment, travel and embarkation time and of violations to the
evacuation procedure;
.8.2 subtraction of 7 min accounts for initial detection and extinguishing action
(section 4.8.1 of the 2000 HSC Code); and
.8.3 for category B craft, the passenger awareness time, the time needed for
passengers to reach assembly stations and the time needed for manning
emergency stations is included in the 7 min time (see section 4.8 of the 2000
HSC Code);
.10 when using table 3.6 it is assumed that at the beginning of the evacuation, passengers
are located at a distance not greater than two decks from the embarkation station.
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3.3.1 For the purpose of calculating the evacuation time in category A craft, passengers should be
assumed to be distributed in a normal voyage configuration (section 4.8.4.1 of the
2000 HSC Code).
3.3.2 For the purpose of calculating the evacuation time in category B craft, passengers and the
crew should be assumed to be distributed among assembly stations and be ready for embarkation
(section 4.8.4.2 of the 2000 HSC Code).
3.4.1 The following two performance standards should be complied with for calculating the overall
evacuation time:
3.4.2 Both performance standards are derived from section 4.8.1 of the 2000 HSC Code.
3.5.1 The values of tE and tM should be calculated separately based on an appropriate combination
of the following documented and independently witnessed trials as is acceptable to the
Administration but which may be subject to verification trials:
.1 type approval trials1 for any inflatable liferafts and marine evacuation systems
used for the evacuation of the craft, the relevant deployment and embarkation
times being increased by factors of 1.3 and 1.14, respectively; and
.2 full scale shipboard trials on closely similar craft and evacuation systems.
3.5.2 Safety factors on tE and tM are accounted for by dividing by 3 in performance standards
formulae (3.4.1.1) and (3.4.1.2).
3.6 Calculation of tI
1
Refer to the Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances, and in particular the times measured in
accordance with 5.17.3.3 and 12.6.1 of that recommendation (as adopted by resolution MSC.81(70)).
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.3 the space between the fixed seats for aisles in public spaces; and
.4 the space between the most intruding portions of the seats (when unoccupied)
in a row of seats in public spaces;
.2 speed of persons, S (m/s) is the speed of evacuees along the escape route (table 3.6
provides the values of S which should be used for the analysis);
Table 3.6*
Fc = Fs · Wc (3.6.1.4)
.5 flow time, tF (s), is the total time needed for a group of N persons to move past a
point in the egress system. It is calculated as:
tF = N / Fc (3.6.1.5)
.6 walking time, tw (s), is the total time needed for a person to cover the distance
between the assembly station and the embarkation station.
3.6.2 Transitions
Transitions are those points in the egress system where the type of a route changes (e.g. from a
corridor to a stairway) where routes merge or branch out.
*
Data derived from land-based stairs, corridors and doors in civil buildings, and are extracted from the publication
“SFPE Fire Protection Engineering Handbook, 2nd edition NFPA 1995”.
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.1 Groups of people:
For the purposes of evacuation, the total number of persons on board is broken down
into one or more groups of people. It should be assumed that all persons in a group
carry out the evacuation at the same time, along the same route and towards the same
embarkation station. The number of persons in each group, the number of groups and
the embarkation station assigned to each group should be in accordance with the
evacuation procedure.
.2 Schematic representation:
The escape routes from assembly stations to embarkation stations are represented as a
hydraulic network, where the pipes are the corridors and stairways, the valves are the
doors and restrictions in general.
.1 The walking time, tw, is calculated by using the speed of persons specified in
table 3.6 and the distance between the pertinent assembly and embarkation
stations.
.2 The flow time, tF, of each portion of the escape route is calculated using the
specific flow Fs from table 3.6 and the appropriate clear width of that portion
of escape route. The total flow time is the largest value obtained.
.3 The travel time is obtained as the sum of the walking time and the total
flow time.
Calculations as per paragraph 3.6.3.3 should be repeated for each foreseen group of people. The
highest resulting travel time is then taken as the ideal travel time for use in performance standard in
paragraph 3.4.
4 Corrective actions
If the performance standards under paragraph 3.4 are not fulfilled, corrective actions should be
considered at the design stage by either modifying one or more components in the evacuation system
(e.g., escape routes, life-saving appliances, passengers load, etc.) or by modifying the evacuation
procedure.
5 Documentation
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.3 position and role of the crew during the evacuation, according to the evacuation
procedure;
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
1 General
The example provides an illustration on the application of the Guidelines. Therefore it should not be
viewed as a comprehensive and complete analysis nor as an indication of the data to be used. More
specifically, the short description of the evacuation procedure provided in paragraph 3.3 is only an
outline, for the purpose of the evacuation analysis, of the complete evacuation procedure the
embarkation time and the deployment time used in paragraph 4 below are purely illustrative.
2 Craft characteristics
The high-speed craft considered is a category B craft with a total capacity of 800 persons
(784 passengers and 16 crew members). As shown in figure 1, when the order to abandon the craft
is given, passengers are distributed in the public spaces on two decks (210 on the upper deck and 574
on the lower deck), the lower deck is equipped with 4 MES. The structural fire protection time
(SPF) is 60 min.
4 6 seat ed p ass
1 6 4 seat ed p ass
164seated pax 1 146 seseated pax 1
crew
1 crew
Upper
U p p er deck Stair
St air 1
Stair
St air 2
2 1 0 p ass + 2 crew
210 pax + 2
M E S2
M E S4
M ES M ES
5 8 seat ed p ass 1 7 0 seat ed p ass 1 7 0 seat ed p ass 1 7 6 seat ed p ass
170s eated 170seated 176seated pax 1
L o wer deck 158crewseated pax 1 2St air
crew 1 crew
Lower
5 7 4 p ass + L o un ge 1 2 1
Stair 2 2 crew
574
6 crew + pax Lounge L o un ge 2 Stair
St air 2
66 crewcrew Lounge Lounge
L o un ge 3 Lounge
L o un ge 4
to
6o p eratcrew
e MES
operate M E S3 M E S1
M ES M ES
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Assembly stations coincide with the public spaces where passengers are located (seated). Passengers
are wearing life jackets.
.1 Embarkation stations (4, one for each MES) are located at the lower deck.
.3 Liferafts (8), 135 persons capacity each, are stowed in racks on the lower deck, in the
proximity of the MES. The aggregate capacity of liferafts is therefore 1,080 persons,
or of 810 persons if one embarkation station is not available in accordance with the
2000 HSC Code.
.1 When the order to abandon the craft is given, crew members start operating the MES
(total 6 crew members), the rescue boats (1 crew member per boat) and to direct the
passengers (as shown in figure 1: two crew members on the upper deck and 6 crew
members on the lower deck); and all these activities progress in parallel.
.2 PHASE 1: For each MES, the slide is inflated and the first liferaft launched, inflated
and connected to the slide’s platform. In the mean time the first 4 groups of
passengers are formed and directed to the 4 MES, each group is assisted by 1 crew
member, for a total of 400 persons, as follows (see figure 2):
.2.1 164 passengers, marshalled by 1 crew member, move from upper deck through stair 1
down to the lower deck and join with 34 passengers and 1 crew member coming from
lounge 2. They then move along the central aisle of lounge 1 (corridor 2); at the end
of corridor 2 two groups are formed, each composed by 99 passengers and 1 crew
member, and move to MES 3 and 4 through doors 2A and 2B respectively;
.2.2 46 passengers marshalled by 1 crew member move from upper deck, through stair 2,
down to lower deck, where they merge with 152 passengers and 1 crew member; two
groups are then formed, each composed by 99 passengers and 1 crew member, and
move to MES 1 and 2 respectively;
.2.3 in the meantime the remaining passengers stay in lounges 1 to 4 assisted by 4 crew
members.
.3 PHASE 2: Once the first liferaft is ready for boarding, the first group for each MES
descends to the liferaft using the slide and platform. When boarding is completed,
the liferaft is detached from the slide and floated away by the rescue boat. In the
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mean time, the second liferaft is launched, inflated and connected to the platform and
the second 4 groups of persons move to the embarkation stations.
.4 PHASE 3: Once the second liferaft is ready for boarding, the second group for each
MES descents to the liferaft through the slide and platform. Finally, the 6 crew
members operating the MES board. When boarding is completed, the liferaft is
detached from the slide. The evacuation is now completed.
In total 8 groups, each composed of 100 persons, are considered. Their (primary) escape routes are
shown in figure 2 for the first 4 groups and in figure 3 for the second 4 groups.
1 crew
46 pass
Stair 1
Upper deck 164 pass 1 crew
no remaining pass or crew
Stair 2
MES4 MES2
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MES4 MES2
MES3 MES1
4 Calculation of tE and of tM
According to the evacuation procedure, each MES is used by 200 persons, if all four MES are
available. Based on full scale trials on craft having similar arrangements and using the same MES
and same number of crew, the total time needed to deploy, inflate and mooring the liferaft and to
embark 100 persons is 330 s (5 min and 30 s). Accordingly, the total embarkation time is 660 s
(11 min).
Based on full scale trials on craft having similar arrangements and using the same MES, the total
time needed to deploy and inflate an MES is 150 s (2 min and 30 s).
5 Calculation of tI
5.1 For the purposes of this example, it is assumed that calculations have been carried out for all
the 8 groups of people into which the evacuation is organized, according to the evacuation procedure
described in paragraph 3.3 above. It is further assumed that the highest travel time is obtained for
the group of people moving (phase 1) from the afterward passenger area in the upper deck down to
MES 3 and 4 respectively on the lower deck.
5.2 The schematization of the escape route is shown in figure 4. As it may be seen, the elements
composing the escape path are 2 doors, 2 corridors and 1 stairway.
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Table 5.3
The values of specific flow (Fs) and speed (S) are taken from table 3.6 of the guidelines; the value of
calculated flow (Fc) is obtained by Fc = Fs Wc (see paragraph 3.6.1.4 of the guidelines).
5.4 The resulting walking time (tw) and flow time (tF), calculated according to paragraphs 3.6.1.5
and 3.6.1.6 of the guidelines are as follows:
Table 5.4
5.5 The resulting total walking time is the sum of the walking time of each element in the escape
path and totals 51 s. The flow time is the highest among all the elements in the escape path and
corresponds to 91 s. Accordingly, the ideal travel time is where, tI = 142 s.
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Stair 1 1
Stair 164
164 pass pax
1 crew
1
Upper deck Door 1
Corridor
Corridor 1 1 Door 1 Stair
Stair2 2
MES4 MES2
Door
Door 2 B2 B 34pass pax
34
1 crew
1
Lower deck Corridor
Corridor 2 2 Stair
Stair1 1 Stair
Stair2 2
Door
Door 2 A2 A
MES3 MES1
Door 2
35 persons MES3
A
6 Performance standard
The calculated overall evacuation time: tM + tE = 150 + 660 < SFP - 7 min = 1059 s
3
__________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1166.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-fifth session (15 to 24 May 2002) recognized
the need for the development of guidelines on the assessment of evacuation guidance systems.
2 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), having considered a proposal by
the forty-ninth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, approved the Guidelines on the
assessment of evacuation guidance systems, set out in the annex.
3 Member Governments are invited to bring the annexed Guidelines to the attention of ship
designers, shipowners, ship operators, shipbuilders and other parties involved in the design,
construction, testing, approval and maintenance of evacuation guidance systems.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1167.DOC
MSC/Circ.1167
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1 Purpose
The purpose of this guidance is to provide functional requirements and performance standards
applicable to all evacuation guidance systems.
2 Functional requirements
2.1 The systems should readily identify the routes of escape when the normal emergency lighting
is less effective due to smoke.
2.2 The systems should be such that, in case one exit may not be used, persons are still able to
easily find their way towards another exit.
2.3 Systems relying on external power sources, including those that are automatically activated
or continuously operating, should be capable of being manually activated by a single action from a
continuously manned central control station.
2.4 Electrically powered systems should be connected to the emergency switchboard required by
regulation II-1/42 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended, so as to be powered by the main
source of electrical power under normal circumstances and also by the emergency source of
electrical power when the latter is in operation.
2.5 All electrically powered systems should be arranged so that the failure of any single device,
or battery will not result in the system being ineffective.
2.6 The systems should not prevent effective communication between the fire-fighting parties
and the continuously manned control station.
2.7 The performances of the systems should not be impeded by the simultaneous functioning of
any other systems, expected to be used in normal or under emergency conditions
(e.g. public address systems, emergency lighting systems, etc.).
3 Performance standards
3.1 Electrically powered systems should meet the requirements for vibration and electromagnetic
interference in accordance with IEC 60945.
3.2 Electrically powered systems should provide a minimum degree of ingress protection of at
least IP 55 in accordance with IEC 60520.
3.3 The systems should be tested, approved and maintained in accordance with guidelines
acceptable to the Administration.
__________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1167.DOC
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-fifth session (15 to 24 May 2002), recognized
the need for the development of guidelines for the testing, approval and maintenance of evacuation
guidance systems used as an alternative to low-location lighting systems required by SOLAS
chapter II-2 and the FSS Code.
2 The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), having considered a proposal by
the forty-ninth session of the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection, approved the Interim Guidelines for
the testing, approval and maintenance of evacuation guidance systems alternative to the low-location
lighting systems, set out in the annex.
3 Member Governments are invited to apply the annexed Interim Guidelines and submit to the
Sub-Committee on Fire Protection information on experience gained in the implementation of the
Interim Guidelines and on any progress made in the development of the testing, approval and
maintenance of evacuation guidance systems.
4 Member Governments are also invited to bring the annexed Interim Guidelines to the
attention of ship designers, shipowners, ship operators, shipbuilders and other parties involved in the
design, construction, testing, approval and maintenance of evacuation guidance systems.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1168.doc
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1 Scope
The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide standards for the testing, approval and maintenance for
alternative systems to low-location lighting systems required by SOLAS regulation II-2/13.3.2.5.1
and chapter 11 of the FSS Code.
2 Testing
2.1 Test for corridors should be performed in reduced visibility using theatrical (white) smoke
with an Optical Density at least OD 0.5 m-1∗. Measuring equipment should conform to a standard
acceptable to the Administration.
2.2 If the system is to be installed in public spaces, the test should be performed in reduced
visibility using theatrical (white) smoke with an Optical Density at least OD 0.1 m-1.
2.3 Test for stairway enclosures should be performed in clear (no smoke) conditions.
2.4 A minimum 80% of the participants should reach the pre-designated exit with a speed of
movement of at least 0.7 m/s calculated using the distance measurement of the optimum route.
Participants achieving a speed of movement of less than 0.7 m/s should be deemed to have failed.
There is no speed of movement criterion applied to stairway enclosure tests.
2.5 The maximum percentage of participants choosing failed exits should not exceed the value of
2% for public spaces and 5% for accommodation areas, corridors and stairway enclosures.
2.6 In the public space configuration when testing with two correct exits, no more than 15% of
the participants may choose the more distant exit.
2.7 There should be a minimum of 60 participants for each test - being at least 8 and not more
than 12 of each age group 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66-75 with an average of
45-55% male/female of the entire group.
2.8 A “control” test should be performed with no guidance system in operation in order to
demonstrate that there is no significant inherent bias to favour the pre-designated exit. Participants
of the “control” test should not participate in any previous or subsequent tests.
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.2 participants arriving at any of the “fail exits” are deemed to have “failed” the test and
should be stopped at that point;
.3 only one participant should be in the test at a time in order to preclude any crowd
behavioural influence;
.4 the test area should be illuminated by the emergency lighting as required by SOLAS;
and
.5 during the test signage other than those being part of the test should not be used.
3.1.1 If the system is intended to be installed in public spaces, the test facility should be designed
so that participants are required to navigate to a pre-designated exit across a public space, where the
shortest distance to that exit is not along a wall. A minimum of two exits should be provided to test
the ability of participants to identify and proceed to an exit within an open space. An additional fail
exit should be located 2 to 3 m from each correct exit.
3.1.2 The test room should be not less than 15 m by 10 m with the start point and pre-designated
exit being on the long sides, diagonally opposite each other, such that the distance around the walls
is approximately equal in either direction. The density of the smoke should be great enough to
prevent a participant from being able to see no more than half to two-thirds of the distance to the
nearest exit OD 0.1 m-1. Direct distance between start and a correct exit should be not less
than 12 m.
The test layout should be such that participants should be required to navigate correctly their way to
a pre-designated exit via at least four decision points including at least two cross-junctions and at
least one T-junction. It should not be possible to navigate the correct route by remaining attached to
one continuous wall. The correct route should include the placement of a non-exit door within 2 to
3 m of the correct exit door. A non-exit door is a fail exit. The total distance travelled over the
correct route should be not less than 25 m, with the distance between decision points being not less
than 5 m.
Participants should be required to use the stairway enclosures to a pre-designated floor. The
participants should enter the stairway enclosures from a mid-point where each will be instructed by
the guidance system to proceed either up or down. The option of up or down should be randomly
chosen.
4 Participant briefing
Participants to be briefed on the purpose of the test and the technology to be tested, using the
proposed briefing technique that would be used in the implementation on board ship, e.g. the briefing
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given during lifeboat drill, instructions on backs of cabin doors or via the ship’s public address
system, etc. No briefing should be given on the route, test layout or numbers of exits.
5 Approval
All systems should be approved by the Administration for compliance with the Performance
standards for evacuation guidance systems (MSC/Circ.1167) developed by the Organization and, for
electrically powered systems, IEC 60092 Electrical Installations in Ships. Installation requirements
should be included in the approval procedures, and individual onboard arrangements should be
verified accordingly.
6 Maintenance
6.1 All elements of the system should be visually examined and checked at least once per week,
and a record thereof should be kept. All missing, damaged or inoperable elements should be
replaced.
6.2 All systems should have their signal tested at least once every five years. Readings should
be taken on site. Should any reading be found to be outside manufacturer’s tolerances, then that
element of the system should be replaced.
__________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1168.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), with a view to
providing more specific guidance for vague expressions such as “to the discretion of the
Administration”, which are open to different interpretations contained in IMO instruments, approved
the unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2 prepared by the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection,
as set out in the annex.
2 Member Governments are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations as guidance
when applying relevant provisions of SOLAS chapter II-2 to fire protection construction,
installation, arrangements and equipment to be installed on board ships on or after 13 May 2005 and
to bring the unified interpretations to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
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1 Ullage openings do not include cargo tank openings that are fitted with standpipe
arrangements with their own manually operated shutoff valves.
2 Examples include the common 2.54 cm (1") and 5.08 cm (2") diameter standpipe
arrangements that are used for sampling, monitoring or measuring of ullage/temperature/interface,
oxygen, liquid and hand dipping in the cargo tank.
1 Combustible gaskets in flanged ventilation duct connections are not permitted within 600 mm
of an opening in an “A” or “B” class divisions and in ducts required to be of “A” class construction.
__________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1169.DOC
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), recalled that, at
its sixty-third session, it had adopted, by resolution MSC.31(63), amendments to SOLAS
regulation II-2/15, prescribing additional requirements to oil fuel arrangements, lubricating oil
arrangements and arrangements for other flammable oils as well as the application of these
requirements. The amendments entered into force on 1 July 1998.
2 The amendments to SOLAS regulation II-2/15, in particular the requirements for oil fuel
systems, applied to all ships constructed before, on or after 1 July 1998 because the above
amendments stipulated to do so. However, the Committee agreed that the amendments to SOLAS
regulations II-2/15.3 and II-2/15.4 were not intended to apply to existing ships constructed before
1 July 1998. The Committee, therefore, clarified that paragraphs 3 and 4 of SOLAS
regulation II 2/15, in terms of compliance with the provisions of paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11 of SOLAS
regulation II-2/15, should only be applied to ships constructed on or after 1 July 1998.
3 The Committee noting that an amendment to SOLAS regulation II-2/15 had been considered
by the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection with a view to clarifying the application of the
aforementioned provisions, approved the attached draft amendment with a view to subsequent
adoption at MSC 81.
4 Member Governments are invited to bring the above information to the attention of all parties
concerned.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1170.DOC
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ANNEX
CHAPTER II-2
CONSTRUCTION - FIRE PROTECTION, DETECTION, EXTINCTION
Regulation II-2/15 – Arrangements for oil fuel, lubricating oil and other flammable oils
__________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1170.DOC
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005),
following the recommendation of COMSAR 9 and recognizing the importance of additional
information, agreed to circulate the additional information on closure of Inmarsat-E services,
given at annex.
3 Member Governments are invited to bring the annexed information to the attention of all
parties concerned.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1171.doc
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ANNEX
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
CLOSURE OF INMARSAT-E SERVICES BY INMARSAT LTD.
1 After in depth consultations between the IMSO Secretariat and the company,
Inmarsat Ltd. has advised IMSO that it will close the L-Band EPIRB service as from
1 December 2006, with the following commitments:
.3 using its comprehensive registration database, Inmarsat Ltd. will notify all
existing registered L-Band EPIRB users accordingly before 1 December 2005;
.4 the replacement programme will address all registered users of L-Band EPIRBs,
including leisure users, not just those within the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as
amended. EPIRBs will be replaced on an equivalent “like-for-like” basis; and
____________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1171.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
“Passenger ships, other than ro-ro passenger ships, not carrying a medical doctor on board
but carrying more than 100 passengers on a route which would make the response time
for a medical intervention from ashore longer than 30 minutes, should benefit from being
equipped with the emergency medical kit/bag (EMK).”
2 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005),
adopted the aforementioned additional guidance and invited Member Governments to bring it to
the attention of all concerned.
_____________
I:\CIRC\MSC\1172.doc
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), at its eightieth session, (11 to 20 May 2005),
having been informed that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had approved
the amendments to the IAMSAR Manual prepared by the Joint ICAO/IMO Working Group on
Harmonization of Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue, and that they had been
endorsed by the Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) at
its ninth session (7 to 11 February 2005), adopted the annexed amendments in accordance with
the procedure laid down in resolution A.894(21).
2 The Committee decided that the amendments should enter into force on 1 June 2006.
***
I:\CIRC\MSC\1173.doc
MSC/Circ.1173
ANNEX
SECTION 1
2 Glossary
“Mass Rescue Operation (MRO) - search and rescue services characterized by the
need for immediate response to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the
capabilities normally available to search and rescue authorities are inadequate”
3 Chapter 4
“4.8 Radio call signs for aircraft involved in a search and rescue operation
4.8.1 A prefix call sign makes the task/function of a specific aircraft easier to be
understood by other aircraft and participating units in the same area.
4.8.2 The prefix call sign can also give the aircraft priority in some situations.
4.8.3 The State authority responsible for air regulation shall ensure that use of prefix
call sign will conform with other national air regulation practice.
4.8.4 During search and rescue missions and exercises it is recommended that the
following prefix call signs be used before the ordinary radio call sign or as a
specific mission call sign.
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4 Chapter 6
6.5.1 A mass rescue operation (MRO) is one that involves a need for immediate
assistance to large numbers of persons in distress such that capabilities normally
available to SAR authorities are inadequate.
6.5.2 MROs are required less frequently than typical rescue efforts, but have high
potential consequences. Flooding, earthquakes, terrorism, and large passenger
aircraft or ship disasters are examples of scenarios that may involve the need for
MROs. Extensive preparations and resources are required to conduct MROs
successfully.
6.5.4 MRO plans and exercises are challenging and relatively complex. Effective
arrangements for use of national and often international resources beyond those
normally used for SAR are essential. Preparations require substantial
commitments and partnerships among SAR authorities, regulatory authorities,
transportation companies, sources of military and commercial assistance and
others.
6.5.5 MROs often need to be carried out and co-ordinated within a broader emergency
response context that may involve hazards mitigation, damage control and salvage
operations, pollution control, complex traffic management, large-scale logistics,
medical and coroner functions, accident-incident investigation, and intense public
and political attention, etc. Efforts must often start immediately at an intense level
and be sustainable for days or weeks.
6.5.6 SAR authorities should co-ordinate MRO plans with companies that operate
aircraft and ships designed to carry large numbers of persons. Such companies
should share in preparations to prevent MROs and to help ensure success if they
become necessary.
6.5.7 What the media reports may matter more than what SAR services do for shaping
of public opinion about MROs. There should be no unwarranted delays in
providing information to the media. Information must be readily available, and
freely exchanged among emergency service providers and shipping, airline or
other primary companies involved.
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6.5.8 Since opportunities to handle actual incidents involving mass rescues are rare and
challenging, exercising MRO plans is particularly important.”
SECTION 2
2 Glossary
“Mass Rescue Operation (MRO) - search and rescue services characterized by the
need for immediate response to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the
capabilities normally available to search and rescue authorities are inadequate”
3 Chapter 1
- Insert a new paragraph 1.8.11 as follows, and renumber the remaining paragraphs
in section 1.8:
"… many nationalities. Such an incident may result in the need for mass rescue
operations (MROs), which are discussed in Chapter 6. In this case, …"
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4 Chapter 2
“2.32 Radio call signs for aircraft involved in a search and rescue operation
2.32.1 A prefix call sign makes the task/function of a specific aircraft easier to be
understood by other aircraft and participating units in the same area.
2.32.2 The prefix call sign can also give the aircraft priority in some situations.
2.32.3 State authority responsible for air regulation shall arrange that use of prefix call
sign will coincide with other national air regulations.
2.32.4 During search and rescue missions and exercises it is recommended that the
following prefix call signs be used before the ordinary radio call sign or as a
specific mission call sign.
5 Chapter 6
- Delete present section 6.14 and insert the following new sections as 6.14 and 6.15
and renumber sections 6.15, 6.16, 6.17 and 6.18.
6.14.1 Many different underwater operations occur within SRRs, such as diving
operations or the operation of military or civilian submarines. When accidents
occur, survivors may be either on the surface or entrapped in a submarine resting
on the seabed. Military submarines trapped under the surface may use
international distress signals or specific military pyrotechnics, dye markers or
beacons. In addition, submarines may pump out fuel, lubricating oil or release air
bubbles to indicate their position.
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6.14.5 Most SAR personnel are poorly prepared to understand or handle medical
problems peculiar to underwater activities, such as decompression sickness, air
embolism, and nitrogen narcosis. However, they should be trained to recognize
the symptoms and know how to obtain competent medical advice. They should
also be trained in handling and transporting victims of such problems without
worsening their situations. If possible to aid in the treatment of the victim, SAR
personnel should obtain information such as time underwater, depth, time at the
surface, time of the onset of symptoms, and the symptoms currently being
experienced.
6.14.6 Medical advice should be sought before air transport of submarine accident
victims.”
MRO Overview
6.15.1 A mass rescue operation (MRO) is one that involves a need for immediate
assistance to large numbers of persons in distress such that capabilities normally
available to SAR authorities are inadequate.
6.15.3 Flooding, earthquakes, terrorism, casualties in the offshore oil industry and
accidents involving releases of hazardous materials are examples which, because
of their magnitude, may require the application of the same resources as required
for mass maritime or aeronautical rescue operations.
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become necessary. Since the need for MROs is relatively rare, it is difficult to
gain practical experience to help deal with them. Types of potential MRO
scenarios vary, but there are certain general principles that can be followed based
on lessons of history.
6.15.5 Effective response to such major incidents requires immediate, well-planned and
closely co-ordinated large-scale actions and use of resources from multiple
organizations. The following are typical MRO demands:
6.15.7 The broader response environment may involve activities such as:
- hazards mitigation;
- damage control and salvage operations;
- pollution control;
- complex traffic management;
- large-scale logistics efforts;
- medical and coroner functions;
- accident-incident investigation; and
- intense public and political attention.
6.15.8 MRO plans need to be part of and compatible with overall response plans for
major incidents. Plans must typically allow for command, control and
communications structures that can accommodate simultaneous air, sea and land
operations.
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6.15.9 The consequences of poor preparations for MROs in terms of loss of life and
other adverse results may be disastrous. Major incidents may involve hundreds
or thousands of persons in distress in remote and hostile environments. A large
passenger ship collision, a downed aircraft, or a terrorist incident could, for
example, call for the immediate rescue of large numbers of passengers and crew
in poor environmental conditions, with many of the survivors having little ability
to help themselves.
6.15.11 There will often be resistance to paying the high price in terms of time, effort and
funding that preparedness for major incidents entails, particularly as they are rare
events. The required levels of co-operation, co-ordination, planning, resources
and exercises required for preparedness are challenging and do not happen
without the requisite commitment of SAR authorities, regulatory authorities,
transportation companies, sources of military and commercial assistance and
others.
6.15.12 MRO planning, preparations and exercises are essential since opportunities to
handle actual incidents involving mass rescues are rare. Therefore the exercising
of MRO plans is particularly important.
6.15.15 Pilots and masters are responsible for manoeuvring the aircraft or ship as feasible
and appropriate and also have overall responsibility for safety, medical care,
communications, fire and damage control, maintaining order and providing
general direction.
6.15.17 In the case of a downed aircraft, whether passengers would be safer on board
should be assessed for each situation. Usually they should promptly evacuate the
aircraft at sea. On land, this decision must take into account the conditions of the
aircraft and the environment, expected time to rescue survivors or repair the
aircraft, and whether required passenger care can be best provided inside the
aircraft.
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6.15.18 The OSC will normally be designated by an SMC. An OSC may be able to
handle certain communications on scene and with appropriate remote authorities
to help free the pilot or master to retain the integrity of his or her craft.
However, these persons are themselves in need of assistance, and anything the
OSC can do to help them should be considered, bearing in mind that the OSC’s
main duty is co-ordinating SAR facilities and rescue efforts under the SMC’s
general direction.
6.15.21 High priority should be given to tracking and accounting for all persons on board
and all lifeboats and rafts, and efforts to keep them together will help in this
regard. Availability of accurate manifests and accounting is critical.
6.15.22 The need to relocate survival craft and check for persons in them can waste
valuable resources. One option is to sink survival craft once the persons in them
have been rescued; however, the potential that other survivors may find and need
the craft should be considered.
6.15.23 Navy ships and large passenger ships are often better equipped than other vessels
for retrieving people who have abandoned a ship or aircraft; use of any such
ships should be considered. Ship reporting systems for SAR may help identify
commercial ships available to assist.
6.15.25 Ship companies should be encouraged to equip large passenger ships and
possibly other types of vessels with helicopter landing areas, clearly marked
hoist-winch areas, and onboard helicopters to facilitate more direct transfers of
numerous persons.
6.15.26 If a ship with a large freeboard cannot safely retrieve survivors from the water or
survival craft, it may be possible to first retrieve them onto small vessels, and
then transfer them to progressively larger ones.
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6.15.27 Depending on the circumstances, it may be safer to tow survival craft to shore
without removing the occupants at sea. Lifeboats could be designed to support
passengers for longer periods of time, and to be able to reach shore on their own
from longer distances offshore.
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6.15.30 The ability of an RCC to continue to effectively co-ordinate the MRO and still
handle its other SAR responsibilities may become overwhelmed, and another
RCC or a higher authority may need to assume responsibility for their other
responsibilities.
6.15.31 With these possibilities in mind, MRO plans should provide for various degrees
of response, along with criteria for determining which degree of response will be
implemented. For example, as local SAR resources are exhausted (or from the
outset), SAR resources may need to be obtained from distant national or
international sources.
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- ensure that SAR plans provide for logistics support for large numbers of
rescuers and survivors including pre-arranged accommodations, if
possible, and availability of food, medical care and transportation;
- consider requesting assistance from airlines and shipping companies other
than the one whose aircraft or ship is involved in the incident, and know
the types of assistance that such organizations might provide;
- consider use of bar coded bracelets as an effective means of identifying
children before, during and after the emergency;
- attempt to reduce the burden on a pilot or master and crews; if safe and
appropriate to do so, place a marine casualty officer on board to assist the
master and SAR personnel; and
- share capabilities, expertise and assets among government and industry to
take maximum advantage of the strengths of each.
6.15.33 Communication plans must provide for a heavy volume of communication use as
a major incident will normally involve many responding organizations that need
to communicate effectively with each other from the beginning.
6.15.36 Regardless of the magnitude and priority of the lifesaving efforts involved in
responding to a major incident, if any other functions are being carried out
concurrently on scene by other than SAR personnel, the overall response
involving SAR and the other functions, e.g., firefighting, should be well
co-ordinated.
6.15.37 If certain basic concepts and terms are recognized and understood by all
emergency responders, they will be much better prepared to co-ordinate joint
efforts.
6.15.38 Standard SAR procedures should typically be followed for the SAR part of the
response, but these procedures will be largely independent of other efforts.
Companies or authorities handling other aspects of the response will follow
command, control and communication procedures developed for their respective
organizations and duties.
6.15.39 The SAR system can function in its normal manner or use modified
SAR procedures established to account for special demands of mass rescues, but
it should be appropriately linked and subjected to a scheme for management of
the overall incident response.
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6.15.40 For major incidents, crisis management for the overall response may also be
needed. The Incident Command System (ICS) is one simple and effective means
of meeting this need. ICS can be used where no equivalent means of overall
incident management is in place. SAR and transportation authorities are likely to
encounter use of the ICS within emergency response communities.
6.15.41 The ICS works best with some advance familiarization and exercising.
6.15.43 SAR authorities should co-ordinate MRO plans with companies that operate
ships and aircraft designed to carry large numbers of persons. Such companies
should share in preparations to minimize the chances that MROs will be needed,
and to ensure success if they become necessary.
6.15.44 Appendix C provides guidance on industry roles and discusses how companies
could arrange for use of field teams and emergency response centres as possible
means of carrying out their MRO responsibilities.
6.15.45 For passenger ships, SAR Plans of Co-operation required by the Safety of Life at
Sea Convention and developed by SAR authorities and shipping companies are
part of MRO plans.
6.15.46 Good public and media relations become very demanding and quite important
during MROs.
6.15.47 What the media reports may matter more than what SAR services do for shaping
of public opinion about MROs. The role of the media may be critical in shaping
the actions of the public and of those directly involved in the distress situation in
a way that contributes to safety, success and panic control. There should be no
unwarranted delays in providing information to the media.
6.15.48 Information should be readily available, clear, accurate, consistent and freely
exchanged among emergency responders and others concerned, such as the
public and families of persons on board.
6.15.49 Designate the person who will speak to the public and the media and develop
press releases, and outline what they will say, staying factual. If SAR services
do not provide a public spokesperson and information for a major incident, the
media likely will, thus denying the Authorities the opportunity to manage the
information and emphasize the appropriate points.
6.15.50 A single spokesperson not directly involved in the incident can be valuable in
relieving the Incident Commander and SMC of this duty.
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6.15.52 Ensure that the media knows who is in charge of co-ordinating rescue operations.
6.15.54 Many entities are involved in a response to a major incident, including ships,
aircraft, companies and SAR services. Co-ordination is required to ensure that
there is one message with many messengers.
6.15.55 Prompt establishment of a joint information centre at a location distant from the
SMC will help to achieve this goal. (A joint information centre is a component
of an ICS and is discussed in Appendix C). The centre can establish proper
procedures for establishing what messages will be released to the public and how
those messages will be released. Since the messages may be sensitive, it is
critical that everyone communicates the same information. The centre can be
responsible for co-ordinating information made available via the internet and
perhaps establishing and maintaining a public website.
6.15.56 The media is a 24-hour global market, and its news is broadcast worldwide. The
media will find a way to get to the scene for first hand information, pictures and
video. By providing transportation to the scene and controlling media access,
safety and the information the media reports can be better managed.
6.15.57 Media outlets often have more resources to mobilize on scene than do SAR
authorities, and RCC operating plans should account for how to deal with such
situations.
6.15.58 Information should be provided to the public on the SAR facilities are being used
and, if possible, a web address or list of contact phone numbers should be
provided for families, media and others to contact for more information.
6.15.61 Once posted, these pages can be easily updated with the status of the incident
and could also include:
- contact information;
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6.15.62 Besides the media, families and other organizations will also want this
information.
6.15.63 It is very important to develop and share lessons learned from actual MRO
operations and exercises. However, concerns about legal liability (often
excessive), may discourage staff from highlighting matters that could have been
improved.
6.15.64 Since lessons learned can help prevent recurring serious mistakes, agreement
should be reached among principal participants on how lessons learned can be
depersonalized and made widely available. Lessons learned from MROs should
be shared not just locally, but internationally.
6.15.65 Careful accounting for survivors after they have been delivered to a place of
safety remains important. They need to be kept informed about plans for them
and about the ongoing response operations. With large numbers of persons often
staying in different places, keeping track of and working with them can be
difficult.
6.15.66 Transportation companies are often best suited to handle and assist survivors
during this time.
6.15.67 Crewmembers may be placed at various locations to record passenger names and
locations. Another possibility is for airlines or passenger ships to attach plastic
cards to life vests to give passengers phone numbers for contacting the company.
Some companies use bar coded bracelets to track children who are passengers.
6.15.68 Communicating with passengers is more difficult in remote areas where phone
service may be inadequate or lacking. If phones do exist, calling the airline or
shipping company may be the best way to check in and find out information. In
more populated areas, local agencies may have an emergency evacuation plan or
other useful plan that can be implemented.
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6 Appendix C
“Appendix C
MRO exercises
Since opportunities to handle actual incidents involving mass rescues are rare and challenging,
exercising MRO plans are particularly important. Mass evacuation and rescue operations are
difficult and costly, leading to a tendency to use simulation excessively during exercises rather
than physically exercising on-scene efforts.
MRO exercise objectives need not be addressed in a single large exercise, but may be satisfied in
part by routine incorporation into multiple drills, some intended mainly to test other systems.
However, realistic drills are necessary and costly, and over 1,000 volunteer ship passengers or
hundreds of volunteer aircraft passengers will likely be needed to conduct a realistic exercise.
Separate rooms can be used to simulate command posts that would normally be in separate
locations.
• Account for:
- Crew and passenger lists,
- Rescued passengers and crew until they can return to their homes. All persons
associated with the rescue and aftermath operations,
- Lifeboats, including empty boats or rafts, and
- Exercises should take account of high freeboard issues for likely rescue facilities;
• Safely transfer and care for passengers (evacuation, in survival craft, rescue, medical,
protection from environment, post-rescue transfers, etc.);
• Test all communication links that may be needed for notification, co-ordination and
support;
• Conduct medical triage and provide first aid;
• Assess ship’s safety management system effectiveness;
• Exercise co-ordination with local response agencies;
• Provide food, water, lifejackets and other protective clothing to survivors;
• Test mass rescue plans of:
- SAR services,
- Operating company (including aircraft and ship plans),
- Any relevant emergency response organizations, e.g., disaster response, military,
firefighting and medical, and
- Transportation and accommodation companies;
• Assess how effectively earlier lessons learned have been accounted for in updated plans
and how well these lessons were disseminated;
• Exercise salvage and pollution abatement capabilities;
• Carry out emergency relocation of the disabled craft; and
• Exercise external affairs, such as international and public relations taking into account:
- Necessary participants involved,
- Joint information centres established quickly and properly staffed,
- Press briefings handled effectively, e.g., consistent information from different
sources,
- Notification of the next of kin and family briefings,
- Staff and equipment capacity to handle incoming requests for information, and
- Rescued persons tracked, kept informed and needs monitored, and reunited with
belongings.
The following steps are normally carried out during exercise planning:
• Assembly a multi-disciplinary planning team and agree on objectives for each aspect of
the exercise;
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• Test all communications that will be used, including tests of radio and mobile phones at
or near the locations where they will be used;
• Identify and brief all participants and people who will facilitate the exercise, and ensure
that facilitators have good independent communications with person who will be
controlling the exercise;
• Ensure that everyone involved knows what to do if an actual emergency should arise
during the exercise;
• If observers are invited, arrange for their safety, and to keep them informed about the
exercise progress;
• Use “exercise in progress”, signs, advance notifications and other means to help ensure
that person not involved in the exercise do not become alarmed;
• Agree and prepare conclusions and recommendations with the entity responsible for
handling each recommendation along with the due date for any actions;
• Prepare a clear and concise report and distribute it as appropriate to the participating
organizations; and
SAR authorities should co-ordinate MRO plans with companies that operate aircraft and ships
designed to carry large numbers of persons. Such companies should share in preparations to
minimize the chances that MROs will be needed, and to ensure success if they are. This section
provides guidance on industry role, and discusses how companies could arrange for use of
company field teams and emergency response centres as possible means of carrying out their
MRO responsibilities.
Early notification of potential or developing MROs is critical, due to the level of effort required
to mount a very large-scale response. It is much better to begin the response process and abort it
should it become unnecessary, than to begin it later than necessary should the actual need exist.
Pilots and masters should be advised and trained to notify SAR services at the earliest indication
of a potential distress situation.
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Company response organizations should be able to help SAR services by organizing support,
equipment, advice and liaison any of their ships or aircraft.
Companies should be prepared to provide information to preclude the need for multiple sources
attempting communications with the aircraft pilot-in-command or ship captain for information
that is unavailable or available from another source. Receiving and handling requests for
information aboard the distressed craft can interfere with the pilot’s or master’s ability to handle
the emergency and manage critical on-scene leadership needs.
Companies operating large aircraft or ships should be advised to prepare a co-ordinated team that
can handle emergency response functions around the clock should the need arise. Such a team
might include staff as indicated in the following Table.
Typical company field team
Team Leader Maintains overview, directs operations and keeps management informed
Communicator Maintains open (and possibly sole) line of communications to craft in
distress
Co-ordinating Usually a pilot or master mariner, who co-ordinates with SAR and other
Representative emergency response authorities, organizes tugs, looks at itineraries,
arranges to position ships or ground facilities that may be able to assist
and organizes security and suitable delivery points for passengers crew
when they are delivered to safety
Technical Maintains contact with regulatory authorities, classification societies,
Representative insurers and investigators and provides liaison and advice for firefighting,
damage control, repairs and other specialized or technical matters
Environmental Involved with environmental impact and spill response
Representative
Medical Gives medical advice, tracks casualties and arranges medical and
Representative identification services for survivors
Passenger and Provides information and support to whoever is designated to care for
Crew next-of-kin and keep them informed, identifies transportation needs, and
Representatives may need to deal with various countries, languages and cultures
Media Gathers information, co-ordinates public affairs matters with counterparts
Representative in other organizations, prepares press releases, briefs spokespersons and
arranges availability of information by phone and web sites
Specialists From within or outside the company who may facilitate some special
aspect of the response or follow up
The company may operate an Emergency Response Centre (ERC) to maintain communications
with the craft in distress, remotely monitor onboard sensors if feasible, and keep emergency
information readily available. Such information might include passenger and crew data, aircraft
or ship details, incident details, number of survival craft and status of the current situation.
Transportation companies should have readily available contacts with tour companies, shore
excursion companies, airlines and cruise lines, hotels, etc., since such resources can be used to
address many problems experienced with landing large numbers of survivors into a community.
Contingency plans for co-operation should be developed between SAR authorities and
transportation companies, and these plans should be sufficiently exercised to ensure they would
be effective should an actual mass rescue situation arise. Such plans should identify contacts,
co-ordination procedures, responsibilities, and information sources that will be applicable for
MROs. These plans should be kept up to date and readily available to all concerned.
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Respective functions of the ERC and RCC should be covered in co-ordinated pre-established
plans, and refined as appropriate for an actual incident. These centres must maintain close
contact throughout the SAR event, co-ordinating and keeping each other appraised of significant
plans and developments.
There are other steps the transportation industry could be urged to undertake to improve
preparedness for MROs. The following are some examples:
For major incidents, crisis management for the overall response may also be needed. The
Incident Command System (ICS), one widely used means of meeting this need, works best
with some advance familiarization and exercising within and among the transportation and
emergency response communities. Since SAR and transportation authorities are likely to
encounter use of the ICS within emergency response communities, this Appendix provides
general information for familiarization with ICS.
Incident Commander (IC): the primary person functioning as a part of the incident
command system, usually at or near the scene, responsible for decisions, objectives,
strategies and priorities relating to emergency response;
Incident Command Post (ICP): the location at which primary functions are carried out
for the Incident Command System;
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Incident Command System (ICS): and on-scene emergency management concept that
provides an integrated organizational structure adaptable to the complexity and demands
of an major incident involving multiple missions, response organizations or jurisdiction;
Unified Command (UC): the incident commander role of the incident command system
expanded to include a team of representatives that manages a major incident by
establishing common objectives and strategies and co-operatively directing their
implementation.
The ICS is designed for use when multiple organizations and jurisdictions need to be jointly
involved in a co-ordinated emergency response activity.
While organizations have their respective systems of command and control or co-ordination,
these should be compatible with systems in use by others so that organizations can function
jointly and effectively when necessary. Commonality and similarities among crisis management
systems locally, regionally and internationally foster effective joint efforts.
The ICS does not take control, responsibility or authority away from SAR services; SAR services
remain focused on lifesaving, while the ICS focuses on promoting an effective overall incident
response.
The ICS training, advance co-ordination and liaison will be rewarded by better performance and
success when a crisis situation arises.
The ICS organization can grow or shrink as the situation dictates, and provides a logical process
and progression to achieve results. Its organization should be allowed to grow with increased
demand and shrink when operations decline, both of which require anticipation.
Advantages of the ICS can be lost when organizations develop their own unique and relatively
complex versions of the ICS; it works best when it remains simple, flexible and standardized so
everyone on scene from all organizations understands it.
In its basic form a person is designated as the IC to handle overall co-ordination, including
setting objectives and priorities.
Support functions (sections supported by one or more persons) can be established as needed and
on the scale needed to keep the IC informed and assist in certain areas.
The four support sections in the ICS organization are as follows:
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Planning Section - helps develop action plans, collect and evaluate information, maintain
resource status and arrange to scale up or scale down activities;
Logistics Section - helps provide resources and services needed to support the incident
response, including personnel, transportation, supplies, facilities and equipment; and
An Information Officer - assists the media and others seeking incident information,
ensures the IC has appropriate information available, and helps to provide information to
the public and families of persons in distress;
A Safety Officer - monitors safety conditions and develops measures to ensure safety and
reduce risks; and
Safety
Incident Information
Commander Liaison
The IC usually establishes an Incident Command Post (ICP) as a base for ICS activities. For
particularly demanding incidents, the ICS organization can be expanded. For example, for
operations that are particularly large-scale, sustained or complex, the IC can be augmented by
establishment of an actual or virtual (i.e. without everyone co-located) Unified Command (UC)
populated by operational managers representing the primary response organizations involved. If
the UC is made up of linked independent command posts, a government post and an industry
post for example, ideally there should still be a person from each command post assigned to work
at the other post(s) involved.
For a situation like a major passenger aircraft or ship disaster, a Joint Information Centre (JIC)
should be established, perhaps in association with the Information Officer position, to facilitate
and co-ordinate the vast amount of information that will need to be managed internally and
shared with the public.
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Whether the ICS should be used depends on the duration and complexity of the incident. If it is
used, co-ordination of SAR functions with other functions is usually achieved by assigning a
representative of the SAR agency or of the SMC to the Operations Section of the
ICS organization.
This allows SAR services to be plugged into the ICS and overall operations while still being able
to function with relative independence in accordance with normal SAR procedures. The ICS has
an overall incident focus, while SAR services must remain focused on lifesaving.
A determination should be made as early as possible regarding the person responsible for overall
co-ordination, and how the overall response will be organized and managed. Procedures should
be understood by all and overall response managed to ensure mutual support, effort prioritization,
and optimal use of available resources, and to enhance on-scene safety and effectiveness.
Inter-agency contingency planning should identify who the IC should be for various scenarios.
Typically, the IC will be assigned from the government organization with primary responsibility
for the type of function most prominent in the response to the particular incident. However, with
appropriate access to experts and information from all agencies concerned, a key consideration in
selecting the IC should be familiarity and experience with the IC function, i.e., the IC should be a
person who can best handle the responsibility.
The IC should be someone skilled at managing on-scene operations and should usually be located
at or near the scene. Everyone involved, regardless of rank or status, will normally be in a
support role for the IC, similar to the SMC support structure within an RCC.
The IC function can be transferred as the situation warrants, although such transfers should be
minimized as is the case for transfers of SMC functions during a mission. It is important to
designate an IC early, in contingency plans if possible, and to make a transfer later, as
appropriate, as delay in designating an IC can be quite detrimental.
Except when functions other than SAR are relatively insignificant to the incident response, the IC
should normally be someone other than the SMC. The priority mission will always be lifesaving,
and the SMC should normally remain unencumbered by additional non-SAR duties.
Similarly, the IC's command post should normally be at a location other than in the RCC,
because the RCC needs to remain focused on, and be vigilant and responsive to, its normal SAR
responsibilities in addition to handling SAR aspects of the major incident.”
7 Appendix O
The fourth column should read only “Mandatory”. In the fifth column the
existing text should be replaced by the following “All ships, on voyages to
or from Greenland ports and places of call”.
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The fourth column should read only “Mandatory”. In the fifth column the
existing text should be replaced by the following “All ships of 20 gross
tonnage and more, and fishing vessels, on voyages between Greenland
ports and places of call”.
SECTION 3
2 Glossary
“Mass Rescue Operation (MRO) - search and rescue services characterized by the
need for immediate response to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the
capabilities normally available to search and rescue authorities are inadequate”.
3 Section 1
• Ships at sea may be the only craft near the scene of a distressed aircraft or vessel.
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• Masters of vessels are urged or mandated to send regular reports to the authority
operating a ship reporting system for SAR and other safety related services.
“Amver
• There is no charge for vessels to participate in, nor for RCCs to use, Amver.
• Many land-based providers of communications services worldwide relay ship
reports to AMVER free of charge.
• Any merchant vessel of 1,000 gross tons or more on any voyage of greater than
24 hours is welcome to participate.
• Information voluntarily provided by vessels to AMVER is protected by the
US Coastguard as commercial proprietary data and made available only to
SAR authorities or others specifically authorized by the ship involved.”
- Insert the following text after the section on Aircraft Reporting System
(pages 1-5):
• In the event a mobile facility has reason to suspect that an underwater accident has
occurred, every effort should be made to contact the nearest Rescue Co-ordination
Centre. When accidents occur, survivors may be either on the surface or
entrapped in a submarine resting on the seabed. Generally, medical care
requirements for survivors of an underwater or submarine accident is specialized
and competent medical advice is required.
• Vessels believing they have collided with a submarine, as with a collision with
any vessel, should anticipate a requirement to provide SAR assistance. Further
information on Submarine SAR and its parallel activity, Submarine Escape and
Rescue may be found at the website maintained by the International Submarine
Escape and Rescue Liaison Office.”
4 Section 2
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• During search and rescue missions and exercises it is recommended that the
following prefix call signs be used before the ordinary radio call sign or as a
specific mission call sign:
- Delete present section on Rescue by Aircraft (pages 2-36) replaced by the text, as
follows:
• Seafarers should consider how to recover survivors into their own vessels under
various environmental conditions. Recovery methods include:
□ Rigging pilot ladders, jacob’s ladders or nets, preferably clear of the ship’s
side, with safety lines. If survivors are unable to climb, ladders or nets
may have to be recovered with the survivors secured to them. Where
practicable:
□ Using rafts or boats as lifts, leaving them on the falls if conditions permit;
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□ Rigging a boat rope for boats and survival craft to secure alongside;
• Any lights in use must not be directed towards helicopters operating in the area.
• When the risks involved in recovery operations outweigh the risks of leaving the
survivors in life saving appliances, consider the following actions:
“• Once on board, medical care and welfare of the survivors should be attended to.
Additional assistance should be sought from the SAR authorities as required;
• Medical advice should be sought from the Telemedical Maritime Advice Service,
via the RCC.”
• Survivor information …… ”
_____________
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7735 7611
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
2 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), with a view
to providing basic safety guidance for oceanic voyages by non-regulated craft to reduce those
risks that could lead to loss of life or severe physical injuries to both crew and would-be rescuers,
agreed to the annexed Guidance.
3 Member Governments are invited to bring the annexed Guidance to the attention of all
parties concerned for consideration and action, as appropriate.
***
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I PURPOSE
The purpose of this circular is to provide basic safety guidance for oceanic voyages by
non-regulated craft to reduce those risks that could lead to loss of life or severe physical injuries
to both crew and would-be rescuers, and to reduce the need for extended and expensive
SAR operations. Furthermore, these craft can, during their voyages, cross congested areas and
create a risk for the safety of the traffic in these areas.
1 Type of craft
1.1 The craft should be of suitable construction for the intended voyage, possess adequate
buoyancy and stability and carry appropriate high visibility markings.
2.2 Sufficient life jacket(s) of an approved type for all crew members.
2.6 Sufficient food, water and, if required, fuel for the voyage. (Emergency water making kit
may be an advantage.)
3 Radiocommunications
3.1 The craft should be equipped with adequate communications and distress alerting systems
within the Global Maritime Distress & Safety System, for example:
.1.1 two types of alerting systems, e.g. long-range communications (radio or satellite)
and a satellite EPIRB properly registered; and
.1.2 hand held radios capable of operating on maritime and aeronautical short-range
frequencies.
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4 Voyage planning
4.1 The person in charge of the craft should prepare a voyage plan and leave that plan with a
responsible person ashore together with details of the craft. Normally, the responsible person
ashore will be the primary contact with the craft for normal communications throughout the
voyage. If the responsible person ashore becomes concerned for the safety of the craft, he/she
should contact the appropriate MRCC. The person in charge of the craft should submit a voyage
plan to the Maritime Administration at the port of departure, if required by that Maritime
Administration.
5 Crew gear
5.1 Suitable clothing with high visibility markings and survival equipment appropriate for the
voyage should be provided.
6 Crew training
6.1 All members of the crew should have satisfactorily completed appropriate:
.1.1 training for the intended voyage, e.g. navigation and communications with
appropriate certification where necessary;
7.2 If the craft does depart, then the Maritime Administration should ensure that the
MRCC(s) responsible for the SAR Region(s) through which the craft is expected to pass are
made aware of the particular voyage.
IV DETAILED GUIDANCE
______________
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INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR E
Telephone: 020 7587 3152
Fax: 020 7587 3210
IMO
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), following the
recommendations made by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment at its forty-eighth
session, approved guidance concerning shipboard equipment, fittings and supporting hull structures
associated with towing and mooring, as set out in the annex, with a view to ensuring a uniform
approach towards the application of the provisions of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-8, which is expected
to become effective on 1 January 2007.
2 Member Governments are invited to use the annexed guidance when applying SOLAS
regulation II-1/3-8, and to bring it to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
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1 Application
1.2 This circular is intended to provide standards for the design and construction of shipboard
fittings and supporting hull structures associated with towing and mooring, which Administrations
are recommended to implement. The provisions of this guidance do not require tow lines nor
mandate standards for mooring lines onboard the ship.
1.3 Equipment that is used for both towing and mooring should be in accordance with sections 3
and 4.
2 Definitions
2.1 Shipboard fittings mean bollards and bitts, fairleads, stand rollers and chocks used for the
normal mooring of the ship and similar components used for the normal towing of the ship. Other
components such as capstans, winches, etc. are not covered by this guidance. Any weld, bolt or
other fastening connecting the shipboard fitting to the supporting hull structure is part of the
shipboard fitting and subject to any industry standard applicable to such fitting.
2.2 Supporting hull structure means that part of the ship structure on/in which the shipboard
fitting is placed and which is directly submitted to the forces exerted on the shipboard fitting. The
hull structure supporting capstans, winches, etc. used for the normal towing and mooring operations
mentioned above should also be subject to this guidance.
2.3 Industry standard means international or national standards which are recognized in the
country where the ship is built, subject to the approval of the Administration.
3 Towing fittings
3.1 Strength
The strength of shipboard fittings used for normal towing operations and their supporting hull
structures should comply with the provisions of 3.2 to 3.6.
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3.2 Arrangements
Shipboard fittings for towing should be located on longitudinals, beams and/or girders, which are
part of the deck construction so as to facilitate efficient distribution of the towing load. Other
equivalent arrangements may be accepted (for Panama chocks, etc.).
3.3.1 The design load used for normal towing operations (e.g. harbour/manoeuvring) should be
1.25 times the intended maximum towing load (e.g. static bollard pull) as indicated on the towing
and mooring arrangements plan. The design load should be applied through the tow line according
to the arrangement shown on the towing and mooring arrangements plan.
3.3.2 For other towage service (e.g. escort), the design load used for each fitting should be the
nominal breaking strength of the tow line defined in table 1 based on the equipment number (EN)
described in the appendix. The design load should be applied through the tow line according to the
arrangement shown on the towing and mooring arrangements plan.
3.3.3 The method of application of the design load to the fittings and supporting hull structure
should be taken into account such that the total load need not be more than twice the design load
specified in 3.3.1 or 3.3.2, i.e. no more than one turn of one line (see figure below).
The selection of shipboard fittings should be made by the shipyard in accordance with industry
standards (e.g. ISO 3913:1977 Shipbuilding-Welded steel bollards) accepted by the Administration.
When the shipboard fitting is not selected from an accepted industry standard, the design load used
to assess its strength and its attachment to the ship should be in accordance with 3.3 above.
Arrangement
3.5.1 The arrangement of the reinforced members (carling) beneath shipboard fittings should
consider any variation of direction (laterally and vertically) of the towing forces (which should be
not less than the design load as per 3.3) acting through the arrangement of connection to the
shipboard fittings.
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3.5.2 The acting point of the towing force on shipboard fittings should be taken at the attachment
point of a towing line or at a change in its direction.
Allowable stresses
3.5.3 Allowable bending stress: 100% of the specified yield point for the material used; allowable
shearing stress: 60% of the specified yield point for the material used; no stress concentration factors
being taken into account.
3.6.1 The SWL used for normal towing operations (harbour/manoeuvring) should not exceed 80%
of the design load as given in 3.3.1 and the SWL used for other towing operations (e.g. escort)
should not exceed the design load as given in 3.3.2. For fittings used for both harbour and escort
purposes, the greater of the design loads of 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 should be used.
3.6.2 The SWL of each shipboard fitting should be marked (by weld bead or equivalent) on the
deck fittings used for towing.
3.6.3 The above provisions on SWL apply for a single post basis (no more than one turn of
one line).
3.6.4 The towing and mooring arrangements plan described in section 5 should define the method
of use of towing lines.
4 Mooring fittings
4.1 Strength
The strength of shipboard fittings used for mooring operations and their supporting hull structures
should comply with the provisions of 4.2 to 4.6.
4.2 Arrangements
Shipboard fittings for mooring should be located on longitudinals, beams and/or girders, which are
part of the deck construction so as to facilitate efficient distribution of the mooring load. Other
equivalent arrangements may be accepted (for Panama chocks, etc.).
4.3.1 The design load applied to shipboard fittings and supporting hull structures should be
1.25 times the breaking strength of the mooring line provided in accordance with table 1 based on
the equipment number (EN) described in the appendix. The design load should be applied through
the mooring line according to the arrangement shown on the towing and mooring arrangements plan.
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4.3.2 The design load applied to supporting hull structures for winches, etc. should be 1.25 times
the breaking strength of the mooring line according to 4.3.1 above and, for capstans, 1.25 times the
maximum hauling-in force. The design load should be applied through the mooring line according to
the arrangement shown on the towing and mooring arrangements plan.
4.3.3 The method of application of the design load to the fittings and supporting hull structure
should be taken into account such that the total load need not be more than twice the design load
specified in 4.3.1, i.e. no more than one turn of one line.
The selection of shipboard fittings should be made by the shipyard in accordance with industry
standards (e.g. ISO 3913:1977 Shipbuilding-Welded steel bollards) accepted by the Administration.
When the shipboard fitting is not selected from an accepted industry standard, the fittings should be
equivalent to a recognized industry standard in compliance with the design load as per 4.3.
Arrangement
4.5.1 The arrangement of the reinforced members (carling) beneath shipboard fittings should
consider any variation of direction (laterally and vertically) of the mooring forces (which should be
not less than the design load given in 4.3) acting through the arrangement of connection to the
shipboard fittings.
4.5.2 The acting point of the mooring force on shipboard fittings should be taken at the attachment
point of a mooring line or at a change in its direction.
Allowable stresses
4.5.3 Allowable bending stress: 100% of the specified yield point for the material used; allowable
shearing stress: 60% of the specified yield point for the material used; no stress concentration factors
being taken into account.
4.6.1 The SWL should not exceed 80% of the design load given in 4.3.
4.6.2 The SWL of each shipboard fitting should be marked (by weld bead or equivalent) on the
deck fittings used for mooring.
4.6.3 The above provisions on SWL apply for a single post basis (no more than one turn of
one line).
4.6.4 The towing and mooring arrangements plan described in section 5 should define the method
of use of mooring lines.
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5.1 The SWL for the intended use for each shipboard fitting should be noted in the towing and
mooring arrangements plan available on board for the guidance of the Master.
5.2 Information provided on the plan should include in respect of each shipboard fitting:
.2 fitting type;
.3 SWL;
.5 method of applying load of towing or mooring line including limiting fleet angles.
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Table 1
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APPENDIX
EQUIPMENT NUMBER
EN = ∆ 2/3 + 2.0hB + A
10
where:
h = effective height, in metres, from the Summer Load Waterline to the top of the
uppermost house; for the lowest tier “h” should be measured at centreline from the
upper deck or from a notional deck line where there is local discontinuity in the
upper deck
h = a + Σhi
where:
A = area, in square metres, in profile view, of the hull, superstructures and houses above
the Summer Load Waterline which are within the equipment length of the ship and
also have a breadth greater than B/4
NOTES
1 When calculating h, sheer and trim should be ignored, i.e. h is the sum of freeboard
amidships plus the height (at centreline) of each tier of houses having a breadth greater
than B/4.
2 If a house having a breadth greater than B/4 is above a house with a breadth of B/4 or less,
then the wide house should be included but the narrow house ignored.
3 Screens or bulwarks 1.5 m or more in height should be regarded as parts of houses when
determining h and A. The height of the hatch coamings and that of any deck cargo, such as
containers, may be disregarded when determining h and A. With regard to determining A,
when a bulwark is more than 1.5 m high, the area shown below as A2 should be included
in A.
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4 The equipment length of the ships is the length between perpendiculars but should not be
less than 96% nor greater than 97% of the extreme length on the Summer Waterline
(measured from the forward end of the waterline).
__________
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